CHITRAL.

HC Deb 03 September 1895 vol 36 cc1582-610

*SIR HENRY FOWLER (Wolverhampton) rose to call attention to the decision recently arrived at by Her Majesty's Government as to the occupation of Chitral. He said: I am sorry that I have to intervene at the present period of the Session with reference to the policy of the late Government and of the present Government in connection with recent events at Chitral. But it would not have been practicable to discuss this question at an earlier date. It would not have been practicable on the Address, for the obvious reason that, in the absence of the papers which have only been laid upon the Table in the course of the last few days, I neither could have defended the policy of the late Government nor ventured upon any criticism of the action of the present Government. Although we must regret that so important a Debate as this should take place at so late a period of the Session, yet, owing to no fault of the late or the present Government, could that Debate have taken place at an earlier date. It will be necessary for me to state very briefly the past relations of Chitral and of British India, not only to correct certain misconceptions which have found expression in this House and in the Press—I refer specially to a statement of the First Lord of the Treasury, who said at the commencement of the Session that Chitral was within and not without the boundaries of the Indian Empire, an allegation which I shall have to traverse in a very few minutes—but it is also necessary to state the history of those relations in order that we may understand the position of affairs that led to the recent expedition, and the reasons which induced the late Government to adopt the policy to which the Government objects. In the first place, I must remind the House that the word "Chitral" is used in two senses. There is Chitral the State and there is Chitral the capital of that State, and that causes some confusion from time to time, both in reading the papers which have been presented and in discussing these affairs. The State of Chitral is, speaking roughly, considerably larger than Wales. It occupies something like 9,000 square miles. It lies in the midst of a vast mountainous region, which is closed in for six or eight months in the year by inaccessible and impassable mountains. It contains a population of between 80,000 and 100,000, and its extreme length at one point is upwards of 200 miles. Now, the capital of this State, the fort of Chitral, which was the scene of the splendid defence which caused the admiration of all Englishmen—[Cheers]—is situated, together with some half-a-dozen scattered villages, in a narrow valley about one mile and a half broad and six miles long, containing a population, all told, of about 4,000. Our connection with the State arose through our connection with the State of Kashmir. It is a very shadowy connection, which is very difficult to trace till we get within very recent times. At all events, in 1846 the State of Kashmir passed into British hands. Part of the arrangements then made was the sale by the British Government, to the Maharajah of Kashmir, of Kashmir and all its adjacent territory, and a sum was paid by him to the East India Company of £750,000. For 30 years there was very little intercourse between this country and Kashmir, and little intercourse between Kashmir and Chitral. The old ruler of Chitral, Aman-ul-Mulk, who ruled it for 30 years, and whose death was the commencement of much of the recent trouble, was always fighting for his independence against the Ameer of Afghanistan on the one side and against the Maharajah of Kashmir on the other. But in 1876, as the House will see from the dispatches in the Blue-book, proposals were made to Lord Lytton with reference to the reconstruction of the arrangements then existing between the Indian Government and the Government of Kashmir, and also with reference to the relations between Kashmir and Chitral. In the correspondence it will be found that Lord Lytton, in reporting to the Secretary of State the interviews which had taken place with reference to these transactions, stated that one of the terms of the negotiations between himself and the Maharajah of Kashmir was that an English officer should be appointed to reside permanently in Gilghit for the purpose of obtaining information as to the progress of events beyond the Kashmir frontier. The House has before it the various stages of these negotiations. The result amounts to this—that a Treaty was concluded between the British Government and Kashmir, and that a Treaty was also concluded between Kashmir and Chitral, under which Chitral submitted to the suzerainty of Kashmir in exchange for a subsidy. That is the beginning of the influence that Kashmir had over Chitral. The experiment was tried of the presence of a resident in Gilghit. That is the extreme outpost of our frontier in Western India, and it lies on the north-eastern frontier of Kashmir. It is inaccessible for a great portion of the year, and was selected as the most convenient outpost on our western frontier in that part of India. Major Biddulph was the first Agent who went to Gilghit, and I think he went either in 1877 or 1878. The arrangement was very unsatisfactory, and in December, 1880, the Government of India submitted to the notice of the then Secretary of State, Lord Hartington, the very unfortunate state of things which had arisen in that neighbourhood. In July, 1881, the Government of India determined to discontinue this Agent at Gilghit. In their dispatch to the Home Government they explained the difficulties that had arisen and that there had been an attempt to take Gilghit by force, and they said:— Under these circumstances it appeared to us that the British Agency at Gilghit could only be kept up at the expense of embarrassment and anxieties altogether disproportionate to the advantages which could be expected to result from its maintenance. We therefore decided to withdraw it. In the correspondence attention was also drawn to the request which the Mehtar or ruler of Chitral had made that he might enter into direct alliance with the British Government. Lord Hartington approved of the decision at which the Indian Government had arrived, pointing out that the appointment of an Agent at Gilghit appeared from the first to have been distasteful to the Maharajah of Kashmir and had failed to realise the expectations with which it was made in 1877. He added, however, that he realised the importance of keeping a watch upon events on that part of the frontier, and it was clearly understood, both by the English Government and the Indian Government, that the action taken was liable to reconsideration if either Government should think fit to reverse it. From that time until 1885 there was no question of a British Resident at Gilghit, but in that year Sir William Lockhart was sent on a general Mission to the north-west of Kashmir, and he made a very elaborate and interesting report upon the results of that Mission. That report could easily have been condensed, and its most interesting features might have been embodied in this Blue-book with great advantage. I cannot but regret the meagreness of the information supplied in the Blue-book, for the insufficiency of the information places the House at a disadvantage in approaching the consideration of the action of the late Government and of the present Government. It would have been well to have had before us the actual reports and opinions of the various distinguished officers of the Indian Government who have been mixed up from time to time in these affairs. Well, Colonel Lockhart, as he was then, after he had described the physical aspects both of Gilghit and Chitral, stated that in his opinion the acquisition of Gilghit would insure the safety of the Hindu-kush. He said the only danger to be anticipated on the Hindu-kush frontier could be met if the Indian Government were to acquire Gilghit. The House will see that, in the whole course of this matter, the prime danger has always been the danger which might arise on the Hindu-kush, That danger, no doubt, was present to Lord Lytton's mind in 1876, and was present to Lord Dufferin's