§ THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER,), Isle of Wightin rising to move—
That John Daly, returned as a Member for the City of Limerick, having been adjudged guilty of felony and sentenced to penal servitude for life, and being now imprisoned under such sentence, is incapable of being elected or returned as a Member of this House,said that it was unnecessary to go back before 1870, because by the Treason-Felony Act of that year, section 2, it was provided that any person who after that date was convicted of felony and sentenced to penal servitude, should, until he had served his sentence or received a free pardon, be disqualified from holding any military office or from being returned as a Member to Parliament, or from sitting or voting therein. Hon. Members were perfectly well acquainted with the provisions of the section, and there was no doubt as to the course to be adopted. A similar state of circumstances arose in O'Donovan Rossa's case, when Mr. Gladstone brought forward a motion in the same terms as in the motion now before the House. The question arose again in the year 1875, when a similar motion was proposed by Mr. Disraeli; and again in 1882, when the motion was made by Sir H. James as Attorney General. He had, therefore, only to bring to the notice of the House the facts in regard to John Daly. On July 27, 1884, at the assizes at Warwick, John Daly was tried and convicted of treason-felony, and sentenced to penal servitude for life. This appeared from a paper which had been laid upon the Table of the House. Then there was a certificate from the 390 Governor of Portland Prison, which was also laid upon the Table of the House, showing that John Daly was now in his custody, undergoing his sentence. No question arose here except the carrying out of the law. By the law of the land, upon which he relied, and by the precedents of Parliament he submitted this motion. ["Hear, hear!"]
§ MR. T. HARRINGTON (Dublin, Harbour)said, he did not think that hon. Members would agree with the hon. Gentleman that this was quite so simple a matter as he tried to make them believe. In one sense the House had only to deal with the disqualification of a man returned at an election, but quite a different question arose as to the competency of the House and the right of the House to decide that question. It was quite true, as the hon. and learned Gentleman had just quoted, that a person convicted of felony could not sit in that House. On the other hand, they had a statute passed by the House referring this question of disqualification, and the question of examining and inquiring into the return to a writ to a special legal tribunal, and the question was whether, the House having transferred by statute to a judicial tribunal this duty, it was competent for the House to again exercise that jurisdiction. If it was, where was it likely to lead them? He was aware that he was precluded by the forms of the House from raising any question of the policy of releasing a person who had been unanimously elected by the people of Limerick, but he would like to be permitted to say one word in defence of the attitude taken up by the electors of Limerick. John Daly was a citizen of their town, pretty well known to all shades of men.
§ * MR. SPEAKERThe hon. Gentleman would not be in order in commenting on that. I have no doubt he would, as he proposes, deal shortly with it, but it would lead probably to answer and debate on a matter which is not relevant to the Motion. Therefore I must ask him not to enter into that topic.
§ MR. HARRINGTONsaid he did not intend to raise the question of amnesty and he bowed to the Speaker's ruling, but he thought it was competent on the Motion to disqualify a particular Member to show that he ought not to be disqualified.
§ * MR. SPEAKERI have not said the contrary. If the hon. Member can show that he is by law not disqualified, it is competent to enter into that; but what the people of Limerick have done cannot affect the question. They have elected him; that is admitted, but the question is whether he was qualified by law.
§ MR. HARRINGTONsaid, that his object was to take exception to the procedure in the Motion made by the hon. and learned Gentleman, and he thought the time had come to place this question of disqualification of a Member returned for any constituency upon better and safer grounds than at present exist. He was aware, of course, the Motion made by the hon. Gentleman was not without precedent. They had had similar motions to that in the three last cases of the kind that had been examined by the House, but every time the Motion was made the same Amendment which he had now the honour to submit to the House, and in practically the same terms, had been made, and the question had turned mainly on the competency of the House, after having delegated to a judicial tribunal the duty of examining the return to a writ, to again take upon itself the duty of examining the writ and deciding upon it. The Election Petitions Act, 1868, chap. 68, sec. 50, enacted—
After the next Dissolution of Parliament no election or return shall be questioned except in accordance with the provisions of this Act.Everybody who had listened to the Motion made by the hon. and learned Gentleman knew perfectly well that in the Motion he had submitted he wanted the House to examine the return to a writ made by a constituency, and there was undoubtedly an assumption by the House of interference with the jurisdiction delegated by that Act to a judicial tribunal. There were two important facts to be considered in connection with the bearings of the section. In the first place the House had never, since the passing of the Act, at least in any case I have examined, interfered with the return to a writ except in those special cases of conviction for treason-felony.
