THE BEHRING SEA ARBITRATION. (Hansard, 20 March 1893)

MR. GIBSON BOWLES (Lynn Regis)
rose to move a reduction of which he had given notice.

§ MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton),
rising to a point of Order, asked whether he would not be debarred from moving a reduction of which he had given notice if the hon. Member moved his first?

§ THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (Mr. MELLOR,) York, W.R., Sowerby
No, I think the hon. Member will not he prejudiced.

MR. GIBSON BOWLES
said, he had to move that, in Class V., Vote 1, the item should be reduced by £4,000 on account of the Behring Sea Arbitration. He desired to do so on account of the grave importance of the question involved, and because he believed its gravity had escaped the attention alike of the late and the present Government. The matters involved were no less than the freedom of the high seas, the livelihood of a most important British colony, and the question whether that colony was or was not to be coerced by the Mother Country. He would, as briefly as possible, lay out the ground on which the question arose, and state the question itself. At the northern corner of the Pacific Ocean lay the Behring Sea between Asia and America at the point where those two continents approached each other, and where Siberia, as it were, stretched forth a hand to Alaska. The sea was 3,00C miles long and 2,700 miles broad. It ran at its northern end into the Behring Straits, and at its southern extremity there stretched for two-thirds across it a chain of islands, the Aleutian Islands, whereof he was particularly concerned with one group, consisting of the Islands of Priby-loff, St. Paul, and St. George. They were barren islands, surrounded all the year round by fogs, and producing nothing but moss and grass, but they were the home of the fur seal—or rather the honeymoon and nursing-ground of that seal, for it was only during certain months of the year—namely, from May till August, that the fur seal resorted to 528 them. When the seal arrived there it met a very serious enemy. He would quote from a statement of Professor Elliott, an eminent American, and a member of the Smithsonian Institute, who, writing in 1890, said that the fur seal moved more easily on land than all other seals, but it was an unusual and laborious effort even when voluntary. Professor Elliott added that, when thousands of young seals were suddenly roused to their utmost power of land locomotion, over rough land, rocks, and other impediments, they exerted themselves most violently, and crowded one upon the other, so that many were actually smothered by the rest. He went on to show that the seals were treated most cruelly, and that when they had been driven many miles inland they were clubbed and killed. The seals had other enemies besides those on land, as they were met on their way to and from the islands by numbers of sealing vessels. Those on board these vessels did not treat them with the cruelty exercised on the islands, as they merely shot the seals through the head as they were lying on the surface of the water. Almost the first notice taken in history of the Behring Sea was to be found in a Russian Ukase issued in 1821. That Ukase ran as follows:— Section 1. The pursuits of commerce, whaling, and fishing, and of all other industry on all islands, ports, and gulfs, including the whole of the north-west coast of America, beginning from Behring's Strait to 151° of northern latitude; also from the Aleutian Islands to the eastern coast of Siberia, as well as along the Kurile Islands from Behring's Strait to the South Cape of the Island of Urup—namely, to 45° 50' northern latitude, are exclusively granted to Russian subjects. Section 2. It is, therefore, prohibited to all foreign vessels not only to land on the coasts and islands belonging to Russia, as stated above, but also to approach them within less than 100 Italian miles. The transgressor's vessel is subject to confiscation along with the whole cargo. This was a claim to regard the Behring Sea as a mare clausum, instead of which he maintained it had always been a mare liberum. When the American Government remonstrated with the Russian Government, as they did at once, they were told that the sea had all the qualities of a close sea. It was unnecessary to tell the House that a claim to so vast an amount of water as this was one entirely new to every publicist, 529 and was opposed to the teaching and doctrine of every publicist of eminence. The protest of the United States was conveyed in a letter from Mr. Adams, in which he said— This pretension is to be considered not only with reference to the question of territorial right, but also to the prohibition to the vessels of other nations, including those of the United States, to approach within 100 Italian miles of the coasts. From the period of the existence of the United States as an independent nation their vessels have freely navigated those seas, and the right to navigate them is a part of that independence. England protested at the same time, and the result was that the claim, which he could not but look upon as a fraudulent claim and an imposture, to regard this sea as a closed sea, was entirely withdrawn by Conventions entered into by Russia with the United States and England in 1824 and 1825. These Conventions stipulated that the subjects of the United States and of England could have free rights of navigation in the Behring Sea. Thus ended the first act of this drama. The second act began with the acquisition by the United States of the territory of Alaska. This took place in 1867, and amounted to a purchase by the United States of Alaska from the Russian Government for 7,000,000 dollars. The Treaty which ceded Alaska to the United States used the words "the territory of Alaska and the adjacent islands." No mention was made of the sea itself, except that an imaginary line was drawn over the sea about two-thirds across, this line being supposed to separate the territories of America and Russia. Throe years later the American Government entered into a contract with a company then known as the Alaska Commercial Company. The contract was renewed in 1886 virtually to the same company, and ceded to them the right of sealing and taking seals in the Pribyloff and other islands. In the same year Congress passed an Act prohibiting sealing by anybody except the agents of the company on these islands and in the waters adjacent thereto. One would have imagined that the waters adjacent thereto meant, as it usually did mean, the three miles limit. The purpose, however, of the Act was to give the company not merely a monopoly of the sealing upon the land, but to hand over to them every 530 seal in every part of the Behring Sea, where the United States Government had no lawful jurisdiction at all. The only claim which the United States could have to