HC Deb 31 May 1895 vol 34 cc736-52

Resolution reported, That a further sum not exceeding £5,310,050, be granted to Her Majesty, on account, for or towards defraying the charges for the following Civil Services and Revenue Departments for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1896.

*SIR CHARLES DILKE (Gloucester, Forest of Dean) moved to reduce the Vote by £3,000 in respect to Uganda, in order to call attention to affairs in that region. He remarked that there were two Uganda Votes included in the Vote on Account. One was for the ordinary expenditure in Uganda, and the other, Vote 7, was a special Vote for payment to the British East Africa Company. But that, having been ruled out of Order, had been struck out of the Vote on Account and postponed. That Vote would afford an opportunity for full discussion on points connected with the future government of Uganda, concerning which a statement had been promised in another place. The territory which it concerned was 800 miles in length from Mombasa to Uganda. That was the territory through which communications to Uganda took place, and those who desired the making of a railway to Uganda, would have an opportunity of discussing it. It had been stated in organs of the Press supposed to be well-informed as to the intentions of the Government, that a statement would be made on this question. He was surprised when it was stated that the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs would make the statement, for, in another place, it was said the statement would be made by the Leader of the House; and, considering the strong views the Leader of the House had expressed, it was only right that the statement should be made by him. Now, his own complaint on the matter he was raising was that the money voted last year for the ordinary service of Uganda had been largely spent on matters, not only not contemplated by the House, but spent contrary to the intention of the House, and even to the promises made at the time the money was voted. Excellent Blue Books had been laid before the House with regard to the whole Uganda question. The last issues were almost entirely confined to details of repeated warlike expeditions to the neighbouring country of Unyoro, which lay outside the Uganda protectorate. He would not trouble the House by going into the past history of the relations between Uganda and Unyoro. In former Uganda Debates considerable reference had been made to the matter, which had been the subject of heated controversy between Captain Lugard on the one side, and Mr. Ashe, the missionary, on the other. Captain Lugard had published reports and also lectured on the subject, and Mr. Ashe had published two books in which he had gone into the whole history of the matter. The whole history of the question up to two years ago, put briefly, was that, while Kabarega had been on friendly term with Gordon, who had governed the Equatorial Provinces, since Gordon days he had been cut off from communition with white men, and when Captain Lugard went to Uganda disagreeable relations sprang up between Captain Lugard and some of the servants of the Company and Kabarega. Mr. Ashe's account of the rise of that controversy —which had led to repeated wars going on still—was this: Mr. Ashe said that the moment the British East Africa Company began operations in Uganda, and Captain Lugard made use of Emin Pasha's Sudanese troops, these scoundrels (which by universal confession they were) began to raid upon and terrorise Kabarega's kingdom. He would not go into the former history of the matter, but would deal with it as it appeared in a recent Blue Book (No. 7) of the present year. It contained a narration of the events of Captain Lugard's campaign of 1891, and it stated that Captain Lugard's policy was to establish a line of forts garrisoned by Sudanese troops, which cut off a certain portion of Unyoro from Kabarega's kingdom, and established another chief there. Captain Lugard took away part of the country. The Blue Book said that— Kabarega resented this, and hostility continued between his people and the Sudanese in the new forts. The Sudanese held their own with ease, but by their licence and misconduct alienated the natives in their neighbourhood. Therefore, it was admitted that the conduct of the Sudanese troops—of which strong language had been used by many observers—was the cause of sudden hostility on the part of Kabarega. Hostilities continued all through 1892. In the summer of 1892, the line of forts was wheeled forward and more territory cut off from Kabarega. In the autumn of 1892, Captain Williams, then in command of Uganda, sent a message to Kabarega demanding tribute in ivory. Kabarega's reply was unsatisfactory, and he said he could not make peace while the Sudanese harried his country. Mr. Grant was sent to report on the misconduct of the Sudanese. Mr. Grant's report, though showing that the original rumours were exaggerated, indicated that outrages had been committed by the Sudanese, who were in British employment and paid out of this vote, on the inhabitants of Kabarega's kingdom. At the end of 1893, Colonel Colvile sent a message to Kabarega. It was strong in its terms, and said that, when they heard that the Sudanese troops in the forts in the country cut off from Kabarega's kingdom were pressing the natives, Europeans were sent to stop this, but Kabarega's people more than once attacked them and killed a Sudanese officer. Colonel Colvile was certainly at the head of a very formidable force, and therefore was able to carry out his policy. He marched into Kabarega's territory with some 16,000 or 17,000 men, about 4,000 