§ THE ATTORNEY-GENERALpointed out that what the hon. and 392 learned Gentleman had been referring to as to the competency of the House was expressly decided by the House in the third case, the case of Mr. Davitt, whose name he had not intended mentioning. In that case it was decided that the House must interfere, and that it was not for the Election Judges to do so.
§ MR. HARRINGTONsaid, that his point was that precisely. A similar Amendment was made and the question was debated, and one of the authorities of the House, whom he would like to cite, was a right hon. Gentleman who gave it as his opinion that the House was entering upon a very dangerous precedent. ["Hear, hear."] The words of the right hon. Gentleman were—
There was great danger in acting as the Government proposed to do in the matter for this reason, that though the House had then on the Table the record of a conviction which showed that somebody in the year 1870 had bean convicted for treason-felony, there was no evidence of identity, or of the transactions which had taken place at the Election;and the right hon. Gentleman opposed the Motion which was then made on behalf of the Government. If they were to have the right of a person to be returned by a constituency to sit in the House determined on Party lines, the question ought to be submitted to a Select Committee of the House, and there ought to be an authoritative decision upon it. It was curious that the House had never questioned the return for a writ since the passing of the Act of 1867, except with regard to cases of treason-felony and murder; but, more singularly still, the House had not consistently kept in its own hands the right of examining into the qualification. In the case of O'Donovan Rossa quite a new principle was introduced, because this was a case where there was no sentence of death, and where attainder did not follow. The House decided in that case, even after the Election Petition Act had been passed, that inasmuch as O'Donovan Rossa was still undergoing a term of imprisonment for treason, he was disqualified. But in the case of John Mitchell, which was debated in the House in 1875, a still further step was taken by the Government of the day; Mitchell was not confined at the time of his election; he had been sentenced to a 393 term of penal servitude, but had escaped from imprisonment, and it was contended that, not having purged the sentence, he was disqualified from sitting in the House. But even then some of the best legal authorities in the House questioned the action of the Government of the day, and an amendment similar to that which he had now the honour of submitting, opposing the Motion made on behalf of the Government of the day, was submitted by the Marquess of Hartington. On that occasion the Leader of the Opposition said, that, as he understood the matter until the case of O'Donovan Rossa, there was no authority for stating that any offence whatever, except one which was of a capital character, and upon which, of course, attainder followed, constituted a disability for a seat in the House. He was not disputing that the question of disqualification was settled by the statute, but he entirely denied the wisdom or right of that House, having delegated to a competent legal authority the question of examining the return for a writ, assuming the function which had thus been transferred to another tribunal. The passing of the Act of 1870, carrying with it the disqualification of particular persons, throw upon the tribunal they had established the right of examining into such matters. If the majority of the House decided practically that a person who was disqualified from taking his seat in the House should sit in the House, they would be going in the teeth of the statute. It was not creditable to that assembly that the qualification of its members should rest on such a shaky foundation. What was the tribunal which was to decide? In the case of John Mitchell the House disqualified him from sitting, and when the electors of Tipperary returned him a second time the House abandoned its functions and did not inquire at all into the matter. In face of such inconsistent action would the Attorney-General inform them what was the tribunal which really had to settle this question? Could a Sheriff on a nomination disqualify the person who was nominated because he was a felon? If so he thought a Select Committee should be appointed by the House to inquire into the matter and have it so determined. They had now three tribunals examining into the question; 394 the Sheriff might do so, the Election Judges might do so, and the House of Commons was taking upon itself in the present instance the duty of doing so. As the question stood at the present time, so far from the matter being simplified by the Act of 1870, if the House of Commons was to keep jurisdiction over it, its duty would become much more difficult than it was now. It was not creditable that a law regulating the qualification of the Members of that House should rest upon so doubtful a basis. He therefore moved to leave out all the words of the Motion after the word "that" in order to insert the following words:—A Select Committee be appointed to examine into all the precedents as to the law of Parliament involved in the return of John Daly for the city of Limerick, and to Report to the House the steps that ought to be taken under the circumstances
§ MR. JOHN REDMOND (Waterford)asked the Speaker, on a point of Order, whether, if the Amendment was negatived, it would not then be impossible to move any further Amendment. If the House decided that the words of the Motion do stand part of the question, he apprehended that it would be incompetent for a Member to move any further Amendment, and he would therefore respectfully ask whether the question could not be put in another form?