the sea must rest, and did rest, on a renewal of the Russian claim to regard the Behring Sea as a closed sea. He contended that this Act of Congress was a usurpation not in the interests of the whole of the inhabitants of the United States, but in the interests of a close monopoly, and the first denunciations of the measure came from the United States itself. Messrs. Handy and Co., of San Francisco, in 1887, said of the company— It has taken possession of, and assumed sovereign power over, the moat valuable fisheries of the whole United States—namely, the Alaska fisheries in Behring's Sea, and without shadow of right or authority, except a lease from the United States, dated the 3rd August, 1870, permitting it to kill 100,000 seals annually upon two small islands in Behring's Sea at a rent of 55,000 dollars per annum, &c.; has taken possession and control not only of the territory, but also of a vast sea, 3,000 miles long by 2,700 miles wide; has made itself the suzerain of the Government, and impressed into its service the officers and agents of the Government to maintain its possession and control of this immense territory and sea. That protest was taken up and re-echoed by the citizens of the Dominion of Canada, for they had been accustomed to, and were still proposing to, lit out scaling schooners in order to earn their livelihood by fishing in the high seas. The third act of the drama began with the first systematic seizures which took place in 1886 of American and British vessels in the Behring Sea. A Correspondence ensued. He was bound to say that reading through the thousands of pages of the Blue Book that had thence arisen he was struck with the great superiority of the American Correspondence to that which had issued from this side of the water. He attributed it to the fact that the American Minister was a Minister who was not diverted from his Ministerial duties by having to go about the country and make speeches in defence of his Party and in depreciation of the other Party. The Americans began very mildly indeed. The first vessels seized in 1886 were released, although not until they had pretty nearly fallen to pieces. As the matter went on, however, the Americans got stronger and we weaker. At last, in February, 1888, Mr. Blaine 531 proposed to Lord Salisbury that a close time should be fixed for seals. Lord Salisbury with great readiness seemed to have agreed to that proposal, which he forwarded to the Canadian Government, the proposition being that there should be a close time for seals in all the seas north of the 47th degree of latitude from the 15th April to the 1st November. The House would see that such a close time would have amounted to a complete prohibition of all pelagic sealing. The Canadians rejected the proposition with scorn, and expressed surprise that such a proposal should ever have been made or entertained by anyone. Of course, more Correspondence ensued, and the Correspondence was brought to an end and summed up on the American side by Mr. Blaine's Despatch on the 13th June, 1880, and on the English side by what he must call the most forcible, admirable, and conclusive Despatch of Lord Salisbury on August 2, 1890. Our right was as clear as any right a nation could have. It had existed unquestioned for many years. The attempt to interfere with it was denounced not merely by us, but by American subjects themselves, and to his great pleasure and surprise he found that the proper attitude for England to take up—an attitude so firm that even if we went to the verge of war we should have protected the freedom of the high seas— was advocated by no less a Body than the International Arbitration and Peace Association. Writing on the 6th of December, 1889, they say— The proceedings of the United States cruisers in seizing and sequestrating—and, in some cases, confiscating—the vessels and cargoes of British subjects engaged in fisheries on the open sea, have caused—as, no doubt, your Lordship is too well aware—excessive and prolonged irritation amongst our fellow-citizens of the Canadian Dominion, as it would appear that those in command of Her Majesty's vessels on the Pacific coast feel themselves for some reason unable to check the high-handed proceedings of the United States cruisers; while those measures of redress long since demanded by Her Majesty's Government and ostensibly conceded by the United States Government do not appear to have ever been carried out or compensation made to the victims of admittedly lawless seizures. Then the Committee of the Association tried to encourage Lord Salisbury and to stiffen his attitude on the question. He believed this was the first time this Association had intervened in such a way, and suggested strong action to a British or 532 to any other Government. Yet our right was not admitted or maintained. In July, 1891, a modus vivendi was accepted, by which we prohibited the sealers from sealing in the Behring Sea on condition that the Alaska Company should be prohibited from killing more than 7,500 seals—a number which it was said it was necessary to kill in order to provide the natives with food. Lord Salisbury for a long time held out for a power of supervision over this arrangement, and it was subsequently found that whilst the British sealers were prevented from killing any seals, the American Company killed not 7,500, but over 12,000. The Treaty of Arbitration was signed in February, 1892, and a remarkable Treaty it was. It provided that six points were to be submitted to the arbitrators. The first was—What exclusive jurisdiction in the Behring Sea, and what exclusive rights in the fisheries therein, did Russia assert and exercise prior to the acquisition of Alaska by the United States? The one question between the two countries was whether the Behring Sea was a free and open sea or a closed sea, and the 1st Article did not touch that question at all? The second point was—How far were these claims of jurisdiction as to the seal fisheries recognized and conceded by Great Britain? That also did not touch the real question in dispute. The third point was—Whether the Behring's Sea was included in the phrase "Pacific Ocean," as used in the Treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia, and what rights, if any, in the Behring's Sea were given or conceded to Great Britain by that Treaty? That question again, he submitted, in no way touched the real point in dispute. The 4th Article asked— Did not all the rights of Russia as to jurisdiction and as to seal fisheries in Behring's Sea east of the water boundary, in the Treaty between the United States and Russia, of the 30th of March, 1867, pass unimpaired to the United States under that Treaty? Well, of course they did—such rights as Russia had. This 4th Article, again, did not raise the real and only question — namely, whether the Behring's Sea was not open to all mankind? The 