* MR. CURZON (Lancashire, South-port)said, he wished to raise once more the question of Siam. He thought that the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Sir E. Grey) would admit that he had no desire whatever, in raising the question again, to do anything to embarrass the Government or to impede the course of any negotiations that might be passing between the Government of this country and the French Government. He thought, however, that where so much was at stake, and where the interests of this country, both commercial and political, were as large as they were in the case of Siam, the House had a right to press for information from the Executive Government. If the interest that was felt in Siam in this country was not very great or absorbing it must be remembered that in the distant regions of the far East the prestige of Great Britain and the action of Her Majesty's Government in dealing with the question were matters of the most vital concern, and that the Siamese question, which could scarcely draw 1311 together a decent audience in the House of Commons, affected not merely the livelihood of thousands of British citizens, but even the prestige of the Empire. In that part of the world an impression undoubtedly prevailed that the interests of Great Britain had been somewhat imperfectly safeguarded, and that France had been permitted with too little protest to pursue a very high-handed policy of aggression towards a feeble State; and unless some statement were made to that country by Her Majesty's Government indicating what British interests were and the point beyond which those interests would not permit of any further advance, he could not help entertaining the fear that the appetite which, in the French proverb, grew by eating might not be satisfied until it had acquired some further spoil in that part of the world. He did not desire to re-open on this occasion any of the aspects of the question which might be considered past and over, but would only call the attention of the House to those portions of it still remaining unsettled. First came the question of the Papers which had been promised to the House, connected with which was the continued occupation of Chantaboon by the French. The House had waited now for some eight or ten months for those Papers, and was still without any information as to the communications which had passed between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the French Government, although extracts from the Despatches were read out nearly a year ago by French Ministers in the Chamber. No information had been afforded as to the proceedings of the French at Bangkok, the blockade, or the State on the Upper Mekong; and, lastly, no Papers had been produced as to any negotiations with other Governments as to future guarantees in reference to Siam. In that state of matters, Members on both sides of the House were anxious to know how Her Majesty's Government had been protecting the interests and conducting the affairs of this country in that part of the East. They were quite willing to believe that the interests of the country were safe in the hands of the Government, and that they had conducted the negotiations with firmness and credit; but surely the time had arrived when the House could legitimately ask for some justification of that 1312 popular feeling in their favour. Of course, he could quite appreciate the reasons given by the Under Secretary of State to the House for not producing the Papers. He had told them the Papers were being withheld until the one outstanding point between the French and Siamese Governments had been disposed of, that point being the trial of a Siamese official, Pra Yot, who was accused of being concerned in the alleged massacre of a French Inspector of Militia and his Annamite escort in a district east of the Mekong River. They had been told more than once by the hon. Gentleman that on the completion of that trial they might expect the immediate evacuation of Chantaboon by the French troops. The first trial had taken place, and the case against the alleged culprit had completely broken down, since it had turned out that the alleged massacre was a collision which had occurred under easily intelligible circumstances, that the firing had initiated with the French, and that Pra Yot had only acted in self-defence. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Court at Bangkok had found him free from blame on all counts of the indictment brought against him. But under the terms of the Convention, the French seemed to have contemplated such an issue, and had reserved to themselves the right of judging whether the sentences were adequate, and of demanding a second trial before a mixed Court, the composition of which they should themselves fix. He would only say, as the matter was pending before the second tribunal, that they would await its proceedings and verdict with considerable interest. Next, turning to the occupation of Chantaboon, which was closely connected with this question, hon. Members were aware, no doubt, that that place was a port on one of the principal rivers of Siam and the means of communication between the provinces of Angkor and Battambong and the foreign world. That port was occupied by the French in the course of their aggretessive proceedings last year, and he had then pointed out to his right hon. Friend the serious character of that occupation without avail. But he thought the right hon. Gentleman had since seen reason to change his opinion in the matter. The French occupation of Chantaboon had continued ever since; they had fortified their posi- 1313 tion, and had maintained there Franco-Annamite troops. But in the Convention their continued occupation of the place had distinctly been made contingent on the fulfilment of two conditions—namely, the complete and peaceable evacuation by Siam of the territory beyond the Mekong, of the famous 16 miles strip on the banks of that river, and of the above - named inland provinces; and, secondly, the completion of the trial of Pra Yot. Those conditions had been faithfully carried out by the Siamese Government—nobody, even the strongest partisans of the French, could say the contrary. That had been recognised on several occasions by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and only one interpretation could be placed on the language which had been held. Without drawing any inferences, he would quote the statement made by the hon. Gentleman in that House on the 16th of February last, that—