§ * MR. SPEAKERsaid, that he was following the ordinary practice in the case of Resolutions when an Amendment was moved to substitute other words for those after the first word "that." What the hon. Gentleman referred to, was the practice in dealing with the clauses of a Bill; but in the case of an Amendment to the Second Reading of a Bill, or a Resolution, the Amendment was put in the way he had just adopted.
MR. T. M. HEALYsaid, the course taken by the Attorney-General, and the remarks he had made, showed that he had not taken any trouble to advise himself as to the course usually followed by Parliament in similar circumstances. This was evident from the absence from his Motion of the operative and peculiar pendant that "Mr. Speaker do issue his warrant for a new Writ." The course now followed was absolutely without precedent, and the Motion in its present 395 form could have no operative effect whatever. It was a nullity. The House had hitherto proceeded in a particular way in regard to these transactions, because a matter of privilege, affecting the status of a man who was alleged to be unworthy of a seat in the House, was involved. Take the case of the last Grand Master of the Orange Lodges, Mr. De Cobain, who was expelled from the House.
§ MR. W. JOHNSTON (Belfast, S.)He was never Grand Master of the Orange Lodges.
§ MR. W. JOHNSTONNever.
MR. T. M. HEALYsaid, he was usually supposed to be, and boasted of being so. The treatment Mr. De Cobain received from the House was, in his opinion, illegal, and he protested and voted against it. The Motion in the case of Mr. De Cobain was one for expulsion, because he was an unworthy Member; and to go back to the days of Sadlier, and of other men expelled, the Motion was accompanied by the pendant that a new Writ be issued. In the case of Mr. Smith O'Brien, the Motion was made on the ground that he was attainted of felony, and his election was, therefore, held to be void. That case was followed by that of O'Donovan Rossa, but the Act of 1870 had not been passed when he was elected. The Motion in that case, as in that of John Mitchel, was of a different character, but it was followed by the pendant that a new Writ should issue. Then came the case of Mr. Michael Davitt, and the form pursued in that case was now followed by the Attorney-General with slavish ignorance. The Motion declared that Mr. Davitt "is" incapable—for the Act of 1870 had not passed, and Mr. Davitt could not be declared "was" incapable by Statute at the time of election. But Mr. Daly was elected after the passing of the Act of 1870, and the precedent of Mr. Davitt did not apply to the present case. It was clear that the Motion should be that Mr. John Daly "was" incapable, and the Motion was necessarily inoperative unless followed by Motion to issue a new Writ. Here was a Motion for the first time founded on the Statute of 1870, but the Motion read "is incapable." Further, there was a serious variance between the Return and the Motion. Mr. John Daly 396 was convicted of "treason felony," but the Motion before the House declared the crime to be "felony." ["Oh, oh!"] The right hon. Gentleman, who was so anxious at the time of the Parnell Commission to get John Daly's evidence that he sent Mr. Soames on a special mission to get it, might have observed ordinary courtesy in speaking of Mr. Daly. He would call him the hon. Member for Limerick, and he thought they ought to give him the courtesy which his election to Parliament deserved. John Daly was not convicted of an offence against the ordinary law—[cries of "Oh!"]—but he was imprisoned for an offence against the Act of 1848—the Treason Felony Act—and at least he was entitled to a true description of his offence, and should not be classed as a felon with burglars, garotters, and wife-beaters. The record, as far as he knew—for he had not a copy—described the offence as "treason felony."
§ THE ATTORNEY-GENERALhere handed across the floor to Mr. T. M. Healy a copy of the record.
MR. T. M. HEALYsaid, he found the document rather lengthy, and he would not read it. In 1882, it was ruled by the then Speaker that it would not be in order to discuss the merits of the case on such a Motion, but suppose an Amendment were moved to the effect that John Daly be expelled and that a new Writ should issue, then the whole circumstances of the conviction could be discussed, together with the question whether he was or was not entitled to clemency. The question before the House was not one of simple legality as the Attorney-General had presented it, but was one of privilege. The hon. and learned Gentleman had said that the law was settled by the cases of Mr. Davitt and of Smith O'Brien. As a matter of fact, all that was settled by those cases was a particular kind of procedure, which procedure the hon. and learned Gentleman had not followed, because he had omitted the Motion for issuing the Writ. The Attorney-General had declared that the Government were bound by the Statute of 1870. He could not accept that view, for anyone who gave attention to the Statute must come to the conclusion that it was an Act for operation in a Court of Law. That House did not pass Statutes about its 397 procedure; it passed Rules and Standing Orders. There was no Statute to regulate the Procedure in the case of Mr. John Daly, just as there was none to regulate the procedure in the case of Mr. De Cobain. The condition in the Statute was that a man must be sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment or more, but Mr. De Cobain was expelled from the House simply because a warrant had been issued against him. Therefore expulsion from the House did not depend upon the contents of the Statute, and this Resolution ought not to have been founded upon it. Mr. De Cobain, as a matter of fact, never did get twelve months' imprisonment, but was let off with six months. The precedent set in the case of Mr. De Cobain ought to have been followed. Mr. De Cobain was expelled from the House before conviction. [The ATTORNEY-GENERAL: "He was never tried."] The hon. and learned Member was mistaken, but as it was an Irish case that was not to be wondered at.
