MOTION FOR ADJOURNMENT.

HC Deb 09 November 1893 vol 18 cc543-627

Mr. LABORCHERE,

Member for the Borough of Northampton, rose in his place, and asked leave to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely:— The impolicy of permitting the Chartered Company of South Africa to establish any claim or contract any engagements with regard to the territory or government of Matabeleland, or to continue its warlike operations in that territory in view of the previous proceedings and the position of the Company"; but the pleasure of the House not having been signified, MR. Speaker called on those Members who supported the Motion to rise in their places, and not less than 40 Members having accordingly risen:—

MR. LABOUCHERE

said that ho did not consider it necessary to offer any apology for having moved the Adjournment of the House, because he believed that every Member present, whatever might be his personal views on this particular matter, would be of opinion that, considering what was now going on in South Africa, the House, as it was now sitting, ought to be seised of the circumstances. He might claim that every Member of the House was in favour of his Motion, because, if any gentleman had wished to stop it, he could have done so by putting down a Motion on the Orders of the House. He was afraid he would have to trouble the House at some length, because one of the difficulties of the present position was that they had a very powerful body of men who had done their best to fog this question and to prevent the country from really understanding what had been going on in Mashonaland and Matabeleland. The House would no doubt, be aware that there was a large territory north of our possessions in the Transvaal, that south of the Zambesi River, and it was roughly divided into British Bechuanaland, another portion of Bechu-analand under British protection, Matabeleland, and Mashonaland. These two latter were each of them rather larger than the area of France. In Matabeleland resided the King Lobengula, whose rights of sovereignty over Matabeleland and Mashonaland had always been recognised by the British Government. For a long time gold had been supposed to exist in great quantities in both of these territories, and consequently Lobengula had been pestered for a long time by a very large number of concession-hunters. Concessions were obtained very easily from African Monarchs, and generally they were fraudulent; the Monarch was asked to promise something in words, then it was reduced to writing, and the Monarch who could not read was asked to put his hand to the concession, with the result that he signed away a great deal more than he had ever promised. In 1888 Mashonaland and Matabeleland were in what was called the sphere of British influence. MR. Rhodes was then a gentleman engaged in financing in South Africa, and had acquired a considerable position in consequence of his having arranged the amalgamation of certain Diamond Companies known as the De Beers Companies. He was also at the head of a strong financial group. He sent a Mr. Rudd to obtain a mining concession from Lobengula, and the concession when obtained was called the Rudd Concession. He came back with a signed concession giving those for whom he acted the complete and exclusive right over the minerals in the dominions of Lobengula. As consideration for this concession he agreed that Lobengula should be given £100 per month, 1,000 guns, and a steamboat. On December 5, 1888, a copy of the concession was sent by Mr. Rudd to the Government of the Cape, and the letter which accompanied it contained the following words:— Besides what appears on the face of the agreement, certain verbal undertakings were given by the King to me; for instance, that any white miners engaged in the country by me should be bound to tight in defence of the country if called upon. Surely if the concession sent to the Government of the Cape and signed by Lobengula did not contain such an important verbal agreement, there was some ground for doubting the genuineness of the concession at that time. Another group of financiers, of whom Lord Gifford was at the head, had obtained a concession from Khama in 1887, known as the Bechuanaland Trading Concession. In April, 1889, Lord Gifford wrote to Lord Knutsford, the then Colonial Secretary, asking for a Charter to enable him to carry out his concession, and, at the same time, Mr. Rhodes declared that he was prepared to co-operate with him. In point of fact, the two groups of financiers were united. Lord Knutsford in his reply stated that whether the Charter was granted or not depended "upon the personnel of the Directorate." After some consideration two Dukes were induced to join the Directorate, and Lord Knutsford thereupon felt that with those two Dukes the personnel was satisfactory. These two Dukes, who he had no doubt were eminent and respectable gentlemen—and he had nothing to say against them—were not in any way especially connected with South Africa, and knew no more about it than humbler persons residing in British dominions. On October 15, 1889, Lord Knutsford, on a Petition signed by the two Dukes, Mr. Rhodes, Lord Gifford, and others, granted the Charter, by which the Company were empowered to use and retain the full benefit of concessions so far as they were valid, and to acquire, by concession or agreement, rights and jurisdictions for the purpose of government in the lands referred to, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. He must now explain how this concession was obtained from Lobengula, for it appeared that he had always absolutely denied that he ever granted it on the terms which appeared on the face of the instrument. When Lobengula was told that he had granted a concession of this nature he sent two Indunas to the Cape, with orders (as could be seen on reference to the Blue Book) to discover, first, whether such a place as England existed; and next, whether, if they discovered that such a place did exist, there was such a person as the Queen of England; and if there was such a place and such a Monarch, they were to lay before her the following letter and to ask her advice on the subject:—

"To Her Majesty Queen Victoria, from Lobengula.

"Some time ago a party of white men came into my country, the principal one appearing to be a man named Rudd. They asked me for a place where they could dig for gold, and said they would give me certain things for the right to do so. I told them to bring it to me, and I would see what I would do. A document was read and presented to me for signature. I asked what it contained, and was told that in it were my words and the words of those men. I put my hand to it. About three months after I heard from other sources I had given the right to all the minerals in my country. I called a meeting of my Indunas and of the white men, and demanded a copy of the document. It was proved to me that I had signed away the right to minerals of the whole country to Rudd and his friends. I have since had a meeting of my Indunas, and they will not recognise the paper, as it contains neither my words nor the words of those who got it from me."

These Indunas came to England; they were presented to Queen Victoria, and the following letter was sent by Lord Knutsford:— The Queen has heard the words of Lobengula. They say that Lobengula is much troubled by white men who come into his country and ask to dig gold, and that he begs for advice and help. Lobengula is the ruler of his country, and the Queen does not interfere in the government of that country; but as he desires advice Her Majesty is ready to give it, and, having consulted Her Principal Secretary of State holding the Seals of Office for the Colonial Department, now replies as follows:—In the first place, the Queen wishes Lobengula to understand distinctly that Englishmen who have gone out to Matabeleland to ask leave to dig for stones have not gone with the Queen's authority, and that he should not believe any statements made by them to that effect. The Queen advises Lobengula not to grant hastily concessions of land, or leave to dig, but to consider all applications very carefully. It is not wise to put too much power into the hands of the men who come first, and to exclude other deserving men. A King gives a stranger an ox, not a whole herd of cattle.

The advice was practically to be very careful about giving concessions, and under no circumstances to give an exclusive concession. The Indunas returned to Matabeleland with this letter from the Queen. On August 10 Lobengula writes— The white people are troubling me very much about gold. If the Queen hears that I have given away the whole country it is not so. I have no one in my country who knows how to write. I do not understand where the dispute is, because I have no knowledge of writing. I thank the Queen for the word which my messengers gave me by mouth, that the Queen says I am not to let anyone dig for gold in my country except to dig for me as my servants.

That was how Lobengula understood the letter of the Queen. In October, 1889, without any further communication with Lobengula, the Company's Charter was granted. This change was notified to Lobengula in the following letter from the Queen, and the document was a very important one:— 1, Lord Knutsford, one of the Queen's Principal Secretaries of State, am commanded by Her Majesty to send this further message to Lobengula. The Queen has kept in her mind the letter sent by Lobengula and the message brought by Umshete and Babaan in the beginning of this year, and she has now desired Mr. Moffatt, whom she trusts, and whom Lobengula knows to be his true friend, to tell him what she has done for him and what she advises him to do. 2. Since the visit of Lobengula's Envoys, the Queen has made the fullest inquiries into the particular circumstances of Matabeleland, and understands the trouble caused to Lobengula by different parties of white men coming to his country to look for gold; but wherever gold is, or wherever it is reported to be, there it is impossible for him to exclude white men, and, therefore, the wisest and safest course for him to adopt, and that which will give least trouble to himself and his tribe, is to agree, not with one or two white men separately, but with one approved body of white men, who will consult Lobengula's wishes, and arrange where white people are to dig, and who will be responsible to the Chief for any annoyance or trouble caused to himself or his people. If he does not agree with one set of people there will be endless disputes among the white men, and he will have all his time taken up in deciding their quarrels. 3. The Queen, therefore, approves of the concession made by Lobengula to some white men, who were represented in his country by Messrs. Rudd, Maguire, and Thompson. The Queen has caused inquiry to be made respecting these persons, and is satisfied that they are men who will fulfil their undertakings, and who may be trusted to carry out the working for gold in the Chief's country without molesting his people, or in any way interfering with their kraals, gardens, or cattle. And, as some of the Queen's highest and most trusted subjects have joined themselves with those to whom Lobengula gave his concessions, the Queen now thinks Lobengula is acting wisely in carrying out his agreement with these persons, and hopes that he will allow them to conduct their mining operations without interference or molestation from his subjects. 4. The Queen understands that Lobengula does not like deciding disputes among white men or assuming jurisdiction over them. This is very wise, as these disputes would take up much time, and Lobengula cannot understand the laws and customs of white people; but it is not well to have people in his country who are subject to no law, therefore the Queen thinks Lobengula would be wise to entrust to that body of white men, of whom Mr. Jameson is now the principal representative in Matabeleland, the duty of deciding disputes and keeping the peace among white persons in his country. 5. In order to enable them to act lawfully and with full authority, the Queen has, by her Royal Charter, given to that body of men leave to undertake this duty, and will hold them responsible for their proper performance of such duty. Of course this must be as Lobengula likes, as he is King of the country, and no one can exercise jurisdiction in it without his permission; but it is believed that this will be very convenient for the Chief, and the Queen is informed that he has already made such an arrangement in the Tati district, by which he is there saved all trouble.

There was one other communication he had taken from the Blue Book of 1890, made by the Queen or Lord Knutsford to Lobengula. It was as follows:— Lobengula should be informed that this letter has been communicated to the Queen as he desired, and that before Her Majesty saw it she had already commanded me to write the message on parchment—

That was the first letter recommending him not to give any concessions— which has just been sent to him; that the words about digging for gold in his country, which he says his messengers, Umsheti and Babyane, gave him, from the Queen, were not exactly the Queen's words, but that he will see from the Queen's last message that she meant much the same thing—that is, that the men employed by the Company to manage the digging for gold will recognise him as King of the country, and will have such powers as he entrusts to them.

That was to say, no other powers but those Lobengula did entrust to them. Now, he considered that these letters were most important. It would be seen that Lobengula absolutely refused to recognise the concession. First, Her Majesty advised him not to give exclusive concessions. When he said "Her Majesty" he meant Lord Kuutsford, but the words were put into the mouth of the Queen. He must here express the opinion that it was most unwise and undesirable to mix up the name of the Queen in those matters regarding concessions or advice to Chiefs in Africa—that words such as ho had read should be put into the mouth of Her Majesty, and that Her Majesty should be compromised thereby. Of course, the Queen spoke not for herself, but as the Representative of the nation and the Government. Specific and definite promises were given to Lobengula with regard to the white men who went into his country, provided he granted concessions. He was urged to give the concessions on the condition that the obligations should be kept. Those obligations were that the white men should only dig where Lobengula permitted thorn to dig; that they should absolutely have no sort of jurisdiction or sovereignty over either Mashonaland or Matabeleland. In fact, Her Majesty told Lobengula that the white men had legally no jurisdiction over each other; but she advised him, in order to avoid disputes and trouble, to allow them to exercise such jurisdiction. On those pledges, Lobengula having received this letter from Her Majesty and imagining, no doubt, that the greatest care would be taken that he should not in any way be damnified by the entrance of these men into his country, confirmed the concession—that was the mining concession, and nothing but the mining concession, which allowed gold to be dug for where Lobengula pleased; but Lobengula always stood to the fact that the concession was not as he had given it. There was no land concession at that time. In 1891, however, a Mr. Lippert obtained a land concession from Lobengula to take possession of land which was unoccupied, which was not grazing land, within the sphere of the operations of the South Africa Company. The Company disputed at first the validity of this concession; but giving up that contention they bought it, and they then considered it perfectly valid. What, then, was the position of the Company so far as regarded the Charter and so far as regarded the concession at the present moment? The Charter was for mining rights where Lobengula pleased to allow the operations to be carried on, and to buy and use land in that place where they were exercising those miniug rights. He contended that these mining rights were obtained by the trickery of the concessionnaires and the Company. In the end Lobengula was induced to recognise them by the advice of Her Majesty, but the original concession was obtained by trickery. He would now show how these gentlemen, having tricked Lobengula out of the concession, tricked the Colonial Office out of the Charter. He had already explained that there wore two groups of concessionnaires—the Lord Gifford group and the Rhodes group; and the two united, and they sold their individual rights to the Company. Hon. Gentlemen knew how this was done. No real payment of money took place. They created a Company; the concessionnaires sold as individuals to the Company, which was themselves collectively. Now, when they asked for the Charter they stated that they were associated for the purpose of forming a Company to carry into effect divers concessions; that agreements had been entered into, and that large sums had been actually subscribed for the purpose of the intended Company. A Charter was asked for and obtained. The Charter allowed them to create a Company, fixed the amount of capital, and imposed certain monetary obligations—obligations of administration and otherwise—on the Company to which the Charter applied. Of course, at that time it was fully understood by the Colonial Office that this Company which was being created were possessors of the concessions. The Colonial Office then had never heard that the Search Company was only a dummy. But what was the real fact? It was that the Company did not hand over the concessions; but they left the concessions on these extraordinary terms: that the Company should incur all the expenditure and costs, and that the promoters or the Search Company should have half the profits. Besides that, there was a clause in the agreement which provided that if at any time the Chartered Company found itself without the means of carrying out the development of the country, then the lease should immediately lapse, and should no longer be an asset in any sort of way in relation to the Chartered Company, but should become the absolute property of the Search Company. That, as he had said, was not revealed to the Colonial Office when the demand was made for the Charter. It was agreed that within a given date there should be a deed of settlement providing for a division of profits and other matters; but that deed of settlement was concealed from the Colonial Office, and had only come to light recently. Upon that Lord Ripon wrote, October 18, 1892— Lord Ripon gathers that his predecessor had indeed become aware by unofficial information of the engagements of the Company to the United Concessions Company, but it may be observed that your letter under acknowledgment appears to be the first direct intimation of the arrangement which has come upon the records of this office. No indication of such an arrangement appeared in the correspondence which led to the grant of a Charter, and from the reply to a question given by Baron do Worms in the House of Commons January 27, 1891, it is clear that the late Government were unaware of it when they advised the grant of the Charter. Whether a knowledge of the arrangement would have influenced their action is a question which they alone could answer; but Lord Ripon thinks it important to place on record a statement of the state of their information at the time when alone their knowledge or want of knowledge of the arrangement was material.

Now, he had said just now that he would state who the Concessions Company was. He had pointed out that these men sold the concessions to the Search Company for £92,200. We might reasonably suppose that they did not undervalue their own property. What they did next was this: They created a thing called a Concession Company; they liquidated the Search Company, and they sold the concessions, plus the Charter, to the Concessions Company. But for how much did the House think they sold this thing that they declared a few months before to be worth £92,200? Why, for £4,000,000. The only additional asset they had was the Charter they had obtained from Her Majesty's Government. Here we had these gentlemen actually valuing the Charter at the modest sum of upwards of £3,900,000. Had it been intended to give them this? Hon. Members knew perfectly well why it was done. The intention was to get rid of the shares to the public. They had heard a great deal about the patriotism of these gentlemen. He had seen it stated in the papers that they might still have a trifling interest in the matter, but that they were "patriots," "pillars of the Empire," men "devoted to the extension of the Empire"; and it was said that any trifle they might pick up in the course of their civilising and christianising operations should not be considered, for "the labourer was worthy of his hire." He had taken some trouble to find out who these gentlemen were. The Concessions Company had to send in Returns to Somerset House. In January, 1893, the last Report was made, and he found from this a great many shares had been sold to the public. Mr. Beit was the possessor of 329,503 shares. Here was a "pillar of the Empire." It was very kind of Mr. Beit to look after the Empire, as he was not a British subject. He was a Dutchman, and not a British subject. He had not been naturalised, and so far as he (Mr. Labouchere) was aware, he did not intend to be. Mr. Rudd had 444,000; Mr. Rhodes had left with him 357,255, and Baron Nathan de Rothschild, who was not one of the Rothschild family living in this country, but a Viennese, had 98,000 shares. It was very kind of him to come forward as a pillar of the Empire. Among those patriots and pillars of the Empire there were two aliens. So far as the Chartered Company was concerned, it was difficult to ascertain the facts. Having obtained a Charter they were free from the liability of sending in Returns to Somerset House. Their capital was to be £1,000,000. The first issue of their shares was 250,000 of £1 each. These shares were distributed among the promoters and the Companies connected with the promoters. But there was this little clause in the agreement—that whenever there was a subsequent issue of shares those gentlemen should have a right to two shares for every one applied for at the first issue. Then there were a great many puffs of the Company. Hon. Members might remem- her how in the newspapers they were told that Mashonaland was the land of Ophir. He remembered an interesting statement being published to the effect that the Palace of the Queen of Sheba had been discovered there. These and similar statements were put forward to induce the British public, to believe that the best thing one could do was to buy a share in the Chartered Company. Besides this, it must be remembered that when the Government gave a Charter, though as a matter of fact it assumed no financial responsibility, yet from the intermixture of the Government of the country with the Company, from the fact that it was a "Royal Charter," investors, who were a, very silly body of people, were led to suppose that in some way there was an assurance or guarantee that the Company was respectable, that the amount of capital was legitimate, and that the whole of the proceedings would be honestly conducted. Such was the effect of the illusion that these £1 shares actually went up to £5 or £6, and were operating to the great benefit of their old friends the "pillars of the Empire." The shares of course went down afterwards; and when they wore about £3 a share—that was to say, at 200 per cent, premium—the second issue took place, and the gentlemen who had taken the original 250,000 shares got two shares for every one taken before. Only 3s. was paid on each share, and consequently these fortunate "pillars of the Empire" got into a market where for 3s. they were able to clear 43s. Therefore, it must he admitted that this Company had taken care of itself. The labourer might lie worthy of his hire, but in this case he thought it would be admitted that the labourer had assessed the value of his services at a pretty high figure. The Company by the sale of the concession shares and of the Chartered Company's shares at the very high premium he had mentioned had already feathered their nests pretty comfortably, and if it were really to succeed these gentlemen would further feather their uests to the tune—some of £400,000, some of £300,000, and some of £200,000. He submitted that all this money had been, and would be, obtained under false pretences. Well, the Company being thus organised commenced its proceedings. It was said there was plenty of gold in the country. Moreover, the Company said they would impose big royalties on everyone digging for gold, and claim 50 per cent, of the profit on the gold obtained. Was such a thing ever heard of? And why did they do it? Because it would give the notion that there was a vast amount of gold in the country, and the people would then be quite ready to pay these enormous royalties. At present he believed the Company owned some forts in Mashonaland, and a road which it had made there. As far as he could see, these were about its sole assets, with some guns and rifles. When the present war broke out in Mashonaland, he believed the total number of whites in the whole of the country, which was about the size of France, was 1,500, of whom he estimated that not more than 500 were actually miners and settlers. This summer found the Company in this financial position: that it had spent absolutely all the capital it had, and was dragging on its existence by temporary loans, including a loan of some £3,000 per month from the De Beers Company. It could not get more money from the public, and bankruptcy seemed inevitable. There was only one possible thing to do, and that was to seize upon Matabeleland. Whether or not then; was gold there in paying quantities, these gentlemen knew that they would be able to say there was, and that if they seized Matabeleland they would in all probability be saved from bankruptcy, for a time at least, and be able to obtain additional money either by a fresh issue of shares, or by borrowing, or by some other moans. Puffs appeared this summer in most of the newspapers. It was wonderful the influence Mr. Rhodes had with the papers, not only in Cape Town, but in this country too Puff's accordingly appeared, pointing out that Matabeland was the laud of Ophir, not Mashonaland. At the same time, they were told that Lobengula was one of the most hideous and horrible despots that ever lived. The chaplain at Fort Victoria wrote to say that it was the positive duty of the Company to enter Matabeleland and to destroy the godless nation there, who prevented these excellent gentlemen from spreading Christianity in that part of the world. When he himself saw these puffs he knew well what would follow. He knew that Matabeleland was for the moment the Naboth's vineyard of these people, and that au attack on the country would follow speedily. He had not to wait long. He did not in any way approve of the mode in which Lobengula governed Mashonaland; but still, looking at all the acts of Lobengula, he appeared to be by far the most respectable person connected with Mashonaland or Matabeleland. If the King's conduct was savage, what was the conduct of the Company itself? Everybody would remember the action of Captain Lendy, one of the officers of the Company, who for some small theft committed in some particular district, went there, fired into a kraal, and killed 20 men. His action was so barbarous that it was reprobated by the Colonial Office, and his hon. Friend the Under Secretary for the Colonies was so carried away by his just indignation that in the former Debate he stigmatised this man as a murderer.

