SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.

HC Deb 07 March 1893 vol 9 cc1253-93

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

76,700 men and boys for the Navy.

THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Sir U. KAY-SHUTTLE-WORTH,) Lancashire, Clitheroe

Mr. Mellor,—Before the Committee proceed to consider in detail the Estimates which it is my duty to bring before the House, I propose briefly to put before the Committee a few salient points. I have no desire to trouble the Committee with a long speech, but would rather confine the few observations I wish to make to a business-like statement. I would refer the Committee, if they desire a fuller statement on these points, or if they desire informations on other points which I may not think it necessary to dwell upon, to the statement circulated to Members of the House in the name of the First Lord of the Admiralty. I can also refer them to the Estimates themselves and to the programme which they contain for matters of detail to which I do not refer. As this is the first time that I have the honour to represent the Admiralty in the House of Commons, I think I may confidently appeal to the kindness of hon. Members and the readiness of the House to make reasonable allowances for one who has only been in Office six months, and who necessarily has to deal with a vast amount of detail that has been altogether new to him. I think I may at the outset take credit on behalf of the Board of Admiralty on one point—namely, that the Estimates have been in the hands of Members of the House at an earlier date than for many years past. When I first went to the Admiralty one of my earnest wishes was that the Estimates might be prepared in better time than they have been for years past, and I desire to thank not only in this, but in a great many other respects, the permanent officials at the Admiralty for the loyal, hearty, and able assistance they have rendered in preparing them. Now, I would first of all, with the permission of the Committee, deal with the question of numbers, which is the point immediately before the Committee in this Vote. There has been a continuous increase from year to year in the numbers proposed to this House. That increase affects the year in which it is proposed only partially, but it affects also the subsequent year. I will not trouble the House with many figures on the subject, but it is proposed that 76,700 men and boys should be voted for 1893–94; that is 2,600 in excess of the numbers voted last year, and 7,900 in excess of those voted three years ago. I will mention what is the consequent annual increase of charge on Votes 1 and 2. The increase in those Votes in 1891 was £134,000, in 1892 nearly £186,000, and in the Estimates I am now proposing it will be nearly £146,000. It would be more but for a fact which bas fortunately come to my rescue—namely, the fall in prices that has taken place during the past year. But for the fall in prices the increase on the Victualling and Clothing Vote would have been very much greater. In connection with the subject of the increase of numbers, I think I ought at once to refer to what was begun under the late Government and what is being now completed—namely, a thorough inquiry into the important question of the manning of the Fleet. The need for an increased number of men is obviously consequent on the increased number of ships under the Northbrook and Naval Defence Act programmes. In the summer of 1891 the difficulty of manning the ships as they were got ready for commission became acute. Consequently, the Admiralty appointed a very strong Manning Committee to consider the subject of manning the ships. It consisted of the First, Second, and Junior Naval Lords of the Admiralty, and two secretaries, of whose labours and the services they rendered I ought to speak in the highest terms. The objects of the Committee were manifold. They considered the needs of the 1894 Fleet, when the ships constructed under the Naval Defence Act were completed; and, first, what ships would constitute the War Fleet, and, secondly, whether the complements for the new ships needed revision. Action was at once taken. The complements were revised and brought up to date. The whole question of the manning of the ships had never before been considered. The complements of old sailing ships—and in this the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Admiral Field) will bear me out—had been patched, and altered, and revised according to the needs or to the altered circumstances which had arisen with the introduction of steam, and other changes in the Fleet. But no regular inquiry had taken place as to what should be the complement of each individual ship. But after the inquiry which has taken place and the Report to the Board of Admiralty, every new complement of every ship in commission will be based on the Report of that Committee. I think the noble Lord opposite will be interested to know—if he does not know already— that this has been done within the last few days in the case of the new ship, the Royal Arthur, which was commissioned on March 2, and also in the case of the Victoria, which was re-commissioned and received a new crew on the same date. The complement of a ship will now be what an efficient Committee of great authority has judged to be necessary. The number of men needed for the Fleet of 1894 has been accurately ascertained. In order to carry out the arrangements it was necessary to increase the number of boys, at all events, for a time, and for the two years 1892–93 and 1893–94 the entry of boys has been raised up to 3,700 a year. It is calculated that the effect of that will be to more than cover the annual waste of the Fleet, and add considerably to the numbers in relation to the largely-increased number of ships. I have so far dealt mainly with the question of the War Fleet, but the needs of the Peace Fleet have also to be considered, and these have altered very remarkably. I do not know whether I need explain to the Committee the great change that has been introduced by the system of a Fleet Reserve. The large increase of ships in reserve rendered necessary the introduction of a new scheme for care and maintenance, and the ships are now put under the care of the Commander-in-Chief at each of the Home Ports as soon as completed. They are only put into the Reserve when they are quite complete, and skeleton crews are placed on board for their care and maintenance. One most important point in connection with these ships is that there should be a sufficient complement of men to keep the engines and the delicate machinery in perfect order. And the hon. Member for Lewisham (Mr. Penn) will be glad to hear that a proportionate addition of engine-room and artificer ratings is contemplated for such service. I may say, in passing, referring to the question which the hon. Member for Lewisham asked last night in respect to the Fleet at sea, that the number of engine-room artificers was very thoroughly considered, and referred by the Manning Committee to an Engineer Committee, which was composed of some of the most experienced men. The result was a very elaborate Report, which stated the number of engine-room ratings necessary for each ship in the Navy. They went into the matter carefully, and one result of their Report is, no doubt, that the number of engine-room artificers told off to each particular ship may be somewhat reduced, but the number of chief stokers will be increased. I will not explain why it is felt necessary to increase the number of stokers in order to make provision for the care of the engines of the ships when at sea. That is a subject of detail on which, if the hon. Member for Lewisham desires further information, I shall be happy to give it. There is another part of the Report which I ought to refer to, and that is the increase of 500 in the number of Marines. The increase in the number of ships obviously necessitated an increase in the number of Marines. This increase, the Manning Committee advised the Admiralty, should go on for two years more, until we have a total of 16,000 Marines, which is the number the Manning Committee consider will be necessary for the Fleet in 1894. Now, I think I have, perhaps, said enough on the subject of numbers. Returning to the question of money, I should like to explain the actual amount which we are about to expend during the ensuing year. In spite of the increase to which I have just alluded in respect of numbers, and the consequent effect upon the Votes for Men and Clothing and other items, we are now able to propose practically the same amount of money as was estimated for last year by the noble Lord opposite. Although the sum is £25,000 more than the Estimates of 1891–2, it is nearly £38,000 less than the expenditure of that year, because the expenditure of 1891–2 considerably exceeded the Estimate. But this result —of Estimates practically equal to those of a year ago—has been brought about not by cutting down new construction, but by a careful examination of each Vote, and the inclusion only of what is necessary, in the opinion of the Admiralty, for the efficiency of the Navy. I will at once come to what I think the noble Lord opposite and other Members of the House will be most anxious that I should dwell on—namely, the question of shipbuilding. I do not propose to enter upon details, because they will be dealt with on the Shipbuilding Vote. I recognise that it is usual to have a general discussion on Vote "A," therefore I will deal generally with the question of shipbuilding. The question has been asked, What is the amount which should annually be spent on shipbuilding? Though I do not propose to advance any reply of my own to that question, I will quote the figures estimated by my predecessor. We have followed the example of our predecessors in printing an estimate of the depreciation of our ships. Last year the waste of depreciation of the Navy was put down at £2,060,000, but, taking into consideration the increase of the Fleet, that figure has now risen to £2,150,000. Last year the late First Lord estimated in his Statement that an expenditure of a "constant annual amount" of £2,350,000 was necessary to keep the Navy up to the proper level. The amount the present Board propose to spend on shipbuilding is just under £3,000,000.

MR. FORWOOD (Lancashire, Ormskirk)

Does that include the armaments?

