GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL. (No. 209.)

HC Deb 03 July 1893 vol 14 cc690-769

COMMITTEE. [Progress, 28th June.]

[TWENTY-NINTH NIGHT.]

Bill considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Executive Authority.

Clause 5 (Executive power in Ireland).

SIR H. JAMES (Bury, Lancashire)

said, that he had given notice of an Amendment to insert the words "from time to time" after "may," page 3, line 8, in order to emphasise the fact that Her Majesty may alter the delegation to the Lord Lieutenant as often and to any extent Her Majesty may think fit. But, by the Interpretation Act of 1889, it was enacted that whenever a Statute conferred powers to be exercised by any person, such powers could be exercised "from time to time," and that Act was made to apply to the Crown. His object being thus attained, and it being clearly understood that the delegated powers would not be fixed and irrevocable, but would always be revocable and alterable, he would not move his Amendment.

MR. W. AMBROSE (Middlesex, Harrow) rose to move— In page 3, line 9, after "Majesty," to insert "acting on the advice of Her British Ministers, by an Order in Council to be laid on the Table of the House of Commons. He had a further Amendment on the Paper to secure that after the Order in Council was laid on the Table it should not be binding if a Resolution were adopted by the House annulling it either wholly or in part. The intention of his Amendment was to give some control to the House of Commons over the prerogatives and powers of the Crown, which were to be delegated to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. He supposed there was nothing to which it was more difficult to give an accurate definition than the prerogatives and Executive powers of the Crown. It was, no doubt, on account of that difficulty that the draftsman of the Bill had not attempted to define the prerogatives and Executive powers of the Crown which it was pro- posed to hand over to the Lord Lieutenant. This, however, was manifest—that as soon as these prerogatives and Executive powers were handed over to the Lord Lieutenant, they would pass from him as through a conduit pipe to the Irish Legislature; and, therefore, it was most important to ascertain what was intended to be passed over to the Lord Lieutenant. The Committee had some information on this point, because in the course of previous discussions both the Prime Minister and the Minister for War had stated that the prerogatives with reference to the Army and Navy would remain exactly as they were now—that was to say, that the command of the Army and Navy would remain exactly as it was now. But that obviously would not be the case if the prerogatives were transferred in general words. If the general words employed were anything like the same form as were employed in Clause 2, transferring the legislative powers, it would be necessary to have the prerogatives, as regarded the Army and Navy, clearly reserved to the Imperial Parliament, unless they were intended to pass to the Irish Parliament. The form of the words of delegation would be most important. In the early part of the discussions on the clause, the question arose as to the consent of the British Government being necessary, before the Irish Government could exercise these prerogatives. The hon. Member for North Kerry very properly pointed out that it would be very embarrassing to the Irish Government if the assent of a British Minister was necessary every time the Irish Government proposed to exercise the prerogative. It was quite clear, therefore, that the prerogatives proposed to be transferred to the Irish Government should be defined. He would not venture to propose a definition by way of an Amendment, for it would be very difficult to lay down a definition in that way. The proper course, therefore, was to have the powers and prerogatives of the Lord Lieutenant defined by an Order in Council. At present the powers of the Lord Lieutenant were defined by Letters Patent. His Amendment, however, did not propose to alter the mode of the appointment of the Lord Lieutenant; but it proposed that the powers and prerogatives which were to be transferred to the Lord Lieutenant should be transferred by Order in Council; that that Order in Council should be first laid on the Table of the House, so that the House might have the opportunity of considering it, and that the House should have the power of rescinding so much of it as they thought advisable. The Committee should take care not to confound the prerogatives with the legislative powers as defined by Clauses 3 and 4. They might abridge the legislative powers as much as they liked: indeed, they had done so; but the abridgment of the legislative powers which they conferred on the Irish Parliament did not in any way qualify or abridge the Executive power or prerogative. On the contrary, it was the legislative power which abridged the prerogative. A great deal of sovereign power yet remained with the Monarch; and the prerogative might even be used for Parliamentary purposes. It would be in the recollection of the Committee that a Bill was introduced into the Commons for the abolition of purchase in the Army. It passed through the Commons, but was thrown out by the Lords; and as the Government of the day were unable to carry their scheme through Parliament, the Crown lawyers, in conjunction with the officers of the Treasury, dug up precedents, and found out that by prerogative alone—by Royal Warrant—the abolition of purchase in the Army could be effected. That case should make the Committee extremely jealous of the way the prerogatives of the Crown were transferred to the Irish Government. It would seem as if the draftsman of the Bill had not grasped the importance of prerogative. By Clause 2 they bad established a sort of sovereign power in Ireland subject to the qualifications contained in Clauses 3 and 4. By these qualifications the Irish Legislature was prohibited from making laws affecting peace or war, and matters arising from a state of war. But the Imperial Legislature had no power in these matters. They were within the prerogative of the Crown; and, therefore, when the Government made a great show of qualifying the powers of the Irish Legislature by preventing the Irish Legislature from making laws affecting peace and war, or matters arising from a state of war, they were simply placing the Irish Legislature on the same footing as the Imperial Legislature. Then, again, the Irish Legislature had no control over the Army and Navy Forces for the defence of the Realm. Neither had the Imperial Parliament any power in regard to those matters. He did not mean to say that the House of Commons could not still further abridge the prerogative; but he did say that the Crown could do these things apart from the House. It had been said by the Government that under the Irish Legislature the command of the Army and Navy would be exactly as it was now. But in the Letters Patent issued on the appointment of a Lord Lieutenant, the Lord Lieutenant was given the command of the Army in Ireland; and, therefore, if the matter would be under the Irish Legislature exactly as it was now, the command of the Army would still rest with the Lord Lieutenant. It was obvious what would happen under these circumstances. As soon as the Lord Lieutenant got his advisers in the shape of an Irish Cabinet, the powers over the Army and Navy in Ireland would rest with that Cabinet, just as the command of the Army and Navy in Great Britain rested ultimately with the Cabinet of Great Britain. Then, again, they had no intimation of what was to be done in regard to the prerogative of mercy under the Irish Legislature. Was it to be placed in the hands of the Irish Legislature? If there were attacks on landlords, offences against property, or if the loyal subjects of Her Majesty were subjected to persecution, and if men were punished for them, would it be in the power of the Irish Cabinet to remit the sentences by exercising the Royal prerogative? He submitted that all these matters showed the necessity of his Amendment, which he now begged to move.

Amendment proposed, In page 3, line 9, after the word "Majesty," to insert the words "acting on the advice of Her British Ministers, by an Order in Council to be laid on the Table of the House of Commons."—(Mr. W. Ambrose.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. E. GLADSTONE, Edinburgh, Midlothian)

In these matters Her Majesty will act on the advice of Her British Ministers. There can be no question about it. The Irish Cabinet of the Lord Lieutenant will have no access to Her Majesty to give her advice. Anybody, I suppose, can address Her Majesty through the penny post; but it is not to be taken as advice given to Her Majesty. The Irish Ministry, as such, will have no access to Her Majesty for the purpose of giving her advice any more than, say, the Members of the Indian Council. By the Constitution of this country are rigidly fixed the means by which alone Her Majesty can exercise her Constitutional powers. There must be the counter-signature of a responsible Minister. The dignity of the Crown, which we have to preserve, would be disparaged by the introduction of words declaring the inability of the Crown to do a thing except on the advice of a Minister.

SIR R. WEBSTER (Isle of Wight)

The right hon. Gentleman has, of course, to a certain extent, answered the argument of my hon. and learned Friend, though I confess he does not seem to my mind to have appreciated the exact difficulty, assuming that the clause stands as it is at present. It is perfectly true that according to the Constitution of the United Kingdom, as it is at present, the exercise of the prerogative of the Crown is controlled by rigid laws. But I am not quite sure that under this Bill the same thing can be said; and we have got to look at the question, not from the point of view of a United Kingdom governed and controlled by one Imperial Parliament, but what is the kind of direction and spirit which may at times have effect when we have got an independent Executive and Legislative Assembly in Ireland. The right hon. Gentleman suggested that my hon. and learned Friend was merely indicating the kind of advice which might be sent to Her Gracious Majesty through the penny post. With all deference to the right hon. Gentleman, I think that was scarcely a fair way of criticising the Amendment.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

I said by anybody else besides those who advise Her Majesty.

SIR R. WEBSTER

The right hon. Gentleman, no doubt, said that. I think he has a little misunderstood the purport of the Amendment. My hon. and learned Friend pointed out it was important it should be clearly expressed on the face of the Bill that this delegation of prerogative should be on the advice of British Ministers; and it does seem to me that conceding and taking the position which the right hon. Gentleman concede and takes is—namely, that at the present time such advice must be so given—it is only carrying out his own principle and idea if, when there is to be a Lord Lieutenant exercising the prerogatives that are delegated to him or other Executive powers of the Queen are to be exercised by delegation from Her Majesty, that that delegation should be given on the advice and recommendation of British Ministers. The right hon. Gentleman has conceded the principle, and yet is unwilling to accept words which, according to his own statement, ought to make that clear which should be clear.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

It is as clear as it can be.

SIR R. WEBSTER

The right hon. Gentleman says it is as clear as it can be. But we have not got that great acumen of the right hon. Gentleman, and those who, centuries hence, have to interpret this, may not be able to see things so clearly. Again, there might be advisers of the Irish Executive who would say hereafter it was not intended that this advice for the purpose of delegation should be at the instance of British Ministers. I must call the right hon. Gentleman's attention to the very summary way in which he dismissed the second part of the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend. It may be that the words in the first part of the Amendment may be thought to be unnecessary. I think they are only a proper safeguard. But, assuming they are thought to be unnecessary, I want to know how he is going to provide for that supremacy of the Imperial Parliament which, over and over again, he has told us is to be maintained? How is that to be insured? What is to happen? It is to be supposed there has been a recommendation and delegation by the Crown to the Lord Lieutenant of some power of prerogative, or some part of the Executive power of the Crown. How is this House, which ought to be the final tribunal, going to decide whether that is a proper delegation of the power of the Crown? The order made by the Crown will, I assume, be on the advice either of the Irish or British Ministers; and, for the purpose of considering this second part of the Amendment, I will assume it is on the advice of British Ministers. Suppose a large section of this House is of opinion that such a delegation of the right to exercise the prerogative was a delegation of Executive powers which was never contemplated by this House when this Bill was passed, or that a majority of Members should be of opinion that it was dangerous to the welfare of the United Kingdom. This Amendment proposes that the Order in Council taking the very important step of delegating to the Lord Lieutenant the right to exorcise the prerogative or Executive power should, at least, be submitted to this House in such a form that this House could ratify or show it expressed its disapproval of it. Assuming that the right hon. Gentleman is right in suggesting that for all time it is to be understood that this advice as to the delegation of the exercise of the prerogative is to be the advice of British Ministers, how and in what way that question is to be so raised and determined that this House can express its opinions upon it? I will make this further observation. Assuming that the view taken by the right hon. Gentleman should not be the view entertained by subsequent Lord Lieutenants or by the Irish Officers of the Crown, and assume they should purport to direct the Lord Lieutenant to exercise the power of prerogative, and do some Executive act on the advice of Irish Ministers, how is that question to be brought before a tribunal to set it right? The more you are convinced that it is a wrong thing for the prerogative of the Crown to be delegated to the Lord Lieutenant or other authority except on the advice of the British Ministers, the more essential is it that there should be ready a well-organised machinery by which that question should be raised and determined. I confess it would be more satisfactory to the House if the right hon. Gentleman would give us some reason which would induce the House to confirm his opinion as to the proper course to be pursued if some future Minister of the Crown should not take the view which he has taken. He has indicated his opinion that, according to the present Constitution, the delegation could only be by the advice of British Ministers. I contemplate the possibility of another view being taken, and the delegation being by the advice of other than British Ministers, and to this I should like to hear some answer.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

was understood to say that the Irish Ministers would have no access whatever to the Queen for the purpose of giving advice, any more than a Canadian Minister or anybody else. He was quite willing to agree that this delegation or material Executive act should receive the sanction of Parliament.

SIR H. JAMES

I really thought we had come to an agreement upon this matter ten days ago, and nothing that has fallen from the Prime Minister has detracted from what was then agreed upon—namely, that, wherever words were introduced into the Bill saying that the power was to be exercised by Her Majesty by Order in Council, that was always to be taken as meaning that that power was exercised by Her Majesty on the advice of her Privy Council here, and not on the advice of the Privy Council in Ireland. The Executive Committee will never advise Her Majesty. Now the question is how to make that clear. It is a very difficult and very delicate thing to do, because we cannot by Statute direct Her Majesty what she is to do, and what particular advice she is to take. Constitutionally these things work themselves out, and what was agreed upon was that there should be a Definition Clause stating that whenever the words were used, "power to be exercised by Her Majesty in Council," that should mean that the exercise of that power should be on the advice of the British Privy Council—or, in other words, the Cabinet. I think the proper way is that it should be exercised by means of the signature of the Secretary of State—which really means that the whole Ministry here are responsible. Once you get the whole Ministry answerable to Parliament, that is all you want. You cannot define the exact method; you cannot direct Her Majesty as to whether she is to summon the whole Cabinet or a particular Minister. What we want is the whole responsibility of the Cabinet. I think it was agreed that some Definition Clause should be brought up. If the right hon. Gentleman will tell us what the words that have been decided on by the Government are, it will save considerable discussion.

MR. SEXTON (Kerry, N.)

wished to observe that there was no agreement as to a Definition Clause. The references to Her Majesty were very numerous in the Bill, and were in various forms. Sometimes the reference was to Her Majesty the Queen, sometimes to the Queen, sometimes to Her Majesty by Order in Council, and sometimes by Order in Council without reference to the Queen. There were as many as 40 such references. Twenty of them were to the Queen personally, 17 to the Council, and three to the Order in Council. These various references were to be dealt with on different principles, so that the right hon. and learned Member for Bury would see that if they were to have a Definition Clause gathering up all these references, and stating under what circumstances and conditions these functions were to be exercised, they would enter on a work of great delicacy and complexity. He would venture to submit it might be more convenient and more safe, at the point where reference to Her Majesty came in, to make it clear there what was the nature of the power to be exercised, and what were the conditions. As at present advised, he was of opinion it would be extremely dangerous to attempt to deal with the whole subject by a Definition Clause.