of whom were armed with guns or rifles. He seldom took part in discussions on Votes on Account, which he regarded as merely means for providing the Government with money to go on with; but in the present instance new matter had occured which demanded immediate notice. This very large force of course assured success, and Colonel Colvile went on to say that he — determined to occupy a line between Kibiro and the Kafu ford, and to construct a chain of fortified posts between those places, thus cutting his kingdom in half. That was the new policy that had been adopted in these regions. The whole point, therefore, was whether the military operations were such as were necessary for the protection of Uganda, and whether the territory could have been successfully held without them. Colonel Colvile went on to say:— Major Owen had orders, if possible, either to surprise Kabarega or to drive him from that part of his territory, and was further instructed to proceed to Wadelai (30 miles distant), and there recruit a limited number of Emin Pasha's late troops, should any be remaining in the district, and should he succeed in obtaining a sufficient number to form a post at Magungu on his return. On Major Owen's departure, I at once commenced the construction of fortified posts at Kibiro and at Kitanwa, five miles distant, and commanding the food supply of the district. Colonel Colvile reported that— British prestige had been vindicated in that part of Africa, by our prompt retaliation after Kabarega's unprovoked attacks on our ally, the King of Toro and on Usoga, the dependency of Uganda. Colonel Colvile went on to say— Kabarega, the terror of this region, and the rebellious vassal of our ally, the King of Uganda, has been reduced to the position of a petty chieftain, his chief source of wealth, the salt mines of Kibiro, have been taken from him, while the south-western portion of his kingdom has been handed over to a confederation of friendly chiefs, from which he is cut off by our chain of forts. In July, 1894, Colonel Colvile sent out a fresh expedition under Captain Gibbs with the object of breaking Kabarega's power, and, if possible, either capturing him, bringing him to terms, or driving him out of his kingdom. Mr. Grant, who was with Captain Gibbs, said, that when they arrived at the junction of the Zezewa and Kiwa Rivers they found a very narrow strait with the water racing like a mill-stream. He continued:— We paddled against this till our strength was all but exhausted, and seeing that we could make no headway, we decided to tie up for the night. While in the act of doing so, three canoes (one a very large one) crowded with people came down the stream. They were on us before we had hardly time to see them. They were not observed until within a few yards of us, owing to a curve in the river. I was on the right flank, and the large canoe came within a yard of me. I used my rifle to push myself clear, at the same time they received a withering fire which disposed of them. They all disappeared, either shot or dropped into the water. It is impossible to say whether they meant to attack us or not; but we did not wait to ask any questions; I should say they probably did. The action of Her Majesty's Government upon Paper was all that could be desired. The Earl of Kimberley, writing to Colonel Colvile on the 23rd November, 1894, said:— Her Majesty's Government have received with satisfaction the Reports of the success of the operations conducted by Captains Thruston and Gibb in Unyoro. These operations were evidently necessitated by the aggressive attitude of Kabarega and his followers towards the Protectorate. But I would impress upon you that the responsibilities which Her Majesty's Government have undertaken to the north of Lake Victoria are primarily connected with the Protectorate of Uganda as defined in recent Notices and Proclamations, and that you should be careful to keep your action within the limits of such measures as may be necessary for military reasons in order to provide for the defence and security of the Protectorate. He, therefore, could not object to the paper attitude that had been taken up by Her Majesty's Government, but he maintained that the Government agents on the spot had gone beyond the policy which that House would be prepared to sanction. Their policy was opposed to the promises which the Government had made in relation to this subject. Colonel Colvile went on to say— It will be seen from the summary of the diary that Kabarega has at last attacked one of our forts, and been repulsed with heavy loss. I have waited for him to play this, his last, card, before making any overtures of peace to him, but as I now believe that he must be convinced of our strength, I have instructed Captain Thruston to communicate with him. He has, however, been so long and so persistently the enemy of the white man that I have no great hopes of his coming to terms. When was it that Kabarega became the enemy of the white man—certainly he was not the enemy of the white man 20 years ago. What had probably made him the enemy of the white man, if such he were, were proceedings of the character reported by Captain Thruston, who said— The best way of assuring the security of the road is the depopulating of the country on each side of it, and I have hitherto only refrained from doing so as I thought that the inhabitants were more or less merely passive acquiescers in the hostilities, but now, as they have harboured Kabarega's parties, and have given information as to our caravans, such altruism is out of the question, so I have this month, and will in future, vary the ordinary patrols by