MR. S. BUXTON

I must correct my hon. Friend. He was not present when that Debate took place. I was not aware that in speaking I had used the term "murder," and in a subsequent explanation I said that if I had done so I withdrew the word, and in substitution thereof stated that Captain Lendy had shown "a culpable disregard of human life, which was deserving of great censure."

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, quite so; his hon. Friend translated his just indignation into the usual Parliamentary language. Now, coming to the mode in which the war originated, in April of this year certain telegraph wires belonging to the Company were destroyed. The Company punished persons in the locality, and raided their cattle as a fine. Then they received a protest from Lobengnla, who said— It is all very well, but these cattle happen to belong to me, and not to the persons who destroyed the wires. The Company admitted that the cattle belonged to the King, and said they would return the cattle, and at the same time they told the King that he himself must punish the persons who destroyed the wires. In the end the position was as stated in the following letter from Mr. Colenbrander to Mr. Moffat:— Buluwayo, June, 29 1893. My dear Mr. Moffat,—It appears that some of Bére's people near Victoria stole some of Loben's cattle, and some 70 men were dispatched to re-capture them, but did not quite succeed. This party was met by Captain Lendy near Victoria, who sent me a line to that effect. The King has, therefore, decided to send a large force to punish 'Bére' or 'Bele' and others for their misdeed (and I fancy that he will go for the recent wire-cutters also). Lobengula asked me to wire and let 'Lendy' know, also Dr. Harris and Dr. Jameson (which I am doing by this post), so that there need be no unnecessary scare caused. He says he has given his people strict orders not to annoy any whites they might meet, and yesterday, whilst I was at Hope Fountain for the purpose of consulting Mr. Helm, messengers again came to our camp to have an extra letter written to Captain Lendy; but finding me away and not wishing to delay their departure, they went to Dawson, who kindly wrote for me, thus enabling them to get a good start in front of the impi, warning the Victoriaites of their intentions. The King is very anxious that the white people should know that he has no hostile intentions against them, and he further says:—'I get my cattle stolen, &c, for which I punish the people, and yet the whites will say that I am cruel to my subjects.' The impi went to get back the cattle of Lobengula and to punish those men. It was most important it should be realised that Lobengula had received practically the approval, not only of the Company, but also of Sir II. Loch, for his proposed action in the matter. Sir H. Loch, in reply to Lobengula, wrote that he Hoped he had given strict orders to his Indiums not to injure or interfere with white people or property. Lobengula replied— Have sent trustworthy man, told him to be very careful not to injure white men, and if any natives whom I send to punish seek protection from them, to go himself to white people and ask them to give them up. Therefore, Sir H. Loch and the Chartered Company knew exactly what Lobengula was going to do. Lobengula further wrote— I am constantly warning my people, but my present difficulty is that they are far away from me. When they do cut the white men's wire, the only quarter I can expect to hear it from is the white man, as my people are not likely to tell me of their misdeeds. I am aware it is a serious matter cutting and carrying away the telegraph wire, as it is the white man's mouth.' Well, the impi went, and it did punish the Mashonas. It punished them as was usual in barbarous countries, savagely and brutally. Some of the Mashonas fled into the Company's village. The Iuduna asked, just as Lobengula had notified he would, that they should be given up. He (Mr. Labouehere) could perfectly understand Englishmen hesitating to return these unfortunate creatures who had taken refuge in the Company's village. They refused. It was natural they should do so. He did not think they ought to have returned them. The Induna made no sort of threat. Dr. Jameson, however, ordered him to leave Mashonaland and to be over the frontier, which was 30 miles distant from the fort, in an hour. In about an hour and a half or two hours he sent a body to pursue the party. The Matabele made no resistance; they were going as soon as they could over the frontier, and they knew that if they stayed there they would be killed. They had already gone 70 miles when the body of the Company's servants fired upon them, killing 30 or 40 of them. The rest fled over the frontier. There was some dispute as to the facts, but he had read a letter sent by Captain Davis and the account given by Dr. Jameson, and it seemed to him that, except that Captain Davis's account was more highly coloured, there was no difference as to the facts between Dr. Jameson and Captain Davis. Cue could easily understand that the greatest cruelty was used when one knew that the man in command of the Company's force was Captain Lendy, whom his hon. Friend at first stigmatised as a murderer, and then stated the same thing in Parliamentary language. Why was not this man turned out of the Company's service? Would he have been allowed to remain in Her Majesty's service? There were no white men killed. In the statement of Dr. Jameson made later on he complained that white men's property had been injured or destroyed by this impi. Lobengula denied this, and when Dr. Jameson was pinned down to facts he could only state that the property of one Englishman, a Mr. Napier, had been injured. The moment had now come for which the Company had been working up, to lay hold of Matabeleland. An angry correspondence at once commenced between Dr. Jameson and Lobengula. Dr. Jameson demanded that Lobengula should pay him compensation for the injury done, and should not violate tin; frontier. Lobengula said— I have received your wire. You accused me wrongfully. I only sent my impi to recover some of my stolen cattle, and to punish the Amasuini, that your people complained to me about, as constantly cutting your telegraph wires; but it would seem now to me that the white people stole my cattle, for I had written to tell Dr. Jameson, so what have you got to say now? You said before that you would not punish my Amahole; but now that I send to punish them for you for harm done to your telegraph wires you resent it—my impi on its way back. What goods have my impi stolen and destroyed, and how many cattle have they captured? You only say that my impi has done this as an excuse for firing on them, I am not aware that a boundary exists between Dr. Jameson and myself. Who gave him the boundary lines? Let him come forward and show me the man that pointed out to him these boundaries. I know nothing whatever about them, and you, Mr. Moffat, you know very well that the white men have done this on purpose. This is not right; my people only came to punish the Amahole for stealing my cattle and cutting your wires. Do you think I would steal cattle from you? No, that would not be right. This seemed to be a very reasonable and sensible letter to write. Sir H. Loch did his best to calm the storm. He wrote to Lobengula, and explained in a Despatch to Lord Ripon the object of his communications— My letters have been framed with a view of affording him a bridge over which he can retreat, and, at the same time, to place clearly before him the risk he would run were he to ignore the gravity of the situation. Sir H. Loch went further, and informed the Company that it must withdraw all claim for compensation, and that Dr. Jameson must send no further communications to Lobengula. These well-meant efforts wore not successful. Probably Sir H. Loch was not aware that it was a choice with the Company between bankruptcy and seizing Mashonaland, or he would have taken more stringent measures. On July 25 Lord Ripon telegraphed to Sir H. Loch— "Times' telegram from Gape Town states that Jameson has informed committee at Victoria that everything was ready to push affairs to an issue, but that nothing could be done without sanction of High Commissioner. Sir H. Loch was told to inquire into the matter. He did so, and the reply of the secretary of the Company was, that he could throw no light on the statement attributed to Dr. Jameson, from which it might be assumed that the statement was correct. The object of the Company now was to get over the prohibition and to force the hand of Sir H. Loch. A meeting was held at Victoria, at which resolutions denouncing the action of Lobengula were passed. Dr. Jameson's next step was to advertise for volunteers. It was stated in the Cape papers, and he had not seen the statement denied, that volunteers were offered 6,000 acres of laud and certain gold claims in Matabeleland provided they succeeded in driving out and destroying Lobengula and the Matabele. Statements were put about that Lobengula intended to attack the Company. The Tati Company was continually urging on war, and saying that unless it were undertaken every white man would be destroyed. What was this Tati Company? It was another of Mr. Rhodes' Companies. Mr. Beit was one of its leading members, and it was the Chartered Company under a different name. With regard to the question whether Lobengula intended to attack the Company or not, a statement which he took from the Blue Book was most important. It was a letter which was forwarded by Mr. Moffat, our Resident with Khama, to the High Commissioner from Mr. Dawson, who was with Lobengula at Buluwayo. Mr. Dawson said— In spite of his rough way of sending messages I am firmly of opinion that Lo Ben does not want to fight, and that he will not do so unless actually forced to it in self-defence. He has already had a report that a large body of men had crossed the Limpopo northward, and is anxious to know what it means; he also complains of his people being put in gaol for no offence, but merely because they are his. The High Commissioner has certainly sent some very conciliatory messages, and holding the opinion which I do of Lo Ben's intentions, I cannot see where the probability of hostilities occurring becomes apparent, unless, of course, the third factor, i.e., the Company, is so powerful as to have its own way in case they wish to see the thing out. Then there was Mr. Moffat's important evidence. No man was better able to know what was going on in Matabeleland than Mr. Moffat, who wrote as follows:— Khama's scouts report that large body of Matabele was coming down to Manowe, and another body lower down the Tuli, also supposed to be moving towards Manowe; evidently a great scare on in Matabeleland. I am wiring officer commanding at Macloutsie Camp. There is reason to believe that this scare has originated from our side. Under these circumstances he (Mr. Labouchere) thought he might fairly say that those who best could form an opinion were deliberately of opinion that while Lobengula was prepared to de- fend his own country, he had no idea or intention of going over into Mashonaland to attack the Company's forces. When he (Mr. Labouchere) saw Mr. Moffat's statement he said to himself, "We have not got it all," and he asked his hon. Friend (Mr. Buxton) whether there were any statements from Mr. Moffat in the Colonial Office which would bear out the statement ho had just read. As his hon. Friend was not prepared to say whether there were any such statements or not, the House must take it that such statements were in the Colonial Office. If so, they ought to be made known, so that hon. Members might have the fullest information whether the war was aggressive or not. Dr. Jameson insisted that there was an impi near the frontier, and that it intended to rush down and attack the Company's forts. Sir H. Loch doubted whether the impi was there, and asked how Dr. Jameson knew about it. Dr. Jameson said he had heard of it from native reports. He was told to send out scouts and did so, but they found no impi, although they said that they found "traces" of an impi. The best proof that there was no impi there was that the Chartered Company advanced on Buluwayo 180 miles before they came across any impi. The situation at this time was complicated by the statement that the Matabele fired on a patrol of the Bechuana police force. He very much doubted whether the firing took place or not, but if it did he was not prepared to say whether it commenced with the Matabele or with the police. However, it could not have been very important, because it seemed that no one was killed on either side. The Beehuanaland police force was a somewhat remarkable one. It seemed to him to be a very undisciplined body of men, and this was proved by au incident which had occurred since hostilities began. Sir Henry Loch wrote to Lobengula asking him to send two Indunas to treat with him. Lobengula did send the Indunas, and they were accompanied by Mr. Dawson, a white man residing in Buluwayo, through whom the Government had made communications to Lobengula. These men openly entered the camp of the Beehuanaland police force. It was said they were supposed to be spies; they were seized and arrested. One of them objected to be arrested, seized a bayonet belonging to a member of the force standing near, and tried to escape. On this the two Envoys were simply executed. He asked the House whether it was conceivable for a moment that spies would have gone openly into the camp? Can anyone imagine that they were really spies? If they were spies they ought to have been surrounded and an inquiry made into their character. Mr. Dawson was there, and he could have been asked whether the men were Envoys or not. These men were murdered. Even among the most savage nations Envoys were respected. Come what might out of this matter, the action of the Bechuanaland police force had inflicted not only a disgrace on them, but, as a portion of Her Majesty's Forces, an indelible disgrace on the good name of this country. Lobengula sent an Induna with a letter to the Queen, in which he said— Why do your people kill me? I despatched an army for my cattle stolen by the Mashonas, with a messenger before them to warn the white people that the impi following had not to interfere with Europeans whatever. Then he concluded— I have called all white men living at or near Buluwayo to hear your words, showing clearly that I am not hiding anything from them when writing to Your Majesty. There were a considerable number of white men residing at Buluwayo and within the territory of Lobengula at that moment, but not one of them was ill-treated. On the contrary, Lobengula sent these men under guard out of the country in order to see that they were safe. He (Mr. Labouchere) could not quite understand from the Blue Book when a direct permission was given by Sir Henry Loch to the Company to invade Matabeleland. It seemed to him that Sir Henry Loch rather drifted into allowing offensive action to be taken. At any rate, Dr. Jameson acquired the conviction that Sir Henry Loch would permit him to invade Matabeleland. He fully admitted the difficulties of the Government and Sir Henry Loch. Both found themselves to be in a most difficult position, created by those who had gone before them in granting in this strange way the Charter to the Company. He admitted that both Lord Ripon and Sir Henry Loch did their best for a long time to maintain peace. Sir Henry Loch, however, was not only the High Commissioner and responsible for what went on in Mashonaland, Matabeleland, and Bechuanaland, but he was Governor of the Cape Colony. Mr. Rhodes was Prime Minister of Cape Colony, and Sir Henry Loch was in an exceedingly difficult position in dealing with his Prime Minister in his position as the head of the Company, he would have some difficulty in telling his Prime Minister that he did not quite believe him and that he was forcing on a war. It must be admitted that the news from the seat of war was very meagre. Somehow, whenever it was not desirable to send any information, the Matabele had destroyed the telegraph wires, whilst when there was good news to communicate the wires were at once restored. Altogether it was difficult at present to understand what was the precise position of affairs there. As he understood the position, the Company's forces did gain what was called a battle. He should rather call it a battue or a massacre. Mr. Rhodes computed that in the military operations of the Company up to date 2,000 Matabele had been killed and wounded against the loss of two white men. He wished to know what had become of the wounded? He had asked the Under Secretary this question before, but his hon. Friend said that he did not know. It was said in the newspapers that the Matabele carried off their wounded. This was absolutely impossible. The victors always occupied the field of battle, and 2,000 men could not carry off 1,000 wounded under a heavy fire and when they were being charged by the Company's cavalry. He, therefore, repeated to his hon. Friend the question, What had become of the wounded? If there was one duty of a commanding officer more sacred than another when he had gained a victory, it was to look after the wounded, and see that they had the best chance of recovering from their wounds. Had this course been followed in the present instance, or was it the case that every one of the wounded was killed by the Company's native allies? The total fighting strength of the Matabele was estimated at 20,000 men, so that one-tenth of that force had been destroyed in this so-called march of civilisation. There had also been an attack on the force of Colonel Goold- Adams, the loss being two white men and 60 Matabele killed and wounded; and he gathered now that the Company was in possession of Buluwayo, and that Lobengula had fled into the mountains with thousands of his warriors. This sort of thing ought to be stopped. He had shown what was the character of the Company, how it had been formed, how money had been gained by these adventurers in selling shares, and how the Company had been practically bankrupt. Hon. Members could not evade responsibility by saying that these things were done by a Company. It held a Royal Charier; it was based on a concession granted on the direct assurance of the Queen that Lobengula should be in no kind of way damnified in his jurisdiction and sovereignty by the acts of the men who came in under the concession of the Chartered Company. He saw that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had written a very sound letter to the Colonial Office telling them that they ought to avoid incurring any larger expenditure than the circumstances of the case required. Certainly, the less that was spent of the taxpayers' money in these miserable quarrels the better it would be. He would point out, however, that unless these proceedings wore stopped, it was possible that this country might drift into a position in which the taxpayers would have to spend a large amount of money. It might be that Lobengula's power was crushed, that this miserable man and his followers had been killed; it might be that this war would be prolonged, that the Company would not be able to deal with it alone; that they would not, even if they could, have a sufficiency of money to carry on this war. The rainy season was near at hand, and it would work for Lobengula; and, therefore, there was a possibility that this country might have to spend a great deal more money. Again, there was the hard fact that by joining in this war by sending Colonel Goold-Adams we were spending the taxpayers' money, the object being to enable the Company to got something in order to swindle and cheat the British investor. What he wanted was that something should be done to put a stop to these filibustering and massacring expeditions. What he thought ought to he done was this: to appoint someone like Mr. Moffat, trusted by the Government and respected by Lobengula, to explain to Lobengula that the sole object of the war was to protect the Company's mines in Mashonaland, and to obtain from Lobengula an assurance that he had no intention of any sort or kind of interfering with the mines. Mr. Rhodes ought to be shown that there was no fear of an attack being made on his mines, and that as he had waged this war simply for defensive purposes, he had attained his object, and ought to go back to Mashonaland. These were the two points he urged on the Government. He acknowledged in the fullest way the difficulties of the Government. He admitted that they struggled and did all they could to prevent this war. They had been overborne by Mr. Rhodes and his pernicious Company. Also, the place was far away. The Prime Minister had said in a letter which he had written to an hon. Friend that he trusted everything would be conducted with justice, mercy, and humanity. He asked the Prime Minister, did he think that at the present moment everything was being conducted with justice, mercy, and humanity? These were noble sentiments, worthy of the right hon. Gentleman. He had no doubt that the right hon. Gentleman sincerely desired that it should be so. The power was in his hands as Prime Minister, and it was his duty to step forward and secure that henceforward everything should be conducted with justice, mercy, and humanity.

