CLASS II.

HC Deb 07 September 1893 vol 17 cc485-555

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £45,471, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1894, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Department of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

SIR R. TEMPLE (Surrey, Kingston)

said, he rose to continue the statement which he was making on the previous evening in regard to Siam. He was at a little disadvantage in beginning afresh, but he hoped the Under Secretary would have the points before the House—the delimination of the country within the bend of the river; the fate of Luang Prabang; the neutral zone effective if it were broad, ineffective if it were narrow; and most of all the true definition of integrity and independence of Siam not only according to French ideas, but according to English ideas. He would remark, in the first place, that, as the friend and ally of that country, it might be well if some assistance could be afforded, perhaps indirectly, to Siam in raising the amount of the indemnity which had been imposed by France, so that no excuse could be given for prolonged occupation. At all events, he wished to know how the matter was progressing. The river which ran through the district in which Chantaboon was situated came from the hills, in which were situated mines of precious stones and possibly minerals; and in those mines British capital and British mining engineers were employed. The Great Lake was also a very important point, as also were the islands in the Gulf of Siam. He wished to be informed as to the position on the western shore of the Great Lake, as to whether the islands in the gulf were still occupied by the French, and, if so, were they going to be evacuated, and when? Were the Government without reliable and definite information as to the French works round Chantaboon? A still more menacing matter was the nature of the proceedings of the French Special Envoy, who was now at Bangkok, and as to whom he had addressed several questions to the Government. Possibly the answers given to those questions merely indicated that the Foreign Office did not know of any arrangements between France and Siam which would have the effect of excluding British interests in the latter country. He further wished to ask the Government whether any commercial arrangements were being negotiated at Bangkok which would have an unfavourable effect upon England as compared with France. He should also like to know whether the British Government would object if Siam showed any tendency in the negotiations with the French Envoy to infringe the existing Treaties which secured to England the most-favoured-nation clause. The answers previously given on these points could not be regarded as satisfactory, and there was undoubtedly considerable apprehension existing that something of this kind was now going on between the French Envoy at Bangkok and the Siamese authorities—that some concessions were being made, and that commercial conditions were being entered into which would have a tendency to exclude British commerce. He had had a letter from one who was well informed, part of which he would read to the House, as it showed how, by making separate arrangements, France might drive a coach and four through the Most-Favoured Nation Clauses. So he could say that he thought there was reason for his demand for information. He believed that unless the British Government exercised considerable watchfulness and firmness it would be perfectly possible, despite all influences to the contrary, for negotiations to be entered into at Bangkok which would prove to the disadvantage of British commerce, and which would be discovered when it was too late to effectively safeguard British interests. That some secret negotiations were going on seemed to be very probable, for what else was the French Envoy doing at Bangkok? He could not be there to settle the details of the ultimatum, for they had already been unreservedly accepted. There was reason to believe that France was engaged in negotiations with some ulterior object, and it was of great importance to England to provide against those negotiations affecting the integrity and independence of Siam. He would simply say that, notwithstanding any promises or assurances that had been made on the point, the Government should not hesitate to question the French Government on the matter—not with reference to old matters which had already been practically settled, but with regard to the future integrity and independence of Siam. On the one hand they should warn Siam that they should object to any arrangement with France which might prejudicially affect their treaty and commercial rights; and, on the other, should intimate to France in a friendly manner, though with a proper degree of firmness, that they should strongly object to any arrangement which affected the independence of Siam. Considering the great interests which England possessed in Siam, and the great importance to her of the integrity and independence of that country being maintained, he wished to urge these points on the attention of the Government as strongly as possible. It might be said that it was too late to take any such steps; but he admitted that many precious interests had been already sacrificed, and he denied that it was too late for the British Government to take steps to prevent Siam from being absorbed into the French Empire, and to insure that she should become a real and solid buffer State between the English and French possessions. He did not wish to say one word hostile to the French. He did not desire to show any unbecoming jealousy of them. On the contrary, he heartily wished them success in the consolidation of the dominions they had acquired in that part of the world. But there must be a limit to French ambition, and that limit should be drawn somewhere in Siam, so as to keep an inviolable zone between our Indian Empire and the French possessions in Eastern Asia. Certain articles had appeared lately in the Press and in the London magazines, in which it was stated that our Indian Empire was coming more and more between the two fires of Russia and France, and, although he was sorry to say he had not written those articles, he could say that the statements in them were perfectly true, and would be confirmed by any Englishman who had resided in the East. In conclusion, he trusted that in his speeches on this subject he had not pressed too hard upon the Government in point of argument, because he had frequently admired the firm, resolute, and forward attitude they had taken up with regard to Egypt and Canada, and other places, and he heartily concurred in the able speeches made by the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs; but the present state of things in Siam was so serious that it was necessary to call the Government to account as strictly as the Rules of the House might allow, in the hope that they would be able to give a good account of their stewardship in this matter. He was looking forward to the Blue Book which would inevitably have to be presented, and he hoped that would justify the nation in reposing confidence in the Government as English Ministers acting on behalf of England.

MR. CURZON (Lancashire, Southport)

No one in the House, I am sure, will be disposed to blame the hon. Baronet for raising this important question, which he has discussed in so interesting and authoritative a manner. Not even the most ardent supporter of the Government will say we are doing wrong in taking up a small amount of the time allotted to Supply in calling the attention of the House to so grave a question as British interests in the far East. Throughout this Session of Parliament I venture to say that the Opposition have shown more than ordinary forbearance towards the Government in respect of their foreign policy, mainly, no doubt, due to the confidence which has been hitherto reposed in the administration of Lord Rosebery. Before proceeding farther, I would say that the importance of this subject must not be gauged for a moment by the depleted state of the Benches I see around me. It is unfortunately, but undoubtedly the case, that there are considerable sources of attraction in a sometimes much derided place elsewhere, where the Foreign Secretary is speaking on a subject on which his views to most of us are at least of as much interest as his views upon matters connected with his own Department. But though those of us who speak on this question here have but a scant audience, much greater importance is attached to our words elsewhere than is perhaps apparent to the minds of our colleagues. That which is said in this House is not only printed and circulated in the newspapers at home, but is telegraphed and published in every country in the far East. I do not desire on this occasion to repeat what I said last time this matter came before the House, but this I would venture to say, that there is not a single criticism in which I then indulged or a single anticipation I then hazarded that has not been justified by what has since transpired. I adhere to the opinion previously expressed that if in March last the noble Earl had found it compatible with his duty to address a perfectly friendly letter to the French Government pointing out that, while we had no desire to interfere in the frontier dispute between Siam and themselves, we should regard any further encroachment upon the integrity and independence of Siam with disfavour and as unfriendly on their part, recent occurrences would never have been seen or heard of. In my travels in Tonkin and Cochin China last November and December I discussed this matter with French officials, and gathered from them that it had never entered into their heads that Great Britain would acquiesce in the French demands, which will result in the virtual dismemberment and extinction of the independence of the Kingdom of Siam. But at an early stage of these proceedings Lord Rosebery, carrying to an extreme limit diplomatic courtesy, assured the French that we had no concern in their quarrel in that part of the world, and the French Government forthwith, interpreting these assurances in the most liberal and most agreeable sense to themselves, proceeded step by step at a rate of progression which can only be described as geometrical, and presented first one ultimatum, then a second, and now, we understand, a third to Siam, expecting at each moment to be pulled up, and as much astonished at our forbearance—I might almost say our weakness—as they were gratified at their own success. Meanwhile, we have been assured by the representatives of the Foreign Office that the French Government is still respecting the pledges it gave. But one of the terms is that the Siamese are not to keep any troops within 16 miles of the right bank of the River Mekong, although they are to be allowed to retain a police force there. The only police, however, in Siam are the military—and I doubt very much whether they would be called military in any other country in the world. To say that Siam is not to maintain military in this district, but is yet to be allowed to keep police there for the maintenance of order, is, therefore, to perpetrate a joke at the expense of that country. It may be suggested that it is from fear of future collision that this precaution has been insisted upon. But have the French themselves withdrawn, or consented to withdraw, their troops from a space of 16 miles on their side of the river? Not a bit. The French are at present concentrating their forces there, and have sent two gunboats up the river. There can be no doubt that this particular condition has been introduced into the ultimatum, and is being enforced by France: firstly, to cut off communication with the territory which will still be left to Siam on the left bank of the Mekong, and, secondly, to facilitate that to which we must look forward in the future as certainly as I am now addressing the House of Commons—namely, the carrying out of further French ambition and aspirations on the right bank of the river. With regard to Chantaboon, the hon. Baronet seems to think we have no interest in it, and says he had no official information about it because we have no Diplomatic Agent there; but he is nevertheless able to state that the 300 or 400 French troops in Chantaboon are in a state of alarm because of the contiguity of 3,000 or 4,000 Siamese troops. In my opinion the hon. Baronet entirely underrates the importance of Chantaboon in connection with the recovery by the French of the two provinces which a hundred years ago belonged to Cambodia. The French have occupied the river, and have advanced eight miles inland, have seized the town of Chantaboon, have thrown up earthworks, and have telegraphed for additional forces. I do not share in the matter of Chantaboon the sanguine anticipations expressed by the hon. Baronet (Sir E. Grey), and I respectfully invite him to keep an eye on Chantaboon during the course of the next few weeks, and to pause until it has been evacuated before he congratulates the Government and the House upon having saved those provinces for the Siamese Government, and upon the fact that the French and Siamese question has been satisfactorily settled. I will leave that point, and turn to what is the most important question to us—the question of British interests in Siam. What are British interests in Siam? They have been more than once stated and restated in the course of our discussions, and in reply to a question from myself they were defined by the hon. Baronet (Sir E. Grey) himself in terms on which no one can improve. He defined British interests in Siam as being four in number. The first, he said, was the protection of the life and property of British subjects residing there; the second is the continued preservation of a neutral zone between the British and French territories; the third, the protection of British trade; and the fourth, the continued independence and integrity of the Siamese Kingdom itself. I will venture to say a few words on each of these interests. As regards the protection of the life and property of British subjects in Siam, I think Her Majesty's Government are to be congratulated on the alacrity with which, the moment there was any fear of those interests at Bangkok being jeopardised, they despatched British war vessels to the scene of operations, although it is a pity that they did not inform the French Government of the object with which those ships were sent, since the French Government made the despatch of the ships an excuse for forcing the passage of the river, and menacing the capital itself. As regards the second British interest—the continued preservation of a neutral zone between ourselves and the French—we understand that negotiations are proceeding at Paris with the view of carving out from the body of the unhappy victim a more or less narrow slice of territory—possibly some hundred miles in width—the object being to prevent the frontiers of Great Britain and France from coming into perilous contact in the far East. I presume that this neutral zone, about which I do not desire for a moment to press for information prematurely, will be constructed out of territory which lies to the West of the trans-Mekong part of Luang Prabang, and that it will consist partly of the former Burmese State of Chieng Kheng, which we ceded to Siam. Whether my anticipations be correct or not, I should like to know to whom is this neutral zone, when constructed, to belong, and by whom is it to be administered? If it is to belong to and to be administered by Siam, are the Siamese to be allowed to keep their soldiers there, or are we once more to have raised this farcical plea of a police that has never existed? Again, what guarantees are you going to obtain for the preservation of its integrity? Supposing that its integrity is in the future violated by French troops, or supposing that the wild tribes who inhabit it appeal to the French to come over the border, how are you going to carry out any guarantee you may have previously given or exacted? There is another point. The hon. Baronet (Sir E. Grey) has more than once talked about this neutral zone as if it were identical with a "buffer State." There is the greatest possible difference between the two things. A neutral zone is the merest apology, the palest simulacrum, of a buffer State that can possibly be conceived. A buffer State implies the creation or existence of a third or intervening State between two Powers whose territories would otherwise come in contact with each other. It implies the exercise by the third State of the rights of sovereignty and the possession by it of a certain stability, and it implies the respect of its territories by the two important neighbours who are situated on either side of it. Of such a character is the buffer State of Afghanistan, and of such a character, though perhaps in a modified degree, was, until recently, the Kingdom of Siam itself. As long as the independence and integrity of Siam were something more than a mere name, so long did it preserve the character of a buffer State. But both that integrity and independence have now been fatally impaired, and unless the Government are able to procure guarantees from the French that they will respect the integrity of the Siam that is left, and will give similar guarantees themselves, the buffer State, in so far as relates to Siam, will have totally disappeared. In any case it is certain that the neutral zone you are going to construct in the north-west will in no respect take its place. Your neutral zone, as I understand, is to be a mere strip of territory, which you are going to mark out with white paint, much as you might mark a crease upon a cricket pitch, and within which I do not suppose the French position will be more effective than would be the position of a somewhat weak batsman standing at the wickets exposed to the attack of a formidable bowler at the other end. The tendency to argue that if this neutral zone is constructed we may hold our peace and thank God that we have got a Government that has done so much for us shows the existence of a mere vain delusion. If we are to come out of this lamentable affair with no better result than that, it will be regarded, if not by ourselves, by everyone else, as a painful exhibition of weakness. I come next to the protection of British trade and British traders in Siam. That interest is not one that is capable of being satisfied by the mere protection of British property or British subjects at Bangkok, or by the mere defence of British shipping in the river. The Committee must remember that, if Siam is considered as a commercial factor, far and away above any other interest is that of the trade of Great Britain. Of the whole export and import trade of Siam 93 per cent. is British, and the French portion is less than 1 per cent. Only one French steamer has plied between Saigon and Bangkok, and that was sunk the other day. At Bangkok itself, where you read in the papers of the passing of resolutions at enthusiastic meetings of French tradesmen, there are only two French tradesmen, one being a barber and the other a keeper of a knick-knack store. The entire export of the main products of Siam—its rice, its teak, and its pepper—is in British hands. The great commercial emporium of Singapore is to a large extent sustained by Bangkok, and the 200,000 Chinamen who live at Singapore in contented subjection to British rule depend for their sustenance on the rice which is floated down the Menam and shipped at Bangkok. The mines of Siam are for the most part in course of British exploitation, whilst the one considerable railway enterprise in which the Siamese Government have been led to embark—from Bangkok in a northeasterly direction to Korat—has been given to a firm of British engineers. These are no doubt somewhat tedious details, but it is necessary to give them in order to convey to the Committee the character of not merely the important but the overwhelming interest, nay, the monopoly of British trade which exists in Siam. When we hear that this interest is to be jeopardised and thrown away out of consideration for a French trade which has never existed and the establishment of which in the future the French national temperament renders impossible, emotions are aroused which cannot be regarded as satisfactory. What is the attitude of the French towards the trade of which I am speaking? Wherever you get French and British competition you find that it is French policy, by whatever means in their power, to cripple and crush British trade. The absence of commercial attributes on their own part does not deter them for one moment from endeavouring to injure, and, if possible, to destroy, British trade in those parts of the world with which they are concerned, even if the process of destruction involves injury to themselves. Take the case of Saigon, the capital of French Cochin China. It was for some time a free port, and became a very flourishing and wealthy place; but as soon as the French realised that the bulk of the trade profits were going into the pockets of the British merchants they revolutionised their policy; Free Trade was abandoned, and the normal French barrier of a prohibitive tariff was raised, even though Saigon was drained of its life-blood in carrying out that policy. This will be the policy that will be pursued if the French have a free hand in commercial and fiscal matters in Siam. I hope Her Majesty's Government are already, or, if not, that they will become, fully alive to their responsibility in this matter; that where French Consuls are appointed in the interior of Siam to foster or protect French trade, which does not exist, they will be employed to protect British trade, which does already exist; that the Government will take very good care to maintain on our behalf the Most Favoured Nation Clause in accordance with the Treaty of 1855; that they will allow no tampering whatever within the Malay Peninsula, which distinctly falls within the sphere of British influence, and that they will require the fulfilment by the Siamese of the contract they entered into for the completion of the Korat Railway and other undertakings in which the commercial community is so largely interested. The fourth and last interest is far and away the most important—namely, the independence and integrity of Siam itself. It was in July last that Lord Rosebery said in the House of Lords—and it was repeated by the hon. Baronet—that the integrity and independence of Siam were matters of great importance to the British, and more especially to the British-Indian Empire, and that Her Majesty's Government were fully alive to their responsibility in the matter; and similar declarations of respect for the integrity and independence of Siam emanated from the French Foreign Minister. Whilst we have been disposed to give full credit to these assurances coming from both quarters, we have been confronted with the very remarkable facts that the French Government and the French Foreign Minister appear to have been engaged, step by step, in violating the very conditions which we believed they undertook to respect, and the British Foreign Minister, almost in the same breath that he declares that the independence and integrity of Siam are British interests, invites us to witness their progressive disappearance with almost Spartan composure on the ground that the minor British interests of which I have been speaking are not at stake. Surely, after all, the main British interest in Siam is the political stability of Siam itself. If you allow the power of Siam and of its King to be crippled, and the country to be under French protection, there will not be the slightest good in going out with your paint-pot to demarcate a neutral zone, or in insisting upon commercial equality for your merchants. I would point out that a Siam under French protection, either actual or nominal, must be an anti-British, anti-English Siam, and the only Siam that can possibly stand on its legs between France and Great Britain is a Siam whose borders are defined and respected, whose Monarch's authority within its borders is not challenged, and which possesses not merely the symbols, but the realities of independence. I hope, therefore, that in conducting negotiations Her Majesty's Government will not lose sight of this far larger question in the background, compared with which the question of a neutral zone is comparatively of very small importance. If we are to attach the credit which we desire both to the declarations of Lord Rosebery and the French Government; if Great Britain desires to maintain the autonomy of Siam, and if the French have no further designs on the independence of that Kingdom, there can be no reason why both countries should not join in a formal guarantee of the integrity and independence of the Siam that is left, which shall be equally binding on both Powers, and shall enable Siam, even at this late hour of the day, once again to raise her head and take her place amongst the Kingdoms of the East. I await with interest "what the hon. Baronet will say on the matter; and although, I am sure, I do not desire for one moment to demand from him any relaxation of the diplomatic reserve he has so skilfully maintained up to the present, I hope that he will at once give us some assurance that this larger and Imperial aspect of the question to which I have alluded has not been lost sight of by the Government, and that in addition to counting up the gains and losses of the moment itself the Government will keep an eye upon a matter which intimately and deeply affects the future peace of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula.

