RESOLUTION.

HC Deb 28 February 1893 vol 9 cc574-688

SIR H. MEYSEY-THOMPSON (Stafford, Handsworth)

My object in rising to-night is to call attention to the International Monetary Conference recently held at Brussels, and to move the Resolution:— That in view of the growing divergence of value between gold and silver, and the serious evils resulting therefrom, this House urges Her Majesty's Government to use its utmost influence to procure the re-assembly of the Monetary Conference, and to impress upon our representatives the immediate necessity of finding some effective remedy in concert with other nations. Now, Sir, I wish to say at once that though I am a bimetallist, yet neither I, nor, I think, any of those who are acting with us on this occasion wish to assert that bimetallism is the only remedy for the evils of which we complain. Personally, I took up this monetary question as an entirely practical one. In February, 1874, just 19 years ago, I was elected a Director of the North-Eastern Railway Company; and everyone knows what terrible depression and disaster fell in the years following 1874 on the great trades and industries of the North-East of England. Not only the iron and coal and engineering, but also the woollen and worsted and linen trades, suffered great misfortunes; and it was in endeavouring to find out the reason for these misfortunes, that I came to the conclusion that scarcity of gold and demonetization of silver were the chief causes of this depression, and that International bimetallism would be the most effectual remedy. Still, we are perfectly ready to consider any other plans that may be proposed, though we do not consider that up to this time any plan has been discovered which can in any way compare with bimetallism. Now, Sir, the question is not, and ought never to become, a Party one. The Resolution to-day is moved by a Liberal-Unionist, it is seconded by a supporter of the Prime Minister, a hostile Amendment is moved by another Liberal-Unionist and seconded by a Conservative, so that it is in no sense a Party question; and in any remarks I may have to address to Her Majesty's Ministers, I wish it to be understood that they are merely addressed to them not as the leaders of any particular Political Party, but because they happen to be for the time being the persons responsible for the action of England with regard to a re-assembly of the Conference, for the selection of the individuals who are to represent us at the Conference, and for the instructions given to those individuals. Then, Sir, I must say one word about bimetallism and protection. We have been accused of protection, I suppose on the principle of giving a dog a bad name. Bimetallism is not, and cannot be, in any way connected with protection, because in its very essence it is contrary to, and the exact opposite of, protection. Bimetallism means equality, protection means inequality. What do you mean when you talk of protection in an economic sense? You mean protecting a man against his competitors by making the law unequal: either you give him a bonus which you do not give the others, or you impose a duty on his competitors which is not imposed upon him; the inequality of the law is the only thing which gives him protection. Now, Sir, what is the meaning of international bimetallism? It means that every man, woman, and child throughout the world would have not only equal, but exactly the same laws with regard to gold and silver money. We wish to see power given to every man, woman, and child in the world to take gold and silver to their Mint and to have it coined into legal tender money. How can absolutely equal and identical laws give protection, when the only meaning of protection is inequality? If absolute equality of treatment would be any benefit to English producers, this proves conclusively that they are treated unfairly and unequally now. It is, as our Friend the Member for Woodbridge Division of Suffolk said the other day, the case of the wolf and the lamb; we ask for absolute equality, and we are told, with sublime disregard of the truth, that we are wicked people, who are asking for protection, which means inequality. But, Sir, though bimetallism does not, and cannot, mean protection, yet the present system of gold monometallism induces other nations to increase or maintain high duties against us. And it does this in two distinct ways: first, the scarcity of gold and consequent fall in prices has made the Continental nations add continually to their Customs Duties, so as to keep off foreign competition, and protect their producers as much as possible from the effect of the fall in prices; and, secondly, it has induced them to keep up or increase their duties in order to protect their stock of gold. Professor Andrews, one of the Representatives of the United States at the Monetary Conference, said in his speech— We produce several commodities which Europe must have, while few of our own wants are of such a nature that we cannot by sufficient outlay provide for them at home. By hindering somewhat the movement of your commodities to U6, which many of us are sorry to have to do, we make it necessary for you to send us gold. It is obvious from this that there could be no surer way to lower American tariffs than for Europe and America to agree upon a policy favourable to silver as money. That, and nothing else, will abate this incessant conflict for gold, leaving America free to effect generous reductions in her Customs Duties. It is, therefore, evident that the result of our present system is to keep up or raise hostile tariffs on the part of both Europe and America. Now, Sir, with regard to the Conference, although the facts are well-known to most Members of the House, yet as several hon. Gentlemen have told me that they have not studied the subject at all, and are anxious that I should begin at the beginning, I will in a very few sentences recall the circumstances which led the principal monetary nations of the world to believe that it was necessary that a Conference should be held, and that an earnest endeavour should be made to discover some means of escape from the evils which the present unfortunate monetary arrangements of the world have already brought upon us, and, if possible, by some International agreement, to ward off the infinitely more serious evils and dangers with which we are threatened if no International agreement can be arrived at. Now, I think that everyone will agree, that while the years from 1853 to 1873 were years of unexampled progress and prosperity, the years between 1873 and 1893 have been chiefly characterised by stagnation and depression. The world has not absolutely stood still in commercial matters; how could it do so with the great increase of population in the United Kingdom, and throughout the British Empire, Canada, India, Australasia, and throughout the world generally? But the rate of increase has been much more slow, trade has been exceedingly unprofitable, and has ruined almost as many people as it has enriched, while in some of our greatest industries, such as iron and steel and engineering, the cotton and woollen and linen, the agricultural, which is the largest of all, and many other industries, the periods of prosperity have been so few, and the periods of depression so many, that the average profit has become exceedingly low, the employment of labour exceedingly intermittent and precarious, and the position so serious, that it has become a national misfortune. This has not only affected this country but many others, so that there is a general feeling of malaise, of impending disaster, a growing conviction that there must be causes at work more deep-rooted and serious than the ordinary fluctuations of trade. And, Sir, there is a widespread and growing belief that the root of the evil is in the continually increasing scarcity of gold in proportion to the wants of commerce and of the world, and the dislocation of the relative value of gold and silver in consequence of the mistaken legislation of the last 20 years. The belief is gaining ground that law must undo what law has done, and that it is only by retracing our steps, and returning to a state of things similar to what prevailed before 1873, that we can hope to find a solution of the difficulty. The population of the world is estimated at about 15,000,000,000, and the population of the nations which use silver for their money is over 800,000,000. Our trade with silver-using countries is enormous, and every item of that trade is carried on by means of an exchange between gold money and silver money. The relation of gold to silver, and the stability of that relationship is of the utmost importance to our trade with silver-using countries, and it is evident that as the European nations gradually shut out our productions by their protective tariffs, it is to our trade with silver-using countries to which we shall have to look more and more for an outlet for our manufactures, and for the support of our wage-earning population; and this is the answer to a very foolish question, and it is one which has been addressed to me scores of times. Why wish to use silver as money and not some other metal such as pig iron? The answer is that there happen to be between 800,000,000 and 900,000,000 of people in the world using silver as their standard money, and there are no nations or people using pig iron as standard money or any other metal than silver and gold. Now, Sir, for an enormous number of years—Mr. Max Muller says since the 8th century B.C., for certain—the nations of the world have not only used gold and silver money, but they have always found it necessary to fix some ratio of value between gold and silver; that is to say, that if a man had to pay a debt, he should be able to pay that debt either by a certain weight of gold, or by a fixed multiple of that weight in silver. The result of that was to keep the commercial value of gold and silver extremely steady with relation to each other. Between the years 1687 and 1873 the highest value of gold compared with silver was 16.25 in 1813, and the lowest value of gold was 14.14: in 1760. In other words, during nearly 200 years an ounce of gold would never exchange for more than 16.25 ounces of silver, or for less than 14.14 ounces of silver. Now, this is a very extraordinary thing, considering that during that time at some periods the annual production of gold from the mines was four times that of silver, and at others the annual production of silver was three times that of gold. It shows, to my mind, conclusively that the commercial value of silver and gold was governed by the fact of their being in all-important countries rated by law to each other (that is to say, a legal tender in certain fixed proportions of weight), and that as long as gold and silver are both actively in circulation as money, the legal ratio will govern the market ratio if they are again rated to each other in all the principal countries of the world. Unfortunately, in 1873, though the monetary system of the world was working extremely well, and the world was extremely prosperous, a new departure was taken, and an entirely new experiment, never before tried in the history of the world, was entered upon. And this experiment was not entered upon deliberately and of set purpose; it came about, as it were, by chance and accident. The Parliaments of the world would never, I believe, have been persuaded to make such a change; but it came about by a train of accidents, and the world found itself launched upon an absolutely new and untried experiment before it had realised what was going on. Germany, I believe it is admitted now, made the change in her currency without sufficient consideration, and without clearly foreseeing the consequences which would follow. France thought herself absolutely compelled by the action of Germany to close her Mints to silver and join in the scramble for gold. The United States demonetised silver at a time when neither silver nor gold were being used as currency in that country, by a few words slipped, intentionally or accidentally, into an Act of Congress, without the vast majority of the population having the slightest idea of what was being done. The effect was instantaneous: the link between gold and silver which had existed by law for hundreds of years in the various nations was broken for the first time, and the scramble for gold began. The value of silver did not fall, as is shown by the fact that prices have remained steady in silver-using countries; but the value of gold has gone up enormously in proportion to silver, and to the average of all other commodities. Between 1687 and 1872 the highest amount of silver which had to be given to obtain an ounce of gold was 16.25 ounces, and the lowest 14.14 ounces, but directly the link between gold and silver was broken, and the consequent scramble for gold began, the amount of silver you had to give to buy gold increased year by year as gold got scarcer and scarcer. In 1875 you had to give 16.59 ounces of silver for one ounce of gold; in 1880, 18.05; in 1885, 19.41; in 1890, 19.76; and in 1892, 23.52. Now, Sir, it is this experiment, begun in 1873, which we bimetallists deplore, which we say was one of the greatest mistakes that the human race ever committed, and to which we trace a very large part of the depression in trade and agriculture from which we are suffering. And as I wish to treat this matter in as practical a manner as possible, I will now lay before the House as clearly and distinctly as I can the exact way in which we think it has done harm, and exactly what it is we complain of. In the first place, we say that by the boycotting of silver, gold has been rendered artificially scarce in gold-using countries, prices have been artificially depressed, and the law has practically taken money out of the pockets of debtors and made a present of it to creditors. Secondly, we say that as many of the evil effects of this experiment have been felt in gold-using countries alone, and not in silver-using countries, the result has been in the past, and will be very much more in the future, to put an end to agricultural and manufacturing production in gold-using countries such as England, and to compel these industries to be carried on in countries which use silver, such as India and China and Mexico. Thirdly, we say that the rapidly-increasing divergence between the value of gold and silver is getting us into the most serious difficulties with regard to the government and taxation of India. Now, Sir, with regard to the first of these propositions, I suppose no one will now deny that gold has appreciated— that is to say, that gold will buy more of the average products of the world than it would 25 years ago. The figures collected by the Economist newspaper, and those collected by Mr. Sauerbeck, show that whereas in the average of the years 1865 to 1870 a certain amount of a number of leading commodities would, on the average, exchange for 100 sovereigns, exactly the same amount of those commodities would only exchange for 66 sovereigns in October, 1892; that is to say, when a man takes his wheat, or his wool, or his iron, or his cotton goods to market, instead of receiving £100, he only receives £66; and if he wants to get £100, he has to buy another £34 by giving 50 per cent. more, or half as much again, of his goods, as he would have had to do between 1865 and 1869. And what has been the result to debtors; and who are the debtors? The debtors are the bees in the social