* MR. J. E.ELLIS (Nottingham, Rushcliffe)

said that, in seconding the proposal of the hon. Member for Northampton, he wished to thank his hon. Friend for bringing this subject forward. He was sure that if there had been any Member doubtful of the desirability of bringing this matter forward, that doubt would disappear after the speech of his hon. Friend. His hon. Friend was engaged in what was to him a very congenial task, in the performance of which so many thousands in this country had occasion to thank him—namely, the unearthing of some rather disreputable transactions. He did not propose to follow the hon. Member for Northamp- ton on the same lines. He thought sufficient evidence had been laid before the House by his hon. Friend to warrant an inquiry to the Government, whether the time had not come for an investigation into the manner in which the Chartered Company had exercised its Charter, for which there were many precedents in our past history? He had gone very carefully through the various Parliamentary Papers dealing with this question, and he was bound to say that they had left a very painful impression on his mind. Three salient feat tires ran through the three Blue Books. In the first place, they had the period under the late Government, for which Lord Knutsford was responsible. Nothing could be clearer than the care with which Lord Knutsford endeavoured to safeguard the rights of the King of Matabeleland, He pointed out that Lobengula was the King of the country, and that persons living in the country were under his jurisdiction, and responsible to him for their actions. Lord Knutsford also pointed out the limits of the Charter of the Company; told the Company that they should not look to the Imperial Government for protection; and did everything to prevent this country taking any responsibility in the matter. The next feature of the Parliamentary Papers was the description of how the trouble arose. Hero, again, the language of Lord Knutsford was clear and emphatic. He rebuked Captain Lendy for his conduct in the most emphatic terms. In his (Mr. Ellis's) judgment, this Captain Lendy ought to have been replaced by someone of greater judgment and humanity. As to the disposition of Lobengula—a very important matter—much light and information was given by Mr. Colenbrander, who was a, most credible witness. In a Despatch published in the second Blue Book, Mr. Colenbrander said— I hope nothing very serious has taken place. The, King's great object was to punish the recent wire-cutting. That showed that Lobengula was desirous that the telegraph wires should be preserved in good order. Later than that there was evidence of the most extraordinary indisposition on the part of those who were urging on this conflict with Lobengula to send any messengers to discuss matters with the King. For instance, Lord Ripon urged Sir Henry Loch to send a message to Lobengula in answer to one from the King, and Sir Henry Loch replied— I do not think it is of use to send a message in reply; whereupon Lord Ripon wrote— It is inadvisable to leave Lobengula's message unanswered. That showed that no real attempt had been made to discover what was in Lobengula's mind. He believed the great part of the mischief had arisen from the King having been left in the dark as to the intentions of those who were now attacking him, and, on the other hand, from their knowing nothing of the King's state of mind. Then there was another very significant passage in the Blue Book. Colonel Goold-Adams, a gentleman in the Imperial Service, telegraphing to the High Commissioner at Cape Town at at the end of September, said— I am convinced that he (Dr. Jameson) will not be able to keep the Salisbury and Victoria people much longer inactive; they will either do something to bring on a row, or will leave the country. This was, in his (Mr. Ellis's) opinion, a most significant message. Then we had the killing of the two Envoys of Lobengula within the British cam]). This demanded the strictest investigation at the hands of the Government. So far as their knowledge went at present he was bound to say that these men lost their lives in what could only be described by the word "murder." He said that, notwithstanding the explanation of his hon. Friend. All through there seemed to have been a want of impartial investigation of the circumstances on the spot, and, as far as the published papers went, some want of light and accurate knowledge at home. His hon. Friend the Under Secretary (Mr. S. Buxton) would get up and say, he had no doubt, that it was inconvenient at the present time to make any declaration as to policy. He (Mr. Ellis) did not want to he unduly pressing. He believed his hon. Friend's sympathies were with those which animated a Memorial to the Government from the Society of Friends, in favour of justice, humanity, and mercy, and that those qualities should animate the action of the Government in this matter. No one bearing his (Mr. Buxton's) name could stand at that Table and say anything else. What he might fairly ask the Government to do was not to drift. They should have some clear and specific policy in their minds. He had the honour of sending a Memorial from the Society of Friends to the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister dealing with this subject of the slaughter that had taken place in Matabeleland. The Memorial said— We strongly feel that such methods of preventing commercial enterprise are entirely incompatible with the Christian religion, and we regard it as a disgrace to our nation's profession of Christianity that in this, as in many preceding instances, the settlement of our countrymen as colonists in uncivilised lands has been accompanied by wars of extermination. He (Mr. Ellis) protested against this mixing up of commerce and religion. They had a remarkable letter of the Rev. A. D. Sylvester, English Chaplain at Victoria, published in The Times. It was dated 12th September, and it said— The officials and Captain Lendy are as indefatigable as ever in their exertions for the good of the country and its inhabitants. Well, they knew what Captain Lendy did. Again, the Chaplain said— Everything is being done here on just principles, and we have the best of order; but we are determined to make a way for the spread of the glorious Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. He must apologise to the House for reading this. As one who always desired to support missionary work, he felt that it was perfectly shocking and sickening that the spread of the Gospel should be mixed up with the name of Captain Lendy, and he was bound to say that if they were to adopt that policy they ought to do it themselves and be responsible for it, instead of doing it by proxy through Chartered Companies. The Memorial of the Society of Friends told them that they should ensure the treatment of the Matabele Not in a spirit of hostility and greed, but of justice, humanity, and mercy. He remembered a most eloquent passage in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister introducing the Irish Land Act of 1881 defining the word "justice," and he respectfully referred the right hon. Gentleman to the definition which he then gave. Again, as to humanity. It had been said during the past few weeks in connection with the deplorable industrial struggle that was going on in England that the rights of humanity should take precedence of the rights of property, and he, for one, cordially assented to that. He asked the House why that should not be so in South Africa? He remembered as if it were only yesterday the thrill that ran through him on reading the burning words of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister in 1878 when, on behalf of one of the nations of Europe, he invoked all those sentiments of justice, humanity, and mercy; and he asked the Government most earnestly not to leave anything undone in support of those great principles, and see that they were unwaveringly acted upon in Matabeleland.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—(Mr. Labouchere.)

MR. MAGUIRE (Clare, W.)

said, as one who had been connected with the Chartered Company, he desired the House, to remember what the position of affairs was in 1888 and 1889. It would be in the recollection of the House that during those years the scramble for Africa was most vigorously going on. The territories between the Limpopo and the Zambesi were threatened on all sides, and it became necessary that Great Britain should take some active step to secure the country, or see the greater part of it pass away from its control for ever. To those who thought the British Empire large enough at present his arguments would have no force, but he would ask those who thought the mission of this country was to develop the waste and uninhabited portions of the globe to consider what were the alternatives before the Government in the years 1888–9, when there was a scramble amongst the nations for the possession of Africa. There were three alternatives—leaving the country, annexation, or granting a Royal Charter. Sir Hercules Robinson wrote to Lord Knutsford— The alternative before us as regards Matabeleland is to recognise a monopoly which may possibly develop into a Royal Charter, or to follow the Swaziland course of allowing a number of competing concession-seekers of different nationalities to establish themselves in the country. Lobengula would be unable to govern or control such incomers except by massacre. They would be unable to govern them selves; a British Protectorate would he ineffectual, as we should have no jurisdiction except by annexation, and Her Majesty's Government, as in Swaziland, would have before them the choice of letting the country fall into the hands of the South African Republic, or of annexing it to the Empire. The latter course would assuredly entail on British taxpayers, for some time at all events, an expenditure of not less than a quarter of a million sterling. The Government of the day were not prepared for the expenditure that was necessary, and the Company, believing this to he a valuable Company, adopted the third alternative, and the Royal Charter was granted. Almost from the commencement the Chartered Company had been bitterly assailed, both for its finance and for policy. It appeared to him that the financial relations of the Company to its shareholders was not a proper nor even a possible subject for exhaustive or satisfactory discussion in that House. The proper place for such discussion was tit the shareholders' meeting; there would be a general meeting very soon, and the matter could then be discussed. But the financial relations of the Company bore a different aspect in their connection with Her Majesty's Government, and such a, charge as that brought forward by the hon. Member for Northampton—namely, that the Charter was obtained by misrepresentation—was one which had to be met.

MR. LABOUCHERE

It is my opinion.

MR. MAGUIRE

said, very well; it was the hon. Member's opinion. It was said that the promoters misrepresented themselves to the Government as being the owners of the Rudd and other concessions. But in the letter of Lord Gilford applying for the Charter he stated that the object of the proposed Company was to extend the railway and telegraphic systems, to encourage migration and colonisation, to promote trade and commerce, and to develop and work the mineral and other concessions under the management of one great and powerful organisation. Well, in reply to the application for the Charter, the Colonial Office wrote to Lord Gifford on May 16, 1889— At present Lord Knutsford cannot undertake to say whether Her Majesty's Government will be able to entertain the scheme, since much would depend on the personnel of the directorate and on the provisions made for securing the rights of Europeans and natives. The Government expressly guarded itself from inquiring into the financial position of the Company, or as to the terms upon which the Company had acquired the right to work these concessions. If, however, they had made any inquiries into those matters, they could have satisfied themselves in five minutes. He submitted, therefore, that in those matters there had been no misrepresentation, because the subject was not one on which the Government required any explanation. There was no concealment as to the fact that these concessions were to be worked by the Chartered Company at 50 per cent., as was shown by the speech of the Chairman of the Goldfields of South Africa, publicly made to the shareholders at their meeting on November 11, 1889. As explained in the Report, after much labour and anxiety the numerous conflicting interests of those having claims in Matabeleland had been reconciled and united in one Consolidated Company. This was a first step towards obtaining a Royal Charter. In that Consolidated Company, which represented and held the Matabele Concession, the Goldfields of South Africa, Limited, held the largest stake—namely, 17–16ths of the capital, or, its the Report states, 8½ units out of 30. This Consolidated Company granted to the Chartered Company the right to work the concession, receiving one-half share in the profits derived therefrom, and all holders of shares in the Consolidated Company in which, as he had stated, his (Mr. Maguire's) Company was the largest shareholder, had the right to subscribe pro ratâ for a certain portion of the working capital of the Chartered Company, which had been fixed at £1,000,000. It was provided in the Agreement that— All property and rights in Africa, mineral or otherwise, acquired or to be acquired by the Concessions Company or the Chartered Company, shall be subject to this Agreement. And again— All net receipts derived by the Chartered Company from the property and rights subject to this Agreement shall belong in equal shares to the Chartered Company and the Concessions Company.

MR. LABOUCHERE

Was communicated to Lord Knutsford?

MR. MAGUIRE

said, it was not; Lord Knutsford did not ask for informa- tion; but the fact that the matter was made public showed that there was no concealment. he understood the statement had been made that if this had been known Lord Knutsford might not have been induced to grant the Charter; but he did not know upon what information that was founded. He now passed to the policy of the Chartered Company. Having obtained the right to work these largo concessions, and having obtained from the Government the Royal Charter, the object of the Company was to peacefully and gradually develop the territories thus placed under their charge. He thought the course pursued by the Company would bear out that statement. At the commencement of 1890 it was resolved to send in a large body of settlers to occupy Mashonaland, which had become almost depopulated by the constant raiding of the Matabele. The Company desired to work with Lobengula, and they sent more than one Mission to him to explain to him the route the pioneers intended to take, that they were not going near to his kraals, and, in fact, to obtain permission for the march. So anxious were they to assist him that they sent a larger force than was necessary in order that his young men should not be tempted to attack small and dispersed bands. The idea of the Company was to occupy the country peacefully, to utilise and protect native labour and the market for native produce—in fact, gradually to civilise the Matabele—and to induce them to stop their raiding and to become well-ordered members of society like the natives of other parts of South Africa. He was bound to say that that effort had not been successful, after a long and serious trial. The fact was that when the Company's pioneers went into Mashonaland there was a slight cessation of the raiding of the Matabele, but when the Matabele saw that the white people were not disposed to molest them, their raiding became more frequent than ever, and, as Dr. Jameson wrote— Three years of negotiations has only induced them to encroach the more. It was a necessary element in the working of the concessions that the native labourers should be free from the raiding of the Matabele, and it was certain that as the sphere of operations would probably increase, the area of immunity of the Mashonas would also increase. That was their hope at the time of the Victoria incident. He would now give his own words. The High Commissioner wrote— Mr. Colenbrander and the missionaries should be made aware as speedily as possible with the true state of affairs. Lobengula's impi camped on the ground close to Victoria; they looted and burnt a house and farm belonging to an Englishman close by; they assegaied the natives in the streets, including black servants of the whites, in front of their doors. Dr. Jameson tried to persuade the indunas to withdraw their men, which they refused. After giving them an hour's law, 38 men advanced under Lendy. They were first fired upon; they returned fire, and charged and pursued the impi for nine miles, killing two head men and but 30 others. The impi retired to the other side Shanghi, waiting for orders from Lobengula. They are now reported to be 3,000 strong. That was not a statement of any servant of the Company, but of the High Commissioner.

MR. LABOUCHERE

was understood to ask from what source the information came to the High Commissioner?