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

No, it does not. It includes the expenditure for the year on contract ships under the Naval Defence Act. For the contract ships the expenditure is £538,000, for the dockyard ships under the Naval Defence Act it is £1,381,572, and for the further programme, £1,062,159—making a total, to give the exact figures, of £2,982,086. These figures cut the ground from under the feet of those who either anticipated a prompt check to shipbuilding, or thought that in proposing the same Estimates we should have to cut that part of them down heavily. Adding the armaments, the expenditure this year will be over £4,000,000. You must remember that there is a charge on the Consolidated Fund of £1,428,571, which extends over seven years under the Naval Defence Act for contract ships, and, therefore, the charge on the taxes during the present year for shipbuilding and armaments is upwards of £4,400,000. I do not think I need dwell any longer on these figures. I will at once come to a point to which the old Board of Admiralty and the present Board of Admiralty equally attach great importance—namely, that when a ship is in hand—taking into consideration certain difficulties, and making a reservation with regard to them—it is desirable to complete her as rapidly as possible. We have had experience of the saving of money effected by the rapid completion of ships in two remarkable cases—that of the Royal Sovereign, in which the cost came under the estimate by over £32,000, and that of the Hood, where the saving is estimated at between £25,000 and £30,000. There are two great advantages besides economy in this rapid completion of certain ships. One of them is that we have ships immediately available in case of war. The Royal Sovereign and the Hood were available for war purposes at a much earlier date than would otherwise have been the case. There is another advantage of which we are now reaping the benefit—namely, that if you complete a ship, commission her, and send her to sea, you obtain valuable experience to guide you in designing future ships. There is another point to which the Admiralty attach great importance, and which is explained in the Statement issued by Lord Spencer—I refer to the re-construction of some of the older ships. The Admiralty are very much alive to the importance of what is called the second line of defence. For a second line some of the older ships are of great value if a certain amount of money is spent upon their reconstruction. That point has not been left out of sight either by the present or the late Board of Admiralty. I pass on now to some points connected with construction, which are of considerable moment. One is the construction of a number of smaller ships remarkable for their great speed, and commonly called torpedo-boat destroyers. The Board have been enabled by the arrangements they have made in the course of the last few months to build six of these ships in three different private yards. As soon as these are completed, and we have the experience which will be gained from their trials, it is proposed to construct 14 more, making 20 in all. These will be built by contract. I pass on to what is perhaps the most important feature of the contract work proposed by the present Board of Admiralty. It will be seen from the Estimates that it is proposed to build two great new cruisers. In the present Estimates only £57,500 are taken for each. The ships are to be called the Powerful and the Terrible, and their total cost will probably be over £700,000 each. They will be superior in speed, in coal capacity, in defence, and in armament to any cruisers that have been built or are building in any part of the world. Their construction has been forced upon the Admiralty by what is going on abroad. I do not think it is desirable that I should enter fully into this matter, but I may say the Admiralty have come to the conclusion that there is no part of our Programme of greater importance, or, indeed, more absolutely necessary for the defence of our great commerce than the construction of cruisers which will be superior to any existing in any part of the world. I may point out to the Committee that the possession by even a weak Power of cruisers more formidable than any possessed by ourselves might constitute a serious danger to British commerce. We may learn from the experience not of a weak Power but of a great Power—the United States in the case of the Alabama—what havoc a single cruiser can make in the commerce of a nation. It is thought by our advisers that there is nothing more important than that we should have cruisers surpassing in speed, coal-capacity, defence and armament, any cruiser that exists or is now building. So much for the contract work.

LORD G. HAMILTON (Middlesex, Ealing)

What are to be the dimensions of the new cruisers?

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

I am not prepared to give the dimensions. The designs are not yet completed, and, even if they were, I should ask the noble Lord not to press me too much on the point, because I do not think it is desirable that these details should be given too soon. I have said generally that it is contemplated that the cruisers shall be superior to any which either are in existence or are building. Leaving contract ships and coming to the dockyard work, it is proposed to build two battleships, which it was necessary to postpone last year, partly because of the hastening of the completion of the Hood and the Empress of India, and partly because of the necessity of getting on with the six torpedo-boat destroyers. These two battle-ships, three second-class cruisers, and two sloops, which are called in the Estimates "station gunboats," and are meant for foreign stations, constitute our dockyard programme. The two battle-ships are to be on similar lines to the Royal Sovereign. We are, however, profiting by the experience we have gained in the design of the Renown, and are increasing the auxiliary or secondary armament, substituting 12-inch for 13.5-inch guns, giving casemate protection to part of the secondary armament, and providing much stronger defence. These great battleships are thought necessary to enable us to keep up with the ships which are building in other countries. It is considered that the new ships will constitute sufficient provision for the coming year in view of the completion of five or six Naval Defence Act battle-ships during the year.

LORD G. HAMILTON

What are to be the dimensions?

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

I am not quite sure that it would be wise to give the dimensions because the designs are not yet quite complete, and I do not think it well that details should be given too early. The two ships will be larger than, and will cost rather more than the Royal Sovereign. The second-class cruisers will be called the Talbot, the Eclipse, and the Minerva. They will follow pretty closely while improving upon the Astrea cruisers of the late Government, and they are also designed to meet vessels which are being built abroad. I now come to the sloops, which are to be called the Torch and the Alert. They will have single screws and sails and are intended for foreign stations. An argument is sometimes used that we are going back a hundred years in resorting to sail power. In reply to that, I would mention that there is an immense advantage on certain of our stations, and particularly the Australian and Pacific stations, in having sail power for the purpose of saving coal. I will give an illustration. The Daphne was lately ordered to proceed from Esquimault to Hong Kong. After she had passed Honolulu the nearest coaling station in the direction of Hong-Kong was Yokohama, which was 3,600 miles distant. The vessel carries coal which is supposed to take her 3,400 miles, but a margin has to be added for contingencies, and probably a distance of 400 or 500 miles is the least that should be thus added. Under these circumstances she had to proceed by way of Fiji and the Torres Strait, a distance of 2,700 miles greater, although it was the hurricane season in the Pacific Islands, and she was likely to encounter dirty weather. The distance between Esquimault and Hong Kong for a steamer with sail power is 7,560 miles, and for a full-power steamer, viâ Yokohama, 7,840 miles, whilst the distance which the Daphne had to traverse was 10,540 miles. The Board of Admiralty recognised the importance of bearing these points in mind, and we think it well under the circumstances to have these two sloops constructed with masts and full sail power. As to the policy of the present Board of Admiralty I may say generally that it is like that of former Boards of Admiralty, to keep the Navy in such a condition that it will be able to give a good account of the fleets of more than one foreign nation, and to maintain the command of the seas for the protection of our commerce. The Board are satisfied that for the year 1893–4 the commencement of two battleships and two great cruisers is the proper way of fully discharging that duty, and that two cruisers are a more urgent need than the addition of more than two to our exceptional strength in battleships. There is another advantage to be gained by building these two cruisers rather than four battle-ships—namely, that the cost will fit in far more conveniently with the expenditure of the year 1894–5. That is a point which the Board of Admiralty cannot overlook, although I merely mention it as one of secondary importance. The noble Lord opposite (Lord G. Hamilton) asked a question yesterday as to the cost of our new ships. Although I do not wish to be absolutely bound by the figure, I may say that approximately his estimate of £5,000,000 as the total cost of the new ships proposed, including the torpedo boat destroyers, is about right. Perhaps I ought to say a word on the programme generally. I do not desire at this moment to re-open the old controversy as to the Naval Defence Act. I think it is quite sufficient to guard myself and those with whom I have the honour to act by saying that we on this side of the House are not enamoured of the policy of Acts of Parliament for these purposes. I will not enter into the objections, constitutional and administrative, which we entertain with regard to that system. We lay stress on the difference between a Naval Defence Act and a Naval Defence programme. I will admit at once that a programme is desirable. "We are only proposing a programme for one year. But I will not conceal from the House that we have examined the effects of our programme on the year 1894–5. This is a new Government, however, and we prefer to restrict our public announcements, to a programme for one year, and in the long run that will be found the best course. This, however, I will say: that we fully recognize the value of continuity of policy in naval administration, and confidently claim that we have done nothing inconsistent with a broad and wise interpretation of that term, continuity. In that sense and in that spirit I commend these proposals to the kind consideration of the House.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That 76,700 men and boys be employed for the Sea and Coast Guard Services for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1894, including 15,005 Royal Marines.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON (Middlesex, Ealing)