hive, the manufacturing, the agricultural classes, the producers generally. We all know what has happened to agriculturists; everyone knows in a general way that agriculture has been suffering terribly; but this state of things is not by any means confined to agriculturists; thousands of shopkeepers, and of men with small—aye, even with large—businesses of various kinds have been slowly ruined during the last 20 years through no fault of their own, on account of no miscalculation as to their own business, but solely on account of the cruel, relentless grinding of the appreciation of gold, and because they have to pay more and more of their produce every year to meet their fixed charges and the interest on their borrowed money. When prices are steady, everyone gets fair play; but what do you think of a country whose laws deliberately deny fair play, whose laws deliberately load the dice against the financially weak, who are debtors, in favour of the financially strong who are creditors, and deliberately push those who are trembling on the brink, and who might have recovered themselves, over into the abyss of bankruptcy? And this, Sir, is what I most earnestly believe is being done by the Monetary Laws of England and Europe at the present moment, and for this state of things England, and England alone, is responsible. She is not responsible for the laws of other nations; but she is responsible in this way: that they believe that they cannot alter the present system without the concurrence of England. At former Conferences they have asked us to join them in changing this unjust system, and we have refused. At the present Conference they were willing to change if England would consent, but England, and England alone, stops the way. But, Sir, I am quite expecting that during the course of the present Debate some hon. Member will get up and say that England would be very foolish to change her system because we gain certain advantages by it. And he will very probably instance India. He can point out with great truth that the Indian Government has to pay some £15,000,000 in gold to England annually. This £15,000,000 is not sent in gold; it is sent in produce. Now, the fall in gold prices has this effect: that to get £15,000,000 in gold you have to give 50 per cent. more produce than you would have had to give 25 years ago in 1865–1869, so that we get for £15,000,000 as much produce as would cost £22,500,000, if gold prices had not fallen. Now, it may be very pleasant for England to force India to pay her every year 50 per cent. more tea and cotton and indigo and wheat and other products than she would do otherwise, but how about India? We are very fond of talking about our ruling India for the good of the inhabitants of India, and that we do not do it for our own benefit; and yet here is India crying out in vain about the evils of the present monetary system. You have the officials of India practically unanimous in favour of bimetallism; you see that the taxation of India has to be increased year by year in order to provide more and more produce to be sent to England in payment of her gold charges, and our answer to India is, No, we are getting practically £7,500,000 of produce from you for nothing, and we will not make any change. And then we wonder and are indignant when foreign countries talk of the selfishness of England. And then, Sir, I have no doubt some other hon. Member will point out—for it is one of the stock arguments of our opponents—that England would be foolish to change her system because she is a creditor country. What does that mean? It means that certain individuals of this country have lent money to foreign countries, and that the interest on this money has to be paid in gold in London; it means also that gold having appreciated, these foreign Governments and individuals have to sell 50 per cent. more produce in order to buy this gold, and that the individuals who receive the gold have 50 per cent. more command over the average products of the world than they would have had if gold had not appreciated. They are not only getting their pound of flesh out of their debtors, but they are getting a pound and a half; and as gold continues to appreciate, they hope soon to receive two pounds of flesh instead of one. Well, Sir, this may be good for certain individuals in England, but at what cost is it done? Now, I believe that one of the great arguments against Protection was that in placing a duty upon wheat you not only raised the price of the wheat which came from abroad, but you also raised the price of all the wheat produced in this country. Well, Sir, the same thing applies here. If you maintain laws which enable the creditor in England to extract a pound and a half of flesh, 50 per cent. more produce from debtors abroad, you are obliged at the same time to allow every creditor to extract also a pound and a half of flesh, 50 per cent. more produce from every debtor in the United Kingdom. You cannot limit the loss to one class of debtors and spare the others. If we are to make merry over the advantages we are gaining over our foreign debtors by making them pay more produce every year to obtain the sovereigns they have to pay certain individuals in England, we must be ready to make merry also over the sufferings of debtors in the United Kingdom who have to pay every year a larger proportion of their produce to other individuals in this country. And we must never forget that this is not an evil which has happened once for all, and is done with. It will probably grow and increase day by day, month by month, year by year, as gold gets gradually scarcer in proportion to the wants of the world, and prices, though no doubt they will fluctuate somewhat for the moment, must tend steadily downwards. And why not face this question at once? You must face it soon, as the growing population of the world will very soon require all the gold produced annually for industrial purposes—wedding-riugs and bracelets and gilding and other industrial wants. But if you consider this appreciation of gold as an advantage, then why stop half way? You have closed the Mints of Europe to silver; close them to gold also, and issue no more bank-notes. You will soon have prices as low as they were when there was little money in the world, labour at sixpence a day, and all prices a fifth of what they are now. Unfortunately, time is getting on, otherwise I should have liked to have gone into the question of young professional men, and to have pointed out to them how very detrimental to their prospects in life are times of scarcity of money and falling prices. All history and experience shows us that in times of increasing money and rising prices, the world has made great steps forward, there has been great prosperity and many new openings for young men, lawyers, or doctors, or engineers, for those connected with the Press, or whatever their line of life may be; but history also shows us that in times of falling prices enterprise has languished and openings have been very few. And now, Sir, I come to the second of the propositions which I wish to establish—namely, that our present monetary system tends to put an end to agricultural and manufacturing production in gold-using countries like England, and to force silver-using countries like China, Mexico, and India to manufacture for themselves very many of the great articles of consumption, which we have been in the habit of manufacturing for them. Let us take first the case of agricultural produce. The case was stated very clearly by a merchant some time ago. Of course, I am only quoting from memory, and not giving his exact words, but the substance of what he said was this: A merchant in India writes to me and says, "I will send you so many thousand quarters of wheat if you will give me the same price in rupees as you did last time." At first sight this appears to me impossible, for the price of wheat. in Liverpool has fallen from 40s. to 30s, "But," he said, "I think a little longer, and I see that I cannot only send him the same price as before, but I could really afford to give him even more, and for this reason: The price of silver has fallen even more than that of wheat, so that the sovereign and a half I get for the wheat at Liverpool will buy more rupees than the two sovereigns did be fore. It makes no difference to the Indian producer what the gold price of wheat is. All that matters to him is the number of rupees he gets in exchange for it. He has nothing to do with gold money; he has probably never seen a gold piece in his life. All his expenses of every kind—rent, rates, taxes, labour, railway rates—are paid in silver, so that if the gold price of wheat falls to 10s. a quarter, it will make no difference to the Indian producer as long as silver falls in the same proportion; and, of course, the same is true of any other grains, wool, hides, tallow, or any other form of agricultural produce which can be grown in silver-using countries. Then," he said, "look at the case of cotton. A merchant in Bombay writes to me and says that he will buy so many thousand yards of cotton goods if I will take the same price in rupees as I did formerly. Well, I try to do so; I beat down the price of the manufacturers in Lancashire, and until silver fell too much the difficulty was met by the price of cotton goods being reduced, but now the price of silver has fallen so low that we seem to be coming to a dead-lock. Prices in India have not changed; the people when they sell their goods receive no more rupees than they did before, and therefore they cannot afford to give more rupees for our manufactures." He said, "These rupees exchange for very many fewer sovereigns, and so what is to be done? The English cotton manufacturer cannot reduce his price any lower; profit has almost entirely disappeared, rates and taxes tend to increase, the interest on borrowed money cannot be reduced; wages will, of course, eventually have to come down, but this cannot be done without a severe struggle. How is this dead-lock to end? "Now, Sir, the hon. Member for Flintshire told us in a speech shortly afterwards what the issue from the dead-lock was: He said, "Eighteen cotton mills are at this moment being erected in Bombay, and two in England." This, Sir, must be the inevitable result, not only in cotton, but in jute, in linen, in woollens and worsteds, in machinery, and most of the things we export to silver-using countries. They cannot afford to pay any more rupees for these articles; these rupees buy fewer sovereigns, and our manufacturers cannot afford to take fewer sovereigns for their produce. They will, therefore, be compelled to manufacture all these things for themselves. This process has already begun, and will, of course, be enormously accelerated if the Americans cease their purchases of silver, and if we see silver, as we are told it very likely will do, fall to something like half its present value. I should like to read to you a few words from a statement laid before the Monetary Conference by the Official Representatives of Mexico. In that they point out that the practical effect of the fall in the value of silver has been that it has proved more profitable to that country to cease to export a great deal of the silver they used to export in payment for their imports—to keep the silver at home and to use it as capital in manufacturing articles for themselves which they used to buy in European countries, and of course very largely from ourselves. They say— But if silver remains in Mexico in larger quantities than it has hitherto done, productive employment for it must, perforce, be found. Agriculture will certainly be developed, but, considering the special circumstances of the country, we think that industrial work will be preferred. The production of our own manufactures will cause a proportional diminution in the consumption of European manufactures, and will in time end by completely superseding some of them. This consequence of the increase in the currency of Mexico is already beginning to be realised. For a long time we have had, if not many, yet very important manufactures of cotton and woollen fabrics, of paper, &c, and their number has been increasing the last few years. Last October a manufactory of cotton fabrics of all sorts was opened at Rio Blanco, near Orizava, on the Mexican and Vera Cruz Railway, the importance of which may be estimated by its having cost already about 5,000,000 piastres— that is to say, £1,000,000. Besides this noteworthy example, we often find in our newspapers accounts of the establishment of new manufactures of various kinds; of metal foundries, some of them on a large scale, of manufactories of soap, of Portland cement, and of many other articles. I should like also to call your attention to a speech made by Mr. Allard, many years Master of the Brussels Mint, whose knowledge and authority on the currency question are universally admitted. He is referring to the case of Italy, and he points out how the depreciation of the currency of Italy as compared with that of the gold-using countries led to a very large development of her manufacturing industries. He says— In Italy, exchange was at one time at 25 per cent. below par, and silver and drafts upon Paris used to be at a premium; and has she not become an industrial country? Thanks to that premium of 25 per cent. she has set about producing more, and has sent us her products. Her commodities received a premium of 25 per cent., and thus she became a manufacturing State; and again, it was the creditor nations to whom she was obliged to pay in gold that have felt the unfortunate consequences. Now, Sir, I am informed that the exchange difficulty is interfering seriously with the export of jewellery, with the export of saddlery and leather, and with very many others of our industrial products. We know that it is interfering very largely indeed with the investment of capital in silver-using countries. If it were not for this difficulty many railways would now be in course of construction which would give great employment to our civil and mechanical engineers, to our contractors, to our locomotive, waggon, and carriage building and rail trades, and I can assure you, Sir, as a Director of one of the largest steel-works in England, that we are in very great want of all the trade we can get. In China I am told that there is plenty of iron and plenty of coal, and there is a most hardworking and frugal population of some 400,000,000 souls. They are very slow to begin anything new; but if the present state of things continues, they will be absolutely compelled to produce for themselves a great many things that they now buy from us; and, Sir, I ask, is not this an absolutely suicidal policy to be adopted by England to force China to produce for herself and for other silver-using countries a variety of articles which a large number of our population gain their livelihood now by producing for her here? With one hand we are doing our best to drive the agricultural labourer into the towns to look for work, and with the other hand to drive away the manufacturing industries which give employment to the workmen in towns, and to cause them to be carried on in silver-using countries. And can the workman follow the trades to India? Can he work in manufactories in the climate of India? We know he cannot; and if he could, would he be content with the 3d. or 4d. a day which the Indian labourer finds sufficient to clothe and house and keep him in comfort? And now, Sir, I am anxious to know what