mind in 1885. It was in reference to that a special Mission was sent, and the result of that inquiry was the deliberate opinion expressed by Colonel Lockhart that that danger would be met if the British Government acquired Gilghit, and he suggested the establishment of an Agency there. The particulars of his proposals are to be found on page 7 of the Blue-book:— Having very fully considered the matter, we decided in the autumn of 1887 that some measures ought to be taken to effect our object without much further delay. Colonel Lockhart, who visited the country in 1885, had submitted, in 1886, proposals for holding it, but these proposals seemed to us to involve unnecessarily large expenditure. We therefore sent up an officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department, Captain Durand, with orders to work out a plan on a more moderate scale. The idea was to establish in Gilghit an English Agency backed by a sufficient number of the reorganised troops which Kashmir would furnish under the scheme for the utilisation of the native armies. The number of English officers was to be as small as possible, and the expenditure to be cut down to the lowest limit. The objects in view were the watching and control of the country lying to the south of the Hindu-kush, and the organisation of a force which would be able in time of trouble to prevent any coup de main by a small body of troops acting across the passes. Captain Durand spent the summer in visiting Chitral and other points of interest, and was very well received. His proposals were briefly that the British Agency at Gilghit should consist of four officers—namely, the officer in charge, two junior officers of infantry and artillery, and a doctor. The force would consist of 1,200 regular infantry, 100 garrison artillery, a battery of screw guns, and 500 irregular troops. This force would be under the control of the English officer in charge, not of the Kashmir Governor. The telegraph line would be completed to Gilghit and roads opened. Certain increased subsidies would be granted to the neighbouring chiefs; the Mehtar of Chitral would be presented with a battery of guns and 1,000 sniders, and in course of time a considerable force of Chitralis would be organised and armed. The Indian Government, however, were of opinion that these proposals might be somewhat modified, but I need not trouble the House with the modifications suggested by them. In the dispatch from which I am quoting we have the first mention in any official paper of what has now become a very vital question in the consideration of our situation in that part of the world, viz., the making of a road from Peshawar, via Dir, to Chitral. It is not easy to overcome the fears and prejudices of the people of Swat and Bajaur with regard to this point; but we have some reason to hope that, in the course of time, we may succeed in doing so. The Khans of Dir and Jandol, who command the greater part of the road, both seem likely in the end to prove tractable, and even now a regular postal road could be established. The proposals thus made were approved of by Lord Cross in 1889. He added that the opening of a direct route to Chitral was an important feature in connection with the Scheme, and that he trusted that the tribes whose country would be traversed would be induced to co-operate in the execution of the work. The Scheme was carried out and an Agency was established. The first Agent was Lieutenant-Colonel Durand, and he seems to have gone there somewhere in the middle of 1889. The Indian Government gave him very full instructions. The general lines on which he was to proceed were fully set out. He was instructed to go to Chitral and set on foot the new arrangement. Lieutenant-Colonel Durand went, and in 1889 we have his Report, to which I draw the attention of the House. The House will remember that one of the conditions to which the Government attached importance was the opening up of this road from Peshawar to Chitral. Captain Durand says, with reference to the conduct of the Mehtar of Chitral:— As to the first stipulation, it is more than doubtful if he is sincere in his professions. He has undoubtedly written to the Chiefs whose territories lie between our borders and those of Chitral, urging them to comply with the wishes of the Government, but, at the same time, he has sent verbal messages advising them to object to the road being open to the passage of troops. That, I believe, has been the policy all the way through, that, I believe, will be the policy in the future, and I believe that one of the sources of the greatest danger in reference to this route is the deep-rooted and insurmountable objection of the tribes and people who live in that locality to the construction of this road—not only the residents of Chitral, but the residents in the country through which the road would have to pass if ever it was made. Well, the Mehtar expressed his willingness to do everything that the Government asked him to do in connection with the construction of this road, while privately he was using his influence, and very successfully, with the Chiefs to prevent it. The House will remember that there was no proposal at that time for any Resident in Chitral, and no proposal for a Resident outside Gilghit. The Resident at Gilghit was to visit Chitral from time to time, but I repeat that up to that time there was no proposal to put any one in residence at Chitral. In 1891 the old Mehtar applied for an increased subsidy. He wanted his Rx. 6,000 turned into Rx. 12,000. The Government of India recommended that the subsidy should be doubled, and they also made certain other recommendations in his favour, and in accordance with his demands; but they said that the allowance should be made contingent on good behaviour and on the condition that the Mehtar and his son accepted the advice of the British Agent or his deputy on all matters. It was also a condition of the grant that he should consent to the permanent residence of a British officer in his country. Now, if that country was inside the British frontier, there would have been no necessity to apply to the Mehtar for his consent, and no necessity to make any bargain whatever with him. At that moment Chitral was absolutely independent, and we had no right to put a Resident there without the consent of the Mehtar. These terms were agreed upon, and he agreed, of course, to this Resident, and now we come to the conditions under which this Residency was formed. The first important document on this point is dated October 19, 1892, which is a very important Dispatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State. I am again at a disadvantage in quoting this Dispatch, because it has been freely "Bowdlerised." There is one omission from it to which I should like to call the attention of the noble Lord the Secretary of State. I do not expect him to answer me now, but it is a question on which he should consult the permanent authorities at the India Office and have some well-understood rule laid down. As the House knows, when the Indian Government considers any question every Member of that Government has a right to record his dissent from the Dispatch which is sent to England. That right is given by virtue of an Act of Parliament, and that dissent is bound to be submitted to the Secretary of State. It seems to me that when the Secretary of State lays a Dispatch no the Table of this House to which Dispatch there were dissents those dissents should accompany the Dispatch, so that the House should be in a position to know whether the Dispatch was or was not unanimous, and what were the reasons which induced certain Members of the Indian Government to dissent from it. ["Hear, hear!"] My right hon. Friend the Member for the Forest of Dean attached some importance to the apparent unanimity on the Indian Council on this question, but I am not making a statement which will be disputed—in fact, I shall prove it by subsequent statements in a later Dispatch—when I say that this is not a unanimous Dispatch and that there were very important and very serious dissents from it. The House has got to take Dispatches as they find them. We have lately had occasion—