SIR C. W. DILKE (Gloucester, Forest of Dean)

reminded the Committee that negotiations were still pending in Paris, but, seeing the scant opportunity they would have in the Autumn Sittings of dealing with the question, he thought that the Government was taking a great responsibility, He was completely in accord with what had been said by the hon. Baronet the Member for the Kingston Division of Surrey and by the late Under Secretary of State for India, as to either a buffer State or a neutral zone in Northern Siam. It was a mockery; but, on the other hand, its creation could hardly be said to be needed in the same way in which it was needed against Russia. France could only get to Siam by the high seas, and on the high seas she was at the mercy of England. She was in this respect in a completely different position from Russia, who was all but our Continental neighbour. The Government could make no statement with regard to Siam, inasmuch as negotiations were pending; neither could they make any statement with regard to a matter which was of high interest to many—Uganda—because they had not yet received Sir Gerald Portal's Report. With regard to Uganda, it was impossible the Government could take any final step until they had consulted the House of Commons. He wished to refer to another case of relations with France, in which, as in the case of Siam, it was possible that the French were trying to make themselves disagreeable to us. He meant the case of Madagascar. He had never been able to understand why the late Government had gone so far out of their way in surrendering the independence of Madagascar. It was a country in which our trade was as predominant as in Siam; and it was a country in which British missionary enterprise had been more successful than in any other portion of the world. Fortunately for Madagascar, its capital was not on the coast like the capital of Siam. It was, therefore, difficult to march on the capital, and the French, when they invaded the island, had failed to reach it. A Treaty was signed by which the French recognised the sovereignty of the Hova Government over the whole island. This was a great concession on the part of the French, to gain which the Hovas agreed to entrust their foreign relations, but their foreign relations only, to France. The late Government having come to an agreement with Germany as to Zanzibar, which it was necessary to force on France, with whom we had a self-denying arrangement as to Zanzibar, recognised a French Protectorate over Madagascar. The present Government could not put them back where they stood before the late Government took this step. What he wanted to know was, how far the present Government was going in the same direction? He would ask what they were doing?—nothing, as he hoped. He would not go into the question of the revival of the Slave Trade on the coast of Madagascar in consequence of the Convention recognising a sham Protectorate, because that would arise upon the Slave Trade Vote. But he would point out that they had gained nothing by the concessions they had made. He could not help thinking that their pledges with regard to Egypt had something to do with bringing about bad relations between the French and ourselves, and that the policy pursued in Siam and Madagascar and with regard to Newfoundland was the answer of the French. In regard to our relations with Newfoundland, a matter which would be referred to on the next Vote, he knew nothing to the discredit of the Foreign Office, but thought that it would be an unfortunate thing if from any idea of proceeding with the arbitration to which the Foreign Office were committed by the late Government we should put further pressure on the colonists.

SIR A. ROLLIT (Islington, S.)

said, he had great pleasure in bearing his testimony to the admirable and efficient way in which the commercial work in connection with the Foreign Office was carried out, and he acknowledged in very handsome terms the services of Mr. Kennedy, Chief of the Commercial Department, who was about to retire. The Commercial Reports published by the Foreign Office were full of information. Their high value was recognised by the Chambers of Commerce of the country, and the more widely they were read the more they would be appreciated, and the greater would be the service they rendered. The extension and prosperity of commerce now largely depended on the policy and the action of the Foreign Office through the Consular Service; so much so that it had been stated by a high authority that commercial considerations had now become one of the most important features of the duty of a diplomatist. Several foreign countries had recognised this fact, and acted upon it by extending their Consular Service, and he hoped this country would adopt a similar policy. The point applied with special force at the present time to Siam, where their Consular representation might be wisely strengthened. Most of the import and export trade with that country was British and carried in British bottoms, and he desired to impress on the Foreign Office the fact that the Chambers of Commerce in the country were very anxious not only as to the protection of their present commerce in Siam, but also as to the action to be taken with a view to develop British trade in that part of the world. In these days of hostile tariffs and competition they must always look out for new markets, and when Siam was developed it would become a most important commercial centre for the trade of this country. Siam must, however, have a real independence, and there must be no interference with the advantage they derived from the Favoured Nation Clause, for without that clause their commercial position would be seriously embarrassed. He hoped the commercial interests at stake would be kept in view by the Foreign Office.

MR. HANBURY (Preston)

rose—

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir E. GREY,) Northumberland, Berwick

I do not wish, Sir, to exclude discussion on other subjects, but I think I am justified in asking the Committee to allow me to state at once the somewhat narrow limits to which I can go in dealing with this matter. In the course of the Debate some time ago on the Vote on Account I stated that the position of affairs was such that my language had necessarily to be guarded and restrained within narrow limits. I regret that that is still the case, and, while I have to acknowledge the forbearance of the hon. Member for Southport, I regret that it has not been further extended. As to the assurances given by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the French Government, it is true that the British Government took no part in the disputes between the French and Siamese while those disputes were confined to the territorial question South of the 18th parallel and on the far side of the Mekong; but directly the dispute covered a wider area, it was perfectly obvious to the whole world that the Government considered British interests were involved, for they entered upon negotiations with the French Government for the delimitation of a neutral zone. Hon. Members seemed to think that we went too far in relying on the assurances that were given by the French Government as to what the limits of their action would be, but the French Government contended that they were not breaking their pledges by their operations on the left bank of the Mekong.

COMMANDER BETHELL (York, E. R., Holderness)

Which bank is that?

SIR E. GREY

The Eastern bank. There is no difference, so far as I am aware, between the two Governments in holding that similar operations on the West bank would break the assurances given. The hon. Member for Southport admits that the Government have been prompt to take measures for the protection of British life and property at Bangkok, so I need say nothing more on that point. As to the question of the neutral zone, that is a matter which now forms the subject of negotiations, and it is consequently impossible for me to enter into details. Then there is the question of British trade at Bangkok, It is said that we have a monopoly of the trade of Bangkok, but that is not the only place where Great Britain monopolises a large share of trade. I will only say, in reply to this question, that I read out to the House the other day the provisions of the Treaty between ourselves and Siam. I cannot conceive that more than one interpretation can be placed on the Treaty, and by reading it I did not intend to convey the impression that it was not meant to put it in force. With regard to the independence and integrity of Siam, I will undertake to say that no one can maintain that that independence and integrity have been violated in a way that affects British interests. No one can seriously contend that British interests or trade in Siam have been injured as yet by the action of France. Our trade is untouched, and the negotiations for a neutral territory are proceeding satisfactorily. But hon. Members opposite have been induced to bring forward this subject not so much because of what has happened in the past as because of their apprehensions of what may happen in the future. With regard to the future, I am sorry to say that, inasmuch as negotiations are still proceeding in Paris, I am precluded from saying more upon the subject than that Lord Dufferin has the fullest and most definite instructions for the protection of our rights in Siam, and to express a hope that the Committee will continue to place confidence in the Government. With regard to Madagascar, I have very little to say further than that the relations between the French Government, Madagascar, and the British Government have remained unchanged' since the present Government came into Office. We have conceded no point in reference to that country. The question is left absolutely as it was when the present Government came into Office. I have only, in conclusion, to express the great pleasure with which I heard the hon. Member who preceded me in this Debate refer, in words of the highest praise, to the way in which the Foreign Office is served by all those in its service, especially as to the commercial side of its policy. I endorse every word the hon. Gentleman said. I desire to express my gratitude, which is great in proportion as I am conscious of my own experience, to those gentlemen at the Foreign Office who by their energy, their ability, and their industry have given me such invaluable assistance in performing the duties of the position which I hold. We do not in this country, under our present system, follow the example of some other countries in opening up markets by Reciprocity Treaties for our trade and commerce. We rely entirely on the great energy and ability of our commercial classes. We recognise at the Foreign Office that our duty is to clear the channels of communication and keep them open, relying upon the enterprise and energy of our commercial classes. That is the system which has brought to us so enormous a share of the trade and prosperity of the world.

MR. J. W. LOWTHER (Cumberland, Penrith)

said, he thought the Committee would agree with the hon. Baronet that it was impossible for him to make public the instructions given to Lord Dufferin in regard to the negotiations which at the present moment were being carried on in Paris in reference to Siam. They on the Opposition side of the House were anxious to make certain that the Government fully recognised the extent to which British interests were involved in the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Siam. He did not think there was much in what had been said by the hon. Baronet in reference to Siam to quarrel with. But he felt bound to draw attention to one observation of the hon. Baronet, and that was that up to this time nothing had been done to impair either the independence or the integrity of Siam. That was an observation that he could not allow to pass without notice.

SIR E. GREY

The hon. Gentleman has not quite caught my expression. What I said was that up to the present time the independence and integrity of Siam have not been violated in a way that has permanently injured British interests.