MR. DARLING (Deptford)

should hope, after the speech of the Prime Minister, that they were somewhat near to an agreement on this Amendment. The Prime Minister seemed to have no objection to the first part of the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend; but he had a slight objection to the wording of the second part of the Amendment, which provided that the Order in Council should be laid on the Table of the House of Commons, and he seemed to think that the assent should be signified in some more convenient way. If that were so, he believed it would be easy for the Government to suggest words instead of those requiring that the Order in Council should be laid upon the Table of the House. The difficulty raised by the hon. Member for Kerry he did not quite wonder at, after the language used by the Prime Minister in discussing a previous Amendment, in which he drew what appeared to him to be an unnecessary distinction between the Premier in England and the Prime Minister of Ireland—whom the right hon. Gentleman seemed to allude to by the term le premier venu, perhaps le parvenu—whose advice would be tendered but not taken. He hoped that they should now agree on the first part of the Amendment, leaving it to the Government to hit upon some words for carrying out the object aimed at in the second portion.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir J. RIGBY, Forfar)

Although we have not arrived at an agreement yet, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bury says, in response to an appeal from him, and an appeal also from the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, we had agreed, so far as the Government was concerned, by a Definition Clause to deal with the numerous cases in which the phrases "Her Majesty" and "the Lord Lieutenant representing Her Majesty" occurred. There are some dozen of such cases—probably more—in the Bill; and we think when we arrive at a clause where these will properly come in—probably Clause 39, the Interpretation Clause—we shall be in a position to suggest words that will satisfy everyone.[A laugh.] Well, which ought to satisfy everyone. Without at all committing ourselves definitely—because useful suggestions may be made—we propose to say where, by this Act, provision is made for anything being done by Her Majesty—that is, some act to be performed, some leave to be given by Her Majesty, or by the Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty—that these two phrases, unless the context otherwise requires, shall be construed to refer to Her Majesty acting by way of Sign Manual Warrant, countersigned as usual. These are the best words, which will clearly cover every case in the Bill. That is the proper way to effect the desire of the Mover of this Amendment. We were going to insert words to the effect that the advice should be that of the Secretary of State; but we have rather a hesitation about that simply on the question of form, and the words probably will be "signed as usual and countersigned as usual." That phrase is not open to the criticism, the other would be, that it would be objectionable, on the point of courtesy, to Her Majesty by suggesting she acts-on advice. She signs the Sign Manual Warrant, and that is countersigned. That covers the whole case. As to the other matter, that Orders in Council should be laid before Parliament, the Prime Minister has said this is to be done. It has always been done in the case of all Commissions given to the Governors of Colonies. I do not think it is a matter necessary to be provided for in the Bill; but if it were thought to be so, a clause could be added to the effect that all Commissions to the Lord Lieutenant should be laid before Parliament, not for sanction to be given to them, but for some control as in the case of the Commissions to Governors of Colonies—that is, for the purpose of throwing blame on the Government if it should be thought necessary. The practice now is to have an office created by Letters Patent on the advice of the Government, and the holder is appointed by Commission, which does not vary from time to time. I do not mean to say it is invariable in the sense that it cannot be altered; but having been well considered it is laid before Parliament, and if there was any material alteration in it, that alteration also would be laid before Parliament.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

The statement of the hon. and learned Gentleman appears to me, on the whole, satisfactory, though incomplete in one particular, to which I will call his attention directly. All I desire in this definition is that we should not only make it clear when Her Majesty is to act on the advice of the British Cabinet as distinguished from the Irish, but also that when the advice is that of the Privy Council it shall be the Privy Council belonging to the Cabinet, and not any other Committee of the Privy Council. As I understand it, there is to be a counter-signature in the ordinary form by the Secretary of State, and, of course, the Secretary of State's responsibility carries with it that of the whole Cabinet to which he belongs. There was another phrase to which the hon. and learned Gentleman alluded, which is, perhaps, not strictly germane to this Amendment, but which has been brought up in the course of this Debate, and by which I should like to know what he means. The phrase is, "The Lord Lieutenant representing Her Majesty." I take it that would not be covered by the formula suggested by the hon. and learned Gentleman, and another formula will have to be discovered to meet that particular case. I hope he will tell us what it is on the first relevant Amendment, or put it on the Amendment Paper so that we may consider it. The Prime Minister has given his assent to the second part of the Amendment in principle. He admits the reasonableness of so far taking the House of Commons into the confidence of the Executive as to lay upon the Table of the House the powers which are to be delegated by Her Majesty to the Lord Lieutenant. I imagine any provision for that purpose must be made in the new clause; and as this is the clause appropriate to the powers of the Lord Lieutenant, I should like to know what words the Government intend to use for carrying out that object if they do not approve of the words which my hon. and learned Friend behind me has moved?

SIR J. RIGBY

The reference to the phrase "Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty" is put into the Interpretation Clause in the same way as "Her Majesty." When provision is made for anything being done by Her Majesty, or by the Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty, then, unless the context otherwise requires it, the provision shall be construed to refer to Her Majesty acting by sign manual warrant countersigned as usual.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

Does that include "on behalf of Her Majesty," as well as "representing Her Majesty "?

SIR J. RIGBY

Certainly not. "On behalf of" means nothing to be done by Her Majesty, it is done by the Lord Lieutenant on behalf of Her Majesty. The doubt arises when you say something is to be done by Her Majesty. Such a clause as the one I have suggested will effectuate our object by making it plain, when the thing is to be done by Her Majesty, it is done in a Constitutional way.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

What about the second part of the Amendment?

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

said, that, in order to meet the views of those who supported the second part of the Amendment, he was prepared to move— And that such instrument of delegation of prerogative or other executive power shall be laid upon the Tables of both Houses of Parliament.

MR. W. AMBROSE

said, as regarded the first part of the Amendment, he was quite aware of the agreement referred to by the right hon. Member for Bury, and he merely desired to bring that agreement to a definite issue. He was quite prepared to accept the explanation and promise that had been given by the Government, and he would accept the concession of the Prime Minister, which substantially met the object he had in view.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

then moved, in accordance with the undertaking he had given, the following Amendment:— In line 10, after the word "Legislature," insert the words "and every instrument conveying any such delegation of any prerogative or other executive power shall be laid upon the Table of both Houses of Parliament.

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

SIR H. JAMES

asked, was it not advisable to mention some period of time, otherwise it might not be laid upon the Table until the Session was over? He would suggest the word "forthwith."

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE (Rochester)

agreed with the last speaker in thinking it would be necessary to add words providing that the instrument should not come into effect until it had been first laid upon the Table of both Houses of Parliament. He suggested the addition of the words "before it comes into force" it should be laid on the Table of both House of Parliament.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

said, that Parliament might not be sitting for months, and such a proposal as that of the noble Viscount might be found very inconvenient. He doubted whether it would be worth while to put in the word his right hon. Friend had suggested; but if his right hon. Friend wished to put it in he would not object.

MR. BARTLEY

considered it would be necessary to introduce some such words as had been suggested by the noble Viscount.

SIR H. JAMES

admitted that "forthwith" might not be the best word, because Parliament might not be sitting. He did not think the Committee would agree that the order of delegation should not come into operation before this House had approved of it. There might be periods when the House might be in vacation; there might be a sudden emergency, such as invasion or rebellion, when the delegation of the powers would be bound to come from the Sovereign, and the Lord Lieutenant could not hold them in suspense until Parliament met, and what they wanted was to get possession of the delegated power, and, if necessary, call attention to what was to be done. He would move that the words "as soon as conveniently may be," should be added to the Amendment.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

accepted this addition.

Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

MR. W. AMBROSE

then moved to add, after the Amendment just accepted, the following Amendment:— Provided that no instrument, delegating any prerogatives or other executive power of the Queen, shall take effect if within twenty-eight days of such delegation being laid upon the Table of the House of Commons a Motion shall be made which shall eventually become a Resolution of the House of Commons rescinding such delegation; provided further, that if any such Resolution shall rescind only part of such delegation, then the part not rescinded by such Resolution shall alone become operative.

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

expressed the hope that his hon. and learned Friend would not press his Amendment to a Division, because, as it had been drawn, he had made a distinction between the House of Lords and the House of Commons, which was plainly un-Constitutional. Certainly, it would not be proper, in his judgment, to give any privilege in this matter to one House of Parliament, leaving out altogether the prerogatives and powers of the other House of Parliament. It was evident that unless some words were put in they would be handing over to the Executive much larger power for a limited period—that was to say, when Parliament was not sitting— than by common consent they ought to have, and his hon. and learned Friend was desirous, by his Amendment, of meeting this difficulty. The Committee had to choose between two evils, and, thinking that of the two the Government had chosen the least, he advised his hon. Friend to withdraw his Amendment.

MR. W. AMBROSE

explained that it did occur to him that there would be a difficulty about the Lords, and his first plan was to extend the provision to both Houses of Parliament, but then he at once saw there would be objections. He really wished to make his Amendment one which could be accepted, and he foresaw that hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway, and perhaps even occupants of the Treasury Bench, would not consent to the inclusion of the Lords. He thought, therefore, he might put in the House of Commons, and the Lords would be able to take care of themselves. As the general feeling of the Committee-was that this could not be effectively done by the means he proposed, he supposed he must accept the assurance of the Prime Minister as to the way in which the matter was intended to be carried out, and withdraw his Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE CHAIRMAN

said, the next Amendment in Order was that which stood in the name of the Member for West Edinburgh.

^*VISCOUNT WOLMER (Edinburgh, W.) moved the following Amendment:— In page 3, line 10, after Sub-section (1), insert—"(2) For the due enforcement of any decision of the Privy Council, or of any decree of the Exchequer Judges, or of any Act of Parliament, the Lord Lieutenant, acting under instructions from Her Majesty, may appoint in each county of Ireland so many officers as he may deem necessary for the purpose, who shall be entitled in Ireland to all the privileges, immunities, and powers which a Sheriff possesses by law. The noble Lord said that the opponents of this Bill had contended over and over again that there were no adequate provisions in it for carrying out what was the intention of the Imperial Parliament or for preserving the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. The supporters of the Bill held the contrary opinion. Their fears were not allayed when the Prime Minister, on the 13th May, speaking on another Amendment, said that in his opinion no course could be more unwise for the Committee to adopt than to make a declaration of power without having adequate means to support it. It seemed to him, if the criticism of the Prime Minister were trne on the subject they were discussing at the time it was made, it was also true as regarded the points enumerated in this Amendment. They were unable to understand what adequate means had been provided in the Bill for enforcing the decision of the Privy Council. Take this case: Suppose the Privy Council reversed all the decisions of the Irish Courts on the meaning of the words "due process of law," and the Executive Government and public opinion in Ireland supported the Irish Courts against the Privy Council, they were unable to see what adequate machinery was provided in the Bill for enforcing the decision of the Privy Council. Again, they were unable to see what due provision there was to enforce the decision of the Exchequer Judges if, for instance, they gave a definition of the words "just compensation" wholly opposed to the preconceived opinions of the Irish Legislature and of public opinion in Ireland. And, lastly, they were unable to see how some of the points in that Bill, which had to be enforced by the Lord Lieutenant, could be enforced with the machinery at present provided in the Bill. By Subsection 2 of Clause 14 at the end of six years an order might be made by the Lord Lieutenant on the Irish Treasury, without any counter-signature whatever, for the payment of sums that had been certified to be due to the British Exchequer. He was unable to see at present what machinery there was in this Bill to enable the Lord Lieutenant to enforce that order, especially if the time had arrived when the Royal Irish Constabulary had ceased to exist. There had only been three serious attempts on the part of the Government to satisfy the demands of the Opposition on this question, and to give any explanation of the difficulty. The Solicitor General on the 11th of April, during the Second Reading Debate, said— The law plainly prescribes, if there is any breach of the peace, any infraction of the law, every one of Her Majesty's subjects who is present, and who is capable of lending a hand, must do so if called upon. That, he must say, seemed to him a most extraordinary sacrifice of facts as they were to facts as they were conceived to be by a lawyer. What did the Solicitor General think took place all the last six years at evictions in Ireland? Was he of opinion that the populace gathered together to witness the evictions would, if called upon, have assisted the Magistrates and police to evict the tenants? He supposed if this duty was incumbent upon all Her Majesty's subjects it was not least incumbent on Members of Parliament; and was the Solicitor General of opinion that what the hon. Members for Mayo and Cork were doing at evictions was not what was generally supposed, but that the hon. Member for Mayo was using a crowbar, and the hon. Member for Cork lending a hand with that instrument which one of his friends had, christened "Balfour's Maiden?" If any answer was needed to meet that contention of the Solicitor General it was furnished by the Chancellor of the Duchy, who, in his book, discussing this very point, said— The Common Law principle that all citizens are bound to assist the Ministers of the law holds good in America as in England; but it is as true in the one country as in the other that what is everybody's business is nobody's business. He thought that pretty well disposed of the contention of the Solicitor General. The next hon. Member who gave them his views on this subject was the hon. and learned Member for Haddingtonshire (Mr. Haldane), who, in the Second Reading Debate, said— The Executive under this Bill would be an Executive of a twofold aspect and responsibility—a responsibility to the Irish Parliament and a responsibility to the British Parliament. He would like to ask his hon. Friend whether this theory of his of the dual duty of the Irish Executive applied also to Colonial Governments? He could not see by what logical sequence he could claim this duty was incumbent on the Irish Government and that no such analogous duty was incumbent on a Colonial Executive. If it was the duty of every Colonial Executive, how was it the Executive of Newfoundland had so signally failed in its duty to the Imperial Parliament? Was it not a matter of common history that the Imperial Parliament and Executive had found itself quite unable to get the Executive of Newfoundland to carry out the Treaty rights of the French, and was it not the case that the carrying out of these Treaty rights had been entrusted not to the Colonial Executive, because it could not be trusted, but to British and French naval officers on the spot? If that were the case, he should like to know what became of the hon. and learned Member's theory—of which he understood he was proud—as to the double duty of the Irish Executive? The last hon. Gentleman who dealt with this question was the Home Secretary, who, in the course of the Second Reading Debate, said— As a matter of fact, we know that the United States have provided—as it will be perfectly in the power of the Imperial Parliament under this Bill to do should occasion arise, for Federal Marshals and other Executive officers to execute the decrees of the Federal Courts. That was the Home Secretary's answer to the question as to how decrees were to be enforced under this Bill. The Home Secretary told them it would be in the power of this House to appoint such officials in Ireland. In his (Lord Wolmer's) opinion, they should not wait until difficulties arose; they should take care that their control was supreme from the outset. The Amendment was an attempt to embody the views expressed by the Home Secretary. He would deal very briefly with the provisions of this Bill, which would be safeguarded and made effective by this Amendment—the important provisions. The pivot of the system will be the Lord Lieutenant; in his Imperial capacity he will have to see that the decisions of the Privy Council are respected and enforced. He had already given a case which was possible under the operation of this Bill; and he would only remind the Committee of the great doubt that existed in the minds of many as to the meaning of the words "due process of law," and that the Privy Council might give a meaning to these words that would be unpalatable to the Irish people. Under Clause 19, Subsections 4 and 5, they had the Exchequer Judges who would have power to give "just compensation." They had to consider the enforcement of the provisions of any Act of Parliament and the provision for the enforcement of the decree of the Court. He held that the Lord Lieutenant, in the position he would occupy as the guardian of the interests of the Empire, should have adequate provision for his enforcement of any such decree. Lastly, there was the duty of enforcing various provisions of this Bill. There were, as he had pointed out, future Acts; but there was also this Bill itself, which, if it passed into law, would have many important provisions which would bear directly or indirectly on the Imperial control. Had the Government considered the possibility of conflict between the British Exchequer and the Irish Exchequer in regard to the charges that the Irish Parliament would be called upon to pay? Had they realised how they were to deal with these large sums, and which, by Sub-section 2 of Clause 14, the Lord Lieutenant had power to order, without counter-signature, to be paid out of the Irish Exchequer to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom? These charges might be very large. They were of three classes—expenses for which the Exchequer of the United Kingdom would be liable if the Irish Exchequer did not meet them, and which the Exchequer of the United Kingdom must afterwards recover from the Irish Exchequer; sums due to the Exchequer of the United Kingdom from the Irish Exchequer, and, finally, expenses which were to be paid by the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, and which it had to recover from the Irish Exchequer. He had, so far as he could, summarised the instalments. He could not guarantee that his figures were absolutely correct; there were large sums under the Land Act of 1891 and others that he could not ascertain. In the first place, there would be the instalments of interest and Sinking Fund on a capital sum of about £20,000,000. In the second place, and beyond these, the annual payments would be about £1,200,000. How were these sums to be secured? He maintained that under the Bill as it stood there was no manner of security for the enforcement of their payment. How, he asked again, were the decisions of the Judiciary or the Lord Lieutenant to be enforced in case of contest between them and the Irish Legislature or Executive? He had to make one more quotation from the Home Secretary, who used them. I do not anticipate any such occasion; but should it arise, it will be the duty of every officer of the law in Ireland, every Sheriff, every Sub-Sheriff, every bailiff, every policeman, it will be his duty—a duty for the non-performance of which he will be liable to be indicted and convicted—to render assistance in the execution of the decrees of the Exchequer Judges and the enforcement of the laws of the Imperial Parliament. He (Lord Wolmer) would like to ask whether the Home Secretary seriously thought that, in the supposed case of a difference arising between the Government and the Executive of Great Britain and that of Ireland, he could rely on the officers of the Irish Executive to act against the orders of their Irish masters, or whether he would propose, in case of their refusal, to prosecute them before an Irish jury; and whether, if he did, he did not think that an Irish Attorney General would enter a nolle prosequi? What was the position in the United States? The Chancellor of the Duchy (Mr. Bryce) in his book, with which they were all familiar, described the position there in eloquent terms, and he thought they ought to do what experience had shown was essential to the working of the American Constitution, and what the Amendment now proposed to do. The Home Secretary admitted the two cases were parallel, and his standard was— Maintaining unimpaired, unquestioned, and unquestionable the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament over all persona and all matters, whether local or Imperial. The right hon. Gentleman should look to this proposal to assist in the maintenance of the Imperial supremacy. The House would observe the Home Secretary's definition of Imperial supremacy. He would maintain supremacy in "all persons and matters." At the present moment the House had control over every Executive officer in Ireland. Under the Bill, after a period of six years, this House would not have one single officer owing direct allegiance to it. Was that maintaining the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament unimpaired? It did not look like it. What had happened in Norway? In that country they were questioning the Imperial authority even in matters of foreign policy. What had happened in the United States and in Switzerland? In both these countries, on more than one occasion, the authority of the Federal Body had been seriously questioned. What had been done there might be done in Ireland. Why did they think it might not? If this Irish Constitution was to be on similar lines to the Consti- tutions of those countries, Ireland could act in the same way; and they were bound to safeguard their Imperial authority by some such provision as he was advocating. They saw that Imperial authority might be questioned. They would be told again, he supposed, as they had often been time after time before, that their opposition to the Bill was based upon a wicked want of confidence in the Irish people, and they had been told that Ireland would not resist the Imperial authority, and, above all, that power would bring with it the sense of responsibility. Well, he would only give the Prime Minister one argument in reply to that which had been the general argument of the Government, and the authority he would quote was the Chancellor of the Duchy (Mr. Bryce). That right hon. Gentleman, in his book, said— The chief lesson which a study of the more vicious among the State Legislatures teaches is that power does not necessarily bring responsibility in its train. I should be ashamed to write down so bald a platitude were it not that it is one of those platitudes which are constantly forgotten or ignored. He might hope that the Chancellor would not consider it right that this platitude should be used by a responsible Minister. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say— We know that power does not purify men in despotic Governments, but we talk as if it did so in free Governments. And talking of the Legislatures of the worst States, he added this— The greatness of the scale on which they act, and of the material interests they control, will do little to inspire them. New York and Pennsylvania are by far the largest and wealthiest States in the Union. Their Legislatures are confessedly the worst. It was because he did not wish the Imperial supremacy in Ireland to rest on a platitude that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy and the Government did not believe in that he moved his Amendment.