Most explicit assurances had been received from the French that they were most desirous of leaving Chantaboon at the earliest opportunity and that they would not remain there a day after the engagements of Siam had been performed.On two occasions since the hon. Gentleman had repeated those statements, and they had been supported by the authority of the Prime Minister himself. He called attention to the clearness of those words, because in a few days' or weeks' time the second trial would be completed, when he hoped that the French, being mindful of the pledge they had given, would voluntarily terminate an occupation which was a menace to Siam as long as it lasted. It was well to recall those statements, lest there should be any tardiness on the part of the French Government to remember the obligations imposed upon them, according to the repeated statements in both Houses of Parliament. He would next refer to the terms of the Commercial Treaty to be negotiated between France and Siam. In the 5th Article of the Treaty which was concluded last October it was stipulated that within six months of that time negotiations should be opened between the Siamese and French Governments, with a view to the regulation of the Customs and the commercial regime to be established for traders in the Provinces of Battambong and Angkor, and in the 16 miles 1314 strip on the Mekong. Negotiations apparently had taken place in Paris; but, of course, he would not press for information which either it was not in the power of the Government to give, or which it would be inopportune to give at the present stage; but the House had a right to demand that when this new Commercial Treaty had been concluded between France and Siam they should be informed that it contained no differential provisions—that no advantages would be conceded to French subjects or traders in Provinces which were admitted by France to remain still an integral portion of the Siamese dominions and where British trade had at least an equal right. In accordance with the Most Favoured Nation Clause in the existing Treaty between England and Siam, it should be distinctly stated in the agreements about to be entered into that no advantage would accrue to French traders or subjects under the new Convention which would not be equally enjoyed by British subjects and traders. It would indeed be an intolerable thing if Siam, having already been compelled under the pressure of superior force to sign away so large a portion of her political integrity and independence, were now a year afterwards to be cozened into a still further surrender of her commercial rights, and still more so if she were compelled to take that course in the interest of a Power which, in spite of its contiguity and its geographical advantages, had never succeeded in building up any solid trade with Siam at all, and to the detriment of another Power— Great Britain—the integrity and industry of whose merchants had already obtained for them 90 per cent. of the total trade in the chief ports. Another point in connection with this matter was that under Clause 8 of the same Treaty the French Government reserved to itself the right to establish Consulates at Korat and Nan. The former place was the terminus of a railway at present being constructed by English engineers for about 160 miles from Bangkok, and was the centre of a considerable trade. Nan was a good deal further north, and was a place where the foreign trade was entirely British or Indian. Neither at Korat nor at Nan would a single article of French manufacture be found. In those centres and districts, the foreign supply was ex- 1315 clusively English and Anglo-Indian. He failed to understand, in those circumstances, what particular purpose French Consuls were to serve when they got there. He did not wish to discuss that matter, but merely to point out that the French had obtained those advantages, and that in fact Consuls had already started for Korat and Nan. On a previous occasion he had asked whether, as French Consuls had been appointed to places where there was no French trade, English Consuls should not also be appointed, but had received no answer. He would again, therefore, ask whether it was not desirable that we should have representatives in those places. The next question was with regard to the so-called "buffer State." At an early stage it was agreed that to avoid friction and the danger of personal collision which might arise from the geographical contact of two such Powers as France and Great Britain in those remote parts of the world, it would be desirable to constitute an intermediate or buffer State between them. The Protocol signed on the subject by Lord Dufferin and the French Minister had been already presented to the House. The Under Secretary had informed them that climatic obstacles (which anyone acquainted with the country would appreciate) had hitherto prevented the despatch of a British Commission to examine topographically the territory in question. It had therefore been postponed until the autumn. A little more information, however, was required on that point. The French Commission had been appointed, and had started, and the names of the Commissioners were known, among them being M. Paris, the energetic representative of France at Bangkok. The Committee ought to know when our Commissioners were to start, and the instructions upon which they were to act. Were they to appear in the Papers which the hon. Gentleman had promised to present? For his own part, he did not attach so much importance to this so-called "buffer State" on the Upper Mekong as some