HC Deb 20 March 1894 vol 22 cc749-83

[Mr. MELLOR in the Chair.]

1. 83,400, Men and Boys.

* SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEYWORTH

Mr. Mellor, before I proceed to the statement which it will be my duty to make in reference to the new proposals of the Government in connection with the Navy, perhaps it will be convenient if I deal with a few of the points which have been raised in the course of the Debate before Mr. Deputy Speaker left the Chair. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Eastbourne mentioned various points with respect to the payment of the coastguard, second-class stokers, leading stokers, chief engine-room artificers, and warrant officers, and suggested that they should be referred to the Committee of which the gallant officer who a short time ago was First Sea Lord—Sir A. Hoskins—is a member. There would be some difficulty in referring any of these questions to that Committee, because it has to do entirely with the officering of the Navy and with the working of the Childers' scheme; and questions of this kind, however important in themselves, are not germane to the inquiry of that Committee. But if my hon. and gallant Friend will bring any of these points under the notice of those who are responsible at the Admiralty he will find that several of them have already been looked into, and that others are under consideration, and any representation which he may make will have most careful consideration. These matters are, however, by no means so simple as they seem when they are individually brought under the notice of the House by an hon. Member in his position. It is easy, for instance, to bring forward the case of the stokers or the case of the warrant officers, and to make out, a very good case; but what the Admiralty have to do is to consider the case of any particular class of men or officers in relation to other classes of officers and men. When dealing with one you cannot help touching the interests of others, and my hon. and gallant Friend need not fear that the representations which he made last Session were not duly considered because I have made no announcement on behalf of the Admiralty in the House in regard to them. I shall presently have something to say about the warrant officers, and I assure my hon. and gallant Friend that the position and pay of the warrant officers and the other classes of whom be has spoken constantly occupy our attention at the Admiralty. I am bound to say one or two words with respect to what fell from my hon. Friend who asked me why we did not draw more men to the Navy from the Mercantile Marine. If he will look at the Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, which is now before the House, he will find that we are going to take a new departure, and are attempting to introduce 800 men from the Mercantile Marine and other outside sources in order to meet the increased demands (hat are being made upon us. The hon. Member for the Kirkdale Division of Liverpool spoke of the officers of the Royal Naval Reserve, and I would simply refer him to the third paragraph of the First Lord's Statement on this subject, which is as follows:— The number of officers to be entered for 12 months' training on board ships of the Fleet has been raised from 50 to 70. I now turn to the statement I have to make, in the course of which I hope to refer as far as may be necessary to other points that have been raised in the course of the Debate. The statement I have to make on behalf of the Admiralty respecting the new proposals may suffer a little from the mist and drizzle of the long Debate, and if it should have made my powder a little damp so that my projectiles do not go off with energy, I hope the Committee will make a little allowance for the circumstances under which, not for the first time, the statement of the Representative of the Admiralty is made in this House. It is not necessary that I should enter in full detail into all the various parts of the scheme which form our complete proposals, because hon. Members already have them before them very fully in print in the Statement of the First Lord. What I propose to do is to dwell somewhat on certain salient points of our scheme, and explain them as briefly and as clearly as I can. It will be in the knowledge of Members of this House that when the present Government came into Office ships were being built under the Naval Defence Act, and I do not think there would be any disposition on the part of the Committee to find fault with the policy of the Government last year in introducing a modest programme. The noble Lord opposite mentioned a few months ago that in the previous year, and I think also in 1887, he had introduced what he described as a modest programme. Our Estimates last year amounted to £14,250,000—almost the same amount as for the three preceding years. The year now ending is the last of the five years of the Naval Defence Act. It appears to be an appropriate time, therefore, for examining our naval strength as increased by five years' efforts, and as compared with the strength of Foreign Fleets. I will not go into statistics as to the relative strength of Foreign Navies, as we had a long Debate upon the subject a short time ago. There has been presented a Return which I moved for on behalf of the Admiralty which states correctly the strength of Great Britain and of five Foreign Powers in ships of war. I will only say this—that anyone impartially considering that Return at the date at which I speak—perhaps I might speak more emphatically of the coming month of April—must come to the conclusion that our present strength in battleships and cruisers, as compared with that of Foreign Powers, is satisfactory, and that there is nothing of which we need be afraid. But vigorous additions have been made for some years past, and are being made, to Foreign Navies, particularly those of France and Russia, and therefore the special efforts we have made during the last five years must be followed by further efforts continued over years to come. Moreover, the addition of the 70 vessels of the Naval Defence Act Fleet, and the further additions now projected, render it necessary that we should have more armaments, more men, and more reserves, with consequent increases in the Wages, Victualling, and Medical Votes, and a prospective increase of Naval and Marine Pensions. So that it is not in shipbuilding only that the tide is rising, and must rise for some time. Comparing the Estimates now proposed to the House with those of last year, the following are the principal increases:—Shipbuilding, £2,267,000; armaments, £68,000; wages nearly £300,000; Victualling and Medical Votes over £150,000; Royal Naval Reserve close on £34,000; works, £270,000; other Votes, £37,000; making a total of £3,126,000. Before I come to the great increase—the shipbuilding programme—let me say a few words on the two other principal causes of increase-first, manning; secondly, works. It has been recognised in the criticisms that have been made upon our naval strength that, whereas during recent years very great additions have been made to the British Fleet, until last year no serious effort has been made to meet the increasing necessity for manning the Navy. A Manning Committee was wisely appointed by the late Government, and it made the necessary inquiries; but the chief burden of meeting the increasing demand for men falls upon the successors of the late Government. ["No."] I am surprised to hear that contradiction; but I do not wish to go into the matter in a controversial spirit. It is obvious, however, that the making of great additions to the Navy must leave the legacy to the succeeding Government of providing the additional officers and men necessary to man the Navy. I do not wish to carry it further than that. We have to face that necessity, and I claim we are facing it without the slightest hesitation, and are doing what is necessary to meet the necessities of the case. The increase we have proposed this year is a, very large one. It has been misstated in some quarters that the increase has been 5,100 men; but the real increase is 6,700 men. Last year I explained the constitution and objects of the Manning Committee. It consisted of throe Naval Lords and two naval experts; and I repeat what I said last year, that we are greatly indebted to the efforts of that Committee for having thoroughly investigated the question and settled the principles on which the manning of the Fleet should be based. I explained last year that the Committee considered what ships would form the War Fleet of 1894 and what should be the revised complements of the ships. Now, there is a permanent Complement Committee which draws up the complements for all newly-designed ships. The number of men necessary for the Fleet has to be considered by the Committee two years in advance. It is necessary to look much further ahead—about 10 years—in order to estimate the number of officers we may want. The proportion the number of men to be drawn from the Reserve for the Fleet in time of war should bear to the permanent Reserve has been carefully settled. We are continuing to enter boys at the rate of 3,700 men a year, and as a result of that we shall be able to meet the wants of the Fleet for 1895, so far as existing ships are concerned. But we have to meet the additions to the Fleet, some of which are being rapidly made—for example, the torpedo-boat destroyers. We have also to meet the larger requirements of our modern ships as compared with the ships which preceded them. We therefore propose that 800 men shall be entered direct from shore—that is to say, from the Mercantile Marine, the Royal Naval Reserve, &c. Turning to the engine-room complements, last year I prepared the Committee for an addition to the engine-room and artificer ratings proportionate to modern needs. In the; coming year the following additions are proposed:—100 chief engine-room artificers, 250 engine-room artificers, and 2,439 stokers, including 272 chief stokers. We have found it necessary to increase the higher stoker ratings. Increasing the number of chief stokers has had a very beneficial effect in attracting a large number of stokers to qualify as mechanics, and thus become more useful. In the ease of the stokers, as in that of the seamen, the necessity of endeavouring to secure a due proportion of men on the permanent list, as distinguished from reserves and new entries, has led to the decision to make these largo additions. I think that the Committee will learn with satisfaction that in this, as in other respects, we have taken measures during the last few months to enable the additions which we propose to be made at once with the least possible delay. The mouths which have passed since the various proposals of the Government were matured some months ago have been most beneficially utilised, and our plans so arranged that no time whatever will be lost, and measures can be taken at once as soon as the first Vote has boon passed by the House of Commons. One word, Sir, about the interesting and important subject of warrant officers. There is not a large addition during the present year. The reason for that is that there were other points which were more urgent. It is considered there would be no difficulty in adding sufficiently to the number of warrant officers in case of emergency. This could be done partly from the coastguard and partly by promotion of petty officers from those who have qualified and are on the roster for promotion. The subject of warrant officers who will be required to meet the increased needs of the Navy is now receiving special consideration, and it is intended to make sufficient provision for future years. I now pass to a subject which occupied the time of the House for a considerable period yesterday evening. I mean the Royal Naval Reserve. The importance of connecting the Royal Naval Reserve with the Service afloat is clearly recognised by the Admiralty: 700 men of the Royal Naval Reserve are now to have six mouths' training with the Fleet, and we are of opinion that if that practice he successfully carried out year by year the Reserve will be greatly increased in value by this training. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Holderness Division of Yorkshire gave some very interesting and pregnant observations to the House on the subject of the Royal Naval Reserve, and it would not be respectful to him if I did not briefly notice these observations. If I fail to notice some of them I can assure him that all will receive due consideration. He asks whether the 800 men who are enrolled from the shore as seamen in the Fleet will be entered for a shorter period than other seamen? We are endeavouring to attract these men not only from the Royal Naval Reserve, but from the Mercantile Marine and the seafaring population, and we hope to get a good number of the fishing population. They will be admitted between the ages of 18 and 28 years. They will sign engagements either for 12 years' continuous service or for five years' non-continuous service, and they will receive exactly the same pay and advantages and pension as the other seamen of the Royal Navy. I think that is a satisfactory answer to the question asked by my hon. and gallant Friend. He also put to me some questions as to the expectations of the Government with respect to the number of Reserves who would be available for war, and quoted the opinion of the Committee presided over by Sir George Tryon, that 10,000 men would he available at the outbreak of war. I may say that the Admiralty share that opinion. The hon. and gallant Gentleman stated his own expectation that we should get 20,000 Reserve men after a time during war, and he asked what was our opinion. I think his guess is as much entitled to receive weight as any guess made by the Admiralty itself. We think that it is a matter of surmise. Perhaps we have our own calculations, but we do not wish to hazard any surmise of our own in the House, and we are quite prepared to accept my hon. and gallant Friend's guess as a very fair one. I am sure my hon. and gallant Friend will excuse me from going further as to that matter, and will recognise that it is a wise-policy on the part of the Admiralty not to explain the details of the manning arrangements which they have in contemplation for war time. He thinks that, at a small cost, a very considerable Reserve may be obtained. I can only refer him to the Report of Sir George Tryon's Committee. I can assure him that we consider our present Reserve a very satisfactory force, but we doubt whether it is desirable to have so large a Reserve that we should be tempted to have too large a proportion of Reserve men in the complements of the ships in relation to the permanent men. As I said just now, the proportion which the one should bear to the other has been carefully considered and settled. The hon. and gallant Gentleman also asked me about the 10 years' men and the 12 years' men as a source of supply to the Royal Naval Reserve. I think he must not look too much to that source. In time of peace 70 per cent. of these men reengage, and that is a satisfactory fact, and shows that the great bulk of the men, after serving their 10 or 12 years, do not desire to sever their connection with the Navy. Out of the remaining 30 per cent. we hope to get a good many in time of war. I now turn to a subject of great difficulty, upon which I can say but little—and that is the need of officers. The Admiralty have taken one important step in respect to that, but before I mention it perhaps I may say that the lieutenants' list is now beginning to rise. The period of difficulty through which we have been passing seems to be coming to an end. The subject is one of interest and of great importance. The Admiralty have appointed a. Committee, upon which Sir A. Hoskins and Sir R. Welby have happily consented to serve, who are investigating the whole of the difficult subject—the numbers, promotion, and retirement of executive officers, and the results of the scheme of Mr. Childers—and when that Committee reports we hope to get most valuable light upon the question how to secure sufficient officers in the lower rank of our Service without unduly flooding those ranks and thus stagnating promotion. In the meantime, the entries of cadets in the Britannia will be kept up. In the time of the noble Lord opposite they were increased, and from 1886 until now they have exceeded 100 a year, having averaged 128 in the last four years. On the subject of engineer officers, we are making an endeavour, which I hope will meet with success, to enter engineers direct, by which we hope to have a considerable accession to our numbers. We are also proposing additions to the Engineers' Training School at Key ham. My hon. Friend the Member for Gateshead, in his picturesque and impressive speech, told us that we do not pay our engineers enough, and do not treat them well enough, and that that is the reason why we do not have a sufficient response to our invitation to engineers to join. He says that we ought to give proper pay and provide proper housing for the engineers. I would say on this point that my noble Friend the First Lord had an interview with hon. Members who represent the engineers last year, and I think they will admit that very attentive consideration was given to the points they brought before him. If they will again approach my noble Friend and the Admiralty and give us the benefit of their advice in this difficult and important question we shall be very happy to consider the whole matter in the light of the arguments they put before us. I do not, however, think it would be useful to enter into a discussion on the subject across the floor of the House. I would much rather that a friendly conference should be brought about, such as we had last year, which bore good fruit. I think it would bear good fruit this year. We fully recognise that the engineering element is one of the most important elements in the Navy in existing circumstances, and I need hardly say that one and all of us are anxious to do full justice to the engineers and engine-room complements. If there is any grievance we are anxious to remedy it. I confess that there is one point which was brought forward by an hon. Gentleman opposite in which I feel that there is some apparent hardship, and that is that we have had to call upon our engineer officers to give up their optional retirement at the age of 50. But that has been absolutely necessary in the interests of the country. If, however, they can show that there is really something that ought to be done for them in consequence of our having called upon them to make that sacrifice in the interests of the Navy we are perfectly open to conviction on that point, and if my hon. Friend and those who have spoken on the subject will bring the matter forward we shall be prepared to consider it. But I cannot say more than that. I do not know that there is anything more in connection with engineers that I need dwell upon to-night. I think that everything is covered by the assurance I have given that we are ready to hear their case—one of the most important eases that could be brought before us and one which calls for careful consideration. I have now, I think, dealt with the various points in connection with the manning of the Navy, and I pass on to the consideration of the Works Vote. That Vote provides for the dredging, and for certain defences of our harbours, and the construction of new docks; coaling jetties, naval and marine barracks, magazines, and so forth. Last year it was evident that the Works Vote must rise, although, having had such short experience at the Admiralty, we were not then prepared to increase it. A year's careful survey of this question has convinced Lord Spencer that a largo expenditure from year to year will be necessary to meet the necessities of the case. Among the works we have in hand at the present moment are the two great docks being constructed at Portsmouth, which will be capable of holding the very largest ships. Progress has been made with very important dredging work in connection with harbours. The approach to Chatham in the Medway has been deepened, the approach to Portsmouth Harbour has been greatly improved, and a beginning has been made of the dredging necessary for the mooring of our great vessels at Portsmouth, and other dredging works are going on at Plymouth. Both at Portsmouth and Devonport extensive dredging is necessary. The Medway will have to be widened in order to make the approach to Chatham Dockyard satisfactory. The works on the extension of the existing mole at Gib- raltar have been begun. The now works proposed by the Admiralty in the present Estimates are, taking them to some extent in their order of importance, first, the beginning of the very great work of the extension of the docks and basins at Devonport Dockyard. That scheme, known as the Keyham Extension, has been under discussion since 1890 and has received very thorough consideration at the hands of the present Board of Admiralty. It includes three additional docks and a large basin area, wharfage, and, as part of the new works, a coaling jetty. These great works cannot be completed in less than 10 years, though of course a, certain part of them will be completed sooner, nor will it be possible to commence them before the end of the year, until the scheme is quite ready for carrying out. Now I come to the question of naval barracks. A few words were said upon that subject yesterday by an hon. Gentleman opposite. He seemed to be under the impression that experience showed that it was desirable during the comparatively brief period our seamen have to spend in port they should be housed in ships rather than in barracks. That view has been