Amendment proposed, In page 3, line 10, after sub-section (1), to insert—" (2) For the due enforcement of any decision of the Privy Council, or of any decree of the Exchequer Judges, or of any Act of Parliament, the Lord Lieutenant, acting under instructions from Her Majesty, may appoint in each county of Ireland so many officers as he may deem necessary for the purpose, who shall be entitled in Ireland to all the privileges, immunities, and powers which a Sheriff possesses by law.''—(Viscount Wolmer.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

The noble Lord is very unwilling that the power of Parliament should rest upon a platitude, but his Amendment would place us in exactly that predicament. It would rest the powers of Parliament on a novel and misplaced platitude; it has every vice that can possibly attach to a platitude. The Amendment appears to me to be entirely out of place. Surely it is most irregular, most inconvenient, and most unprecedented to consider how the decisions of the Privy Council or the Exchequer Judges arc to be executed when we have no Parliamentary knowledge as to whether these authorities are to exist or not. The time to consider how these decisions are to be given effect to will be when we determine that such decisions shall be allowed to be taken under the Bill. But, if the Bill passes in its present form, the decisions of the Privy Council and of the Exchequer Judges will be parts of the law of the land in Ireland. Every officer of the Irish Government will be bound to give effect to every legal decision falling within his own proper and legitimate province. The noble Lord says he cannot trust the Irish Executive—that it will be opposed in all cases to the execution of the Imperial law. But if that sentiment has any foundation whatever, the result of recognising that foundation would be, not that the Amendment should be adopted, but that the Bill should be rejected. It is part of the old process on which the House has teen spending days and weeks—namely, that, having admitted the broad principle on the Second Reading, we are to go to work point by point, clause by clause, and line by line to introduce proposals that would utterly destroy the whole scheme of the Bill and make it ridiculous. This, as I have said, is not the proper time for dealing with the question raised by the Amendment, and we cannot accept it.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN (Birmingham, W.)

Dealing with the Amendment proposed by my noble Friend, the Prime Minister has commenced by stating his objection to the place in which it appears. He says we do not at present know whether there will be any Privy Council or whether there will be any Exchequer Judges, and that we ought to have regard to the will of Parliament before we propose to insert clauses dealing with the power of the Council or the Judges. Now, Mr. Mellor, I do not think this is a serious objection. We have not found the Government so conciliatory in the matter of Amendments that we can look forward to their accepting Amendments which, as the Prime Minister says, will destroy the whole scheme of the Bill. Is it likely, when we come to deal with the constitution of the Committee of the Privy Council or with the Exchequer Judges, that we shall find the Government inclined to make any change of importance in the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman? We might be more inclined to meet the Prime Minister if it were not that we are now discussing this measure under very peculiar circumstances, because we might be able to find a compartment which would allow us to take the Amendment at some future stage of the Bill; but the Government have carefully excluded the possibility of our bringing forward new clauses by the vote which they have carried in the House, because we do not know whether we could find time for them subject to the limitations that have been imposed. The Prime Minister went on to say a word or two as to the merits of this Amendment. In the first place, he did, as he has done on all, or nearly all, the Amendments we have brought forward—he told us that the Amendment indicates our rooted distrust of the Irish Parliament and Executive; and he said we ought to have confidence, inasmuch as any decision of the Privy Council—any decision of the Exchequer Judges—will be part of the Irish law, and that we should have confidence that law will be carried out by the Irish Legislature. I think it is an extraordinary instance of forgetfulness on the part of the right hon. Gentleman that he has not had before him the state of things in the United States of America. We are not likely to be charged with any distrust of the United States or of the framers of the American Constitution; and yet it is perfectly well known that independent States have resisted the Federal jurisdiction and the decisions of the Federal Judges. That being the case, why are we to be expected to place our confidence in the Irish Legislature? Why are we to be told it is an improper distrust to assume that the Irish Legislature will also be inclined to resist the Imperial law? I do not argue the question from the mere point of view of distrust, although I have never concealed my distrust of the manner in which the power of the Irish Legislature will be exercised. But I put it to the Prime Minister that if the framers of the American Constitution had to provide this power—if experience has shown that it is necessary to provide it—why should we not provide it here? The United States have elaborated a whole system of Federal procedure in connection with the United States Marshals; and it is something of that kind that we are endeavouring to set up by this Amendment. An hon. Friend reminds me that this provision of the American Constitution wag added—that it was found to be a necessity after a very short experience. Another point made by my right hon. Friend was that my noble Friend, in moving the Amendment, has not defined the powers which this officer is to have. Is that a fault; is it fatal to the Amendment? Let me call the attention of the Government to their own Bill. Here is a clause which I think they must actually have forgotten or insufficiently studied—Clause l9, which allows the Exchequer Judge to appoint an officer— Whose duty it shall be to enforce that judgment or decree; and for that purpose such officer, and all persons employed by him, shall be entitled to the same privileges, immunities, and powers as are by law conferred on a Sheriff and his officers. The clause does not define the power of this officer except in that general language.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

Hear, hear!

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

That is the only definition given in the Bill. I am now obliged to say that I do not believe the right hon. Gentleman has read the Amendment. That says— For the due enforcement of any decision of the Privy Council, or of any decree of the Exchequer Judges, or of any Act of Parliament, the Lord Lieutenant, acting under instructions from Her Majesty, may appoint in each county of Ireland so many officers as he might deem necessary for the purpose, who shall be entitled in Ireland to all the privileges, immunities, and powers which a Sheriff possesses by law.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

We assign to an officer the execution of duties which are the Sheriff's duties; but there are a multitude of duties which are not Sheriffs' duties at all.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Then the objection of my right hon. Friend was not accurately stated. It is not that we have not defined the powers, but that we have not given sufficient powers. We should be prepared to add any powers that the right hon. Gentleman would be inclined to concede. But for the moment, in our humble opinion, the powers we have given are sufficient. At any rate, it is not open to the right hon. Gentleman to say we have not defined when we have taken the words of our definition from his own Bill. Another complaint against the Amendment is that it does not state the number of officers the Lord Lieutenant is to employ; and, again, the suggestion is forced upon the mind that the Prime Minister has not read the Amendment; for it provides that the Lord Lieutenant is to act in this, as in other matters, under the advice of Her Majesty's English Council. Under these circumstances, it is an utter mistake to say that the Lord Lieutenant would have a personal discretion. As to the last objection—that the Amendment does not define the pay of these officers of the State, or where the money is to come from—the Prime Minister must be perfectly aware that it is not open to a private Member to insert provisions imposing new charges. If the Government assent to the Amendment they can easily fix the amount of the pay of the officers themselves. Now, I think I have fairly met the objections that have been taken by the right hon. Gentleman. There is one word more I desire to say before I sit down. I do not want to argue this question upon any ground based upon distrust I may feel with regard to the Irish Legislature; but I am entitled to refer to the statements which have been made again and again by hon. Members opposite below the Gangway. It will be in the recollection of the Committee that the other day I referred to the language used by the hon. Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon), who said that if the whole of his speech were read it would be found to bear a different complexion to that which I had represented. I challenged the hon. Member to give his explanation, and the hon. Gentleman said that at a later period of the Debate he would do so, but asked to be informed of the place at which the speech had been delivered and the date. That was a perfectly fair request, and I at once furnished the information. I did not expect him at once to reply, because it was perfectly fair that he should take time to examine the statements he had made. But, although later on in the Debate the Prime Minister assumed that the hon. Member would reply, the House has heard nothing from him since. The hon. Member is again in his place, and I wish to challenge him upon the subject. I have the whole speech here, and I assert that there is not one single word in it which can in the slightest degree modify or diminish the force of the words which the hon. Member used. I say that the hon. Gentleman, not only on that occasion, but upon others, has again and again declared that whenever they have an Irish Parliament they will have the Police and the Constabulary under their control, and they will remember those who have been the enemies of the people.

Mr. DILLON rose, but Mr. CHAMBERLAIN declined to give way.

THE CHAIRMAN

The right hon. Gentleman is in possession of the Committee.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I have nearly finished. I assume that the hon. Member is prepared to give an answer to my challenge. If he is unable to explain away the words I have quoted, then I appeal to the Government whether they are going to hand over the peace and order of Ireland to men like the hon. Member for North Kerry, who have threatened that they will abuse those powers? [Nationalist cries of "Oh, oh!"]

MR. SEXTON arose amid loud cries of "Order!" and "Dillon!"

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I meant the hon. Member for East Mayo—not the hon. Member for North Kerry.

MR. SEXTON

Any such accusation is an infamous falsehood.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I told the hon. Member on sitting down that I meant the hon. Member for East Mayo. I made a mistake.

SIR F. S. POWELL

I rise to Order. I distinctly heard the hon. Member for North Kerry describe the conduct of the right hon. Gentleman opposite by using the words—"It is an infamous falsehood."

MR. SEXTON

The hearing of the hon. Baronet is capable of some improvement. What I said was that any such accusation as the right hon. Gentleman made against me at the close of his speech was an infamous falsehood. I never used such language. [Cries of "Order!" and "Chair!"]

SIR F. S. POWELL

That is just my point. I desire to know from you, Sir, whether it is in Order for one hon. Member to describe the language of another as an infamous falsehood?

The CHAIRMAN rose.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

As I have already admitted, I accidentally referred to the hon. Member for North Kerry instead of to the hon. Member for East Mayo. I do not think that the matter need go any further. I had no intention whatever of making any accusation in. reference to this subject against the hon. Member for North Kerry.

[Mr. DILLON here left the House.]

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

said, that he believed the hon. Member for East Mayo had retired in order to obtain some book of reference in regard to his speech. Perhaps, in the meantime, he might supply another statement which had been made by the hon. Member. The quotation he was about to make was proved before the Special Commission, and would be found on page 30 of the Report. It was a citation from a speech of the hon. Member, as follows:— It will be our duty—and we will set about it without delay—to disorganise and break up the Royal Irish Constabulary, that for the past 30 years has stood at the back of the Irish landlords. Then I should like to see the Irish landlord who will face the Irish tenant. The hon. Member had gone about Ireland for the last 12 years threatening what he would do when he came into power; and it was a little too much for the Prime Minister to talk eternally to the House about this doctrine of trust. The right hon. Gentleman was not going to risk a cent with these people. He was going to submit the entire property of the Irish minority to these men, and he now complained because the House would not swallow his Bill and take these gentlemen on trust. Who first taught the House to distrust them? Who was it declared that the doctrines of the Land Leagne were the doctrines of assassination? It was the Chancellor of the Exchequer who used the words, and who was sitting on the Treasury Bench now. That right hon. Gentleman had used those words; they were true words, and the right hon. Gentleman knew it. He protested against the Prime Minister telling the House that they were to offer no objection to handing over everything to men who had broken almost every one of the Ten Commandments.

[Whilst Mr. T. W. RUSSELL was speaking, Mr. DILLON re-entered the House.]

MR. DILLON (Mayo, E.)

said, that the right hon. Member for West Birmingham had refused him the courtesy, which was universally extended by one Member to another, of putting a question in the course of his speech. What he had wished to ask the right hon. Gentleman was, What were the other occasions on which he had repeatedly threatened people in Ireland with a misuse of power if ever he possessed it? The right hon. Gentleman must have known what was the question he had wished to put to him, because the right hon. Gentleman was making a statement which he knew he was not able to substantiate. The right hon. Gentleman, on a previous occasion, had read an extract from a speech delivered many years ago at Castlereagh, and frequently quoted. He had asked the right hon. Gentleman for the place and date of the speech, and the right hon. Gentleman had said it was delivered at some village called Kilmoree; but, on referring to the newspapers, he (Mr. Dillon) had found that it was the same old speech which had been so frequently quoted. He admitted frankly that the language which the right hon. Gentleman had read out was correctly contained in a report of that speech; but he held that the context of that speech did, to a considerable extent, modify the meaning of the language quoted. He would ask every hon. Member whether it was fair, or just, or reasonable, to seek to attribute to a Member of the House an intention so outrageous and so cruel as that which the right hon. Gentleman sought to impute to him, based upon a brief extract from one speech? [" Oh, oh!"] No other speech had been quoted. The right hon. Gentleman had had ample time and many men scavenging among old newspapers; but he had based his charge upon one short extract from a speech delivered under circumstances of cruel and extraordinary provocation. The speech was delivered in 1886, a short time after the massacre of Mitchelstown, where he had seen before his own eyes three innocent men shot down—and shot down in cold blood—by policemen who were acting under the orders of an officer, who was so bankrupt in character that even the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Balfour), the Tory Chief Secretary, had dismiss him from his employment. He spoke of Captain Segrave. The right hon. Gentleman would remember those days. That officer was charged by the jury with gross incompetency, if not with worse, and of being the cause of the murders committed at Mitchelstown. The Government of the day did all in their power to shelter him; and it was only after a complete exposure of his character that he was dismissed. The recollection of these events was hot in his mind when he made the speech in question, and had been for weeks and months before. Not a single week had elapsed since that event in which he had not seen peaceable meetings broken up by the batons of the police, in which he had not been in constant terror of a repetition of the scenes of Mitchelstown. Within half-an-hour of the delivery of that speech he had been told by the organiser of the meeting of a poor peasant woman who, two days before, had been sent to prison by the Magistrates for a month for assaulting a bailiff who, the evidence showed, had gone to her house intoxicated and grossly insulted her. The woman pleaded that she might be taken home under police escort to fetch her two months' old baby which she was suckling. The Magistrates refused, but despatched a car-load of constables, with never a woman among them, a distance of nine miles, to fetch the child. It was not just to rake up language delivered under such terrible provocation and never repeated in cold blood, and he would say that he regretted having used it—as showing any fixed purpose in his mind. But there was a passage in the earlier part of the speech which modified the meaning of the words conniderably— I will go further, and say that the officers of the law who have made themselves prominent against the people by their harshness and cruelty, if they desire promotion when an Irish Government is in power, will have to go elsewhere for it. There he plainly pointed to the authors of the Mitchelstown massacre, and of the incident he had just alluded to. There was nothing in the speech to justify the construction put upon it by the right hon. Gentleman, and the statement of the right hon. Member was unfair and unjust. While it was perfectly possible to extract from his speeches, during those 12 long years, sentiments which he regretted having uttered, he did believe honeetly that if these speeches were placed side by side with the utterances of any other man in a similar position they would not compare unfavourably with those utterances; and if the people of this country were aware—as some of them, happily, now were—of all the provocation of the time, they would not think the language such as to justify them in condemning their character.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