people were disposed to give to it. The French Chauvinist feeling had been worked up to a great state of excitement and apprehension in regard to it; but, in his opinion, a vindication of the indisputable British territorial rights— which were incapable of dispute by 1316 the French Government — on both banks of the Upper Mekong River would be of more advantage to British interests, and a greater safeguard for the transit of commerce with the Southwestern Provinces of China than any buffer-State which could be constituted by diplomatic arrangement. The Government, of course, knew better than anyone else whether such a buffer State was advisable or necessary; but they should at least see that it was what it pretended to be. It must not be a "neutral zone," but a neutral State. A neutral zone would become merely an Alsatia into which all the dacoits, thieves, and brigands from the surrounding States would flock; but the very name neutral "State" postulated the exercise of some executive authority. Ex hypothesi such a State could not be either French or English, because it would separate the two Powers; neither could it be Siamese, because Siam had given up the whole of her territory on the left bank of the river. Her Majesty's Government should see, therefore, that the discharge of the elementary duties of administration in this State was placed in competent hands. Perhaps the Government were in a position to give the Committee information on a subject germane to this—the Anglo-Chinese Convention which had been concluded relating to the frontiers of Burmah. Its main features had appeared in the Press; but he had been told, in answer to a question, that until the Despatches arrived at Pekin, Her Majesty's Government were not in a position to give any information upon the subject. He believed the Convention included the cession to China of the important State of Kiang Hung; and, inasmuch as that abutted on the Mekong River, where the buffer State would have to be carved out, this was a matter obviously which was closely allied with the question now under discussion, and the Committee was entitled to be informed by Her Majesty's Government what quid pro quo they had received for so important a concession. Therefore, he would ask whether the Papers to be presented would relate to the Convention in regard to the Burmese frontiers as well as to affairs in Siam? He next desired to state what was the real danger that lay before Siam. He had no desire to wound the susceptibilities of Frenchmen, 1317 and hoped he had never spoken or written in the course of this controversy a word transgressing the limits of respect for a great neighbouring Power or going beyond the bounds of fair criticism. But it could not be gainsaid that the French Colonial eye (and he was speaking of what he had himself seen) was directed upon the Menam Valley and territories at present belonging to Siam with a glance in which there was more of longing than of love. They had already made the Mekong Valley their wash pot. Over the rest of Siam they wanted to cast out their shoe. He did not say that any such aggressive views were encouraged on the Quai d'Orsay, and indeed they were frankly inconsistent with the pledges given by the French Government. But a long course of Eastern experience had taught us that a central Govermnent,however honourable its intentions and desires, was not always capable of exercising perfect control over imperious pro-Consuls at a distance from headquarters or even of restraining over-active subordinates operating upon an out-of-the-way frontier. The realisation of any such scheme as a French occupation of the Meinam Valley was a prospect which no British Government could tolerate for a moment. Whatever guarantees might be given it would involve the total extinction of an important branch of British trade upon which the wealth and commerce of Singapore largely depended. Further, it would constitute a serious political danger to our Indian Fmpire to have a foreign Power established in the Meinam Valley adjoining our territories and the Provinces of Lower and Upper Burmah. Such a result would impose distressing burdens upon our Indian finances and would constitute a very serious peril to our Indian Empire. Unless some clear warning were given by Her Majesty's Government to the French of the great and legitimate interest which this country took in the matter it was quite possible we might wake up any day to find that such a consummation had taken place and that Siam had been compelled or persuaded by a Power which she could not resist to sign away the last shreds of her political and territorial autonomy. There was only one way by which that issue could be averted. Over and over again the French Government had protested its desire to respect the 1318 integrity of Siam, and had explained its recent aggression as the vindication of historic claims, and as being divorced from any ambitions of ulterior absorption. For our part, he imagined that the desire of the British Government to respect the independence of Siam was absolutely beyond cavil or suspicion. That being so, one was tempted to inquire what objection there could possibly be to the British Government inviting and the French Government giving a guarantee of the future integrity of Siam. Such a guarantee, he should say, the respective Governments ought not only to be willing to reciprocate, but to initiate. If there should be any disinclination on the part of the French Government to enter into such an arrangement, colour would be at once given to those suggestions and suspicions as to their ultimate aims and objects and intentions, in regard to which such great indignation was expressed when they were hinted at. He was convinced that only by such a guarantee could the future independence of Siam be assured. If she were protected by her two great neighbours on the east and west, and so rendered free from the danger of further territorial loss, she would then be free to develop the stability which the country now lacked. Siam was a country which possessed