MR. RADCLIFFE COOKE (Hereford)

, interrupting, said: I rise to order, Sir. I observe an hon. Member below the Gangway reading his correspondence in the House. I desire to ask whether such a proceeding is in order?

* MR. SPEAKER

It is against the Rules of the House to bring private correspondence into the House, and read it there.

* SIR H. FOWLER,

continuing, proceeded to read from the Dispatch as follows:— We have lately had occasion to consider further the question of our future policy in Gilghit and the surrounding States and the strength at which it would be necessary to maintain the British Agency in order to carry out that policy effectively. The proposals of Colonel Durand and the Resident in Kashmir on those points have been before us for some months, and we have had the advantage of discussing them with Colonel Durand. The conclusion to which we have come is that it will not be necessary to make any increase in the number of troops in the Gilghit Agency, either British or Kashmir. We have relieved the 200 Goorkhas by 205 Sikhs, and we have sent up a small detachment of sappers, but, on the other hand, we have withdrawn the mountain guns sent up last year. I quote that as showing that the Government of India—that was at the time when Lord Lansdowne was Viceroy—were of opinion that the object was to watch any proceedings on the Hindu-Kush. The difficulty of supplying the troops at Gilghit was so great that it was necessary to keep the force down to the lowest possible point. The Government of India also proposed an increase of two additional political officers, an addition to the number of military officers, and, no doubt, although it does not appear, I think, in these extracts, one was placed at Chitral. It was our duty, it was stated, to avoid as far as possible from entangling themselves in the disputes of the natives. The Secretary of State approved of this proposal; but there is a letter addressed by the Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Kashmir which, I think, more fully explains the policy of the Government than that developed in their Dispatch. That Dispatch is as follows:— I am directed to address you on the subject of our future policy in Gilghit and the surrounding States. You were informed that the Government of India had no intention of pushing the project for the construction of a road through the territory occupied by the Indus Valley tribes. It was also pointed out to you that no action should be taken likely to lead to a collision with the Chilasi tribes, and that their headmen should be treated in a conciliatory manner. It will be your duty to inform the British Agent in Gilghit of the instructions you have thus received, and to impress upon him and the officers of the Agency the necessity of acting strictly in accordance with them. The Government of India have now had under their consideration the strength of the force which should be maintained for the future in the neighbourhood of Gilghit. The force in question is obviously intended for a twofold purpose. It is intended, in the first place, as an obstacle in the way of a Russian advance against Gilghit through the passes of the Hindu-Kush; and, in the second, to watch the tribesmen of Hunza and Nagar and the adjoining States. In regard to the second object, it is to be hoped that the effect produced upon the surrounding tribes by the successful operations against Hunza and Nagar will for some time to come render them unlikely to cause trouble. I am to impress upon you strongly that it is the desire of the Government of India that the officers of the Agency should carefully avoid any action which might have the effect of bringing about hostilities. Their efforts should, on the contrary, be directed to endeavouring, by means of conciliatory measures, to establish the most amicable relations with the tribes. Apart from the political objections which the Government of India entertain to a policy which might have the effect of involving us in further military operations on this part of the frontier, numerous proofs have lately been afforded of the costliness of maintaining a large force in the neighbourhood of Gilghit. It will, moreover, be obvious to you that, upon general grounds, there are serious objections to keeping considerable portions of the native army in so distant and isolated a position Under these circumstances, and assuming that the policy which has thus been laid down will be rigorously adhered to, the Government of India see no occasion for adding to the strength of the Gilghit garrison. Considering the great difficulty of transporting supplies across the passes by which Gilghit is divided from Kashmir, there would be obviously great advantages in fixing the strength of the garrison at a number which the country itself would be able to support. That number would, it is understood, not exceed about 1,600 men. Upon this point and upon the distribution of the troops in the neighbourhood of Gilghit and throughout the line of communication no decision will be come to until Colonel Durand's arrival in Simla. The Governor General in Council gathers from your telegram of the 18th inst. that you and Colonel Durand are both of opinion that the garrison of Gilghit itself might be safely reduced to the strength of one regiment and a battery, the remainder of the Imperial Service Troops being stationed along the line between Bunji and Astor. I may observe that the Government of India, while admitting that it will always be necessary to maintain a small body of British troops as an escort to the Resident, are not without hope that it may eventually be found possible to hold Gilghit with a force consisting mainly of local levies raised from amongst the neighbouring tribes, and entirely dependent upon local supplies. In this view it is desirable that the utmost encouragement should be given to the spread of cultivation in the neighbourhood. The Government of India are satisfied that the re-establishment of the Gilghit Agency was undoubtedly necessary, and that the operations against Hunza and Nagar were inevitable. Now that those have been brought to a successful conclusion, it is hoped that it may in the future be found possible to secure the passes and to maintain peace in the Dard States without adding materially to the burdens of the Empire. That brings us down to the summer of 1892. In August, 1892, the Mehtar died, after a rule of something like 30 years. He was a man of great ability and firmness, and after his death there followed what our officer described as a period of "dynastic murders and civil war." The eldest son was 31 and the second 24. The latter, Afzal-ul-Mulk, succeeded, and the elder, Nizam-ul-Mulk, fled to British protection at Gilghit. Afzal murdered all his brothers he could get hold of. The Government of India at once acknowledged the man in possession, and he at once asked for a British officer to be sent to him at Chitral. Immediately before this the uncle, brother of the old Mehtar, made a sudden descent in the night, slaughtered Afzal, and took possession of the throne. He ruled about two months. Nizam, then at Gilghit, had no doubt of the support of the British Resident. I am not justified in saying that he was encouraged, but he was permitted to advance into the territory of Chitral, and he became Mehtar. I regret the interference of the British Agent in the internal affairs of Chitral. He had been expressly prohibited from doing so, but the Government of India, after further investigation, came to the conclusion that under the circumstances his action was justifiable, and approved of what he had done. Up to three years ago there was no Resident in Chitral; therefore we are perfectly free from complications in considering this question. The Agent appointed was Dr. Robertson, and in a Dispatch dated April 3, 1893, he said that "the atmosphere was one of conspiracy and intrigue." The Government never intended that his mission should be more than temporary, and considered that after he had recognised the new Mehtar it was undesirable that he should remain any longer in Chitral. Dr. Robertson left, but he deemed it desirable to leave Captain Younghusband and Lieutenant Gurdon behind him. In June, 1893, he presented a very interesting Report, which showed what was his opinion then. I thank the Government for giving us that Dispatch, but we have not got Sir George Robertson's Report in 1895. ["Hear, hear!"] It is much more important to be in possession of his views in 1895 than in 1893, particularly as the Government attached importance to Dr. Robertson's views in 1893. When he arrived at Chitral, he says:— Instead of finding ourselves in the position of envoys sent to congratulate and form an alliance with a young prince flushed with recent triumphs over rebellious subjects and powerful outside foes, we found ourselves called upon to firmly establish on his throne, and infuse with hope and virile energy, an unnerved, terror-stricken chief, who was conscious that he ruled on the merest sufferance a thoroughly disaffected people, whose abstention from further outbreaks of violence was entirely due to a doubt and fear lest the Government of India might have the will and also the power to avenge any injury to its nominee. That under such peculiar circumstances any permanence can be expected for the work already successfully accomplished would be unreasonable, unless the same plans which have worked so well in the immediate past be steadily persevered with in the immediate future. Military force other than that which the Mehtar himself can organise and direct it would be impolitic to use in Chitral, even if it were possible to employ it at such an enormous distance from its base of reinforcements and supplies in Kashmir or India. The upper classes have to be won over and conciliated by friendly overtures, apparently emanating from men absolutely secure and confident in their strength and position, while at the same time the imagination of the Adamzadas must be acted upon by the spectacle of their ruler being securely protected from all outside enemies and gradually making himself feared and respected by the firmness, combined with justice, of his rule, and by the display of the wealth and resources he possesses as the subsidised ally of his acknowledged suzerain, his Highness the Maharajah of Kashmir. That there are many difficulties in the way of carrying out such a line of policy it would be idle to deny, but there are also two factors, the value of which cannot be over-estimated, as favouring influences in any attempts we may make to mould the Chitralis to our interest, especially if these favouring influences be employed discreetly and with dexterity. They are, first, the absence of any real fanatical feeling in Chitral; and, secondly, the extreme impressionability of the people. The absence of all sentiments of religious intolerance in Chitral amounts to a national peculiarity. The impressionability of Chitralis, again, is something extraordinary. It undoubtedly makes them terribly fickle. But fickleness tells both ways. If you cannot rely upon unswerving supporters in changeable people, you can at least be happy in the thought that they can rarely become inveterate opponents. When great impressionability is combined with extreme cupidity, for which Chitralis are also remarkable, the power of influencing them lies with the man of most tactful speech, especially if he also possesses the longest purse. Polite attentions, complimentary speeches, have a great, if ephemeral, effect on most Chitralis. When accompanied by a small douceur they not unfrequently have the effect of starting the recipient to his feet with his eyes dimmed by grateful tears, his mouth full of fervid protestations of devotion. It is true his gratitude rapidly cools, but it can be excited again as often as is desirable by a re-employment of the means described. It follows, therefore, that a political officer in Chitral has a wonderful power always at hand of influencing for a time all those brought into direct contact with him. All manner of apparently determined enemies of the Mehtar, Adamzadas, Moghli Pirs, Sayads, as well as intriguers of other classes, succumbed at once to the not very subtle influences employed against them, while, as soon as it became generally known that I preferred expressions of loyalty to their Mehtar to hearing speeches of personal devotion to myself, the alteration I desired was made almost invariably. I think the Chitralis have something in common with western races when pleasant speeches are accompanied by long purses. Sir George Robertson adds that— An Englishman now may travel anywhere throughout the length and breadth of Chitral without the slightest fear. He would be welcomed everywhere. The mission returned with no escort, unless Mr. Bruce's four Gurkhas may be so denominated. There were no sentries at night, no suspicion of danger at any time. A district in the heart of British India could not appear more peaceful and quiet. Such is the result of merely five months' work in the country. This was written in June, 1893, and it only shows how men may be deceived. In 18 months all was altered. The Indian Government, however, came to the conclusion that Captain. Younghusband should remain for the present, though not at the capital. Colonel Durand proposed to make his quarters at Mastuj, 63 miles away. That Dispatch was replied to by Lord Kimberley, and Lord Kimberley's Dispatch again is not given in full; but I am able to supply a very serious omission in it out of the Blue-Book itself. Lord Kimberley, after referring to Dr. Robertson's Report and to the Dispatch of the Government of India, says:— I observe that, in your opinion, the maintenance of an English officer as Political Agent in Chitral renders necessary the retention of strong posts along the line of the Gilghit and Ghizr rivers, and it is partly on this account and partly to paralyse any hostile action of the tribes having relations with the Gilghit Agency that your Excellency's Government desires the permanent addition of a Bengal infantry battalion to the garrison of the Gilghit Agency. But in determining our future policy towards Chitral a wider view must he taken, and the question must be looked at with reference to the general aspect of affairs in that region, which may in a short time be considerably changed. That was what Lord Kimberley wrote. But it would be altogether an unintelligible sentence where he speaks of "the general aspect of affairs" if, in the editing of these Dispatches, they had not edited other letters which contained the pith of that portion of Lord Kimberley's Dispatch. The Secretary to the Government of India, writing to the Resident in Kashmir, stated what was the general aspect of affairs in that region which Lord Kimberley thought might be changed, and which would seriously affect the whole question. He says:— When a review of the position on this frontier was placed before the Secretary of State for India nearly a year ago, Lord Kimberley sanctioned the retention of Captain Younghusband in Chitral as a temporary measure only, and pointed to three possible contingencies which would materially affect the general aspect of affairs in that region. Those contingencies were (1) the abandonment by the Ameer of all idea of bringing Chitral under his control; (2) the successful conclusion of the negotiations with Russia for the determination of boundaries in the Pamir tract; and (3) the mitigation, through the mediation of our frontier officers, of the irritation and suspicion of the frontier tribes. The Ameer, at the close of 1893, bound himself not to interfere with Chitral by the Agreement concluded with Sir Mortimer Durand. In June, 1894, the Government of India appear to have addressed the Resident in Kashmir, pointing out to him that the first of the conditions to which Lord Kimberley had attached importance had been attained by the Durand Agreement; that there were indications that a Pamir settlement might before long be arrived at; and that the attitude of the tribes was fairly satisfactory. In these circumstances, you were informed that, if no new complications arose, the political officer in Chitral should be withdrawn when the winter was over. At the time of that letter—in June—the Pamir Agreement was still unsigned; there was still suspicion among the tribes; and the Government of India came to the conclusion that— For another year our position in and towards Chitral must remain upon the present footing. It appears that Colonel Bruce and Captain Younghusband advocate a policy of activity and extension which is not in accord with the views of the Government of India. This is not from London; this letter is written from Calcutta to the Resident in Kashmir, and expresses the view of the Government of India. The Dispatch continues:— I am to request that this policy may be impressed on the British Agent, and that he may be clearly informed that it is not intended to maintain permanently a resident officer in Chitral. It will suffice to retain the unquestioned right of sending a political officer into Chitral at all times. That Dispatch was submitted to me—I had then succeeded to office—and I then stated, on August 3, 1894:— The reasons which induced Lord Kimberley to declare that it would be 'premature to decide now on the permanent political and military arrangements for this frontier' are still of weight. It is true that the Ameer of Afghanistan no longer advances any claims to exercise control in the affairs of Chitral, but the settlement of the frontier on the south-west and south of Chitral may still lead to troublesome complications; while on the north the question of the line delimitating the Russian boundary in the regions of the Upper Oxus is still unsettled. It was perhaps premature, in these circumstances, to raise the question of withdrawing Captain Younghusband from Chitral, and I fully concur in your decision that the moment for effecting what would certainly be regarded as a final withdrawal is inopportune, and, while adhering to Lord Kimberley's view that the present arrangements can only be regarded as temporary, I am no more prepared than Lord Kimberley was last year to formulate a definite policy (whether of abandoning or continuing those arrangements) within the fixed period such as is indicated. In other words, the view that Lord Kimberley, the Government of India, and that I myself ventured to take was that, so long as the boundary of the Ameer was unfixed and the boundary with Russia unsettled, it was wise and prudent to make no change in the position of the resident officer at Chitral, but that when those questions were settled—and the House knows they have been now settled for a considerable time—he should be withdrawn. I now come to another extraordinary illustration of the editing of these papers. In the Dispatch from the Government of India, to which my Dispatch was a reply, there is not a word about the road to Peshawar. But in my reply this passage is given:— I approve also of your decided rejection of the proposals for establishing a political officer and an escort in Yasin and for opening up the road between Peshawar and Chitral. The House will see from that, that it had been proposed to the Government of India to make this road, that they declined to