shared, I believe, by some persons of authority, but the opinion at which we have arrived is this—that to men who have to suffer various discomforts during the number of years they are at sea, it is a great advantage to be placed in barracks when they are on shore, and we can point to the experience gained at the Gunnery School at Portsmouth, and at the great naval barracks at Devonport, as establishing the view that it is an inestimable advantage to have well-constructed barracks to receive our seamen when they come on shore rather than to place them in hulks, where they encounter so many discomforts and where they are exposed to some risk of lire. There is also the further objection to such an arrangement, that these hulks occupy valuable space in our basin area which, with our increasing requirements, it is most desirable to keep open. In connection with this subject of barracks, I may say that the swimming arrangements for sailors and stokers have not been lost sight of, and I hope that before long we shall have such arrangements as will enable sailors, stokers, and Marines to have a full opportunity of learning to swim. The convict prison at Chatham being now no longer needed for convicts, the Admiralty have been able to complete a scheme, not without great alterations and considerable expenditure, to alter the present prison-like aspect of the buildings and fit them as barracks. There will also be a considerable extension of the Keyham Training College for Engineers, which is now overcrowded. Another increase in expenditure is caused by the necessity of adding to the accommodation for Marines—of whom 500 wore added to the establishment last year, and 500 this year—at the barracks at Walmer. That is a most desirable place for training young Marines, and at present we are obliged to shorten the period. Consequently, it is proposed to add to the barracks sufficiently to enable us to keep the young Marine recruits longer at Walmer. With regard to other works, the extension of the mole at Gibraltar has been taken in hand, but we are impressed with the necessity, not only of carrying out that work, but also of beginning a further extension on the mole, so that the ships within the great harbour at Gibraltar may be sufficiently protected from torpedo attack. We have also come to the conclusion that the time has come when a dock must be constructed at Gibraltar, and the first step in that direction will be taken this year. Stress has been laid by an hon. Member on the necessity for greater accommodation for the storage of ammunition at foreign stations. We have introduced into the Estimates proposals for adding to the magazine accommodation at Malta and Gibraltar, and I hope that our stores of ammunition at these places will be brought up to a satisfactory amount. I will now turn to the question of shipbuilding. The total Shipbuilding Vote this year is close on £7,000,000, or an increase of £2,267,000 over that of the current year. The first point to which I wish to draw attention under this head is that by a concentration of effort on the completion of the Naval Defence Act programme we have been able to exceed the anticipations we formed at the time we took Office. The stock complaint made against most Governments on first taking Office has been that they were so intent on beginning new ships that they delayed to complete the ships already in hand. But the desire of the present Government has been to do the reverse, and in taking this course we have acted upon the advice of the naval members of the Board of Admiralty, who were colleagues of the noble Lord opposite. There have been complaints from some quarters, however, about the course we have pursued in pushing to completion the ships under the Naval Defence Act, showing how impossible it is for any Government, whatever it may do—and especially for a Liberal Government—to please some people. We have two very good reasons for the policy which we have adopted, and they are these. In the first place, ships pushed forward to completion promptly are always cheaper and generally better than those whose construction is allowed to drag on for a long time. Secondly, by this effort we have done our best to bring the Naval Defence fleet to its full lighting strength at the end of the term fixed, and thus to fulfil the hopes of the framers of the Act in 1889 and the intentions of the Parliament which passed that Act. All the 10 battleships which were proposed under the Act are now either in commission or in such a state that they could go into action next week if necessary. Of the 42 cruisers all are complete and ready for service with the exception of five, and those are so far advanced that we shall be able to finish them during the next few months; and of the torpedo gunboats three or four only remain to be completed. Coming to the year on which we are entering, the first object on which part of our shipbuilding money has to be spent is the completion of the Naval Defence Act ships, and for that purpose we propose to vote the sum of £281,000. The second head of expenditure is the dockyard ships now in hand of the further programme not under the Naval Defence Act. These are the Renown the Majestic, and the Magnificent—three first-class battleships—three cruisers of the Talbot class, and two sloops building at Sheer-ness. The third division of outlay is the contract shipbuilding now in hand, including the Powerful and the Terrible, two first-class cruisers, building at Barrow and on the Clyde, and 42 torpedo-boat destroyers, two or three of which are either complete or in an advanced condition. There are also 10 torpedoboats of the first class. What I have enumerated is no inconsiderable amount of work. But the new proposals have still to be added, making a fourth bead of outlay. These are, five dockyard battleships, two contract battleships, six contract cruisers of the second class, and two sloops. Hence the work in hand in the dockyards will be, beside:- the completion of the five cruisers under the Naval Defence Act, eight first-class battleships, three second-class cruisers, and four sloops. In private yards the work will be two first-class battleships, two first-class cruisers, six second-class cruisers, and 36 torpedo-boat destroyers. Complaint has been made that we are proposing too much money for the Majestic and Magnificent, and too little to the new ships; but I am satisfied that the Controller of the Navy has very wisely distributed the money, in view of the way in which the Royal Sovereign was pushed forward. That was a record, but with the Majestic the present Board hopes to create a new record, profiting by the experience gained on that occasion. The Majestic is really growing at Portsmouth by leaps and bounds, and 850 tons of material have been already worked in. The experience gained from year to year at the Admiralty enables work to be pushed forward with increasing rapidity. The total amount, including armaments, which it is proposed to vote for new construction under these Estimates, is a sum close on £5,000,000, or in actual figures £4,950,000. For new construction under Vote 8, exclusive of armaments, we propose to vote £4,500,000, as compared with £2,398,7C0 voted in 1893. Taking separately the ships not under the Naval Defence Act, including armaments, we propose to vote for them £4,669,000, or excluding armaments £4,219,000, as against £1,017,000 proposed in the Estimates of the current year, an increase of £3,202,000 for new construction excluding armaments. Out of the £4,500,000 for new construction, dockyard labour will absorb £800,000, and of the balance, £3,700,000, the larger part will go to manufacturing and other industries outside the dockyards. So does a large part of the expenditure on armaments. My right hon. Friend the Member for the Ormskirk Division made a calculation as to the cost of our programme. He took only the proposals before the House, for one year, and that is not a fair statement of the total cost of the programme of the Government. This Programme will involve for the five years ensuing a very liberal provision by Parliament of public money to meet the needs of the Navy. It will involve more money next year, and in the following year than this year. Unfortunately, at the very moment when the cost of this increased expenditure falls upon the nation we have still the unpleasant prospect of having to pay for two years the annuity of nearly £1,500,000, or a total of £2,857,000, for the contract ships built under the Naval Defence Act. Those ships have been completed, but the cost, £10,000,000, instead of being paid in the five years, was spread over seven years, of which two have still to run. In this statement I do not wish, unnecessarily, to open up any controversial topics; but I will just say this. We were told by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for St. George's, Hanover Square, on the 13th of May, 1889, that— It is an exceptional effort which we are making. We are both making up for arrears and forestalling the efforts of the future. We were led to hope that we should be able, at the end of five years, to revert to so-called normal expenditure. This anticipation was the justification—the only possible justification—for not bearing in the five years the burden of five years' work. The work under the Naval Defence Act, though costly, has been good. But of this we feel satisfied: If the House of Commons could have foreseen the impossibility of returning to normal expenditure at the end of the five years and the necessity of spending another £3,000,000 in excess of the normal Estimates, and a still further increase in 1895, the House would never have assented to this feature of the Naval Defence Act, and would have insisted that the burden of the five years should be borne in the five years, and that sufficient for the succeeding period would be, I will not say the evil, hut the burden thereof. After the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff I need not go very fully into the point raised by the hon. Member for Belfast. My hon. Friend said that if the hon. Gentleman could produce a ram which could do what he said, the Government would not hesitate to adopt it. I can only invite him to submit his design to the Admiralty. We should accept with the greatest joy an indestructible ship which is capable of going amongst formidable ironclads and destroying them one after the other, while it is perfectly invulnerable itself. There are hon. Members present who have submitted plans to the Admiralty, and they have been very fairly considered; and I can only regret that the hon. Gentleman opposite did not take the opportunity which was open to him last week of meeting the present Director of Naval Construction at the Institution of Naval Architects, where the whole of the matters which the hon. Member has brought forward might have been discussed by experts.