said: The right boil. Gentleman has given us a very fair statement as far as it goes, and when he asks for the consideration of the House, we, of course, are entitled to hear what he has to lay before us, and when, further, he tells us that his Government are acting in the direction of giving effect to the policy of the late Government, he may be confident that he will have the utmost consideration and support from this side of the House. But, Sir, notwithstanding the right hon. Gentleman's clear and lucid speech and the Memorandum of the First Lord of the Admiralty, the information placed before the Committee is not to be compared with that which in previous years has been presented. The right hon. Gentleman has made it clear that the Government propose a large increase in men and a reduction of expenditure. The increased cost of the extra men will amount to £145,000, and so it is we have the fact that the Admiralty are trying to carry on an increased amount of work on an expenditure reduced by £145,000. When I was at the Admiralty I made a forecast of what the Estimates this year would be, and I calculated that, making every possible reduction, it would not be possible to provide the necessary services except by an increased expenditure of from £150,000 to £200,000 over the Estimates of last year. Therefore the present Estimates are, I hold, £200,000 short of what they ought to be. But it it impossible to eliminate from our consideration the discussion in regard to Navy matters which took place last night. The right hon. Gentleman appears to give great consideration to the appeals made by the Representatives of the Dockyard towns. But I would point out to him that what these gentlemen wanted was not consideration, but cash, and cash and consideration are not convertible terms, and anybody who pretends that he would favourably consider any proposal unless he had cash would not be very popular in the Dockyards. The late Government thought they did more for the Dockyards than any former Government; but the requests made by the Representatives amounted to an increase of £300,000 a year, and I say unhesitatingly that if the late Government had chosen to increase the Votes by that amount every Dockyard Member in the House of Commons now would be a Unionist. The right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues are in this position. These gentlemen who represent the Dockyards have made promises to their constituents, and right hon. Gentlemen must do something to satisfy them, otherwise they may lose their support, and the hon. Gentlemen may lose their seats. But how is this extra sum to be provided? The right hon. Gentleman only explained to us Votes which have not been cut down. The Ordnance Vote has been cut down by £83,000, and the Works Vote has been cut down by £68,000. I say unhesitatingly, from my knowledge of the requirements of these branches, that both of them ought to have been higher than they were last year, and it is only by delaying the commencement of necessary and urgent work, or by transferring a sum which ought to be in the Estimates from the Consolidated Fund, that the reduction can be made. In considering the Navy Estimates, it is always to be remembered that there are only three Votes which are compressible or expansible. We compressed two of these to the lowest possible point, and they will, I feel sure, have to be increased next year. With regard to Vote 8, which provides for men and material at the Dockyards, I would point out that we were last year completing our great naval programme, and as a ship approaches completion the nature of the expenditure changes. Well, now, the great bulk of the expenditure at the completion of a ship is on labour, while the great bulk at the commencement is, as the House will understand, on material. The Admiralty are now under the necessity of commencing a large new programme, and the main item of expenditure will be the provision of material. Therefore, that part of Vote 8 relating to material cannot be cut down, and the only other part is that for labour. The result of cutting down the Estimates by £200,000 and of making promises to the Dockyard Representatives is that, although we may improve the position of the dockyard men, we will have during the next few years very largely to reduce their number. I have no comment to make on that part of the Vote with regard to the increase in the number of men, but Lord Spencer in his Memorandum makes the following observation:— So long as the requirements of the nation for vessels of war continue as they are, it will be impossible to reduce the number of officers and men serving in the Fleet, and I am not prepared to suggest any change in this direction at the present time. Now that is a statement misleading both as regards the basis on which the increase is founded and as regards its conclusion. No First Lord of the Admiralty can hold out any hope either for the present or for the future of any reduction in the number of men voted for the Navy. The country has determined that the Navy is to be equal in force to the combined fleets of any two nations, and the inference that at some future time a reduction in the number of men is to be made is altogether erroneous.

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

No inference like that suggested can be drawn from the words. Nothing of the kind was in the mind of my noble Friend.

LORD G. HAMILTON

I would refer the right hon. Gentleman to the Memorandum itself. It says:—"I am not prepared to suggest any change in this direction," and the Chancellor of the Exchequer has suggested the words "at the present time." The Secretary to the Admiralty will agree that in order to give effect to the recommendations of Admiral Hoskin's Committee a steady increase in the strength will be necessary for the next two or three years. The hon. Member for Lewisham (Mr. Penn) last evening criticised the policy of substituting a certain number of chief stokers for chief engine-room artificers. The justification is that every year, as education progresses, there are more men who can manage and drive engines, and it is fitting that some of the arduous work of the more highly paid men should be transferred to men of rather inferior position who are yet quite competent to discharge the duties so given to them. Last night various suggestions were also made as to the desirability of meeting the request of the warrant officers to be placed on the same footing with respect to commissions as that of warrant officers in the Army. There are difficulties in the way of granting that request. We recognised them last year; and were then asked that a rank should be given to them which would rank them as commissioned officers equivalent to that of chief officers in the Coastguard. One way to carry out this Policy was to increase the number of chief warrant officers and to find some new denomination for them. If the subject were taken in hand and a slight increase of pay were granted, the grievance could be removed in a manner which would be satisfactory to the men themselves and to all concerned. With the new construction programme I have little fault to find, but my figures do not quite agree with those of the right hon. Gentleman, for I calculate that the provision in this year's Estimates is rather less than that in last year's. There is an impression abroad that because the Naval Defence Act has been passed the equality of our fleet with the fleets of any other two nations has been achieved; but it has not yet been achieved and will not be until next year. In that year it will be necessary to consider carefully the condition of Foreign Navies and their ship-building programmes, and it may be found necessary to do something more than make good the wear and tear of the existing British Fleet. The right hon. Gentleman said that he did not propose to embody his programme in an Act of Parliament. That I consider a mistake, because the only way by which a Government can give permanent effect to their wishes is by Statute. If the admitted wants of the Navy are not provided for in that, way they may be disregarded at a future time and relegated to a second place by a Government anxious to meet financial exigencies, or they may be overlooked in some way. The objection to legislation like the Naval Defence Act chiefly came from the officials of the Treasury. Such legislation it would seem is contrary to their instincts and traditions. There is no department of State that wants reform; so much as the Treasury. It is the most antiquated and unbusiness-like of all our institutions. The moment a common-sense proposal is made it is opposed by the Treasury, with its obsolete notions of financial administration. I venture to prophesy that unless the representatives of the Admiralty guard themselves by putting their proposals in an Act of Parliament it will be found impossible to give effect to them. The procedure of the right hon. Gentleman with respect to his programme is distinctly open to criticism, and it might be useful if we were to put in contrast the policy of the' present and the late Governments with respect to the amount of information laid before the House. The Committee are asked to sanction the building of four very large ships, and no detailed information has been given respecting them. I have great belief in the genius of the head of the constructive department, Mr. White, and in the ability of the Naval Lords, but it is rather a strong order to ask the Committee to assent to so very large a programme without giving them more information. I estimate that the programme will cost £5,000,000. I suppose the two cruisers, which are to cost £700,000, are substitutes for two new battle-ships which it was proposed to build last year. I intended when in office to build three new battle ships. I had passed the designs of one, and had left the other two over for the financial year terminating April next. I assume that the two cruisers proposed to be built by the Government are in substitution for the two battle-ships I proposed to construct. It is a substitution of two cruisers for two battle-ships. I dare say the right hon. Gentleman has good reasons for this course; but it must be recollected that if we ever get engaged in a really serious war, the command of the seas will really rest with that Power which has the most battle-ships and the most fighting power. The judiciousness of this substitution of cruisers for battleships, therefore, depends on the arms and armament of the cruisers, and it is difficult for us, without information as to the size and equipment of these cruisers, to decide whether or not this is a proper course. I suppose they are to be faster and better armed than the Russian war vessel which is described as the largest and most heavily armed now afloat. I suppose the clear tonnage will be 13,000 tons.

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

I am not in a position to give the details in respect to the cruisers just now.