dispatching larger parties to sleep in the different cultivated districts, burn their bouses, destroy their crops, and cut down the banana plantations. This, I hope, will have a good effect, but I fear that the partial success of their last attempt may encourage the Wanyoro to further molestation of our caravans. The escort of these will, however, be increased, and be either under myself or a Soudanese Captain. Both the captains can be trusted to act vigorously on the offensive, if attacked, and are much more capable than British civilians, who do not know a word of Arabic, and absolutely refuse to make any attempt to learn. Raiding parties, consisting of a company, have during the month been sent to destroy the plantations at Katonga and Matama. These are large and populous districts, the former situated on the east and opposite the centre of the road to Barangwe, the latter about 12 miles down the Kafu from that place. An expedition against Uma was successfully carried out, and his crops were destroyed and his houses burnt. No serious opposition was met with, and it is expected that he will shortly ask for peace. Captain Thruston reported to Colonel Colvile as follows— Before daybreak, on the 11th instant, I surprised Kabarega in his town at Machudi, near the Somerset Nile, and captured his cattle and all his property, and had it been a clear night, I should probably have taken him alive. As I had previously received instructions from you, that should I be fortunate enough to inflict a severe reverse, on him I should make overtures of peace, I have left for him a letter in Arabic, a translation of which I have the honour to attach. But I am informed that no military reverse, however severe, will be, sufficient to induce him to ask for peace, but that he will prefer exile among the Langus, to the east of the Nile, to submission to us. He has now crossed the river, where he will probably stay some time and possibly permanently, and in this latter case, as I am informed, he will at once lose his hold over his Chiefs, and they will gradually make their submission. If, however, in the course of the next few months, he either returns to Unyoro, or, in the event of his not doing so, his Chiefs do not desert him, then a small increase in the strength of our force in Unyoro and the establishment of a fort in the central district near Masindi, which would be made a base whence periodical expeditions (probably one or two would be made sufficient) could be dispatched, would insure the permanent exile of Kabarega from his kingdom, and the ultimate pacification of the country. This was what was termed the pacification of the country over which we did not even pretend to set up a protectorate. Captain Thruston went on to say to Kabarega— If you wish for peace send one of your Sheikhs to me, and I will send him to Uganda to hear from the English Governor in that country the conditions of peace. The first condition will be that you build your house in its former place near our fort at Mapala, and that you should become an obedient British subject. If you accept peace, then 'there shall be no fear or trouble for you,' but if you reject it the war shall be continued as long as you live. In a communication from the Foreign Office to Mr. Jackson, it was stated:— His Lordship has noticed that in the terms of peace which Captain Thrushton offered to Kabarega, it is stated that the latter must become 'an obedient British subject.' I am to observe that no such condition of peace should be insisted on. Unyoro is outside the limits of the British Protectorate, and neither the Chief himself nor any of his subjects can be considered as under the protection, still less as the subjects, of Her Majesty. That was satisfactory, but it was not so satisfactory that the Foreign Office should previously have approved of this military expedition into the dominion of Kabarega. In the instructions to Colonel Colvile, they were distinctly told that Unyoro was outside the limits of the British Protectorate. No raids of any kind had taken place since we had been there. A line of forts had been created, and Kabarega had never been past that line of forts; the most he had ever done was to attack one of those forts when they was pushed into the heart of his territory. In conclusion, he was one of those who was hostile to the Uganda Protectorate; he believed that we were wasting our money there, and doing more harm than good. We were not really benefiting the cause of civilisation; we should never get back the money we had spent; and the European Powers were engaged in a wildgoose chase in these expeditions which they sent to the heart of Africa. It was no use our attempting to conduct warlike operations at a distance of 1,100 miles from the coast. We should have remained on the coast of Africa, and carried through treaties with the Portuguese, which would have given us the freedom to trade and missionary enterprise throughout their dominions. We had chosen to enter upon the other course, and they were obliged, more or less, now to adopt that view because it had been established by the House of Commons. He was not one of those who were disinclined that this country should assume heavy responsibilities; it was only the Central African policy that he did not accept; but even if he accepted that policy, as regarded the Uganda Protectorate, he should still say that this Unyoro policy was a dangerous extension of it, one which had cost an enormous amount of human suffering, and allied us with native auxiliaries of whom we must feel ashamed.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir EDWARD GREY, Northumberland, Berwick)