make it, and that the late Government concurred with them in their opinion. That brings us down to the end of 1894. In 1895, on January 1, the Nizam-ul-Mulk was murdered by a follower of his brother, Amir-ul-Mulk. I am not going to trouble the House with the history of that occurrence, but my own opinion is that the whole of those transactions formed part of one conspiracy between Umra Khan, Sher Afzal, and Amir-ul-Mulk. Lieutenant Gurdon was in Chitral when the murder took place with eight or ten Sikhs. Dr. Robertson was at once sent to Chitral to report on the situation, where he arrived on February 1, and then commenced the difficulties of the situation. The Government of India very soon advised us at home of the serious position of affairs, and our Government felt that their first duty was to rescue Dr. Robertson. I did not hesitate myself; on March 8, I received for the first time an official intimation that Robertson was in danger in Chitral, and and on the same day I telegraphed:— I am prepared to approve such action for securing safety of Robertson and party as you may deem necessary. In other words, the Government of India had a free hand in order to rescue Robertson. ["Hear, hear!"] The House remembers what took place—the prompt action of the Government of India, the magnificent preparations of Sir Robert Low, and the wonderful mobilisation of that force of men in less than three weeks. On March 14 the Government issued a Proclamation to all the people of Swat, the people in Bajaur who did not side with Umra Khan, and all other persons concerned, which, after stating that Umra Khan had invaded the district and had had warning that he was to retire from the district by April 1, and if he did not the Government would send a force into Chitral to the rescue of Robertson, proceeded:— The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present and prevent any future unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and as soon as this object has been attained the force will be withdrawn. The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribes, and they will scrupulously avoid any acts of hostility towards the tribesmen so long as they on their part refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops. Within a fortnight of the receipt of the telegram announcing that Proclamation I telegraphed:— As soon as present trouble is over, policy with regard to Chitral and neighbourhood will have to be fully and carefully considered in light of recent events. Meantime our hands should be kept perfectly free. I hope, therefore, that you will take care that nothing is said or done to commit Government either way with regard to making new roads or retention of posts now occupied, or occupation of new posts. The House will remember the brilliant advance that was made, the brilliant relief from Gilghit under Colonel Kelly, and the successful termination on about April 18 or 20, when the siege was raised and Robertson relieved. On April 26, I addressed a Dispatch to the Government of India on the whole question of future policy. I said:— Since that Dispatch was written the protracted discussion as to the limit of Russian influence in the region of the Upper Oxus has been brought to a close, and an agreement has been arrived at by which the southern boundary of Russia's possessions in these regions will be the Panja and the Pamir rivers, and a line drawn eastward from Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier. The effect of this will be, while bringing her in one direction within a very short distance of the Chitral frontier, to maintain in the other an intervening belt of country between her southern outposts and the eastern end of the Hindu-kush. Moreover, the demarcation of the Afghan boundary under the Durand Agreement, in which the Ameer undertakes to abstain from interference in Chitral and the transfer to Afghanistan of the whole of the Kafir country up to Chitral, introduces a new element into the problem. The delimitation of these boundaries would, apart from recent events in Chitral, have introduced changes indicating that the e had arrived for some general survey of the existing situation, in order that the policy which had been provisionally adopted might now be settled on some permanent basis; but these events themselves have brought into strong relief the risk involved in maintaining a British officer in Chitral under existing conditions, a risk not unforeseen by your predecessor, but one which, owing to the peculiar combination of a popular claimant to the Chitral throne with the Pathan invaders, has taken a more acute form than was probably present to the minds of the Marquess of Lansdowne and his advisers. On the one hand, it has been made clear that, so long as a British Agent and his escort in Chitral can be supported only from Gilghit, he may for months be cut off from any support at all, and at best can only be supplied from a small and inaccessible frontier station by means of a road 200 miles in length, and of the worst possible description for military purposes; while to maintain a garrison at Gilghit, adequate for such military responsibilities as the existing combination has thrown upon you, would involve an intolerable financial burden, both upon the Kashmir Government and on your own. On the other hand, the shorter and more direct line of communication between Peshawar and Chitral involves the gravest responsibilities, both military and financial. The establishment and maintenance of this line of communication has been recognised as an important element in the policy of your Government in Chitral, but it was at first hoped that, by the influence of Umra Khan, an arrangement might be come to with the Pathan tribes, through whose territory the route runs, for effecting this object. As it became clear that the assistance of Umra Khan was not likely to be obtained, the project was laid by; but it has always been urged by the local authorities as essential to the security of the agency at Chitral. The Question whether such a road running 150 miles through the territory of the Pathan tribes, notorious for their fanaticism and hostility to foreigners, can be maintained at all without constant military pressure, or even military occupation, is one which is open to discussion; but in any case it is certain that it cannot be maintained without heavy expenditure from year to year, and it is possible that if maintained by arrangement with the tribes it might at the most critical time be closed against us, and the whole work of opening it up by military force would in that case have to be undertaken again from the beginning. I then asked the Government of India for their views, and on May 8, 1895, they sent their views to me. In fact, this is the last Dispatch we had from the Government of India on this question. I need not go through that Dispatch in detail. The Government of India attaches enormous importance to maintaining our position in Chitral, because of the risk of foreign occupation if it were abandoned, and they maintained that it would be unjustifiable to ignore our pledges to preserve the suzerainty of Kashmir. I am not aware that anything has transpired in Chitral to jeopardise the suzerainty of Kashmir. But when the Indian Government came to the means by which their policy is to be carried out, then their Dispatch becomes very misty. They say:— What must be faced is a consideration of the means whereby we can maintain a sufficient military occupation of the Chitral valley. The length of time occupied and the difficulty incurred in sending troops and supplies by way of Kashmir and Gilghit, and the expense of doing so, are so great that some of us would prefer to abandon all attempt to occupy Chitral rather than try to hold it by so precarious a thread. The alternative is to establish communication from the Peshawar border. The expense of doing so may be prohibitive. They then set out other objections, and say that the course which they recommend may involve the Government in an expense which the finances of India can ill afford, and in an increase of responsibilities with the tribes on our northwest frontier, which we would fain avoid. It may be possible to lessen these objections." And they concluded by saying that, at all events, the interests involved were so large that they considered it their plain duty to lay before me the conclusions at which, after full consideration, they had arrived. That is the history down to the date of the last Dispatch which I received from the Government of India. Before considering the question of future policy, I think there is one point upon which we are all agreed, and that is if a British officer with an escort is to be maintained at Chitral, it will be impossible to secure his safety so long as he relies alone upon Gilghit for his transport and his supplies. Gilghit is itself an outpost cut off for half the year. From there to Chitral is 225 miles, the road being across a pass 12,000ft. high and running through that dangerous defile in which Captain Rose and his party were destroyed. If Chitral is to be held by British troops, it can only be by opening up and maintaining a road from Peshawar, through Dir, to Swat. I say that because it is impossible to separate the policy of retaining Chitral from that of making and maintaining this road. If we are committed to the establishment of a permanent garrison in Chitral, we are committed to the maintaining of this road, and that means the occupation of the State of Chitral and the country lying between the frontier and Chitral. So far as the military aspect of the matter is concerned, the question is simply this: Is the