When the hon. Member rose just now, at the close of my speech, I could not foresee what it was he meant to say, and only thought it more convenient that he should allow me to finish, so that he might have his opportunity of explaining. It appears now he rose to ask me to give particulars in other cases. I am perfectly prepared to give him details and places of other similar speeches: but I will not be led astray from the consideration of this particular speech. The Committee has heard the defence of the hon. Member—that he was speaking in circumstances of such intense provocation that, in fact, almost any language would be justified, and that he himself was in a condition of mind in which he could hardly control himself. Why? Because the massacre of Michelstown had taken place only a short time ago, and he was still thrilling with the horrors of that massacre. You cheered that. [Ministerial cheers.] Yes; you cheered it. [Renewed Ministerial cheers.] Do you know that the fact is that the massacre of Mitchelstown took place on September 9, 1887, and that this speech was delivered on December 5, 1886? The hon. Member for East Mayo, who has had more than a week in which to prepare himself, and has had the facts, dates, places, and everything before him, now comes down to this House and palms off a statement of that kind. Well, Sir, in these circumstances how can we accept the hon. Member's tardy repentance? The hon. Member read a few words out of a speech, and he says that they reduce very considerably the strength of what followed. Well, I am going to read a passage or two from the hon. Member's speech, because it breathes from first to last a deliberate intention to use a particular power—namely, the power which the Government are going to give to him in order to be revenged on his enemies. Who are his enemies? Does the Committee think that they were the police who, he says, behaved so badly, or the local Magistrates who gave such wrong decisions? Yes; but they were also the bailiffs and the agents. Were they responsible for the massacre of Mitchelstown which occurred 12 months afterwards? I will tell the Committee how the speech was really made. It was made in defence of the Plan of Campaign. At the very commencement of his speech the hon. Member says— And now I will say a word of warning to these men who in the present struggle are thinking of taking the side of the landlords, the oppressors of the people. I want to say a word of warning to the bailiffs and all that class of people who will side with the landlords in the coming struggle this winter in Ireland. There is no man in Ireland, England, or Scotland who does not know who will be the Government in Ireland within the next few years .….I tell these persons that the time is at hand, and very close at hand, when the police will be our servants, when the Irish police will be taking their pay from Mr. Parnell, who will be Prime Minister of Ireland; and I warn the men today who take their stand on the side of landlordism and signalise themselves as the enemies of the people when it is in our power we will repay them. That is followed by the modifying passage which the hon. Member has quoted; but, as if he were afraid of the modifying effect of this passage, he reverts to the original strain. His object is to convince the Committee that what he means is that they would not be bound to give these men good jobs under the Irish Parliament; but does that apply to the bailiffs and the agents? No; that might possibly apply to the police, but on no conceivable application could it have reference to the other persons named— I call on the Nationalists of Ireland to aid us in this struggle against the men who hunted them down like dogs in 1867. Who were they? His memory is a long one. He is not merely to have revenge on the men who opposed the Plan of Campaign, but on all the men who have offended since 1867. They also are to be kindly remembered when the Irish Parliament is set up. For who were foremost in hunting them down in 1867 but the agents and the local Magistrates; I call on every Irishman in Ireland and America, by every memory of his race, on those who have suffered by the black memories of the persecution of landlords in past generations, to stand by us; and if the Irish race goes into it in the spirit of past struggles the result cannot be doubtful, and when we come out of the struggle we will remember who were the people's friends and who were the people's enemies. Well, I say that we are not satisfied with such protection for the minority in Ireland, the men who, according to the hon. Member, had hunted them down in 1867, and who are now riding over the people—we are not satisfied with the protection—which will be given to them by the hon. Member for East Mayo. This Amendment, therefore, is a necessary Amendment; and if there was the slightest intention on the part of the Government to give any protection to the minority in Ireland they would at once accept it.

MR. HARRINGTON (Dublin, Harbour)

said, that if all the things now alleged against the Irish Members were true, they were equally true when the right hon. Gentleman was prepared to make a treaty with those Members. If there was anything in the character of the Irish Members which now rendered them unfit to carry on Irish government, the same elements of distrust must have been in the mind of the right, hon. Gentleman when he sat on the Treasury Bench as a Member of a former Government. The right hon. Gentleman had no distrust of the Irish Members when he proposed to give them control of the Land Question in 1885 and the charge of education. It was now, however, for the purposes of dishonest argument, that the right hon. Gentleman had discovered that the character of the Irish Members was so bad. But he remembered the time when the right hon. Gentleman sent some of his emissaries to Ireland with a letter to the Irish Members.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN, rising amid loud cries of "Order!" and "Chair!" said: That statement is absolutely untrue.

MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)

I rise to Order—

THE CHAIRMAN

Mr. Harrington is addressing the Committee.

MR. LABOUCHERE

I rise to Order, Sir. The right hon. Gentleman said the statement of my hon. Friend opposite was absolutely untrue, and I wish to ask whether it is in Order for one Member to accuse another of absolute untruth in this House?

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

Mr. Mellor—[Cries of "Order!" and "Sit down!"]

MR. HARRINGTON

I shall be able to give the right hon. Gentleman some proof—

MR. LABOUCHERE

Mr. Mellor, I asked for your ruling.

THE CHAIRMAN

The words did not reach my ear, but I wish to say that I deprecate all strong language and all personalities, and I hope that hon. Members will avoid using expressions which are calculated to lead to disorder.

MR. HARRINGTON

said, he should endeavour to respect the Chairman's ruling. He could only say that the course of conduct pursued by gentlemen opposite during the many weeks the Bill had been in discussion was likely to provoke retorts from those Benches. Upon every opportunity they could seize upon they assailed the character of the Irish Members. The Irish Members did not look to them for a certificate of character; they looked to their own people, who trusted them infinitely more than gentlemen opposite were trusted in their constituencies. The statement which the right hon. Gentleman had made that he sent no letters to Ireland was a statement for the truth of which he would refer the right hon. Gentleman to Mr. Duignan. Irish Members, who were at the time being imprisoned by the Government of which the right hon. Gentleman was a Member, received letters from Mr. Duignan, of Walsall, and Mr. Duignan stated to them—[Cries of "Question!"] It was the question, but he did not want to press the argument further than to say that the Irish Members were at least as worthy of trust now as they were when the right hon. Gentleman was prepared to give into their hands, without the thousand safeguards he now proposed, the entire plan of government in Ireland. He wished now to finish his statement about Mr. Duignan—

THE CHAIRMAN

I do not see how this is in Order. The hon. Member is entitled to defend himself against anything that has been said, but he must not go beyond that.

MR. HARRINGTON

said, he was only giving the right hon. Gentleman the particulars. He would, however, give them to him privately.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

A charge has been made which I am bound to meet at once. [Nationalist Cries of "Chair!"] As I understand the hon. Member—[Renewed Cries of "Chair!"] It is so characteristic to allow the charge to be made and not allow me to reply.

THE CHAIRMAN

I hope hon. Members will not interrupt. The right hon. Gentleman is entitled to explain.

MR. T. M. HEALY

One of our Party was stopped.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I am very sorry the hon. Member was interrupted, because if he had gone on I should have known exactly what I had to answer. I can only answer the statement he was allowed to make. I understand he says I gave letters to Mr. Duignan, of Walsall, for the Irish Members, in which I made offers to them of some bargain or arrangement.

MR. HARRINGTON

That is not what I said. I said that Mr. Duignan, of Walsall, had a letter containing a proposal on Irish Government, including National Councils, and that Mr. Duignan gave it to the Irish Members as coming from the right hon. Gentleman—and he told the Irish Members that their replies and observations were to go to the right hon. Gentleman. He told the Irish Members, some of whom were in gaol at the time, that it was given to him for the purpose of bringing the right hon. Gentleman their replies.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I do not think Mr. Duignan could have said that, and, if he did, it was inaccurate. Now I know exactly what the charge is. Mr. Duignan was not a friend of mine; he was a political acquaintance. I did not give him any letter to take to Ireland; but Mr. Duignan himself, on his own account, entirely without any reference to me, and without my knowledge, went to Ireland. He afterwards wrote me a long and very interesting account as to what he had observed, and I wrote him in return a letter marked "private," in which I stated in so many words that I would never, under any circumstances, consent to Home Rule. [Nationalist cries of "Oh, oh!"] Yes; the letter exists, and has been printed. There is no secret about it. Further, I expressed my own personal opinion that something in the nature of a National Council, which I very roughly sketched out in that private letter, might be a settlement of the difficulty. As the House knew later on, with the full assent of the Prime Minister, I conducted negotiations with Mr. Parnell in respect of somewhat similar subjects. Mr. Duignan, after receiving my letter, asked whether he might show it to some few persons in Ireland, privately, as I think. I did not know to whom he was going to show it. He did show it, I believe, to some of the Irish Members, because he subsequently sent me a letter from the hon. Member for North Louth (Mr. T. M. Healy), in which he commented on and criticised my proposal. It was not done at my request, and he did not go there with any letter of mine. It was only after he had gone there that there took place the private correspondence, which was transferred into a public correspondence because one of the Irish Members to whom it was shown put it into print.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Sir W. HARCOURT, Derby)

I hope that this discussion, which has degenerated into a personal controversy, will conclude. I confess I was a little surprised that my right hon. Friend founded his charge on that particular speech, which I understand was made in 1886. Now, I remember that date very well, because it was in December, 1886, that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham made the public statement that he thought that a few people meeting round a table would have no difficulty in settling the question of Home Rule.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

No; I beg pardon. The speech is, of course, in the Library, and my right hon. Friend is mistaken. I did not say we could settle the question of Home Rule. I was dealing with the Laud Question and the question of Local Government; not with the Question of Home Rule. [Nationalist cheers.] These interruptions force me to give a further explanation. The Local Government I spoke of, as the speech will show, was distinctly Municipal Government and County Government. I made that perfectly clear, and I did not say, and I did not think at that time, that it would be possible for us by sitting round a table to settle the question of Home Rule. I only consented to do so afterwards, when my right hon. Friend himself invited me to add that to the subjects I have named.

SIR W. HARCOURT

I do not object to my right hon. Friend's explaining in the middle of my speech. What I say is that he threw out the suggestion that half-a-dozen people should meet round a table to settle the Irish Question then in dispute. [Mr. J. CHAMBERLAIN: No.] Well, Sir, I am in a position to speak with some confidence on this subject, because some two or three years ago my right hon. Friend challenged me to state what happened on that occasion. I did state in great detail to my constituents at Derby what occurred. I printed and circulated my statement, and I sent it to my right hon. Friend, inviting him to correct any errors that might be in it. The statement was confirmed by all the other gentlemen who were present on that occasion; and, therefore, I may speak with some confidence of what occurred. It is quite true that, as my right hon. Friend has said, he desired, in the first instance, to confine the question to the land. We said we could not deal with that unless the question of Home Rule was to be a leading subject in the discussion. We then went into the matter. The right hon. Gentleman—

SIR M. H. BEACH (Bristol, W.)

Mr. Mellor, I rise to Order. Our time is limited, Sir, and I wish to ask you whether the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which certainly ought to be confined to the Question, is confined to it or not?

SIR W. HARCOURT

I will try to confine it to the Question.

THE CHAIRMAN

I imagine the Chancellor of the Exchequer is now coming to the Amendment.

SIR W. HARCOURT

I will speak to the Amendment and to the speech of my right hon. Friend in a single sentence. I will say that three months after the speech of the hon. Member for Mayo was made the right hon. Gentleman was willing to give the power over the police in as large a degree as it is given under the present Bill to the Irish Members.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I rise, in one sentence, to give the last statement of my right hon. Friend an absolute contradiction.

MR. LOUGH (Islington, W.)

said, the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. J. Chamberlain) said he had always expressed a rooted distrust of those who would come into power in Ireland under the Home Rule Bill.

THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. Gentleman cannot discuss something that has been said by somebody else.

MR. LOUGH

With very great respect, I put it to you, Sir, that there was no possible connection between the speech of the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. Dillon), which you allowed the right hon. Gentleman to refer to, and the Amendment.

THE CHAIRMAN

That was in Order for this reason. The right hon. Gentleman explained that he thought the Irish Members were not fit to be trusted with power. That was his view, and it was answered by the hon. Member for Mayo (Mr. Dillon), who had been charged with having made a particular speech, and who defended himself. He explained that the words he used were not intended to be serious. I must ask the hon. Member to come to the Amendment.

MR. LOUGH

said, he was coming to the Amendment. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. J. Chamberlain) said he had always expressed distrust of the people who would come into power under the Home Rule Bill, and quoted a speech delivered by the hon. Member for Mayo in 1886. He (Mr. Lough) now wanted to quote a speech delivered by the right hon. Gentleman.

THE CHAIRMAN

The right hon. Gentleman quoted the speech of the hon. Member for Mayo for a particular purpose. It would be out of Order, on this Amendment, to quote a speech delivered by the right hon. Gentleman himself for another purpose.

MR. LOUGH

said, the speech he wished to quote was addressed to the particular point that was before the Committee. The point on which the Government based their position in rejecting the Amendment was that the Irish people might be trusted to carry out the laws passed by Parliament. The Amendment traversed that position, and the right hon. Gentleman said he had always entertained distrust of the Irish people. But he did not always express that opinion. The right hon. Gentleman said, in a speech delivered on June 17, 1885, at Holloway— It is a National question as well as a parochial question, and the pacification of Ireland at this moment depends, I believe, on the concession to Ireland of the right to govern itself in the matter of its purely domestic business. What is the alternative? I do not believe that the great majority of Englishmen have the slightest conception of the system under which this free nation attempts to rule the sister country. It is a system which is founded on the bayonets of 30,000 soldiers encamped permanently as in a hostile country. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer was speaking the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. J. Chamberlain) interrupted him with the remark that formerly he was only willing to grant Ireland municipal institutions. But the right hon. Gentleman said at the Cobden Club dinner on the 13th June, 1885— The extension of municipal institutions is not all that we have to do in the way of Local Government.…. It is a National question also.…. We have also to recognise and to satisfy the national sentiment, which is in itself a praiseworthy and a patriotic and an inspiring feeling,…. in this way only is there any chance of our being able to remove the deeply-rooted discontent which follows as a natural consequence from the attempt of one nation to control and interfere with the domestic and the social economy of another, whose genius it does not understand, whose pressing necessities it is not in a position to appreciate, whose business it has not time to attend to, and whose prejudices and whose preferences it is impossible, even with the very best intentions, to avoid sometimes ignoring or offending,… and I believe that in the successful accomplishment of its solution lies the only hope of the pacification of Ireland and of the maintenance of the strength and integrity of the Empire. He hoped that these quotations would be considered relevant to the subject in hand. In his opinion, any concession of Home Rule which was limited by an Amendment of this kind would be nothing better than a farce and a delusion.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

I am sure the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down meant well, but it is quite evident that he had not the slightest glimmering of what the course of the argument has been upon the Amendment, as far as the argument could be said to have any relevance to the Amendment at all. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham, dealing with an Amendment which had for its object to provide that the Irish Executive, acting under the advice of the English Imperial Parliament, should have power to carry out its duties, pointed out that the Irish Government, by the declaration of the Irish Members themselves, could not be trusted to carry out the law. That may or may not be a sound argument, but that it was a relevant argument no human being can deny, and it has certainly brought forth the most extraordinary attempt at an explanation ever made in this House. I have often heard the Member for East Mayo (Mr. Dillon), in Debates in this House, endeavour, as he has endeavoured tonight, to play upon the sensibilities of the House, and in a pathetic tone of voice narrate anecdotes—into the accuracy or inaccuracy of which I will not now inquire—which might appeal directly to the feelings of hon. Gentlemen, and under cover of which he desired to hide the real question at issue. The hon. Gentleman has been unmasked before, but never so swiftly, never so completely as to-night. The old device of the hon. Member has been often exposed. It has never been exposed before upon the nail as on the present occasion. I hope the next time the hon. Member comes down with that peculiar manner of his, which, I observe, has a great effect on the House of Commons when it is unfamiliar with it, but which strangely loses its power when one has become used to it, I hope he will bear in mind what has occurred to-night. So far, undoubtedly, the discussion has been a heated one; but it has been strictly relevant to the issue. But then comes the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, by way of illustrating those methods of procedure in Committee which required the Prime Minister on Friday to apply the gag, shows clearly how discussion in this House may be hastened and made relevant, and how strictly those in charge of the Bill keep to the point of the Amendment. Though we have not been given much time for discussion, yet during the time the mercy of the Government has allotted to us I think we might, at all events, have been left undisturbed by the irrelevant personalities which the Chancellor of the Exchequer drags in. [An hon. MEMBER: Who introduced the personalities?] Quite so; the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham made a personal attack. Was it an irrelevant personal attack? Had it no bearing on the issue before the House? Did I not see the Prime Minister go to the end of the Treasury Bench and listen anxiously to every word that fell from the hon. Member for East Mayo, and express his satisfaction when he thought he was making a successful reply and then retire in dismay when the answer was given?

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

I did not retire to my place until some time afterwards.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

I may have been in error as to the exact position occupied on the Bench by the right hon. Gentleman, and in that case I apologise. I was not wrong as to the expression of his face. The question is this—whether, after the two speeches which have been quoted from gentlemen below the Gangway, and after the historical verdict passed on their actions during the last 12 years—whether, in the face of facts which are or ought to be known to every man who hears me with regard to what they have done and what they had promised to do, you still think it well to trust the Irish Members with a power which the American Constitution itself dare not trust to a single State Legislature?

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 196; Noes 230.—(Division List, No. 186.)