MR. J. W. LOWTHER

said, that he quite admitted the force of the hon. Baronet's qualification. It put the matter in a different light. He did not think they could fairly admit that the independence and integrity of Siam had been fully maintained, leaving British interests out of the question altogether, when they found that at present this so-called independent State was not permitted to have a military force within its frontiers. When they found that some three or four of her islands had been actually seized by a foreign Power, and when they found that her ports were in the occupation of a foreign Power, he admitted at once the great difficulty the hon. Baronet had in making any further statement in the matter, and he would simply say, before passing from the question, that they desired specially to call the attention of the Government to the great extent of British interests in Siam, and to the manner in which these interests might be affected by agreements which might be entered into between France and Siam without our knowledge. He next came to the question raised by the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean with regard to Madagascar. The right hon. Baronet had taken the line that the late Government had recognised a Protectorate which had no existence either in fact or in paper. What were the actual facts in regard to the matter? The facts were that after the war between the French and the Hovas in the year 1884 a Treaty was concluded, the first Article of which provided— The Government of the French Republic will represent Madagascar in all its foreign relations. Madagascar abroad will be placed under the protection of France. He could conceive nothing wider than those words in the direction of giving a Protectorate to France in the foreign affairs of Madagascar. That Treaty was laid on the Table of the House by Lord Salisbury in March, 1886, and it lay on the Table of the House during the whole of that short Parliament, but, no exception was taken to it. Then, in the year 1890, Lord Salisbury's Government simply recognised the existing state of affairs. They entered into an arrangement with the French Government by which they recognised the Protectorate of France over the Island of Madagascar. His contention then and now was that the Treaty of 1890 did not go one step beyond the Treaty of 1886 between the French and the Hova Governments, and he hoped that the present Government would not go one step beyond the position in which they at present found themselves in relation to Madagascar. So far as his recollection went of the negotiations which had taken place in the short time he had had the honour of being at the Foreign Office, he did not think there was anything in the Papers, which could not properly be laid on the Table of the House. The last Papers were laid nearly nine years ago, and as a great deal had happened since then, he thought another instalment of Papers on Malagasy affairs should be furnished by the Government. He was sorry to say he differed from the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean with reference to the arbitration between the Colonies and France in regard to the Newfoundland fishery disputes. The right hon. Baronet had implored the Government not to go on with the arbitration; but he should be inclined to implore the Government to go on, for it seemed to him that until they got that one point settled it would be impossible to arrive at a solution, satisfactory or otherwise, of this difficult question, which had been pending now for so many years. It was true that the Colonial Government had protested against our going into arbitration on this point. The Colonial Government really desired that the Treaty of Utrecht should be ripped up, and that the whole question as to the right of France on the east and north-east shores of Newfoundland should be re-opened. The Government made such a representation to France, and it was not surprising that the French rejected it. France had its rights upon that particular coast, and whether Newfoundland was a British Colony or whether she was in a position of independence or whether she was joined to the United States, the rights of France would still attach to the particular coast. He said again that until they got this question as to whether lobsters were fish or not settled they could not make any progress in dealing satisfactorily with the cod fisheries, and other points of dispute between the two Governments. In the agreement for arbitration it was provided that it should be in the power of either the British or the French Government to submit further questions for consideration to the arbitrators. He desired to join with the hon. Member for South Islington and the Under Secretary in the tribute which they had paid to the gentleman who had served the Foreign Office with exceptional ability during a great number of years, and whose loss, if he ever had to leave the Foreign Office, it would be extremely difficult to replace. During the short time he had been in the Foreign Office he owed a great deal to the assistance which he derived from that distinguished public servant, Mr. Kennedy. A Return might, he thought, be issued as to our position in relation to tariffs of foreign nations. He had received many inquiries from Chambers of Commerce as to the issue of such a Return. The last Return had been issued five or six years ago, many changes had since been made in the foreign tariffs against our goods. The work of preparing the Return would be heavy; but the materials for it must, he believed, be in daily use at the Board of Trade. He trusted that before long they might have the promised Paper in regard to Vitu. He thought that before deciding anything definite in regard to Uganda we should ascertain the position occupied by the British Company in the sphere of influence. The position of affairs in Samoa had gone from bad to worse, and he would like to be informed as to what had been decided in regard to Mataafa, and whether there was any prospect of a settled Government being carried on in Samoa?

MR. PROVAND (Glasgow, Blackfriars)

said, it was only becoming that someone on his side of the House should acknowledge the work which was being done by the Foreign Office, and which had been referred to by the Member for Islington (Sir A. Rollit). He remembered that in 1885 and 1886, when Lord Rosebery became Foreign Minister, the delays in obtaining Consular Reports sometimes extended over two or three years, but a change came about during Lord Rosebery's administration, and since then these Reports, or extracts which were likely to be of benefit to the commercial community, had been furnished with commendable rapidity. For the last three or four years the Foreign Office had given them commercial information of a fuller character and with greater promptitude than was furnished by any other Government, and he thought that a Parliamentary Vote of Thanks should be accorded Mr. Kennedy and Lord Rosebery for the good work they had accomplished in this direction, and which, it was to be hoped, would continue and, if possible, be even improved in the future. He should like to say a few works in reference to what had been said as to Saigon and the other French possessions. He had been for many years, and was still, connected with the trade of Eastern Asia, and therefore perhaps he might speak with the authority of one who had not only lived there, but had been actually engaged in the trade of that part of the world. France had done enormous work, and at very great cost, in trying to develop trade in Eastern Asia. Between 20 and 30 years ago the French established a line of steamers there to which the French Government gave an enormous subsidy, but these vessels were chiefly employed now in carrying British merchandise. The French trade, with the exception of the silk trade which they had with Shanghai, was a very small and trifling trade indeed. He had been astonished sometimes at the language of French diplomatists, journalists, and politicians. One would think, to read their statements, that the French had an enormous trade out in the far East, but as a matter of fact the most of what was said and written upon the subject was largely mythical, and French trade in the far East, as we understood the word, had practically little existence at all. There could not be any French trade in any ports in the East if trade was free, because it would pass into our hands or into those of the Germans, or would be taken by the Chinese, who were no doubt the dominating trading race of the East, and unless the French prevented us or the Germans or the Chinese from doing trade then it was certain they would get no trade for themselves. This was true of every place the French had in the East. When they obtained possession of any place they immediately sat down and concocted fixed regulations aimed expressly against ourselves, and if the first series of enactments or regulations were insufficient, they concocted a few more, and finally arrived at this state of things: that, whatever little trade could be done or was done, must filter through their hands. They must take a toll for everything done in the place, and unless they made the regulations he spoke of, they might as well leave the place, so far as doing any trade themselves was concerned. He desired to call attention to the position of two places in the East which did a large trade with Siam—uamely,Hong Kong and Singapore. They were absolute commercial mysteries to all Frenchmen who had never lived there. These places, 40 years ago, had no existence as trading places at all. What were they to-day? Singapore was an enormous trading entrepôt for Java, Borneo, Siam, and the whole of the places in the Straits, and Hong Kong was an enormous trading port for the whole trade of the seaboard of China. Any person and any country might trade there. But that was not the French idea of trade at all. If the French were to obtain possession of these two places they would immediately concoct fiscal enactments with a view to direct the whole trade into their own pockets. If France were allowed to impose such fiscal regulations as these on Siam the trade of Singapore and Hong Kong would suffer materially. It was not that the trade would be done by France, but it would cease to be done at all; the little that remained passing into French hands, and the trade that we had, at the present time, connected with these places would be very seriously affected. Something like 83 per cent., or about four vessels out of every five coming to the ports of Siam wore under the British flag. He hoped the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be able to give us an assurance that our interests would be amply protected in any arrangements that were come to. There was not the smallest doubt we should be able to retain the large trading business he had spoken of unless we were interfered with by France in the regulations which were now being made. He hoped the Foreign Office would see that whatever settlement was come to there should be nothing in it to prevent our continuing our trade relations, both by sea and land, between this country and Siam, and Singapore and Hong Kong.

MR. HANBURY (Preston)

desired to support the views which had been stated, more particularly by the Member for South Islington. Looking at this question of Siam almost entirely from a commercial point of view, representing, as he did, a manufacturing constituency very keenly interested in finding new markets for its trade, he should like to say he listened with great pleasure to what the hon. Baronet said as to the deeper interest the Foreign Office was now taking in commercial matters. He could assure the hon. Baronet that if the Foreign Office acted firmly and vigorously where the trade of this country was concerned, they would have behind them such a force of popular support—from the industrial population—as perhaps no Foreign Office had ever had before. Referring to the subject of Madagascar, it struck him as a most peculiar fact that there should be this difference of opinion between France and England as to the proper interpretation of the Treaty relative to Madagascar. It seemed to him to be a loosely worded document, and it was quite clear that France, at any rate, did not quite take the view of that rather ambiguous phrase, "the Protectorate of the Island of Madagascar," which our Foreign Office then took, and which he hoped was taken at present. It was really a pity that the language of the Treaty was not less ambiguous, and it would also have been better if the Foreign Office had not lent itself to the French interpretation by withdrawing two Consuls from Madagascar somewhat, it appeared, at the dictation of the French, thereby implying that the French interpretation of that Treaty was the more correct one. As to the question of Siam, he wanted to press the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs for an answer on two points, which he did not think were necessarily confidential, and on which the hon. Member for Kingston (Sir R. Temple) asked for information. They were questions as to matters of fact. The hon. Member for Kingston asked for information as to how the indemnity was being paid by Siam, and whether it was believed that Siam would be able to meet the obligation that France was imposing upon her, and he also asked as to what information had been received with reference to the French entrenchments around Chantaboon. These were two plain questions, which could be answered without any disadvantage to the Public Service. The hon. Member for Kingston told them on the authority of a statesman well known and versed in Eastern affairs that the Most Favoured Nation Clause was really no protection for our interests in Siam against the kind of concessions that it was to be feared the French would be able to wring out of the Siamese. This statesman contended that in the face of that Most Favoured Nation Clause the French would be able to treat with the Siamese in this fashion. They would say to the latter—"We shall not require the whole indemnity we are asking for if, in return for our not doing that, you will give us certain monopolies and certain concessions in your own country." It was maintained that it was perfectly within the obligations under which Siam rested towards us and the Most Favoured Nation Clause that she should come to some terms of that kind with France. It would be well to know from the Foreign Office whether, according to the interpretation they put upon the most favoured nation clause it was possible for the Siamese to treat with the French on such terms. In view of the fact that it was possible these concessions and monopolies might be granted to French subjects under French pressure it was important to show how vast were our interests in Siam, and how small was the French interest at the present moment. No less than 87 per cent. of the whole shipping in the trade to Siam was English shipping and of the remainders per cent. was German. The value of the English imports was 93 per cent., German 2 per cent. In value the English exports were 85 per cent., German 8 per cent. But there was something further, and that was that the greater number of the vessels carrying foreign flags were chartered by Englishmen, and the whole of the cargoes carried were English cargoes representing English trade. In contrast with all this, according to the last Foreign Office Report the French cargoes, both imports and exports, only amounted to 03 per cent., which was a perfectly trifling and ludicrous state of trade in comparison with that carried on by England with Siam. The mines in Siam, he understood, were in English hands. Taking the special exports from Siam, rice, which was the principal, was almost wholly in English hands; the tea trade was almost entirely carried on by English firms, and the paper and spice trade was in the hands of two English firms. Coming to the trade of cotton manufacturing, he was told that one-fourth of the whole import trade of Siam consisted of cotton manufactures, and the latest Report stated that the goods now sold were almost entirely of English manufacture. This showed the enormous extent to which England was interested in this country, and although it was quite fair for the Under Secretary to say that hitherto English trade had not been much affected by what had been going on, still it was possible that if care was not taken as to concessions to France being outside the Most Favoured Nation Clause it might happen that a great danger would be done to English trade which represented three-fourths of the whole export and import trade of the country. He came to another matter connected with the trade in Siam which, prospectively at any rate, affected Lancashire considerably. He had been speaking hitherto of internal trade, but he wanted to say a word or two about external trade which might be opened up through Siam or Burmah with the South West of China. There was a teeming population there, and great openings for trade. It had been the object and desire of English merchants for a considerable time to get into this corner of China through the Burmese State. He fancied the road for a railway had been surveyed three times—namely, in 1866, 1869, and 1873. Of course, the annexation of Burmah made this route a great deal more possible. Whatever might happen to France in Siam, we could no doubt go a long way in the direction of the southwest corner of China through our own territories; but whether we were able actually to reach that south west corner of China through our own territories would depend a great deal upon what was done in Paris, and in the negotiation as to the Burmese Shan States. It was a question how far portions of these Shan States could be dealt with by Siam, or how far we could claim to have complete control over them. Unless we retained the power to go through certain of the Shan States, about which there was this doubt, the railroad could only be carried to a certain point, because it would then have to pass through a very mountainous district not under our control, and the whole of the trade would then have to be carried on by caravans. This would have the effect of making the carriage about £30 a ton—an almost prohibitory rate. So far as he was able to gather what the French were trying to do was this: Their railroad would run up the east bank of the Mekong, and if they were able to run through the neutral zone they would be able to reach North West China by their own railway, and no doubt a good deal of the present difficulty had been caused in Siam by their desire to obtain this railway. He expressed the strong hope that the Foreign Office, in the negotiations that were taking place, would lose no opportunity of peeing that, even if the French did get this communication to the South West of China, that important district, teeming with population and presenting large openings for English trade, should not be shut out from us, and that we should be able to get this communication through the Burmese State which at the present moment there seemed some likelihood of our losing. He wanted to ask one or two other questions as to the closing of the trade in the Soudan, and also as to Nyassaland. With reference to the Soudan, he approached the subject entirely from the point of view of his constituents interested in the trade there. Until 1877 we acted on the idea that the only way of taming the Mahdi and his successor, Osman Digna, was to try and starve out that country. But in 1887 a better system was adopted, and General Grenfell and Sir Charles Hollis Smith, as representing the English Government out there, encouraged trade in every possible way. They had advanced to a station there in the west side of the mountains called, he thought, Boshee. The result was that the tribes were able to pasture on the mountains during the summer; they were bound to us very much by the fact that they received this protection from us, and they also acted as an advance post against raids from the Arabs from Khartoum and that side. But General Grenfell and Sir Charles Hollis Smith had been succeeded by other representatives, a now system was adopted and trade was closed under the somewhat mistaken idea that we should be able to starve out the people of that country, and so, if necessary, be able to clear the Soudan and go back as far as Khartoum; but that, he was told, was a wholly mistaken notion. What occurred was this: We had not been able to starve them out, it was clear, and two things had happened, one of which was very detrimental to the honour of this country. Undoubtedly we did give a pledge to the Arabs, and during the time of Sir Charles Hollis Smith we practically contracted that we should protect them in future. Under his successor he believed they were disarmed; Osman Digna came down upon them, raided them, destroyed their crops, carried away their women, and we gave no protection whatever to these disarmed men. If that was true, it was dishonouring to this country. Speaking from the trade point of view, these raids tended to destroy what little civilisation there was in that country; it destroyed the people there, or, at any rate, it destroyed their crops, and consequently the opportunity of purchasing our goods by a people who might be very useful customers. Again, the policy of trying to starve out Osman Digna in the Soudan had entirely failed, for he was able to get supplies from the Masai; and the only result was that the Arabs whom we had disarmed and had pledged ourselves to defend had been raided, and the whole trade with the Soudan had fallen into the hands of Italian merchants. With regard to Nyassaland, he would point out the anomalous position which Mr. Johnston occupied there, being at the same time Portuguese Consul, British Commissioner, and agent for the British South Africa Company within the sphere of influence. He believed Mr. Cecil Rhodes, when he was last in England, spoke very plainly to the shareholders of the British South Africa Company to the effect that he had the reversion of Nyassaland, and that he was actually subsidising it at the present moment by paying for a large force of police there. This matter ought to be cleared up. He had received many complaints that so much power should be put in the hands of ft British Commissioner who was at the same time the servant of a Chartered Company; and he would like to know how far Mr. Johnston, in acting in this double capacity, was paving the way for Nyassaland to fall into the hands of the Chartered Company? He was no great believer in these Chartered Companies, and he was not sure they should find that this one was destined to be somewhat of a failure, as he was sorry to say the British East Africa Company had been. Before they gave extended powers to the British South Africa Company and allowed it to extend its territory so much, they ought to be more careful that it was really a company with sufficient means to carry out the work confided to it. The Chartered Company claimed a large jurisdiction over Matabeleland and Mashonaland; but he was told the deeds and documents transferring to the Chartered Company the rights over these territories had not been handed over to the Chartered Company by the United Concessions Company from whom they acquired them; the Directors of the one Company being to a large extent Directors of the other Company. There were many things that required looking into in connection with the British South Africa Company, and he should like to know from the Under Secretary for the Colonies whether Mr. Rhodes was justified in telling the shareholders of the Company when he was last in London that he had the reversion of Nyassaland, and that he was actually subsidising it by finding a large force of police.

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; Committee counted, and 40 Members being found present,

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT (Sheffield, Ecclesall)

said, he wished to refer to the statement that the Member for the Forest of Dean (Sir C. Dilke) made with regard to our policy towards Madagascar. The right hon. Baronet appeared in a new capacity. He (Sir Ashmead-Bartlett) remembered him well in the old days, when he represented the Foreign Office, and when he was always the defender and the advocate of France. The right hon. Baronet, according to the belief of the Opposition at that time, was the principal cause of the unfortunate policy of the Government of the day, which was based on the overthrow of the understanding with the great German Monarchies, and upon an alliance with France and Russia. There was no doubt that the Government of 1880 to 1885 was led into that disastrous Egyptian policy more or less by the influence of the right hon. Baronet. The right hon. Baronet attributed the Protectorate of France over Madagascar to Lord Salisbury's short Administration of 1885–6.

SIR C. W. DILKE

said, he did not attribute any French Protectorate over Madagascar to Lord Salisbury's Government. What he complained of was the terms of the recognition of the Protectorate. General want of confidence.

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

said, the right hon. Baronet was referring to the Treaty of 1890, which recognised the Protectorate of France over Madagascar; but he (Sir E. Ashmead-Bartlett) was referring to the Treaty of 1885, which was the result of the policy of the present Prime Minister's then Government. The Treaty of 1890 was practically but the recognition of the Treaty of 1885. What had happened since 1885 was simply the consequence of the ignorance and weakness displayed by the Government of the day. That Government made a great surrender in regard to British interests in Madagascar in allowing the French to do as they pleased. He would say that there was generally a want of confidence felt in a Government which had the present Prime Minister at its head. That want of confidence was nowhere more conspicuous than in the results which had followed upon the administration of foreign affairs by the present Government during the past twelve months. They had at the Foreign Office a man of great ability and patriotism; but, all the same, there was a fatal gloom overshadowing the present Government in their foreign relations. He did not say they were responsible for all the attacks that had been made on British interests in different quarters of the globe; but there was a general feeling abroad that when a Government, of which the present Prime Minister was the head, was in Office, British interests could be attacked with impunity. That feeling had been illustrated in Egypt. The pronouncement of the Leader of the House in 1891 with regard to the embarrassment and injurious character of the British occupation of Egypt led the French to attack that occupation, and to intrigue and manœuvre against us there, and so had necessitated the recent increase of our garrison in that country. The Prime Minister was the cause of all their troubles. Siam was another instance of the same disastrous influence. As the hon. Member for Southport had said, if the Government had before June informed the French Government that a moderate rectification of the frontier on the Mekong would not be objected to, but that anything which would cripple Siam, or would deal a blow at British prestige in the East, would not be permitted, the whole diffi- culty with Siam would have at once subsided. What would the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs have said had he (Sir E. Ashmead-Bartlett), or any hon. Member, got up in the House 10 weeks ago and said that the French would filch 75,000 square miles of territory from Siam; that the Siamese troops would be driven away from both banks of the Mekong; that the revenues of the richest Southern Provinces would be seized by France, and important strategic positions on the Gulf of Siam would be occupied by the French forces; that France would inflict a great blow on British trade, and that they would injure British prestige throughout the East? The Under Secretary and his Colleagues would have poured out the vials of scorn on him, and he would have been laughed out of the House. Yet every one of these things had happened. Questions were repeatedly put to the Government, and assurances were as often given that no danger was threatened to Siamese or British interests; but all these assurances had been falsified. The Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs assured the country that the independence and integrity of Siam were objects of first-class importance to Her Majesty's Government. He did not know about the independence of Siam, but he thought, unless the present policy was reversed, that independence would exist only in name. With regard to the integrity of the country, there was not the slightest doubt that that integrity had been destroyed by the forcible transfer of the 75,000 square miles of Siamese territory of which he had spoken. Four-fifths of the export trade of Siam was in British hands, and any disturbance with our foreign Imperial trade inflicted an injury on this country, and especially on the working classes of the country. On this subject he should like to read a quotation from The Times' correspondent at Bangkok. He wrote in Tuesday's issue— I must emphasise everything that I have hitherto telegraphed to the effect that it is England that is really attacked through Siam. Great Britain must harbour no illusions, as she has lost prestige in the East up to the present in this Franco-Siamese conflict. The letters which I have received from China and Japan clearly show this, and, as regards Siam itself, so far from British interests being considered as fully protected, I am in a position to state that important British enterprises which were con templated here, and which would have given employment to labour and capital, have been abandoned owing to fears for Siam's future. That, he thought, was worthy of the attention of Her Majesty's Government. With regard to our Indian Empire, he looked upon the influence which the weak and unsuccessful policy of the Government with regard to Siam would have on India as being probably the most serious phase of the whole matter. There was no use in our affecting an ostrich-like security while Russia was advancing on one side of India and France on the other. There was little doubt that France and Russia were combining their aims and their policy in Europe, and it was more than likely that they would also co-operate in Asia. He feared that unless the policy which the Government had pursued in the past was soon and completely reversed with regard to Siam, they would find ere long that the injury which had already been done to Siam, and the blow which had been struck at British prestige, would be very largely increased, and to an extent that might even menace our power in the East. He had desired to say a word with reference to the Pamirs, but at this late period of the evening he would refrain. He would only say that he hoped the Government were correct in the statement they made that the Russian force in occupation had not been increased, and that the promise of the Russian Government not to increase their force, or to fortify important Passes on the road to India, would be carried out.

MR. LAWRENCE (Liverpool, Abercromby)

said that, interrupting the Debate on Siam, he would invite the attention of the Committee for a short time to the subject of the West Coast of Africa. They had heard many encomiums on the efforts and services of officials of the Foreign Office, both at home and abroad, and nothing he intended to say would detract from the value of those services. The action of the permanent officials had, no doubt, been dictated by the general policy that had animated the various Cabinets that had ruled over this country for the last few years. He desired to call attention to the monopoly which the Royal Niger Company had set up against the express words of their Charter granted in 1885. This monopoly was exercised in a country comprising something like 500,000 square miles, and said to contain a population of 30,000,000. The district was not an entirely new one, so far as British trade was concerned, like other districts in regard to which Charters had been granted. It had been known to British trade for 50 years, and the British Government itself had been spending money there to the tune of £500,000. It was stated, when the Charter came before the Cabinet of the day, that the interests of all the British traders had been bought up, but that statement was incorrect, because within the last few months they had purchased the business of the African Association, which had all along protested against the Charter, and besides this Association there were about 12 other firms engaged in the trade. The petty native traders who for a large number of years had been trading up and down the river had according to Bishop Crowther, entirely disappeared, and the potash trade, which was at one time entirely in the hands of those native traders, who were agents for British firms, had been monopolised by the Company. Thus a trader writes— We were not permitted by the Agent to leave Lokoja. From February to July, 1885, we were detained there, unable to obtain a passage for us and our potash, while the Company poured into Lagos some hundred tons to take advantage of the 'boom' then existing in that market. This was not a Party question, both Parties in the State having been responsible for what had occurred. The fact was that five or six years ago the colonising enterprise of recent years was not so distinctly manifest. Imperial federation was not so much talked about. Cabinet after Cabinet came into power, and while they could not deny the great British interests that existed up the Niger they had not the courage, as they should have had, to send out a representative of their own to organise and civilise the district, but through lack of courage they handed over to this company the duty that they themselves ought to have discharged. The Charter was granted, practically, without public inquiry and behind the backs of the Glasgow, Liverpool, and native traders, who, until it was established, had no knowledge that it was going to be granted. The Charter stated that no monopoly should be set up, but the ink of the Charter was hardly dry when, in July, 1886, Lord Aberdare, at the annual meeting, had stated that the Company had set out with the full intention of trying to get a monopoly of the trade in the district. When a monopoly of this kind was set up enormous injustice was done to other traders. He distrusted the policy of handing over a great territory to a limited body of traders, believing that competition was far more civilising. Lord Iddesleigh, in November, 1886, through the Foreign Office, had stated that he considered the terms of the Charter were a sufficient guarantee against any monopoly and differential duty; but the Committee would see how little was the effect of those words. It was clear to everyone that when a person was Governor as well as a trader, he was at a great advantage over other traders. He could collect revenue from the outside trader; he could, and he (Mr. Lawrence) believed he did, in this case, pay backsheesh to some of the black potentates inland in order to induce them to bring down trade to the offices of the Company. It was clear that a monopoly, though protested against on paper, was certain to be set up in practice. A duty of £50 and £60 and up to £100 had to be paid for stations on the Niger. It had, too, to be paid in gold, and if the Committee remembered that at present barter was the sole method of exchange in the district it would be understood what a hardship it was to make these traders bring gold out from England. The Company had imposed very high Import and Export Duties, and a tax upon salt of 20s. per ton, while in the other African States in the neighbourhood it was 5s. a ton, and in the adjoining Niger Protectorate 4s. per ton. The duty on palm oil was 20 per cent. ad valorem, and on palm kernels 30 per cent. ad valorem. These Export Duties, which did not exist in other British territories, had been put on owing to suggestions thrown out at the Berlin Conference, to meet the special expenditure of keeping down slavery. He should like to ask the hon. Baronet to say, when he replied, what was the extra expenditure in putting down slavery that this Export Duty was meant to meet, and whether the expendi- ture was as large us the amount received in duties. The result of the duties had been that in two years ending 1888 the export of palm kernels from Lagos dropped from 2,500 tons to 1,000 tons. The Committee would see, therefore, that the Lagos traders had just reason to object to the monopoly which, owing to the action of Cabinets at home, had been set up on the Niger River. If the Government at home had been content merely with having called into existence the Royal Niger Company, and had limited its trading to certain places, say, north of Onitscha, perhaps those he represented would not have asked him to specially draw the attention of the Committee to the matter; but the Cabinet of 1892 improved on the Cabinet of 1885, and had extended the area over which the Company ruled, handing over to them the Mahini country, a large and most fertile portion of the Oil Rivers district—about 90 miles of some of the richest territory in that part of the world. How was it that the Foreign Office permitted this to be done, notwithstanding that they had a most serious representation from the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce and the Lagos traders against it—supported, too, by the opinion of Her Majesty's Consul resident in those parts? Those he represented believed that the extension of Sir Claud Macdonald's rule over the whole of that area would be of enormous advantage to the trading community. It would do away with the double system of duties obtaining there. At present, the charging of duties on goods going out of that territory would lead to confusion. The unhappy natives had no idea of customs houses, and would be easily placed in an interminable fog as to whether they were breaking the law or not. The country was riddled with countless streams which were the road ways of the district. Clearly it was expedient that such a district should be under one authority. He should be told that the Niger Company originally came into existence owing to the enterprise of our Gallic neighbours, who were going north, south, east, and west annexing territory; that the Company was chartered in order to secure possession of these territories to the British Crown. But, if so, he hoped the Committee would agree with him as to the reasonableness of the Company leaving the Claud Macdonald territory and going farther a field, with all its advantages—its Imperial support and so on. It should leave, under the jurisdiction of Sir Claud Macdonald, the lower part of the river, which had long since been opened up to British trade, and which had been brought under British influence by Treaties made with Her Majesty's Government, direct through its own Consuls, and not in the least owing to the action of the Niger Company. Although this most successful government of the Oil Rivers Protectorate—which had immediately begun to pay its way—had been established, the district had been sliced off and handed over to the Royal Niger Company. He did not think this Company came to them with the cleanest of hands. They all knew that beyond seas many things were done by people who bore our name and sailed from our shores which could not be defended. He did not wish to believe that all the statements which came from these districts were true, but it seemed pretty clear that some very questionable things had been done by agents of the Company; and he should like to know how far they had been made the subjects of inquiry by the Foreign Office in days gone by? He believed there was a great deal open to censure in the early conduct of the Company. There was one thing which had been brought under his notice in 1885 and 1886. A few months before the Charter was granted an agent of the Company captured three children belonging to a certain tribe, and held them as hostages. The Company had written to the Foreign Office saying that the act was an exceptional one under an exceptional state of things. But after the three children were captured, and a white person was taken in retaliation by the natives, and kept in a black hole for some time, an agent of the Company was actually sailing by and taking no measures to secure this person's liberty. There were other stories of a sinister character, which had been narrated in the columns of The Liverpool Daily Post—a journal whose editor had been a well-known man in the House. It was stated in that paper that natives endeavouring to run the gauntlet through the territory of the Company had been shot at. He could not vouch for the truth of that, but this and the other stories to which he referred could easily be verified. Then, again, the Company was surrounded with mystery, and its own servants were bound to secrecy as to its action under a penalty of £1,000. The clause in the contracts with their servants ran as follows:— Mr.—agrees that he will not, either during the currency of this agreement or for a period of ten years after its determination, from any cause whatever, without the assent of the Company, communicate to the newspapers of Great Britain or other countries, or to any outside persons, official or private, any facts, whether commercial, industrial, scientific, or political, in connection with the business or administration of the Company, or the district occupied by the Company, or with those who shall have visited or become acquainted with it during his employment in the Company's service, and that he will not publish, or distribute privately, any pamphlet, book, or other paper disclosing any such facts, nor in any way knowingly induce any person, or persons, to carry on any occupation of profit within such districts. … The amount specified is by way of liquidated damages, and not by way of penalty, but any such payment shall not prejudice the right of the Company to restrain a continuance of such breach. Sir Claud, when Major Macdonald, had been sent out to inquire into the allegations against the Company, but his Report had never been published. He was afraid that many Foreign Office Reports were for the Foreign Office alone, and could not be published, but he had good reason to believe that many officials—not merely Major Macdonald—had several times brought to the knowledge of the Government facts which showed that the operations of the Royal Niger Company ought to be more carefully looked into than they had hitherto been. To his mind what should be done was this: some Crown Commissioner should be sent to reside in the district. Furthermore, in his opinion, the Company ought to be compelled to publish periodical accounts similar to those which were published by the old East India Company, showing the receipts and expenditure, both administrative and commercial. Administration and trading accounts should be kept rigorously apart. What the British East India Company were compelled to do under Acts of 33 Geo. III., c. 52, and 53 Geo. III., c. 155, he claimed that the Royal Niger Company should be compelled to do, because they had ousted all other traders from their district. This did not apply to the British South Africa Company, in whose territory there were no outside traders; but in the case of the Niger Company the Government ought to require it to send up accounts of all their expenditure and revenue to be laid before Parliament. He had ventured to bring this matter before the Committee, because they had hitherto received no reply on these matters from the Foreign Office. No doubt it would be said that these Companies were the cheapest form of annexing territory to the British Crown, and that it did not matter in the long run which trader made the profit; but he felt convinced that, if they wanted to spread civilisation rapidly and to found it on a sound basis, the soundest policy was to allow competition to come in. That would be much more efficacious than the policy of tying the hands of traders by allowing a monopoly.