SIR E. HARLAND

I wish to say that at the very time when Mr. White's valuable paper was being discussed I was very closely engaged on the Royal Commission on Labour. I could not possibly have attended, although I was most anxious to do so.

* SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

Of course I at once accept what the hon. Gentleman has said. I only want to indicate that exceedingly technical points of that kind can be far better discussed among experts than across the floor of this House. The hon. Gentleman thought it would be desirable that designs for warships should be referred either to a Committee of this House or to a Committee, including engineers and representatives of the Mercantile Marine. That question was dealt with by the hon. Member for Cardiff, who objected to an embargo being placed on the Constructor of the Naval Department. The Admiralty consider themselves responsible for designs, and they would not be discharging their duty if they surrendered that responsibility. It is a great responsibility, but they have the advantage of first-rate expert advice, and the Board consists to a very important degree of naval men of experience whose opinions on such subjects are entitled to great weight. I think it is a satisfaction to the country that they should accept the responsibility for designs of ships and not place it on a Committee of the House of Commons or any other Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff asks for an assurance that the new ships will be absolutely invulnerable against guns, rams, and torpedoes. He knows that is too much to expect; and I venture to say to the House that anyone occupying my position ought to be chary of giving any such assurances. The next war—long may it be off—will alone solve many of these problems, but I do say that we believe our new ships will be strong enough to keep rams and torpedoes at a respectful distance, and that they possess qualities of offence and defence which will not be second to those of any of the existing battleships of the world. It will be satisfactory to the House to know that all possible preliminary steps have been taken in connection with the carrying out of our programme. Orders for commencing the two big battleships can consequently be given to-morrow. Invitations for tenders, with the consent of the Treasury, were issued some time ago; they have come in, have been examined, and have been provisionally settled, and the expenditure on the earlier dockyard battleships has already begun. More than £350,000 has been taken for the three which are to be commenced early, and about £60,000 for two which cannot be begun at Portsmouth and Chatham till the end of the year. It is absolutely impossible to commence ships in the dockyards without regard to the work which is in hand, and that is the reason why a comparatively small sum is taken for those two ships, though it is double the amount which was proposed for two battleships which were put in the Estimates of 1892–0 by our predecessors. For pushing on the Majestic and Magnificent more than £160,000 in labour alone, or more than £836,000, including materials and contract work, is taken. The Renown will cost about £266,000 this year. These measures for prompt commencement and rapid pushing forward of ships now in hand are part of the fulfilment of the assurance which was given to the House by the right hon. Member for Midlothian on behalf of the Government that steps would be taken, with Treasury sanction where necessary, for hastening preparations and avoiding loss of time. I ask the Committee also to remember that, as we fully maintain our supremacy as a Naval Power, so also we maintain the superiority in the speed at which we can build ships of war. Not only is that the case, but we can build considerably cheaper than Foreign Powers. It cannot be too clearly understood by our neighbours that we recognise the fact that the United Kingdom cannot afford to allow any combination to endanger our supremacy on the seas. Whatever it may cost, whatever sacrifice it may entail, we shall keep our Navy capable of defending our interests against any combination which can be formed against it, and of performing the exceptional duties in time of peace, and the duties of a different nature in time of war, which fall on our ships. This is our defence, as an Empire of islands at home and in distant seas, an Empire of colonies and dependencies throughout the world. When we say this, we say it in no warlike or defiant spirit, but as a truism, as a doctrine which is accepted in this country by people of all shades of opinion, as a recognition of what is vitally essential to our commerce, to our security, and to our very existence. We are asked in some quarters to publish our five years' programme. I gladly notice that by some other critics of both shades of politics we are strongly urged to do nothing of the kind. The opinion of the Government is this—that the only possible effect of prematurely publishing our programme is to deprive us of an advantage which we may as well retain as long as possible. It is right that we should look ahead; that what we do this year should be part of a scheme thoroughly worked out by naval and expert authority at the Admiralty, considered by the Government, and approved in time to allow of the careful preparation of designs for various types of vessels of improved or novel construction. The scheme has been worked out, and will remain. The preparation of the designs has been commenced, and the newer types will be built in the coming years of the period; and I may say on behalf of the Government that it is their deliberate resolve that if they have an opportunity they will continue theirs effort through the five years and carry into full effect their programme. That is my answer to my right hon. Friend, who says this is a programme of promises. He may regard it as such; but I ask the House generally to accept our word that it is our intention to persevere with the programme, and, if we have the opportunity, to carry it into effect. If hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite take our places and come into Office we entertain not the slightest fear that they would go back from a programme which has been settled by their predecessors, and which is based on the best expert advice. Risk may arise of undue stimulus to the increase of rival efforts abroad when a five years' programme is announced with a flourish of trumpets. We do what we can to minimise that risk by confining our published details as to ships and money to one year. But how can we best check this competitive race on the part of other Powers? My answer is this—by evidence that one Party is quite as alive as the other to the paramount duty of maintaining our strength on the sea. And if to that evidence he added the salutary lesson that neither Party in this House will be tempted to Party attack and Party recrimination on the subject of our Navy—a subject on which we should all agree, and which should be lifted above the level of faction and petty wrangle—then we may hope that it will be once for all understood that nothing which any other State can do will prevent our maintaining the security of our commerce, the defence of our possessions throughout the world, and the command of the seas. Sir, I now submit these large and carefully-considered proposals to the House, in full confidence that they will be adopted by common consent in the true interests of the security, prosperity, and peace of our people and possessions throughout the world.