very considerable resources. The country had a patient and intelligent population, and there was a public spirit in its Sovereign and its leading men; and it was quite possible, under favourable conditions, for Siam to gain a creditable position among independent nations. But without the protection of such a guarantee as he had described, it was to be feared that Siam would be too apprehensive of the disasters that might await her to work out her own salvation, that she would be swayed first in one direction and then in another, and would be likely to yield to the temptation of purchasing support by granting still further concessions to whichever she might conceive to be the stronger party. It could not be too strongly impressed upon the Committee that the real buffer State between Great Britain and France in the far East could not be an artificial strip of jungle which was to be carved out from a comparatively unknown and desolate country in a remote angle of the Upper Mekong. Siam itself must remain the real buffer State. It was no good 1319 making a sham buffer State in the northeast whilst the real buffer State in (he south-east was being sapped and undermined. It would be far better that the sham buffer State in the north-east should be a failure than that the genuine buffer State in the south-east should be a phantom. They waited with great interest for any information that could be given to them on this subject. He hoped that the Government were thoroughly alive to the great Imperial importance of this question, and ho should be glad to know whether, in their negotiations with France, they had included proposals for a guarantee of the future independence of Siam, for such a guarantee was of the highest importance as being likely to ensure good relations in the future between France and Great Britain in the Fast.
§ * THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOE FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir E. GREY,) Northumberland, Berwicksaid that, with regard to the Anglo-Chinese Convention, he was still not sure that it had reached Pekin. Therefore, although there possibly might be no harm in making some statement with reference to the matter, he thought, on the whole, it would be safer to defer any observations which he might have to make until the time when they would be quite certain that the actual terms of the Convention were in the hands of the Chinese Government. He found no fault with the hon. Member for having raised the Siamese question, and of course he did not wish to detract from the importance of the question to the Imperial interests of this country. The hon. Member had a great deal of knowledge on this subject, which nobody could dispute, and felt strongly upon it, and there was a clearness and attractiveness in his way of presenting his case which anyone might envy. But, of course, in discussing this question the hon. Member had exercised a freedom which could hardly be exercised to the same extent by a Member of the Government. He would, however, deal with the points raised by the hon. Member as far as he could, and, first of all, he had to say that the whole question of the relations between Siam and France remained not absolutely, but practically, in much the same state as it was in when he last discussed it in the House. It was, therefore, not possible for him to add much to what he had 1320 previously stated. The question of the buffer State was one which it was arranged from the beginning could not be decided until the delimitation of the frontiers should have been finished. He saw no reason to suppose that the names of the British Commissioners or their instructions would be withheld from Parliament. Even if the French Commissioners had been named and even if they had started, the arrangement that had been made was a bilateral arrangement, and it was not possible for the question of the constitution of the buffer State to make any real progress until the delimitation of the frontiers should have been undertaken on the one side as well as on the other. As to the reported appointment of French Consuls in Siam, he had to say that he was not certain that there had been two appointments. One Consul, however, had been appointed to serve at Korat, but had not yet arrived there. The Government had in view the appointment of a British Consul at Korat and would not lose sight of the matter. With regard to the Commercial Treaty, he would only observe that so far as the Government knew, no commercial provisions had yet been agreed upon between France and Siam. This country, of course, disliked intensely having differential duties imposed against its trade in any part of the world. In making Treaties with other countries it had not been our policy to ask for special trade advantages, but we strongly objected to arrangements between other countries under which our trade could not have fair play in foreign markets. Under the treaty with Siam we had a Most Favoured Nation Clause, and not only this Government, but any Government, would be quite certain to make use of its right under that clause should any advantages be given by Siam to any third country which could in any way conflict with British interests. Turning now to the larger and more general question, he would recall the Committee's attention to the exact state of things. There was not long ago a dispute between France and Siam, which at one period assumed a very threatening aspect, and the result was that a Convention was signed between France and Siam, and certain stipulations were made between them. The position taken up by the French Government had always been that it was 1321 their desire to have the stipulations of that Convention fully carried out on both sides. The Siamese Government had taken up the same position, and the French Government had declared from the beginning that it was necessary that the stipulations of that Convention should be carried out on both sides before they could enter upon any fresh discussion. He would not discuss the merits of the Convention and the