LORD G. HAMILTON

I think the right hon. Gentleman puts rather a high test on the confidence of the House. When will the right hon. Gentleman have full details of these vessels? I think-we must insist on them. Last year I undertook to lay the designs of the vessels before Parliament before any money was spent on these vessels. I think the House has a right to this information. There is a very important question at stake which is the distribution of the guns on board the vessels. These vessels are more heavily armed, and, therefore, comes in the most important question, how are the guns to be distributed. At present we have a disposition of the guns on board these vessels which we believe to be most effective. The great thing is to be able to work the guns above without interfering with the guns below. I attach great importance to the fact that the guns may be fired independently of each other, because in the heat of action it is impossible to have concerted action in the firing of the guns, and what happens is that one gun goes off and then another. I must, therefore, urge the right hon. Gentleman, without wishing to embarrass or impede the Admiralty in any way, to give full details of these vessels—the dimensions, armour, and armament, as well as the cost— before we are asked to assent to what is undoubtedly a departure from the existing practice. I only want an approximate estimate. I do not know whether the Government realise the great change which has taken place in Naval policy since we were in office. We need to work to a standard, and it is impossible to work to that standard unless you make out in advance the exact sum that is to be spent year by year. I cannot help thinking that in the course of procedure which they have adopted the Government next year will find themselves in a difficulty, because of the encroachments that have been made on money appropriated by Act of Parliament to new construction, and which will prevent the completion of the new ships as soon as has been promised. As regards the distribution of work, I am not quite satisfied with the distribution between the dockyards and the private yards. I think it likely to lead to great reduction in dockyard labour, because while the expenditure for material goes up the expenditure for labour goes down. The Admiralty will find great difficulty in providing material for the employment of the necessary dockyard hands. The larger the ship the smaller the proportion of the expenditure which goes to labour, and the smaller the ship the larger the proportion of the expenditure that goes to labour. For instance, in the case of the Royal Sovereign, the tonnage of which was upwards of 14,000 tons, the cost of material was £388,000, and the cost of labour £190,000. Therefore, for every £1 spent on material there was only 10s. spent on labour. On the other hand, in the case of the Edgar, of 7,300 tons, the cost of material was £95,000, and the cost of labour £134,000, which gave £1 to material for £1 8s. to labour. In the case of the Circe, of only 830 tons, an expenditure on material of £9,000 afforded occupation for £20,000 worth of labour, which gave £1 to material for £2 Is. to labour. The Government now proposed to put the whole of the torpedo destroyers, 20 in number, out to contract. A better distribution would be to retain a certain number of these vessels for dockyard work. The dockyards would be able to build the engines and boilers of these vessels, and in this way labour in the dockyards would be employed more efficiently than can be done under the proposed allocation of the work. Then, neither the right hon. Gentleman nor Earl Spencer has given us any informa- tion as to the class of armour-plate to be used in these new vessels. Experiments in armour-plate have been rapidly developed during the last year, and there is now no doubt that certain American patents with respect to these plates have been very successful. I would like to know whether the Admiralty propose to protect these new vessels with that type of armour, and, if not, with what type of armour? I wish also to point out that the boilers in these vessels have given a great amount of trouble, and I hope the Admiralty will bear in mind that there should be a large margin of boiler power in vessels destined for high speed. I now turn to the Ordnance Vote, and I find that the amount of money ordered to be spent under the Naval Defence Act, £600,000, has been cut down to £450,000. I do not know on what grounds that has been done, and it seems to me an infraction of the principle of the Naval Defence Act. The great object of that Act was that ships when built should have not only guns, but a reserve of ammunition and stores. Taking into consideration that there was a small reserve for eon-tract-built ships, I, when in Office, after full consideration with my advisers, fixed the amount of the reserve for dockyard-built ships at £2,500,000, as the amount which must be appropriated to the armament of these vessels. That was a reduced amount, but the Admiralty have cut it down by £150,000. I want to know is it proposed to transfer the sum to the Consolidated Fund?

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

I am assured, by the same authorities who advised the noble Lord, that no ship that is to be completed will be completed without its guns; but, as certain of the ships are not to be completed within the time contemplated by the Naval Defence Act, so, also, their armament was not required so soon. I can assure the noble Lord that there is no depletion contemplated in reserves of armaments.

LORD G. HAMILTON

I knew what amounts were necessary six months ago, and I cannot tell how the remarkable change has been brought about. However, I will raise the question on Vote 9, and then the right hon. Gentleman may be in a position to answer. I think the inevitable result will be that next year the Armament Vote will go up, and if the Vote for material goes up also, it is clear that next year you will be in great financial difficulties. The same observation applies to the Works Vote. I calculated that the Works Vote would go up by £20,000 this year, instead of which it has gone down £68,000. I see that some very pressing matters have been postponed. The Gibraltar Mole and the Naval Barracks at Portsmouth have disappeared from the Vote. These were large works that were contemplated. My general criticism upon the Vote is that, while certain works have been completed, an insufficient number of new works have been proceeded with, which will undoubtedly result, in years to come, in a large increase of expenditure. But the most important reduction in the Estimates is that by which the subsidy to the merchant cruisers was reduced from £60,000 to £22,000.

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

That is only in consequence of a decision to keep one year's amount in hand.

LORD G. HAMILTON

This is a very important point, and one in which the House takes a great interest. The late Government introduced a plan by which the steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental and the great Atlantic liners were subsidized for the conveyance of troops, on the shortest notice, at a fixed rate, and whenever the Admiralty chose. The great merit of the scheme is that if we became involved in any large Naval war operations the whole resources of these Companies would be at our disposal. It is difficult to over-estimate the value of that plan, and I wish to know whether the Government propose to continue it.

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

The policy will be continued in the present year.

LORD G. HAMILTON

Do I understand that the intention is to change the policy?

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

The subject will be further considered, but for the present it is proposed to continue the system.

LORD G. HAMILTON

I know what the words "farther considered" means. I may take them as a warning, and I wish now to utter my protest against any interference with the plan. The subsisting system has the additional advantage of encouraging the employ- ment of British seamen on board of the, subsidized liners, and it sets an example: for others to follow in this respect. I was astonished to find that one-third of the number of petty officers in the Mercantile Marine were foreigners. So in drawing the contracts with the companies a clause was inserted subjecting them to a penalty unless they carried a certain number of Naval Reserve men on board. I hope nothing will be done to interfere with the efficiency and scope of that policy, for it is one on which I and my friends feel strongly. There is only one other matter of importance to which I would like to call the attention of the Committee. When in office it was my duty to make myself acquainted with the opinion of foreign experts as to the condition of our sea-going fleet, and I think I may say that they have a high opinion of its efficiency and organisation. The improvement during the last six or seven years has been very remarkable. But there is one point in our defence to which I desire to call particular attention, and about which these experts are not so enthusiastic, and that is, the parts the Army and the Navy are to take in it. Every country except our own entrusts to the Navy and not to the Army the defence of great Naval ports and stations. In every one of these countries the Army is the first line of defence; but here, where the Navy is the first line of defence, we reverse the policy. The present system of coast defence is wrong, and every year the work connected with that defence is becoming more marine and more aquatic in its character. Writing to the United States Government in June, 1888, Lieutenant Colwell said— The coast defence of Great Britain is notably the most inefficient of any of the great European Powers, owing to the divided control, lack of co-operation, absence of digested schemes for mutual support, and the mixing of Naval and Military duties. The defence is unwieldly in its administration, unprepared for sudden work, and labours under the disadvantage of placing Military men outside their legitimate sphere of work. To entrust our coast defence to the Army is a wrong system, and the longer it is in the hands of the Army the more difficult it will be to work it. Holding these views, I am very anxious that, if the House wishes it, nothing should be done by either the Admiralty or the War Office to impede the gradual transfer of the defence of Naval ports and stations from the Army to the Navy. If it was ever proposed to arm the Army or Navy with obsolete weapons there is not a man in this House who would not protest against placing them upon such unequal conditions. In my judgment, an obsolete system of organisation is as bad or even worse than an obsolete system of arms. Obsolete arms can easily be replaced, but an obsolete system of organisation eats into the very roots of the country's resources, and cannot be altered at a moment's notice, and in a time of emergency and danger. Let the Committee for a moment consider under what conditions alone the stationary defence by the Naval force can be tested. It cannot be tested except under circumstances of adversity. It is only so long as our Navy is supreme in her command of the sea that no serious attack can take place; it is only when it is demoralised at sea that the conditions under which it would be necessary to work a mixed system of this kind could be tested. And I hold very strongly that we ought to look at this question from one point of view alone—which of the two services is best to undertake the work, and if it is decided that the Navy, and the Navy alone, can adequately undertake that work, I think that gradually there should be transferred to them the men, materials, and money necessary to enable them to perform the duty which their training, service, and experience specially qualify them to undertake. I admit it might result in a very considerable difference between the dimensions of the two services, and entail a considerable transfer of money from the Army to the Navy Votes. It is the only sphere of action where two services overlap; and if this question is discussed and considered the almost unanimous opinion of those who have gone into it would be that the change I have pointed out would be one that should be gradually undertaken upon the decision of the House. I apologise to the Committee for having spoken at such considerable length, and I will sum up what I have said in one or two sentences. The proposals with regard to the men are satisfactory, and also the new Shipbuilding Vote, as far as money is concerned. We are short, however, of information, and we must have that before these vessels are built. The work to be done, in my judgment, is insufficient, but even if it be insufficient, and the Admiralty have those demands pressed upon them that were made last night, it is essential if they wish to give effect to the programme which they have laid before the Committee, that they should try and adopt our dockyard procedure and pass an Act of Parliament. I am perfectly satisfied that unless they do so they will find they will be unable to hold their own against the financial exigencies of the Treasury or against personal or political pressure from Members representing dockyard constituencies. On the other hand, if they will follow our procedure, all they will have to do will be to admit they have made a mistake, and they have often done that in other matters, and they will meet with almost unanimous support on this side of the House. Having got the assent of the House to this Shipbuilding Vote, and the House having declared this shipbuilding programme is to be completed in a certain time, they will be in an impregnable position, and they would find that they would be able to defy alike the pressure of the Treasury and their friends, and bring to a rapid and effective realisation the large shipbuilding proposals they have placed before us.

MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER (Belfast, W.)

did not desire to speak upon technical matters, but there were one or two questions which seemed to him essential for the Committee to take into account with the distinct object of making a change. The noble Lord who had just sat down had given him a good introduction to the matter he wished to call attention to in the suggestion for further employment of the Royal Marines. He was not aware whether the Committee realised what a large proportion of their Naval forces the Royal Marines at present constituted. The number of men had been increased, and was now no less than 14,500, out of a total of 71,000 combatants in the Naval and Marine Service, and would shortly be 16,000. They had in their possession a force of soldiers absolutely without rival, and yet at this moment they were acting in a manner calculated to deprive that body of men of the services of the most competent officers; they were at present handicapping the Royal Marines by a system they adopted of non-employment of the officers. Physically the Royal Marines was one of the finest corps they had, and only last year the recruiting standard went up to 5 ft. 10 in., but they laboured under one very great disadvantage. Every one knew that so far as the men were concerned they were not only treated well, but they found no difficulty in obtaining employment on leaving the service, but the officers laboured under very great disadvantages. He had been making an examination of the chances of employment for the officers, and he found that the chance of employment on active service was only one—namely, that of Deputy Adjutant General, whose active service immediately relegated him to a stool in an office in Whitehall. The first condition of his being placed upon the active list, was that he should become inactive. In the Army, however, he found there were on the active list 188 Generals, and in the Navy there were 21 "Flag" officers actively employed; therefore, the chances held out to the Royal Marine officer was out of all proportion inferior to those in the Army or Navy, whichever basis they took it upon. The chances offered to the Royal Marine Officers ought to be at least six times what they were. He did not wish to say anything discourteous, but the obvious conclusion to be drawn was that they were not likely to get the exact class of men they ought to get when they narrowed the field of promotion. They could not and must not expect to get the best work from any class of men if they did not give them a reasonable chance of promotion. A remedy for this state of things was easy. What was wanted was to give a wider sphere of responsibility and employment to the officers of the Royal Marines. At present the only posts open to officers in this branch of the Service who had succeeded in their career was that of Commandant at Portsmouth, Chatham, and Devonport, and the post he had referred to at Whitehall. They wanted a wider field, and what he would suggest was that the Commandant's post should be extended, and there was ample opportunity in various parts of the world. They had coaling stations, which were what he might call amphibious positions which required to be manned by men accus- tomed to the sea and acquainted with the working of navy guns. For these stations they required men who could be easily transferred by our ships from one point to another; there were points that might become threatened which would require the assistance of men who could be rapidly moved without liability to the disadvantages of sea sickness, and the disorganisation that attended the embarkation of troops; men who could be moved without throwing out of gear the whole Army organisation. What they wanted was a force that could easily be transferred from one place to another and made effective at whatever place it was sent to. Such a force existed to their hands in the Royal Marines. He did not propose to discuss the details of this question as they had been discussed at great length and with great ability elsewhere, but they must not forget that the Royal Marines happened to be a service that did fall somewhat between two stools, and did not receive the amount of encouragement and approval that they should receive, either at the Admiralty or the War Office. This was a grievance which was making men discontented, and he thought it was a matter that the Committee might very well press upon the attention of the Board of Admiralty. There was one other matter he would like to call attention to. A document had recently been brought before the attention of the Admiralty which was the result of a statement made by a large number of officers in Her Majesty's ships sailing in foreign waters. One of the matters in this document affected the personal comfort of the officers, and should receive some consideration. It was a well-known fact that officers in the Army received a large amount of leave on return from foreign service, as a matter of right. In the Navy the leave given was six weeks, and after that time the officer was on half-pay, which meant in the case of a lieutenant that he received about 2s. a day less than was received by the compositors who set up the Parliamentary Papers they read day by day. The conditions of sea-life were also very different to those in the Army, where an officer carried about with him all his paraphernalia, and was frequently accompanied by his wife, and therefore he did not think he was going too far in commending this matter to the representatives of the Admiralty, and urging that something should be done to put the officers of the Royal Navy on something approaching an equality with officers in the Army. Before sitting down there was just one other matter that he should like to call attention to it, and it arose out of the speech of the noble Lord (Lord G. Hamilton). It was proposed by the Admiralty to build a large number of extra torpedo boats. He did not know what provision was made for the manning of them, but under the present circumstances whenever the torpedo boats were called out the greatest difficulty was found in manning them. What happened was that when the best men were called away from the sea-going ships, the best artificers were taken from the engine-room, and the best officers were taken from the ward-room in order that the boats might be sent to sea. These officers and men were put into boats with which they had no acquaintance, a most wasteful process, and a process which no captain who had ever been in command of a ship would recommend. In that connection he would suggest the propriety of utilising what was ready to their hand at this moment. They had lying up at Devonport, Portsmouth, and Chatham some four score of what were called first-class torpedo boats, which were only taken out once a year. The boats were of no real use where they were, and as they had all round the coast an incomparable force in their yachtsmen and crews, who knew the territorial waters fifty times better than the majority of officers in the Navy could, he would suggest that these boats should be handed over to some properly-constituted volunteer force that would be responsible for providing crews, and who would undertake to be responsible for housing, and for any damage to the boats. He believed that in this way an excellent force would be given to the Navy.

ADMIRAL FIELD (Sussex, Eastbourne)

said he was in a great difficulty. He gave notice of a special character regarding the Admiralty Minute with reference to the Howe court-martial, and he sat for five hours last night desiring to bring the question forward. Now, he had heard some rumours that if he tried to bring it on he would be stopped, and, therefore, he wished to ask whether he could raise the question of the Admiralty Minute upon this Vote.

THE CHAIRMAN (Mr. MELLOR,) York, W.R., Sowerby

I think it would probably come either under the Admiralty Vote or the Vote for Martial Law.

MR. HANBURY (Preston)

On a point of order, Sir, I wish to ask a question. We have been discussing the Shipbuilding and Admiralty Vote on this Vote, and it is treated as a general discussion. May I ask what distinction you draw between the Shipbuilding Vote and the Admiralty Vote?

THE CHAIRMAN

The distinction is this: on the first Vote of the Navy Estimates it is usual for a general discussion to take place, which is opened by the Secretary to the Admiralty. It is not competent on that to go into matters of detail, or any special matter that does not concern the Vote itself. With regard to the Shipbuilding Vote, the noble Lord (Lord George Hamilton) confined himself to discussing that generally and not on any particular details.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON

Might I, on a point of Order, point out that we are discussing a Vote in which is included Admiral Fairfax and the other officers whose conduct my hon. Friend desires to call attention to.