LORD G. HAMILTON (Middlesex, Ealing)

The fact that Her Majesty's Government have proposed to the House Estimates so largely in excess of those of last year, coupled with the speeches of the present Prime Minister and other Members of the Government, may be accepted by the House as an earnest that the Government are determined to do their best to bring up the Navy to the standard of strength at which both Parties in the House agree it is necessary it should be maintained. Therefore, I feel it is the duty of those who in the past have urged upon the Government the necessity of increased expenditure, to do their best to accept the proposals now submitted in the spirit in which they are made, to let bygones be bygones, to refer to the past as little as possible, and to concentrate our attention in trying to make the proposal of the Government a really workable scheme which shall secure for the British Navy a standard of strength superior to that of any other two Foreign Powers in the world. The difficulty with which we are confronted on the threshold is that while the Government ask the House of Commons to give them its confidence in respect of a five years' scheme they only reveal to the House one-fifth part of that scheme. I am bound to say that the reasons which have been given for this maintenance of secrecy will not stand a moment's analysis. What is the objection to taking Parliament into the confidence of the Government? Every Government has done so before. It was done when Lord North-cote's three years' scheme was proposed. And when the late Government brought forward their five years' scheme, not only did they tell the House what they proposed to do, but they gave a full record of the financial liabilities which the scheme would impose on the revenues of the country. It is impossible, therefore, for Parliament to have confidence in a scheme of the financial magnitude of which it has no knowledge. The right hon. Gentleman's objection to the publication of the scheme is that foreign nations will find out the details. But does the right hon. Gentleman really suppose that he can keep the scheme secret from any Foreign Government during five years? The only result will be that every Admiralty in Europe will be in full possession of the details of the Ministerial plans, and the body that will be kept in ignorance is the House of Commons, which has to vote the money. I cannot, therefore, understand why the Government will not take the House of Commons into its confidence. The right hon. Gentleman had gone at great length into various proposals in connection with his scheme. He proposes to spend a very large amount of money under the head of buildings and works. I have no doubt these are necessary, but the amounts which it is proposed to expend during the coming year appears in many cases to be absurdly out of proportion to the total sum, which is put at £4,130,000. For example, they propose to spend £940,000 on dredging, but the amount taken in the Estimates for the year is £85,000, which means at this rate spreading the expenditure over a period of 12 years. On Keyham Basin they propose to spend £2,000,000, but the amount taken for the coming year is only £1,000, and at this rate it will take 2,000 years to complete the expenditure. The next liability is £783,000 for expenditure abroad. The amount taken for the year is £23,000, which means that it will take 36 years to pass before the work is finished. Then for barracks, which are urgently required, it is proposed to spend £350,000, and £1,000 is all that is asked to be voted now, so that these barracks, which are urgently required, cannot be finished for 350 years. It is, therefore, evident that if the present generation is to have any benefit from these works and buildings we must contemplate a very much larger expenditure in future years. I repeat, that it is right that the House should be taken into the confidence of the Government: because if a change of Government takes place, how can the incoming Government be pledged to a scheme the full extent of which they do not know? I venture to repeat that it is only right that the House should be taken into the confidence of the Government, because if a change of Government should take place how could the incoming Government be pledged to a scheme, they full extent of which they were not aware of? The only method by which continuity can be maintained, and the adherents of both Parties in the House kept to a scheme of naval construction, is to take the House into confidence and secure the assent of both Parties to the scheme. We should then all be pledged to it, and no matter what changes may take place the scheme must be carried out. As to the Manning Vote, it is said that no attempt was made by the late Admiralty Board to meet the manning difficulties engendered by the Naval Defence Act. A more astonishing statement I never heard, and it was denied in the flattest and plainest manner by Lord Spencer. Six or eight months after Lord Spencer came into Office he dealt with the question of manning. Did the noble Lord then say that the late Government made no attempt to meet the manning difficulty entailed by the Naval Defence Act? On the contrary, the noble Lord, after being six months in Office, so far from stating that the late Government had neglected the manning difficulty held out the hope that certain reductions might be made, but that they could not be made just then; that it was impossible to reduce the number of officers and men then serving in the Fleet, and that he was not prepared then to suggest any change in that direction. The fact is that for years before the late Government left Office they raised by annual increments the number of men from 60,000 odd to 74,000 odd. It is therefore an act of gross injustice to say that the late Government ignored the manning difficulty.

* SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

I beg the noble Lord's pardon; I said nothing of the kind. I recognised the fact that the noble Lord opposite appointed the Committee, a most useful Committee, but. I said what was perfectly true, that the burden of the increase in the number of men had fallen upon the present Government.