VISCOUNT WOLMER

said, he wished to move the following sub-section, which should be read in conjunction with his last Amendment:— (3) The Lord Lieutenant shall, whenever he considers it advisable, by order, without any counter-signature, direct the Royal Irish Constabulary to support the officers of the law in the execution of their duty. It was the intention of the Bill that the Irish Constabulary should act under the direction of the Lord Lieutenant, not as advised by the Irish Cabinet, but as advised by the Imperial Cabinet; and, therefore, these words were necessary to enable him to direct them as he thought fit to safeguard the Imperial interests and execute the decrees of the Imperial Courts.

Amendment proposed, In page 3, line 10, to insert the following sub-section:—"(3) The Lord Lieutenant shall, whenever he considers it advisable, by order, without any counter-signature, direct the Royal Irish Constabulary to support the officers of the law in the execution of their duty."—(Viscount Wolmer.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

was understood to point out that the object of the noble Lord was provided for in the Bill, but that if there was any doubt about it the 2nd section of the 30th clause would be the more appropriate place for considering the Amendment.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Do I understand that so far as the Government are concerned they intend and are willing that the Lord Lieutenant shall have full power over the Constabulary, and that he shall be able to exercise that power without reference to the advice of the Irish Cabinet?

MR. J. MORLEY

You need only read the first two lines of the 2nd subsection of Clause 30. They lay down that the Constabulary shall "be subject to the control of the Lord Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty."

MR. CARSON

thought it would be advisable to insert some such words as those proposed in Clause 5.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

said, the point in the minds of hon. Members opposite could be more satisfactorily discussed on Clause 30.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

said, the police were to be reserved to the Imperial Parliament for a term of years. During that term the laws would have to be enforced; and he wished to know, supposing there were an eviction, and the Sheriff requisitioned the police, would the Lord Lieutenant, apart from his Irish advisers, have power to direct them in order to see the law carried out?

MR. J. MORLEY

was understood to reply in the affirmative.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

After the promise of the Government to consider the matter on Clause 30, it would be as well not to press the Amendment further.

MR. J. MORLEY

No; we consider that the words of the Bill effect the object in view; but, of course, we are open to argument.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

I fail to see the difference between "considering the matter" and being "open to argument."

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

said, that if the Government thought it desirable, on grounds of policy, that the Lord Lieutenant should have at his command a body of Constabulary, whose movements he would be able to direct, quite irrespective of his Irish advisers, it was unfortunate that they had made no permanent provision for carrying it out. The Royal Irish Constabulary were to be extinguished after a certain period, and their places were not going to be taken. The Government were in this curious position—that while they thought it desirable and expedient that the Lord Lieutenant, as representing Her Majesty, should have a force of police at his command, they had only provided for that force during the years in which the Constabulary were to be in existence.

MR. J. MORLEY

Amendments should be considered on Clause 30.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

MR. CARSON (Dublin University)

said, that before the Committee passed from these Amendments he wished to have the following Amendment, which occurred to him during the discussions, inserted as a sub-section in the clause:— The Lord Lieutenant, acting under instructions from Her Majesty, may appoint such person or persons in Ireland as he may deem to be necessary to represent Her Majesty, and to direct and enforce on her behalf and in her name any Imperial right or interest. He said it was quite clear that under the section dealing with the Imperial Court—that was to say, the Exchequer Judges—there was a power in the Court to bind bailiffs or sheriffs or any other Executive officers of the Irish Legislature in proceeding to carry out their duty. But this Amendment had for its object not the carrying out of the decrees of a Court, but the setting of the law in motion where Imperial matters were concerned. In the case of treason or treason-felony, the British Executive would direct the Irish Attorney General to prosecute. He presumed there would be an Attorney General, as representing the Queen, under the Irish Legislature. But the Irish Executive might not wish their Attorney General to prosecute. They might say—"We do not approve of this, and we will not set the law in motion." What could the Imperial Government do, under those circumstances, if they had not some officer of their own in Ireland to enforce its orders? In the collection of the Imperial Revenue, also, the Imperial Government alone would be interested; and if any conflict were to arise between them and the Irish Government, unless some such Amendment was adopted the Imperial Government would have no one to set the law in motion. He begged to move his Amendment.

Amendment proposed, To add as a sub-section, "The Lord Lieutenant, acting under instructions from Her Majesty, may appoint such person or persons in Ireland as he may deem to be necessary to represent Her Majesty, and to direct and enforce on her behalf and in her name any Imperial right or interest."—(Mr. Carson.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

SIR J. RIGBY

I do not think the Amendment comes in the right place, and, quite irrespective of that, I do not think it is necessary. The Amendment, in the view of the Government, is covered by those already argued. It differs from them in form, but in principle it is the same. The apprehension of the hon. Gentleman is that there would be a difficulty in carrying out prosecutions by Executive officers in Ireland, because the proper persons to act were not at hand. If the occasion contemplated by the hon. and learned Gentleman ever arose, the Imperial Government will have perfect power to appoint such officers as may be required (without relying on the Bill at all). In the first place, I do not apprehend that the danger hinted at—namely, that the Irish Attorney General would decline fees, by refusing to act on behalf of Her Majesty—is likely to arise. I do not say that Her Majesty will act in such a case on her prerogative. But we can appoint them by Act of Parliament. These matters being exclusively under the direction of the Imperial Parliament, the Imperial Parliament would have the carrying out of anything in relation to them.

MR. CARSON

said, he did not think the Solicitor General had answered the point at all. The point was—was the Irish Executive, in all the matters which had been excluded from their powers, to have complete control indirectly? The Irish Government could mar the whole effect of the clauses containing the exceptions to their powers by saying to their Attorney General—"We do not wish these matters to be carried out, and we, therefore, direct you to take no action." Suppose that difficulty, arose what would the Imperial Government do? Such a case had occurred in America. The Federal Attorney General had complete control in all Federal matters, and he had representatives in all the States to carry out these Federal matters. In the State of Virginia the State Attorney General proceeded to act on a law passed by the State Legislature. The Attorney General at Washington conceived that the powers of the State Parliament did not extend to the passing of such a law, and he took steps to prevent the State Attorney General from taking action under it. The Attorney General of the State Parliament, however, went on, and the Federal Attorney General had him sent to prison. As in America, where they had a distinction between Federal matters and State matters, so under the Bill, whore they had a distinction between Imperial matters and local matters, they would necessarily have disputes between the Irish Government and the Imperial Government. Take the case of treason and treason-felony. In that matter, which had been excluded from the Irish Legislature, it might reasonably be presumed that a clash of opinion would occur. Some people in Ireland might endeavour to obtain separation from this country altogether. The Imperial Executive might direct proceedings for treason-felony against those people, and the Irish Executive might say—"We have no power over treason-felony, and we are not going at the beck and bidding of the Imperial Government to carry out this matter; and we do not wish our Attorney General to proceed for treason and treason-felony in the Irish Courts." If that case happened, what would the Imperial Government do? The Solicitor General said they would come to the House of Commons and pass an Act. The Solicitor General had treated the matter, as he had previously treated other matters, by "pooh poohing" it, and by falling back upon their old familiar friend—the great confidence they were to have in the Irish Government. He ventured to say that they would render entirely nugatory all the reservations and restrictions on the legislative powers of the Irish Government if they were going to rely on the Irish Executive to take action in all these matters.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

I hope the Government will see that my hon. and learned Friend has asked a specific question, to which we are entitled to an answer. How is the Imperial Government going to appoint an Attorney General in Ireland to carry out its objects there, supposing they find that the Irish Attorney General, appointed, not according to the will of the majority of the Imperial Parliament, but solely in accordance with the will of the Irish Parliament, is not a convenient instrument to carry them out? I understand that there is nothing in the Bill to compel the Irish Executive to have an Attorney General, and nothing to compel them to carry out our objects. You say in Clauses 3 and 4 that the Irish Legislature are not to be allowed to legislate on certain matters; but you say in Clause 5 that they may, by Executive action, have control of those matters. Surely that is absurd. My hon. and learned Friend presses the Government to say what is the machinery—if they reject his Amendment—by which they propose to carry out in Ireland matters now carried out under the American Constitution by the Federal Attorney General. We are strengthened in our argument by the experience of the United States, where they have found it necessary not merely to have a Federal Army, but to have a Federal Attorney General to see that the objects of the Federal Government are carried out in the different States. He did not wish to press upon the Government any particular solution of the problem, but that there is a difficulty to be met cannot be denied, and we ask the Government how they propose to deal with it?

SIR J. RIGBY

I thought I dealt with the specific point. Suppose there be an Irish Attorney General who will be so different from other Attorney Generals as that he will not take fees or do any work, the Lord Lieutenant, as representing Her Majesty in these matters, will appoint some other counsel.

MR. CARSON

Will the Lord Lieutenant have such power?

SIR J. RIGBY

The Lord Lieutenant is appointed to represent Her Majesty in Ireland, and if he should not have such powers, there is no doubt that this House will agree to them as soon as the necessity for them is pointed out.

Question put, and negatived.

MR. BRODRICK (Surrey, Guildford) moved the insertion of the following Amendment:— The Lord Lieutenant shall not exercise any of the prerogatives or powers the exercise of which may be delegated to him by Her Majesty in furtherance of, or in connection with, any of the matters with regard to which the Irish Legislature has not power to make laws, save so far as may be necessary to carry out any existing law or future Act of Parliament including this Act. He said, it would be evident, after the discussion they had had on the last two Amendments, that it was necessary to closely scrutinise the powers that were about to be given to the Lord Lieutenant under the Bill. His position was a very ambiguous one; he would have to fulfil a dual function, and serve two masters. He was to be appointed by the Imperial Government. The last few Lord Lieutenants who had been selected on the opposite side of the House had been gentlemen eminent for their social virtues and personally respected by all who knew them; but they were also men who could not be said to have had previous experience of political affairs or office. It therefore became necessary that their functions should be more clearly defined, and that their powers should be accurately stated in the Bill. The Lord Lieutenant would also have to serve the Irish Parliament. He might order a prosecution which the Irish Executive would decline to carry on. In the same way he might order the taxes to be collected; and if the Irish Executive declined to collect those taxes the Lord Lieutenant had no power to collect them without the ponderous, tortuous method of the Solicitor General, of a Bill being passed in this House. Then the Lord Lieutenant was to have the control of the Army and the Civil Force for six years, and at the end of that time he was left without anybody to represent him. He thought it was very desirable, from this point of view, that they should see whether at the same time the Lord Lieutenant would be using the prerogative given by Her Majesty for purposes which were set in motion by the Irish Parliament, although they had no power or right to deal with it. The Viceroy might be withdrawn, but that step, in the case of Lord Fitzwilliam, had produced serious consequences, and it was the last expedient to which the Imperial Government should have resort. He (Mr. Brodrick) based his claim to the consideration of the Government in this matter on the statement of the Attorney General, on 14th June, who stated that he did not see why the Executive should have powers that were not given to the Legislature. This Amendment was absolutely in accord with the principle laid down by the Attorney General. He maintained that the position of Lord Lieutenant under this Bill was one which was dissimilar from that which any subject of the Crown had ever occupied in relation to Her Majesty. His powers were novel and ill-defined powers, and he said if the political appointments which had been made in the past were to be continued—however amiable or estimable might be the gentleman nominated—if it was proposed to give the position to a man who had not held high office—Cabinet rank, at all events—it was possible that the problems brought before him, and the differences he had got to deal with in connection with the two Parliaments, might prove troublesome and dangerous in the extreme to the Parliament here if he were inclined to make any excuse. Such being the case, they had a right to endeavour to get the Government to define these powers in every respect; to take away any danger from them by making it clear to the Viceroy exactly what the powers were, so as to make it as easy as possible for a man to ascertain which master he was serving and what his exact legal position was in respect to any demand made upon him by the Legislature to which he was largely accountable, but which, at the same time, would watch jealously any alteration he might think it necessary to make in the interests of the taxpayers of this country.

Amendment proposed, In page 3, line 10, after sub-section (1), to Insert the words—"The Lord Lieutenant shall not exercise any of the prerogatives or powers the exercise of which may be delegated to him by Her Majesty in furtherance of, or in connection with, any of the matters with regard to which the Irish Legislature has not power to make laws, save so far as may be necessary to carry out any existing law or future Act of Parliament, including this Act."—(Mr. Brodrick.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

MR. J. MORLEY

I listened to the hon. Gentleman's speech in support of the Amendment with attention. He says the future Lord Lieutenant would be an amphibious person, and would have to serve two masters, one of whom he might hate and the other love, and that he might get into a strait with one or other whichever course he follows. I think the hon. Gentleman's own speech was rather amphibious, and great part of it referred back, in effect, to an Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for Edinburgh, which was negatived. The answer to the hon. Member, in substance, is a very short one. First of all, I might refer him to the practice of Colonial Governments, which shows that the multiplication of functions which the hon. Gentleman finds so paradoxical does, in effect, happen in our own system of Colonial Government from the beginning of the year to the end. Every Colonial Governor does occupy a dual position. Every Colonial Governor is advised by his Colonial Ministers on matters that exclusively concern the Colony, and then wherever Imperial matters come in with which his Colonial advisers have no special or imperative concern, he has reference to other considerations and advice. I quite admit that, Ireland being so much nearer, in our relations with Ireland there are some respects in which the Irish Viceroy will take a different place to that of a Colonial Governor. I have never denied that. I have always argued the case of Home Rule on that understanding, and in that sense I have used the expression that the Lord Lieutenant was the keystone of the arch. The Amendment of the hon. Member does not really affect that difference between the position of a Colonial Governor and the position assigned by this Bill to the Lord Lieutenant. The hon. Member really, I think, can hardly have grasped the full significance of the latter portion of his own Amendment. He said that the Lord Lieutenant has no power whatever under this Bill, except within the limits of the legislative sphere. What does he say in his Amendment? To put it shortly, that the Lord Lieutenant shall have no power except within the legislative sphere so far as may be necessary to carry out any existing law or future Act of Parliament, including this Act. I think if the hon. Member had realised the full force of his own statement he would have seen that it entirely demolished his own saving and the proposition he laid so much stress on, that the Lord Lieutenant has no power except within his legislative sphere.

MR. BRODRICK

was understood to say that the right hon. Gentleman had misunderstood his point, which was that the powers in question should be confined to matters on which the Irish Government could legislate, but should not be allowed to extend to matters not within the sphere of the Irish Government.

MR. J. MORLEY

The hon. Member, I think, still does not realise his own Amendment, because what he has just said is in contradiction of his own saving. The plain truth is, the Lord Lieutenant represents Her Majesty in relation to Irish Ministers. Those Ministers will be responsible to the Irish Legislature, no doubt through him, so far as Irish matters are concerned. But then he is also responsible for other matters which are excepted from the powers and competence of the Irish Legislature. So far as these matters are concerned, the hon. Member himself in his own Amendment saves his position by enabling him to do all such things as might be necessary under the existing law. That is to say, that in all matters of Imperial concern the Lord Lieutenant is to exercise his judgment upon, and administer Executive powers in respect of, not upon the advice of Irish Ministers, but otherwise. The hon. Member forgot entirely the most important part of this clause. These powers to the Lord Lieutenant are to be delegated powers. The clause says so. The hon. Member complains that we have not taken pains to tell him what his powers are; that we have not defined the limit of these powers; that we have not explained fully in the clause, for the guidance of the future Lord Lieutenant, within what limits he has to exercise what I may call Imperial powers in relation to the matters excepted from the competency of the Irish Legislature. The answer to that is very simple. The Lord Lieutenant will have those powers delegated to him by an instrument. That instrument, as has been said already upon the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for Edinburgh, will lay down specifically what he has to do in relation to matters which are Imperial, and which by Clause 3 are excluded from Irish competency; and that instrument delegating these powers, specifying what they are and enumerating the conditions and terms under which they are to be exercised, as was stated by the Prime Minister, will, of course, when a change of system takes place, come, in the first instance, under the cognisance of the Imperial Parliament. We contend we have more perfect provision for defining the two spheres of the Lord Lieutenant as head of the Executive. We insist that, in exclusively Irish matters, he will act upon the advice of the Irish Ministers—subject, of course, to whatever action may be taken in this Parliament in restraint on that action. So far as the Lord Lieutenant is concerned in those matters which are within the sphere of the Irish Chambers he will act upon the advice of the Irish Ministers. In Imperial matters, which are taken out of the cognisance of the Irish Legislature, he will, of course, be guided by the terms of the instrument as to the powers he exercises. Upon those provisions we rely, and we are, therefore, unable to accept the hon. Member's Amendment.