is the attitude of Her Majesty's Government with regard to these facts? Do they question them? Do they deny them? Have they any remedy to propose? I can hardly believe that they look upon them with satisfaction, or that they wish that our wheat lands should become prairies and our manufacturing districts deserts. Then, Sir, to come to my third proposition, there is the question of India. What is Her Majesty's Government going to do about India? You must do something; you cannot go on adding indefinitely to the taxation of India as the price of silver falls. The difficulty is this: The Indian Government has to pay annually in England some 15,000,000 sterling in gold and it has no gold to pay with. It receives all its revenues in rupees, and the same number of rupees buy less and less gold every year. The average value in sterling realised by the Indian Government for their rupees during the 10 years 1861 to 1871 was £1 11s. 6d. The highest average rate realised for rupees was 26.02d. in 1859–1860 and 26.035d. in 1860–1861. The lowest price at which the Indian Government have ever sold rupees was in 1892—namely, 14⅝d., and the average from the 1st January, 1892, to the 1st January, 1893, was 15.3d. Now, the actual amount of gold purchased by the Indian Government in the year 1892 was £16,319,949; and if the rupee had been at 2s., the cost of this sum in rupees would have been 163,199,490 rupees; but the actual cost, owing to the dearness of gold, was 256,170,572 rupees—that is to say, that 92,971,382 more rupees must be raised in taxation from the people of India than would have been necessary if the rupee were at 2s. Even if we take the rupee at 1s. 11½d. the difference is still over 90,000,000 rupees. Now, this increase from R.160,000,000 to R.250,000,000 in round figures is in exactly the same proportion as if on some department of our expenditure in England you had raised our taxation from £16,000,000 to £25,000,000, an increase of £9,000,000 sterling. And it is a real increase to the people of India. Prices have not changed there to any serious extent, so that they have to give more of their produce, in the proportion of 25 to 16, in order to obtain the additional rupees. But, Sir, this is nothing to what we are threatened with in the future. We are told plainly that if this Conference cannot arrive at any decision, the United States will cease purchasing silver, and will enter into the struggle for gold. Now, for the last two years the United States have bought 54,000,000 ounces of silver, at an average cost of about £10,000,000 sterling a-year. Suppose they cease to buy silver, and buy gold instead. They will make silver much more plentiful, and gold much more scarce, and we are told that the rupee is certain to fall to 1s., and would probably fall to 9d. Now, what would be the effect on the finances of India? With the rupee at 1s., of course, the gold they buy would cost exactly double what it would with the rupee at 2s. Therefore, last year the number of rupees required would have been 326,398,980, instead of the 163,199,490 rupees which it would have been with the rupee at 2s., an increase of 163,199,490 rupees. And with the rupee at 9d., the amount required would have been 435,198,640 rupees, or an increase of 271,999,150 rupees. This, Sir, would be equivalent to raising some branch of expenditure in England which had formerly cost £16,000,000 to £32,000,000 or to £43,000,000, or an increase of taxation of £16,000,000 or £27,000,000 sterling. Now, Sir, these figures are appalling, and yet no man living can answer for it that if this Conference does not re-assemble the rupee will not fall even lower than 9d. And you would have also to increase the salaries of the servants of the Crown in India, who have already suffered great and unmerited hardship, and whose case already needs consideration, and this means still more taxation. Is this a prospect which Her Majesty's Government regard with satisfaction? Only two practical remedies seem to have been proposed. One is bimetallism, the other is the closing of the Indian Mints to the coinage of rupees. One is a policy of plenty, the other of scarcity; bimetallism by international agreement could be adopted with the greatest ease as far as India is concerned. The Mints of India are already open to the coinage of both gold and silver. You have only to give legal tender to gold at the agreed ratio with silver, to rate gold to the rupee, and the thing is done. You need no interference with the habits of the people; in fact, not one person in a hundred in India would know that any change had been made. This is the policy of plenty. The difficulty has arisen from the scarcity of gold. Relieve the tension on gold by allowing silver to take its place to a certain extent in the reserves of the Banks of Europe, and the scarcity of gold in relation to silver would be relieved. The other policy—the policy of closing the Mint to silver—is the policy of scarcity. By law in Europe we have made gold artificially scarce. Make rupees artificially scarce in India, and you will restore the balance. Instead of relieving Europe from the evils which are pressing upon it, subject India also to the same evils, and then everything is to be all right. Now, this policy might, of course, be effective up to a certain point. The population of India is increasing; and if you forbid the increase of rupees to meet the wants of this population you may create an artificial scarcity of rupees, and thus depress all prices in India. But there are several very grave objections to this plan. We are told on very high authority that if India closes her Mints, and America ceases her purchases of silver, that it will probably not be long before we see the price of silver at 2s. per ounce. Now, supposing that your plan has been effectual, and that the rupee has regained its exchange value of 1s. 11d., then the value of the silver in the rupee will not be worth more than 10d., while the nominal value of the rupee will be 1s. 11d.; that is to say, with £100 in gold you would only be able to buy 1,044 rupees; but with £100 you could buy silver enough to make 2,400 rupees. What a temptation to the introduction of rupees coined elsewhere! They could be copied exactly, made of exactly the same weight and fineness of silver, and be as good coins in every respect, except that they would not be issued through the Indian Mint. You have an enormous frontier to guard, and it would be extremely difficult to keep out perfectly good rupees, coined elsewhere. Then there is another difficulty, and a very serious one. The habit of the natives of India has been for centuries to turn their savings into ornaments, which are worn round the arms and ankles of their wives and daughters. These are Indian bracelets (exhibiting bracelets). An Indian does not look on these or speak of them as worth so many rupees; he says they are so many rupees. Their custom is to take the actual rupees to the silver-worker; he makes those very rupees into an armlet; the armlet is weighed back to the customer against the exact number of rupees he has handed over; the armlet is put into one scale and the rupees into another, and they have to balance exactly; the customer pays a small sum for the workmanship, and the transaction is complete. Now, from time immemorial this custom has prevailed—the people turn their savings into ornaments, and turn them back into rupees when they want money. So long as the Mints are open, the bracelet is always worth exactly its weight in rupees, minus the 2 per cent. which is the Mint charge for coinage. But if you close your Mints, the value—the enormous value, amounting probably to tens of millions sterling—would be instantly depreciated. Now, Sir, I know something of the difficulty of trying to explain bimetallism to educated people in England, but think of the difficulty of explaining to an Indian ryot that he is not being robbed by this process. Many families must possess among them 100 rupees' worth of these ornaments, scraped painfully together in a country where wages are not more than 3d. or 4d. a day; this is the only reserve of the family, their only money capital handed down from father to son, and not to be touched till some great famine or calamity comes; the only resource of the family against actual starvation—these ornaments have been actually made out of 100 rupees, and no one has ever doubted that they could become 100 rupees again if occasion required. But all of a sudden, in the twinkling of an eye, by the signing of a decree, this 100 rupees' worth of ornaments becomes only worth its weight in uncoined silver, perhaps only worth 40 or 50 rupees. What are you to say to the man? He asks why the decree is signed? You say, "Because gold is scarce in Europe "; but he will reply, "Silver is our currency here; we have nothing to do with gold. Has there been anything the matter with our currency?" You have to confess that the monetary system in India has been working to perfection, as is shown by the fact that prices there have remained steady during the last 20 years. He will say, "Then a large part of my savings is to be destroyed because of monetary difficulties in Europe with which I have nothing to do, and by which, if we had not been governed by England, we should not have been affected." If you want to create a grievance—universal, enduring, well-founded—which will affect every village in India, Assam, and Burma, I do not think you could go to work in a more ingenious and effective way. Before I leave this part of the subject I should like to quote a few words from the statement made to the Conference by a gentleman whose opinion will command universal respect, Mr. Alfred de Rothschild. He said— Gentlemen, I need hardly remind you that the stock of silver in the world is estimated at some thousands of millions; and if this Conference were to break up without arriving at any definite result, there would be a depreciation in the value of that commodity which it would be frightful to contemplate, and out of which a monetary panic would ensue, the far-spreading effects of which it would be impossible to foretell. And now, Sir, is there any remedy? Is it too late to avert the evils impending over us? Fortunately, I believe, that it is not. The sword is suspended over our heads by a single hair, but it has not yet fallen. There is still a way out of the difficulty by International agreement— by bimetallism, or by some better plan if one can be discovered. I went to Brussels when the Conference assembled there on purpose to satisfy myself as to whether any International agreement was possible. I look upon the question as entirely a practical one, and I was not going to-waste time and trouble over this matter if International agreement appeared to-be impossible; but, I am happy to say, I came to the conclusion that International agreement was not only possible but easy, and could most certainly be arranged if England did not stop the way. And here I think I ought to point out clearly to those who have not studied the question that the reason why so many of the great countries of Europe have been anxious to adopt a gold currency is not because they think there is any particular virtue or advantage in a gold currency, but because they wish to have the same currency as England. If England had adopted silver monometallism they would have wished to be silver monometallic also; and if England became bimetallic it would be to their advantage to be bimetallic; for this reason: that the trade between any two countries-is immensely facilitated when the legal tender money in each country is composed of the same metal or of the same two metals. Now, the exchange business of a country like England with a monometallic gold standard naturally divides itself into three main divisions: First, exchange with those countries who have a gold standard; secondly, with those countries who have a silver standard; and, thirdly, with those countries whose currency is paper. The simplest of all forms of exchange is with a country like Australia, which has exactly the same standard coin as our own—the sovereign. A man in Australia, if he has a debt to-pay in this country, has only to see that he has the requisite number of sovereigns at his bank, and he knows that he cannot by any chance be obliged to pay more than the cost of freight and insurance for sending these coins to England; but as the par of exchange is not determined by the denomination of the coins, but by the amount of pure metal in them, the effect is exactly the same for all other nations who are on the gold standard. Then comes the question of exchange with a silver-using country. Now, for very many years, as long as silver was about 60d. an ounce, and the ratio of silver to gold 15½ to 1, the ratio between gold-using countries and silver-using countries was almost as steady as between two gold-using countries. The par of exchange was practically 1 ounce of gold against 15½ ounces of silver, and did not vary far from that point. Now that the link between gold and silver has been broken, the par of exchange between gold and silver has practically disappeared; and any man who has a debt to pay in gold in this country, and has only silver to pay it with, does not know that at the time of payment he may not have to pay 24, 25, or even 30 ounces of silver against an ounce of gold, and that whatever profit he hoped to gain by the transaction may not be turned into a loss. In the case of countries whose currency is paper, the evil is, of course, greater still, unless the amount of paper in circulation is rigidly restricted to such an amount as will keep the paper on a par with gold, because at any moment a large new issue of paper money may upset all calculations, and bring about a state of things like that we see in the Argentine Republic at the present moment. The object, therefore, of all nations is in the interest of their traders to have for their standard money the same as that of the great trading and financial countries of the world, such as England, the United States, and France, whether the system adopted be gold monometallic, or silver monometallic, or a combination of the two, like bimetallism. The only reason why European nations wish to keep large reserves of gold in what is called their war-chests, is because in case of war they would have to buy arms and ammunition and provisions and stores from the United States and England, which under the present system have to be paid for in gold. If England and the United States were bimetallic, it would not matter whether their war-chests held gold or whether they held silver, as they could pay for their purchases in either metal. And now, Sir, I should like to call the attention of the House for one moment to the attitude of the different nations at the Conference which has just been held. We will take the United States first. They sent across the Atlantic five gentlemen of great ability thoroughly conversant with the question, and admirably qualified to represent the opinions of a great nation like America on a great financial question. They did not all belong to the same Political Party, but they were all agreed in recommending to the Conference that bimetallism was the only satisfactory solution of the question. At the same time, they were perfectly willing and anxious to examine any other proposals, and to endeavour, with the help of the Representatives of the other Powers, to find some solution of the problem. I think the attitude in the United States in