MR. J. W. LOWTHER

said, he had already trespassed upon the time of the Committee for some little space, but would now promise to be brief. He was glad the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Lawrence) had at last had an opportunity of bringing this matter before the House, though he was afraid he could not agree with the hon. Member in the view he had presented in regard to the action of the Niger Company. The hon. Member represented that the Government had handed over the administration of this vast territory of 500,000 square miles to the Niger Company. That Company, by pressing up the river, had enabled Great Britain to bring under her sphere of influence the vast territory in question. Liverpool merchants who traded with that part of Africa had not ventured up the Oil Rivers.

MR. LAWRENCE

said, that he knew of one firm which had been up there for 40 years.

MR. J. W. LOWTHER

said, that his information pointed to the fact that at the time the Charter was granted to the Niger Company they had bought out every one of the traders on the whole river, and they had gone behind the Liverpool traders, who confined their operations to the mouth of the Oil River, and had pushed up to the east, and therefore it was not unnatural that a certain amount of trade jealousy should arise on the part of the Liverpool merchants as against a Company whose operations had proved to be eminently successful. His hon. Friend talked about monopoly, but where was the monopoly? By the Berlin Treaty of 1885 the navigation of the Niger was open to all the world; therefore, the clients of the hon. Member were entitled to make use of it. And what duties were imposed on merchants? Absolutely none. There is not a single Import Duty imposed on any merchandise on the two rivers, except in the case of alcohol, tobacco, and war material. If the clients of the hon. Member wished to introduce those things into the country duty would have to be paid, but as to ordinary articles of merchandise—in which the hon. Member's clients probably dealt—there was not a single Import Duty of any sort or kind to be paid throughout the length and breadth of the dominions of the Chartered Company. According to the information supplied to him (Mr. Lowther), not only was there no monopoly, but the trade of the independent traders had actually increased in the district since the Niger Company had been granted a Charter. In 1886 the Niger Company had the whole of the trade; in 1887 independent traders had l–17th of the trade; in 1890 they had l–12th; and in 1891 they had l–9th. He did not feel called upon to defend the Niger Company, the Conservative Government having been in no way responsible for the granting of the Charter. While he was at the Foreign Office he came to the conclusion that the Company was doing a most admirable work, because they prevented any importation of spirits above the deltaic region, and in the lower regions had imposed a very high duty on alcohol. It had enormously developed the country in the time it had been there, and had acquired for British trade and influence this vast territory, which amounted to nearly 500,000 square miles, and which, if it had not been so acquired, might have been swallowed up by France 10 years ago.

SIR E. GREY

said, that in regard to the point raised in the first speech of the hon. Member for Penrith, as to whether any fresh Papers on Madagascar would be laid on the Table, he could not give an answer without further inquiry. The question had been raised in the House already this Session, and the consideration which influenced the Government in refusing to give them was that, affairs in Madagascar being still in a critical state, even if Papers which might be produced had no direct bearing on the questions at issue, they might indirectly have some disturbing influence which it was not desirable to provoke. However, the point raised would be considered. The question of the Return of the tariffs of foreign countries would have to be considered by him with the President of the Board of Trade before a reply could be given. The Papers as to the cession of Vitu were in course of preparation, and he did not know why they had not yet been presented to Parliament. There had been no intentional delay in presenting them. With regard to Samoa there had, no doubt, been some trouble there, but there was no intention to inflict retributive justice on the person who was the cause of it. Mataafa was unfortunate; he did not happen to be the nominee of the Treaty Powers; and, secondly, he was not successful. He was placed on board a man-of-war, and it was for the three Treaty Powers to decide what should be done with him. He would probably be placed upon an island belonging to one of the Treaty Powers, where he would be secure, so far as Samoa was concerned. By his removal the Government of Malietoa had been strengthened, and it was hoped that affairs in Samoa might progress satisfactorily as soon as the new officials had arrived. With regard to Manicaland, the British and Portuguese Commissioners had met on the spot and had gone through certain delimitations, but failed to agree. The question of final settlement was now the subject of correspondence between the two Governments. Regarding the Soudan, he was as much against the policy of starving the Soudan as the hon. Member himself, but the question must depend upon the future influence of political considerations. As to Chantaboon, they had received assurances that its occupation was only to be temporary, while as to the Most Favoured Nation Clause, the Treaty was so distinct that the Government would be bound to see that no commercial advantages were given to other countries which would result in the exclusion of British trade. With regard to Nyassaland, it had been the object of the present Government to insure that its administration should be impartial as regarded the various interests concerned, and the Government had hitherto made no change in the conditions under which it was administered. It should be remembered that in all new territories this country had to consider whether the taxpayers would agree to expenditure enough to take them over. If the British taxpayer was not asked to pay, they must be prepared for some anomalies in existing administration. As to the Niger Company, it had administered the territory over which it ruled well, and had raised no political complications. After the most careful inquiry it appeared that the Customs raised did not so much as cover the amount which the Company spent in administration. It was one of the few Chartered Companies which paid a dividend.

SIR J. FERGUSSON (Manchester, N. E.)

said, the Debate had been necessarily discursive, but beyond all doubt the most prominent subject before the Committee had been the state of affairs in Siam. In his humble opinion, the Committee ought to accept as satisfactory the statement made by the Under Secretary. He could not associate himself with the opinion of the hon. Member for Sheffield (Sir E. Ashmead-Bartlett), as he did not believe that British prestige had been lowered in the East and in India by the occurrences that had taken place. We did not, and we never had, assumed responsibility for a protectorate in Siam, and he ventured to think our reputation was more likely to suffer from extravagant pretensions than from confining our efforts to our legitimate interests. The Under Secretary of State had accentuated the statement he made on a former occasion with regard to our great commercial interests in Siam and the Resolution of Her Majesty's Government to defend and protect them. He believed they might look with confidence to the Foreign Secretary to act up to the spirit of that statement, and they would pay careful attention to the result of the negotiations that were going on. He believed the Secretary of State had due regard to the interests of British commerce, for it would be not only a national loss, but a national disgrace to allow those interests to be injured or destroyed. The Committee ought to be satisfied so far with the assurances of the Under Secretary.

Mr. HANBURY

rose—

SIR W. HARCOURT

I beg to move, "That the Question be now put."

Question put, "That the Question be now put."

The Committee divided:—Ayes 140; Noes 55.—(Division List, No. 296.)

Question put accordingly, and agreed to.

Resolution to be reported.

Motion made, and Question proposed That a sum, not exceeding £25,680, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March 1891, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Department of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, including certain Expenses connected with Emigration.

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

said, he wished to call attention to the position of affairs in Mashonaland. That position was critical, if not perilous, for British subjects and British interests. There were some 1,500 British subjects no w engaged in developing the resources of that distant, but most promising and naturally rich country. They were practically cut off from the rest of the British possessions. Hundreds of miles separated them from any immediate assistance which could be afforded either by the Imperial or the Colonial Government. The hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury), in a speech he had made earlier in the evening, had attacked Chartered Companies. He (Sir E. Ashmead-Bartlett) was sorry to hear that from the hon. Member, because if the hon. Member would carry his mind back to the latter portion of the last century and the earlier portion of the present century he would see that the East India Company, the great prototype of the present Chartered Companies, had done the greatest amount of good for the commerce and Imperial power of this country. The greatest commercial development of this country abroad had originated from the efforts of private individuals, working sometimes for their own hand and sometimes banded together as Chartered Companies. What was the position of the British Chartered Companies in South Africa? They had been carrying on a great work of exploration and development in one of the richest territories of the world. A grave danger now threatened them. Lo Bengula, a powerful and savage Monarch, who could put from 15,000 to 20,000 armed men in the field, was dissatisfied with their progress, and threatened them with serious danger, if not complete destruction. Although the colonists might be able to defend themselves within Forts Victoria and Salisbury from any attacks by Lo Bengula's warriors, their work, their wealth, and their resources were of such a character that their retirement within the forts would practically ruin all their enterprise. Their work was twofold—mining and agricultural. There were no two forms of industry so open to destruction by an enemy as mining and agriculture. Everybody knew how easily crops could be destroyed, cattle carried off, and the machinery and appliances of mining ruined by an active enemy. Therefore, the retirement of the colonists within those forts would mean the practical ruin of their settlement and the destruction of their agricultural and mining enterprise, which were very open to the enemy's attack. The Government had assumed an unjust and illogical attitude towards this great British enterprise, for they had said to the Chartered Company that their forces, which would be adequate for the defence of the forts, but absolutely inadequate for the protection of the settlement from the raids of the Matabele, were not to undertake any offensive movement, but were to remain on the defensive. But the only practical way of dealing with the danger would be by a speedy movement of the whole of the British forces in Mashonaland upon the King's kraal. He had asked the Prime Minister the other day whether the defence of a position was not often best secured by offensive tactics. That statement was received with ignorant jeers by the Radical Party, and he was not surprised at that. The latest news from Mashonaland was that, in the opinion of Sir H. Loch and of the responsible authorities in Mashonaland, Lo Bengula was at the present moment temporising, because he had sent some 6,000 of his men on a raid into the Mashukuhunbwe country to the north of the Zambesi, and until they returned he would be unable to take the offensive against our colonists. When that force returned Lo Bengula would be in a position to throw between 15,000 and 20,000 armed barbarians against the small body of 1,500 colonists in that distant country. What was the character of those Matabele? The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies had tried to throw some responsibility on the late Government. "Though Lo Bengula's character was known," said the hon. Gentleman, "the late Government had some negotiations with the Potentate." He would venture to submit that that argument was wholly beside the matter. The hon. Gentleman had added that these raids of the Matabele, which used to be of a most destructive and horrible character, had practically ceased. But that was not so. The raids had been resumed in the present year, and had been attended with all the horrors of the massacre of the helpless Mashonas and the carrying into captivity of their women and children. Every British Government had at some time or other to enter into negotiations with Powers and Potentates whose character for humanity might very largely be disputed. The object of the late Government, as well as of the Chartered Company, in entering into negotiations with the King was to secure peace and order for the large districts which had hitherto been exposed to the raids of these savage tribes; and it was because that policy, which had been successful for several years, was now threatened with attack by Lo Bengula that he now brought the matter before the Committee. He would refer hon. Members who wished to know anything about the Matabele and their raids to the letters which appeared in The Times of that day and on previous days, the statements in which would be fully confirmed by everyone who knew anything about South Africa. He would read a few extracts from a letter which had appeared in The Times of August 29th, from the Bishop of Derry, whose knowledge of South Africa was derived from the most authentic sources— The Matabele are descended from a Zulu tribe which emigrated in 1825 under Ummilhquiri, father of Lo Bengula. They form a military state or caste: they are soldiers, not for defence but for the raids upon feebler tribes for cattle, slaves, and especially women. Mashona- land is the centre of their raids, their happy hunting ground. The Matabele loves to kill, lives to kill. The Bishop then went on to describe the raid of the Matabele. The kraals of the Mashonas were surrounded at night. In the morning the savages made a descent on them, massacred the men, and carried off the women, children, and cattle into captivity. A certain number of Mashona men were preserved in order to drive the Mashona cattle into the country of the Matabele, and when they arrived there these unfortunate men were brutally slaughtered before the eyes of their families. That happened this very year, and yet the Under Secretary for the Colonies told them that the raids were things of the past.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr. S. BUXTON,) Tower Hamlets, Poplar

I did not say that. I said to a large extent.