MR. MAGUIRE

said, he really could not tell. He would not go into the incidents between July and October, leaving to the House to see from what took place at Victoria what Lobengula's position was. Sir Henry Loch, in a telegram to the Marquess of Ripon, received 25th August, said— Lobengula, replying to my message of the 20th July, says, 'I shall return no cattle or compensate anybody for either cattle captured by my impi, or damage done to property until such time that Rhodes first returns to me all the captives, their wives and children, cattle, goats, and sheep which were given protection to by the Victoria people, and had I known at the time when I despatched my impi in the direction of Victoria what I know now, I would have ordered them to capture and loot all they could lay their hands on belonging to the whites to compensate myself for the people and their property which were withheld from me.' Sir Henry Loch added— It is, of course, impossible to comply with this request. That placed, in a very few words, the point which was raised by the Victoria incident. That point was whether the Matabeles were entitled to raid away the white people's settlement, whom they had allowed to go into the country, kill their servants and destroy their property. The Chartered Company, and the people who had gone in under the Chartered Company, stated that this could not be. Lobengula, on the other hand, stated in the fullest manner his right to do so. It appeared to him that so long as Lobengula stuck to this position of his, war was, humanly speaking, inevitable, because it was obvious the white population could not allow their homes and industries to be interfered with, and while Lobengula made this claim for himself, and his young men were prepared to carry it, out, it was really impossible to see how hostilities could be avoided. But the officials of the Chartered Company and the High Commissioner evidently felt the danger of hostilities breaking out, and made preparations to meet such a state of affairs. Lobengula also saw there was great danger of hostilities occurring, and he at once recalled his impis from the other side of the Zambesi, and sent scouts out towards the South. He would not trouble the House by going into the incidents between July and October, which were set out in such detail in the Line Books. Suffice it to say that all mining operations in the country were suspended, that the white inhabitants had, for the most part, to live in forts, and that they were on the look out for what was going to happen. Lobengula, on the other hand, called out his indunas and sent out his force of observation. The scouts that were sent out by the Commissioner met the impis in the neighbourhood and the impis fired upon them. In this connection he would only say that upon the 2nd of October the forces of the Company were fired upon; on the 5th of October Her Majesty's forces were tired upon, and on the 5th of October Sir Henry Loch gave permission to Dr. Jameson to take the steps he considered necessary for the peace and order of his district. In spite of what had been said, he might say that no one regretted these hostilities and the necessity for them more than the Chartered Company. The Company had spent a great deal of money. They had this year, for the first time, opened up a short East Coast route into the country; under its auspices for the first time considerable quantities of mining machinery were being introduced into the country, and it really did not seem reasonable or common sense to say they should take this opportunity of forcing on a war which must necessarily throw back the peaceful development of the country for a considerable time and which at the outset must have presented a most uncertain prospect. He thought it might be said that the war was now practically over. He did not think, unless one was misinformed, that there would be much more serious fighting, and the question that really practically lay before the Government to consider was what was to be done in the future. He thought it was certainly altogether premature to attempt to lay down details of the settlement which would be necessary in Matabeleland, but there were some considerations which must be met before arriving at a settlement, upon which he should like to say a few words. It had been put forward in many quarters that the policy of the Chartered Company was a policy of extermination towards the natives. Those who had followed the course of events in Mashonaland would know how far this was from being the case. They would know how the Mashonas had increased in numbers, how they had been enabled to come from their rocky fastnesses—where they lived more like kites than human beings—into the fertile land, and how they were afforded, as far as the Company were enabled to afford them, personal protection and employment and opportunities of earning a comfortable subsistence. The Company went into Matabeleland with every possible intention and desire to live at peace with the Matabele. To achieve that result the Company was put to enormous expense in its initial proceedings, and was obliged to exercise the greatest caution—which it did exercise—in its subsequent operations; and now that the war was over, as he hoped it was, it was most certain there was no idea of any extermination of the Matabele, and not the slightest wish to harry the Zambesi out of the country, but it was hoped that the Matabele in Matabeleland would become as valuable an element of society there as the Zulus were in Zululand. The hon. Member had spoken about the great slaughter of the Matabele compared, he was thankful to say, to the small loss of the English. But he thought if the hon. Member had followed the course of these native wars, he would find that it was generally the case that either the loss was very largely upon the native side, or else that the European force was altogether slaughtered. In fact, their native battles must be like Isandula, where the English force was cut down, or like Ulandi, where for ten Englishmen killed several thousand natives were slaughtered. If the natives once got in upon them, there would be very few of the English left. All he could say was there was not the slightest desire to exterminate, or to drive the Matabele out of the country, but what was the wish of the Company—and it was necessary both in the interest of the white population, and of the other native races, who in numbers largely exceeded the Matahele—was that the present military organization of the Matabele should he broken up, that they should leave the military kraals altogether, and live the lives of ordinary natives. In fact, that they should marry and settle down. In the military kraals they were not allowed to marry or to work, and they really had nothing to do but go on these raids, and that was a system which the Company wished to put an end to. There was another point upon which also there seemed to be much misapprehension. It appeared to be considered that there was a certain amount of a kind of rivalry between the Imperial Government and the Chartered Company; but he thought anyone who had gone into the case would see nothing was farther from being the case. Not only were the rights and powers of the Crown fully preserved by the Charter, but anyone who read the Correspondence—and he only wished himself that more Correspondence had been published of the incidents between 1890 and 1892, during the years which the Company occupied the country—would see that there were constant communications between the Company and the High Commissioner, and that there was scarcely an action of the Company's which was not reported to the High Commissioner, and that the High Commissioner did not express his views upon. It was true he did not give instructions—he carefully guarded himself from that—but he gave suggestions, and one could not but see that those suggestions were most constantly and most deferentially attended to. That being so, he would ask the House to consider what the present position of the Company was with respect to Matabele. It would be seen in the first Article of the Charter that the sphere of operations of the Charter expressly included Matabeleland. It would he farther seen by Clause 10 of the Charter that the maintenance of law and order over the territories in its sphere of operation was committed to the Chartered Company, and for the purpose of maintaining this law and order they were authorised to raise a force of police, and under the first Ordinance of the Charter they were given this power to raise this force of police not limited to Mashonaland, but, generally over the whole sphere of their operations. Therefore, it appeared that the distinction which was now attempted to be drawn between Mashonaland and Matabeleland was not to be found in the Charter, or in the concessions, or in the Ordinance for a police force; but it was to be found in the agreement with Lobengula as to which part of his territory should be first thrown open to mining operations. And he would further wish to point out that Her Majesty's Government had expressly guarded themselves from assuming any responsibility with respect to the maintenance of peace and order in Matabeleland. He would refer the House to Lord Knutsford's Despatch to Sir Henry Loch of February 3, 1893, when he said— You would do well to remind Mr. Rhodes that the Company must not look to the Imperial Government for the protection of its territories against aggression. And more specifically still after this occurrence at Victoria, Sir Henry Loch, telegraphing to the Marquess of Ripon on the 26th of July, said— The British South Africa Company are fully aware that they are solely responsible for providing both men and money for any war and for the maintenance of peace and order in Mashonaland and Matabeleland. The Marquess of Ripon, telegraphing the next day to Sir Henry Loch, said— Your telegram re Matabeleland received with much satisfaction. He thought that very clearly showed that down to the 25th of July—indeed, down to the present day, so far as he knew—there was no distinction made by Her Majesty's Government between the responsibility of the Chartered Company over Matabeleland or over Mashonaland, and that, therefore, in the ordinary course as the Chartered Company had most strictly in every detail conformed to the instructions of the High Commissioner, so now they were, in the terms of their Charter, entitled to the same position in Matabeleland as they had previously been placed in by Her Majesty's Government in Mashonaland. That was what he conceived to be the ordinary and accurate interpretation of the Charter and the action of the Government to the Company. But there were a few other elements which had, he thought, to be considered before arriving at a settlement in this matter, and one of these was the state of opinion in South Africa. Whatever might be, or whatever was said by certain people in this country about Mr. Rhodes, there could at least be no dispute about this: that in the country in which he had passed his manhood he had secured the unbounded confidence and esteem of the great mass of his fellow-countrymen; that he was not only the most powerful Minister the Cape Colony had seen, but he thought they could say the most powerful Colonial Minister of this or any other day. He meant powerful in the sense of the weakness of the opposition to him in his own country. The opinion of Cape Colony unanimously demanded that this question of the future of Matabeleland should be settled—granted that all the proper requirements of the Imperial Government had been complied with—upon those lines of local development in which they believed: and they considered that Mr. Rhodes, with the assistance of Mr. Jameson, was the person best qualified to lay down the lines which would lead to a speedy, a profitable, and a peaceful development of the country. It was expressly stated in the Charter that no settlement could be arrived at without the sanction of Her Majesty's Government; but what was considered was that the details and lines of that settlement should be laid down in accordance with local opinion, and to meet what were believed to be local requirements. But this was a matter which one would be loth to treat from a South African point of view alone. There were really very grave Imperial considerations involved, and it appeared to him that the most important of these considerations was this: Suppose that they did not allow the Chartered Company to proceed with this work of development, the question arose, what were they to do? and, so far as he could gather, there was no more feeling on the part of this country now than there was four years ago to go into what was estimated by Sir Hercules Robinson, a very competent and not a very extravagant judge, as an expenditure of £250,000 a year; and again, the further question arose, why should the English people do anything of the kind? He would ask them to consider what had occurred in that country through the agency of the Chartered Company in the last four years. Considerably over £1,000,000 had been spent. A white colony had been settled in Mashonaland, and an ordered Government set up there. Another country had been added to those to which the white colonist could proceed. A railway had been built, not in the Chartered Company's territory at all, but through the Crown Colony of Bechuanaland. A telegraph line had been erected through the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the capital of Mashonaland, and the posts were already in the country and in the process of being cut to pass this telegraph on to the capital of the British administration north of the Zambesi. A new route had been opened into the interior of Africa, from the East Coast through the Portuguese sphere, and £10,000 a year had been paid over to the British Imperial Government to assist in the development of the territory north of the Zambesi. This had been done in four years without costing the English taxpayer one single farthing, and he thought, whatever might be said upon other grounds, that that was a work not only deserving of some recognition, but that it also made one think whether, if they reverted to the old principle of Downing Street administration, they would got the same results in anything like the same time. He would ask the House to consider the very analogous case of Bechuanaland. He knew that Bechuanaland was not supposed to be as desirable a territory as Mashonaland, but it was certainly very much more accessible. British Bechuanaland was acquired by the Imperial Government at an initial outlay of £1,000,000, which was the cost of the Warren Expedition. Since then it had cost the Imperial Exchequer, roughly speaking, between £60,000 and £120,000 a year. He knew that the greater part of that expenditure within the last few years had been made in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, but he thought it was a fact that British Bechuanaland, which was now self-supporting, never became self-supporting until a railway was built through that country under the auspices of the Chartered Company. So that really not only was the English Government benefited by the work that was being done for it in Mashonaland, which otherwise would not be done at all, or which the English Government would have to pay for, but indirectly it benefited by the work of development of the whole country which the Chartered Company had set going. He thought the real reason of the sterility of Downing Street Administration, compared with the fertility of local development, was that in the latter case they had the people really at the head of it in its progress and prosperity. He did not in the least wish to make the slightest reflection on the officials of Bechuanaland. He knew them all, and he believed there was no better set of officials in any colony under the Crown. But it was the system that was at fault, and they were pitted against a system in competition with which they stood no chance whatever. He thought when a certain amount of the heat and feeling which was excited—and very properly excited—in this country, whenever there was a loss of native lives, had died away it would be recognised that the Chartered Company entered upon this enterprise of theirs with every intention of a peaceful development, that they had been driven by the force of circumstances into a war which was more perilous and more dangerous for them than for anybody else, and at the termination of these hostilities there would be every desire not to press heavily upon these native races that had been in temporary hostility, but that the Company would try and incorporate them in the work of development which they had inaugurated in those parts of South Africa, and which he believed they would bring to a successful issue.

* MR. S. BUXTON

I do not think there is any inclination on the part of the House, and certainly not on the part of the Government, to complain that this question should have been discussed. The only complaint I have to make is that it is somewhat premature to discuss it at the present moment, because it is impossible, as the House understands, for the Government to make any very distinct declaration of policy with regard to the future of Matabeleland. The Debate, so far as it has gone, has practically taken two courses. My hon. Friend who moved the Adjournment of the House first went into the question of the Chartered Company, which I will come to in a few minutes. He then went into the question of policy with regard to the present unfortunate hostilities, and though I do not say he attacked the Government, because he was good enough to give them the benefit of his support, at the same time he criticised some of their actions, and he certainly criticised very strongly the action of the Chartered Company. I think I may be allowed to say that in regard to the very unfortunate hostilities which have taken place in Matabeleland the opinion, and policy, and desire of Her Majesty's Government have been clear throughout. In the first place, they have always endeavoured to preserve peace if it were possible to preserve peace; and, in the second place, they have been determined that if hostilities were to take place these hostilities should have justification, and that if they took place they should take place with every moral certainty of success. From the beginning, as the House is aware, they said to the Company very distinctly, following the policy of their predecessors, and endorsing that policy, that the Company, and the Company alone, were responsible for peace and order in Mashonaland, and that the responsibility for the defence of that country must fall upon the Company and not upon the Imperial Government, though, of course, as regards their own position in British Bechuanaland, they had to take precautions for the defence of British territories, so that in case of attack they would be able to defend themselves. Nor could they be indifferent to the success of the troops under the command of the Company. We regret, and deeply regret, that we were not successful in maintaining peace, and that the Company have not succeeded in avoiding war. But I would point out that the result of the prohibition which the Government placed on the Company under the Charter was to prevent the country from being rushed into war at a moment when there was no justification for it, and when the war would not have been successful, and would have involved this country far more than or has been involved. I think that has been the justification for the action of the Government in making themselves partially responsible in the matter. The gist of the hon. Member's accusation against the Company is that, being a bankrupt concern, it has "got up" this Matabele war in order to improve its financial position. I am bound to say that, looking at the position of the Chartered Company and of the settlers in Mashonaland, the logic of events showed that the absorption of Matabeleland into Mashonaland would, sooner or later, be brought about either by peaceful or by hostile means. I think that cannot be denied; and, as far as the Company are concerned, I am convinced they would rather have had it come later and in a peaceful manner. The Company initially had no desire to enter into the present hostilities, and certainly would rather have had them postponed for years to come. I am quite certain that, as regards this autumn, hostilities were unexpected and very unwelcome. I cannot think my hon. Friend, with his knowledge of Financial Companies, is serious in saving that the best way of running up the price of your shares was to go to war, and that the best way of increasing your credit was to borrow money to carry on hostilities.

MR. LABOUCHERE

If a Company has absolutely no money, has spent all its capital, and can only borrow by seizing on the property of its neighbours, it may be wise to do so.

* MR. S. BUXTON

Such statements are mere assumptions. If the hon. Member really believes that the Company has gone to war to increase its credit, I totally disagree with him. Well, now, in considering this matter, we have logo back to the original cause of the hostilities—the raid round Fort Victoria. I say very strongly that at that time, at all events, the intentions of Lobengula towards the whites were friendly, but the impi he sent to recover some stolen cattle, and, as he had said, to punish the Mashonas for cutting the telegraph wires, although instructed—Lobengula says they were instructed, and we have no reason to disbelieve his words—not to interfere with the whites, nevertheless committed outrages among the Mashonas in the territory administered by the Company, the result being that that impi was driven away, and justifiably driven away, by the armed forces of the Company. I do not desire at the present time to pass any judgment upon the mode in which that was done. My hon. Friend jumps to conclusions very quickly. We have contradictory Reports, and we do not wish to cast blame on either side, as we prefer suspending judgment. Having received contradictory Despatches from Captain Lendy and Dr. Jameson, we have directed inquiries to be made, and when the results of those inquiries are reported to them we will be able to form an opinion as to the facts at issue. Lobengula, as I said, was at first perfectly friendly. After the Fort Victoria raid he assumed a threatening tone and hostile language in regard to the Company and the whites generally. Sir Henry Loch undoubtedly did all he could to pacify Lobengula and to preserve the peace, but he had to tell Lobengula that if the peace were to be preserved he must give up raids into the territory under the jurisdiction of the Company——

MR. LABOUCHERE

In Mashonaland?

* MR. S. BUXTON

Yes, the part occupied by the Company; and must renounce his claim—which even the hon. Member for Northampton thinks to be outrageous—to a number of the Mashonas—men, women, and children—whom he demanded in order to put to death. It has been said that Sir Henry Loch did not take sufficient trouble to ascertain what was in Lobengula's mind. But the fact is that Sir Henry Loch, from beginning to end, endeavoured to obtain information from both sides, and to have an impartial investigation into the position of affairs. Sir Henry Loch not only wrote frequently, but he received many letters from Lobengula, but Lobengula sent an Induna to the Cape to consult with him. The result of that consultation and Lobengula's replies was, that it was made clear that Lobengula refused to give up his raids or to draw any line between what might be called civilisation and non-civilisation. He refused to give up his claim to the Mashonas, and he also refused any longer to receive his £1,200 a year, which had previously been paid to him in monthly instalments. Meanwhile, his young warriors were threaten- ing in large numbers the borders of the adjacent territory; and whatever Lobengula's own views might have been—and I believe he had no desire to come into conflict with the white men—it was clear that his warriors, his young men, his jingoes, had got somewhat out of hand. It was all very well to say that there was no direct evidence that Lobengula's impis were threatening the Company. The evidence as far as it went was all in the opposite direction. The autumn rains were coming on, and the trading community were, in consequence of the threatening aspect of affairs, practically restricted to one or two fortified places in the country. The position became intolerable. And, in these circumstances, as Lobengula would not withdraw his impis and forbid further raiding, I do not think the Company were much to blame in desiring to bring the matter to an issue before the time when it would be impossible to take effective action. I do not wish to go into details, or to discuss the Blue Book, in order to decide whether hostilities could have been prevented at one particular moment or another. We are content, with regard to this question, to rest ourselves on this basis. We had on the spot Sir Henry Loch, in whom we had the fullest confidence—a man whom everybody admits had done his very best to maintain peace, he at last reluctantly came to the conclusion that hostilities could not be avoided. The position of the Government was that it had prohibited the Company from making any forward movement. Sir H. Loch advised that hostilities should not be prevented; that by continuing to prevent the Company from making a forward advance the Government would take upon itself the responsibility of defending Mashonaland. The Government, therefore, did not feel justified in prohibiting any longer the advance which the Company thought necessary for their safety. It was only when peace was out of the question that Sir H. Loch at last made up his mind very reluctantly that war must take place, and he was resolved to do all he could to make it a successful war, and carry it to a proper conclusion. I believe that every Member of this House who has read the Blue Book would say, on seeing what Sir Henry Loch has done, that he is a man who has the honour of England greatly at heart, and who was anxious to preserve peace, and had done his best to put an end to difficulties which, unfortunately, were too great for his powers. As far as I am concerned, I look upon war as a great evil, but, unfortunately, sometimes a necessary evil, and, in my opinion, hostilities wore never entered into with a less light heart than on this occasion. They were entered into reluctantly and with a full sense of responsibility. They were not, I believe, of the seeking of the Company, and certainly not of Her Majesty's Government. The war came about, to a large extent, from the difficulty of dealing with an uncivilised people. But turning from that, war might be justifiable, but it might be carried on in an unjustifiable way. There are one or two things which I would like to say upon that point. In this war there was, first, the most unfortunate incident of the killing of the Indunas—it is not clear that they wore sent in reply to Sir Henry Loch's letter; but they are said to have been sent down by Lobengula to consult with Sir Henry Loch. On that point I agree with every word that has fallen from my hon. Friend behind mo (Mr. J. E. Ellis). I agree that even though the killing of those Indunas was, as I feel sure, purely accidental, it is a blot upon the escutcheon of England. A strict inquiry is to be held into the matter. That is the only way in which the honour of England can be preserved, and I think my hon. Friend (Mr. Labouchere) might suspend judgment until the result of the inquiry is known. My hon. Friend condemns the war because, he said, it is so unequal. But was it so unequal after all? The handful of men advancing into such a country as this undertook a tremendous risk.

MR. LABOUCHERE

Maxim guns!