THE CHAIRMAN

No, it is not the action of those officers to which the hon. and gallant Gentleman wishes to draw attention, but to the Admiralty Note.

ADMIRAL FIELD

said he bowed to the decision without further question, though it was a little troublesome, after having prepared one's mind for a particular subject, to have to throw all that on one side, and take up another question. However, he would do his best. Let him say, speaking for himself and his brother officers, they heartily congratulated the right hon. Gentleman (Sir U. Kay-Shuttleworth) upon the new honour conferred upon him, and they thanked him for the manner in which he had introduced these Estimates. He could assure the right hon. Gentleman a warm support from naval men, but he should like to ask why the right hon. Gentleman had parted with the only naval man on the opposite side who might have assisted him; instead of letting him (Mr. R. Duff) go to the Admiralty they had sent him to New South Wales, so that the Admiralty was left with a poor landsman without any professional assistance. There was another hon. Gentleman who ought to have been sitting on the Treasury Bench, the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir E. J. Reed). That hon. Member knew a great deal about naval matters, and he should like to ask why the Government had not obtained his services. He did not know whether they had broken their alliance with him, but he offered the Government his sincere condolence for not having the hon. Gentleman to explain difficult questions. He would now say a word with reference to the suggestions of his hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Arnold-Forster). The Navy thoroughly understood the object of his hon. Friend, and fully recognised the valuable services he had rendered the Navy in former years. The hon. Member touched on the question of the employment of the officers of the Royal Marines. Every naval officer would go with him and beyond him, if that were possible, on the question. Though a limited number, they were most valuable in time of war, and in times of peace he thought it would be most advantageous to employ them at the various coaling stations. The noble Lord (Lord George Hamilton) promised to try the experiment at the Falkland Island coaling station, and he would like to know if that had been carried out. The right hon. Gentleman shook his head, but he believed that if it were tried it would turn out to be a very great success. The noble Lord raised a very important and grave question about the dual control in various naval ports. Of course, theoretically, the Navy quite endorsed his views. The noble Lord said this should be carried out gradually. It would take a long time to carry it out, for they had neither officers, nor men, nor forces adequate for such a thing, and before it could be carried out effectually there would have to be a very large increase in the Navy and the Marines. There was, however, no difficulty in garrisoning the distant coaling stations. He came now to the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and it was to a certain extent gratifying to naval men that there had been no attempt to cut down the expenditure and minimise the policy initiated by the noble Lord (Lord George Hamilton and his Board in 1888. But, looking at the statement as a whole, it seemed to him an apologetic kind of statement. It appeared to have been drawn up with great caution, and with a view to gratify certain supporters of the Government. There was an apology for the increase in the number of men shown in the Estimates. The statement ran something like this: "That the cost of the medical attendance had increased correspondingly with the increase in the number of men, and we apologise for it." Were they ashamed of this increase? The Government proposed to increase the personnel of the Navy by 2,600 men; but, as far as he could make out, there was to be no increase in the number of the boys. He took it there was to be an increase of 2,600 men, including 500 Marines. Was that so, or were there boys? The feeling was that they ought to have at least 2,000 more men for the Marines; 500 more was not a number nearly sufficient, and this branch of the Service should be brought up to a strength of 20,000 men. He believed the Government were leaning too much on the Royal Naval Reserve, which ought not to be looked npon as a force to compose the first line they sent out to meet the enemy. These, however, were matters of detail which the House could not possibly be competent to deal with. He was grateful that they had appointed a Manning Committee to whose knowledge these questions could be referred, and whom they could rely upon to give a wise decision. The only doubt he had was whether the Executive would carry out their recommendations.

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

I can re-assure my hon. and gallant Friend; they are carrying out all the recommendations of the Manning Committee.

ADMIRAL FIELD

was glad to hear it. He was glad to see that the Admiralty were proposing a new kind of armament for the Renown. He also found in the new ship it was proposed to introduce a new kind of gun, and he was glad to notice that a new quick-firing gun was being introduced. He complained that little or no information was given as to the number of guns in reserve, and in process of manufacture. Last year the First Lord of the Admiralty gave full information on these points, but this year they had no such particulars for their guidance. He should like to ask the Secretary for the Admiralty for some information about public works. The statement intimated that arrangements were being made for rapid coaling at certain ports, but nothing was said as to the new dock at Gibraltar. Naval men had been pressing this question upon the late Government, as they recognised a new dock at Gibraltar was necessary. He should like to know whether the Admiralty had taken any steps in the matter. We should not give up that point. He saw no mention of the Repulse. What had become of her? Were they ashamed of her? She was a very fine ship, and was certainly worth mentioning. As to the Royal Naval Reserve, there was no information about the number the Reserve was to consist of, although last year they were told it was to be raised to 27,000. The late Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton) started the policy of inducing promising young officers in the Mercantile Marine to enrol themselves and receive 12 months' training. Now, a mercantile officer, unless he were trained for a time on board a man-of-war, would be practically useless, and it was quite right for the late Lord of the Admiralty to give them facilities for being trained. But what was said in the first paragraph of the present First Lord's statement on this subject? It has not been possible, for financial and other reasons, to accept all the candidates who offered themselves. "For financial and other reasons! He did not admit that was a sufficient reason. Were they to depend on financial reasons for an officer being trained or untrained? They might have war breaking upon them, and were they to be told that these young men had not been trained for financial reasons? The cost was, comparatively speaking, so small that the objection was not worthy of notice. If they insisted on economising, for mercy's sake, do not economise on the training of officers, and 12 months' time was a short enough period for such training. Another paragraph which he had noted with displeasure was that one which stated that the system of training of the Second Class Reserve men was going to be changed, and that, instead of taking their drill annually as heretofore, they were going to be put on board a man-of-war and take their training for a month once every five years. One month's training in five years was absolutely useless, for in such a long interval they would have forgotten all they had previously learned. Three years should be the minimum. He was pleased to note that a little money was to be spent on clothing the Naval Reserve men in a proper uniform. The Secretary to the Admiralty stated that it was the desire of the Government to maintain the position taken up by the late Government, namely, that the Navy of England should be on a par with any combination of any two Powers. But the Government were departing from that policy now. He was credibly informed that the Admiralty already ought to be increasing their shipbuilding, because other nations had already increased theirs—since this policy was inaugurated by the late Government in the Naval Defence Act. France and Russia had built or were about to build new ships. France was going to build 10 additional armour-clads, and Russia eight, making 18, so that we should want 18 more ships according to that to maintain the standard. Then France and Russia were making, or were going to make, additions to various other classes of vessels, so that if the Admiralty really intended to carry out the policy they had stated they were desirous of carrying out they would have to make many additions to the Navy. One word as to the standard of comparison, namely, that the Navy of England should be on a par with any combination of any two Powers. Naval men accepted that as a minimum and not as the standard. The standard they considered should alone be regarded was one which should be according to the measure of the work to be done. He had in his hand a letter from the distinguished Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Geoffrey Hornby, who said— Personally I have never assented to the measure of the force assumed by the Admiralty, namely, that it should be equal to that of two foreign nations. It should depend first, on the tonnage of the Mercantile Marine which it has to protect, and then on the degree to which that marine is spread over the globe. Yes, but the Admiralty had never studied that particular question, but they had fixed as their standard what might have been suitable in Nelson's time, namely, double the force of any foreign Power against whom the Navy might have to fight. The position of the problem, however, had changed since Nelson's time. Allusion had been made to the mercantile cruisers. He had seen with much concern that the Inman Line, to whom the Government had been paying £15,000 per ship, had now been converted into a company called, he believed, the International Line running from America to Southampton. We had lost these ships, and paid our money for practically nothing. The Admiralty ought to consider this question anew. There ought to be something more than a mere holding of 12 months' money in hand, and there ought to be some penalty attached to a breach of the arrangement between the Admiralty and mercantile firms, otherwise what was to prevent firms receiving our money and then selling their ships? It was not of much practical use to have merely an honourable understanding on such a matter, and he suggested to the Admiralty there should be a hard-and-fast agreement, with penalties attaching to a breach of the same. He asked for some assurance that the training squadron was not to be done away with; most naval men were holding that, in these times at all events, it would be premature to adopt such a course. He now came to a few grievances. They had heard the Members from the five dockyard seats trying their level best to ventilate the grievances of the dockyard employés and to carry, out the promises they had made, and by which they had won these seats. For his part he would much rather these seats should be lost to the Unionist Party than that the late Government should have done what they knew to be wrong in the management in the great dockyards. He believed the policy the late Government initiated in the dockyards was the best possible for the Service, and the good of the Service ought to be the only consideration that ought to weigh. He contended that the system of classification at the dockyards was the very essence of their successful administration; the whole Navy was based upon it, and it was the only successful policy to adopt in the administration of a great Department. He hoped, therefore, that this system of classification would be con- tinued. It should be remembered that the Fleet did not exist for the dockyards, but the dockyards for the Fleet, and the grievances of the seamen and officers were entitled to some consideration. He endorsed what had been said about creating a new rank for warrant officers. There should be a new rank created for meeting the aspirations of this deserving body of men. They had fleet surgeons and fleet engineers, and why not have fleet gunners, fleet boatswains, and fleet carpenters? That was a small thing to ask for, and surely it was worth while to meet that claim and make these men contented and happy. There was not a more loyal body of men under the Crown. He also endorsed what had been said as to considering the grievances of the chief petty officers which he thought ought to be considered and remedied. There were grievances which were scarcely, if at all, touched upon by the noble Lord. The coastguardsmen suffered under grievances for the last 10 years. He (Admiral Field) pressed them on the attention of the Members of the existing Government in 1886, and he had continued to mention the matter since then. The coastguardsmen held very strong views about the indifference with which they were being treated. It was most unfair to allow this difference to continue between one section of men-of-war's-men and another section—for they were all men of war, and, although the coastguards might not be in active service, they were quite as active as the others. The great grievance was in the matter of payment, and it ought to be remedied without delay. There were other grievances, but he would not go into detail on the points involved. He had had a conversation with an officer in the higher ranks of the Service, who admitted to him that these grievances existed, and said they ought to be remedied; but the blessed Treasury always stepped in the way of a remedy. He had left the case of the officers to the last, because he thought the case of the men ought to be considered first. They had a body of lieutenants who had very little hope of promotion. It was heart-breaking to ask these men to give their services, and, as the numbers were greatly in excess, something should be done to assuage their feelings on the score of promotion. This grievance was a very great one, and he believed not half enough had been said about it. It was well known that a lieutenant coming home after an absence of four years, and paying off, had been ordered off again without any consideration. He did not see how they could get the present state of things remedied except through the House, as they could get no satisfaction from the heads of Departments. Would the right hon. Gentleman make a note of it? The lieutenants undoubtedly felt very sore about the matter of leave of absence and the matter of appointments. The matter of leave of absence, as a general principle, should be carried out in a regular and proper way. In a time of war everyone must go; but in a time of peace these officers should be allowed some time to see their friends, and they should even be allowed to marry, another privilege of which they were at present deprived. Another thing was that it was now no longer necessary to keep ships for lengthened periods on foreign stations. The feeling generally was that two years should be the maximum. Three or four years was a very long time to be away, and there was no reason why, in these days of steam and telegraph, there should not be more frequent changes — exchanges, perhaps, he should say—of our vessels from the Mediterranean to China, and another from China to the Mediterranean. The maximum term of service in such cases in the French Navy was two years, and he did not see that they should not adopt that period in England. Anything, indeed, that would bring contentment to a service upon which the Empire depended for its very existence merited the attention of the Government. He wished to know whether the gunnery school started at Sheerness had its full complement of men and appliances and was working efficiently. Another thing was the statement in the Memorandum that the Sultan would be completed in 1894. He did not blame the present Government for the delay. The noble Lord (Lord G. Hamilton) and his friends on that (the Conservative) side of the House were largely, if not wholly, responsible. But he thought they ought to make an effort to turn out the Sultan to take the place of the Howe. He found that right hon. Gentlemen were proud of the rapidity with which the Royal Sovereign was completed and put in commission. The period was two years and eight months. Surely, if that were so, the Sultan ought to be available within a period of 12 months? They began last year and they ought to have the work finished this year. He would not trouble the House by going into other matters as he simply rose to speak on one subject. He hoped the matters which had been mentioned would have the attention of the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues in the Government. He had no doubt that if proper attention were given to them contentment would be restored to the Service. So little was required, and that little would so help to remove the unpleasant feeling that existed, that he could not but expect that the Government would yield to the request put forward by the Service and by its friends in that House.