§ MR. PARKER SMITH (Lanark, Partick)asked whether the hon. Member was in order in discussing the case of Mr. De Cobain.
§ * MR. SPEAKERsaid, that it was in order for the hon. Member to attempt to show that there was a parallel case to the one under consideration. The question of the weight to be attached to the parallel was not a matter of order.
MR. T. M. HEALYobserved that it was a matter for the jury. The Motion before the House would have no effect on the legal status of Mr. John Daly, whose disability existed now. What would affect him and the electors of Limerick was the issue of a new Writ, and to that point the hon. and learned Gentleman had not addressed himself. In previous cases a Motion for the issue of a new Writ had, he believed, always been made. Where now was the Motion for the issue of the Writ? In 1882, Sir Henry James put down a Motion for the issue of a Writ. Mr. Gladstone, in 1870, moved his Motion in regard to O'Donovan Rossa, and put down a Motion for the issue of a Writ. In Mitchell's case, Mr. Disraeli also put down a Motion for the issue of a Writ. It was left for the present Tory Party, which founded itself upon 398 precedents, to omit this Motion. He submitted that they were entitled to have some light thrown upon this matter. At the time of Mr. Davitt's Election for Meath, in 1882, another gentleman had been nominated with him, and Sir Charles Lewis, then Conservative Member for Derry, drew attention to the fact in the House of Commons. In consequence of his arguments, which were endorsed by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Plymouth (Sir E. Clarke), Sir Henry James declared that as it was within the bounds of possibility that the gentleman nominated with Mr. Davitt might proceed to a Petition, he would allow the time within which a petition must be presented to elapse before moving for the issue of a Writ, and that time was allowed to elapse. Now, together with Mr. Daly, Mr. Francis O'Keefe, a former Member of this House, was nominated for Limerick. Was it not also within the bounds of possibility that Mr. O'Keefe might proceed to a Petition, and therefore ought not the precedent set by Sir Henry James to be followed? Neither the Attorney-General for England, nor the Attorney-General for Ireland, whose presence in that House every Irish lawyer must welcome, had said one word upon this important point. The fact was that the Government had not approached this subject with sufficient learning and research. It was unfortunate for the interests of House of Commons procedure that these questions involving privilege were generally considered in connection with the case of some Irish Member. When this House dealt with Irish Members, it was a case of "short shrift and a short rope." If they were now dealing with the case of the humblest Englishman, or with the smallest English question, the Law Officers of the Crown would not hesitate to devote hours to the consideration of the matter, and to treat it as of the highest constitutional gravity and importance. He deplored, as a Member of Parliament, the rather superficial way in which the Attorney General had addressed himself to this subject. He hoped that in the future, when the hon. and learned Gentleman had to deal with grave matters of this kind he would condescend to give the House a 399 fuller exposition of its practice and of the law than he had done on the present occasion.
§ * THE ATTORNEY-GENERALsaid, it would probably be for the convenience of the House he should say a word at the present stage. It was not the first time that the hon. and learned Member for Louth had criticised both his conduct and his knowledge of law.