* MR. S.BUXTON

Yes; but Maxims do not always make victory certain. But what does my hon. Friend mean when he said that there was a massacre of the natives? When there is war there must be victory on one side or the other. And has my hon. Friend got one tittle of evidence to show that there was one man killed in these battles beyond what was necessary to ensure the victory of the troops? While we all regret that men should have been killed, the term "massacre," is not the right one to use, because we ought to recollect if there was a "massacre" on one side there might have been a greater massacre on the other. I am thankful that the victory has been so complete, because any defeat or repulse would have led to the "massacre" of a greater number of natives in the end. An Isandhlwana always leads to an Ulundi. Well, Sir, there is the question of the wounded. I regret that the information at the disposal of the Government at the present moment is very meagre. The Imperial column and the Company's column are a very long way from any means of communication, and all that the Government have heard is fragmentary and very short. I do not know, however, why my hon. Friend should have assumed that Englishmen, however hard put to it, would slaughter the wounded themselves or allow others to do so. Even if that were done under very extreme difficulties it would be a reflection on English arms. I would ask my hon. Friend for occasional friendly judgment in these matters, and not always to assume with regard to his countrymen that the worst side of human character is the true one. I ask him to suspend his judgment on that as on other matters. No, Sir, we must draw a broad distinction between war and outrage. The other day we were discussing charges of outrage on natives, and I did not hesitate to denounce them. But there is no reason to believe that outrage as distinct from war operations took place here. We hope that the accounts we have had of the numbers killed and wounded have been considerably exaggerated. The last accounts, I am thankful to say, go to show I that hostilities are practically at an end, and that probably there will be no occasion for further fighting at all. My hon. Friend (Mr. J. E. Ellis) asks—"Will you at once stop the fighting? Will you send Mr. Moffat to negotiate with Lobengula?"

* MR. J. F. ELLIS

I do not make any such specific request.

* MR. S. BUXTON

The Member for Northampton did. He asked us to stop the fighting and negotiate with Lobengula. Well, as Her Majesty's Government have taken every reasonable step they could to prevent the war, so they will take every opportunity that may occur to bring it to a speedy con- clusion. I emphatically declare—and I believe I am speaking the sentiments of the Company themselves, though I have not had any communication with them on the subject—when I say that this war is not to degenerate into a war of extermination or expulsion. But the hateful military system that has existed for so long in Matabeleland must be broken down. So long as the Matabeles were willing to turn their swords into ploughshares and become peaceable citizens, I am quite sure there is no desire, and no intention—and certainly permission would never be given by the Government—to expel them from the country or to treat them in any way except with that humanity, mercy, and justice which my hon. Friends prize, and rightly prize, so highly. With regard to the question of future policy, it is really premature to attempt fully or fairly to discuss it. But I would ask the House to remember that Her Majesty's Government have not got a free hand with regard to this matter, but are very much tied and bound by the acts of their predecessors. In considering the policy to be pursued in regard to the future of Matabeleland, the fact cannot be ignored that Matabeleland as well as Mashonaland are included within the region of South Africa described in the Charter as the principal field of the operations of the British South Africa Company, and that in the Charter no distinction is made between Matabeleland and Mashonaland, the latter being already practically occupied and governed by the Company. Nor can the point be ignored that the mining and land concessions held by the Company are applicable to Matabeleland as well as to Mashonaland—to the whole territory claimed by Lobengula. We must also bear in mind that the greater part of the operations now proceeding have been undertaken on the responsibility of and at the expense of the Company. The very important question of public feeling in South Africa must also be taken into account in dealing with the question. With hostilities still, unfortunately, in progress, and with different possibilities still open, the Government are not in a position to lay before the House any cut and dried proposition hi regard to the future of Matabeleland; but they have requested Mr. Rhodes to enter into direct communication with the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Loch, with a view of preparing with him a scheme for the pacification and the future well-being and government of Matabeleland, to be submitted for the consideration and approval of Her Majesty's Government. I may add that there is no intention of driving the Matabele out of the country, and that the settlement will include, as an essential feature, duo safeguards for the protection and rights of the natives. Of course no action taken on the spot previous to the final settlement will prejudice the arrangements ultimately come to in regard to the future of Matabeleland. I have already trespassed upon the time of the House, but I must say a few words on the first part of the speech of my hon. Friend. It is perfectly true that the Government are bound to a very large extent by their predecessors and by the Charter; still, if it could be shown that the Charter was obtained under fraudulent pretences the position would be rendered different. I can only say that any accusations brought against the Company in regard to matters not at present within the cognizance of Her Majesty's Government may affect the question in regard to the future; but I am bound to say that none of the matters brought forward by my hon. Friend this afternoon can affect the question of the future, because they are all old stories. They were discussed, decided, and disposed of long ago; and if there was misconduct on the part of the Chartered Company, that misconduct had, at any rate, been condoned. Most of this information was in possession of right hon. Gentlemen opposite when this Charter was given, and all of it was in their possession when the Charter was discussed in the House. My hon. Friend condemned the Chartered Company for not, as he said, disclosing their position in regard to the subsidiary United Concessions Company at the time the Charter was granted. I will only say, having gone into that question as carefully as I could, I believe I am only speaking the minds of right hon. Gentlemen opposite in saying that I believe that if the Colonial Office had possessed that information at the time, while it would not have prevented the Charter being granted, it would have considerably modified the terms on which the Charter was given. There is just this to be said—that it certainly was understood at that time that the Secretary of State desired to have nothing whatever to do with the financial relations of the Chartered Company. It was understood that all he desired to see was that it was a British Company, that it had a proper Board of Directors, and that its capital was duly and properly subscribed. That is the excuse of the Company for not mentioning the subject. At the same time, I think it would have been far better if the Company had disclosed their position in regard to the United Concessions Company.

DR. CLARK (Caithness)

It did not exist then.

* MR. S. BUXTON

It is only a question of name. There were three Companies, one being formed into the other. But we cannot deal with this matter, because, as I have said, whatever was done has been condoned by the late Government and this House. After all, it was largely a matter for the shareholders, and not for the Government of the day. I have no desire to follow my hon. Friend into his detailed argument in regard to the concessions; but I will say, speaking broadly, that the granting of the Charter covered these concessions as far as the Government of this country and this House were concerned, and we cannot now go back on that past history. I doubt whether Lobengula himself really had these causes of complaint in regard to this matter which the hon. Gentleman who originated this Debate seems to think he had. Lobengula himself, no doubt, acquiesced in the position of the Company.

MR. LABOUCHERE

I said that Lobengula acquiesced on specific pledges from Her Majesty the Queen that he should be in no way damnified in his jurisdiction and sovereignty.

* MR. S. BUXTON

What my hon. Friend said in his speech was that this concession was practically obtained under false pretences, and that Lobengula complained that he had not been properly informed as to what he was giving up. All I wish to say is that Lobengula practically acquiesced by his subsequent action. He is a little out of court, because, whatever he thought of the concessions, he carefully took the considera- tion he was paid for them—namely, the £1,200 a year, month by month, until the other day, when hostilities were about to begin. I am not here to defend the Chartered Company; I am not myself very much in favour of government by Chartered Companies. But I am bound to say, in regard to this and other charges brought against the Company, that my hon. Friend has very much exaggerated the case against the Company, and that is enough for me at the present moment when taken in conjunction with the further fact that the matters referred to have, if they ever existed, been condoned by the Government of the Queen and this House. The question was discussed in the House on the Motion of the hon. Member for Northampton. We have to take the position and the facts as we find them, and, in dealing with these facts, to see that the Company carry out their Charter according to the terms in which it was granted. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Clare has shown that the Company has done this. The Company took the Charter to develop the country, and to increase civilisation and good government in that part of Africa, and I say that, quite apart from the financial question—which I agree with my hon. Friend is rather a matter for the Company and its shareholders—the British South Africa Company has opened up a large tract of territory, and has done much to introduce civilisation and commerce into the centre of Africa. While, I am not here to defend them or to minimise anything which the Company may have done in a wrong direction, it must be remembered that if it had not been for their existence this country would have lost that huge part of Africa, which is a place of the future; and that in dealing with Matabeleland as we have dealt with Mashonaland, we cannot ignore either the existence or the rights of the Chartered Company. I will only, in conclusion, hope that hostilities are now over, that pacification will soon be brought about in Matabeleland; and that we desire in dealing with the question to do so in the best possible spirit, having regard to the rights and interests of the natives, to Imperial interests, and also taking into account Colonial interests and Colonial feeling.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR (Manchester, E.)

Everybody will admit that the manner in which the Debate has been conducted, both in the temper displayed and the brevity with which it has been brought to a conclusion, is due to the fact that the Party in power belong to the same side as the hon. Gentleman who brought forward his Motion [Mr. LABOUCHERE: Hear, hear.] he assents to that view. [Mr. LABOUCHERE: Certainly.] I need not, then, draw the picture of what his epithets, which have been not against the Company—who are not here to defend themselves—["They are!"]—there may be one individual Member here—but against us, if we had been sitting on these Benches. The hon. Member has endeavoured to dissociate the present Government from all blame——

MR. LABOUCHERE

That was before I heard the speech of the Under Secretary. I do not now dissociate them. I consider that the result of a Liberal Government being in power is usually some massacre in Africa.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

I do not know what sort of speech the hon. Member expected the Under Secretary to make; but if he had read through the Blue Books on the Table, he would have seen that, whatever the present Government can do, they cannot, by any possibility, dissociate themselves from responsibility for this war. The Under Secretary said that we were "partially responsible;" but I do not believe that he meant to imply that he and his colleagues dissociated themselves from responsibility. At any rate, whatever his intention might have been, nobody can look at Sir Henry Loch's Dispatches without seeing that they took the same view, as to the justice and equity of the position of the Chartered Company as against the Matabele, as was taken by the late Government itself. That being the case, I should have left the Government to fight their own battles with their own friends if it had not been that the policy of the late Government has been drawn into this Debate. The Under Secretary hinted that, in the opinion of himself and his colleagues, the policy which handed over great districts on the edge of civilisation to the management of Chartered Companies was one which he did not regard with any great favour. I dissent from that. I was, of course, one of those responsible for giving this power to the Chartered Company; but on looking back over the four years in which the Chartered Company has been in existence, I am more than ever confirmed in the wisdom of our policy; and I see, I think, clear evidence of the good fruits which it will bear. Let us, after all, look at this matter from a common-sense point of view. If you have a great district inhabited solely by uncivilised races, conterminous with other districts inhabited by civilised races, and if the former district is suitable for colonisation or agricultaral or mining operations, it is practically impossible—human nature being what it is—that you will not have immigration of the civilised people into the territory of the uncivilised in search of working concessions, and so on, among the nationalities of those barbarous districts. Now, there are only three ways of solving the problem—so far as I can see. You may leave the matter to be decided entirely between the immigrants, or colonists, and the savages. How has that invariably ended? Hon. Gentlemen come here apparently as the friends of savage races. If they look back on the history of our colonisation in districts where the Government bad no control, and where the whole management of the relations is left to the savage organisation on the one hand, and to the European immigrants on the other, wherever that has been allowed to occur, these results have followed—that the savages have been ousted from all their possessions, and very often under circumstances of cruelty and massacre, which have left, a permanent stain on the name and reputation of those nations who boast—and justly boast, no doubt—that they are the pioneers of civilisation. I do not, therefore, believe that, in the interests of the native races themselves—to say nothing of our interests—the policy of laissez faire is a possible one. There is a second policy. You may endeavour to govern these border regions from Downing Street. You may have a costly administration, paid for by the Treasury, managed by officials of the Government, and under the supervision of the Colonial Office. If you adopt that system you will undoubtedly obtain one most desirable result—namely, that you will secure the humane treatment of the natives; but you will do it at a most enormous cost, not only direct cost, but also indirect cost, in the slow development of the country under your rule. I think it was the hon. Gentleman the Member for Clare who called the attention of the House to an example of this system which is now going on in Bechuanaland. There is no question that Bechuanaland is expensive—there is no question that it is excessively expensive to the Treasury, and I am afraid there may be some doubt as to whether everything is being done there which should be done. I want to point out to the House why it is that the cost bears so heavily upon the British taxpayer and the British Treasury, and why the British taxpayer and the British Treasury are so reluctant to undergo it when Commercial Companies are not. The reason is a simple one. If the Company pays £100,000 a year to maintain one of these outlying districts while the country becomes populated, neither the Treasury nor the taxpayer gets any advantage except, indirectly, to a very small extent, through the benefit derived by the British manufacturer. But a Commercial Company, if it has sufficient funds, is glad to incur this outlay, for the reason that when the country is developed it secures ample remuneration. Therefore it will always happen, if you attempt to manage this particular kind of borderland between civilisation and barbarism from Downing Street at the cost of the Treasury, that, in the first place, the Treasury will have an overwhelming temptation to starve it, and that temptation will he justified by the fact that the Treasury itself, representing the British taxpayers, will never get a sixpence of advantage, however well it may carry out its great task. Therefore I reject the second alternative. I reject the first alternative in the interests of the savage tribes themselves, and I reject the second alternative in the interests of the Treasury and the taxpayers of the country. I say, therefore, you are driven back, where you can adopt it, on the third alternative, which is to hand over the administration of these countries to one large single and responsible association, under your own control. That is what has been done in this case. The success of the experiment depends, and must depend, partly on the personnel of the Company and partly on the funds which are at the disposal of the Company; and so far from associating myself with the attacks which have to-day been made on this Chartered Company, I must say, looking hack over its history, I am of opinion that we have been exceptionally fortunate both in the man who has been the guiding spirit and animating soul of this great organisation, and in the fact that he had at his back resources which he has freely and even lavishly used for the purpose of extending the operations of his own Company, and even more directly and immediately, of extending the blessings of civilisation—of extending railways, and telegraphs, and roads—[Laughter and interruption.]

An hon. MEMBER

Rhodes.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

Yes, in extending railways, and telegraphs, and roads through regions which but for the efforts of this Company would undoubtedly have lacked these great requisites of progress for many years to come. What sort of language has the hon. Member for Northampton been using about this Company? Why, Sir, the most sordid Company-monger who ever disgraced the City could not have received harsher treatment or been the object of more violent language than has been poured forth on the Directors of this Company. I am utterly unable to understand the justification for such treatment. The hon. Member for Northampton is deeply perturbed because, forsooth, the profits of this Company, when they are made, are to be divided equally between the original Concessions Company and the shareholders of the present Company. That may be a good or a bad arrangement, but undoubtedly it appears to be one of which the shareholders of the present Company were perfectly cognizant, and, that being the case, it is not an arrangement with which Parliament has any sort of right to interfere. This, at all events, is clear, that the resources of this Company have been most freely used. So far from this being a case in which the original promoters and chief upholders of the Company have used it as a means of inveigling unwary shareholders, is it not the case, as I have heard it stated, that Mr. Rhodes himself and others have themselves lent vast sums outside the capital of the Company for the purpose of carrying out the work of the Company? At this moment, I believe, the Company are spending something like £10,000 or £14,000 a year in bearing the cost of our administration—not their administration—of the Shiré highlands. I confess that if you can find in the whole record of any civilisation such an amount of money spout in the same number of years, either by a Government or by a private Corporation, without one sixpence of return, as has been spent by this Company up 1o the present time, I shall be extremely surprised. I never heard of such a thing. At all events, before we agitate our minds over the injury to the shareholders of the Chartered Company, which is to be done by transferring half their profits to somebody else, let us wait till such time as the Company has earned any profits to divide. Half the attack of the hon. Member consisted in saying that the Concessions Company had robbed the Chartered Company, and the other half in saving that the Chartered Company were bankrupt. It appears to me that the two things are inconsistent. If they are bankrupt there will be nothing to divide. If they are bankrupt, how are they to get this improper profit out of the arrangement? The hon. Member, in his ardent zeal against the policy of the late Government, and apparently now against the policy of the present Government, has made an attack which appears to he perfectly unjustifiable upon a body of men, and especially upon Mr. Rhodes, who, under difficulties that must have been enormous, have shown a power for organisation and of administration which does credit, I boldly say, to the reputation of Englishmen in both these departments. Until it has been proved that efforts which in themselves were unquestionably for the benefit and the credit of the Empire are really stained by the crimes attributed to the Chartered Company, I shall continue to think that the attack to which we have been treated is due to that want of imaginative sympathy which too often destroys the undoubtedly humane efforts of some hon. Gentlemen opposite, who, in controversies of this kind, not for the first time, in our history, show themselves incapable of appreciating some of the greatest qualities which have gone to build up the British Empire. I have told the House exactly the conclusion I have come to on the evidence before me. Further evidence, of course, may modify that conclusion. When we know all the facts, it may turn out, though I do not believe it will turn out, that blame attaches to those who are responsible for the action of the Chartered Company, which will sully even the brightest deeds. No such evidence has yet been produced, and nothing has occurred either in the Debate to-night or in the history of the last three or four years which makes me do anything but congratulate myself that I was a member of the Government which originally gave powers to the Chartered Company of South Africa, which I believe, so far as I can judge, they have used in the best interests of the Empire.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

There are two points in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman on which, I think, he is entitled to expect a word from me on the part of the Government. In the first place, I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that we have not the smallest idea of any attempt to dissociate ourselves from responsibility for the war now unhappily being carried on. On the contrary, I feel that while the Company, of course, has its own responsibility—and it is a serious responsibility—in respect to that war, yet the Government is obliged to acknowledge, as we do acknowledge, its responsibility also. It must have the chief share of responsibility; and any share that the Company may have must on this occasion be regarded as subordinate and secondary for the time to the responsibility that weighs upon Her Majesty's Government. We have deeply lamented it; we have endeavoured to avert it; the necessity for it has come upon us; that necessity we have frankly met and recognised. The speech of the right hon. Gentleman has been principally occupied with a very interesting discussion upon the merits of Chartered Companies, and of this Chartered Company in particular. When I recollect the language of my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, to the effect that the object of the war was, on the part of the Company, which he said was a bankrupt concern, to swindle and plunder the British public into providing further funds for the execution of its purposes—when I recollect that language, I cannot feel sorry that the Com- pany have found so spirited and able and uncompromising a defender as the right hon. Gentleman opposite. Perhaps it is enough to say that no censure was pronounced by my hon. Friend (Mr. Buxton) on the policy of the late Government in the establishment of this Company, with regard to which, whether they were right or wrong, it must be admitted that they had a very difficult question to dispose of. But the right hon. Gentleman, if I may say so, has been a little too sweeping in his condemnation of the policy of committing to colonists in a foreign land the regulation of their relations with the aboriginal inhabitants. It is not true that that has always been an unfortunate course of policy. On the contrary, there is the instance of New Zealand, where, so long as this country insisted on managing the military concerns of the colony, and the relations of the colony with the aborigines, wars were, I will not say incessant, but very frequent; sometimes disastrous, thoroughly unsatisfactory, and continually reproducing one another. The simple transfer of responsibility to the colonists of New Zealand entirely transformed the whole state of the case, and since that time the relations between the colonists and the aborigines have presented no painful feature of a violent nature, except the painful feature that in cases of the kind there has appeared to he a silent dwindling of the aboriginal race, ending in its extinction.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

The right hon. Gentleman, perhaps through my fault, has somewhat misrepresented my statement. I did not at all imply that the colonists were incapable of managing the native relations. What I said was that this territory was in too early a stage to be described as a colony.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

The question is a very interesting one to me, for it is very nearly 60 years since I was engaged in a controversy with regard to the relations between the Old Cape Colony and the Kaffirs on the border. Then I contended stoutly that the best way was to leave the colony to manage its own affairs. I quite admit the relevancy of the interruption of the right hon. Gentleman, and I was going to point out that this is not a case where it would have been possible to solve the problem that has arisen by leaving the colonists to bear their own responsibilities. Now, Sir, I do not presume at all to say that this Debate ought now to be brought to a conclusion, but I venture to express the hope that it will be brought to a conclusion. After the speech of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary (Mr. S. Buxton), which I think was heard with general satisfaction, I will only remind the House in the fewest possible words of the position in which it stands as to what may be considered the main points of the case. My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) has effectually redeemed himself from any charge of an undue disposition to favour or let off Her Majesty's Government in this matter. Not only has he directed his hostility against us, but he has generalised his hostility, and has said that whenever the Liberal Party accedes to office there is always a massacre in South Africa.