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

said, the words "large extent" were not used by the hon. Gentleman, or, if they were used, they were used in such a way that the attention of the House had not been fixed on them.

MR. S. BUXTON

The hon. Gentleman's question to me was whether or not I could say that the raids had ceased within the last few years. As a matter of fact, with the exception of the raid the other day, the raids are to a large extent things of the past.

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

said he differed from the hon. Gentleman as to his impression of what he had said on the subject. The cessation of these murderous raids was due to the policy of the late Conservative Government and of the Chartered Company. But what had happened this year in Mashonaland? In July one of Lo Bengula's impis raided the country, and many of the unfortunate Mashonas were massacred close to Victoria itself, and their women and children were carried off. Lo Bengula, when remonstrated with by the agent of the company, said that the Mashonas were his slaves, and that he had the right to treat them as he chose. For the last 50 years the unfortunate Mashonas have been subjected to this persecution, and thousands of them had been killed and their women and children made slaves. The country in which these atrocities were being perpetrated was a country under British protection, a country in which the British flag was flying. It might be true that the Chartered Company were largely responsible for peace and order in Mashonaland; but it was impossible for the Government to repudiate the responsibility, which must in the last instance fall upon them for the protection of the British subjects in that country, and for the security of those who looked up to them for security. The Government had thrown upon the Company the responsibility of protecting British subjects within their territories, and yet had forbidden them to take aggressive action against Lo Bengula, which seemed to be the only effective method of giving protection to those who were dependent upon them for their lives. All that was asked was that the Company and the British settlers in their district should be allowed to deal a deadly blow at this barbarous and cruel tyrant, and thus secure Mashonaland for all time against the raids of the Matabele. When Lo Bengula's impis returned from the raid they were making against the Mashukuhunbwes it would be impossible to protect Mashonaland from the overpowering numbers of these savages should they attack the settlement. If such a thing occurred, Her Majesty's Government would have to bear the responsibility. The Government had adopted the very worst policy that it could adopt. They had adopted the half-and-half, meddling and muddling, policy which always characterised a Ministry of which the present Prime Minister was the head, and refused to permit the Company to adopt the only rational means of defending themselves against these raids. Lo Bengula claimed that the Mashonas were his slaves, and that he had a perfect right to carry off their cattle and their women and children. What were these Mashonas doing for the settlers? They were supplying the necessary labour by which alone the country could be developed; they acted as agricultural labourers and mining labourers in Mashonaland. These unfortunate people had taken refuge from Lo Bengula in their mountain fastnesses. They had been induced to come down from these fastnesses in the belief that they would be preserved from the cruelty of the Matabele under the protection of the British flag. But they did not get that protection; they were still being raided by Lo Bengula. The Bishop of Deny in his admirable and eloquent letter well described the terrible results of these raids— The Mashonas are absolutely necessary for the development of the country, whilst their extermination is growing nearer every year. The sight of gentle, unoffending servants simply hacked to pieces, their blood spurting over the Englishman's gown, or the Englishman's coat, is something too terrible for thought to dwell upon. This cloud, big with death, ever threatening to break into a fresh storm, and forming again and again, must be dissipated, unless the peaceful development of Mashonaland is to become impossible. The present condition of affairs was described in an extract which he would read from The Times newspaper— Dr. Jameson, the Administrator of Mashonaland, who knows more about the situation than anyone, has declared the present position to be impossible, and says that it renders action of some sort imperative. Mining work in Mashonaland is suspended; the natives who supply the manual labour cannot be induced to come down from their fastnesses. Prospectors are obliged to remain within the protected area of the Company's occupation. On all sides the opinion appears to be gaining ground that a trial of strength between the forces of barbarism and civilisation in that part of Africa is becoming inevitable. Such a trial has in no way been courted by the Company. War is financially undesirable, and if the conflict could have been postponed for another decade, the Company would have been in a better position to enter into it with the necessary assurance of success. All this showed that a grave responsibility would rest on the Government if they adopted the policy they had announced to the House. Her Majesty's Government had no right to blow hot and cold in this matter, for it involved the well-being and prosperity of 1,500 British subjects, and possibly their lives as well. Either the Government should undertake responsibility for the protection of our fellow-subjects in Mashonaland, or should give the British South Africa Company a free hand in dealing with Lo Bengula.

COMMANDER BETHELL

said, it was obvious that the Chartered Companies must be restrained by the Government to some extent; it was not less obvious that if war ensued the Imperial Government must sooner or later interfere to protect British subjects. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had that evening spoken of Chartered Companies as excellent institutions, but in his own view the policy of colonising by means of such Companies was very doubtful. It might be that the accounts which had been referred to might turn out to be somewhat exaggerated, and it might even yet be found preferable to square Lo Bengula rather than to fight him. But whether that was so or not, he thought it was quite clear that inasmuch as the Imperial Government restrained the Chartered Company from taking any step which they have believed to be necessary for the safety of those over whom they ruled, obviously in some way or other the Imperial Government would have to come to their assistance in time of difficulty. He would suggest to his hon. Friend, who thought more vigorous action should have been taken by the Government that he should remember that if the Imperial Government was called upon to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the Chartered Company, it might have something to say to the Chartered Company about the chestnuts after they were pulled out. He would not now enter at greater length into the ethics of Chartered Companies. He would prefer to proceed, as formerly, by slow steps into a new country. That course was pursued in Nyassaland with extremely happy results; and, while upon this point, he would like to ask that more frequent Reports might be published as to the condition of this part of Africa. Although he would have liked to have had some discussion before Parliament closed on certain important questions connected with Uganda, they could not well discuss anything until the Papers relating to that part of Africa were before them.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I want to say a word or two upon questions relating to African colonisation, but before I do so I would like to say that I am also very much interested in another Colony—the Bahamas—the discussion in regard to which, I believe, will be raised by my hon. and gallant Friend opposite. It is quite as much for the convenience of the Government and the Committee as for ours that we should separate what we have to say and keep each subject distinct; but, of course, if the Government are going, without giving us the slightest warning, to move the Closure at some early period, then, of course, it will be necessary for us to deal with the various subjects together. I do hope that the Under Secretary will take this opportunity of giving the Committee in some detail the opinions of the Government upon the whole question of Chartered Companies, which is a subject of the utmost importance, and has, within the last few years, received great development. The Chartered Company of Borneo has, perhaps, been made a precedent, which has been largely followed in the case of Africa. I am not prepared to say that this is the best policy to follow, and experience must have shown that there are great difficulties connected with it. On the other hand, there is much to be said in its favour. If we are to proceed with that policy there ought to be some continuity, and some rule ought to be laid down as to the responsibility of the Imperial Government in connection with Chartered Companies. There is no advantage at all in Chartered Companies unless you intend deliberately and permanently to throw upon them the responsibility which you have committed to their charge. You say to a Chartered Company—"We give you powers to provide for the peace, order, and good government of the land which we trust to your care," and then at the very first opportunity, the moment there is any trouble in the land, there is at once a demand upon the Imperial Government that they should interfere, and, apparently, the Imperial Government drifts and drifts until at last it does interfere. We have, therefore, all the disadvantage with regard to Chartered Companies, all the trouble and risk, and none of the advantages. I think that is altogether a mistake. For myself, I may say that I have not seen reason to doubt that the system of Chartered Companies might have been a very good system, at all events, in the early days of the colonisation of these countries; but, as I have said, you should make an arrangement with a Chartered Company and stick to it. You must say to them—"You have the responsibility, and you must take it up. If you go into a country you must take the risk." In the case of the British South Africa Company, I am not aware that they have even disputed this responsibility, or their readiness to fulfil their obligation; but then the Government comes in and interferes with them, and when the Company, which, by the way, had asked for no assistance, proposed to take a forward movement or an aggression, as it had been called, but which was really a defensive movement, as he understood it, against this Chief Lo Bengula, then the Imperial Government steps in and says, "You shall not move an inch without consulting us: you are not to take the only true method of protecting the people who look to you for protection; you are not to take the only reasonable method, which is to punish Lo Bengula for his aggressions." If the Government was going to take the responsibility of saying—"You shall not punish Lo Bengula for his aggressions," then all I can say is that in that case the Government will have a very heavy responsibility if any massacre of either native or European subjects of Her Malesty took place. I think the Government ought really to state the matter plainly for the information of the Committee. We ought to know exactly what our relation is to these Chartered Companies. Are they practically independent bodies? In that case let them take the responsibility, and then they will have no claim on this country; but if the Government resolve to interfere with the policy of the Companies, we shall be answerable for any failure of that policy. I hope we shall have a clear statement on this subject.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr. S. BUXTON,) Tower Hamlets, Poplar

I do not think the Committee will expect me on this occasion to enter at length into the question of Chartered Companies generally. We have Chartered Companies in various parts of the world. So far as the Colonial Office is concerned we have only one in any sense under our control; the Foreign Office have four or five, and I do not think it would be expedient on the present occasion that I should attempt to lay down any principle which ought to direct the Foreign Office, as well as the Colonial Office, in dealing with these Companies. But so far as the British South Africa Company is concerned, the position is that they acknowledge themselves to be entirely responsible both for the administration and the protection of the territory over which they have control, but in their Charter, as regards any question of dispute between them and the chiefs in their territory, there is a distinct clause which enables Her Majesty's Government, if they think fit, to interfere in that dispute and to forbid the Company taking a forward action, or to come to some arrangement with them in regard to that particular matter. Government are in communication with the Company in regard to the dispute with Lo Bengula, and they have made no complaint whatever in regard to the attitude Her Majesty's Government have taken up. They have declared themselves perfectly competent to look after their own protection, and they have declared themselves very well satisfied with the moral support which we have given them.

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

What is the moral support?

MR. S. BUXTON

The moral support is that we have, as regards the posts of danger in Bechuanaland, sent up more police, and we are prepared in that sense to show Lo Bengula that, as far as we are concerned, he cannot attack our territory with impunity. It has been assumed that the Company are in a position to attack Lo Bengula at the first moment. That is entirely and absolutely incorrect. The Government are, of course, bound to take an interest in the action of the Company, and what we have done so far as regards their position is simply this—we have said that at the first moment they should not make an aggressive movement on Lo Bengula without our knowledge and authority. A good deal has been said about Matabeleland and Lo Bengula and his raids, which I do not desire to defend; but I think we ought to require two things. In the first place, these raids are no new thing, and, in the second place, as regards the raid the other day, Lo Bengula declared that he sent the impi in order to punish the Mashonas, partly on our account—because they had stolen some telegraph wires—and partly because he wanted to get back some cattle that had been stolen. I think it is quite clear that this impi did largely exceed his orders, and that they were very severely punished by a large number being killed.

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT (interposing)

What was the subsequent statement?

MR. S. BUXTON

His statement was that which we have always admitted —namely, that the Mashonas were his subjects. We have always admitted that they were his subjects, and his statement that they were his slaves was another way of saying that they were under his jurisdiction. What I wanted to point out was this: at the present moment, whether as a matter of right or wrong, there can be no justification on the part of the Company for an aggressive movement which the hon. Gentleman is so anxious should be undertaken, and where also, quite apart from the rights and wrongs of the case, at the present moment they are not in a position to make it. And, so far as we are concerned, we are not going to be rushed into another South African War. We feel it is only right and just from the point of view of Imperial interests as well, I am bound to say I think of the interests of the Company themselves, that they should not by a forward movement, without proper support, be allowed to suffer some reverse which might raise a very large number of native troops throughout other parts of Africa against the white men. We are, as far as we can, desirous of ending this dispute in a peaceful way; we are very anxious to take no more risks than we can possibly help, but at the same time the Government are fully aware of the responsibilities which they have undertaken by forbidding this forward movement. They believe that is the right policy. They know that at the present moment the Chartered Company themselves are in accordance with the action they have taken, and I can only say in the very delicate position of the question at the present moment that remarks such as those of the hon. Member are, in my opinion, very mischievous and highly inexpedient. [Sir E. ASHMEAW-BART-LETT: Which remarks?] The observations which the hon. Member used more than once, that in his opinion we ought to allow and encourage the Company to attack Lobengula whether right or wrong—[Sir E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: I said nothing of the kind]—or whether they are likely to be successful or be defeated. These remarks are so much in accord unfortunately with the views of persons on the spot—but not with responsible people in the Company—that I fear unless a strong expression of opinion in this House is made, they may easily rush us into this war which we are very anxious to avoid. I hope, at all events, that we may be able to avoid any difficulty with Lo Bengula, and I think the hon. Gentleman ought to remember that the Company and these Colonists have been very fortunate in having had up till now a very easy and peaceful time, and I do not think on the first difficulty which arises that they ought to complain, or that they ought to call upon Her Majesty's Government to support them in their aggressive movement. We are prepared to defend the territory for which we are responsible; we are prepared to do our best to avoid difficulties of this sort, and the Company themselves declare that in their opinion they are quite prepared to meet any emergency. Therefore, as far as we are concerned, while we fully feel the responsibility of any action we may have taken in the matter, we believe that such action as we have taken has been in the interest of peace and in the interests of the company themselves, and we believe that if a difficulty arises we shall be in a proper and right position to meet and deal with it. With regard to what has been said as to further Papers on this and kindred matters, I have in the last day or two laid some Papers on the Table, which I hope will be printed and circulated in a very short time. As regards the question of Swaziland, I think hon. Members will feel that it will be more convenient to discuss that question when we reach it in the ordinary course; and if hon. Members desire to speak on it they had better do so on the special Vote instead of mixing it with other questions.

THE CHAIRMAN (Sir J. GOLDSMID,) St. Pancras, S.

called upon Sir C. Dilke, when—

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

said: I desire, by way of personal explanation, to say that the Under Secretary has very considerably misrepresented what I have said. I did not advise a forward movement. I said that the Government had no right to throw all responsibility upon the Chartered Company, and at the same time forbid all offensive movement. The first I knew of the forward movement was the statement by the Government that they had distinctly forbidden a forward movement. With regard to the statement of the hon. Gentleman, in my opinion, on the whole, not unsatisfactory, and if his answers to my questions had been in the same sense, the House would have been spared much of my remarks to-night.