said, he could not quite agree that the point of view from which the right hon. Baronet had spoken was really the true point of view which was warranted and justified by the history of the facts. The right hon. Baronet first of all dealt with the origin of Kabarega's hostility to the Uganda policy, and he told the House that he considered that hostility to have been provoked mainly by two causes, which were very closely connected—first, by the establishment of a system of forts by Captain Lugard some years ago, and by the garrisoning of those forts with Sudanese troops, who were left without European control, and whose acts were undoubtedly calculated to provoke the hostility of their neighbours. A point with which the right hon. Baronet did not deal was—that when Sir Gerald Portal went to Uganda he insisted upon the forts being withdrawn, and on the Sudanese being placed under the control of Europeans. Since that time the Sudanese had remained under the control of Europeans, and they had had no account from that part of Africa of further excesses committed by those Sudanese troops, one of whose qualities was that they were amenable to discipline as long as a European was over them. Assuming that the causes of Kabarega's hostility were those stated by the right hon. Baronet, they were removed by Sir Gerald Portal, but when they were removed did Kabarega's hostility cease? In the last Blue Book on Uganda it was stated:— In September 1893, in accordance with Sir Gerald Portal's views, the garrisons of all the Unyoro forts were withdrawn into Uganda; some few Wanyoro, who were friendly and who feared Kabarega, were granted land in Uganda. Practically, Sir Gerald Portal did then what the right hon. Baronet was asking that we should send imperative instructions to have done again at this moment. The result of withdrawing those forts at that time was so unsatisfactory, that he thought they ought to be cautious in interfering with the discretion of the authorities on the spot. "The withdrawal from the old forts," it was stated, "was considered by Kabarega as a victory," and, so far from having pacified him, Colonel Colvile found that there were frequent acts of aggression, and that the situation in fact was an impossible one. Colonel Colvile had stated:— Kabarega's frequent previous acts of aggression, the death within our territory, at the hands of his troops, of our native officer Shukri Effendi in May last, the fact that he had kidnapped and still holds in slavery 20,000 Waganda subjects, that he had neglected for years past to pay the tribute due by him to the King of Uganda, that his capital is the only remaining great slave trade centre of this part of Africa —which he thought of very great importance—"had long given good cause for forcibly bringing him to reason." He had summed that up by saying that Colonel Colville found the situation to be impossible. Some steps had to be taken, and the steps which were taken were the re-establishment of a line of forts, not exactly in the places of Captain Lugard's forts, but so placed as to be best calculated to prevent Kabarega from committing acts of hostility against Uganda. The ground on which the retention of those forts had been justified, was that they were necessary for the peace of Uganda itself, and their maintenance was still justified on that ground. If it did not clearly appear, from the information at their disposal, that they were necessary, he should still hesitate to send more peremptory instructions than had been sent already. The latest information that the Government had was that Kabarega had used a truce, which was granted him by Captain Thruston, simply as a blind, and that after having apparently accepted the truce he had again instigated certain bands of Unyoro people, numbering as many as 1,300, to raise two provinces of Uganda. The object of Kabarega in doing this was to break through the line of forts in order to establish communications with Arabs further south, from whom he could get large supplies of gunpowder. He had not the least doubt that Kabarega wanted those supplies of gunpowder in order that they might be used in a way very disadvantageous to Uganda. They had not the slightest evidence that Kabarega's attitude would be more friendly in the future than it had been in the past. The right hon. Baronet had pointed out that in the terms offered to Kabarega by Captain Thruston certain conditions were made, among others that of becoming a British subject, which were not in accordance with the policy which had been laid down. So late as April 6, they had sent instructions that in the terms offered to Kabarega no such conditions should be insisted upon. The condition which must be insisted upon was that Kabarega should be a friendly neighbour to Uganda, and at present all the evidence at their disposal went to show that he was not willing to accept any such condition. On the contrary, he was still implacable, and he thought the utmost that could be done in the way of sending instructions to promote a peaceable settlement with Kabarega had been done, and until they had further evidence that the authorities on the spot could deal more leniently or by less aggressive measures than they had been obliged to undertake in the past, he thought it would be wrong to send further and stricter instructions than had already been sent. He hoped the right hon. Baronet would see that, as far as the present situation was concerned, the Government had kept faith with the House of Commons, and that they had guided their policy on the lines laid down last year. The Government trusted that the instructions they had laid down with the authorities on the spot would prove to be effective and satisfactory. It must be remembered that it took three mouths to communicate with our officials in Uganda, and therefore that it was unavoidable that much must be left to their discretion. The Government were confident, however, that the new Commissioner who had been appointed—a most able, experienced, and discreet officer—would do his utmost to act up to the letter of his instructions, and at the same time would do everything in his power to so administer the country as to insure peace and to promote its best interests.