§ * THE ATTORNEY-GENERALwent on to say that he would lay to heart the strictures of the hon. and learned Gentleman, and endeavour to profit by the advice he had given. Now, the point raised was that this matter ought to be left to an Election Judge. That was a question which had been already argued out. It was the subject of formal discussion in connection with Mr. Davitt's case in 1882, which was, as he had already stated, after the Election Petition Act was passed; there was in fact no case for a petition, but it was the right and duty of this House to declare that the return made to the Writ was no return at all. Therefore, although the hon. Gentleman was quite within his right in bringing forward this Amendment, there was no reason at all why the House should adopt the course of directing an inquiry which could lead to but one result. There could be no doubt at all that Mr. John Daly was convicted of treason felony, and that he was now suffering the sentence for which he was convicted. That fact was matter of common knowledge, and an inquiry in these circumstances would serve no reasonable purpose, and would be a useless waste of time. The hon. and learned Member for Louth had in the course of his observations been very severe on him for not moving that the Writ should issue. That, however, was not a matter for one occupying the position of Attorney General. Anybody might put that Motion down. Nobody knew better than the hon. and learned Member the rivalries that existed in days gone by with regard to who should make the Motion for the issue of Writs. There might be rivalry in some parts or sections of the House as to who should make the Motion. It did not appear to the Government that it was a question for them, though it was their duty to 400 see that no unreasonable delay took place.
MR. T. M. HEALYDoes the hon. and learned Gentleman contend that Daly could not be a Member of this House up to the moment when the Writ was issued?
§ * THE ATTORNEY-GENERALreplied that in his opinion Daly could not be a Member of this House, and was not a Member of this House at the present time. ["Hear, hear!"] It was an absolute absurdity to suggest that this House was not bound by the law of the land. It could no more declare that John Daly was a Member of the House and was entitled to come here, than it could allow a woman or child to enter its walls as a Member of Parliament. He was distinctly of opinion that John Daly was not at this moment a Member, and could not be allowed to fulfil any of the functions or enjoy any of the privileges of a Member of this House. He was sure the learned Member would acquit him of any want of courtesy if he did not dwell upon the hon. Member's personal aspersions upon himself. He would lay them to heart, having sufficiently dealt with the various points raised by the hon. and learned Member.
§ * MR. CLANCY (Dublin County, N.)said, that by Act of Parliament passed in 1868, it was declared that after the next Dissolution of Parliament, no election or return should be questioned except in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and the manner in which such election or return was to be questioned was by petition. No more sweeping pronouncement could be conceived than was contained in that section. The answer of the learned Attorney-General that this matter had been argued out before was no answer at all. On the contrary, the fact that the question had been argued before in the House suggested that there was a question and a serious question to argue. In truth, this matter could not be settled in a satisfactory mariner except by a Select Committee or some other tribunal which would take upon itself the investigation of all the precedents and facts. The House had committed illegalities before in such matters as these. Some 120 years ago, John Wilkes was returned to this House. He was returned more than once, and was more than once expelled from the 401 House, and on one occasion his election was declare null and void, and not only so, but the House declared another person, who had only a minority of votes, entitled to take the seat. A few years afterwards, in 1782, a Resolution was passed by the House of Commons, declaring all its previous action illegal, and Lord Campden, in the House of Lords, stated that the action taken in regard to Wilkes had inflicted a greater wound on the Constitution than anything done during the whole reign of Charles I. The House of Commons might pass a Resolution expelling a Member, or declare that a particular person was unfit to sit in this House, but he submitted with great deference that the House of Commons could not make a law and could not create a disqualification which did not exist, and could not prescribe any way of avoiding an election, except that which the law had laid down. Now, in 1868, Parliament undoubtedly laid down the law in regard to this matter, as he had stated it—namely, that this House could not proceed to disqualify a candidate or declare an election void, except by way of petition. There was one further argument in support of the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend and, it was this: A Return had been presented to the House of the conviction of a person named John Daly, and also a second return from the Governor of Portland prison declaring that a John Daly was now a prisoner in that place. The Attorney-General smiled at the suggestion that there was not sufficient indentification. Last Session the Earl of Selborne died. Everybody knew that Viscount Wolmer had succeeded to his father's title and position in the House of Lords, but the House of Commons did not proceed to take action without inquiry. Everybody knew that the gentleman who was then Earl of Selborne was sitting in the House of Commons; there was not a single human being in England who did not feel morally convinced that there was a person sitting in the one House who ought to be in the other. What was done? The late Chancellor of the Exchequer took the very course that was suggested by his hon. and learned Friend now, and moved for the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire whether the Earl of Selborne had died, and whether his 402 eldest son had succeeded to the title, and should therefore take his place in the House of Lords, although Viscount Wolmer himself declared that he was his father's eldest son, and that his father was dead. There was another illustration afforded only a few days ago. That was the return of the two Writs for Monaghan, in which an error had been made as to the name of the hon. Member, in each case the gentleman who had been returned for the one division having had his name inserted in the Writ relating to the other division and vice versâ. Everybody knew that one hon. Member had been returned for North Monaghan and the other for South Monaghan, but the House was not satisfied, and actually went to the trouble of summoning from Ireland the Clerk of the Crown, commanding him to take a walk up the floor of the House and to alter the Writs in the presence of Mr. Speaker. Nor was this all. The two hon. Members were called upon to name the Divisions for which they had been returned, but the House would not believe even the two Members themselves, and another colleague had to get up in his place to corroborate their statement. On the ground that there was no proof of identification, and also on the further ground that they ought to settle this matter once and for all, he ventured to submit that the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend ought to be accepted.