fortification of Chitral a strategic necessity for the adequate defence of the Indian frontier in the event of an attack upon its north-west? The natural fortification of that district is the vast range of the Hindu-kush, which is so picturesquely and forcibly described by the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Curzon). He says:— The Indian Empire is girdled not merely with one or two ranges of great height and corresponding difficulty, but, so to speak, with an armoured belt-plate wedged upon plates of the most prodigious snow and ice mountains to be found upon the face of the earth. This mountain belt is in some cases over 200 miles in thickness, and not until its successive palisades have, one after another, been pierced or broken down, does the invasion of India enter into the domain of possibility. But, Sir, no Government can act upon geographical possibilities or upon an opinion which it has formed upon them. This was a purely military question, and I, as Secretary of State for India, was incapable of deciding such a question. My colleagues were under the same incapacity, and the present Government must be guided also by military considerations and also by military experts. The House is aware that there is a very considerable difference of opinion upon this question. The House is aware, from publication in the Times newspaper, that Lord Roberts, an authority for whom I entertain very great respect, entertains one opinion; we know from the Dispatch of the Government of India that the two eminent soldiers who advise that Government—Sir George White and Sir Henry Brackenbury—also agree in that view; and if I understand the view put forward by them, it is that Chitral is of the greatest strategical importance, so far as the passes of the Hindu-kush are concerned; that the invasion of India from the north-west could be attempted through those passes, and that Chitral, being a weak Power, would fall under the power of its strongest neighbour. But, Sir, the British Government and the Government of India at home have also military advisers. They have as a military adviser that distinguished Field-Marshal who commanded the Indian army for a considerable number of years, and who served for upwards of 40 years in India, and whom Lord Rosebery described as the highest living Indian military authority—I mean Sir Donald Stewart. As the House knows, Sir Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Adye, Sir Charles Gough, and Lord Chelmsford, all of whom have served in India, entertain opinions differing from those of Lord Roberts. But the late Government went further, and availed themselves of the best military advice that they could command. The advice thus given is not part of the papers which have been published, and it would not be right to quote that advice or to give names. But this I may say, that, so far as our military policy was settled, it was guided and settled, so far as military considerations were involved, by and upon the advice of the most eminent military authorities of the day. I sum up their opinions, so far as the result which they produced upon my mind and the minds of my colleagues, to this effect: That the gigantic natural geographical defences of the north-west frontier render the advance of an invading army practically impossible; that, having regard to these and other considerations, our position is at the present moment practically impregnable; that Chitral is not a place of considerable importance as a base for military reserves, and that it is not useful as a base for military operations, defensive or offensive; that to lock up troops in Chitral or in the Chitral Valley would be a military blunder; and that the construction of a military road-to Chitral would, in the event of hostilities, be an advantage to an invading force and a disadvantage to a defending force. The late Government also came to the conclusion that Gilghit was sufficient, as a point of observation, and that to leave our main line of defence and to establish outposts and form depôts of supplies in distant mountain deserts would weaken the strength of our position. [Cheers.] There were other considerations of a detailed and technical character brought before them, which convinced the late Government that, looking at the question solely from a military point of view, they would not be justified in adopting the proposals of the Indian Government. But the late Government had also to consider the political, administrative, and financial questions affecting the occupation of Chitral, accompanied by the occupation of a military road. The length of the road proposed to be occupied is 180 miles, or the distance from London to Manchester. The Malakand Pass is over 4,000 feet high, and there is the Lowarai Pass 11,000 feet high. The road, if made, will have to be garrisoned, and there must be cantonments, forts, and bridges, while tunnels will have to be made for the protection of the road from the snows of winter. In fact, the road would be a peninsula between two large tracts of territory extending on the one side to the Afghan frontier, and on the other to the present frontier of Kashmir. The late Government were advised by experts that the formation of such a road meant the practical subjection of the tribes, and the annexation of the country between Peshawar and Chitral. A military road in that district means a military police to deal with offenders, and we cannot hold the country with our troops unless we are prepared to carry on the civil administration. Sir N. Chamberlain says: If we remain in Chitral, Bajaur, and Surat, the tribesmen will only be kept quiet by our retaining, at a great annual cost, a sufficient force in the valleys to overawe them. To make a military road, and to expect to keep it open without coming into collision with the tribesmen, is to my mind devoid of reasoning. Only 36 miles of this road will be in Chitral territory, and the rest will have to be constructed through a country inhabited by hostile tribes, who are distinguished by the fierceness of their fanaticism, their love of independence, and their fear of annexation. We have no more right in the district than we should have in Switzerland. Lord Roberts has stated that the whole fighting force of these tribesmen is about 200,000 men. Have the Government asked themselves whether it would not be better to have these tribes as independent allies, who would form another line of defence, rather than to have them as revengeful foes? [Cheers.] When we have conquered them we shall have created a permanent source of discontent and danger, and they will seriously weaken our power to resist the attack of any hostile force. The practical question, which will sooner or later have to be determined by this House, is, whether we are going to extend the frontier of India by at least 200 or 250 miles on the western side, in order to cover a large tract of country from which we can derive no possible advantage, and from which we can obtain no possible revenue, and in which we may be constantly embroiled with independent tribesmen, patriotically defending their native soil? [Cheers.] Sir J. Lyall, the late Governor of the Punjab, who knows something about the country in question, said that he was informed that the initial cost of making such a road, and guarding it during construction, would be no less than half-a-million sterling, and that it would take three years to construct. Sir J. Lyall further stated that the tribes would certainly not assent to the making of such a road, and that, therefore, unless there was a military occupation of a line 180 miles long, it would be impossible to construct the road. According to the present computation, 5,000 or even 10,000 men would have to be interned in almost inaccessible districts, to whom supplies must be carried by pack animals, under enormous difficulties and at great cost. I am aware that the Government of India have said that they are not going to increase the Indian Army, but in that case the present Indian Army must be too large. ["Hear, hear!"] I do not believe that that Army is too large, and, therefore, I hold that to lock up any part of it in a place from which it cannot be withdrawn if troubles arise would be most unwise. ["Hear, hear!"] There then remains what I may call the moral question to be determined. The Government of India, by their Proclamation, declared that they had no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which our troops might pass. When that Proclamation was issued, there were two witnesses that I may quote as to the impression that it conveyed. In the first place, The Times' Correspondent said:— A Proclamation has been issued to the Yusufzai and other clans affected that we do not intend to annex any territory, but merely to compel Umra Khan to evacuate Chitral. But a more important testimony with reference to the meaning of that declaration of the Indian Government was given by the present Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who wrote as follows with regard to it:— I see that the Indian Government say that as soon as they have attained their object in Chitral the British force will be withdrawn, and that there is no intention of occupying the intervening territory. Of course, that may be technically true—no one wants to add to our responsibilities, which are already sufficiently heavy; but if this Proclamation means, as it may undoubtedly be interpreted to mean, that, having opened up the essential and inevitable route to Chitral, we are going to allow it again to be closed, it will be difficult to find words to describe the melancholy fatuity of such a course. ["Hear, hear!"]