SIR G. BADEN-POWELL (Liverpool, Kirkdale)

, wished to offer one or two remarks in reference to the Amendment. The explanation made by the hon. Baronet on behalf of the Government would, he believed, be regarded generally as very satisfactory. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean had gone, in his very lucid speech, to the very root of our whole policy in Africa, but looking to the sparse attendance of hon. Members, and to the time of the Session, he did not think a question of such importance could be adequately debated that afternoon. Though therefore, he should not enter largely into the subject, he wished the House and the public to understand that there were some who took great interest in the question, but did not agree with the views of the right hon. Gentleman. When the occasion offered, he should like to point out that there was one important point on which the right hon. Gentleman had not touched, namely, the view taken or entertained as to the future social and material condition of the populations of the territories in question to be dealt with. The establishment of the line of forts and the flying columns that had been spoken of were, after all, really two indications that our administrations were carrying out the principles of the Brussels Act, and the regulations for the stoppage of the slave trade, and the amelioration of the condition of the nations. Those regulations were arrived at after mature consideration, and the forts and flying columns were only two means for promoting the desirable end referred to. He noticed that the right hon. Gentleman spoke of Colonel Colvile as if he acted simply under his Commission as a Major in the Guards. It was nothing of the kind. He acted under commission from Her Majesty to do great acts of State, and, judging from his own little personal experiences in similar circumstances, he did not think the language used by Colonel Colvile was at all inappropriate. On those occasions it was right and wise to speak the language of high State documents; in fact, it was the only way to make a proper impression on the native chiefs, and also on those Europeans, or semi-Europeans, who were always to be found near the chiefs as their advisers. Both the Under Secretary and the right hon. Member for the Forest of Dean had shown that we had arrived at this state of affairs in Uganda—we had crushed the power of the various chiefs and the opportunities of Kabarega to do evil, but we had not done what in honour we were bound to do—set up some efficient administration in place of that which we had destroyed. That must be the keynote of our future policy in Uganda. It was the only policy, he was confident, that the House of Commons would approve, and he trusted that in view of the great distance of the country, and the consequent difficulties and delay in communication, the Government would shortly take measures to facilitate that communication, and remove the difficulties of transit. He hoped the Government would pursue their policy in Uganda, until they joined hands with the civilised forces of Egypt, and established our influence over the whole watershed of the Nile. If they pushed forward with energy on the path they had adopted, they would certainly be working for the interests and advantage of this country and of East Africa alike.