§ MR. MAURICE HEALY (Cork), remarked that the Attorney-General had himself demonstrated the futility of the Motion he had moved. He had told them that John Daly was not a Member of this House, therefore, the Motion did not either make a new law nor did it enforce the existing Law. If there was any doubt, and the hon. and learned Gentleman considered that the House of Commons should express its opinion as to what the law was, such a Motion might be made. But the Attorney-General was emphatic in his statement that the law was clear and that no declaration was required. On the other hand, the law being clear, if the hon. and learned Gentleman and his Government had desired to enforce the law, then his conduct would have been intelligible and his Motion would have been understood, because it 403 might have been said it was the business of the House not to declare the law, but to enforce it. But the hon. and learned Gentleman did not contend that there was any necessity to declare the law, and did not take upon himself the duty of enforcing it, therefore, the Motion was a mere nullity having no effect, either legal or otherwise, and he was completely at a loss to know why the hon. and learned Gentleman had moved it. But there was both a question of law and of fact involved. The question of fact was the identity of the person referred to in the Motion, and the hon. and learned Gentleman asked them to decide that without any evidence whatever. Before the House was called upon to resolve any question of fact, the practice of the House had been to require that evidence of the most complete character should be given. In addition to the question of fact, which they were asked to solve without evidence, the Attorney-General had also asked them to declare their opinion on the question of law. The hon. and learned Gentleman thought the law was perfectly plain, but that was not so clear. That House had no power to make law, and if it passed twenty resolutions declaring the law was in a particular manner it would be perfectly open to any Member to get up and say that was not the law. The laws could only be made by the Queen, Lords and Commons. The tribunal to establish the law in this case should not be the House of Commons, but the Judges of the land. In the Bradlaugh case the House of Commons came to a certain conclusion, and the Courts of Law held that the law laid down by that House was bad and the opinion the House expressed was erroneous. Not only was the Resolution absolutely futile in itself, but it involved the dangerous practice of that House taking upon itself to discharge a duty for which it was not competent, and which the law had not imposed upon it, namely, the duty of deciding what the law was. It would be an absolute nullity to pass the Motion; it would neither make a new nor enforce the existing law. The hon. and learned Gentleman did not ask them to proceed to the expulsion of a Member; his case was that the seat for Limerick was already vacant, and that being so, they were engaged in a futile and useless 404 discussion of a Motion which should not have been made.
§ * MR. C. J. DARLING (Deptford)remarked that we might almost hope the Attorney-General would yield to the appeal made to him from the other side of the House, and as he had not seen fit to move that a Writ should issue for the election of someone else as Member for Limerick, he would simply leave the matter where it stood. It appeared to him that Limerick, if it was represented, was represented in a way that must commend itself to everyone on the Government Benches. He had not the least doubt that the opinion of the constituency was very well represented, and that at all events the electors of Limerick had done something to reduce the over-representation of Ireland, which had so often been complained of by the Unionist Party.
§ MR. SWIFT MACNEILL (Donegal, S.)I rise to a point of Order.
§ * MR. SPEAKERThe hon. Member is not out of order.
§ * MR. DARLINGI have said all I desire to say, sir.
§ Question put: "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
§ The House divided:—Ayes, 261; Noes, 85.—(Division List No. 15.)
§ Main Question put.
§ The House divided:—Ayes, 256; Noes, 74.—(Division List No. 16.)
§ Resolved: That John Daly, returned as a Member for the City of Limerick, having been adjudged guilty of felony and sentenced to penal servitude for life, and being now imprisoned under such sentence, is incapable of being elected or returned as a Member of this House.
MR. T. M. HEALYMay I ask the Leader of the House how long he will allow this place to remain without moving a new writ?
§ THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURYI should have thought that the Motion for a new writ rested rather with the Party to which the disqualified person belonged.
§ THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURYNot to-day.