* MR. CURZON

said the sentence in his letter in the Times was based on an imperfect telegraphic summary of the Viceroy's Proclamation in that paper. He presumed that was correct, but when they read the Proclamation itself they found it contained a distinct limitation, in the first sentence of the Proclamation, to the people of Swat and Bajaur. [Ministerial cheers.]

* SIR H. FOWLER

It is addressed to Swat and Bajaur and to any other persons concerned. [Opposition cheers.] I am talking about the people of Swat and Bajaur, of their thousands and tens of thousands of inhabitants. What did the Government of India mean by it? Let me turn to their Dispatch of April 26th, page 39:— At the same meeting a Proclamation was issued to the people of Swat and others beyond the Peshawar frontier, announcing the intention and object of the government, assuring them that we did not intend to permanently occupy any territory through which the force might pass, or interfere with the independence of the tribes, and promising friendly treatment to all who did not oppose the march of the troops. That was how the Government of India interpreted their own Proclamation. In the interpretation of human affairs you not only deal with men's words but actions. How did they interpret by their actions? Major Deane at once commenced negotiations with the Swatis and other tribes concerned, and explained the situation to them. The assistant to the British Agent at Gilghit, having reported that all the men of Tangir and Darel had been recalled to their homes, which possibly indicated some excitement there, he was authorised to explain to the people the purport of the Proclamation issued to the Swatis and the Bajauris. Practically, the Government of India prevented opposition on the faith of this Proclamation, and the noble Lord, in his own Dispatch of the 16th of last month, recapitulating the whole case, says:— It is probable that this Proclamation was not without effect, at all events on the tribes in immediate contact with us. The native tribes did not combine against us. What was our danger? It was a holy war of religious fanaticism aroused, and the whole case proves there was no combination against us among the tribes, because they believed in British honour—[Cheers]—and that the British Government would fulfil that to which they were pledged. You talk of "prestige!" That word has been used frequently with reference to the advance on the north-western frontier. It was a word with which we were familiar in the great Debate on the evacuation of Kandahar in this House 15 years ago. We were told our prestige required that we should not abandon the position we had acquired by splendid daring and splendid endurance. Loss of prestige! Do you think these tribes do not understand and do not appreciate the brilliancy of the attack and the defence? But they will understand if you recede from your word, after you were allowed to pass over these terrific passes unopposed on the faith of the Proclamation. The prestige and honour of the British name will be still greater if we have the courage to keep our word. [Cheers.]

* THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON,) Middlesex, Ealing

Do I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that Lord Elgin cannot be trusted to keep his word? [Cheers.]

* SIR H. FOWLER

The noble Lord will be quite at liberty to reply when I have finished. I have said nothing reflecting on Lord Elgin. But I say that if the British or Indian Government annex any portion of the territory through which they passed last March, April, or May, that Government, whether Indian or British, will have broken its faith with the tribes to whom the Proclamation was issued. My right hon. Friend the Member for the Forest of Dean says his conscience was satisfied when he knew that the Indian Government unanimously recommended this policy of annexation. I am old enough a Mem- of the House to remember the speech the right hon. Baronet made on the evacuation of Kandahar, and the Indian Government unanimously objected. [Sir CHARLES DILKE: "No, no!"] I beg my right hon. Friend's pardon, but I say they did. [Laughter.]

* SIR C. DILKE (Gloucester, Forest of Dean)

No, no. It was four to three. I will read the names presently. ["Hear, hear!"]

* SIR H. FOWLER

The majority of the Indian Government.

* SIR C. DILKE

You said unanimously.