events that preceded it, but it was obvious that, having arrived at that point, the thing which the Government had a right to look forward to was the fulfilment by Siam and France of the stipulations which they had respectively agreed to under the Convention. But those stipulations had not yet all been fulfilled, though the larger part of them bad been fulfilled on the Siamese side. There still remained the question of the trial. One stage had been completed, but under the Convention the right was expressly reserved to the French Government to have a new trial should the first trial not be satisfactory. That right they were determined to exercise; and Papers had been withheld from the House because the desire of the British Government had been that the stipulations on both sides of the Convention should be carried out in a friendly and satisfactory spirit. It might be that Papers might now be published without endangering the chance of a satisfactory settlement, but the Government thought that having waited so long, and as only a small point now remained to be settled, it would be a pity to do anything to prejudice a satisfactory issue. He admitted that Papers could not be withheld from the House very much longer. If the proceedings in connection with what remained of the Convention were unexpectedly to be prolonged it would not be fair to the House to withhold the Papers that had been promised. Although the Government had borne that in mind, and had already begun to consider whether they ought not to place the House in a position to review the facts of the case by publishing Papers, the present moment was not one in which he could make any definite statement to the House upon the matter. He would remind the House that there had been a change of Government in France, and it would be most unreasonable that any step towards the publication of Papers should be taken until 1322 there had been some friendly communication between the Governments of the two countries. It was not yet known what the new French Government would be, but the Government relied upon it that, in accordance with the traditions of the past of that great country, whatever the new French Government might be, it would take up the thread of the negotiations where they had been left in a friendly spirit. Her Majesty's Government had already demonstrated freely during the last year or more that they were most ready to reciprocate any friendly spirit shown on the other side, and that being so, he hoped the Committee would understand that, although the publication of the Papers had been inconveniently long delayed, it was not possible for him to make any definite statement with regard to them while political affairs in France remained in their present state of uncertainty. He could only give his hon. Friend the assurance that the matter should not be left much longer in its present state. The Government were anxious to see the stipulations of the Convention carried out on both sides, and that there should be a clear understanding arrived at between all parties which would prevent not only the risk of any danger or serious damage to the interests of any of the parties concerned, but might also avert for many future years the risk of any friction between them.
§ SIR R. TEMPLE (Surrey, Kingston)said, so much had transpired that afternoon to justify the pressure he had repeatedly put on Her Majesty's Government, that he hoped he might be allowed to add a few observations to the remarkably able statement they had heard from the hon. Member for Southport. The Committee would recollect that just two months had elapsed since he urged the production of Papers, but no step had yet been taken by the Government to publish the Blue Book, while the French Yellow Book had been published some time without regard to the arguments of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. This was not as it should be, seeing that the people of Great Britain had far greater interest in the matter, commercial and material, than had the people of France, and they should not be left without information by the Government. He assured the Government that until the Papers were pro- 1323 duced and Members saw what the proceedings on the British side had been, there would be reasonable apprehension that British interests, material and commercial, had not been safeguarded. He earnestly commended to the Committee what had been said by the Member for Southport. A small buffer State in the north-east corner of Siam might be of some value. He did not dispute that, but the true buffer State in south-eastern Asia between France and England was Siam itself. That the French had cast longing eyes of cupidity not only on Bangkok, but also on the Valley of the Mekong and the Valley of the Menam, had been known for the last 10 or 20 years to every Anglo-Indian statesman, and unless measures were taken we would wake up to find that besides having a Russian frontier on the west of India we had a French frontier on the east. That would be a most dangerous thing for the people of India. The true and only remedy was that pointed out by the hon. Member for Southport— namely, that France should come to an understanding with England to preserve the independence of what remained of Siam after the outrageous spoliation to which the country had recently been subjected. The time had come when we must speak out in these matters. He maintained that if the British Government was firm and the French Government was honest, a joint guarantee of the independence of Siam would be arrived at. He was bound in charity as well as in policy to assume that the French Government was honest, and he hoped he might assume that the British Government, even in the hands of Her Majesty's present Ministers, would be firm.
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Sir W. HARCOURT,) Derbysaid, he rose to point out that it was necessary that the Government should get the Vote to-night, and he hoped hon. Members would have that fact in view during the short time that still remained to the House.