this matter has been very much misrepresented, and it is with very great pain and regret that I see in our leading newspapers frequent assertions that the people in the United States have been actuated in this matter solely by a desire to sell the produce of their mines, and to find an outlet for the silver they have accumulated in their treasury. This assertion I believe to be entirely untrue. The average production of silver in the United States in the last three years has only amounted to the commercial value of about 57½ million of dollars—or, in English money, something under 12 million sterling—and it is calculated that one-seventh of the mines belong to English companies and English capitalists. Dr. Andrews, one of the Representatives of the United States at the Conference, estimated the proportion of the value of silver produced annually in the States to their total production to be four in a thousand or.004, and he gave the values of the production of some of their principal industries, with the result of showing that for every dollar's worth of silver which is produced annually in the United States, 249 dollars' worth is produced of other things—that is to say, that the annual production of silver is a very small factor in the sum total of the production of the United States. Not one man in 100 of the citizens of the United States can be interested in a silver mine, while at least 90 in 100 are in favour of International bimetallism, and the free coinage of silver by International agreement. The reason, Sir, which induced the United States Government to purchase and coin silver and to use silver certificates has been very much misunder- stood in this country. It has not been done in the interests of the owners of the silver mines, but on account of the deliberate determination of the Government and citizens of that great country, that a sufficient supply of legal tender money should be provided, to prevent the extreme contraction of the currency which would otherwise have taken place, and with a view to holding the scales fairly between debtor and creditor. Now, Sir, I was myself in the United States in the year 1873, at the time of the great financial panic and crisis in that country, and saw some of the effects of it. This crisis was caused by the increasing value of the paper currency, which resulted from its diminution in quantity in proportion to the increasing wants and the increasing population of the States. The bank notes which had been at one time so much depreciated that 250 dollars of them were only worth 100 dollars in gold, had at that time fallen to the premium of about 12½, so that 112½ paper dollars would purchase 100 dollars in gold. All who had borrowed money at the time of the Low value of the bank notes were great losers. Many people were ruined, and the destruction of credit and the disturbance of business were very great. When the United States resumed specie payments, this cause of contraction came naturally to an end. The attention of the people in the United States had, however, been drawn to the question of currency, and there was already a good deal of talk about it in 1873. I remember attending a debate in the Senate on the subject, either in 1873 or the beginning of 1874. They saw clearly that their increasing population and increasing trade would necessitate constant additions to the currency, and that for the basis of this currency they must have either gold or silver, or both. Having just gone through all the misery attendant on an appreciating currency, consequent on the rise in the value of bank notes and the resumption of gold payment, they were not disposed to go through the same thing again on account of the appreciation of gold itself, and they saw clearly that if gold was to be the sole basis of their circulation, and if they were to enter into the general scramble for gold to obtain sufficient for their needs, the result would be an immense appreciation of gold, and a very great fall in the price of silver, and of all other commodities for which gold was exchanged. They had grasped the fact that an appreciating currency robs the debtor for the benefit of the creditor. They also saw clearly that the producing classes are, and must be, the great debtors, and in the United States the producers are the people who are most thought of, contrary to the general idea which seems to prevail here, that consumers only have to be thought of, and that producers must look out for themselves. The attitude of the United States is perfectly clear in this matter. They say—"We think the best solution of the problem is bimetallism, but we are perfectly willing to consider and give our best attention to any other plan that may be brought forward." Let us now look at the attitude of France, so well explained by M. Tirard, the present Minister of Finance at Paris. He tells us, in effect, that France has accumulated such immense stocks of both gold and silver metal that her interests are safe in any case, but that France had accepted an invitation to the Conference knowing that there is such a solidarity of interests between the different countries of the civilised world, that no one nation has any right to be indifferent to any question or social problem which affects the interests of all—a sentiment, Sir, which I think we shall all admit to be worthy of the great Minister of a great country, and to be in welcome contrast with the selfish opinions we have heard so much of, which seem to assume that the interests of one country can be separated from those of all the other nations of the world. M. Tirard tells us plainly that in his opinion France has always been, and is still, bimetallist, but that they cannot open their Mints to the free coinage of silver for individual account so long as the other great countries refuse to do the same, for the very natural reason that silver would be sent to France by other countries in settlement of International differences, and that they would refuse to take it back again from France when there was a balance to settle the other way; but he gives us plainly to understand that if other countries would agree to adopt bimetallism, France and the Latin Union would be willing to consider the question with them. I think that it will be admitted that the following words of M. Tirard, quoted from the Report of the Commission, will show that it is not France or the Latin Union which is stopping the way. M. Tirard, Delegate of France, Feared that Mr. Cannon had incorrectly understood him if, on the ground of his declaration, Mr. Cannon thought that the Latin Union, or, to be more exact, France, in whose name M. Tirard had spoken, was less friendly to bimetallism than England. M. Tirard declared that he had said nothing of the kind. On the contrary, he had said that France was bimetallist in fact, and that if she would not resume the free coinage of silver, and if she would not go back to absolute bimetallism, it was only because England and other countries of Europe had declared in the most formal way that they intended to remain monometallic, and that, at least for the moment, they were not disposed to admit the white metal to their Mints. In another speech M. Tirard defined the nations whose adherence to a bimetallic plan was necessary as England, Germany, Austria, Hungary, the Scandinavian nations and others. Now, Sir, would the other nations join? It seems to me that we are moving in a vicious circle. We send Representatives to a Conference the known views of four out of five of whom are opposed to bimetallism. Therefore, all the other countries imagine that England is absolutely opposed to any change, and as they will not adopt any system without her, they are extremely reserved in their declarations, thinking that it is useless to attempt to do anything. Then our Representatives report— In the first place, in addition to the distinct declarations on the part of some of the most important European Powers that they would not entertain bimetallism. Now, what is the truth of the matter? Are other nations opposed to bimetallism or are they opposed to bimetallism without England? I believe most honestly and sincerely that what the other countries object to is bimetallism without England, as they see that bimetallism with England included would be to the advantage of every one—to England most of all. Russia has neither gold nor silver in circulation, so bimetallism would not affect her at present, but it would be of immense service to her in getting back to a metallic standard, which it is a great object for her to do. The Scandinavian nations will probably join the larger countries, but in any case their action could not imperil the success of the arrangement. Holland sent two extremely able and convinced bimetallists, and there is no doubt that the citizens of Holland are almost unanimous in the wish for bimetallism. Spain and Mexico are willing to accept bimetallism in concert with the other Powers. Germany has been very reserved in her declarations, but I cannot believe that Germany would refuse to join all the other great countries. It would manifestly be to her interests to join them. Germany has been making great efforts lately to push her manufactures in all parts of the world, and with very great success, not only in countries with a gold standard, but in countries with a silver standard also; and for trade purposes it would be an immense advantage to her to have the same system of money as the countries she trades with, and that her customers in silver-using countries should be able to pay her in their own money. And what are the conditions of Government in Germany? We have a young and intelligent ruler, with no antiquated and out-of-date prejudices to get rid of, determined to master these questions, and to do the best he can for his country; and in no country in the world is there a larger number of men more thoroughly instructed in all these matters, or who have given more painstaking and accurate attention to them. Falling prices have caused, and are causing, great Socialistic disturbances in Germany, and anything which can tend to arrest this fall, and restore contentment, must be regarded sympathetically by the German Government. Of Austria-Hungary, as they have given us no indication of their views in this matter, it is difficult to speak, but they are initiating a great reform in their monetary system, and certainly bimetallism would make it very much easier for them to carry it out satisfactorily. My conclusion, Sir, is this: that everything depends upon the action of England. I am thoroughly convinced, and I believe nearly all the members of the Conference are thoroughly convinced, that bimetallism could easily be carried if England would agree, but that no plan of any sort or kind is likely to be agreed to without the concurrence of England. England has taken a very great responsibility in this matter, and if great misfortunes fall upon our manufactures and trading industries, in consequence of the Conference being a failure and nothing being done, it will be England alone who will be blamed for it. If the members of the Conference are convinced that the English Representatives really intend to use their utmost endeavours to find some way out of the difficulty, I have no doubt that a way will be found. And, Sir, I wish to say one word on the question of the Representatives we are going to send there. I do not wish to make any reflection upon anyone. I believe that all our Representatives are upright, honourable, conscientious men; but I wish humbly to submit to this House whether, when you send Representatives to a Conference with the object of finding a remedy for an evil, the most likely way to accomplish your purpose is to send any Representatives who are conscientiously convinced that no evil exists, and therefore that no remedy is required. And now I have to thank the House for the very great indulgence which they have extended to me; and, Sir, representing as I do an enormous manufacturing constituency, the largest but one single constituency in the United Kingdom, and believing, as I do, that the employment and means of subsistence of many thousands residing in my constituency are immediately threatened by the dangers which are confronting us, I hope this House will admit that I should have been wanting in my duty if I had failed to take the very earliest opportunity of calling the attention of the House to this very serious matter. And I will conclude with a direct challenge to our opponents. I call upon them not to confine themselves entirely to their old stock arguments. Of course, we must expect to hear that bimetallists are wicked wolves of debtors, who are trying to eat up poor little innocent lambs of creditors. No doubt the old familiar bogies will be trotted out:—The bogey of the possible finding of that solid mountain of silver which the world has been looking for for some thousands of years, and has not yet succeeded in finding; the bogey that people will pay their debts in wheelbarrows full of silver; that the ratio could not be maintained; and, lastly, the arch bogey that the financial supremacy of England would be destroyed if we ceased to handicap foreign financiers by the fact that England is the only place where gold is sure to be paid for bills on demand. These arguments have been refuted over and over again, but our opponents seem to think that this controversy is a game of ninepins. As often as we upset their arguments they pick them up again, put them back in their places, and then think that they are quite prepared for the next comer. But now, Sir, I challenge them to produce arguments which, at the present time, and with our present knowledge, would induce this House, if the world had remained bimetallic up to the present time, to change bimetallism for monometallism. Personally, I believe that financiers would share, like every one else, in the prosperity which bimetallism would bring; but even supposing that it were not so, can you imagine anyone standing up in this House and proposing to add several million sterling a year to the taxation of India, to sacrifice all debtors, to ruin the agricultural, the cotton, the iron industries, and to depress all others, for the sake of protecting a few financiers in London against the competition of their rivals abroad? Has the mountain of silver been found? Were people paid in barrowsful of silver when bimetallism existed? Do we not know that the ratio of value between gold and silver was maintained by the action of the law extremely steady for hundreds and even thousands of years prior to 1873? Will our opponents tell us wherein the special virtue of this beautiful and semi-sacred experiment of monometallism consists; what good it has done in us the past, what good it is doing in us the present, what good it is going to do us in the future? I have to-day told the House, in as plain and straightforward language as I can command, what I believe to be the evils of the present system. I call upon our opponents to tell us, in equally plain and straightforward language, what its advantages are, so that the House may judge between us. I beg to move— That, in view of the growing divergence of value between gold and silver, and the serious evils resulting therefrom, this House urges Her Majesty's Government to use its utmost influence to procure the re-assembly of the Monetary Conference, and to impress upon our Representatives the immediate necessity of finding some effective remedy in concert with other nations.