* SIR H. FOWLER

I say that the majority of the Indian Government of 1879–80 were against the evacuation of Kandahar. The right hon. Baronet spoke in this House in favour of the evacuation of Kandahar, and the Duke of Devonshire (then the Marquess of Hartington) dealt, name by name, with the Members of the Indian Government, and denied the proposition then attempted to be laid down by the Tory Party that we were bound by the action of the Indian Government.

* SIR C. DILKE

Sir Donald Stewart and the present Lord Cromer.

* SIR H. FOWLER

That can be settled hereafter. At all events, the right hon. Baronet did not feel bound in 1881 by the opinion of the Indian Government with reference, to the evacuation of Kandahar. But why does he not ask the opinion of the great Indian officials and the Governor of the Punjab, who is no mean authority on the question? We know what the opinion of Sir James Lyall and other preceding Governors of the Punjab was. What is the opinion of the present Governor of the Punjab—a man who, perhaps, is the greatest authority in that district, who knows the country and is responsible for the peace of the frontier? What has been the advice of Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick on the evacuation of Kandahar? I am sorry to weary the House—[Cries of "No!"]—with this long defence of the policy of the late Government, but I have said enough, and I will not repeat myself. Under all these circumstances the late Government came to the conclusion that we could not accept the proposition of the Indian Government. We came to the conclusion that we could not, on military, political, administrative, or financial grounds, and above all in the teeth of our own Proclamation, advise the taking of any step which would mean the annexation of the Chitral valley and the countries of the tribes. What has been the policy of our successors? The noble Lord immediately on accepting office very properly stated that the present Government would reconsider the question, and on August 1 he asked whether there was no further information as to the possibility of arranging with the tribes for the road between Peshawar and Chitral and the strength of the garrison there. The only information the noble Lord has received is contained in a telegram dated August 4, which says:— The Conimander-in-Chief has been consulted on points in your telegram. First, we have avoided open negotiations with the tribes. The reports received from Low and Define warrant the confident expectation that a peaceful arrangement for the road can be made. [Cheers.] I am quite willing to wait and see what the peaceful arrangements were, and our judgment should be reserved until we know whether these arrangements have been successful. But they have not been successful to the present time. I have worked out what the force proposed would be, and I make out there would be about 5,145 soldiers. Taking the present strength of the regiment (and from that the pioneer regiment at Gilghit, which is to be withdrawn, would have to be deducted), the number of soldiers would be between 4,000 and 5,000. The Secretary of State, having received this information, wrote an able Dispatch dated August 16, and in that he reviews the whole situation from the commencement. In reference to the question of cost, he says:— Time evidently was necessary for the investigation and decision of the question of cost. He calls attention to the views expressed by Lord Kimberley and myself as to keeping control over the external affairs of Chitral. Lord Kimberley has been somewhat misunderstood on that point, for keeping control over the external affairs of Chitral does not imply annexation or possession of the State. We have absolute control over the external affairs of Afghanistan at this moment. Then towards the end of his Dispatch the noble Lord sums up the position. He says:— It was apparent from your letter of May 8 that your Government was not without apprehension that the task of opening up this road might, if it were to necessitate the military coercion of the tribes and the interference with their independence, be one of such great cost and involving such embarrassing complications as to render it of doubtful expediency; but in your opinion this question, both in its financial and political aspects, depended on the attitude which might be assumed by the tribes, and you indicated that, if amicable relations could be secured and they could be persuaded to become responsible for the safety of the road, the cost need not be prohibitive. The noble Lord quotes their allegation "that peaceful arrangements can be made," and adds:— The information now conveyed materially alters the position. It removes, if your officers have rightly estimated the conditions, the doubt which was felt as to the possibility of opening up the road by peaceful means and maintaining it without an intolerable burden of expenditure being imposed on the Indian revenues. I am bound to say the noble Lord is perfectly consistent in his telegrams an his Dispatch. He says that he gave a strict caution as to keeping the conditions of the Proclamation. The noble Lord guards himself by four "ifs." He says—If the cost is not prohibitive, if you can effect a peaceful arrangement with the tribes, if it is necessary to maintain a permanent force on the Malakand, and if the terms of the Proclamation are rigidly adhered to, then the noble Lord will sanction the proposal of the Government of India. I submit that until these "ifs" are solved he cannot tell what is to be done, and I go further and say we cannot press him. He has had no answer to that Dispatch, and until he is in a position to tell the House what the occupation will cost, what the attitude of the tribes is, whether they will recognise a new arrangement, and whether the arrangement will be in harmony with the Proclamation, no intelligible decision as to their policy can be taken by the Government. A few months at this season of the year will not affect their policy. In a question of this magnitude we can afford to wait. I do not ask the House to pronounce a judgment now; I reserve my right to do so hereafter. It has been my duty to explain and defend the policy which the late Government thought it wise to adopt after ascertaining the views of those best qualified to advise them, and that has been the main object of my speech. In conclusion, I say that the policy I have endeavoured to defend is no new policy. One of the greatest Viceroys who ever ruled over India—Lord Lawrence—in the memorable Dispatch with which he closed his administration, laid down the lines which should guide the action of the Government of India with respect to its North-west frontier. I will quote the last three paragraphs of that Dispatch:— We think it impolitic and unwise to decrease any of the difficulties which would be entailed on Russia if that Power seriously thought of invading India, as we should certainly decrease them if we left our own frontier and met her half-way in a difficult country, and, possibly, in the midst of a hostile or exasperated population. We foresee no limits to the expenditure which such a move might require, and we protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and appreciate. And we think that the objects which we have at heart, in common with all interested in India, may be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness on our frontier, and by giving all our care and expending all our resources for the attainment of practical and sound ends over which we can exercise an effective and immediate control. Should a foreign Power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance on a compact, highly equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our own border; in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses; in the sense of security of title and possession, with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and the native aristocracy; in the construction of material works within British India, which enhance the comfort of the people while they add to our political and military strength; in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources; in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard; and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression, or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt. The history of the last 20 years has afforded many startling illustrations of the wisdom of that policy and, I may add, of the folly of departing from it. That policy has been stamped with the approval of a large majority of the great soldiers and great civilians who have made our Eastern Empire a priceless boon to the people of India, and the noblest dependency of the British Crown. It is on behalf of that policy I venture, at this, almost the last hour of the Session, and in this exhausted House, to enter my humble protest against embarking on an enterprise which may be, and which in this case I conscientiously believe will be, a standing menace and a constant danger to the security and prosperity of the Indian Empire. [Cheers.]