MR. AMBROSE

thought the right hon. Gentleman hardly apprehended the true position of the Lord Lieutenant. Under Clause 5 a miniature Constitution was erected, and the Lord Lieutenant was intended to represent Her Majesty as a kind of ceremonial or figure-head. He did not use this expression in any offensive sense. If they made him a real Executive officer they ran enormous risks, because they brought him—the representative of Royalty, of the Throne, and of the Constitution—into conflict, it might be, with the Irish Legislature; and just as the intervention of Ministers in Great Britain was intended to prevent anything like friction between the Sovereign of the realm and either House of the Legislature, so in Ireland they ought to make the position of the Lord Lieutenant one in which he could neither come into conflict with the Parliament of Great Britain nor with the Parliament of Ireland. If they made him an officer who was at one time to act on the advice of the Irish Parliament and another time on the advice of the Imperial Parliament, they put him in this dual capacity in an extremely difficult position, and there would be friction between him and the Imperial Parliament or between him and the Irish Parliament. He ventured to think the true position was to have Ministers in the Irish Cabinet who should represent the Imperial Government and who should operate as a sort of intermediary between the Lord Lieutenant on the one hand and the Irish Parliament on the other hand. The Amendment of his hon. Friend seemed to him a most reasonable one. It recognised the proposition that they could not attempt to limit the Executive powers which were to be transferred to the Irish Government in the same way that they limited the power of the Legislature. In so far as the prerogative and Executive powers of the Sovereign might be necessary for maintaining, enforcing, and carrying out the laws, this Amendment recognised the right of the Executive Government of Ireland to have the prerogative of the Crown. What the Amendment aimed at was really this: they had limited the power of the Legislature and said it should not do certain things. But, whilst they limited the power of the Legislature in that way were they to allow the go-by to he given to those limitations and allow the Executive Government of Ireland to break through every one of those restrictions through the medium of the prerogative? The Amendment aimed at that, and was designed to prevent, by mere Executive acts, those things being done which the Legislature was prohibited from doing. He hoped the Amendment would be accepted.

MR. BLAKE (Longford, S.)

I think it is a very extraordinary thing that objection has been taken from the Opposi- tion Benches to the clause of the Bill in this regard. That clause in the most emphatic manner practically reserves the right and liberty to the Imperial Parliament to deal with this question, and from time to time, if need be, to prescribe the method under which, and the conditions upon which, the prerogative power should be delegated to the Viceroy. In fact, if objection were to be taken at all, it should be taken from these Benches. We are trusting to the equity and justice of the Imperial Parliament to carry out the Constitution in its true spirit, to delegate Executive power in that spirit whereby the efficient exercise of the Legislative and the complementary Executive power may be accomplished; and practically to make that division in the delegation of the Executive power, which shall accomplish this net result: that the Viceroy shall act upon the advice of the Irish Government in reference to so much of the Executive power as is connected with Irish affairs, and shall act upon the instructions—not the advice but the instructions—of a Secretary of State responsible to this Parliament in those matters in which the prerogative belongs to Imperial concerns. There is no cause for friction—there is no cause for double advice even. The officer in one case, in Irish concerns, acts as a Constitutional Monarch upon the advice of the Cabinet responsible to his Legislature. The officer, in the other case in which he acts as the Imperial Delegate carrying out the will of the Imperial Government, acts upon the instructions of a Minister of this Government responsible to this Parliament. And the division of Executive powers and the conditions and limitations under which he is to exercise those Executive powers are reserved, in effect, to this Parliament by the clause which provides that they shall be delegated by instruments which, of course, are to be framed by a Government enjoying and retaining the confidence of this Parliament. So that, in case the instruments shall be found not to carry out the spirit of the Constitution, and not to limit the duty of the Viceroy to act upon the advice of the Irish Cabinet in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution as interpreted by this Parliament, still this Parliament retains the power to see that men are put in Office who will model and revise those instruments from time to time so as to carry out the spirit of the Constitution.

MR. BUTCHER (York)

said, the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had found a solution for the difficulties pointed out by that Amendment. He had told them that this extraordinary dual Lord Lieutenant would act in Irish matters on the advice of Irish Ministers, and in Imperial matters on the advice of Imperial Ministers, and that there would be no friction whatsoever. It was somewhat strange that the distinction between Irish and Imperial matters, which a very short time ago it passed the wit of man to distinguish, should now be left in a manner in which no conceivable friction was possible. That was a development to which they on that side of the House would have to take some objection. The object of the Amendment was to insure that upon the Irish Executive should be imposed those restrictions which the Government had admitted to be necessary and proper to be imposed upon the Irish Legislature. In this Amendment they had one advantage, and that was that they could not be met with the stock Government objection that they were showing distrust of the Irish Parliament. He did not for one moment say they did not feel that distrust, for they did justly feel it; but in this particular case it was not open to the Government to confront them with that taunt, for the very good reason that they themselves in these matters had indicated distrust of the Irish Government, and had thought it necessary to take them out of the sphere of Irish legislative action. If these were matters which it was necessary to take out of the sphere of Irish legislative action, à fortiori was it necessary to take them out of the sphere of Irish Executive action. Take Clause 4, Sub-section 5. The Government had recognised it was necessary to prevent the Irish Legislature from making any law whereby any person might be deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, or whereby any person might be denied the equal protection of the laws. Under the late Government one of the greatest difficulties was that which arose from the persecution of boycotting, and it was only owing to the vigorous action of the late Chief Secretary that boycotting was suppressed by giving adequate police protection. Were they to be told that if the Irish Legislature wished to revert to the system of boycotting they would go to the trouble of passing a law by which a person should be deprived of equal protection of the laws? No; such an idea was absurd. They had the simple and obvious expedient by Executive action of denying police protection. Nothing could be more easy. That being so, it was desired to put on Executive action that restriction which the Government had imposed upon legislative action. In the American Constitution, from which this very Sub-section 5 of Clause 4 was borrowed, the restriction which the Government had embodied in their Bill was an Executive restriction in the first place, and not a legislative restriction. Amendment 14 of the American Constitution, from which the clause was borrowed, provided— No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. And it went on— Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law. He had no doubt the Chancellor of the Duchy would tell them how it was that the American Constitution, in enacting this restriction, expressly made it an Executive restriction, whereas the Government in their Bill limited it to a legislative restriction. [Mr. BRYCE: It is not so.] He had pointed out one case in which legislative restriction would be absolutely of no avail, and if they wanted to insure equal justice they must also impose Executive restrictions. It might be said there were already provisions by Common Law which would prevent the Executive going beyond their duty. An Executive officer was at present liable to indictment for breach of duty; and if they were acting on the law of the United Kingdom, it would not be necessary to have this provision. He would, however, ask the Chief Secretary whether he would refer them to any clause in the Bill which would take away from the Irish Legislature the power to pass Acts of Indemnity? There was nothing to prevent the Irish Legislature from indemnifying an officer who might do wrong, or act illegally; so that in one sense, although the police authorities in Ireland might be bound to give police protection in a certain case, that would not be any hindrance to their passing an Act of Indemnity against acts of an illegal character.

MR. J. MORLEY

It would be void.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE (Mr. MUNDELLA, Sheffield, Brightside)

was understood to endorse Mr. Morley's observation.

MR. BUTCHER

said, there was nothing in the Bill to render such an Act of Indemnity void; and it would have the effect of allowing the officer who had acted illegally escaping the punishment due for so acting. The officer would not be called upon to suffer the penalties attaching to his illegal act. That was the real danger. The Chief Secretary did not seem to think it was real; but if he was desirous that the Act should not be open to an interpretation of that sort, then he (Mr. Butcher) said it was essential that some such words as were proposed in the Amendment should be inserted in the Bill; and, further than that, he would say that these words should be followed up by something—some penalty—attaching to the illegal act, such provision being made in a manner which would prevent its being repealed by the hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway (the Irish Members).

SIR H. JAMES (Bury, Lancashire)

said, that he was not aware of any reference in the Bill to any advice or instruction to be given to the Lord Lieutenant in such a question as indemnity. It appeared to him, therefore, that the Committee should clear up the point. There was nothing in the Bill to say how the Lord Lieutenant was to be guided in respect of Imperial matters. For example, for six years the control of the Constabulary and the collection of the Revenue would be Imperial; but when the Lord Lieutenant acted in these questions and gave directions to the Constabulary in order to have the Revenue collected, by whom was he to be guided? From the Constitutional point of view he objected to the word "instruction," because the Lord Lieutenant, in his judgment, ought to be advised and not instructed. With whom, therefore, was he to take counsel? He-must have someone to advise him; he could not be altogether isolated. If he was to be isolated, why was he to be placed in such a position? There would be no Imperial Minister. There would be no Chief Secretary. The Ministers in Dublin would be Irish Ministers pushing Irish interests everywhere and probably coming in conflict with Imperial interests. Who was to stand between the Irish Legislature and the Lord Lieutenant if such a conflict should arise? There would be no one there to stand between them, to act on behalf of Imperial interests. From the Imperial side there would be no means of communicating with Ireland. If the Lord Lieutenant was obliged to ask for counsel would he obtain it from the Imperial Cabinet? And if he would obtain it, by what means? He would have no one through whom he could communicate; and he would not be a Member of the Imperial Cabinet himself. He hoped the Government would give a clear explanation of their intention on this question now that it had been raised.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE (Rochester)

said, he joined with the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down in his request for an expression of the views of the Government. He was surprised that no Member of the Government had risen to reply, because the question was a very important one. He knew that the Solicitor General (Sir J. Rigby) generally fell back on the assertion that these powers were not in the Bill, but were implied in it. That was the reply to a question of his (Lord Cranborne's) the other day.

SIR J. RIGBY

I said nothing of the kind. I gave a popular version of the clauses in the Bill, and said the language used in the Bill was, of course, more technical.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

said, the Solicitor General was at the time evidently annoyed at the attitude he (Lord Cranborne) had adopted.

SIR J. RIGBY

Not at all.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

said, the Chief Secretary fell back upon the Colonial model. Well, he was surprised to hear the Colonial model quoted. He said there was no difficulty in the case of the Colonial Governments.

MR. J. MORLEY

I did not say that.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

said, the right hon. Gentleman knew that there could not be the same difficulty with Colonial Governors as would arise with the Lord Lieutenant under this Bill. He could cite cases to show that as long as there was left in the hands of the Lord Lieutenant the power of dealing with subjects which the Irish Legislature were prevented from dealing with the restrictions in Clauses 3 and 4 would be of no value whatever. He recollected a case in which a Colonial Legislature passed an Act against Chinese immigration. It was an illegal Statute, because it was against the Treaty engagement of the Crown. It was an Act, in fact, which could not be passed without the leave of the Crown. What course did the Australian Legislature adopt? Having passed the Bill, it proceeded to enforce it without waiting for the leave of the Crown. Did the Imperial Government interfere on that occasion? The Act was in reality not an Act; yet it was enforced, and the Royal leave only came 12 mouths afterwards. If that could be done in the case of the Australian Government, what might they not expect to take place again and again in Ireland? The Lord Lieutenant was almost certain to surrender to those who were about him. The Chancellor of the Duchy (Mr. J. Bryce) told them last Wednesday that there would be nothing to prevent this.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY (Mr. J. BRYCE, Aberdeen, S.)

I said that no one would be allowed to transgress the law.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE

said, he was sorry if he misquoted the right hon. Gentleman. He understood him to say that the Legislature in Ireland would not be able to deal with any of those subjects with which they were prohibited from dealing by Clauses 3 and 4, but that the Lord Lieutenant would have power. If that was so, difficulty must arise. Was it sufficient to restrain the Legislature and give the power to the Lord Lieutenant? If they did that they surely destroyed the value of the clauses they had passed. Surely it was right to say that the Lord Lieutenant would have every inducement to act with the Irish Cabinet? Let them take the case of voluntary enlistment in Ireland. Supposing they came to a certain position in European politics that the public opinion of Ireland might be of influence in some European quarrel. Then, if the Lord Lieutenant's powers were not restricted by this Amendment, a serious difficulty might arise through his action. There were other questions upon which serious apprehensions might be entertained if these powers were given. There were such questions as the prerogative of mercy; laws might be rendered nugatory or alterations might be made in laws. He could give many cases, but these were sufficient to show that, as long as the Lord Lieutenant had in his hands the power to deal with the subjects that the Legislature was prevented from dealing with, the restrictions to which he had referred were of no value whatever. The only resource they could have was of an officer through whom the Imperial Government would be in direct communication with the Lord Lieutenant as representing Imperial interests. In that way they might provide that power should be given to withdraw these subjects from the Lord Lieutenant, or, at all events, the Imperial Government could let their views be known to him. The protection of the Government in this country did not mean the protection of the law; but it depended upon the authority of the Government, and that depended upon whether the Government sufficiently enjoyed public confidence to enable it to give such protection. In this country an officer would be liable to penalties in the ordinary course of justice if he violated the law, and he thought it was clear that they were not providing that the general law should prevail in Ireland. It seemed to him that it would not prevail, or need not prevail, if the Lord Lieutenant so willed. They were entitled to a reply upon the question, and especially from the Chancellor of the Duchy, who should explain his speech of last week.

MR. BLAKE

said, he would like to add a word after what had been said by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Bury (Sir H. James). With reference to Imperial matters, the Lord Lieutenant would be the officer of the Imperial Government, under its control and directions, and taking his instructions from it. In all minor matters he would, under general instructions, act upon his own discretion, subject to communication with the Secretary of State in any case of difficulty. The true Constitutional doctrine was exactly as he had stated it. In Irish matters, the officer, though representing the Imperial Government, would appoint, dismiss, and do all acts that seemed to him right and proper on Irish advice and subject to the conditions he had mentioned; in Imperial matters that office would, he repeated, be under the control and direction of the Imperial Government.

SIR H. JAMES

said, he accepted the doctrine just laid down by the hon. Member; but he would strongly press for an answer to the question who, in such cases, was to advise the Lord Lieutenant? There might be a question as to sending the Constabulary, say, to Cork, or as to the collection of the Revenue; the Lord Lieutenant would be isolated, and there would be no one to give him assistance except by way of direction from England. He objected to the Lord Lieutenant being made the mere mouthpiece of direction from England. And of whom was he to be the mouthpiece? Who was to be answerable for him in that House? There would be, as he had said, no longer a Chief Secretary for Ireland. If the Lord Lieutenant was waiting upon advice from England, who was to advise him in his difficulty? They could not call a Cabinet Council to say whether police were to go to Cork. He must press this matter upon the attention of the Government. The Chief Secretary knew what it was to be in Office. He knew the vast correspondence that had to be attended to in connection with the government of Ireland. He knew the great numbers of letters and telegrams that reached him daily, and that had to be answered. To whom were all these communications to be sent in the future? It would be to the Prime Minister or to the Cabinet; and they were entitled to know who the authority in such circumstances was to be?

MR. SEXTON (Kerry, N.)

(who was received with ironical cheers from the Opposition Benches) said, he was extremely flattered by that cheer. Did it seem very strange that an Irish Member should intervene in a discussion on a Bill concerning the Government of Ireland? Was it so strange that he was entitled to the kind attentions of hon. Members? Touching the second question of the right hon. and learned Gentleman, as to who was to be responsible for the Lord Lieutenant here, he ventured to say that the question was one of detail with which the Committee need not concern itself. [Ironical cheers.] That, at least, was his view; and he would do his best to recommend it. The Lord Lieutenant would be a part of the Imperial Government, and it would be a matter of arrangement between the Lord Lieutenant and the Imperial Government as to how his telegrams were dealt with and by whom. He admitted that they need not trouble about how the telegrams were to be answered. He presumed the Home Secretary would deal with such matters; but it would be purely a question of arrangement. This was a bogey raised by the Opposition. The Lord Lieutenant, in dealing with Irish affairs, would have his Cabinet. It was said he would be isolated in dealing with Imperial affairs. Might he remind the Committee that during the 18 years of Grattan's Parliament the head of the Executive was without a solitary soul to advise him, and had constantly to refer to London? At that time there were no steamers and no telegraph, and a letter took four or five days in crossing, and a week might elapse before a reply came. If any official in Ireland to-night wanted advice on any particularly urgent matter he would telegraph to the Chief Secretary; and if the government could now be conducted, why should it not be conducted with equal efficiency under Home Rule? If the Chief Secretary wished to satisfy the Irish Members with information on any point he telegraphed to Ireland and obtained a reply. Why could not the telegraph be used under an Irish Government? If the government of the country could be conveniently conducted under such an arrangement at present, surely the Lord Lieutenant in the future could follow the same system. It would only be in rare and special cases that he would have to seek advice from London, and when he wished to do that he would be in exactly the position that the present Government were in. The difficulty that had been raised was entirely illusory, for in nine cases out of ten the Lord Lieutenant under a Home Rule Government would be in a better position, and in the tenth case he would be in no worse position than at present, when the Irish Administration was conducted by a Chief Secretary in London.