MR. T. GIBSON BOWLES (Lynn Regis)

said, his views were very much in accord with those of the right hon. Member for the Forest of Dean. [Sir E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT laughed ironically. The hon. Member for Sheffield might laugh, but what he said was the fact, and he would point out to the hon. Gentleman that at least the right hon. Baronet spoke on the question with a knowledge of the facts and a knowledge of the geography of the country. He would yield to no one in readiness to give the money necessary for the work in Uganda if it were worth doing. But it was not worth doing, and we ought not to have had anything to do with it. Uganda was so far from the sea coast—1,100 miles and more—and it was so difficult to communicate with it, that under existing conditions, at all events, we should never get any advantage from it. We had no need to be in Uganda, and in the way the Government had taken to get there they had acted contrary to all the traditions under which the Empire had been built up. The sea coast was our true basis of operations. In acquiring territory hitherto our practice had been to occupy the sea coast, and to leave it to the energy and enterprise of private individuals—acting independently of the Government, without orders and sometimes against orders—to push forward gradually further and further into the interior. That was the way we built up our Indian Empire. In that way, and in that way alone, had we been able to establish our sway over the whole of India. If we had begun to build up India in the way we were now pursuing with regard to Uganda, he ventured to say we should not have had in our possession to-day a shred of that Empire. If the object were to establish communication with the interior of East Africa, the far better course would have been to establish a line of communication from Suakin to Berber. To occupy Uganda for the purpose was to begin altogether at the wrong point The story told by the Under Secretary showed that our presence and action in Uganda would be surrounded by difficulties. In regard to the chain of forts, they had been told that after they were first established Sir G. Portal came to the decision to abandon them. They were abandoned, but Colonel Colvile subsequently resolved to re-occupy them; and they were now occupied and armed. Of course those forts would always be a running sore to the wild chieftains in and near such a country as Uganda, and the consequence would be that we should have to submit to our authority being defied every now and again, or to be continually extending our area of control, with the result of ever-increasing expenditure and responsibility. That was one of the dangers we should have to encounter, and of course the danger was greatly increased by the distance of the country from the coast. How could such a large territory be properly governed at three months' distance from Downing Street? Our plan in the past in the acquisition of territory was first to occupy the coast, to work gradually inwards, and to keep communication open from the sea—not to make a Government or official job of the work, but to leave private individuals to work their way on by perseverance and commercial enterprise. Generally speaking, Government undertakings of this kind failed. We did not want to be in Uganda at all. The time had not arrived for us to go there; it might in a hundred years or so, but at present any expenditure in trying to establish ourselves there was a waste of public money. He had always looked on this Uganda adventure with the gravest apprehension. He believed it was an unwise and an unfortunate undertaking, and he should be glad to hear that means were on the point of being found which would enable us to retire from Uganda in an honourable way.