MR. LABOUCHERE

That is an historical fact.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

I will not go into history, but I do not admit that it is an historical fact. My hon. Friend showed his impartiality and vindicated himself from any charge of undue bias in favour of Her Majesty's Government, but I cannot help saying that he should be a little more restrained as to the use of strong language in these matters. It is a very strong proceeding indeed to charge our countrymen in these responsible, difficult, and dangerous positions with being the authors of an act the most detestable that human beings can commit, and I will point out to him that, although there may be occasions when, if the evidence is clear and demonstrative, it may be necessary to go that length, still it is language that it is better to refrain from until we have the whole case before us. Then my hon. Friend says that Mr. Rhodes is unworthy of belief. It is no part of my business, and I hare no power or ability, to discuss all the proceedings of that very able man; but I must say I cannot concur in the opinion that anything has happened which justifies us in holding that a gentleman who enjoys the almost unbounded confidence of the free community in which he lives is reduced to so low a point of moral character as to deserve that a censure of that kind should be pronounced upon him on the floor of the House of Commons. I do not think Mr. Rhodes deserves such censure. Let us see how the case stands with regard to these undoubtedly painful circumstances. In the first place, it is, I think, admitted and felt that the House may so far—this is not a question of Party politics—repose confidence in those who are entrusted with the administration of affairs as to believe that everything that can be done will be done to ensure humanity and justice in these deplorable circumstances. The name of my noble Friend, Lord Ripon, has, I think, always been associated during his public life with a great regard—sometimes it has been thought with an excessive regard—for the interests and rights of other races subordinate to us. The speech of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary (Mr. S. Buxton) has sufficiently indicated what are his dispositions, and I may say that the very name he bears is a guarantee to the country. I recollect very well the great ability, the high character, and the great public services of his distinguished grandfather, and I rejoice to think that that name is still associated with tempers, principles, and dispositions which I believe that grandfather himself, if he could arise among us, would not be inclined to disown. Well, what is the cause of this war? The immediate cause lies in the two demands made upon Lobengula, that he should put an end to a system of raids, which means after all the destruction of peace and industry in the country, and that be should withdraw his demand for the delivery over to him of a number of Mashonas, whom there is every reason to believe it is his object and intention to put to death. All through the speech of the hon. Member for Northampton there appeared to be a tacit assumption that Lobengula was the perfect master of the situation in his own country, and that whatever he willed he could effect, and that whatever he was disposed to answer for was certain to be realised in fact. Now that, I believe to be a fundamentally wrong assertion. It is exactly the old case of the Kaffirs over again. When a generation grew up who did not recollect the former troubles, the young men of the Kaffirs, in time became intemperate and unmanageable, and brought about a fresh war. There is every reason to believe that it is not the older men, but the younger men who have been the source of the unhappy events which have recently occurred in South Africa. I think that the House will be of opinion that it would be a crime against justice and humanity, and against policy, if the British authorities had not demanded from Lohengula these two securities, and had not regarded the refusal of them as necessitating the hostilities which have taken place. My hon. Friend who seconded the Motion, while abstaining from the demand of the hon. Member for Northampton, said there was a case for inquiry. I think that I may appeal to him to admit that that case for inquiry has been freely acknowledged by the Under Secretary. As regards the conduct of Captain Lendy, where it has been impugned inquiry has been ordered. As to the case of the Envoys, it is also the fact that an inquiry is being made into it, and also in regard to the remaining cases. The treatment of the wounded is new to my hon. Friend as a matter of charge and imputation, but on that point also inquiry will be made. I hope, therefore, my hon. Friend will think that we have not been slow to meet him on points where justice supports his fair and very moderate demand. What is the demand of my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton? It is that we here, from these Benches or from our desks in our offices, should at once without more ado send out a peremptory demand for the cessation of hostilities. How many men are there in this House who, if they were in our place, would resume that responsibility? What is our knowledge of the condition of the country, of the relative forces intervening, and of the risks that are consequent upon taking a wrong and rash resolution in these matters. My hon. Friend might with comparative safety recommend us to take that responsibility, but I am certain that the House will not think we are wrong when we say that the demand which the hon. Member makes is one to which it is impossible for us to accede. I will not detain the House any longer. I admit that the general subject is one which demands the attention of the House; but without suggesting that the Debate upon it should be immediately closed, I venture to hope that the discussion may be rapidly and speedily brought to an end when it has proceeded far enough.

DR. CLARK (Caithness)

said, he wanted to hear some reasons why they were at war. He considered the war perfectly unjustifiable, and was of opinion that if it were continued the responsibility for any further bloodshed would rest upon the Minister who allowed it. He had listened carefully to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, and had not hoard a single reason given why we should be at war with the Matabele at the present moment. The reason given by the hon. Member for West Clare, that our troops had been fired on in Bechuanaland, was not borne out by the information published by the Government. The only justification which, so far as he could see, was attempted was that the Chartered Company had sent out a number of scouts who saw some natives, and that shots were fired. There was no information as to who first fired; but, at any rate, no blood was shed. What wore the facts as to this alleged firing upon British troops? Here was the statement as it appeared on page 91 of the last Blue Book—a telegram from the Officer Commanding, Macloutsie, to His Excellency the High Commissioner, Cape Town— 5th October. A patrol of mine, consisting of a non-commissioned officer and two men, reports by heliograph from my post between here and the Shashi that whilst patrolling this morning on the south bank of the Shashi River they were tired upon b}r, as far as they could gather, about 30 Matabele. Our men returned the fire. On some more of our men coming up the Matabele retired. I cannot hear of any large body of Matabele, and suppose this was only a party pushing forward to see what we are doing. A few shots fired under these circumstances with natives who retired could not justify the Company in going to war. What has boon done by Sir H. Loch to prevent the war? He had done nothing. It was said that we were justified in interfering with the Matabele, because they had made raids into Mashonaland; but if the Matabele Indunas had been cruel, the Indunas of the Chartered Company bad been just as cruel, and no story that had been told of the Matabele was worse than that told of Captain Lendy. Lobengula had been asked to send an impi to punish these men, and he had sent one. The men took refuge with the British, and the British refused to surrender them. Though, no doubt, that course was justifiable, the British were not justified in killing the men. The question was, were the accounts which had been sent by Jameson and the others to be relied upon? Supposing these accounts were taken for granted, was the Company, in the lace of Clause 7 of the Charter, entitled to make war upon the Matabele without first obtaining the sanction of the Secretary of State? He maintained that the Charter had been violated. There were a number of telegrams between Sir H. Loch and Lobengula. Who read those telegrams to Lobengula? Mr. Colenbrander, who was with the King as agent of the Chartered Company, and who had taken part in the Zulu fight and in all recent troubles in South Africa. The Chartered Company sent messages to Lobengula, and the Tati Company made demands which were somewhat similar to those of the Chartered Company. The High Commissioner also sent messages, but he would ask why someone representing him was not sent to Lobengula? He was asked to send Indunas to the Commissioner, and he sent Umshete; but he, unfortunately, was unable, through illness, to see the Commissioner; and, although he wanted to come to England, he was not allowed to. Why had not some person been sent to Lobengula with that object? The same course had been pursued as that which landed us in the Zulu War; for we sent no one to Cetewayo. Mr. Moffat was in Khama's country, and could easily have been sent. He was a friend of the King, knew the language, and could have done all that was necessary. They did not know whether the telegrams from Sir Henry Loch had ever reached Lobengula. All they had had from him was a protest against the action of the Company. Further, when his two chief Indunas were sent they were killed. We had sent nobody to Lobengula, who had not caused a single drop of white blood to be shed, and now we had made war with him and driven him from his capital. He had heard no reason from the Treasury Bench why that should have been done. As to the charge that the concession was obtained from Lobengula by false pretences, and that the Colonial Office had been tricked, no one was in a bettor position to give information on that point than the hon. Member for West Clare. That hon. Member had gone up to Lobengula as agent for Mr. Rudd and Mr. Rhodes, and if ho had got that concession by fair and not by foul means he could have said so definitely. He had not, however, that day said one word in defence of his position. Lobengula bad repudiated the concession as not being framed in his words. As it matter of fact, the King's signature was obtained by fraud, and the hon. Member could not deny it. In the second place, the Colonial Office were tricked into granting the Charter, for the applicants had pretended at the time that they had obtained the concession, and that it was in order to work that concession and such others as they might secure that they wanted the document. The answer of the hon. Member was that they had not told the Government about that because no question was asked on the subject. Both the points put by the hon. Member for Northampton had been established. The hon. Member for West Clare had told the House that we should have lost this portion of South Africa if we had not interfered. Why? We had come to terms years ago with the Germans on one side and with the Portuguese on the other, and there was no reason why we should not have done the same with Lobengula. This territory had been within our sphere of influence just as it was now. The position, so far as we were concerned, was that we were at war and it could not now be stopped. The charge of raiding was made against the Matabele. No proposal was ever made about stopping raiding. Why had Sir Henry Loch proposed that there should be boundaries between Matabeleland and Mashonaland? Why did he never send an ultimatum about stopping raiding—why bad the war taken place without an ultimatum? They could not stop the war now, and no doubt it would be a good thing to break up this Zulu war system, for the Matabele were a branch of the Zulu race, having been settled for 50 years in Matabeleland, but still following the warlike methods of the Zulus. When the war was over, what policy was to be adopted? The policy of the Leader of the Opposition was a curious one. Twelve years ago, when the Liberal Government began a policy of Chartered Companies— previous Governments having abolished the old East India Company and the Hudson's Bay Company and all the old Chartered Companies—the right hon. Gentleman made some of his ablest speeches from the Bench below the Gangway against the revival. To-night the right hon. Gentleman had answered those speeches for himself and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University (Sir J. Gorst). The right hon. Gentleman 12 years ago had strongly opposed the policy of establishing Chartered Companies, and he (Dr. Clark) should have thought he had been too busy since coercing the Irish to trouble about the matter. It was evident, however, that the right hon. Gentleman had found time to change his mind. He was evidently unaware of the position of things in South Africa now. How did we stand there? We had had a fight in Zululand. How did Zululand stand to-day? It was peaceful and prosperous. The only thing necessary to secure perfect peace there was to send back Dinizulu and his two uncles; to give them a Government pension, and a bit of laud to live on. If that were done, Zululand would continue peaceful and prosperous. It was paying its way now, and not costing the British Government a penny. Then, as to Basutoland. A dozen years ago the Cape spent £3,000,000 in fighting the Basutos, as the Chartered Company was now fighting the Matabele. The Government had to interfere after the Cape had thrown away its millions and lost its men, and how was Basutoland now? The same High Commissioner who was sent there 12 years ago still remained, and the country was enjoying unexampled peace and prosperity. It did not cost a penny to the British Government. As to Bechuanaland, the condition of the country was owing to the stupid settlement there made. If the same settlement had been made there as had been made in Basutoland and Zululand, things would have been satisfactory; but, unfortunately, it was made into a colony, whereas Basutoland and Zululand were Dependencies, with a High Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner, who lived with the native Chiefs, and prevented disorder. In Bechuanaland they must have a Governor with a large salary, and a number of Commissioners and an army. The Republics and the Colonies did not want an army. There was no need for a single soldier there, and even if soldiers were wanted it was not necessary—as he had ventured to point out seven or eight years ago—to pay them 5s. a day per man. If they got men at 1s. a day as they came back from India they would be adopting a wise policy, for the climate was a splendid one, and it would be much more healthy for the men to send them there for a time than to bring them at once into the cold climate of England. Colonel Carrington's men seemed only to be useful to act as dogs on the commander's hunting expeditions. He submitted that if a native police were required they should follow the policy adopted at the Cape, and have a commandery calling on each man as he was wanted. But, to return to the question of the war, as he had said, the Government had offered no reason for it. The Government had granted the Charter, and they knew why it was inserted in The Gazette of December, 1889. It was granted in October, and the House of Commons had never yet sanctioned or condoned its existence. The men who had got the concessions he had described as filibusters and licensed freebooters, and he had been denounced for so doing. But he had said at that time that the necessary result would be war, and that it would be necessary to wipe out Lobengula and his Matabele, and that the Company were now doing—under false pretences. The Company swindled Lobengula into granting his concessions. The concession-mongers went into Matabeleland as they had gone into Mashonaland. They went as an armed force. They put themselves into laager every night, expecting to be attacked. They went, as he had said, as licensed freebooters, and war had been the inevitable consequence. Ten years ago they were discussing these things in connection with Bechuanaland; before that it was Zululand; to-day it was Matabeleland, and to-morrow it would be Barotseland; and neither one side of the House nor the other had been able to arrive at any fixed policy. He believed that if the Government settled with the Chartered Company now it would be the cheapest way out of the difficulty: he did not know whether it would not be the best. They were not responsible for Umsheti; he was there before we were; but, why should he be punished when Captain Lendy was allowed to go free? Lendy was still the trusted servant of the Chartered Company; but the Under Secretary had called him a murderer, and said he deserved censure for his cruelty. Yet he was not to be punished.

* MR. S. BUXTON

I said he deserved censure, but that as 18 months had elapsed since the conduct complained of I did not think it possible to re-open the question.

DR. CLARK

said, the hon. Gentleman condoned the cruel conduct because it occurred 18 months ago. But why was not the House made acquainted with this matter earlier? Hon. Members never knew until this year that it had occurred, although it was done last year.

SIR J. FERGUSSON (Manchester, N.E.)

It is not true.

DR. CLARK

said, that nobody denied the facts. The Under Secretary denounced Captain Lendy, but went a little too far, as he thought, in his indignation. But because a black man had been guilty of like conduct he was to be punished. That was not a policy which the Liberal Party would be able to support in the country; even the Nonconformist conscience would not like it. He thought the best thing now to be done was to inquire into all that had occurred from the very beginning, to ascertain how the concession was obtained, to prevent fraud, and to ensure that, at the end of the term, to make proper provision for the government of the country. The Liberals were responsible for what was now occurring; he did not know whether to blame Lord Ripon or Sir Henry Loch, but he did assert that there was no justification for the war, and that they had no right to spend Imperial money by sending Imperial forces to crush Lobengula; for what had he done? Two or three of his men were patrolling; a shot was fired; nobody was killed, or even hurt——

MR. CONYBEARE

That is not so.

DR. CLARK

said, that perhaps his hon. Friend would be able to give a better reason for the war than any that had yet been put forward. Of course, the Matabele must be defeated, but he feared the Under Secretary was a little too optimistic in the opinion he expressed that afternoon as to the eventual results of the last engagement. He was not sure they had settled this question. If Lobengula remained in the bush all they could do was to wait until the rainy season was over. During that season the Company's forces—composed, as they were, of the scum of Johanncsberg—would be decimated by pneumonia; their horses would die from disease; their means of communication with the rear would be cut off, and they would be able to do nothing till the winter season. During that period surely the Government would try to communicate with Lobengula. They should send to him the son of the friend of Lobengula's father, Mr. Moffat. Lobengula desired to be friendly, as was evidenced by his reply to the Indunas, who asked his permission to kill the few white men in his country. His answer was—and he was in a very difficult position at the time—"Go down to the gold fields and kill the white men there, and when you have done that I will give you permission to kill the white men here." He did not, in fact, want the white men killed—he desired to be friendly. ["Hear, hear!"] He saw that his hon. Friend (Mr. Buxton) cheered that. If so, why had they not communicated with Lobengula instead of sending an army to conquer him?