5th Article asked whether the United States had any right to the protection of and property in the fur seals in the Behring's Sea, and, if so, 533 how such rights arose? Nowhere could he find raised the one true question involved in this matter—namely, whether the sea was or was not an open sea. The 7th Article of the Treaty declared— If the determination of the foregoing questions as to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall leave the subject in such position that the concurrence of Great Britain is necessary to the establishment of regulations for the proper protection and preservation of the fur seal in, or habitually resorting to, the Behring Sea, the arbitrators shall then determine what concurrent regulations outside the jurisdictional limits of the respective Governments are necessary. That was a proposal to put the Behring Sea under a Council of Nations, and Great Britain was to take part in it, he supposed, to exclude all other people from the sea. There was another question to which he wished to direct attention. If the United States had the right to exclude our vessels from the sea, then, undoubtedly, what they had done was in the exercise of their right; but if they had no right, then compensation was due to the seal fishers. The principle of compensation had been fully admitted by our Government, for we had already ourselves paid the compensation to the sealers. That principle seemed to him as the necessary corollary to the one, the only true, question to be decided—whether this was or was not an open sea? But that was expressly excluded by Article 8, which ran— The high contracting parties having found themselves unable to agree upon a reference which shall include the question of the liability of each for the injuries alleged to have been sustained by the other, or by its citizens, in connection with the claims presented and urged by it; and, being solicitous that this subordinate question should not interrupt or longer delay the submission or determination of the main questions, do agree that either may submit to the arbitrators any question of fact involved in such claims, and ask for a finding thereon, the question of the liability of either Government upon the facts found to be the subject of further negotiation. Therefore, the main question was not put before the arbitrators at all. It might be alluded to as a corollary question, but was not to be decided by the arbitrators, but was to be the subject of further negotiation. Arbitration was bad for us. He would go further, and say was always bad for us. There were three methods of settling this or any other serious question that 534 arose between nations. They might compromise the matter. They might wrangle and chaffer for a time, and then come to some agreement. There were great advantages in that manner of settlement. They might get something to which they were entitled, and feel, at the same time, that contentment had been fostered between the two nations. They might, in the second place, surrender the whole matter—in this case the freedom of the Behring Sea. There were advantages in that mode of settlement. At any rate, they would be entitled to the gratitude of the nation to whom they had surrendered, and they would, in all probability, foster in the nation that sort of feeling which was engendered between private individuals, when one was able to say, "He acted like a gentleman," which meant that the gentleman had given up something to which he was entitled. There was a third mode—the resistance of any infraction of rights by war. There were great advantages in that mode of settlement—advantages such as an increase of trade. [Cries of "Oh, oh!"] Yes, trade had increased when war was waged with all the strength of England, and he was sure that that was an argument that would go to the hearts of hon. Gentlemen on the Ministerial Benches. But there were other advantages in war. War led to a final settlement of the question in dispute, an I left behind it sentiments of mutual respect for the bravery shown in conflict. But he saw no advantage at all to this country in a settlement by arbitration. He would tell the Committee why: because we had not a single friend on the Continent of Europe. We had many advantages, but we had also the signal advantage of being envied and hated by every people and nation on the Continent of Europe. There was not a nation in Europe that would not take the opportunity of giving a decision against this country, and, therefore, we could have no confidence in any Court of Arbitration. Take the facts. There was the Alabama case. He admitted we were wrong in that case. But that was owing to the action of the Government of hon. Gentlemen on the Ministerial Benches, who allowed the Alabama to escape while they were making up their 535 minds whether they ought to stop her. Then there was the Delagoa Bay dispute. That was settled against us though we had justice on our side. Then there was the San Juan dispute. We had justice on our side in that case also, but the arbitration wont against us. In fact, in 99 cases out of 100 cases of arbitration, the award would be always given against England, whatever the merits of the case might be. The primary question involved was the right of our Canadian fellow-subjects to this fishery. The right of England, and the other nations of the earth to the high seas was also involved. But what specially affected us was whether we were or were not entering upon a new system of coercion of the British Colonies. On one side of the American Continent we were preparing for the coercion of the Newfoundlanders to allow fishing off their coasts—fishing to which, he maintained, the other party concerned had no right or title; and on the other side of the American Continent we were trying to coerce the Canadians from fishing the high seas. Had we forgotten the lesson taught us 100 years ago by those who were then our fellow-citizens in the Northern States of America? To enter into any system of coercion against Canada would be most unfortunate and should be deprecated. He thought it his duty to put the actual facts of this matter before the country, and to point out that through this arbitration we might be forced into the discreditable policy of using coercion to drive Canada into a course of conduct we had no title to drive her into. If we were not able to protect the freedom of the high seas in times of peace, if we were not able to maintain control over them in time of war; if we submitted to arbitration, the question whether or not we were to be allowed to traverse the high seas, and if we were induced to use coercion towards Canada, then all the bleating Despatches written in the Foreign Office would not hide the fact that the greatness of England was gone. The hon. Member concluded by moving to reduce Item M by £4,000, on account of the Behring Sea Arbitration.

§ THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir EDWARD GREY,) Northumberland, Berwick
The hon. Gentleman has ended his speech, moving this reduction, by stating his grave apprehension that this Arbitration would lead to the coercion of Canada. That apprehension of his is founded upon two promises: first, that the verdict of the Arbitration will be given entirely against our side of the ease (which, I think, is a contention that cannot be founded on any argument or on any knowledge in our possession); and, secondly, it is founded on another premise, that if the verdict of the Arbitration is adverse to us Canada will refuse to recognise that verdict. Now, Canada is represented on the Arbitration Board, and bears part of the expenses of the Arbitration, and I think it is a reflection on the loyalty of that bolony when the hon. Member presupposes that if, in the result, the verdict should not be in accordance with her wishes she will not be prepared to abide by it loyally. As regards the rest of the hon. Gentleman's speech, I think that it is most singularly inopportune. I will give a small instance of its inopportuneness first. The hon. Member dealt with the habits of the fur seal in an interesting statement. Indeed, he spoke with a knowledge that seemed to be carefully acquired; but this House has not yet full access to the sources of knowledge which they will presently have as to the habits of the animals. The Joint Commissioners sent out by this country and the United States have investigated this question carefully on the spot; they have presented Reports, which will he laid before the Court of Arbitration, and the Government is willing to publish these Reports as soon as consent is obtained from the United States and the Court of Arbitration. It would, therefore, have been more opportune had the hon. Member waited for these Reports before inviting us to discuss the habits of the seal. But the inopportuneness of the speech was of a far more serious character than that. The hon. Member stated clearly that he does not wish to have any arbitration at all. If the hon. Member does not wish for arbitration he ought to have provided a satisfactory alternative for it. He suggested three courses as alternatives. 537 The first was wrangling and chaffing.