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

I will not attempt to follow at any length the genial speech which the hon. and gallant Gentleman has just delivered. He is our only Admiral, and any remarks or suggestions he addresses to the House are sure to be listened to with respect and attention. I cannot follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman into all details, but I would like to say that, while he told us that this point and that had not been attended to, those are the very points which have received the most careful attention of the Admiralty. Now, with regard to the men, the coast-guards and their officers, the Admiralty will take care to bear in mind the friendly suggestions of my hon. and gallant Friend. The reconstruction of the Sultan will be completed in 1894 or 1895. It could not be much sooner, for the work has only just commenced. The comments which have been passed upon the conclusions arrived at by the Manning Committee will also be carefully considered. I have to thank the noble Lord opposite for the friendly tone of his remarks. The noble Lord seems to think that we are doing an increased amount of work on a reduced sum of money, and he referred to the Armament Vote, but the reduction on the expenditure of this year is really very small.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON

I quoted the figures, and they are large enough.

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

The Armament Vote of last year proved to be unnecessarily large, by a sum of at least £80;000, and the present Board of Admiralty had this to guide them. The noble Lord also inquired about the saving of £442,000 on the armament of the Dockyard ships, under the Naval Defence Act. There was a reduction in the original Estimate in respect of ammunition, due to a decision of the late Board in 1890, that the proportion of reserves of ammunition for the Fleet was too high. If we were to maintain this reserve, in accordance with the original Estimate given in the Naval Defence Act, we should be landed in considerable rejections of obsolete ammunition. Again, there is a saving of about £138,000 owing to the cost of stores manufactured in Government factories, and also in private trade, being cheaper than originally estimated. As an instance, I may mention that the 6-in. quick-firing brass case has come down in price by one-half. Nothing has been done, in the direction of cutting down the Estimate for armaments, which will endanger the absolute efficiency of our ships. No ship is to be without her guns. The noble Lord said the Works Vote should be higher. But he cannot point to any work of importance which has been left out. We are going on with the Gibraltar Mole, and we propose to spend £5,000 during the year upon it. We have no intention of shirking expenditure upon the barracks at Portsmouth. Sooner or later something will have to be done there, but I may say that there is a prospect that we shall be able to turn the convict prison at Portsmouth to account. Hence the delay. Attention has been called to the coaling station at Devonport. We have been advised not to proceed with this until we have experience of the coaling arrangements that are being provided at Portland. In spite of the suggestions made, the Dockyard Members need be under no apprehension that the wages in the Dockyards will have to be cut down. The Government have no intention of initiating any spasmodic reductions in numbers, but we expect that by a gradual process of waste they will come down to their normal strength. From what I gather the last Government must have been an uncommonly happy family. Last night the late Secretary of the Treasury (Sir John Gorst) attacked the late Admiralty; while the late Solicitor General condemned the system of classification which they introduced. And to-day I have been greatly amused at the observations of the noble Lord regarding the Treasury. I can assure the House that there are no differences between the present Board of Admiralty and the Treasury. Their relations form an acute contrast to those which evidently existed between certain Members of the late Government. With regard to new ships, I must decline to give detailed information in public which might be used by foreign Governments to the detriment of this country. If, however, the noble Lord or the right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary of the Admiralty desire fuller information, I shall be happy to show them the designs of the proposed new vessels when they are complete. The noble Lord says we should give information to the House of our intentions in regard to all these matters; but I would remind him that in last year's Estimates he gave less information as regards his ships of the Further Programme than we are giving of those which we propose to commence.

LORD GEORGE HAMILTON

I proposed to spend a very small sum towards the end of the financial year. The House should have a guarantee of the manner in which this money is to be spent.

SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH

One point to which the noble Lord alluded was his scheme of defence of naval ports by naval forces, but his views now differ from those which he held in February, 1891, and embodied in his statement to Parliament on the Estimates. He then said— I admit that if such a change could be carried out it would tend to secure unity of action and responsibility, and would, in an emergency, secure at the great naval ports the rapid utilization of all available resources, for whatever movement the exigency of the moment might require. But it is a proposal that involves so immense a change, that it is not under any conditions practicable in the immediate future. The transfers of men and money, material and buildings, which it entails would revolutionise the proportions the Army and Navy now bear to one another, and many experienced naval officers are averse to the change. Moreover, its increased cost in one direction is certain, whilst the counterbalancing savings are problematical. Still, looking to the fact that nearly every Foreign Power has adopted the principle of placing their Naval Authorities in charge of maritime defences, care should be taken that the various alterations which from time to time must occur in the organisation both of the Army and Navy do not increase the obstacles to such a transfer of duties. Further investigation and experience can alone determine whether the change is desirable in the common interests of both Services, and nothing in the meantime should be done to prejudice that future decision. Under these circumstances we may fairly ask the House to pause before it commits itself to so great a change.

MR. FORWOOD (Lancashire, Ormskirk)

I do not rise for the purpose of stopping the Vote, though I do not think that three hours' discussion is very long for such important subjects as have been before us. Three hours is a very short time when you consider the importance of the Vote. I promise, however, that I will not occupy more than a few moments. As I have said, I am not going to object to the Vote, and I do not propose to go into detail; but there are one or two points upon which we might reasonably ask for further information. There are one or two points to which I wish to allude. I think it was very satisfactory to read in the Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty that the programme of construction under the Naval Defence Act has been fully realised, and that at the end of this year only nine vessels out of the 70 which are ordered will remain unfinished, and that they would have been finished had it not been necessary to adjust the labour question at the dockyards. In reference to the boilers and machinery for the vessels of the Navy, a very interesting and important Report has been published by a Committee, and I venture to say that a more valuable document has seldom been introduced in a Public Department. I would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he will not allow that Report, or portions of it, to be made public, as it will be of considerable value to the Mercantile Marine of the country. I should have liked to know what was done with the £100,000 which was taken for boilers last year. No doubt it has been used for other purposes and used advantageously, but it would have been advantageous if we could have had information on that point. It is satisfactory to see that the transfer of the Naval Ordnance Department to the Navy has worked so well for eighteen months. The deficiencies in Naval Ordnance at this moment are less than they were expected to be. Another point that is satisfactory is that only £2,200,000 remains to complete the vessels that are left on hand under the Naval Defence Act. That compares most favourably with the £6,000,000 the late Government had to provide to complete the vessels when my noble Friend took charge at the Admiralty. Another point of satisfaction is that the Dockyard and contract ships under the Naval Defence Act, which were estimated roughly to cost £21,500,000, have been constructed within £650,000 of the estimates; but probably the whole difference between the estimated cost and that accounted for only amounts to something less than £100,000. The Secretary to the Admiralty alluded to the Programme, and to the depreciation of the Navy; but the strength of the Navy will not be considered sufficient until the whole of the Naval Defence ships have been added to it. When they have been added the amount necessary to meet depreciation, and to keep up the Navy will be £2,350,000, as stated by my noble Friend. As to the two cruisers, each of them is to cost roughly £700,000. I want the House to understand what a marvellous departure that means—what a great change in naval shipbuilding policy. The cost of a cruiser may be taken at £35 per ton of displacement; therefore, these vessels are to be of the approximately enormous size of 20,000 tons displacement, which is practically the size of the largest vessel that crosses the Atlantic, and we are to jump up from 9,000 to 20,000 tons. That is an enormous advance, which requires some consideration and thought. At present we have no particulars about it. Upon the question of the Works Vote, I wish to call the right hon. Gentleman's attention to one point. I observe that in the expenditure proposed this year no less a sum than £20,000 has been unspent. I think it is not a good principle that large sums of money should be voted for works which are not carried out, and the money devoted to other purposes. Among these works there is the Sheerness Gunnery School, which is to cost £9,000. £3,000 was provided in last year's Estimate, but it has dis- appeared altogether in the succeeding year's Estimate. I do not know whether the school is completed, or whether the idea of constructing it has been abandoned. As to the merchant cruisers, there seems to have been a misapprehension on the part of some hon. Members in reference to the Inman ships which have been transferred to the American flag. We pay to the owners of these vessels a certain sum every year on condition that if the Admiralty require the vessels their services are at their command. It is provided that the year's hire shall always be kept in hand, so that if the owners desire to sell the ships, and the Admiralty do not take them or hire them, the hire of each ship will be sacrificed by the owners, and some £18,000 or £20,000 will remain in the hands of the Admiralty that might have been claimed by the owners. I hope the policy which was carefully thought out and considered by this House is not now going to be abandoned by the Government; but that, instead of reducing they will rather increase the number of really the best of the merchant ships now in use.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Sir W. HARCOURT,) Derby

I feel obliged to appeal to the House to allow this Vote to pass. Everybody knows that arrangements have been made (which it would be inconvenient to alter) for taking the Army Estimates on Thursday. I hope that arrangement will not be altered. I trust that hon. Members, of whom I have no doubt there are many, who desire to offer further observations on the Vote under consideration will reserve those observations.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR (Manchester, E.)

The situation, as I understand it, is this: We were engaged last night in discussing certain questions relating to the Navy Vote, but those questions were not in reality Navy questions but Labour questions, and they were of great importance. The Vote now before us, which bears upon Naval policy, has been debated now for only three hours, perhaps through the necessities of the case, and hon. Gentlemen opposite have taken a leading part in the discussion. The right hon. Gentleman now suggests that such observations as Members may desire to make should be made on a later stage of the Vote. But as the right hon. Gentleman is aware, you, Mr. Mellor, have quite rightly, in the exercise of your office, strictly confined the discussion to questions relevant to the Vote before the House. A stringency not undue, but still a considerable stringency has been shown by the Chair in limiting the discussion; and, therefore, it would not be safe for any hon. Gentleman to defer to a later Vote any observations he may desire to make which would be in "Order" on this Vote, but which might turn out to be out of "Order" on other Votes. I would venture to suggest as a compromise that the Vote for the men should be taken, and that there should be a brief discussion on the Vote for money—Vote 2—which should be taken at a later date. That would conciliate all opinions on both sides of the House, and I do not believe that in the long run the Government will make any less rapid progress by agreeing to this compromise.

SIR W. HARCOURT

Unless the Money Vote is taken we shall do nothing at all to-day. It has been the practice to take a large discussion on this Vote, it has also been considered in "Order" to discuss on this Vote subjects which might be discussed on the Victualling Vote. I think I am correct in this, and therefore I hope there will be no objection to allowing the Money Vote to be taken, and the discussion to be resumed on the Victualling Vote.

MR. HANBURY

The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer cannot direct the Chairman, who has taken up a new position—a proper position — against which the Opposition are not going to protest in any way. It certainly, however, has the effect of altering the circumstances under which we discuss these Votes. We have no guarantee whatever that we can discuss on the Victualling Vote matters which we are perfectly entitled to discuss on the first Vote. That being the case, I do hope that the Leader of the Opposition will be no party to the proposal of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but that he will reserve our full right to discuss the Votes on some subsequent day.

THE CHAIRMAN

On this first Vote I allowed a general discussion on topics connected with the Admiralty, and the only restriction I laid down was what I found to be according to the Rules of the House—namely, that specific matters which ought to come under some other Vote could not come under this, nor could anyone go into matters of detail on other Votes, but only on matters contained in this Vote.

MR. T. G. BOWLES

This is a Vote for 76,600 men. I desire to move a reduction of that, and I wish to know whether I shall be able to do so. The reduction I should propose would be of one man—namely, the Admiral at Portsmouth. Shall I be in Order in doing that, and in giving my reasons for the Motion?

THE CHAIRMAN

The reduction must be a substantial one. That has been ruled over and over again.

MR. T. G. BOWLES

He is an Admiral, Sir.

Mr. PAUL (Edinburgh, S.)

rose in his place, and claimed to move "That the Question be now put."

Question, "That the Question be now put," put, and agreed to.

Vote agreed to.

Resolution to be reported To-morrow.

Committee to sit again To-morrow.

It being ten minutes before Seven of the clock, the Chairman left the Chair.

House resumed.