§ MR. LABOUCHERErose to call attention to the explanations of the Government in regard to the Soudan expedition. With regard to the reasons alleged for the expedition, he said the answers of the Under Secretary were so diplomatic that he really could not understand the position of Lord Cromer in the matter. He asked the right hon. 488 Gentleman specifically to tell the House whether the expedition was in consequence of the advice of Lord Cromer or against his advice. It was a most astounding doctrine to lay down, when the Government was asked what was the opinion of Lord Cromer, that it was inexpedient and improper to tell the House what was the opinion of any particular adviser. The thing turned very much upon what Lord Cromer did advise, he being the adviser of the Government in Egypt. Again, as to the reason advanced, that the expedition was intended partly for the relief of Kassala, he wished to know why in the name of common sense the expedition did not proceed by Suakim rather than by Wady Haifa, 700 miles away. He pointed out that when it was proposed to go to the relief of Italy, Signor Crispi was the Italian Minister, and a Jingo of the Jingoes, more Jingo even than the Colonial Secretary. But Signor Crispi had ceased to be a Minister and had been replaced by the Marquess di Rudini, who occupied the same position as if, in regard to Egypt, the right hon. Member for the Montrose burghs were to replace Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister. The Marquess di Rudini had stated that there was no Protectorate at all in Abyssinia, and that though Italy held Kassala, it did not belong to Italy, but was held simply with a pledge to give it back to Egypt should Egypt re-acquire her sway in the Soudan. The Under Secretary told the House that the expedition was only going a hundred miles or so to another outpost. So convinced was the Leader of the Opposition that this expedition merely meant a little raid into the Soudan with the view of occupying this outpost, and nothing more, that he did not vote on that occasion. But on the Debate on the Vote on Account the Colonial Secretary told the House that we were to go as far as we did not meet with resistance—our advance was to be limited by the resistance offered; and so pleased was the Under Secretary with this military and strategical plan of the right hon. Gentleman, that on Saturday, at Southport, he compared the Colonial Secretary to Alexander the Great. [Laughter.] At the end of the Debate the Leader of the House said we meant to go as far as we could, and where we went we intended to stay. But still the 489 House understood that the intention of the expedition was to defend the frontier by taking some military outpost in the Soudan. In the newspapers, however, it appeared that the Sultan sent to the Khedive asking what was going on in Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman said that the answer of the Khedive to the Sultan was that we were making an expedition because this was an opportune moment for getting back Dongola. This threw a new light on the whole affair, ft was understood that there was no intention to go to Dongola, and when asked to explain the statement of the Khedive, the Under Secretary said that the House must only take its information from Ministers. But it was exceedingly difficult to get any information as to the expedition. He asked the right hon. Gentleman to say, specifically, whether he repudiated this statement by the Khedive and affirmed it to be untrue, or whether he recognised it as a statement in conformity with the, intentions of the Government, and whether it was the intention of the Government to go to Dongola. The right hon. Gentleman, in his speech at Southport, on Saturday, threw a new light on everything connected with this expedition. He suggested that we were going to undertake it because in Africa there were light-coloured and dark-coloured people, and because the latter must be taught that it was hopeless to contend against the former. This doctrine greatly enlarged our obligations, and, if acted upon, would, in the end, make us a species of general police in Africa in the interests of the white population. If we were to be defeated in the Soudan he did not believe that the white population of any other country would come to our aid. The right hon. Gentleman repeated at Southport that one object of the expedition was to defend the frontier against some possible raid on the part of the Soudanese into Egypt. But could the right hon. Gentleman refer to a single military man who said that the frontier of Egypt to the south was unsafe, and that we were rendering it safer by advancing a certain distance into the Soudan. The right hon. Gentleman the; Under Secretary himself gave a new explanation in his speech at Southport of the object and intention of the expedition. 490 He said it was a preliminary to a permanent recovery by Egypt of a small portion of her old provinces, as a step to the recovery of the whole. This country was a desert with a few oases in. it which were inhabited by fierce, nomadic tribes, and was it to be supposed that they would allow one of their little oases to be taken after another without a struggle. Such a war as this would last for years. It was the case when it was announced that we were going to hold Suakim. For two years we were persistently attacked by the Soudanese, who possibly thought that if we kept Suakim we should eventually take Berber, and go to Khartoum; and if the scheme of the new Alexander the Great, the Secretary for the Colonies, was carried out, it would cost this country a great deal both in blood and money. He read in The Times that morning that there was a feeling of perfect horror in Cairo at what we were doing. It was stated that the move towards Dongola, being made in accord with England, was naturally regarded as only the first step in a far more important advance intended to crush the Khalifa's tyranny, a task for which the Egyptian Army alone was not considered strong enough. He agreed with that. He thought it was very probable that British troops would have to be sent out, and he could not help thinking the Government were perfectly aware of that, though they did not like to say so at once. They wanted to lead up to it step by step. We should first hear that the Egyptian troops had advanced, and then that English troops were to follow. There must, in all human probability, be an advance of British troops. The right hon. Gentleman, alluding to Foreign Powers and their views regarding this expedition, said that they had Germany now sustaining their policy. Yes, but some months ago they heard of the fitting out of a flying squadron against Germany. They were then complaining of Germany's unfriendly attitude towards them in South Africa, and now they met that by getting Germany to come forward and outvote France in Northern Africa. He asked was there ever such a tangle as that which right hon. Gentlemen on the Treasury Bench had got into regarding that expedition? The Under Secretary of State admitted that France did not approve of their 491 action, but hoped when she understood it better she would approve of it. He himself saw no sign of France approving or being likely to do so. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that their attitude towards France for six months was one of considerable conciliation. What had become of that continuity which was the pride and boast of the Government? They conciliated France for six months. They did that when Germany became a little troublesome, and now they conciliated Germany when France became a little troublesome. That was playing one off against the other, and he could conceive of no policy more likely to unite the two countries one with the other against this country. Was it really so necessary to undertake this expedition to the Soudan at the present moment? Was it so necessary to take the Soudan and place it under Egyptian rule that, in order to do this, after having tried to conciliate France, and having succeeded in conciliating her for six months, they must suddenly break with her and put themselves in the worst possible relations with that country? He desired to know something about the Caisse de la Dette. In the Caisse de la Dette there were certain funds which could be withdrawn with the consent of the Commissioners. The question arose whether the funds could be dealt with with the consent only of all the Commissioners, or by merely a majority? He gathered that it had been decided by a majority that the funds might be withdrawn for this expedition. But how was that majority arrived at, and how was it decided that it was to be a majority and not unanimously? Why, by the majority itself, and naturally the minority appealed against this to the international tribunal. He thought it would have been reasonable to have waited for the decision of the international tribunal before taking the money, but they at once took it out. Supposing the international tribunal decided against this country, who was going to pay the money back? Were they? The funds in the Caisse de la Dette were limited, and, in all probability, would not be sufficient for the expedition. Suppose they were not? How were they going to get the further money? Were they going to pay it themselves? These were 492 questions to which they ought to have an answer before they broke up for the holidays. Really, their position in regard to this matter was most unsatisfactory. A few days ago he asked the Under Secretary whether the application to the divers countries to be allowed to withdraw the money from the Caisse de la Dette was made simultaneously, and the right hon. Gentleman said it was. But so far as he could gather from The Times and other newspapers, it seemed to be clearly understood that Germany was sounded beforehand.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, that then he understood from the right hon. Gentleman that Her Majesty's Government had not the most distant idea whether Germany would be in favour of the expedition or not. In all this he thought they ought really to remember, in their relations with Europe, that they had given certain pledges in regard to Egypt. Every Minister he could remember had solemnly declared that their object was to withdraw as soon as they possibly could from Egypt because their continuous occupation, of it was a continuous danger to this country, and that they wished to establish a neutrality, such as existed in Belgium, in Egypt, in order to enable them to withdraw from it. If they were pledged to withdraw, did any hon. Gentleman really think that they would advance that cause by making this expedition into the Soudan, and by attempting to reconquer a portion of the Soudan and to hand it over to Egypt. If they really did add the Soudan to the existing Egyptian provinces, they must unquestionably put an end to their withdrawal for many a day. He thought that Europe was of opinion that they were going to the Soudan in order to find some plea for remaining in Egypt, and not only that, but that they were going there with the intention of not only remaining in Egypt, but in the Soudan. It was all very well their talking about recovering the Soudan for Egypt, but it must be remembered that, so long as they were in Egypt, exercising the same paramount, real, absolute power that they did at the present time, if they added the Soudan to Egypt, it was we who went to the Soudan, and it was we who practically annexed the 493 Soudan—it was not Egypt that did so. It might be that that was not the intention of the Government. He only said it looked very much like it, and he was not at all surprised that the European Powers felt that this was very likely the object of the Government. Europe, it must be remembered, was divided at the present time into two camps. On the one side they had the Triple Alliance, and on the other was the Dual Alliance. The Triple Alliance, in this question of the withdrawal of the money voted with them, but did they vote on the merits of the question? No. They voted with them because they wanted to gain favour with them. Why did they want to gain favour with them? In order that they, in their turn, might be able to get something out of them. When they had these two great hostile camps in Europe, when they got a vote carried by one of these hostile camps in opposition to the other one, they were not only dragged into this dispute that existed in Europe, and which would probably, one of these days lead to war, but they were obliged to take sides. He thought that was a most dangerous thing. They really knew absolutely nothing of what was going on, and he wanted to know why they were not to be taken into the confidence of Her Majesty's Ministers with regard to this matter. Were they really not to be told the genuine reason why this expedition had been entered upon? Were they to be put off with one reason one day and one reason another, each contradicting the other t Were the Government afraid of the European Powers knowing what took place? Were they of the Dervishes? No, they were not. They were afraid of public opinion in this country. He was not raising the question of the wisdom of the expedition, but he did say that they were the English Parliament, the great council of the nation, and that they had to express tacitly or actively their approval or otherwise of such an important movement as the Government had now undertaken. But how could they do that unless they had the whole of the facts before them. His complaint was that the Government had not given the House the fair and full facts of the case, and before they separated for the holidays he hoped the Government would be good enough to frankly tell them 494 everything they possibly could in connection with the expedition.
§ THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURYsaid, he could not sufficiently admire the ardent patriotism which had induced the hon. Gentleman, at the hour of three in the morning, when he was sure to be imperfectly reported, to give a re-hash of all the speeches which had been made by Ministers on the question of Egypt for some time past. The hon. Gentleman had said that he had discovered in the statements of Ministers a great variety of contradictory views. He had listened with curiosity to hear in what these contradictions consisted, but he did not give one single instance showing that the several Members of the Government who had addressed the House on the subject had varied by one hair's breadth in the accounts they had given of the objects and purposes and motives for which the expedition had been undertaken. Then he put a question as to whether the majority of the Caisse could or could not decide how the funds should be disposed. The Government thought a majority could decide in this matter, and they were assured that that would be the ultimate verdict. As regarded the situation he could assure the House and the hon. Gentleman that the Government were not more involved in European arrangements in Treaties now than they were before the expedition was undertaken. Nothing they had done as far as they were aware would involve the country in any future complications with other Powers, and what, else could the hon. Gentleman want?
§ MR. LABOUCHEREWhat about Lord Cromer?
§ THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURYsaid the questions regarding Lord Cromer had already been answered by his right hon. Friend. If the hon. Gentleman supposed, with regard either to Egypt or any other question, the Government were going to lay on the Table of the House all the details and all the heads of the discussions which had taken place between the Government and their advisers, he was greatly mistaken. On such principles no Government could possibly be carried on, and they, in this respect, were merely following the precedents which all other Governments had set. The statement 495 made by his right hon. Friend in regard to Lord Cromer both before and after the defeat of the Italians in Abyssinia amply covered all the necessities of the case. He hoped he had now sufficiently dealt with the hon. Member's speech, and that the hon. Member might be able to depart for his holiday fully satisfied with his criticism of the action the Government had taken. [Cheers.]
§ MR. EDWARD MORTON (Devonport)felt we were at this moment in a situation which appeared to him as grave as any position he, in his short experience of politics, had known. In form, the assurance just given by the right hon. Gentleman seemed as satisfactory as it could be, but he could not help recalling to mind the fact that while to-day they were to adjourn for the Easter holiday, there was an occasion just 18 years ago when then, as now, there was a Jingo Government in office, and when then, as now, Lord Salisbury was Foreign Secretary. On the 16th of April, the date of the adjournment for the Easter holidays, a question was asked under the apprehension that the Government was engaged in foreign complications that might land us in a war with Russia. Sir Stafford Northcote, the then Leader of the House, said:—
At this moment there is nothing in our policy at all different from that which we have respectively declared to this House. There is no change in the views we have expressed in the Debate which occurred only a week ago.The right hon. Gentleman then went on to say that:—Nothing in the situation had altered for the worse since the time we last had communication with Parliament on the subject, and we say with the most perfect confidence we see no reason whatever to apprehend any inconvenience from the rising of Parliament for the time mentioned.That was the sort of declaration made by the right hon. Gentleman, but what happened? Within a week of Sir Stafford Northcote making that speech, the people of this country were alarmed by the news that Indian troops had been ordered to Malta. [Ministerial cheers.] Was there no change in the policy of the Government? Did the ordering of Indian troops to Malta mean no change in the policy of the Government from 496 what was known by the House at the time Sir Stafford Northcote made his speech? It was on the face of it absurd to suggest such a thing. It meant such a change as was denounced at the time by two of the most prominent Members of the present Government, namely, the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Colonial Secretary. The present Leader of the House used the same argument that Sir Stafford Northcote used 18 years ago. Sir Stafford Northcote was the soul of honour, and the only inference to be drawn from his words was that there was in the Cabinet an inner Cabinet. [Loud cries of ''Order!"] He should then, he said, speak to his own side. The Government were now engaged in a most dangerous project. They were threatened with many complications. [Ironical cheers.] He did not deny that they should be able to meet those threatened complications, but it was the maddest folly with a hostile America—[''No!'']—and Germany, and—what they had always to reckon with in recent years—a hostile France, to plunge into the desert involving more serious difficulties still. [Uproar.] There was a phrase which had been generally used which sounded now somewhat ridiculous—"splendid isolation.'' If they were free from dangerous alliances and complications that might be all very well, but the solidarity of the British Empire was worth vastly more than any alliance. He agreed with regard to Italy that the worst service they could render her was to support her in her policy. Their policy in the Soudan was little short of iniquitous, and he was sure they would realise that when they woke up in the morning —[laughter]—it was little short of madness.