LORD G. HAMILTON

I differ altogether from my right hon. Friend. We increased the manning number by 15,000 men, and the Reserve by 6,000. I undertake to say that we provided the great bulk of the men necessary to man the Fleet as anticipated under the Naval Defence Act. Of course, if you subsequently add a fresh number of ships you must increase your numbers of men. I am perfectly satisfied that 5,000 additional men will cover all the requirements, as far as manning is concerned, for the ships comprised in the Naval Defence Act. We are now told that there is to be an increase of 6,700 men, but I cannot see how that total is arrived at. But I am quite willing to recognise that the Government have dealt liberally with the manning difficulty, and that their proposals are in the main satisfactory. The number seems really to be 5,700, that is, 1,000 short. Of that number, 1,600 is automatic; 800 are seamen entered direct from the Mercantile Marine; there is an increase of 350 engine-room artificers, 2,450 stokers, and 500 marines. As far as I can make out, 500 are boys who have been entered, making the number really 5,200. I question the policy of the increase of stokers, as the duties of stokers and firemen are the same in the Mercantile Marine as in men-of-war, and we can obtain men when we want them for this duty. It is otherwise with trained men. Whilst I agree with the proposals relating to manning, I wish to make a suggestion. In the past, when officers and men were more than sufficient to man sea-going ships, a number of secondary and subsidiary duties were put upon the men in the Navy, including the surveying and trooping service. I have always felt that, as officers and men receive more scientific training, it is a mistake to use them for the every-day purposes where less trained labour would answer every demand. It seems to me to do so is much the same as using razors to chop blocks with. I deprecate the mode in which it is proposed to augment the number of stokers. I do not believe there is any necessity to make the newcomers long-service men. To do that would be to create an additional expense, when stokers, whose work is the same on any steamships, can be obtained easily from the Mercantile Marine. I am strongly of opinion that it would be for the advantage of the Public Service if a change were made in the present arrangements by which troops are now conveyed to and from India. The Indian troop service is now composed of old troopers. These old ships will soon, however, cease to exist, and I am strongly in favour of the proposal that trooping and transport should be carried out in future not by Government ships, but by contracts with private companies. In time of war these troopers would at once have to be laid aside, and every officer and man engaged on them now would have to be used elsewhere. As that is what must happen on the outbreak of a war, I cannot hut think it would be a wise policy to get the transports which would then have to be called into requisition into something like working order during times of peace. I believe there are some 60 lieutenants locked up in the surveying service. I would not dissociate the surveying service from the Navy, but I think a good deal of that work could be done by hired vessels, leaving a considerable number of officers available to man our vessels. I am glad to hear that a Committee has been appointed to consider the question of officers under the proposed new arrangements. With regard to the subject of increased pay, which is from time to time brought forward for non-commissioned officers and men, I have always maintained, whether I am at the time in or out of Office, that if the men expect more money in the future the conditions of the old régime must be very carefully gone into. I regard with great satisfaction the action taken by the Government with a view of extending the scope of the annual mobilisation, and I am glad to see that the system is steadily developing and increasing in favour with the men. I believe that the change in the barrack system is also working good. Before I say a few words on the Shipbuilding Vote, I must notice the very able speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast (Sir Edward Harland) with reference to the Admiralty business now before the House. I could not help feeling that the opinion of none of us can stand on equal terms with that of a man who has had so many years of daily practical knowledge of shipbuilding, when a question has to be faced from a purely practical point of view. But while I most fully appreciate the value of the hon. Member's remarks as to what should in future be done in the way of lengthening our war vessels and altering their coaling capacity, I would very humbly suggest that the experience gained in the building of merchant ships alone cannot always be applied to the building and equipment of men-of-war. In building the latter there is one thing above all to be considered—namely, where and how to place the guns. So difficult a question has this always proved that I feel I may say that those who have tried the building of both kinds of ships have come to the conclusion that to build a merchant vessel is but child's play to the difficulties experienced in building properly a fully-equipped man-of-war. A battleship is a fighting machine, and, therefore, many things in her design must be subordinated to the training of her guns and the storing of the ammunition for them. I would make one suggestion, and it is this: that the hon. Member for Cardiff, who has achieved such success in the designing of vessels to cross the Atlantic, should try his hand on a cruiser, and that he should take all the responsibility for her sea-going qualities.

An hon. MEMBER

Battleships?

LORD G. HAMILTON

I am not so sure about the hon. Member's battleships, and therefore I would give him a cruiser first. If he could attain success with that he would have had the satisfaction of proving his theories, and the Constructive Department of the Admiralty are only too glad to welcome outside suggestions when they can do so with reasonable security. The confidence that is now placed in the Designing Department of the Admiralty is a contrast to the lack of confidence formerly exhibited, and the change may, I think, be taken as the measure of the gratitude due to Mr. White for his services during the past 13 years. If the Committee assent to the proposals for increased expenditure we ought to have a guarantee that the money voted will be applied to the purposes for which it was asked. Great objection was taken by Members of the Government to the procedure under the Naval Defence Act by which money, when voted to particular ships, was under the necessity of being devoted to those ships alone, and could not be devoted to any other purpose. The financial year, which would close on April 1, was the first in which the two systems had been in operation—the new system inaugurated by the Act and the old system. The two systems having now been in operation side by side, I would ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer to follow the results of an investigation which I have made. The amount of money voted under the Naval Defence Act for new construction was £1,381,000, and every penny of that has been devoted to the purpose for which it was asked. All the rest of the money came under the old system. It provided for the commencement of four large ships and the building of a number of smaller ships and torpedo-catchers. There was a unanimous opinion that we should push on the building of big ships, because we were most deficient in them. For that purpose the Board of Admiralty took £375,000, and the sum they had spent at the close of the present financial year was £143,000. There may be plausible reasons given for the expenditure having been kept down—for the difference between the actual and the estimated expenditure—but as the ships were included in the Programme of the preceding year, there does not seem to be any valid excuse for the difference between the sum spent and the sum voted. The Admiralty also proposed last year to build 14 torpedo-catchers, experimental vessels. They were to be provided with tubular boilers, on a new principle; and, as we are only in the infancy of that experiment, I protest against the unwise step of so many being built until we have gained experience which may suggest improvements. Though the House was in continuous Session, there was no intimation of any change until December, when the Financial Secretary, in a tone of triumph, informed the House that instead of 14 the Admiralty had ordered 36 torpedo-boats, costing £34,000 each, thereby incurring an additional outlay of £800,000 without Parliamentary authority. Now, Sir, I own to being very much surprised at this occurring with the right hon. Gentleman as Financial Secretary, because he was so very severe on all our Departments when he was Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. What is the consequence? The consequence is that a liability of £800,000 is carried forward to this year. If this unauthorised order for 22 torpedo-ships had not been given, that £800,000 would have been available for big ships, and four or five of them might have been commenced in private yards. I object to this irregularity, from a Parliamentary as well as from a naval point of view. It is a mistake to order at once such a large number of torpedo-boats, which require constant care and attention, especially when the engine-room artificer complement is so short, and when there will be a difficulty in obtaining basin accommodation for the vessels that will be completed this year under the Naval Defence Act. From the Parliamentary point of view I ask what guarantee have we, if we are not put in possession of the whole scheme, that the same transaction may not take place in the future on a larger scale? I suppose the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty will say that when I was in Office I did the same thing. Even if I did, that would not be a justification, but I did not. What I did was entirely different. I will tell the Committee what occurred. The late Government had trouble with certain boilers which leaked badly, and we were reluctantly compelled to put in the Suspense Account £60,000 or £70,000 for the purpose of reboilering those vessels, if certain experiments failed. But the experiments succeeded beyond our most sanguine expectations, and that sum was not appropriated under the Repairs Act, but we asked the Treasury to be allowed to devote the money to building certain small vessels. But what has the right hon. Gentleman done? I quite agree that there must be a latitude given to First Lords of the Admiralty, so that they may make provision for unforeseen expenditure out of savings, but there is one Vote to which the power of diversion ought not to apply, and that is the Vote for new construction. My complaint is, that not only have the Admiralty run up unauthorised liabilities with regard to small boats, but also with regard to big vessels. It is an axiom of naval finance that no new ironclad is to be constructed until the House of Commons has an opportunity of assenting to the commencement of the vessel, but during the past year the Government have, without authority, entered upon the construction of big vessels which in the aggregate will cost £2,400,000. I therefore congratulate the right hon. Gentleman, as the late Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, on having beaten the record of financial irregularity in running up this enormous bill without authority. The right hon. Gentleman referred to a possible change in the Government. If that change takes place, and the right hon. Gentleman resumes his functions as Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, we shall watch with interest the manner in which he will pronounce judgment himself for this irregularity. If Parliament is to have control over expenditure, such transactions ought not to take place. I hope we will have an assurance from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that nothing of the kind shall occur again. There is no Service which is more liable to fads than the Naval Service. At one time it is a torpedo, at another time a 100-ton gun, and at another a torpedo catcher. All these things are good; but do not let the idea run away with you. I have always believed that the danger of torpedoes in warfare has been over-estimated, and the more I see and read the more am I con-finned in that impression. These 42 vessels to which I have referred are of no use whatever for offensive purposes, and their construction only shows how a certain idea carries away distinguished naval officers. The expenditure of £4,500,000, which the right hon. Gentleman proposes, is a good round sum. It is not quite equal to what France and Russia are spending at the present moment, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer may fairly take credit for the greater economy of our method of construction. The idea is that our Navy is to be equal to those of any two Powers, and the two strongest Naval Powers are France and Russia. England has now 22 first-class battleships building and in commission. With the additional seven ships that are to be constructed the number will be raised to 29. France and Russia have already 28 first-class battleships. I therefore imagine that the number "seven" was fixed upon in order to give England an apparent advantage of one over the battleships of these two nations. But the bulk of the vessels of these Powers in course of construction are, however, much advanced, and will, I fear, be completed before our seven additional ships can be finished. France and Russia will, therefore, soon be ahead of us. In second-class battleships there is no semblance of equality between ourselves and France and Russia, for we have only 12 such ships, whilst the two Powers named have 21. In second and third-class cruisers we are superior, and we have a certain superiority in first-class cruisers. What we want are big vessels; and, that being the case, instead of building six second-class cruisers, it would be wiser to build four of the first-class, which are vessels that can take part in any great naval engagement. I wish to say, in conclusion, speaking for myself and for a large majority of those who act with me, that we desire to co-operate with Her Majesty's Government in increasing the strength of the Navy; but when the right hon. Gentleman concluded by stating that he had placed his scheme on record, I must point out that that is exactly what he has not done. I hope, therefore, that the Government will consider the advisability, in spite of what they have said on platforms, of taking the House of Commons into their confidence, and telling it what they really propose to do. If they will only do that, and give some assurance that what I have complained of shall not occur again, they will receive every assistance from us in bringing to a successful issue any scheme for the strengthening of the Navy in the interest of the Empire at large.