MR. S. MONTAGU (Tower Hamlets, Whitechapel)

said, he had great pleasure in seconding the Resolution. He did not propose to discuss the details of bimetallism. His opinions on that subject were well known inside and outside the House, but he felt bound to state that he considered International bimetallism still holds the field as the most effective remedy for the present evils, and that it would be the best preventive of danger and disaster in the future. Nevertheless, he should welcome any other wise proposal that would render stable our Eastern exchanges. He had been a Bimetallist ever since he had commenced business 45 years ago—25 years' experience of the world's currencies in what were practically universally bimetallic times, and 20 years since that system was wilfully destroyed. He had witnessed the financial effects of bimetallism when we had a deluge of gold from California and Australia, and only one country was so foolish at that period as to demonetise gold, and that country was Holland. In consequence of bimetallism, we were enabled to exchange in France vast sums of gold for silver, which enabled us to buy cotton in silver-using countries at the time of the cotton famine. Since 1873 that splendid compensating balance based on the two metals had been destroyed by the action of Germany and the Latin Union, and consequently silver could no longer be coined in Europe, and the growing divergence between gold and silver caused serious difficulty. It separated India financially from Europe. The instability of the rupee acted like a quicksand in which fortunes had been engulfed. Occasionally that quicksand had the appearance of steadiness, but it was exceedingly dangerous on account of the instability of the exchange. He thought that Germany and the Latin Union made a great mistake in closing their Mints to the free coinage of silver, and he believed that with the co-operation of this country and the United States they would gladly retrace their steps. Since 1873 he had witnessed the steady decadence of our Eastern trade, not in quantity but in character. Prior to that date our trade with India and China was mainly conducted by men of renown, who carried it on with energy tempered by prudence. Later on it had been characterised by a gambling spirit tempered by discredit. In former days a merchant trading in cotton or tea could base his operations on statistics of existing stocks, and stock and crop prospects; but now all his hopes might be shattered simply by the precipitate sale of silver in the London market. These phases of Eastern trade, the steady and prudent stage, and the speculative and gambling stage, had been succeeded by deep depression, by hand to mouth trading, which like a canker eats into the very roots of commerce and diminished the revenue. The future prospects of the gold value of silver and rupees were extremely gloomy. A storm was brewing on the other side of the Atlantic which might wreck the fortunes of traders with silver-using countries. Could his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer say that this was a satisfactory state of things? The Chancellor of the Exchequer might declare that on no condition would he tamper with our currency, and on no consideration would he encumber the British public with depreciated silver in the place of appreciated gold. He agreed with those who worship the golden calf taking no warning of the plague which followed that worship. If, through the re-assembling of the Monetary Conference: a wise plan should be adopted by all the Great Powers, that course could hardly be styled tampering with our currency. He (Mr. Montagu) could also with confidence assert that with universal bimetallism the British public would not in any way be encumbered by silver. On the contrary, gold would not be so largely hoarded in foreign banks, but would be more plentiful than now. Does any intelligent Englishman carry about with him even £20 in gold? Is any internal business transaction carried out by the payment of a large amount of gold? The tendency of the civilised world was to use bank notes instead of coin, and cheques instead of either. They had seen lately the French people preferring Bank of France notes to gold, although these notes were payable in silver. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer issued the long expected one pound notes the circulation in this country would eventually be paper— half sovereigns—and silver with a few sovereigns thrown in. He felt certain that if international bimetallism prevailed no one in this country would be inconvenienced. No change in our currency would be apparent; cheques, bank notes, and even gold would be equally available, and the struggle for gold would cease. When the Monetary Conference reassembled other proposals besides bimetallism would no doubt be considered. The plan proposed by Mr. Alfred de Rothschild should be adopted rather than to allow things to drift. Mr. Rothschild's objections to bimetallism were easily answered; but he would only answer one of them. Mr. Rothschild exaggerated the difficulty of exporting silver as compared with gold, and spoke of £1,000,000 sterling in gold. Well, that would weigh about 7⅕ tons, and the same value in flue silver would now weigh about 176⅕ tons. But shipping companies charged the same freight for both, a percentage on the value, and even in many cases shipping companies preferred silver. It made very good ballast, required no packing, and its weight was its own protection. The great and growing divergence between gold and silver was a most serious matter for the Indian Government and Indian traders. The Indian Government could not view with indifference the ever increasing burden of their external debt. The investments of this country in Indian Government Stocks, and in Railways and in other Indian Government Securities amounted to about £200,000,000. There were besides very large investments in India by banks and traders, the amount of which it was almost impossible to ascertain; but if he said £300,000,000 as the total of our investments he believed it would be well under the mark. The rupee was now worth a little less than 15d., which had grievously increased the burden of India. A fall of 1d. in every rupee meant a loss of capital of over £20,000,000 sterling, which loss must fall either upon English traders or their fellow subjects in India. If the rupee fell to 1s.—and who could foretell that even that will be the end of the fall?—the natives of India must be still further taxed, through no fault of theirs, in order to pay this gold tribute, and railway rates in India must be considerably and continuously raised unless dividends were to fall off. Again, the English residents in India must certainly have their salaries increased in accord- ance with the depreciation in value of what was called the vanishing rupee. Although money might be a drug here and much required in India, it would be very dangerous to go to the relief of the Indian people, because to turn gold into silver without any certainty as to the future price was a gambling transaction. It had been asserted that by buying sterling bills in India for forward delivery the English trader could be protected. That was a risk in ordinary times; but hon. Members can hardly realise the constant fluctuation in silver, generally downwards. In January, 1892, the highest price of silver was 43¾, and the lowest 41¾; in February the highest was 41¼⁆, and the lowest 41⅛ and soon, until we come to August, when the highest was 392155; and the lowest 37⅞. On one occasion silver fell 5 per cent. in three days. He now came to another important point —namely, the effect of the decline in silver upon our working-classes. There was no doubt that the well-being of British workmen depended greatly upon the well-being of workmen abroad. Trade combination here could never be completely effective unless it was also in some degree international. What could be the permanent benefit of successful struggle here if workmen abroad were underpaid. Their cheaper productions would successfully compete with ours in foreign markets. Now, the effect of the decline in the gold value of the rupee was a decline in the gold price of Indian native labour. Therefore, in present conditions a fall in the price of silver in London affected every British industry with which silver-using countries compete. He would remind the House in this connection of the well-known instance of the substitution of Indian cotton goods in China and Japan for British goods. Indian workmen cannot combine, although that country was worse off than if she had an inconvertible paper currency. A forced paper circulation could be kept within bounds according to the internal requirements. But India had a practically inconvertible silver currency, which could be indefinitely increased from outside by sending to India silver which would not be used elsewhere. A remarkable speech was delivered recently in the House by the hon. Member for the Woodbridge Division of Suffolk (Mr. Everett), which included a reference to this question. The hon. Member pointed out in very forcible terms the advantages which arose from a plentifully circulating medium in this country in the early part of this century. All sound financiers condemn inflation arising from enforced circulation of inconvertible paper. The chief, perhaps only, objection to such inflation was that a day of reckoning must come when the note circulation must be contracted, and the reaction counteracted all previous advantages. But what objection could be taken to inflation based upon an international currency such as gold? The production and importation of gold were a great advantage to the masses by diffusing wealth and levelling upwards the social condition of a great number of people. He agreed with the hon. Member for the Woodbridge Division as to the great advantage to English-speaking people caused by the gold discoveries in California and Australia. If gold production was advantageous, so would be the production of silver, if tied to gold by an International Convention. Now, he was not in favour of a great rise in silver, and should oppose isolated action in this country. That absurdity was tried in the United States and was found to fail. It was beyond the power of one country, or perhaps of two countries, to fix the value of a metal of which the stock was estimated by hundreds of millions sterling. They must recognise that this country had a greater interest in silver than any other. We possessed a far larger proportion of the world's silver than any one or any two countries in the world. We had invested a far larger proportion of our wealth in silver-using countries than any one or two countries in the world. We have to sell on behalf of the Indian Government silver in the shape of Indian Council Bills to the extent of £16,000,000 sterling annually. Could they wonder, therefore, that foreign powers declared that England stopped the way? The resolution was a very reasonable one. The re-assembling of the Conference was feasible, because the delegates of the United States would, after the change of Government, have a steady standpoint, and it was worth while to meet to consider their definite proposals. The Conference failed to arrive at a conclusion mainly on account of the transition state of the United States Government and the attitude of some of our delegates. Probably some practical proposal might result from the next meeting. He thought that as a general principle it was wise to encourage such a Conference. He should be glad if the scope could be enlarged, so as to include the assimilation of the laws governing other forms of international currencies, such as bills of exchange and other international bonds. Such meetings promoted goodwill among nations, and should be welcomed in this country, whose complex interests were secured by friendly relations with other powers. He would, therefore, urge upon the Government to encourage the reassembling of the Conference, and by facilitating a reasonable settlement of this great question promote the welfare of our working-classes in manufacturing and agricultural districts; promote the welfare of the people of India, for whose social and financial well-being we are responsible; and also render more secure the commerce of our traders with silver-using countries, and revive the prosperity of this great Empire.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That, in view of the growing divergence of value between gold and silver, and the serious evils resulting therefrom, this House urges Her Majesty's Government to use its utmost influence to procure the re-assembly of the Monetary Conference, and to impress upon our representatives the immediate necessity of finding some effective remedy in concert with other nations." — (Sir Henry Meysey-Thompson.)

THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. E. GLADSTONE,) Edinburgh, Midlothian

My right hon. Friend the Member for the London University (Sir John Lubbock) has given notice of his intention to move the Previous Question as an Amendment to the Motion which you, Mr. Speaker, have just read from the Chair. But the House, I think, will not be surprised at our feeling—especially as we have been appealed to very pointedly by the Mover of the Motion—that the opinion of he Government upon a Motion of this character ought to be declared upon a positive and main issue—namely, whether the Motion itself is one fitted to be adopted, and not merely upon a question of opportunism. I am, therefore, very glad to have an opportunity of saying a few words upon this Motion, and as I know there are many gentlemen who are desirous to express themselves upon it, some of them, perhaps, to the extent of the Mover of the Motion, and knowing that the hours of the evening are limited, I shall endeavour to compress what I have to say within a very moderate compass. Now, Sir, I find a difficulty in understanding the nature of the step the House is called upon to take. The speech of the Mover and the speech of my hon. Friend the Seconder are manifestly speeches in favour of bimetallism. They mean bimetallism and they mean nothing else, except in so far as they say, if you can show anything else as good as this then they will accept it. But in the absence of any such alternative bimetallism has been the theme of their speeches and is the idol of their affecttions and imagination. But why have they not put bimetallism into their Resolution? They have not only not put it into their Resolution, but the hon. Mover of the Resolution has been most careful to explain, in his anxiety for a comprehensive division which shall include all descriptions of voters—voters of all kinds and forms—that those who voted for his Motion will in no degree pledge themselves to bimetallism. Then to what do they pledge themselves? What is the real effect of this Motion? Let me endeavour to get at it as well as I can in the difficult position in which we are placed by the speech of the hon. Mover. The object of the Motion to a certain extent is clear as far as it relates to the Monetary Conference at Brussels. That Conference was assembled, I apprehend, I may say, on the direct invitation of the United States, and it is now proposed that the initiative should be taken out of the hands of the United States and be put into our hands. That is a very extraordinary and it may be a very unprecedented proposal for us to adopt. The hon. Gentleman says that everybody is desirous to move in the matter, only they await the guidance of England. The assertion is confuted by the very existence of the Conference. The United States did not wait for the guidance of England in calling for this Conference. They took the initiative, and we, who followed that initiative with more or less of zeal, sympathy, or misgiving, if not unfavour, have a right to expect from the United States a declaration of what, having taken that initiative and brought together the Powers of Europe, she means to propose. It appears to me that the hon. Mover and my hon. Friend who seconded the Motion have very little faith in the United States indeed, although the United States took the initiative. But having somewhat discourteously snatched the question from the hands of the United States, what do they do? They propose to hand it over to us who sit upon this Bench. Is that a judicious choice on their part? Are we prepared to make any more beneficial use of that initiative than the United States have done? On the contrary, our opinions are that no plan has been opened by which it is possible or shown to be possible for us at the present time to make a change in the standard of value in this country. Therefore, having taken the initiative from those whom we have every reason to assume would be ready to use it, the hon. Gentlemen propose to hand it over to people who they know are not ready to use it. And still more extraordinary—and, if the hon. Mover of the Motion will forgive me for saying so, still more irrational—is that point which remains to be noticed— namely, that not only are we unprepared and unprovided, through the poverty of our minds, with any good grounds for the reconstruction of our currency, but he himself has not put such a plan into our hands. If he is going to send us to Brussels and to order us to stir up these flagging Deputies to make a great change in the currency of Europe, surely the least he can do is to save us from a ridiculous position. For our position would be nothing less than ridiculous if we were to accept this Resolution, and if, having stimulated our representatives to compel the Conference to do something when the members of the Conference modestly expressed their disposition to listen with all deference to what we proposed, and said, "Only let us know what you recommend," we were to reply, "We have nothing to recommend to you." I perfectly understand those sound orthodox bimetallists who condemn in the strong terms they choose to use the utter vacuity of mind of the right hon. Gentle- man the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his Colleagues, who have not got a good bimetallic plan in order to produce that delightful state of things in which prices rise and everybody is happy. That I comprehend. But I do not comprehend why it is that we, being in this state of utter poverty and destitution of mind, the hon. Gentleman will not give us the smallest hope or put any language in our mouths which, when we go before the members of the Conference, whom, by moral force, we are to call together, would enable us to start it on its career. I therefore come to the conclusion that the Motion of the hon. Member is very unsatisfactory. If it were carried it would place us in a ludicrous position. But I am bound to say, notwithstanding that profound veneration for this House which on all occasions I feel, that that ridiculous element in our position, I am afraid, would not be confined to ourselves, and that some of it would redound possibly upon the Mover of the Motion, and very considerably upon the House which has sent us on this fool's errand to Brussels to ask the Conference to do something, and not to give them the smallest hint of what it is. I now come to the question on which I am entirely at issue with the hon. Mover of the Resolution as to a matter of fact. He dwelt in various parts of his speech very strongly upon the fact that it was England, and England alone, which stopped the way, and he even quoted a speech from M. Tirard, the French Minister and delegate, in support of his allegation. Has he read that speech? and, if he has, is the hon. Member not aware that in that speech it is declared that several of the greatest Powers in Europe had committed themselves to the opinion that they desired to make no change in the monetary system of the world? The French Delegate mentioned Germany, Austria, and Russia, and in addition to these we know that the same thing has been declared by Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway, and, I believe, also by Denmark. Well, Sir, there you have six or seven of the Bowers assembled at Brussels who have signified their intention to make no fundamental change in their monetary system, and that without the smallest reference to England and independently of any course that England might think it proper to take. I do not accuse the hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend behind me in the slightest degree of misrepresentation. The fact is that their minds and imaginations are so possessed of the enormous blessings that they have got to bestow upon mankind by the medium of this bimetallic system, that they are persuaded that all the Powers, when they come close to the question, must share their views, and consequently, instead of recognising the fact that these Powers at Brussels do not support them, they put words into the mouths of representatives of those Powers which they never used. Russia, for instance, has not said a word in favour of the proposed change, but the hon. Mover of the Motion says that this change would be so beneficial to Russia that he is perfectly convinced that Russia must see it and must hasten to adopt it. If that is the case why did not Russia say so at Brussels? My own opinion, speaking roughly, is that the Powers assembled at Brussels were divided into two moieties. One is those Powers who have declared that they intend to make no change, and which have Germany and Austria at their head, and the other consists of the Powers some of whom refer to England and say that if England has a proposal to make they will listen to it with deference, and some of whom indicate they will not be unwilling to make the change. But what is the uniform characteristic of this second moiety, the moiety which is most favourable to the views of the Mover of the Resolution? It is that not one of them has given the slightest, the faintest, the most shadowy indication of the kind of change they would be prepared to discuss with England or to adopt. That, Sir, was the condition of the Conference. We shall do nothing to discourage the meeting of this Conference. We have endeavoured to act with courtesy and goodwill to all the Powers of Europe, and we are very glad that every measure should be taken that tends to probe and sift this great question to the bottom; but, at the same time, it would be hardly respectful of us to give positive recommendations when in respect to their recommendations we are totally unprepared with plans for giving them effect, and when, I am sorry to say, the Mover and Seconder still leave us in an unhappy state of mental destitution with regard to such plans. With regard to the meeting of the Conference, one is a little reminded of the old proverb that one man may bring a horse to the water but that 20 cannot make him drink. The hon. Member who moved this Motion has not shown that he is possessed of the magic secret which is absolutely necessary in order to make this Conference drink. I will not go into all the points raised by the Mover and Seconder of the Motion, but I will come to the consideration of what is the standard of value and what are the qualities which give to that standard of value those merits which have led mankind to seek it through a long and painful process, and to find their way step by step towards it, and having got it, to retain it. It seemed to me strange that no notice was taken by the hon. Mover of this Motion of a question of the most practical and vital importance which has been raised by Mr. Giffen, and which evidently lies at the very threshold of the subject, when we view it as a subject which has attained acceptance by Parliament, and which is now to assume a legislative form. The point is this: What is to take place in this country with respect to the enormous sums of money that are held at call? Now, I do not wish to impute anything, except that which is accepted by the promoters of the Motion. What are the facts? The complaint is a complaint of low prices. The desired condition which it is sought to bring about is a state of rising prices; the means to be adopted are to supply the people, who require money for the payment of debts or purchase of commodities, with a currency to which they will have access on easier terms. They are to get that currency cheaper. Very well. The consequence of that will be, if that currency is to be obtained cheaper, that any given nominal amount will be worth less in that currency than it is in the present currency. It is unquestionably easy to lower the currency a little by a very mild and genial process, like some of those medicines which are administered to the system and work without violence or pain. Now, I ask any hon. Gentleman in this House to put himself in the position of a man who has money at call. I trust all those whom I am addressing are in that happy position. He has money at call, and that money must be paid to him under the law, every farthing of it, in sovereigns. But suppose the hon. Gentleman by his eloquence, and the aid of those who support him, should have induced this House to pass a Bill, under influences prevailing elsewhere, by which after a particular day the money out at call, and now repayable in sovereigns to him, and in nothing worse, would become repayable in either sovereigns or silver in a ratio arbitrarily fixed by the State, what would be the effect? After that particular date they would get for the money out at call rather less in real value than they would get before that date. The consequence would be that monometallists, bimetallists, silver men and gold men—every one of you—would call in every farthing you have out at call. You are not going to be content with £90 or £95 after a given date if you can get £100 by calling in your money before that given date. By-the-bye, I think Mr. Giffen, the highest living authority—though there are many living authorities well acquainted with this subject— estimates that the sum so out at call is about £600,000,000; and I want to know what is to be the effect of saying to the owners of that £600,000,000, "Allow your money to remain where it is and you will have to take £90 or £95 for every £100, but before a given date you could get £100." I want to know whether they would not call in their money when they could get £100; and I want to know, too, what would be the effect of that on the credit of the country, and on the stability and firmness of many of the best and most stable banking and commercial houses in the land? There is another point that I would just refer to for a moment in the speech of the hon. Mover of this Motion, as it deserves some notice. Does he anticipate the re-entry of the human race into the Garden of Eden? For he seems to think that unless we adopt his plan we shall fall below our present mediocre and mixed condition, and very likely go down lower into some other region which it would not be prudent, becoming, or politic to name. That appeared to me to be the tendency of it, and the purport of it when developed into its full meaning. He spoke of the condition of our manufactures pining in a miserable manner for the last 20 years under the operation of monometallism, and he said that the cotton districts in particular were to go down to prairie value. That is the expression he used—prairie value. Such are the eyes with which the hon. Baronet reads the facts of our condition. He says that till 1873, when the Bank of France coined silver freely for every one who took it there, we did wonders; we were in a state of continual advancement; but that since 1873, we have been pining regularly away, until we are now little better than skin and bone, and the prairie value is all that will be left to us in place of the vast manufactures and the vast invested capital in the cotton trade of the country. Is that a fair representation of the course of the cotton trade of this country during the last 20 years? I am informed, from no secret sources, that during less than that time the cotton trade has changed enormously. I take the year 1877 and compare it with 1891—this period of decline, of depression, of divergency between gold and silver, and of all the horrors that will naturally be expected to follow. What was the state of the cotton trade in 1877? I believe I am correct in saying that it was then represented by 1,100,000,000 lbs.; while, in 1891, that miserable, perishing industry presented to us only the small figure of 1,800,000,000 lbs. I am speaking of imported raw cotton, which is the measure and extent of the industry. Is it not singular that gentlemen should come down here primed with facts, and that the facts should be so acted upon, through the warmth of their philanthropic affections burning to attain a happier state of things for mankind, that they should not be able to take cognizance of figures like those, which show within the past 14 years an increase of something like 60 per cent. in the aggregate extent of the cotton trade of this country? What I have endeavoured to bring to my own mind, and what I should like to bring to the minds of others, is the consideration of this question—What is the standard of value? We know perfectly well that gold is our standard of value. But what is meant by a standard of value?—for till we know this I do not see how we are to attain to a right position for judging of the qualities which ought to recommend to us this or that form of legislation, including the estimation of our own standard of value. I understand by a standard of value a common measure of commodities. It is a commodity itself. I admit that ought to be fully recognised. But when you seek for a good standard of value you seek for that by the terms of which you may express the real value—that is, the real purchasing power and force of every other commodity whatsoever. What is important to the owners of or the persons interested in those other commodities? To supply them with a good standard of value. We have passed beyond the stage of barter. Barter and exchange are the primary necessity of mankind in their first efforts towards civilisation. Barter may be the first form of that exchange, but barter is so inconvenient, and so hampered by the conditions under which it acts, than no large extension of human intercourse or commerce can take place under that system, and, consequently from the very first stages of the history of mankind there are efforts, sometimes of barbarous tribes, more energetic and more forcible as they attain more strongly towards civilisation, to get at something like a standard of value. The object of it is this—that the man who has goods to sell, and is going to accept for those goods a certain portion of the standard of value, should know the real compensation he receives for the thing he is going to give up, and what he can make of the money which is to be given to him as representing the value of the object he is parting with. In the same way, with regard to the man who buys, he also wants a standard of value which will represent to him as exactly as possible the power that will be in his hands when he has bought the commodity with its value measured by the amount of circulating medium that he is willing to give for it. It is exactly like the case of a standard of height, by which you can compare with the utmost exactitude the man of 5 feet with the man of 6 feet. What you want in this standard of value to make it do its work properly is fixity, steadiness, stability, and continuity. You want its properties to be such that what it is to-day it shall be to-morrow, and what it is to-morrow it shall be the

MR. A. J. BALFOUR (Manchester, E.)