MR. PLUNKET (Dublin University)

The hon. Member for North Kerry need not have apologised for intervening, for I have no doubt that if this Bill were ever to pass into law no one would be better qualified to give information concerning its provisions, or to exercise authority under it, than the hon. Member. But what we are anxious for is some definite information and some clear authority as to what the hon. Member spoke of as "the future Government of Ireland." The hon. Member has given us his views as to how the matters directly connected with Imperial interests could easily be dealt with by the future Government under this Bill; but it is an extraordinary thing that, though the Irish Members have freely responded, no reply to the points raised by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Bury has been given by right hon. Gentlemen opposite who are de facto, though not de jure, the present Government of Ireland. We claim to have an answer given by the Government, and not by the Irish Members—who are not yet the Government—as to how these Imperial matters are to be dealt with. We entertain greater fears with regard to the Executive authority to be set up under the Bill than with regard to the legislative authority. It would be comparatively easy to bring under the view of the Imperial Parliament any misdeeds that might be attempted in the way of legislation in Ireland; but what we fear much more, and what would be far more difficult to bring under the view of the Imperial Parliament, would be the acts of oppression that would be committed upon the minority in Ireland by the Executive Government to be established by the Bill. The hon. Member for Longford made a statement that was not at all an agreeable one to those who feel with the minority in Ireland. He said that in the future the Lord Lieutenant would be practically a Constitutional Monarch. But by whom will that "Constitutional Monarch" be advised? What will be the spirit which will breathe into the Executive—what will be the objects that they have in view? Why, they will, of course, have the same spirit, the same objects which are to be found in regard to the Legislature which it is proposed to establish in Ireland. Then, what we ask by this Amendment is that the Lord Lieutenant should be restrained, not only with regard to the exercise of his functions in reference to Imperial matters, but also in reference to those matters for which you have thought it necessary to devise restrictions on the power of the Legislature. We want to have restrictions put upon the Executive power, which we fear more than the legislative power—restrictions analogous to those which have already been adopted in regard to the property and liberty and lives of the minority in Ireland. What we want to ask is, how are we to have any remedy against the Executive power being used to injure the minority? I would respectfully ask for an answer to the question put by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Bury, and for a statement as to how protection is to be afforded in the Bill to the minority against acts of oppression which may be attempted by the Executive authority.

MR. BRYCE

I will attempt to answer, very shortly, the questions put by the right hon. Gentleman. He asks what protection there will be for the Irish minority? We conceive that the restrictions imposed in Clauses 3 and 4 on the Irish Legislature will be equally binding on the Irish Executive.

MR. PLUNKET

What provision in the Bill will provide that protection?

MR. BRYCE

We conceive that it arises from the Bill as it now stands. It is quite clear that if the Irish Executive were to take any action in violation of the rights and liberties of the people, as safeguarded in Clause 4, they would either do so in reliance on some Act of the Irish Legislature, or without relying on such an Act to protect them. If they did so in pursuance of an Act of the Irish Legislature, the Act would be no protection, as it would be a violation of Clause 4, and would, ipso facto, be void; if they did it without the protection of an Act of the Irish Legislature they would break the law.

Several hon. MEMBERS: What law?

MR. BRYCE

The existing law, which can be changed only by an Act of the Imperial Parliament. Therefore, if such an act of oppression as that contemplated by the right hon. Gentleman opposite were committed that would be a breach of the law, and the person who committed it would be liable to an action tried before the Exchequer Judges, and any point of law arising would be submitted to the Privy Council. Therefore, as the Bill is framed, protection given to the minority against unjust Acts of legislation extend also to the acts of the Executive. If any Lord Lieutenant were to direct, or connive at, such acts of illegality on the part of the Executive as the right hon. Gentleman seems to assume, he would deserve to be recalled; but no Lord Lieutenant is likely to be appointed who will thus violate the functions with which the Imperial Parliament will entrust him. With regard to what fell from the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Bury, the Government conceive that the Lord Lieutenant will be guided by the instructions which he receives in the first instance from the Imperial Government, which will tell him in what cases he is to consult the Imperial Government and in what cases he is to act on his own responsibility. That is the effect of the Colonial precedents. Subject to that, the Lord Lieutenant will refer to the various branches of the Imperial Government according to the nature of the case with which he has to deal. The police at present are administered by the Chief Secretary; but they will in future be administered by the Lord Lieutenant—and this is really an Irish matter, notwithstanding the six years' reservation. Then, if a question of trade or navigation arises, and the Lord Lieutenant thinks it needful to have the advice of the Imperial Government, he will consult the Board of Trade.

SIR H. JAMES

The right hon. Gentleman compared the position of the Lord Lieutenant with that of a Governor of a Colony; but, in the case of a Colony, the Governor has a Council to whom he appeals for advice in respect of matters that occur within the Colony. If the matter is purely external, I can understand his taking orders or advice from from the Imperial Government; but we have got a state of things to deal with in Ireland to which the right hon. Gentleman has not referred. In Ireland there are matters not Imperial for which the Imperial Government is to be solely responsible, such as the management of the police and the collection of the Revenue. There is nothing at all analogous to this in the Colonies. In respect to such matters the Lord Lieutenant will be without advice. He will be no longer a ceremonial officer. He will be responsible to the Queen acting on his own advice as an Executive officer. He will have no Minister whom he can make responsible for bad advice; but his responsibility will be always personal. He is not always to act upon instructions. He is not to be, and would not wish to be, a mere servant or agent. He is to exercise his own discretion. Then, I say, it is unexampled in questions relating to internal matters that any Representative of the Queen should be left without advice to guide him. According to the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy, you are going to put the Lord Lieutenant into that defenceless position; and he, of all men, is the last you should put into such a position. He will have his Executive Committee by his side; and you, who are anxious to guard against friction, will leave the Lord Lieutenant in this position: that one hour he will be subject to friction, and in the next he will have to go in Council with the men with whom he has been contending. Our view is that the Lord Lieutenant ought to be protected by some Council. There ought to be Ministers to assist him when he deals with Irish internal affairs, which, though not strictly Imperial, are not to be left to the determination of the Executive Committee, but to the Lord Lieutenant. We have passed through confusion enough on these clauses. What was confusion, I am afraid, will become worse confounded till it reaches chaos. The clause presents a sad spectacle. [Laughter.] It is exactly what Irish Members will laugh at; and some day they will laugh at the Government for being so foolish as to allow them to get control over those Imperial interests for which the Imperial Parliament is answerable, and which belong to the Imperial Ministry.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

said, that on May 31 he had raised the question as to who was to be the Representative of Ireland in that House, and the Chief Secretary said in reply— The Government are quite prepared to make provision for the representation in the House of those responsible for what goes on in Ireland, just as there is a Representative of what goes on all over the Empire. When the proper time comes—on Clause 5—upon that which concerns the constitution and functions of the Executive power, the Government will be willing to discuss the matter. Up to the present, however, the Government have left the discussion of the matter to hon. Gentlemen opposite.

MR. J. MORLEY

There are three or four Amendments down on the Paper dealing with this special point. The subject is not raised by this Amendment.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

What, then, does the Chancellor of the Duchy mean by saying that the President of the Board of Trade will be responsible on trade questions?

MR. BRYCE

I did not say he would be responsible. I said that in matters which arose in Ireland and came within the sphere of the Board of Trade the Lord Lieutenant would consult the Board of Trade.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

What I want to know is this. If the Irish Members who are left in this House desire to raise any question, who is to be responsible for Ireland here? To whom are we to appeal? Will the Chief Secretary answer that question now?

MR. J. MORLEY

I do not know, Mr. Mellor, whether you will allow me to answer on this Amendment? It has nothing to do with the Amendment.

THE CHAIRMAN

I think the right hon. Gentleman will be in Order in answering.

MR. J. MORLEY

My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy did not say—

MR. T. M. HEALY (Louth, N.)

I rise to Order, Mr. Mellor. I wish to ask you whether we will be in Order in that case in discussing the Amendment of the hon. Member for Preston lower down on the Paper?

THE CHAIRMAN

Yes; as this Amendment is drawn, it raises the question of the position of the Lord Lieutenant. That is the reason I did not shut out the discussion at this point.

MR. J. MORLEY

The hon. Member for South Tyrone misunderstood what was said by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Bury said—"You are going to plant in Ireland a Viceroy isolated from everybody, who can ask for nobody's opinion, who can seek nobody's advice"—

SIR H. JAMES

On British affairs.

MR. J. MORLEY

Quite so. On Irish affairs he would consult his Irish advisers. My right hon. Friend said—"Obviously, if I want to ask a question on some matter of present administration I refer to the Home Secretary." As I understand it, under the new system, if the Lord Lieutenant seeks advice, say, upon copyright, which is an Imperial matter, or upon navigation, he would go to the Board of Trade; upon a case of treason he would apply to the Home Secretary or to the English Attorney General, and so on, with the list of excepted subjects, there will be some English adviser to whom he will not be bound to go, but to whom he will naturally go if he is not able to decide of his own knowledge and judgment. That is an answer to the point raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bury. As to the other question raised by the hon. Member for South Tyrone, it is a much more important one, and that is who is to be answerable in this House for the doings of the Lord Lieutenant? The hon. Member has quoted words used by me on the 31st May. I said we were prepared to make provision for responsible dealing with any question that might arise on the part of a Minister in this House; but the Government have never contemplated the creation of an Irish Ministry. That was not in my mind when I made that statement which has been accurately quoted by the hon. Member (Mr. T. W. Russell). They have never thought that it would be expedient to have someone corresponding to the Chief Secretary; but there will be a Minister here—probably the Home Secretary as in the old days—to answer all questions gentlemen may choose to put as to Irish administration. That was the old system, and the Government see no reason why it should not be revived. Seeing that this subject is to be raised again, I do not dwell on it now. But that is our very simple and straightforward answer.

MR. GOSCIIEN (St. George's, Hanover Square)

I think we should save time if the Government would only be frank at an earlier period with regard to their intentions.

MR. J. MORLEY

I would point out that the question was only asked five or six minutes ago for the first time.

MR. GOSCHEN

What I mean is that the Government ought to have declared their intention in May, when the question was first raised. Why, when the case came up before in May, did not the right hon. Gentleman say, "We intend to make such and such an arrangement, though it may not be the time to discuss it now"? Then we should have known what the general plan of the Government is. We have to drag the plan out bit by bit. We received the hon. Member for Kerry (Mr. Sexton) just now with a joyous cheer, because we thought he was going to give a "tip" to the Government. But we find that the Government have had this plan in their minds from the very first. Why have they not told the Committee? Time has been wasted in endeavouring to extract information. [Cries of "Question!"]

An hon. MEMBER: You are wasting it.

MR. GOSCHEN

I should not waste time if our fair remonstrances induced the Government to play with all their cards on the table, and not always to keep one up their sleeve. Now the revelation has come, and what is it? It is not a revelation of a plan, but a revelation of chaos. The Home Secretary is to answer in this House for the Lord Lieutenant. The Home Secretary is to answer, but he is not to be responsible, I suppose.

MR. J. MORLEY

The Cabinet will be responsible.

MR. GOSCHEN

But the Lord Lieutenant is to supply him with information. There are three things necessary. There is an answer to be given in this House; but besides that there is consultation, and besides that, again, there is instruction. The Chief Secretary has told us that the Home Secretary is to answer—that the Lord Lieutenant is to write letters to the various Departments of State to consult them about this and that. But the hon. Member for Longford said that instructions were to be given to the Lord Lieutenant. Well, who is to give these instructions with regard to the Constabulary and those distinctly Irish matters which are reserved for the Imperial Parliament? Which is the Department of the Government that is to send instructions to the Lord Lieutenant? Notwithstanding the revelations that have been made, we are still without information on that point. Who is to give instructions?

MR. J. MORLEY

The Home Office, no doubt.

MR. GOSCHEN

Then we may take it that the Irish Constabulary are to be practically under the management of the Home Office?

MR. J. MORLEY

I would explain that the Government do not regard the police remaining in the hands of the Lord Lieutenant for a period of six years as constituting an Imperial concern. That will be an Irish matter, with reference to which the Lord Lieutenant will act upon his own responsibility.

MR. GOSCHEN

Then the Lord Lieutenant is to have three capacities. There will be an Imperial Lord Lieutenant, an Irish Lord Lieutenant, and a hybrid Lord Lieutenant, with the Constabulary remaining under Imperial control, or, rather, under the management of the Lord Lieutenant advised by the Irish Executive. I want to know if finance is to be put in the same position? I would like to take an indulgent view of the conduct of the Government in this matter. I do not believe that this is their deliberate plan; I rather incline to the view that they have not thought the matter out, and it is only through Debates of this kind that gradually they are brought to see in what they are landing this country. No wonder that their measure is not put before the country; no wonder that even now they do not put the whole of it before the House, and that they produce it piecemeal! It seems from this piecemeal revelation that the Lord Lieutenant is to act in three capacities.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

Three compartments!

MR. GOSCHEN

Yes, but not watertight compartments. [Cries of "Question!"] Has there ever been submitted to the House of Commons anything so ludicrous, so absolutely unworkable? I wonder whether we shall find the Lord Lieutenant in a fourth position in connection with the Revenue? I should like to know how the Lord Lieutenant is going to be advised with regard to this matter. [Cries of "Question!"] It is rather too much the question. What security have we that the subject of the Constabulary will remain an Imperial subject if the Lord Lieutenant, in the management of the Constabulary, is to be guided by the Irish Executive?

MR. J. MORLEY

My right hon. Friend speaks with great vehemence; but he has not quite understood what I said. The position will be this: The Lord Lieutenant's instructions will be drawn up by an English Minister, presumably the Home Secretary. He will receive general instructions as to the Constabulary, but the particular details of operations will be left to his own judgment.

MR. GOSCHEN

New difficulties arise. [Cries of "Question!"] Everyone will admit that this is one of the most important points in the Bill. Apparently the Lord Lieutenant, in connection with the Constabulary, is to act much as the Chief Secretary acts now. It is the Chief Secretary who is now responsible for the more important and higher duties which the police discharge. The action of the Chief Secretary may be challenged in this House on the Votes, and is the action of the Lord Lieutenant capable of being challenged when he is acting on his own judgment with reference to the Constabulary? If that is so, the Lord Lieutenant will be in this position: his real masters, the Imperial Parliament, will not be able to challenge his conduct on the Votes, but the Irish Parliament may possibly pass a Vote of Censure upon him. Can there be anything more absurd than the position of the Lord Lieutenant even after the explanation of the right hon. Gentleman? Is the Lord Lieutenant to move the Constabulary of his own judgment, and if he is to do so is that action to be challenged or not in this House, and, if so, how? This Constitutional Lord Lieutenant becomes in this matter an Executive officer moving the police about without any Irish advice to guide him, possibly even against the views of the Irish Cabinet, and without English advice. It appears to me that the Committee is more in the dark after the explanation of the Chief Secretary than we were in at the commencement of the Debate.