SIR. TEMPLE (Surrey, Kingston)

thought it a waste of time to discuss whether we ought to be in Uganda or not. We were already there, and went there with the solemn consent and approval of Parliament, and we should have to remain there. It was merely beating the air, therefore, to talk over and over again about whether we ought or ought not to have gone there. The one and only question which now remained to consider was whether, being in Uganda, we should do our duty there. One thing was plain—that as we were in the country we were bound to exercise control in it. It was quite true, as the hon. Member for Lynn Regis had said, that our proper basis was on the sea coast. Well, so it was in this case, and he contended that the best and safest way of holding Uganda, and holding it with advantage to East Africa and to this country, was to construct a railway from Mombasa to Uganda. As to our duty and responsibility in the matter, there were two reasons for occupying Uganda—the policy of acquiring control over the waters of the Nile, and the stoppage of the slave trade. These were the reasons why we ought to be in Uganda; and he had listened with satisfaction to what fell from the Under Secretary on the subject. He hoped the Government would not be deterred by the arguments of the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean from pursuing the righteous course which they had adopted.

MR. ALPHEUS MORTON (Peterborough)

said, he had always objected to the Uganda Votes, and he was glad to have an opportunity of supporting the Amendment. He did not believe the suppression of the slave trade had anything to do with this question. In any case, we could not go all over the world for the purpose of suppressing slavery. There was a good deal of slavery to put down in this country. When the Charter was granted to the British East Africa Company the House of Commons was distinctly told that it had no responsibility whatever. Were they to continue the policy of allowing chartered companies to start adventures of this sort, and then to take them over at the expense of the people, when every bit of evidence they had showed that they were of no good to us? At a time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer was refusing all grants in aid of the people of this country, we could not afford to spend the taxpayers' money in a wildgoose chase out in Africa. He was in favour of good honest colonial enterprise, but they knew that Europeans could not live and thrive in Uganda, and that except on the seaboard it would afford no opening for British trade. The continuation of this jingo policy must mean an expenditure of millions of money, and he regarded the Amendment as a protest against future expenditure of this kind. He was sorry that a Radical Government should be carrying out enterprises which were supported by their opponents, and which they condemned in the strongest terms when they were in Opposition. He hoped a more reasonable and liberal policy would be adopted in reference to this matter.

MR. W. P. BYLES (York, W.R., Shipley)

did not think any hon. Member could have listened to the speech of the right hon. Baronet who moved the Amendment without having been greatly impressed by the very strong case which he made out. For his part, he could not understand how any English gentleman could listen to the story of the doings of those who represented us in Central Africa without a blush of shame Such incidents as the boat incident—to which, by the way, no reference whatever was made by the Under Secretary—ought to be made known far and wide in this land, and that men should know that our prancing pro-Consuls in Central Africa were doing these things in their name, and that the Government of this country was putting its hands into the pockets of the taxpayers to pay for such doings. A withering fire upon a boatload of innocent and unarmed natives, who were destroyed, dropped into the river, and so forth! And they were told by eminent authorities on the other side of the House that we were there, and must stay there and spend this money. He did not believe that we ever ought to have gone there, and thought the sooner we came away the better. The hon. Member for Kirkdale rejoiced that, since we had had influence in Uganda, we had destroyed the power of the Princes around. To his mind, that was the greatest condemnation of our African policy. If that policy were pursued, we must go forward until British influence was paramount all over Central Africa. The hon. Member said he did not believe the House would vote for any other policy. He might be right, but there were tens of thousands of voters in the country who did not approve of that policy. If the working men of this country could have listened to that Debate, he did not believe that for a moment they would approve of this encroaching and aggrandising policy in Africa. His conscience would not allow him, whatever Government was in power, to vote this money for Uganda. He did not believe that the people whom he represented desired that the money should be spent in this way, and if the hon. Baronet went to a Division he should deem it his duty to support him.

MR. J. G. WEIR (Ross and Cromarty)

desired to lodge his protest against the policy of the Government on this question. What right had they to provide means to prop up a number of company-mongers who wished to carry on their enterprises in Central Africa? They could not get a shilling out of the Treasury for useful work in the Highlands of Scotland, and it was very hard lines to find these large sums voted for quite unnecessary purposes.

Amendment proposed, to leave out "£5,310,050," and insert "£5,307,050."—(Sir Charles Dilke.)

Question put, "That '£5,310,050' stand part of the Resolution."

The House divided:—Ayes, 79; Noes, 27.—(Division List, No. 119.)

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