THE CHAIRMAN

I must point out to the hon. Member that this is more than an explanation.

SIR C. W. DILKE

called attention to the action of naval officers on the Treaty shore of Newfoundland, and said it would be impossible for Parliament to impose its will upon any other Colony which had responsible and representative institutions in the manner in which it had attempted to do in the case of the self-governing Colony of Newfoundland. The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies had been reported to have said, in reply to a question, that the recent extraordinary action of the naval officers was in pursuance of a discretion conferred by Treaty. He had afterwards explained that he was misreported and had not said "Treaty." But the discretion alluded to was not contained in any Statute, and it appeared to him that the powers which were exercised by the naval officers were outside any law. Turning to the Blue Book which had recently appeared, he said that the first action taken by Lord Ripon in the matter, to judge by a telegram sent to the Colonial Government, went in the same direction as that in which the late Government had gone in their dealings with the colony, only the language was still more peremptory. In the telegram Lord Ripon threatened that Her Majesty's Government would be compelled to resort to coercive Imperial legislation. The whole question now in dispute arose out of the meaning to be attached to the words saying that we should not molest or interfere with the French fishery in the Royal declaration attached to one of the Treaties. The British contention was that we had a concurrent right of fishery on that part of the Newfoundland shore upon which the Treaty of Utrecht had given the French the right to land and dry fish. That part of the coast was an integral portion of the Colony and it returned two Members to the Colonial Legislature. It had not been until the lobster fishery commenced, in the year 1882, on the Treaty shore, that conflict arose on the French Treaty rights. In 1887 the French naval officers began to cut the nets of British fishing boats that were engaged in fishing off the Treaty shore, and to remove British lobster pots, and so did that which our Government had declared that they had no right to do. He denied that Newfoundland had been unwilling to carry out Treaty obligations, and declared that if, instead of a feeble colony, they had had to deal with an Australasian Colony, no attempt would have been made to bully the Colony or to propose Imperial coercive legislation, as had been attempted in the case of Newfoundland. He did not think that it was to the advantage of the Colony that arbitration should take place upon the limited subject to which it was confined, and as regarded which it constituted a partial admission of a monstrous claim. He did not wish to interfere with the Treaty rights, but in their protection of the French they had gone far beyond the letter of the Treaty. They had prevented their own Colonists from making use of their own country, and it was because he felt that they had gone much too far that he ventured to call the attention of the Committee to the matter.

MR. A. C. MORTON (Peterborough) rose to Order.

MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER

said, there was no question of Order involved, and called upon

COLONEL HOWARD VINCENT (Sheffield, Central)

, who had risen simultaneously with Mr. Morton. The hon. Member said that, having been recently in Newfoundland, he would impress on the Government how deeply the Colonists felt upon this question, and how necessary it was to arrive at a settlement.

MR. A. C. MORTON

said, that he did not intend to detain the Committee unnecessarily, but he was of opinion that they ought to protect the British citizens in Newfoundland. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. J. W. Lowther) had stated that the colonist desired to "rip up" the Treaty of Utrecht. That was not so. The Newfoundlanders had stated distinctly, through their Delegates who were here in 1891, that they desired and were willing, to purchase the French rights, whatever they were, at a fair price. And all that they asked of the British Government was that, as Newfoundland was a poor Colony, the British Government should lend them the money at a low rate of interest, and he (Mr. Morton) was assured that the Newfoundlanders would pay both interest and principal of such a loan. He (Mr. Morton) did not think much of the proposed Arbitration. After all, it would only decide whether a "lobster" was a fish or not, and would leave the main question undecided. On the whole, he (Mr. Morton) thought it would be just as well to drop the proposed Arbitration altogether, and to approach the French Government in a friendly manner with a view to settle the question finally by purchasing the French rights; and it was admitted that the French people had rights on the Newfoundland coast. Until that was done the "Newfoundland difficulty" would never be settled. And he (Mr. Morton) earnestly hoped that the present Government would do their best to get the matter settled. He (Mr. Morton) had by several questions called the attention of the Under Secretary of State (Mr. Buxton) to some grievances of the Newfoundlanders, but the replies were not very satisfactory. One of those matters was with regard to the naval officers acting as Magistrates in questions affecting the rights of the colonists. What the Newfoundlanders said was that they had Magistrates and Courts of their own on the land, and they objected to their citizens being tried in secret on British ships without any chance of their being properly represented or protected by publicity. He (Mr. Morton) hoped that the Government would in this matter allow the colony complete Home Rule. Then there was the question of Admiral Sir B. Walker, and the compensation cases. He was informed that the Admiral had evaded service of the writs which had been issued against him. That, if correct, was a disgraceful state of things, and should not be allowed by the British Government to exist for a single day. Surely the British Government could appoint some respectable solicitor at St. John's to accept service of these writs, and allow the Supreme Court to hear and settle these cases. In this, as in other matters, he (Mr. Morton) hoped that the Colonial Office would do their best to remove the grievances which were properly complained of, and do justice to our oldest colony.

SIR J. GOLDSMID

said, as he understood the matter, there were three points of complaint. The Colonists complained that the Government here had decided against them without fairly considering the position of affairs; that by the Treaty the French had the right to put up temporary buildings only for the purpose of curing cod, whereas they had put up most substantial factories in order to do something else; and further, that the British Government did not protect them against the French, who destroyed the nets and implements of the local fishermen, although they had at least equal rights with the French to fish for Crustacean as well as for cod. He thought the Admiralty might easily give instructions to the Naval Officers to prevent the French from taking the law into their own hands. He could not see the object of arbitration. What was the point for arbitration? Was it whether a lobster was a fish? If that were determined, how would it settle the dispute? He agreed with much of the argument of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Forest of Dean (Sir C. W. Dilke), and he thought it was only fair to the Colonials that they should be consulted with reference to what should be done in these matters affecting themselves.

MR. S. BUXTON

Three points have been raised, and I shall deal with them in their order. With regard to the objection as to Justices of the Peace for the Colony, they were appointed at the request of the Colony; and as soon as the Colony is able to appoint local Justices, the Government will be glad to relieve these officers from a position which they do not desire. In many parts of Newfoundland they have been of great advantage to the inhabitants, who have approved of the bulk of their actions. We cannot now go back, and we are bound by the Acts that previous Governments have for many years passed. As to the question of coercing the Newfoundlanders, I can only say that England has always sympathised with their difficulties, and has made attempts in a sympathetic and liberal spirit to meet their views. In 1857, in 1864, and in 1874 action was taken, and the difficulty with France as nearly as possible concluded; but, unfortunately, the Newfoundlanders rejected our proposals, and no settlement was arrived at. As to the question of the particular matter to which the permanent Act will apply, I admit to the full it is a limited reference which goes to the Board of Arbitrators; and I think every one of us—certainly Her Majesty's Government—would be only too delighted if every one of these difficult and anomalous French Treaty questions could be referred to arbitration and settled by definition. Unfortunately you cannot go to arbitration unless both sides are prepared to do so. The late Government more than once approached the French Government with a view to seeing if all the questions at issue would not admit of arbitration. The French Government, however, have refused to arbitrate on all the points, and I think we shall all agree that the present moment is not at all a favourable one to meet the French Government with a view to complete arbitration. That being so, and the position being an anomalous one, it appears to me better to have these small questions arbitrated upon than to allow them to add to the friction already existing. I can only say that we have endeavoured, and will still endeavour, to meet the Newfoundland Government in the most friendly spirit we possibly can. The Despatch referred to, which I am glad to think the hon. Member regards as an advance in the right direction, was written with a view to getting them to send a delegation over here to discuss the question, and to show that we, as far as we could, consistently with Treaty rights, were ready to meet them in regard to their own local matters. We trust that they will endeavour to meet us in the same spirit, so that this section of the matter may be removed as one source of friction with France. That is the position so far as we are concerned. We are anxious to settle this section of the matter.

SIR J. FERGUSSON

said, that during the five years he was Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs this question had constantly occupied the attention of the Government. Nothing could be a greater mistake than that which appeared to dwell in the mind of the hon. Member for Peterborough—namely, that the late Government—and he supposed he could speak also for the present Government—were in any way indifferent to this question, because Newfoundland was not one of the largest Colonies, or its people one of the most numerous and best able to make their voices heard. On the contrary, this question had occupied an amount of attention out of all proportion to its magnitude and the size of the Colony, or the interests involved. As the Under Secretary of State had said, it was a matter of great difficulty with which, after all, two great Powers were concerned, each tenacious of the privileges and rights of its subjects, involving questions as to which there was considerable difference of legal interpretation. He had been surprised at the remarks of the hon. Member, but he had been still more surprised to hear from the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean (Sir C. W. Dilke), who had had large experience in connection with foreign affairs, and who, he freely admitted, was a very considerable authority on many points of foreign affairs, arguments which showed such a total disregard of the rights and susceptibilities of other Powers. When the right hon. Baronet deprecated arbitration and said that we had the rights of our Colonies to protect, and that they should be left to manage their own affairs, was it possible that he was ignorant of, or indifferent to, the position of the French Government on this question? How was it possible that one nation—still less a colony of a nation—could judge its own cause? Where there was an International difference for one Power to say—"These are our rights, and these we will maintain," is nothing less than saying—"We will go to war unless our view is accepted." Was it to be supposed that the French Government would tolerate an assertion by us of the right of the Colonists of Newfoundland to say what was the interpretation to be placed upon certain Treaties, and to what extent they would carry them out? It was evident that the responsibility rested with the Power who made the Treaties, and that it was the duty of that Power to see that they were carried out. The British Governments had been far from indifferent to the susceptibilities of the Colonists. They had run considerable risks of difficulty with the French Government, and he was bound to say that the French Government had been forbearing in the matter. To say that we could permit a Colony to ignore obligations under which it lay, to interpret a Treaty for itself and disregard the rights of France under that Treaty, seemed to him to ignore and disregard the plainest principles of International Law. The hon. Member for Peterborough said—"Why go into arbitration about the matter of lobsters?" There were a school of politicians who said—"We ought to go to arbitration upon all matters of International difference;" but when it came to any particular point that had to be arbitrated upon they said—"You have no need to go to arbitration." It was perfectly impossible to contend on the one hand that arbitration was the course in all cases of difficulty, and then to decline to go to arbitration because it did not suit them to do so.

MR. A. C. MORTON

I never said that.

SIR J. FERGUSSON

But the hon. Member said that some way of settling the matter ought to be found with the French Government. Well, the only way of settling a dispute was to go to an International tribunal, and that Her Majesty's Government had been willing to do. But here arose the difficulty. They had to consider the limits and grounds of arbitration. Neither Power was willing to refer to arbitration what it regarded as sovereign rights. The French asserted their right to something like concurrent possession of the Treaty shore with ourselves, and to build salmon weirs on the streams—they did build them, in fact, and they had to be removed. The French would like us to refer to arbitration whether they had a right to do such things, and whether they possessed concurrent rights on the Treaty shore. This we could not allow. Neither would the French Government submit to arbitration matters they considered to be their undoubted rights under the Treaty, consequently the Reference had to be narrowed to the limits we had stated. Novertheless, there were some questions of principle here involved, because, if the curing of lobsters, which was not an established practice when the Treaty was entered into, lay within the right of "drying fish," then it might follow that the necessary buildings must be put up for the purpose. A good deal depended on that question. He had only risen to point out how vain and futile it was to say that they could leave to the Colonies the right to settle affairs that were matters of International arbitration. We could not deal in amity with a foreign Power with whom we had contracted International Treaty engagements were we not to charge ourselves with the fulfilment of those Treaty obligations, and were we not ready to settle by arbitration matters we could not settle by diplomacy.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

said, he was unable to agree with the strictly official view put before the Committee by his right hon. Friend opposite. The right hon. Gentleman was bound by his responsibilities to support the view taken by successive Governments, and to accept the view which had been stated to the Committee by the Under Secretary. When he (Mr. J. Chamberlain) was in America, dealing with a fishery question of a different kind, he had had the opportunity of making the acquaintance of some of the foremost Representatives of the Colony of Newfoundland. He had entered into conversation with them on this subject, and had learned a great deal about it. He confessed he had come to the conclusion which had been so well stated to the Committee by the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean. Those who heard the right hon. Baronet would say that these discussions in Supply were not purely obstructive. The right hon. Gentleman had given an account of this dispute with regard to the lobster fishery on the Treaty coast of Newfoundland, which had been accepted by the Under Secretary of State as substantially correct; and what was the conclusion that the right hon. Gentleman drew from the statement—a conclusion which must have been accepted by everyone who heard him, and who, at the same time, was prepared to accept his facts as correct? It was that the French had extended their rights under the original Treaty and under the King's Declaration until they were now claiming more than either in equity or in law they were entitled to. The Newfoundlanders, according, to the right hon. Baronet, were absolutely right in their contention. What was to be done? It was suggested by the Government that they should be forced to arbitration because the Colony would not go willingly. The right hon. Baronet said there were certain questions affecting territorial rights which were not fair subjects for arbitration. "Suppose," he said, "the French claimed a Treaty shore on the Isle of Wight, would you go to arbitration on a claim of that kind? Clearly not. Why should you go," said the right hon. Member, "to arbitration on a similar question because it happens to affect a Colony?" Under these circumstances, they arrived at this conclusion—that, in the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman, they could not admit the claim of the French—they could not go to arbitration. What was the alternative? Was the right hon. Gentleman prepared to go to war? Really, this was very important. This question had been raised by two supporters of the Government who belonged to the New Radical Party. Whenever people came forward to defend the rights of the Empire, and the property of the Empire, they were accused of being Jingoes at once; but here were two hon. Members, belonging to the New Radical Party, who pressed on the Government a course of action which meant war if it meant anything.