MR. CONYBEARE (Cornwall, Camborne)

said that, having some acquaintance with South African matters and the persons engaged in the affairs under discussion, he thought it only right that he should say it few words in reply to the very violent attack which had been made on these persons by some of his hon. Friends, and notably by his hon. Friend the Member for Caithness. He thought that no person who had in the past taken any note of his action in the House or elsewhere in regard to the Native Races of South Africa would accuse him of desiring in any way to justify any atrocities that might have been committed on them, much less to plead for their extermination. As far back as the Zulu War he had been one of the most determined opponents of his own Party in their treatment of probably the best and most warlike race in South Africa. More recently, when the affairs of Swaziland were before the House, he stood alone in his pleading that the Swazis should be protected against what was far worse than anything that had taken place in Matabeleland—namely, the demoralisation which the introduction of drink into the country would bring about. He mentioned those things because he knew there wore some who would condemn him for defending a Company to whom they had a rooted objection, and whom they regarded as scoundrels and adventurers and the scum of South Africa. In discussing a matter of this sort he did not think much good was done by heaping abuse upon any of our fellow-countrymen, whether in South Africa or elsewhere; and knowing something of the character of those who were engaged in this enterprise of opening up the most suitable parts of Africa, lie made bold to say that there were gentlemen connected with the Company and with Cape Colony who were incapable of doing the things charged against them without any evidence whatever. Tributes had been paid to the high character and abilities of Mr. Rhodes, but he had risen on behalf of gentlemen who, much more than Mr. Rhodes, were exposing themselves to danger in this out-post duty in Matabeleland. He referred particularly to Dr. Jameson, the Commissioner of Mashonaland. He knew that gentleman; he had had intimate relations with his brother; he was acquainted with other members of the family, and ho had no hesitation in saying that there was no more upright and high minded Englishman engaged in the affairs of South Africa than Dr. Jameson; and when he heard all those loud-mouthed assertions of duplicity and ruthless atrocities by the Chartered Company, which meant that they were done with the sanction of Dr. Jameson, he thought it right to say that there was no foundation for the charges which had been brought against their fellow-countrymen, who were trying to do their duty—as Englishmen always did it, with pluck—and of whom, at any rate, it should be said that they had done the best they could do under the circumstances. What was the case with respect to the general administration of Mashonaland for the last four years under Dr. Jameson's administration? No doubt there had been some deplorable incidents, especially those with which Cap- tain Lendy was connected. That matter had been fully considered and censured, not only by the High Commissioner of South Africa, but by Lord Ripon, as head of the Colonial Office. But when his hon. Friend the Member for Caithness declared that the war was as absolutely unjustifiable as the attack on the Zulus 12 or 14 years ago, when he declared that Sir Henry Loch had intentionally abstained from sending an ultimatum to Lobengula, and that the King was kept in the dark as to the grievances of our people against him, all he could say was that those charges were totally unfounded, and were contradicted almost in every page of the Blue Books. In support of what he said, he should refer to one or two points of the Correspondence. In the second Blue Book, page 11, there was a message from the High Commissioner to the Rev. J. S. Moffat, dated 15th August, and which was to be sent by special runners to Colenbrander to be delivered to Lobengula. It contained the following:— My friend,—Mr. Moffat has communicated to me your message to him. You ask what have you done. My answer is: Your impi entered the settlement of the white men and killed their servants and obliged the white men, in defence of their lives and property, to fire upon your people. I believe the Indunas in charge of that impi acted contrary to your wishes and instructions. They may not tell you the whole truth, but you may believe what I tell you. I do not desire war, but I wish for peace; and as you have, in accordance with my desire, withdrawn your impi from the vicinity of Victoria, and as some of your people have been killed and thus punished for what they did, I will tell Dr. Jameson, provided you keep your impis away from the vicinity of the white people, that I consider he should be content with restoration of any cattle and other property stolen by your people from the white people. That was on the 15th of August last, and then on the 16th of August the High Commissioner sent for Mr. Moffat and asked him to forward by special runners another message, in which he instructed Mr. Colenbrander to use to the King language of a friendly character— You can tell him" (he says) "I believe it is his desire to live on friendly terms with the white people, and that it is my desire peace should be maintained, but that he will understand if his impis go into towns settled by the white people and kill their servants and destroy their property, fighting will follow, as it would if the white people went into his people's kraals and destroyed their property. That I am telling him what really happened. They destroyed the house and property of a farmer named Napier, as also the property of other white men, and killed the white men's servants at the white men's doors. The King gave permission to white men to live in his country, and they therefore expect him to protect their lives and property by keeping his impis away from them. You will point out to Lobengula that I am speaking to him as a friend, and that I thank him for the protection he has hitherto always extended to white men; that I am informed that the cattle he claims arts either back, or on their way back, to Buluwayo, and I shall be glad to learn if he has received them, for if not, I shall order inquiries to be made as to what has become of them, so that they may be returned. I expect him to do the same with respect to any cattle taken from the white men by his people. Later on, in page 53 of the Blue Book, there was this telegram— From His Excellency the High Commissioner, Cape Town, to the Assistant Commissioner, Palapye. 'Please send the following message from me to Lobengula:—My friend, I send to let you know that your Induna, who has been ill, is now better, and will soon be able to come on to Cape Town to see me.' That entirely disposed of the allegation that the High Commissioner prevented representations being made to Lobengula or refused to have anything to do with him. I hear from Victoria that you have sent impis to the border. I ask you, is this so; and why do you send impis close to I he white men? The white men ask, what do these things mean? I am your friend, Henry B. Loch, High Commissioner. How utterly unfounded, in face of messages like this, was it to say that no representations were made to Lobengula. As a matter of fact, representations were made to him almost every day. On page 78 was what he should certainly call an ultimatum. It was a, telegram from the High Commissioner to Rev. J. S. Moffat, dated 1st October, and was as follows:— Send the following message by special runners to Lobengnla:—'My friend, the uncertainty which exists as to your intentions may lead to hostilities, which I believe both you and I are desirous to avoid. I hear that you have large impis out not far from Victoria and Fort Charter. I have directed white scouts to go out and ascertain if this is the case; if they find impis too near the settlements of the white people the impis will be required to be withdrawn, because after what has happened it will require time to restore the confidence that formerly existed between your people and the white people, and the white people will not allow impis to be so close as to cause apprehension as to their intentions, and if there is to be peace why should you have impis out? If there are no impis out I shall not allow the white people to attack you, but if the impis are out and too near. I cannot stop Dr. Jameson taking what steps he may consider right for the safety of the lives of the people and of the property under his charge. Be wise, keep your impis and people away from the white people, and send some of your chief Indunas to talk over the matter with me, so that there may be peace. There is no time to be lost; send runners immediately on receipt of this, and send your people to their homes. He really failed to see how anyone who had taken the trouble to run through the Blue Books could make the statements his lion. Friend had made. On the page following the one which he had just quoted they would see the statement, not for the first or only time, of what the position of Sir Henry Loch was as to any aggression— It must, however, be evident that the Matabele have hostile intentions, and that their presence is not merely in defence of their country from invasion, before I sanction any advance on Buluwayo. It was only after all these warnings to Lobengula to keep his impis from raiding in the immediate neighbourhood of the Company's fort that eventually sanction was given by the High Commissioner allowing the advance of the Company's forces. It might be asked what evidence had they got that the messengers ever came through to Lobengula? That was answered on page 81, where the Assistant Commissioner, the Rev. Mr. Moffat, Palapye, sent the following telegram to the High Commissioner:— Received this morning by Khama's runners from Buluwayo, dated 24th September:—'Lobengnla to the High Commissioner. Your letter has arrived. I thank you for sending me the news of Umshete's sickness; any further news of him I will be glad if you will send me. My heart is very sore that Umshete is sick, as I sent him down to bring you my mouth. He is the only one who knows all I would wish to say. He also knows wind was said at Entutweni. The people from the East have again come and taken some of my cattle.' There is also a covering letter from Usher:—'Many thanks for your kind letter, and I sincerely hope you will drop me a line whenever an opportunity occurs. We saw the King to-day, and he told us that the Mashonas to the East had taken another small herd of his cattle. Dawson and I got through with the Governor's message, and will send you what the King said.' And, lastly, there was this Dispatch from Sir Henry Loch to Lobengula, which was dated October 6 last, and which was sent through the Rev. Mr. Moffat— Send following message to Lobengula:—'My friend: it has been reported to me that your impis are collected in considerable strength near to the white settlements in Mashonaland. It is with deep personal regret that I inform you the present state of feeling which has grown up between your people and the white people renders it impossible that large impis can be permitted to remain in such near proximity to the white people as to be a source of constant danger of collisions arising between them. I have already informed you of a recent occasion, when your people fired upon a small party of white men in the vicinity of Victoria. The state of uneasiness which exists between your people and the white people is due to several causes. The most serious one is the practice of raiding the Mashonas with your impis. To levy taxes legally due to you as King is right, but to accompany levying taxes with taking from the Mashonas all their property, and killing indiscriminately men, women, and children, and taking those who escape death to be your slaves is what the English will not permit in any country in which they reside. Your people have further, without any provocation, fired yesterday morning upon Her Majesty's Bechuanaland Border Police near Macloutsie. These acts, together with the barbarous customs to which I have alluded, cause the white people to live in daily apprehension as to the safety of their lives and property. This state of things cannot be allowed to continue.' He thought that was quite sufficient evidence to show that ample warning was given, and that there was no unprovoked attack on the part of our people against Lobengula and the Matabele. The question had been raised in the course of these Debates as to whether the first shot was fired by our people or the Matabele. His hon. Friend, lie thought, insisted that we were the first to fire on the Matabele. He would prove that the contrary was the case. On page 56 of the first Blue Book there was the following Despatch from the High Commissioner to the Rev. Mr. Moffat, dated 20th July:— Mr. Colenbrander and the missionaries should be made aware as speedily as possible of the true state of affairs. Lobengula's impi camped on the ground close to Victoria; they looted and burnt a house and farm belonging to an Englishman close by; they assegaied natives in the streets, including black servants of the whites in front of their doors. Dr. Jameson tried to persuade the Indunas to withdraw their men, which they refused. After giving them an hour's law, 38 men advanced under Lendy. They were first fired upon; they returned the fire, and charged and pursued the impi for nine miles, killing two headmen and about 30 others. The impi retired to the other side of Shushi, waiting for orders from Lobengula. Then that was followed by the following ultimatum which the High Commissioner sent to Mr. Moffat for Lobengula:— Send following message by special runners as quickly as possible to Colenbrander, to be delivered to Lobengula: 'My friend, it is with regret that I learn since my last letter that the impi in the neighbourhood of Victoria has transgressed your orders; that they entered the streets of that settlement, killing the black and native servants of the white people before the doors of their houses, and that the whole country is smelling of the blood shed by your people. These acts on the part of your people cannot be permitted to continue; they will bring upon you the punishment that befel Cetewayo and his people. I wish to control the anger of the white people, but when aroused in just indignation, I shall find it difficult to restrain them, nor shall I say to them 'stop' unless you at once withdraw your impis and punish the Indunas who have brought this trouble upon you and your people. You must make good to the white men any injury that has been done to their property. Dr. Jameson made friendly endeavours to restrain your people and induce them to retire, but when the conduct of your Indunas and people became dangerous, not only to the property, but to the lives of the white men, and they dared to fire on the white men, then the limits of patience were passed; but still to prove to your people how dangerous it was to meddle with white men, Dr. Jameson, instead of sending forward the hundreds he had at his command, sent forward only a mere handful of white men, who charged and scattered your impi like chaff is blown before the wind, and chased them for miles, killing more than double their own number. Be warned in time. From what can be done by few men you may judge what would be in the power of hundreds of English, mounted on swift horses, to perform; respect the white men and their property; live in peace with them and prosper; recall your impi from the country into which it was agreed they should not enter; abandon the system of raiding the country, burning villages, and taking lives; punish those who have brought you, by their ill-judged action, into trouble with the white men, and compensate those who have suffered loss; and so enable me, before it is too late, still to continue to sign myself your friend.' Whatever might be the meaning of all the correspondence that took place as to the minor incidents, as to the collision between the Bechuanaland Border Police and the Matabele, the main facts stood out in this way: that the Matabele raided the Mashonas up to the walls of Fort Victoria, and even in the streets of the town, and that the first shot was fired in repelling an attack of that sort. What happened after this was that Lobengula insisted that he was perfectly within his right in claiming that these Mashonas and their families and cattle should be given up to him to he massacred and destroyed by him. If hon. Members would study the different Despatches in the Blue Books they would certainly find that Lobengula distinctly declared more than once that he would not do as Sir Henry Loch claimed he should do, and withdraw his impis from the neighbourhood of the English settlements, until these unfortunate Mashona captives were given up to him for destruction. That was undoubtedly the immediate and tangible cause of all that had taken place since. He was anxious to defend not the Company, but to defend from unfounded attacks those Englishmen who, with their lives in their hands, were doing their best to maintain our position in South Africa. If they studied the various communications from Sir Henry Loch they would see that during the whole time the Company had been in existence these attacks upon the Mashonas and white men had been going on. For instance, on page 58 of the first Blue Book they would find this telegram from Dr. Jameson to the High Commissioner at Cape Town:— 22nd July.—I have been requested by a deputation from a public meeting held here yesterday to send to your Excellency a copy of their resolutions, one of which I wired to Mr. Rhodes last night; this will be sent by next post; the main points are:— 1st. Absolute necessity of immediate settlement of the question. 2nd. Utter want of faith in word of Lobengula or his power to keep it, with reasons. 3rd. Result of these yearly raids. paralysing all business, mining, agricultural, or transport, with evidence of the present condition of affairs, loss of means of subsistence; £4,000 per month would have been spent in mining and other salaries, now nil, in farming; loss of stock and burning of crops already experienced on nearly every farm; the natives in the employ of the farmers have been killed by the Matabele, and in many cases cold-blooded murders in their presence; emphatically know that these raids have been and will be of yearly occurrence during the dry or working season; beyond this, fear of their wives and children being murdered many Dutch in laager here, with their families, stock, seeds, and farming implements, determined to return unless matter promptly settled; seriousness of interruption to road of entry, post oxen stolen, and buys in charge killed, so that unsafe to travel by transport or post; necessity of accumulating in centres, so leaving property, merchandise, &c, to be looted. That Despatch was embodied in a long Despatch giving details authenticated by a number of the residents in Victoria. [A laugh.] He did not suppose his hon. Friend had taken the trouble to go out to South Africa, but if ho wished for personal information, let him take the first boat and go out there and see whether Lobengula was the archangel he thought he was, and the English residents the fiends he seemed inclined to think them. It was impossible that the English settlers could continue in the country if Lobengula and his impis were allowed to go on attacking and murdering them. In another statement of Dr. Jameson to Dr. Harris, of Cape Town, dated 22nd July last, Dr. Jameson writes— You ask for details of the Matabele troubles. I will now give them for the last two years, that you may understand how we have done our utmost to avoid collision. Karly last year a Matabele impi raided Lomagunda, killing Chief and large numbers of men, and taking women and children to slavery. Being far away, our police were too late to prevent, but I sent warning message to Lobengula; later last year, when I was here, some fugitive Makalaka came to me, asking protection against a large Matabele impi who were killing and raiding Chibi and other kraals across our Tuli road. I sent police, who interviewed impi, and sent them away again; I sent severe message to Lobengula; always the same answer, that some cattle hail been stolen, and his impi was not to interfere with white men. A month ago Mashona reported to Captain Lendy raiding Matabele across our border; Captain Lendy with police went out, and impi retired. Lendy sent letter by them to Lobengula, reminding him of my messages, that his men must keep beyond border. Loben's answer was that he was sending a large impi to punish Mashonas, but again that they were not to interfere with whites; this is the impi which has given the present trouble, and which is still encamped just beyond the border. Last Sunday week its presence was first announced by a number of Makalakas from a kraal on the commonage rushing into Victoria for protection. Two of these were killed between the hospital and the church, and several others in the streets of Victoria, before the police got out to drive the Matabele off. The garden boy of the English clergyman, Sylvester, ran away; Sylvester, looking for him, found him assegaied about a mile out of town. Altogether about 20 were killed in Victoria. Captain Lendy informs me in every kraal for miles around Victoria, men, women, and children have been murdered, cattle and grain taken away, and what could not be carried off burnt. When Lendy with mounted party drove off the impi the other day they found them encamped round a kraal on a kopje cutting off the water supply. It seems this is their method: not to attack a dangerous place, but to starve them out for water, and then butcher. Anyone who read the official documents with an unprejudiced mind, and who did not start with the preconceived notion that everyone connected with the Company was a swindler and a rogue, could not fail to perceive that the servants of the Company had done their best to postpone the inevitable collision. When he was in South Africa last, in the latter part of 1891, he heard a good deal about this business, and a great many people, even then, thought it was impossible to go on long without a collision. He always argued, at any rate, that, it was their duty to endeavour to avoid a collision, and he hoped the Matabele having the advantage of the mining operations in that country, and the wealth to be derived from them, would be induced to work honestly and industriously like the Mashonas. But unfortunately that was not the nature of the Matabele. They would not work, their idea being to go raiding and foraging about. The collision which had so long been inevitable had occurred, and it had not occurred by any aggression on our part. Lobengula had been repeatedly warned to keep his impis from raiding close up to Victoria and other ports, and it was in consequence of his defiance that the hostilities had taken place which they all deplored. He was not blaming Lobengula personally, for had that Monarch tried to prevent his braves from attacking the white settlers he would probably have been killed himself, and an internecine war would have ensued amongst his subjects. As to the deplorable incident in connection with the death of the Envoys, he entirely shared the indignation that everyone would feel supposing it to be true that our people had deliberately shot down Envoys knowing them to be Envoys from the King. His hon. Friend the Member for Nottinghamshire was evidently under that impression, and the Under Secretary for the Colonies in his reply did not bring out the fact as clearly as it should have been brought out that our people did not know them to be Envoys.

MR. S. BUXTON

What I said was that I had not all the particulars about the matter which was under inquiry, and that it was exceedingly inconvenient to discuss it without particulars.