§ MR. CHAPLIN (Lincolnshire, Sleaford)said, he did not quite understand the statement which the right hon. Gentleman made. At 20 minutes past 6 o'clock he coolly got up and told them that this money must be granted tonight without producing a single reason to support it. He (Mr. Chaplin) had been informed by hon. Friends who had 1324 experience in the matter that there was no reason whatever why the Vote should be obtained to-night. But if the necessity existed the fault rested with the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues, who had had the whole Session before them, and who might have put the Vote down on any day during the week. He doubted whether this attempt to hurry the Vote through without necessary discussion would be successful. He said "attempt," because he questioned whether, under the circumstances, the Closure would be allowed. ["Oh, oh !"] Hon. Members forgot that there were distinct Rules regulating the application of the Closure. The rights of the minority were not to be infringed, and though he did not presume to say what course the Chairman would take, it was at least open to doubt whether the right hon. Gentleman would be justified in saying that the Debate should be stopped to-night. That would be a very strong order indeed. The fault rested entirely with the Government, of whom the House had had the same unfortunate experience on more than one occasion. Last Session they had announced that they would close the discussion of a Vote on Account at a few hours' notice, and this Session they were depriving Members of one of their oldest privileges in order that they might prosecute other business to which, no doubt, they attached great importance, but to which they could not expect the House of Commons to attach similar importance. He (Mr. Chaplin) desired to call attention to a most important subject in regard to which a Notice had been put on the Paper on the previous night.
§ MR. A. C. MORTONsaid, he had two Notices on the Paper before that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sleaford, with regard to Newfoundland. He wished to ask whether Her Majesty's Government would see that a. proper opportunity of deciding Election Petitions was afforded in Newfoundland before any appeal to the country was made? because, so far as he could make out, he believed the late Government of that colony desired to whitewash themselves by a new election. There was a feeling in the colony that a Dissolution might yet be rushed by the Party in power if the Governor General gave way, and did not stop it until after the Law Courts had decided on the Election Petitions. He also wished to know 1325 whether the Colonial Office were attempting to move the Foreign Office to get the question affecting the French shore settled by the French Government? He moved to reduce the vote by £10 in order to emphasise the questions he had raised.
§ MR. A. C. MORTONI am aware of that, but I do move.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Item of £6,500, for the Colonial Office, be reduced by £10."— {Mr. A. C. Morton.)
§ SIR F. EVANS (Southampton)said, he was sorry that attacks should be made in the House against gentlemen who were not able to reply for themselves. The hon. Member (Mr. Morton) said the late Government of Newfoundland asked for a Dissolution in order that they might get themselves whitewashed. He (Sir F. Evans) demurred to that statement. There was nothing to prove what the motives of these gentlemen in asking for a Dissolution were. Everyone acquainted with Newfoundland must know that the present state of affairs had no precedent in the history of the colony. The peculiar circumstances under which the demand for a Dissolution occurred would not allow of an explanation in the brief space of time at the disposal of the Government in the present Sitting. The position he held in regard to Newfoundland was such that it might be his duty at a later stage to bring the whole question under the notice of the House, but it was impossible to do that in the few moments now at his disposal. He, therefore, contented himself with asking the House not to accept the statement in which the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. A. C. Morton) attributed mala fides to the late Government of Newfoundland. As to the other question raised by the hon. Member, it was not possible to settle it until the Colonial Government had come to a decision as to the legislation to be passed by the Colonial Parliament.
§ THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr. S. BUXTON,) Tower Hamlets, PoplarI wish to reply to the two points raised by my hon. Friend (Mr. A. C. Morton). As regards the French Treaty shore, that is 1326 a matter to which already a great deal of attention has been given, and it has always been the object of the English Government to come to some arrangement with the French Government in order that this very intricate question may be settled. No effort will certainly be spared by the English Government to put an end to any difficulties that may occur. I should like to say this with regard to the Treaty shore, that very great forbearance has been shown on both sides, on the part of the French naval officers especially, and on the part of our officers, and I think it very creditable to both parties that so few disputes have arisen. As to the magisterial work, all the information I have been able to obtain is that, as far as they have acted as Newfoundland Magistrates, their conduct has given the utmost satisfaction. With reference to the Constitutional crisis which unfortunately is now going on in Newfoundland, it is quite impossible for me to give an answer to a hypothetical question. My hon. Friend wants to know what we are going to do under certain suppositious circumstances. Though, of course, we have to consider carefully all the different points of view, and although to a certain extent we have made up our minds as to what we propose to do, it is impossible to state what we shall do in circumstances which have not arisen. I think my hon. Friend behind me (Sir F. Evans) was justified in entering his protest against the assumption of my hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Mr. A. C. Morton), that the action of the late Government in Newfoundland was founded on bad motives. Apart altogether from escaping the results of the corruption that may have taken place at the election, there are many reasons which may have made a Dissolution at that time an advantage instead of a disadvantage. At the same time, the Governor, acting in the exercise of his discretion, refused a Dissolution, accepted the resignation of the late Government, and has now a new Government in Office. If a question respecting Dissolution arises he will, no doubt, communicate with us, but he will also act under the power which is given to him by the Constitution.
§ MR. A. C. MORTONsaid, he was obliged to the Under Secretary for his statement, but he did not withdraw a word 1327 he had said about the late Newfoundland Government.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Original Question again proposed.
§ MR. CHANNING (Northampton, E.)said, that on Vote 8 he wished to ask a question respecting the very important point of the appointment of practical men as Railway Sub-Inspectors.
ADMIRAL FIELD (Sussex, Eastbourne)said, be had given notice of his intention to call attention to a very important matter on the Colonial Vote.
ADMIRAL FIELDsaid, he wished to draw attention to the subsidies paid by some of the Crown Colonies to foreign mail steamers for carrying British mails. He had received a very unsatisfactory answer to a question he had put to the Under Secretary for the Colonies (Mr. S. Buxton) on the subject. The hon. Gentleman had admitted that it was the case that the Crown Colony of Mauritius paid a subsidy of something like £6,000 a year to the French Messageries Maritimes for carrying mails to and from the colony, but had said that Her Majesty's Government were practically powerless to interfere with this very objectionable arrangement. He (Admiral Field) thought it was time to speak out against this subsidising of foreign mail steamers with British money. Our shipping interests were seriously interfered with now by the bounty-fed shipping of France. Another foreign steamship company—a German line—was also subsidised to carry the mails to the Falkland Islands. It was monstrous that this state of things should continue. When he had appealed to the Under Secretary (Mr. S.Buxton) for any instance in which a foreign Government subsidised a British Company for carrying mails, the hon. Gentleman had replied that the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway Company were subsidised for carrying mails from Calais. The hon. Gentleman's answer was not very candid, because the conditions imposed by the French Government in granting that subsidy was that the steamers should carry the French flag, be commanded by French officers, and be manned by French crews
§ MR. S. BUXTONwas understood to explain that he had given an incorrect 1328 answer in consequence of a pure misunderstanding as to the question. He had had no intention of deceiving the hon. and gallant Gentleman.
ADMIRAL FIELDsaid, he, of course, accepted the hon. Gentleman's statement, but he wished to know whether Her Majesty's Government would impose similar conditions in reference to the contract with the Messageries Maritimes as the French Government imposed with regard to the contract with the London, Chatham, and Dover Company—namely, that the French Company's ships should fly the English flag; that they should be commanded by English officers, and be manned by English crews?
§ MR. CHANNINGsaid, he wished to ask a question about the inquiries respecting fatal accidents to railway servants. It was well-known that railway men had again and again demanded that they should be treated in the same way as miners, and have men who were acquainted with the daily details of their work to carry out inquiries for them. During the last four years no fewer than 2,000 railway servants had lost then-lives in other than train accidents, and in only one or two of these instances had there been any inquiry whatever. He thought it most important that men who were acquainted with the daily work of railway servants should look into such cases and make recommendations which would enable the Board of Trade to deal with the real causes of the fatalities.
§ Mr. CHAPLINrose to continue the Debate—
§ The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUERrose in his place, and claimed to move,' That the Question be now put."
THE CHAIRMANAfter the statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer a short time ago, I must leave this matter to the judgment of the Committee.
§ Question put, "That the Question be now put."
§ The Committee divided:—Ayes 221; Noes 116.—(Division List, No. 58.)
§ Original Question put accordingly, and agreed to.
§ It being Seven of the clock, the Chairman left the Chair to make his Report to the House at Nine of the clock.