MR. HOWELL (Bethnal Green, N. E.)

said, he was by no means satisfied with the expressions used by the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty respecting the engine-room artificers. In connection with that portion of the scheme which provided for a large number of stokers, the right hon. Gentleman used the singu- lar expression, "the stokers are qualified as mechanics." Now, the only men who were in any sense qualified as mechanics were the artificers. These men had to serve a seven years' apprenticeship to fully qualify themselves as practical engineers, and then they had to pass a test examination as to fitness; and yet, after doing all that, they could never he promoted from the position in which they found themselves on the first day of their entry into the Navy. Their grievance was that they could never be promoted, and that though they entered the Service as nominal petty officers, they had not the status, pay, accommodation, or authority of petty officers. In all other branches of the Service avenues of promotion were provided. In the Army a drummer-boy could become a non-commissioned officer. These men, after all, were the really qualified practical engineers of the Navy. He had nothing whatever to say of the so-called engineers —so-called, he meant, by the Regulations; but he did say that whatever their qualifications might be they had not the special qualities which the engine-room men had. Engine-room artificers were selected for service in torpedo-boats. They would not select even engineer officers for that onerous post, and yet, with the exception of a little extra pay while doing such duty, engine-room artificers went back to the same rating as before without any chance whatever of promotion. As the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Liverpool had said, the ships of the Navy would have to depend, not on the men on deck, not on the first-class officers, but upon the men beneath, who were in the engine-room. He therefore asked the Financial Secretary, and through him the First Lord, to consider the position of these men. They asked for nothing unreasonable. They did not ask to be relieved of their onerous duties. They did not ask to be made gentlemen on board the ships; but they asked that they should have the chance of promotion like every other class in the Service, and that they should have accommodation suitable to the positions they occupied. The right hon. Gentleman talked about the stokers being qualified as mechanics. What did he moan by that phrase? The engine-room artificers were the only qualified mechanics. If the stokers were put into the engine-room as mechanics with the artificers, the Navy would find itself at once, so far as the Regulations would permit, absolutely without the assistance of the very class of men it most required—[A laugh]—because the artificers would never allow their places to be taken by untrained and unskilled men, when they themselves had spent a long apprenticeship. The hon. and gallant Member for Eastbourne laughed. He would tell the hon. and gallant Gentleman that the workmen had done so before, and would do it again. He therefore appealed to the Financial Secretary, in the interest of the welfare of the Navy, to take the matter into consideration. It would have to be dealt with sooner or later. He hoped the Conference suggested would take place at an early date, and that the recommendations of the men would be attended to by the Admiralty.

ADMIRAL FIELD (Sussex, Eastbourne)

said, the hon. Member for Bethnal Green had said there would be a mutiny in the Service if the demands of a certain section were not settled. He did not think the hon. Member meant that, and he would pass the expression by as a figure of speech. He did not wish it for a moment to be thought that he entertained ungenerous feelings towards the engine-room artificers; but he should say that he thought this case was greatly exaggerated, and that the 15,000 stokers who would be required under this Naval Programme deserved even more consideration. The leading stokers were mechanics. ["No, no!"]

MR. W. ALLAN

I have been in the Navy myself, and I never knew a fireman to lift a hammer in the repairing room.

ADMIRAL FIELD

said, he was sorry for having ruffled the hon. Gentleman; but he was right in saying that the leading stokers were looked upon as mechanics; that they worked under the engineers, and would continue to do so till the end of time. There should be no jealousy of this kind between branches of the Service. The sympathies of hon. Gentlemen opposite were with their pets the engine-room artificers, but he thought the stokers were not unworthy of consideration. The hon. Member for Gateshead had called them firemen. They were more valuable than firemen, for they were taught what the engine-room artificers were not taught—how to fight. He did not want to be thought ungenerous towards the engine-room artificers. Let them get what they could, but let their demands be first carefully considered by the Admiralty. Passing to the general scheme, he should first offer his humble compliments to the right hon. Gentleman the Financial Secretary for the manner in which he had presented his statement to the House. He was glad that the noble Lord had struck the right keynote by promising the Government all the assistance the Opposition could give them in the discharge of this great duty. This should not be a Party question. It was a question of the greatest national importance, and it ought to be handled in a fitting manner by both sides of the House. He did not share the objections of the noble Lord to the action of the Admiralty in ordering these torpedo-catchers without the authority of Parliament. He rejoiced that they had had the courage to order them without that authority. [Dissent.] Well, he was speaking as a naval officer and not as a politician, and he did not care "tuppence" about the authority of Parliament having been obtained or not.

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

We had the authority of the Treasury for spending the money.

ADMIRAL FIELD

said, it was enough that the Treasury had assented. He was afraid that the noble Lord had been keeping bad company when he found him wanting to abolish the Imperial troopships.

LORD G. HAMILTON

The Indian troopships.

ADMIRAL FIELD

That was not his view on a former occasion.

LORD G. HAMILTON

Yes.