MR. GIBSON BOWLES
I said "chaffering."

§ SIR E. GREY
It makes no difference to my point. The hon. Member suggested wrangling and chaffering between this Government and the Government with whom we have the difficulty. That may be a proceeding more or less interesting or more or less prolonged; but I do not see how it could lead to any definite conclusion of the differences which exist between the parties. Next, the hon. Member suggested surrender, but this the Government are not prepared to do. The hon. Member also said the Government might go to war, but this step also we certainly are not prepared to take. If there were any party of Members in this House who wished now at the eleventh hour—in fact, it is long past that hour so far as arbitration is concerned—who wished to dismiss arbitration and go for some other alternative, it is too late to adopt such a course consonant with the honour of the country, considering how far arbitration is gone. But there is no such party in the House. There is no such party on the other side of the House, where sit the Members of the Government who signed the Treaty of Arbitration, and on this side of the House there is nothing but a feeling of satisfaction and relief that this matter has been referred for settlement to arbitration. I say that even to enter into a discussion of the arbitration leaves us open to a suspicion that we are dissatisfied with the arbitrators or that we are not prepared to abide by their decision; or that we have discovered some point of weakness in our case. I do not think we wish to lay ourselves open to any of these suspicions. I do not believe that the House of Commons feel any want of confidence in the arbitrators, who will begin their labours this week, or that we have any idea of giving to the United States the impression that we do not intend to be loyally bound by the result. On these grounds I ask the Committee not to enter into a discussion, but to allow the Vote to pass, and so sanction an arrangement entered into by the late Government, carried on by the present Government and which we hope will end in a satisfactory solution.

MR. J. W. LOWTHER (Cumberland, Penrith)
I only rise for the purpose of adding a few words to what the right hon. Gentleman opposite has said with a view of impressing on my hon. Friend the Member for Lynn Regis the undesirability of continuing this discussion. After listening to the very exhaustive and full, and, so far as I was able to judge, the accurate, statement which the hon. Gentleman gave of the whole history of the Behring Sea question, I am sure the House will regret the absence of the right hon. Gentleman during the whole of the last Parliament from the Councils of this House. But I fully agree with what the right hon. Gentleman opposite has said. This question, so far as this House is concerned, is practically a concluded question. We are on the point, within a day or two, of entering into arbitration upon these very matters. The Treaty of Arbitration has now been signed, and I cannot help thinking—though my hon. Friend behind me may have doubts upon it—that the whole of the points at issue between ourselves and the United States Government are fairly and fully contained in the five points of the 6th Article of the Treaty of Arbitration. My hon. Friend laid special stress on one point. He said that nowhere in the Treaty was the question raised as to whether the Behring Sea was or was not an open sea. I contend that in the fifth paragraph of the 6th Article that question is fully raised. It is to this effect— Has the United States any right, and, if so, what right, of the property in the fur seals frequenting the islands of the United States of the Behring Sea, when such seals are found outside the ordinary three-mile limit. That raises the whole point. That is the vital point of the arbitration, and upon that point the arbitrators will be able to come to a decision. But as I rose to impress on my hon. Friend the advisability of not continuing the Debate, I do not wish to continue it myself. We have full confidence that the arbitrators will hear our case most carefully and considerately; and whilst having full confidence in the justice of the case, which we shall plead before the Court of Arbitration, we have equal confidence that administrators will do their best to administer justice and settle for all time the unhappy difficulty that has arisen in 539 this question between ourselves and the United States, who have dealt with us in a very amicable manner in this dispute.

§ MR. HUNTER (Aberdeen, N.)
said, he was surprised that the speech of the hon. Member for Lynn Regis should have been begun, as we were on the eve of entering into arbitration; but, having been begun, he was extremely surprised that it ever should have come to an end. The hon. Gentleman occupied an hour in his speech, but with the material at his disposal in the Blue Books, the Committee should be thankful for having been let off so lightly, for the hon. Member might have gone on for six hours. The point of the speech of the hon. Member seemed to be this: Lord Salisbury, in the management of the Behring Sea difficulty, has been scandalously weak. He agreed with the hon. Member. But what was the use of raking up questions of that sort? Lord Salisbury was always scandalously weak in dealing with a stronger Power; but he made up for it by being scandalously strong in dealing with a weak one.

MR. GIBSON BOWLES
After the representations which have been made to me I wish to withdraw my Motion.