MR. CONYBEARE

said, in support of his statement he would quote the following Despatch from Sir Henry Loch to the Marquess of Ripon, received on the 23rd October:— Late last night it was reported to me that three Envoys from Lobengula, accompanied by Mr. Dawson, arrived at Colonel Goold-Adams's camp on 18th October; that on first arrival Colonel Goold-Adams was not aware that they had come as Envoys, as Dawson did not explain to him that he had any message for me. The officer was not an officer of the Chartered Company, but an officer of the Crown, and he was not aware that these people came as Envoys— Learning from interpreter that they were contemplating getting their horses and escaping from the camp, he ordered their temporary detention until he could ascertain from Dawson who and what they were, assuring them at the same time they had nothing to fear; that the Indunas, however, became alarmed, and one of them, suddenly seizing a bayonet from the scabbard of one of the men, stabbed two of the guard, and was shot in endeavouring to escape; the second Induna, making the like attempt, also met with his death. It seemed to him that as that was already published in the Blue Book, it was only fair that that representation of what occurred should be set forth in the Debate. He thought in what he had said he had, at any rate, shown grounds for a fair consideration of the position of our fellow-countrymen engaged in this work. The Member for Northampton made what he could not help thinking was a very unfair innuendo against Palmer's men in connection with the question of the wounded Matabele, the innuendo being that these natives had deliberately massacred the wounded Matabele. Palmer's men were some of the best natives in Africa, and Palmer himself was a Christian who practised Christianity in his everyday life and one of the best gentlemen in the truest sense of the word that could be found, and the innuendo levelled against Palmer's men was most unjustified. He only wished to say one word in conclusion. On the general question as to whether it was desirable to have a territory like this administered by a Chartered Company there were great differences of opinion, but he was bound to say, having made some slight study of the question and finding what evil consequences had followed in other parts of South Africa through no such action being taken, and through things being allowed to drift, he quite agreed with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition in his view that the grant of a Charter to a private Company was the best means to be adopted. He would ask hon. Members to recollect what took place some few years ago. The hon. Member for Caithness (Dr. Clark) dealt at some length with the history of other parts of South Africa. What happened in Swaziland. The Chief was oppressed by people of every nationality swarming into his country, and he had no power to keep order. Ultimately Theophilus Shepstone gave him control over the whole country, but he (Mr. Conybeare) was not aware that things were better there than under the Chartered Company. Look again at what took place in Stellaland. These things were allowed to drift until this country had to interfere at a cost of £4,000,000. He said unhesitatingly that if the Chartered Company had not been granted powers to take over the administration of Mashonaland the same difficulties would have arisen. They would have had the Boers going into the country, and they could not have kept the English out, with the result that English subjects would have established themselves and created British interests, and therefore he said that unless the Imperial Government itself was prepared to take over the direct administration of those territories it was far better to have one strong representative Company chartered with the administration of affairs, and that was the principle laid down by Her Majesty in her letter to Lobengula at the time the Charter was granted. Then look at the Niger Company, which was the first to receive a Royal Charter, and see what a great work that was doing. [A laugh.] An hon. Member laughed, but he (Mr. Conybeare) could tell him he had no more to do with the Niger Company than he had with the Chartered South Africa Company. He protested as a Radical who hated Jingoism, and as bitterly opposed to universal annexation, against the petty parochialism that seemed to infect some advocates of the Radical creed, who would confine their view entirely to the narrow limits of these Islands, and seek to limit and curtail the natural development and legitimate expansion of our Colonial Empire.

* MR. J. F. HOGAN (Tipperary, Mid.)

said, that as one who had had an almost life-long experience as a British colonist, he would like to offer a few brief observations on the general aspects of the important question that had been raised by the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere). The first consideration that must strike every reflective mind in the course of this discussion was, that they were debating a question of the most vital interest and importance to a large section of their fellow-subjects in the total absence of any direct and accredited representatives of theirs. They were discussing South African policy, and the people most directly and immediately coucerued—the South Africans—had no Members here to legally and authoritatively voice their wishes and sentiments. Thus, although they might style themselves the "Imperial Parliament," the present and other similar instances that occurred from time to time brought home to them the conviction that the phrase was really a misnomer, that this Legislative Assembly was not Imperial in the true and proper sense of the word, that the House of Commons as at present constituted was not representative of the Empire at large, and that in consequence its Debates on Imperial questions appreciably suffer from the absence of direct representative delegations from the great divisions of the Empire. In these circumstances it only remained for those who had come from the Colonies to informally and unofficially represent the prevailing currents of colonial opinion to the best of their knowledge and ability. Personally, he had not the slightest doubt that colonial opinion is overwhelmingly in favour of Mr. Rhodes and what he might call the forward movement in South Africa. The British occupation of Mashonaland and Matabeleland was the logical and inevitable accompaniment of Colonial expansion in South Africa, and any ill-informed or ill-digested attempt on the part of the Imperial Government to prevent the consummation of this certain and natural course of events would be viewed by all well-wishers of our Imperial unity with grave regret and apprehension. Those who were urging the Imperial Government to take a highhanded course of action in South Africa apparently forgot that the days of arbitrary Downing Street rule were now no more, that our great Colonies had ceased to be submissive dependencies, and must be regarded and treated as British States in open, organised, and honourable alliance with the Mother Country. Mr. Rhodes was now, and for years had been, engaged in the truly loyal and noble mission of building up a solid and enduring British Confederation in South Africa that would be worthy of taking its place in the near future by the side of the great Dominion of Canada and the almost consummated Dominion of Australia. Mr. Rhodes was a statesman of such strong fibre, such commanding personality, such unswerving determination, and such far-seeing sagacity, that he was not in the least likely to be moved one inch from the course he had marked out for himself by the reckless criticisms and the unjust attacks that had been levelled against him by the "Little Englanders" of the press, the platform, and the Senate. He (Mr. Hogan) felt sure that in his quarter of the House at least these attacks would meet with little, if any, sympathy or support, for Irishmen had a special and unique interest in the cause of colonial expansion with which the name of Mr. Rhodes had so long and so intimately been identified. Ireland had been so sadly and shockingly misgoverned that the most brilliant and gifted of her sons had been effectually prevented from rising, in their own land, to the highest positions in the State. If they wanted to look for the names and records of Irish Governors, Irish Speakers of Legislative Assemblies, Irish Premiers, and Irish Ministers of the Crown during the past half-century, they would not find them in the archives of Dublin Castle, but they would find them in rich profusion in the annals of all our great self-governing Colonies. It was only in these young and progressive countries that Irishmen of energy and ability had found a fair field and no favour, and the history of Greater Britain told in almost every page how largely and successfully they had availed themselves of the opportunities for distinction that the Colonies cast in their way. To him, therefore, and he thought he might add to many other gentlemen also sitting in that quarter of the House, colonial expansion meant increased opportunities for Irishmen to come to the front, and on that ground also, even if there were no other and larger considerations involved, he would be a cordial supporter of the South African policy of Mr. Rhodes. Of course, he did not for a moment deny that there had been some painful and regrettable incidents in connection with colonial expansion in South Africa. But, unfortunately, there was nothing new in that. The history of colonisation in every quarter of the globe was, as they all knew, largely concerned with the deplorable misunderstandings and consequential unhappy conflicts with aboriginal tribes. Judging from the experience of the past, such collisions would seem to be inevitable. No good purpose was served by painting them in the darkest and most sensational colours, or by making them a ground of charge against a Colonising Company, when it was undeniable that they were almost always accidental accompaniments of the work of colonisation. He (Mr. Hogan) would yield to no one in strongly condemning and earnestly deprecating any and every form of wanton ill-treatment of native races by white colonists. Every reasonable precaution should be taken to safeguard native rights and liberties, but it was not fair or just to sweepingly condemn a great Colonising Company on account of the imprudence or misconduct of a few of its officials. He had gone carefully through the Blue Book that had just been issued, and he had failed to discover any substantial evidence to justify the cry that had been raised in some quarters for the revoking of the Charter of the British South Africa Company. Some of the officials of that Company might have made mistakes in their dealings with the natives—that was only what might have been expected in the light of past colonial experience—but the Company itself must be credited by all fair-minded men with a conspicuous success in the work of pioneer colonisation. It was entitled to whatever rewards it might reap from its adventurous enterprise, and stay-at-home Britons, instead of cavilling, criticising and depreciating it, should as a matter of right and justice recognise and acknowledge that the British South Africa Company had done valuable pioneering work for the British race—work that the Colonial Office had neither the machinery, the adaptability, nor the elasticity to accomplish. He trusted, therefore, that the Imperial Government would be careful to do nothing that might impede the progress of colonial expansion to the North of the Cape, that they would place the wishes and requirements of the colonists concerned in the forefront of their policy, and that they would cheerfully and effectually co-operate with the Prime Minister of the Cape in laying broad and deep the foundations of the future South African Dominion.

* MR. D. CRAWFORD (Lanark, N.E.)

said, it was not a grateful task to prolong the discussion, even for a short time, after he appeal of the Prime Minister, but he thought this was an occasion upon which the Government were all the better for hearing a little plainly some of the feeling which their own followers entertained. As a nation they professed a high standard of morality in their dealings with uncivilised and inferior races. We were not slow to criticise the French in their dealings with Siam, nor to blame the United States for their action towards the North-American Indians, and to allege that their treatment of the negroes had brought upon them a lasting curse and pestilence. But there were circumstances attending the proceedings of this country in South Africa which ought to make them modest in condemning the conduct of other nations. He could say that he should not have intruded himself on the House if he had not felt the matter deeply, as he knew they were all anxious to get on with other business in which they were deeply interested. He should not have intervened if he had not thought it was a very serious question indeed whether their honour and reputation as a nation—which might have very lasting and international consequences—were safe under the present system. He did not think the attitude of the Government on this question entirely satisfactory. No one new better than he did that it would be impossible for any Ministers to administer the affairs of their office more humanely than was done by the present Secretary of State for the Colonies and his lion. Friend the Under Secretary. But it was difficult for the Government to do what was fair and right in the interests of the native races. It was quite possible to hold that opinion and yet not to impute any serious moral blame to any person concerned. He did not blame the Chartered Company, which naturally was pushing its commercial interests as far and as widely as it could. He also admitted that Sir H. Loch had been very anxious to preserve the peace, and it was clear that the Government, even in their own interest, were very desirous to do everything to avert war. The evil lay in the system, but that did not relieve the Government of a great responsibility. It had been said they ought to defer in this matter to the wishes of the Colony. He admitted that the wishes of the Colony were entitled to all respect, and if it were possible for the House of Commons and Parliament to divest themselves of responsibility in that country, and hand over responsibility to the Colony, he for one would only be too happy. But it was not possible. It had not been said, and it could not be said, that the Government and Parliament had no responsibility in the administration of South Africa, and certainly the last responsibility which Ave ought to abdicate was the protection of the natives. It had been claimed by his hon. Friend the Member for the Rushcliffe Division (Mr. J. E. Ellis), and those for whom, he spoke, that justice, humanity, and mercy should be dealt out to the natives of South Africa, and that, claim had been admitted by the Prime Minister. He must say it appeared to him, on a careful perusal of the Papers, that, neither justice, humanity, nor mercy, and least of all justice, had been dealt out in this instance. The first question—not, that he was about to raise many, still less to read long extracts from the Blue Book—was whether this war was necessary at all? He had the very gravest doubts whether it was necessary, and it was in that connection only that he was inclined to lay some special blame on the High Commissioner, because it was admitted on all hands that King Lobengula was personally desirous to keep the peace, and the war—the cause was reduced to very narrow limits—was said to have been provoked by a raid upon Fort Victoria and the neighbourhood. It had been admitted by all speakers in the Debate that Lobengula spoke the truth when he said the object of the raid, so far as he was concerned, was not directed in any way against the white population but to recover some cattle which he conceived belonged to him, and to punish some people who had injured the telegraph wires, which was pursuing the matter in our interests. That raid was accompanied by the death of some of the Mashonaland people employed at Fort Victoria. That was severely punished on the spot, as a Chief and more than 30 men were killed by the people at Fort Victoria. Surely that was sufficient punishment and satisfaction for that raid. Messages and correspondence followed about it, and at first the letters of Lobengula were most apologetic. He disclaimed any intention of doing any harm to the whites, and expressed his regret that his impi had exceeded their instructions. What followed upon that was this—and here he would road the only quotation with which he would trouble the House. Sir Henry Loch sent a most injudicious and, he thought, most insolent message to the King, that made the King entirely alter his tone. Sir Henry Loch wrote to say— Dr. Jameson made friendly endeavours to restrain your people, and induce them to retire; but when the conduct of your Indunas and people became dangerous, not only to the property but to the lives of the white men, and they dared to fire on the white men, then the limits of patience were passed; but still, to prove to your people how dangerous it was to meddle with white men, Dr. Jameson, instead of sending forward the hundreds he had at his command, sent forward only a mere handful of white men, who charged and scattered your impi like chaff is blown before the wind, and charged them for miles, killing more than double their own number. That was the reply the High Commissioner thought himself well advised to send to the friendly and apologetic messages of this King, and that entirely altered his tone. He was a savage, no doubt a cruel savage, but he was a person of great importance in his own country, and when he was told that his men would be driven like chaff before the wind his tone altered, and became hostile and threatening, though even then he did not think there was any reason for an aggressive movement. That was the whole alleged cause of the war, and he thought it was unprovoked. He would ask the House to consider the position of this King Lobengula, and this was a matter in which the Government had left them too much in the dark. What was the international and legal position of this King? Let them put themselves for a moment in his position. It was only five years ago, in 1888, that the first advances were made to this savage Prince. He was then ruling in his own country under a title that was unquestioned. In the name of the British Government they did not say—"You are a chief of a robber horde, we do not acknowledge your title." If they had said that, the situation would have been entirely different, whether such a course could have been defended or not. But those who approached him did so as suppliants, asking the favour to sink mines. That was granted, and then, so lately as 1891, Lobengula gave another concession to some Germans, on the footing of settling farms, thinking, no doubt, that by granting this second concession within the same limits as the former, he was establishing some sort of check, and obtaining some sort of security for his independence. But the second concession was immediately bought up by the Company, and so the check was gone. Still, the independent position of Lobengula remained. He never renounced any jurisdiction within his own country. That was shown in their own Blue Book; and Sir Henry Loch expressly stated that neither the Mashonas nor the Matabele were British subjects. The attitude of the Government expressed by his hon. Friend (Mr. S. Buxton) and by the Prime Minister was that it was expedient that the military power of the Matabele should be broken, and that peace and good government could not be secured to the country till that was done. That might be so; but what right had they to invade the country and establish a system of their own? He had searched in vain for any definition of a boundary between Matabeleland and Mashonaland. The Member for Clare (Mr. Maguire) pointed out that no such boundary existed. Why, then, should Lobengula be held to have made an aggression, and why could the Chartered Company be defended in driving him out of his Kingdom and slaughtering thousands of his best men? He did not suppose that Lobengula would be qualified by his manners for a seat in the House of Commons; but he was a Sovereign in his own dominions, for all that. And it would be remembered that, though white men and women were resident at his kraal up to the last, he had not hurt a hair of their heads, nor had he injured any of the white colonists in the rest of the country. The Leader of the Opposition pointed to the three ways of dealing with a white population settled on the fringe of civilisation—to leave matters to chance, which resulted badly for the natives; or to call in the Imperial Government, or to grant to Chartered Companies. One reason why a Chartered Company could, so to speak, run the thing upon the cheap was that they were able to plant settlements, which they had no sufficient force to protect, in the midst of wild, uncivilised tribes, because they knew that they had the force of the Empire behind them. In this case the injury which was done to the Chartered Company was slight in the extreme. Not a single white man was injured; and yet the course they took by way of reprisals was to drive those unfortunate people out of their country altogether. He did not forget the statement of his hon. Friend (Mr. S. Buxton), that they were not to be permanently dispossessed. He hoped that pledge would be remembered. But the objection to government by the Chartered Company was that the system never could secure just and fair treatment for the natives. The officers of such Companies were not subject to the slightest Imperial responsibility—they had not those high traditions of public duty that Imperial officers had. The temptation was great, and there were too many instances in which the subordinate officers appeared to regard the natives as something like big game which it was their pleasure to shoot down. His right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and his hon. Friend (Mr. S. Buxton) objected to the use of the word "massacre."

MR. S. BUXTON

dissented.

* MR. CRAWFORD

said, he would not apply that word to the deplorable slaughter on the field of battle; but if he did use it with reference to the attack on Ngomo's kraal it would not be misapplied, and lie doubted much whether the same might not be said of the repulse of the Victoria raid. He admitted that the influence of the white man must expand, and the British sway must extend. In a place like Africa there was not the choice of leaving the natives in permanent independence. If Great Britain did not take her part another civilised Power could stop in. They ought to take their part, but it must be done in a manner consistent with the humane traditions of this country. If the Chartered Company could not conform to those traditions, they ought not to be allowed to act in the name of the country. The system of Chartered Companies had, as some of them predicted would be the case, involved them in war in Uganda and in war here, and he trusted they had now seen the end of that system. It was difficult to say what was to be done now; but he asked that the Government should declare in a more unequivocal manner than they had yet done their complete acceptance of the responsibility of the situation. It was all very well to give due weight to the opinion of the Cape Colony, but the Cape Colony was an interested party. It might be very difficult to resist the opinion of the Cape Colony, but if a Liberal Government was worth anything at all and a question of human life was at stake, let them show a little of the courage of their principles. Let them not desert their principles even for the sake of popularity. As the Government had asserted a right of sovereignty over these territories, however this had been acquired, let them accept the responsibilities of that sovereignty and see that justice was done to the subjects of the Queen, if subjects they were, whether they were black or white.

Mr. Bucknill (Surrey, Epsom)

rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

MR. LABOUCHERE

rose——

MR. SPEAKER

Order!

Question, "That the Question be now put," put, and agreed to.

MR. LABOUCHERE

If I am not too late, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

* MR. SPEAKER

That cannot now be done. The Motion that the Question be now put being agreed to, it is not competent for the hon. Member to withdraw his Motion.

Question, "That this House do now adjourn," put accordingly, and negatived.