MR. GERALD BALFOUR (Leeds, Central)

said, that the questions of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bury bad remained absolutely unanswered. The right hon. Gentleman had pointed out that the Lord Lieutenant would be in an isolated position, and asked from whom he was to obtain advice? Was he to go to the Irish or to the English Cabinet, or was he to advise himself? Let them take a specific instance. It was obvious that the most difficult questions would arise as to the boundary line between English and Irish authority; and when they did arise, was the Lord Lieutenant to apply for advice to the Irish or to the English Attorney General. If he applied to the Irish Attorney General it was clear that that officer could hardly be counted on for an impartial opinion upon a question which related to a division between Imperial authority and Irish authority. He would illustrate that point by reference to the position of the Attorney General in America. That was very different from the position of the Attorney General in this country. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Duchy described him as having A general oversight of the Federal Judicial Departments, especially of the prosecuting officers called District Attorneys, and the Executive officers called United States Marshals. He was the legal adviser of the President in those delicate questions, necessarily frequent under the Constitution of the United States, which arise as to the limits of the Executive power, and the relations of Federal to State authority. Who was the legal authority to whom the Lord Lieutenant was to have recourse when those delicate questions arose in the case of Ireland? So far as he understood from the answer of the Chancellor of the Duchy, the Lord Lieutenant would be his own legal adviser.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN

It seems to me that very grave inconvenience would result from such an arrangement as my right hon. Friend appears to contemplate. The Lord Lieutenant, as we have known for some time past, is to act with regard to Imperial questions under the more or less direct advice of the Imperial Ministry, and on Irish questions on the advice of his Irish Cabinet. Now take a case which may arise. Suppose the question is whether the Lord Lieutenant is to send more police to County Clare. It is clear that that cannot be provided for by any general instructions from the Imperial Ministry. The Lord Lieutenant must act upon his own discretion. Well, the Lord Lieutenant does or does not send more police into the country. By taking that course he gives offence to the Irish Legislature and the Irish Executive, and thereupon they pass a Vote of Censure upon him. What is to be the position of the Lord Lieutenant in such a case? Knowing that he is in constant and daily relations with the Irish Executive, and cannot be a successful Lord Lieutenant unless he keeps on good terms with them, he is likely to be much influenced by them when he acts on his own discretion, and it is probable that he will act more in these matters according to the wishes of his Irish advisers than to the wishes of the Imperial Government. Let me draw attention to a case in which we have had such dual authority exercised, and show what has been the result. The dual state of things which my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary wishes to set up in Ireland is already in existence at the Cape. We have the same man acting as High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony. As Governor of the Cape Colony he is bound to follow the advice of the Cape Ministry, and must be a persona grata to them, or his position would be untenable. As High Commissioner he has to look after Imperial interests. As far as I know, no difficulties have resulted from this; but this state of things has existed for some time, and the Committee will remember to what a position it brought us. When Sir Bartle Frere was acting in his dual position he brought us into the Zulu War. This was precisely because he had these dual powers. If it had been possible for him to have been in separate and sole communication with the Imperial Government, I do not believe that war would have occurred. He was acting on his own discretion, and under the influence of the Cape Government. Well, that is a case which I think is precisely analogous to the case we are setting up here, and the result of the confusion of powers in that case was injurious to the interests of this country. It would be perfectly easy to put cases which might arise in which conflicting opinions would be given by an Imperial Ministry and an Irish Executive, and in all these cases it is almost certain that Imperial interests would go to the wall in order that the Lord Lieutenant might keep on good terms with the Irish Legislature. I think the state of things referred to by the Chief Secretary encourages us to continue this discussion, and it explains to us two things: It explains how it is that whenever, as in this case, a Debate on this Bill gets at all critical in Committee hon. Gentlemen opposite call out "Question!" and "Divide!" It also explains to us why, in view of similar discussions, the Government have thought it necessary to limit debate in this Committee.

MR. COURTNEY (Cornwall, Bodmin)

said, the situation as described by the Chief Secretary rather threatened a recurrence of what happened some time ago in one of the Australian Colonies. There was an acute crisis there, and the Governor was in great doubt as to what his action should be as a Constitutional Governor. He therefore telegraphed home to the Secretary of State "Shall I or shall I not follow the advice of my Ministers?" and he received this oracular response, "You must consult your Constitutional advisers." He was afraid that if the Lord Lieutenant was left in the position described by the Chief Secretary he might be landed in equal embarrassment and receive a similar reply. The truth was, that the position as described by the Chief Secretary and the Chancellor of the Duchy (Mr. Bryce) could not be worked. If the Lord Lieutenant misconducted himself in any of the important functions entrusted to him, it would be the duty of the Imperial Government to inform him, and it would be the duty of the House of Commons, if necessary, to stir up the Imperial Government for that purpose. That being so, there must be a Minister in England who would be the responsible person charged with the superintendence of all the functions of the Lord Lieutenant which were not performed on the advice of the Irish Minister. The Home Secretary would probably be the Minister who would be responsible to the House for the proceedings of the Lord Lieutenant; but it would not be necessary for him to give himself up entirely to Ireland. The Irish Ministry might have a branch in the, Home Office or the Colonial Office, and it might be made a branch of the Foreign Office. The idea of the Lord Lieutenant going about and seeking advice now from the Home Office, now from the President of the Board of Trade, and now from the Foreign Office was impossible of execution. The parallel the Chief Secretary rested upon did not apply at all. No doubt the Chief Secretary might consult all these Ministers, but he was the one man responsible to the House of Commons. There must be some responsible Minister who could be called to account for the action of the Lord Lieutenant.

MR. J. MORLEY

That surely was what I said. At all events, that was the thing I meant to say, and to the best of my belief did say. I said, "The Home Secretary would be responsible for all that was done in Ireland as far as this House took the trouble to take cognisance of it."

SIR H. JAMES

Would he be responsible for the advice given to the Lord Lieutenant?

MR. J. MORLEY

He would not be responsible for the advice given, but he would be responsible for the action taken on that advice.

SIR H. JAMES

Who would be responsible for the advice?

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL (Paddington, S.)

I would like to ask what extraordinary change has come over the general mind of the Committee since I left it at 8 o'clock? At that hour the Committee had come to the decision, with the full consent of the Government, that perfect responsibility rested upon the Lord Lieutenant in the exercise of the prerogative of the Crown, but that responsibility depended upon the Sign Manual of the Crown countersigned by the Secretary of State. Nothing could have been more satisfactory. But now I come down and find everything upset. What has taken place in the interval? The Government are totally unable to say who will be responsible for the exercise of these powers. What are the prerogatives of the Crown for which the British Ministry will be responsible? The Chief Secretary says that in certain subjects the Lord Lieutenant will have to use his own discretion, and that in others he may consult the President of the Board of Trade, the President of the Local Government Board, or the Home Secretary; but the right hon. Gentleman left the Committee in entire ignorance as to whether such communications were to be confidential communications, whether they were to be hole-and-corner communications, or who, if communications took place between the British and Irish authorities in that most irregular way, was to be responsible. Since 8 o'clock the situation has become altogether obscure. I lament the transformation, because it would be so easy for the Chief Secretary to have kept the whole thing clear, seeing what has been done by the First Lord of the Treasury. I cannot see why the matter should be left in this state of obfuscation. I hope the Chief Secretary will not let the Committee divide on this question in the dark. He seems to think that any want of perception in the minds of the opponents of this Bill is dishonest, but how can we understand when, between 8 o'clock and midnight, he thus succeeds in obscuring the issue?

MR. WYNDHAM (Dover)

said, he only rose to ask a question. The speech of the Chief Secretary had thrown some doubt on the Imperial character of the Constabulary, but it was certain that the Lord Lieutenant was responsible to the House of Commons for maintaining the Constabulary as an efficient Force, and he could, if he thought it expedient, prevent the Irish Legislature from reducing it. Suppose, under the advice of the Irish Legislature, he reduced the Force, and trouble arose—which was not inconceivable during the next six years—would it be competent to the House of Commons to reduce the salary of the Home Secretary?

MR. T. H. BOLTON (St. Pancras, N.)

said, it was clear that the House would for the next six years retain a large interest in Irish affairs. The Land Question would be retained for three years and the control of the police for six years, and there was also the large question of finance. These were all great and important questions, but who was the Minister that was to be responsible for them in the House of Commons? Who was to represent Irish authorities in that House? He did not want to unduly press the Government, but he would urge the necessity of being frank and candid. It could not be suggested that the Lord Lieutenant, who was not to be a Minister of the Crown, who was to be placed in a position of quasi-independence, could in any sense be responsible to this House. Who was to be responsible to the House during the probationary period of six years? For the Lord Lieutenant to seek the advice of different British Ministers on different subjects was simply absurd. India was governed by a Viceroy with a Council advising him; but they were represented in Parliament; the Colonies bad their several Governments, but they were represented in this House by a Secretary of State, and surely a similar arrangement should be made as to Irish affairs. Were they to have in that House a Minister responsible for Irish affairs, or were they to have a delusive arrangement which was only calculated to mislead and to give most inefficient control over the direction of these important matters?

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

I do not think that hon. Members have realised that the question before the Committee is one which lies at the very root of responsible government. I do not wish to be unnecessarily severe, but it is surely plain that the Government have not thought out the situation. The principle underlying responsible Parliamentary government is that for every Executive act done by the Crown or its representative somebody can be made responsible. In Irish affairs the Lord Lieutenant is to act under the advice of an Irish Ministry whose salaries may be reduced by the Irish Legislature. In Imperial affairs the Lord Lieutenant is to be responsible to his Imperial advisers; but so far as I understand the statement of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, there is to be no single British Minister responsible to this House for the Lord Lieutenant's action.

MR. J. MORLEY

I regret I did not succeed in making myself clear. What I have stated, and what I now repeat, is that the Government certainly contemplate that there will be a British Minister answerable for Irish business, although he will not be an Irish Minister exclusively.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

I accept that statement, but I confess that I cannot reconcile it with the statement of the Chancellor of the Duchy as to the Lord Lieutenant skirmishing among and consulting a succession of Ministers on different subjects. Still, I am the last person in the world to wish to make bad blood among colleagues, and I will not, therefore, press the matter further. The right hon. Gentleman has spoken of the Lord Lieutenant acting in two capacities; but there remains a third category of affairs, such as the finance and the Constabulary, on which the Lord Lieutenant will neither receive the advice of the Irish Administration nor yet be under the control of the English Home Secretary; and the Chief Secretary explains that on such matters the Lord Lieutenant must practically act on his own initiative. In that third department I cannot make out that any human being is responsible. If the Lord Lieutenant commits a blunder with respect to the Constabulary or taxation, whom are we to attack in this House; whose salary are we to reduce; and on what Vote in the Estimates can the whole subject be raised? That is a perfectly clear question, on which on Constitutional grounds we have a right to get a reply, and I do hope we shall get a straightforward answer as to who will be amenable in such a case as I have cited.

MR. J. MORLEY

I am perfectly willing to give a reply, but it can only be a repetition of my former reply. The Lord Lieutenant, under the new system, will have two sets of responsibility. [Mr. A. J. BALFOUR: Three.] I think not three. Upon matters within the scope of the Irish Legislature the Lord Lieutenant will undoubtedly take the advice of his Irish Ministers. The right hon. Gentleman sees that. In all other departments of his action the Lord Lieutenant will by the theory and practice of the Constitution and by the spirit of this Act be responsible to the Government in this country. I can conceive no other set of cases. I fail to see how the Constabulary and the Revenue fall into a different class. The Lord Lieutenant, so to speak, will be the agent for the Imperial Government, which will, consequently, be responsible for his actions.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

Will he consult the Home Secretary on questions as to the removal of the Constabulary?

MR. J. MORLEY

That is the very thing I said he would not do when I spoke earlier in the evening. He will not seek advice on questions of such detail. He will decide them on his own discretion. The Imperial Cabinet will be responsible to this House for all matters which the Lord Lieutenant may do outside those matters upon which he will be properly guided by the Irish Parliament. Outside of those matters he will be the agent of the Imperial Government. I have now tried, with the best intentions in the world, to answer the question put to me.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

If the Home Secretary is not to give orders on police matters, and if the Lord Lieutenant in regard to them does a wrong thing, whose salary is to be reduced? It is perfectly legitimate, intelligible, and just that if the right hon. Gentleman gives wrong orders his salary should be reduced; but how can we reduce his salary, or even criticise him, if he cannot give orders? I will not press the question further, because there is evidently no answer to be given, and it is clear that the Government have not thought out the matter.

MR. ASQUITH

The question which the right hon. Gentleman has put appears to me to be one of the simplest and most elementary kind. There is a broad distinction in our Constitutional practice between the Minister representing a particular Department in this House, and the Cabinet of which he was a Member, and which is jointly and corporately responsible for the acts of all its Members. The mere fact that under the new Constitution in Ireland the Home Secretary, for example, may be the Minister to answer questions in this House as to how the Lord Lieutenant performs his duties will not in the least degree absolve the Ministry as a whole from its joint and ultimate responsibility. The Lord Lieutenant will always act either on the advice of his Irish Ministers in purely Irish affairs, or, outside that ambit, he will act under the instructions and subject to the responsibility of the Imperial Government; and the mere machinery by means of which that responsibility may be brought home to the Government in the House of Commons is a mechanical matter.

MR. GERALD BALFOUR

said, the Chief Secretary had told the Committee—and the statement had been endorsed by the Home Secretary—that the Lord Lieutenant must act on the advice of the Irish Cabinet, or else on the advice of the Imperial Cabinet. But, supposing the Irish Ministry had resigned, was the Lord Lieutenant, in summoning a new Ministry, to act on his own responsibility, or upon the advice of the Imperial Cabinet?

MR. J. MORLEY

Really, I am surprised that a gentleman so acute as the hon. Member for Leeds could put such a question as that. Of course, the state of things in this country, when a Government is turned out of Office, will prevail also in Ireland under similar conditions. The outgoing Ministers will be responsible until their successors are appointed.

MR. GERALD BALFOUR

The right hon. Gentleman has quite misconceived my question. I did not ask who would be responsible in the interregnum for the conduct of affairs, but who would advise the Lord Lieutenant in summoning a new Irish Cabinet? Is he to act on his own responsibility, or on the responsibility of the Imperial Executive?

MR. J. MORLEY

The Lord Lieutenant would be in the same position as a Constitutional Monarch or a Colonial Governor in similar circumstances. He would act on his own responsibility.

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 247; Noes 274.—(Division List, No. 187.)

THE CHAIRMAN

The next Amendment, standing in the name of the hon. Member for York (Mr. Butcher), is out of Order.

MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER (Belfast, W.) moved to insert, after "Legislature," the following:— Provided that the prerogative of mercy shall not be exercised by the Lord Lieutenant on behalf of Her Majesty, except upon the advice of Her Majesty's principal Secretary of State. This Amendment did not apply solely to the people of Ireland. It had a wider scope, for it dealt with a matter that concerned vitally the United Kingdom as a whole. It was a matter of grave concern to all persons in the United Kingdom that the prerogative of mercy and pardon should not be exercised in any part of the United Kingdom save on the advice of a Minister of the Crown. Unfortunately, a criminal could not be confined to the place where the crime was committed, because the moment any person was released he was at liberty to go to any other part of the United Kingdom where he might desire to continue his operations. But the question he raised referred, not only to persons who might be in gaol, but to that large number of persons who had absconded from Ireland to avoid criminal prosecutions, and who, there was every reason to believe, would, if his Amendment were not adopted, be brought back and receive high offices under the Irish Government. It would be said, no doubt, that the Irish Government would not advise the Lord Lieutenant to exercise the prerogative of the Crown except in respect to political powers. He, however, did not take that view. But even if the operation of the prerogative was confined to political prisoners, a very great danger would arise, because it should not be forgotten that a fundamental difference existed between Nationalist Members and other Members in the House as to what constituted political prisoners. There was diametrical opposition even between Nationalist Members and the occupiers of the Treasury Bench on the subject. He could not accentuate that view more strongly than by quoting some words used by the Home Secretary. The right hon. Gentleman said he could not recognise—and nothing would induce him to recognise—the distinction which Nationalist Members sought to draw between persons who had been guilty of felony for some political reason, and persons guilty of the same felony for some other reason. The right hon. Gentleman was violently assailed as his predecessor had been assailed, and as, no doubt, his successor would be assailed, for not drawing that distinction. The Committee was face to face with the fact that Nationalist Members were pledged to release prisoners who had been justly convicted, after a fair trial, of the most heinous offences the moment they got their opportunity. What was the Home Secretary going to do under those circumstances? Was the hon. Gentleman going to stand by and see men whom he had declared to be justly imprisoned for grave crimes, to be let loose on the community, because he would be able to say that he had washed his hands of all responsibility in regard to the matter. The Committee could not too closely realise that the whole aspect of crime as it appeared to them was totally and absolutely different from its aspect as it appeared to hon. Members from Ireland. It would be thought that there could be no two opinions about the use of explosives; about violent resistance to the police, and about violent infringement of existing contracts. But on these matters there was, unfortunately, a diametrically opposite view entertained by Nationalist Members. For instance, while they had all been horror-struck by the Phoenix Park murders, the hon. Member for the City of Cork referred to the Commission for the trial of the murderers as a strangling Commission, and talked about "honest Dan Curley," who was a man who had justly come by his deserts on the gallows. That was only a specimen of the way in which these great crimes were regarded by hon. Members opposite, and there was no reason for believing that they had changed their views with regard to them. Then, again, there was in the House an hon. Member who had been a responsible official of the Land League, and who had had as his colleagues four persons who had absconded from the country to escape their trial for felony. Against one of these persons, at least, there had been an indictment for wilful murder. What guarantee could the Committee have that the first act of the hon. Member to whom he had alluded under the Irish Legislature would not be to bring back his colleagues from voluntary exile to high positions in Ireland, instead of to the gallows that would await them under the Criminal Law?

It being Midnight, the Chairman left the Chair to make his report to the House.

Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.