SIR C. W. DILKE

If it is put tome as a question, I say we have no demand at all to make on the French. We have simply to remain in possession of the rights which we have. If he asks me whether I think there is any risk of war in that I say no.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

said, he had not asked any question of the right hon. Baronet; but he was prepared to give way to him at any moment he desired to make a further statement. As he had said, he was in agreement with the right hon. Baronet; but he wanted to have a clear understanding as to the position of the new Radical Party on the question of Treaty rights, for it seemed to him that it must inevitably lead them into war. The right hon. Baronet said it would not lead to war, but that was simply the right hon. Gentleman's ipse dixit. It would not lead to war if the French Government gave way; but how did the right hon. Baronet know that they would give way? What authority had he to speak for the French Government? He said we had no demand to make on them, but at the present moment French officers were cutting the nets of our people, they were preventing the establishment of railways and of local communication, and interfering in many ways with the territorial right of our Colonists. And were we to sit still? "No," said the right hon. Baronet, "we were to give instructions to our Naval officers to prevent the French from doing these things." But what would be the result of that? War. ["No, no!"] It was absurd for the right hon. Member to interrupt him and to say that it did not mean war with France. What was the alternative? It was repression—to say to the Newfoundlanders—"You are a small Colony; you do not interest us. It is true you are the oldest of the British Colonies; but as a pecuniary matter, if we strike a balance, we shall not be the gainers by your possession; and under the circumstances, if you do not take our advice and give way to the French, though we admit that you are right and the French are wrong, we will not protect you, and you must workout this question for yourselves." This was really a most important question, on which it was well he should clear their minds of cant, and to have a clear notion of what their policy should be. This was a case in which his right hon. Friend would, he thought, be prepared to say—"Our honour in this matter is concerned, and we are bound to accept even the risk of war in protecting our Newfoundland Colonists." If the right hon. Gentleman said that, he would not say that he (Mr. J. Chamberlain) should not be inclined to support him; but, then, do not let the new Radical Party accuse him and his friends of being jingoes. The other alternative was to say to the Colony—"Go, in Heaven's name, and settle affairs with the French!" That was the position taken up by the hon. Member behind him.

MR. A. C. MORTON

No, no!

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

said, he did not know whether the hon. Member's desire was to repeat his statement.

MR. A. C. MORTON

said, he objected to what the right hon. Gentleman was saying about him. He (Mr. Morton) had stated in his speech that what he desired was that they should approach the French Government in a friendly way with a view to purchasing their rights. He had said that the people of Newfoundland had stated distinctly that they were willing to pay for these rights.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

said, the proposals of these amateur diplomatists were most ridiculous. The view now put was not that put by the hon. Member in his original speech.

MR. A. C. MORTON

said, he had put that view.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

said, the hon. Member proposed that they should approach the French Government in a friendly way and say—"You are absolutely wrong; you have no rights. Now, what will you take for your rights? "It was well-known that the French would not sell their rights; but if they were prepared to do so, it was equally certain that any price they put on them would be much larger than Newfoundland could afford to pay. Newfoundland was a miserably poor Colony, with a population of 300,000 or 400,000. But did the hon. Member propose to put the expenditure on the British taxpayer? They had seen no inclination on the part of the new Radical Party to spare the British taxpayer; but he confessed it would be another thing to be carried to their credit if they required Parliament to pay for the extinction of rights which did not exist. This discussion threw light on many interesting questions. It threw light on the foreign policy of the new Radical Party and on their self-governing legislative policy and their policy with regard to the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament and the veto of the Crown. In the case of Newfoundland there was an undoubted and unimpaired and indefeasible supremacy of the British Crown; the Imperial Parliament had a veto over the legislation of the Colony, and yet here was a case in which a small Colony refused to carry out the Treaty engagements of the Imperial Power, and the right hon. Baronet said that he and a great number of his friends would do everything in their power to prevent the Imperial Parliament from exercising the supremacy of the British Crown and from vetoing the concurrent legislation of the Colony.

SIR C. W. DILKE

I am loth to interrupt my right hon. Friend, even when he refers to me as speaking for the new Radical Party, though I have spoken simply for myself. I repudiate the sug- gestion that I would back up the Colony in refusing to carry out Treaty engagements.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

said, he was well aware that the right hon. Baronet contended that the French had no Treaty right, and that they were wrong in their claim. But the position of the Government was the reverse of that. They admitted the claim of the French as a subject of contention which they were willing to submit to arbitration. How was supremacy to be exercised over Newfoundland when they found a powerful Party led by the right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean ready to use all the Forms of the House to prevent it?

MR. A. C. MORTON

said, he wished to repudiate a great deal that the right hon. Member for West Birmingham had said. He believed that the French had Treaty rights; so did the Colonists, and they had no desire to rip up the Treaty. They were willing to buy the French out. With regard to the practicability of this purchase, the right hon. Gentleman ought to know that the United States purchased two of their present States—one from France and one from Spain—and that within recent years they had bought a large tract of territory from Russia. Surely the British Government could do something of the same sort. [Cries of "Divide!"] It was nonsense to talk of the "new Radical Party" as desiring to carry out a Jingo policy. They had no such desire. What he desired was that whatever rights the French had we should purchase. There was no question of war in the matter, because all these things could be settled if the Government wished it in an amicable manner. [Cries of "Divide!"] The Under Secretary had said that the cases he (Mr. Morton) had brought under the notice of the Colonial Government were mares' nests; but judging from the reply of the hon. Member he, at least, did not seem to think so. The people of Newfoundland did not think so. It had been admitted that there was something in some of the cases; but it was contended that the matter could only be settled by the Government. This was, unfortunately, the way in which the Colonial Office had generally treated the Colony. Whatever complaints were made they were almost always said to be "mare's nests," and until they could induce the Colonial Office to adopt a better mode of dealing with the questions, difficulties would be constantly arising. [Cries of "Divide!"] He contended that it was the duty of the Colonial Office to arrange with the British Admiral as to accepting service of writs. He (Mr. Morton) had a letter from a Member of the Assembly of Newfoundland, in which he stated that he had taken out a writ against Sir Baldwin Walker, but had been unable to serve it because he had left the country. Six other cases had been sent to him, in one of which the claim was for 2,000 dollars; but Sir Baldwin Walker, although he had been in the country, had evaded the service of the writ by only coming on shore on Sunday, and getting away to his ship before the time at which the writ could be legally served. He (Mr. Morton) did not wish to concern himself in any dispute between the Colonial Office and the Admiralty; but he trusted that care would be taken to appoint someone in Newfoundland to accept service of the writs. ["Divide!"]

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

The discussion which has taken place has been no doubt interesting and important; but I think it will be felt that it has now reached its natural termination. [Cries of "Oh!"] I understand there are still several questions to be raised under the Vote in regard to other Colonies than those that have been dealt with, and I think the Government might now consent to report Progress. [Cries of "No!"] I beg to move to report Progress.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. A. J. Balfour.)

SIR W. HARCOURT

I hope the Committee will be disposed to sit a little longer. I believe that the other subjects to be discussed will not take long, and seeing that the Government have obtained only two Votes in the past two days—the Home Office Vote yesterday, and the Vote for the Foreign Office to-day—I think the House should go on a little longer. [Cries of "No!"] Do hon. Members opposite think that one Vote a day is a satisfactory rate of doing the large amount of work yet before them? In these circumstances, I think we should go on with Supply.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

The right hon. Gentleman appears to think that the time which has been occupied on this and the preceding Votes had been unreasonably long. If he will look back at the record of the proceedings of previous Parliaments he will find that, by comparison, the time which has been occupied on these Votes has been extremely limited. I would remind the right hon. Gentleman that two days for discussion on the Home Office and Foreign Office Votes is a very limited amount of time compared with that occupied on those Votes last year. The Foreign Office Vote, which has been closured after four hours' discussion, has usually taken two nights; and it must not be forgotten that we have yet to discuss the Report of the Supply taken last night. There are many important questions to be raised on the Votes, and it is only in Supply that Members find their opportunity of criticising the policy of the Government. I do not think there is any desire to discuss unimportant Votes at undue length. All we ask is that discussion shall not be cut short by the arbitrary action of the Government.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Dealing only with our discussion to-night, I would point out that at least two or three of the important questions which have come before us have been raised by the right hon. Gentleman's own side. I would also point out that Members—notably the hon. Member for Camberwell—who sit on the Liberal side of the House, who have given notice of their intention to bring forward certain matters under the Foreign Office Vote, have left the House under the impression that there will certainly be no opportunity of discussing them after 1 o'clock in the morning. One question to be raised of which I know something myself has to do with the Bahamas. I think that out of courtesy to hon. Gentlemen who have put down these notices we should not attempt to proceed with the Votes at this hour. When we were discussing the conduct of business, the Prime Minister, in answer to a statement of mine, which was to the effect that under the new Rule it was intended by the Government that we should sit up every night until 1 o'clock in the morning, distinctly repu- diated any such idsa. My right hon. Friend has spoken as though we were only going at the rate of one Vote a day. I would point out that on Tuesday the Government obtained no fewer than five Votes, in addition to which they have since obtained the whole of the Home Office Vote, the Foreign Office Vote, and have now pretty well got through the Colonial Vote. Most important questions have been discussed, including Siam, Madagascar, and the raids of the Matabele. Any one of these subjects at an earlier period of the Session would have been good enough for two days at least, whereas we have got rid of half-a-dozen in a few hours. Any reasonable person who takes note of the number of important subjects which have been discussed during the past two days will at once be ready to admit that no time has been wasted. The Government may do what they please, but they cannot get this Vote. In view of the Opposition, it will only be putting the House to unnecessary trouble if the Government force us to go to a Division.

SIR W. HARCOURT

The right hon. Member for West Birmingham a short time ago expressed his desire to bring forward the question of the Bahamas. All that the Government desires is that the right hon. Gentleman will bring that question forward now.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Not at 1 o'clock in the morning.

COMMANDER BETHELL

said, he did not know whether the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer was aware of the fact that the hon. Member who intended to raise the question of the Bahamas was not present. He had gone away, believing that the Vote now under discussion would not be passed to-night. He (Commander Bethell) and other Members had understood that after the question of Newfoundland had been dealt with Progress would be reported. He would appeal to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to accede to that course.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

Do the Government propose to take the postponed Resolution relating to the House of Lords to-night?

SIR W. HARCOURT

Yes.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

That will occupy some time.

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 43; Noes 133.—(Division List, No. 297.)

Original Question again proposed.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested that the Motion with reference to which notice had been given should be brought on tonight. I have already pointed out that, as regards the Motion in which one of the right hon. Gentleman's own supporters are interested, it is impossible for that gentleman to bring it forward, because he has gone home. As regards the matter that I am concerned with, no doubt its discussion will not occupy much time, but it is a subject when there could by no possibility be any reference to it in the public Press. The matter concerns the administration of justice in the Bahamas, and it is a subject that is of intense interest to the Colony, at all events, and which cannot be reported in the Press at such an hour. At all events, I do not choose to let it come forward without the possibility of its being reported. It is now 25 minutes past 1, and the Government have still, by the necessities of the case, to deal with the Report of Supply, including the matter on which they sustained a defeat the other night. I think it is asking too much that we should proceed with the ordinary work of Supply. Understandings entered into with the Prime Minister appear to me not to be worth anything at all. He goes away—["Oh, oh!"]—and his Lieutenants will not keep his engagements. ["Oh, oh!"] But I will not press that point. I quite understand that the tactics of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer are part of the policy of bullying the House of Commons. Well, we have resisted that before, and I shall continue to resist it to the end. Under any circumstances I beg to move that you, Sir, do now leave the Chair.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do now leave the Chair."—(Mr. J. Chamberlain.)

SIR W. HARCOURT

I will not discuss the question in the tone adopted by the right hon. Gentleman, who says he does not choose to let the Committee discuss a certain subject. Whose language, I should like to ask, is the language of "bullying?" The right hon. Gentleman's is not the tone that I hope any gentleman uses on these Benches. I only ask, in the interests of all parts of the House, and in view of the late period of the Session, that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen should do what they can to facilitate the despatch of Public Business. The right hon. Gentleman admits that the question on which he desires to speak will only occupy a short time, and it seems to me, therefore, that his only fear is lest posterity should lose the benefit of the speech he is prepared to make. That is, no doubt, a very important matter. I should be very sorry that future generations should not be able to study that oration. Informer times we used to consider 1 o'clock an early hour, and I am told that in another place, where they are not so anxious about the preservation of their orations, they are still debating. If the House of Commons considers itself physically weaker than the House of Lords, and is so much more solicitous about the reporting of its speeches, it will be useless to protract this struggle, and I do not propose to do so. I would, however, express a hope that on other occasions these questions will be approached in a different spirit from that adopted by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I entirely share the wish of the right hon. Gentleman that questions of this kind will hereafter be treated in a different spirit. As the right hon. Gentleman has given way I will not follow him in his extremely insolent remarks. [Cries of "Withdraw!"]

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

I rise to Order. I wish to ask whether the right hon. Gentleman is in Order in describing the observations made by a Member as "insolent remarks?"

THE CHAIRMAN

I did not hear, the words. If the right hon. Gentleman did use them they are not Parliamentary, and I think the right hon. Gentleman will see the necessity of withdrawing them.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I have great pleasure in withdrawing the expression, in accordance with your ruling, and I will substitute another word which has been admitted to be in Order, and say, instead of insolent remarks, venomous observations. I must protest—[Cries of "Divide!"]—against the misrepresentation of my language; and again I say that to treat a question which is of the greatest importance and interest to one of our Colonies—[Cries of "Divide!"]—at half-past 1—["Divide!"]—when there can be—["Divide!"]—I say to treat the affairs of an important Colony—["Divide!"]—I say to allow—["Divide!"]—

THE CHAIRMAN

Order, order!

MR. J. CHAMBEBLAIN

To allow a matter which interests an important Colony—["Divide!"]—to be discussed at half-past I in the morning, is to show great want of respect to that Colony.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Motion made, and Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again,"—put, and agreed to.

Resolution to be reported To-morrow; Committee also report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.