Hear, hear!

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

I am very glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman opposite assent to that. Fixity and invariability are the first elements of a standard of value. It should be valuable, uniform, and portable, and these are qualities which gold possesses. But the grand thing is, if it is to be a good standard of value, it should possess fixity and invariability. That fixity and invariability cannot be absolute. If you find any commodity whatever, which should always maintain exactly one and the same relation to the sum total of all the exchanges to be effected in the world, then you will have an absolutely perfect standard; but that you cannot do. We do not pretend that gold is an absolutely unchangeable standard of value; but the belief is, at any rate, held by a large portion of civilised mankind—it is a belief growing and gaining ground from year to year—that gold is the best standard of value, because, above all, it is the least variable standard of all. The Commission which sat some time ago did not admit that the supposed scarcity of gold had been proved, and the hon. Baronet the Mover of the Resolution did not supply that proof. There are no proofs. There are some great commodities which are very low. It is not for me to dogmatise about it; but this I can say, that no proof of a gold famine has been supplied. But then, Sir, it is obvious and just to observe that the fall in some commodities—in wheat most conspicuously —is the natural result of the combined action of certain causes, the existence of which is well known, one of them being the long continuance of peace, and therefore the larger and the more free application of human industry to the business of production, and the enormous cheapening of the means of communication. Is it true that every great commodity has fallen in value? Quite the contrary. Let us look at another very great commodity—at what is, perhaps, the greatest commodity in the world, greater even than gold—that of human labour. I want to know whether that is not rising all over the world, and whether it has not risen enormously in this country, in almost every branch that can be named. Compare the wages of domestic servants with what they were 30 or 40 years ago, in the blessed period, according to the hon. Baronet. Take also the limited class about whom I happened to hear the other day—the theatrical profession. I have it on unquestionable authority that the ordinary payments received by actors and actresses have risen largely. No one is unaware of the increase of fees in the medical profession, and I am bound to say that there are none more nobly earned in the world than by that description of labour. I do not know whether there are any in this House who are personally cognisant of all the circumstances connected with the gold discoveries. They were extremely curious and of the greatest interest; and I make this concession—that at the period of the gold discoveries, if, had it not been for those discoveries, we must have had a gold famine in the world; but owing, as some would say, to a happy accident, or, as others would say, under the influence of an old-fashioned belief, to the wise, providential adaptations which are constantly at work, the gold discoveries in California, and afterwards in Australasia, corresponded with the most astonishing development of industrial power ever known in the history of the world. It was at that very time when the railway system began, when the ocean steamer system was transformed, when the telegraph came into existence, and a multitude of material changes, all operating in the same direction; and at that very time came what is probably more powerful than all—Free Trade legislation. The result was an enormous extension of human industry, and a vast enlargement of the exchanges which had to be effected in the world. The gold discoveries appeared to meet the great want thus created, and certainly no gold famine was experienced in England at that time; but these gold discoveries became exceedingly large, especially when the Australian discoveries were rapidly accumulated on the Californian supply. The effect was that there went abroad an opinion, entertained just as strongly and as conscientiously as the present opinion about a gold famine, that there was a plethora. I am not exaggerating when I say that not only the ignorant herd, but many men of sense, and practical men who were high and solid authorities on questions of economy, believed firmly about 40 or 45 years ago that gold was depreciated 20 or 30 per cent. I might mention a few names. There was the late Viscount Cardwell, as good an economist as I have ever known among purely political men; there was Mr. Cobden, who, in addition to his other great gifts and powers, undoubtedly stood very high as a political economist; and there was the distinguished friend of Mr. Cobden, M. Chevalier, who published a book, the main proposition of which was that gold had undergone a real depreciation of 20 per cent. All that has blown over now, and nobody believes at present in any such depreciation. I believe it so happened, too, that at that period silver was in a state of considerable steadiness, and afforded a very fair test of values in the market. I think I should be right in saying that silver then rose from 5s. to 5s. 2d. per ounce, and that gold fell about 3 per cent. That was a most severe trial, and there is no epoch in history, not even in the 16th century—when such remarkable changes were produced by the discovery of America—when so vast and enormous an addition had been made, almost at a moment's notice, to the monetary transactions of the world, and to the necessity thereby created for an enlargement of the circulating medium. That test gold has stood, and has not varied more than about 3 per cent. I should say that is a very respectable case to make out for gold as a circulating medium. If, under such pressure and such an agony of trial I might almost call it, the fluctuation of gold amounted to only a trifle, the position of gold as a standard of value is splendidly demonstrated. Now, Sir, it is proposed to give silver a share in the supply as a circulating medium, but what has been the case with regard to silver? The supply of silver appears to be subjected to more extraordinary variations than any ever known in the case of gold. The variation in the value of silver within the last 20 or 30 years is not less than 40 per cent., and not only that, but the hon. Baronet who made the Motion told us that we are not at the end of the variation, for he said that the rupee, which was once worth 2s., and which is now worth 1s. 2½d., will probably go down further, to 1s. or even to 9d. That means, therefore, that unless you step in and give the artificial assistance of the law this great commodity of silver, which it is proposed to bring into partnership with gold as supplying a standard of value for the conduct of all exchanges, will, under the operation of actual facts, aided a little by the prophecies of the hon. Baronet, fall between 60 per cent. and 70 per cent. Am I right in contending that fixity is the proper requirement of a standard of value? If it is, I want to know how you can improve that standard of value which, under the severest circumstances, has never varied more in this country than 3 per cent. or 4 per cent., how you can prove that by associating with it a commodity which has actually varied to the extent of 40 per cent., and with respect to which those who regard it with the largest amount of favour anticipate a further variation of 25 per cent. or 30 per cent. Do you suppose this is all to be set right by fixing a ratio? On what day will you fix a ratio? And if you fix your ratio, what will be the state on the next day of the markets with reference to the commodities for which you are fixing a ratio? Do you think a man who has money to receive will be content to take less because, stepping out of your province, you have told him that he ought to be satisfied with a less valuable commodity than that which he expects? I do not believe it. I believe the opinion of those who look to fixing a ratio is that it must be a mutable ratio. I do not enter into the question whether a double standard is conceivable under certain circumstances. I believe it is. I look at the actual facts which are before me, and I ask, Is there any period during the last 30 years when you could have fixed a ratio between gold and silver by law on a given day, and when you would not have been compelled to change it again and again? If so, what is our standard of value to be? I do not mean what is the idea of the standard of value to be. Are we to choose it for its fixity, or are we to choose it for its liability to indefinite and eternal change? The hon. Member spoke rather with ridicule upon the position of this country as the great creditor of the countries of the world. Well, Sir, it is the great creditor of the countries of the world; of that there can be no doubt whatever; and it is increasingly the great creditor of the countries of the world. I suppose there is not a year which passes over our heads which does not largely add to the mass of British investments abroad. I am almost afraid to estimate the total amount of the property which the United Kingdom holds beyond the limits of the United Kingdom, but of this I am well convinced, that it is not to be counted by tens or hundreds of millions. One thousand millions probably would be an extremely low and inadequate estimate. Two thousand millions or something even more than that is very likely to be nearer the mark. I think under these circumstances it is rather a serious matter to ask this country to consider whether we are going to perform this supreme act of self-sacrifice. I have a profound admiration for cosmopolitan principles. I can go a great length in moderation in recommending their recognition and establishment; but if there are these £2,000,000,000 or £1,500,000,000 which we have got abroad, it is a very serious matter as between this country and other countries. We have nothing to pay to them; we are not debtors at all; we should get no comfort, no consolation out of the substitution of an inferior material, of a cheaper money, which we could obtain for less and part with for more. We should get no consolation, but the consolation throughout the world would be great. This splendid spirit of philanthropy, which we cannot too highly praise— because I have no doubt all this is foreseen—would result in our making a present of £50,000,000 or £ 100,000,000 to the world. It would be thankfully accepted, but I think that the gratitude for your benevolence would be mixed with very grave misgivings and doubts as to your wisdom. I have shown why we should pause and consider for ourselves once, twice, and thrice before departing from the solid ground on which you have within the last half-century erected a commercial fabric unknown in the whole history of the world—before departing from that solid ground you should well consult and well consider and take no step except such as you can well justify to your own understanding, to your fellow-countrymen, and to those who come after us.