ADMIRAL FIELD

did not understand so. He was himself strongly opposed to the giving up of these troopships. The matter had been fully inquired into, and the result had been that it was found that the troopships had done splendid service, and had paid for their cost over and over again; and not only that, but they had been an admirable school for officers and men, and the only efficient school that we had. Consequently, he did not think that the noble Lord really represented the naval view of the subject. He thought it would be an admirable plan if we adopted the French custom and carried our own troops in our own transports. They would then have the Naval Reserve men trained in men-of-war vessels instead of being carried about in all sorts of vessels. ["Agreed!"] Well, he thought he was entitled to the same consideration as hon. Members for the dockyard towns. He thought the French were at least as wise as we were, and if they thought it desirable to carry their troops in their own troopships it was a very curious thing that we should be told that we ought to abolish our troopships. Then the noble Lord wanted them to give up the Survey Service. For his part, he wanted to increase it. Their complaint was that they had not enough of the Surveying Service, and that there were not enough surveying officers. He hoped the Government would not assent to any change in the way of decreasing the efficiency of that Service. If we were so poor that we could not have enough men and money to keep our Fleet going, then God help us! He should prefer that there were more men in the Marines. He rejoiced that the Admiralty were going to increase the leading stoker class, but it was more important to increase the seamen class. He was amazed to see that only 500 Marines were put down as increase. They were the cheapest force that could be devised under the Crown. They were cheapest as regarded pay and provisions, and were excellent men in regard to discipline, and valuable generally to the Fleet. He hoped the Secretary to the Admiralty would consider this point again as to the inferior stoker class of men, and he should suggest that they knocked off, say, 1,000 of the proposed increase, and substitute a similar number of seamen. The Admiralty thoroughly understood the needs of the situation both as to works and ships, and personnel, and armaments and docks, but the Government were not able to put forward a complete scheme for their acceptance. If they did not choose to put forward a complete scheme, of course they were masters of the situation. He regretted that they were the masters of the situation. He noticed they had put down seven battleships and six cruisers to be built, but he did not understand why the cruisers were to belong to the second class; all the information they had was in favour of vessels of the Blenheim and Blake class. But the Government were masters of the situation, and would do as they liked, and, no doubt, they would go on doing as they liked; but, at all events, he hoped they would do what they could to meet the ideas that he had indicated. They were promised seven battleships and six cruisers. Only five had been laid down, and two stood over for two years. If the Government was satisfied that we were weak in battleships, why should not all of them have been laid down at the same time? If five of the ships were to be advanced rapidly, why not the whole seven of them? Allusion had been made to the lieutenants' class. The lieutenants' class was much below what was required by the circumstances of the present time? That might not be the view of hon. Members opposite, but he had endeavoured to gather the opinion of lieutenants in the Service, and that was their opinion; and they felt that when they were called upon to command important vessels, it was a great hardship that they should not have the substantive rank of commander. The rank of commander was an ambition desired by everybody in the Service, and he thought it was worthy the serious consideration of the Admiralty whether officers called upon to command vessels of an important class should not have the substantive rank of commander, although the seniors might not be promoted to the rank of captain. He thought it would do a great deal of good if they promoted 100 lieutenants to the rank of commander. The right hon. Gentleman had said that, with regard to the engineer class, the Admiralty were ready to hear their case. He, however, would rather have a Committee to consider the case instead of individuals, and he was only sorry that the Admiralty did not know more about the subject.

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT (Sheffield, Ecclesall)

said, the most remarkable thing about the proposals of the Government was that they only proposed to spend £1,360,000 out of the total of £8,000,000 which their complete programme would cost. No reason could be given by the Government for failing to put their complete programme, which should be a five years' programme, in its entirety before the country, except for the fact that they committed themselves to attacks upon the late Government when they were carrying their five years' programme out. Of course, they welcomed any effort on the part of the present Government to bring the Navy up to its proper strength, and they would support them in all that they could do in that direction. At the same time, they could not help feeling that the programme was begun much later than it ought to have been begun. Then the Government had practically wasted 20 months of precious time, and now they put forward a new programme of seven battleships and six cruisers, but were only proposing to spend one-sixth of the whole sum involved. He wanted to say one word in regard to a work of great importance referred to in the First Lord's statement—he meant the construction of a naval dock at Gibraltar. When the late Government went out of Office two years ago they put a sum of £2,000 into the Estimates for preliminary inquiries and examinations, and now the Government came forward with a proposal to spend several thousand pounds on the dock. He ventured to say, although he made no claim to be an expert in the matter, but as one who had studied it thoroughly, that of all the necessities of the Naval Service the building of this dock at Gibraltar was the greatest. He would rather see the dock at Gibraltar undertaken and finished even if it were necessary to give up the construction of one of the battleships. What was the centre of our, naval power? It was at present the Mediterranean. If we were forced into a war with France the Mediterranean Fleet would be compelled to retire to Gibraltar for reinforcements, and it was probable that the great naval battles of the future would be fought in waters close to Gibraltar. Was it creditable that we had not the means of receiving and repairing a single battleship, or cruiser, or torpedo catcher at that great naval centre, which ought to be one of the greatest naval centres and dockyards in the world? It would be necessary, as things stood at present, to send a disabled warship 1,000 miles—to Portsmouth or Plymouth—against an enemy in possession of innumerable torpedo-boats. Seven thousand vessels stopped at Gibraltar in 1889, and the amount of commerce passing through the Mediterranean in a year was enormous. One of the first necessities of the Navy, he urged, was the construction of a suitable dock at Gibraltar. The work had been put off year after year; and now that the Government had undertaken it at last, they only put £1,000 on the Estimates, leaving £366,000 for construction of the dock alone to be spent in future years. He hoped the Government would consider this question, and see if it was not possible to advance the work more rapidly. It was an undertaking the necessity for which was recognised by the whole nation, and he did not think the money could be better spent.

MAJOR RASCH (Essex, S.E.)

said' that before the Vote was taken he must endeavour to get an answer from the Admiralty upon a matter of great interest to his constituency. The Admiralty engaged in dredging operations, and the stuff the dredgers got up, in defiance of remonstrances made, was thrown into the fishing grounds of his constituents, or, at all events, into waters which were under the purview of the Kent and Essex Fishery Committee. In order to get an answer from the Civil Lord of the Admiralty he should move the reduction of the Vote by £100.

THE CHAIRMAN

That would be out of Order.

THE CIVIL LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. E. ROBERTSON,) Dundee

I can assure the hon. Member that this work is about to be stopped. I will give the hon. Gentleman to-morrow particulars of the new scheme of dredging, which I am sure will obviate the objection raised.

MAJOR RASCH

May I mention that I was present at the last meeting of the Kent and Essex Fishery Committee, and know what is the proposal made. I accept the proposal in the sense that half a loaf is better than no bread, but I suggest that the best plan is to throw the refuse into the water from between the Mouse Light and the Mouse Sand—if the hon. Gentleman knows where that is. In that case I shall not want to trouble him again.

MR. E. ROBERTSON

said, he could not go farther than to promise to consider the suggestion.

Vote agreed to.

2. £3,918,500, Wages, &c, of Officers, Seamen, Boys, Coast Guard, and Marines, agreed to.