MR. GOSCHEN

I can thoroughly echo the last words which fell from the right hon. Gentleman, to the effect that we must look once and twice before we do anything which shall seem in the slightest degree to compromise the splendid fabric of British commerce that has been raised up during the last half-century. But if I have been anxious that there should be a Debate upon this question to-night, it is because I believe that the basis upon which that commercial structure has been raised should be thoroughly understood and grasped, and that the more light that can be shed upon this question the better. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues, and the most ardent bimetallists in this House, will agree that it is extremely important to every section of the community, and especially to those who seem to lean towards bimetallism, that if bimetallists are wrong they should be shown to be wrong, and that the movement which we have now witnessed should either be checked by the arguments by which it could be met, or that we should know the basis upon which it really rests. I would preface the remarks with which I am about to trouble the House with the statement that I am anxious to contribute what little I can to the understanding of this most important question. I feel the extraordinary complexity of the whole of these problems to such an extent that I believe dogmatism on either side to be thoroughly out of place, and what is specially required is that the first principles should be thoroughly understood and grasped. And I would further say that I speak simply for myself on this occasion, and I do not wish that any of those who sit around me should in any way be compromised by any doctrines I may utter. But I have taken in the past so considerable a part in discussions of this question that perhaps the House may think it would be my duty not to shrink from expressing the views which I hold upon the subject. The right hon. Gentleman commenced his most interesting speech with a discussion of the proceedings at the Conference. I will follow him with regard to that point presently. Upon that part of his speech I cannot say that I agree with him. He was entitled to deal simply with the aspect of the questions which had been put forward by the Mover and the Seconder, and he alleged, possibly with justice, that they had argued the matter mainly from a bimetallic point of view, and therefore he addressed his reply mainly to the principal views put forward by the bimetallists on the question of the fixity of ratio and the general question of a standard of value. But there are many other questions which are interesting in this matter besides that of bimetallism, and I think the House should be acquainted with the origin of the Conference. The United States summoned the Conference; originally they couched their invitation in different language to that in which it was ultimately accepted. They couched their invitation as if the object of the Conference would be to establish a bimetallic system. The late Government did not think they could enter a Conference under an invitation which seemed to pledge them as the original invitation would have pledged them, and therefore they suggested an amendment of the invitation in the direction of saying that the object of the Conference would be to study whether there might be an increased use of silver in the currency of the nations of the world. The Conference, therefore, is not simply a Bimetallic Conference, and is not chiefly a Bimetallic Conference, but a Conference which would aim at an object which I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman himself shares, but an object which many monometallists share, and which all the members of the Royal Commission share —namely, the object of introducing silver more largely as a subsidiary element in the currency of the world. That the variation between the value of gold and silver has been detrimental must be admitted by every one. The right hon. Gentleman spoke with fervour with reference to the necessity of the fixity of our standard. But that standard has suffered through the withdrawal of its partner to so large an extent. Originally there was a partnership between the two metals. The one partner was withdrawn almost all over Europe. In some countries it became a sleeping partner, but generally silver was dethroned, and gold was left to do, unaided by silver, the work which formerly gold performed in conjunction with silver. What was the consequence? Of course the fixity of gold suffered, because the fixity of an article such as gold with reference to commodities must depend upon the extent of the demand with reference to the stock of that metal or production of that metal. And if gold suddenly was called upon to do more work than it had done before, then the gold standard suffered in its fixity. The right hon. Gentleman said —I do not quite understand why—I could not quite follow him—that gold had only varied 3 or 4 per cent. Gold has varied nearly 25 or 30 per cent.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

At what period?

MR. GOSCHEN

I do not think the right hon. Gentleman follows me. He possibly thinks simply of the variation between gold and silver. But that is not the variation of gold as a fixed standard. Of course, that gold only varied 3 or 4 per cent. with reference to silver does not show the absolute fixity of the gold as a standard; but it shows what was done by the bimetallic system in France during the years from 1853 to 1874. The right hon. Gentleman says gold only varied 3 or 4 per cent. Why, bimetallists could point to that fact as the strongest argument in their favour. It shows that where you have a bimetallic system the variation is not so great. But I am not concerned with that point. What I am concerned with is that gold in relation to commodities has varied, not 3 or 4 per cent., but 30 or 40 per cent. The right hon. Gentleman quoted Mr. Giffen as one of the highest living authorities on a point on which I do not know that Mr. Giffen is an authority— namely, on a question of banking, whether the £600,000,000 which were on call would be withdrawn or not, and how they could be met.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

It was on the estimate of £600,000.

MR. GOSCHEN

I am glad that Mr. Giffen did not lend his authority to such a statement. I may take it that it is the assumption of my right hon. Friend that this would be withdrawn?

SIR W. HARCOURT

It was the assumption of Mr. Herries, the banker, and who was the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

MR. GOSCHEN

If it was the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the present day who put forward such a proposal one would value the statement in regard to the whole of the surrounding circumstances of the day, but I do not think you can quote an historical statement of that kind with the whole system of banking entirely changed since that time. I am sorry I have been led away from the general line of my argument. I should like to say a word or two on this £600,000,000, but at present I am engaged on the subject of the fixity of the standard, and the right hon. Gentleman very properly asks me for my test. Mr. Giffen himself says this— We cannot say positively that the recent change from a high to a low level in prices is clue to change of money of the nature or in the direction of absolute contraction. Thus Mr. Giffen distinctly admits a change from a high to a low level of prices. I do not know that the general view that the lowering of prices is caused by the appreciation of gold would be seriously questioned.

SIR W. HARCOURT

It is questioned by the Commission.

MR. GOSCHEN

It is not questioned by the Commission. The whole of the Commission say it contributed to this effect, and they treat it as an element. They do not say how far you are to attribute that fall to the contraction of the currency; but they do not dispute that it entered largely into it. I am not sure whether Sir Thomas Farrer, in his letter in The Times of this morning, does not admit that point. It was admitted on all sides that the fall in the value of silver is a matter deserving of the attention of all parties; it was for that reason it was thought right that we should be asked to join in the Conference which had been proposed. The Conference examined several plans; and it is certainly my impression—and those who were present at Brussels can make it good—that practically it was the action of the English delegates that broke up the Conference. That seems to me to be of the essence of the case, and it is because some of us consider that the Conference was broken up by the action of the British delegates that we think it right that the English Government—if we can induce them to do so—should take a line which would show that they were anxious to carry out those objects which induced them originally to join the Conference. The right hon. Gentleman made merry over the demand that the English Government should take up the negotiations again; but if it is correct, as I believe it is, that it was the action of our delegates which stopped this Conference, and if it was right to go into the Conference at all, surely we are not asking too much if we say we should wish them to do their best once more to bring the Conference together, not for the purpose of bimetallism, but for the original purpose contemplated. There were other proposals which were before that Conference. The right hon. Gentleman asked whether it was possible to find any plan at any time; whether it was not absurd to go into a Conference without any chance of finding any solution. But what did the Royal Commission say, of which his own Lord Chancellor was a member? We pass now to other proposals of a practical character. In our opinion it might be worth while to meet the great commercial nations on any proposals which would lead to a more extended use of silver, and so tend to prevent an apprehended further fall in the value of that metal, and to keep its relation to gold more stable. I base my support of the Motion not upon any bimetallic fallacy or theory at all, but upon the recommendation of the Royal Commission that it is worth while to meet great commercial nations on proposals which would lead to a more extended use of silver, and so tend to prevent an apprehended further fall in the value of that metal. This is the majority, this is the whole Commission, who were in favour of that proposal, and they are anxious to do, what? To keep the relation of silver to gold more stable. I should think the whole House would desire this greater stability. Fixity is one thing but stability is another. Therefore, I say, no stone ought to be left unturned, no difficulties ought to be allowed to stand in the way of continued efforts to find a solution of this most complex problem, upon which eminent monometallists who sat upon this very Commission say that a further understanding with other nations of the world would be desirable. Surely that is a point which cannot be treated with ridicule, and I do not know that the right hon. Gentleman intended to treat the matter with ridicule. I think, and doubtless the right hon. Gentleman would agree with me, that the interests at stake are far too grave to allow any temporary difference of opinion to prevent negotiations which have been interrupted from being resumed. I feel the question is extremely important at the present time, because, if the Government finally allows the Conference to break up, all attempts to increase the use of silver must necessarily be suspended or become abortive for years to come, and we shall be left face to face with a situation which I do not think the majority of the House would wish to see the country remain in. In all I have said I have not for one moment run counter to the strictest and most orthodox doctrine that might be proposed by the right hon. Gentleman himself. Well, it is said that other nations drew back—France especially. Yes, but they drew back mainly on account of the English delegates, and I think the right hon. Gentleman is a little mistaken in his view as to the attitude, for instance, of Germany. Germany entered the Conference coldly, but I know—I have ascertained myself at Berlin—that there is a growing feeling of doubt with regard to this matter; and now the agriculturists in Germany are moving very much as the agricultural interest is moving partially in this country, thinking the fall in prices is to a great extent due to the part which gold and silver play together, and thinking they ought to put pressure on the Government in regard to taking a warmer interest in the Conference. I was in another State in Germany where precisely the same matter was considered by the Government, and where they thought the matter was far more serious than they had believed in the beginning. Now, as for France, to quote the records of the Conference, M. Tirard said he feared that Mr. Cannon had incorrectly understood him if, on the ground of his declaration, Mr. Cannon thought that the Latin Union, or, to be more exact, France, in whose name M. Tirard had spoken, was less friendly to bimetallism than England. M. Tirard declared that he had said nothing of the kind. On the contrary, he had said that France was bimetallist in fact, and that if she would not resume the free coinage of silver, and if she would not go back to absolute bimetallism, it was only because England and other countries of Europe had declared in the most formal way that they intended to remain monometallic, and that they were not disposed to open their Mints to the white metal until other nations came round to some great international agreement. I think that is different from the impression conveyed by the right hon. Gentleman, and it cannot be denied that if this country put forward some plan for the increased use of silver it would be hailed with acclamation by all the nations of Europe. Now, Mr. Speaker, I should like to touch on one or two points suggested by the right hon. Gentleman but only by way of clearing up the controversy if I may say so—not in a controversial spirit to answer the right hon. Gentleman, but to put some points on the other side to the House and country in order that it may be seen how the matter really stands. Let me refer to the question of £600,000,000 which are on call and which Mr. Herries said he thought could be withdrawn. If they could have been withdrawn at that time, I do not think any banker now would hold that such an operation would be possible. But what did the right hon. Gentleman do? He suggested how frightfully injurious it would be to every creditor if, by association of silver with gold, he should receive less than his £100—if he should receive £95 or £90 instead of £100. But what has happened to the debtors? I firmly believe if I had made the speech of the right hon. Gentleman I should have been charged with representing the capitalist class, and it would have been represented that I only thought of the man who was determined to have his pound of flesh. It is the sovereign he is to have, whatever that sovereign may command. He must have his sovereign, and it is suggested that it would be monstrous if he should have to take silver instead of gold if, owing to bimetallism, the silver at that time would not be worth £100, but worth less than £100, though everywhere current as £100. The bimetallists hold that such a variation is impossible; but suppose the value of the sovereign to have increased—and I want particularly to put this to the House—through the action, not of nature, not of the increased production of silver alone, nor through the decreased production of gold, but through the action of the law in Germany and other countries; the debtor is then precisely in that position which the right hon. Gentleman fears the creditor would be in now if we were to associate ourselves with other countries in this question. He is worse off just by so much as the sovereign he is bound to pay has risen in value. Whether there has been a depression or fall in prices in the theatrical or medical profession I will not stop to inquire. There may be especial circumstances in these cases, but whether that is or is not so there has been, according to the testimony of Mr. Giffen, a very large fall in prices. And what is the effect then of that fall in prices which is assumed—I will say for the moment is only assumed—to be due to the displacement of silver? What is that effect? If by the greater bulk of currency you produce a rise in prices, is it not à priori almost certain that a contraction of the currency will produce a fall in prices? The right hon. Gentleman made an ingenious and strong argument with regard to the gold which had poured into this country between the years 1850 and 1860; and he showed the effect which that had had on the prosperity of the country. The pouring of gold into the country had had a certain effect upon our prosperity. That, I think, was the argument of the right hon. Gentleman. But if that is so, is it not certain that if the gold has got to do more work, it is equivalent to a contraction of the currency? It seems to me to follow perfectly reasonably from the premises that, if a bulk of gold poured into the currencies of the world produces a great rise in prices, a reduction of gold, or what is equivalent to the same—namely, a greater pressure put upon gold to do its work, will have an identically opposite effect. The right hon. Gentleman may challenge us to prove that. It is difficult to prove it in all the complexity of causes, but it was always alleged that that result would take place. I ventured in 1878, when I was on the Monetary Conference in Paris, to prophesy that there must be a depression of prices through the demonetisation of silver in all the countries in Europe. I looked upon it with alarm, and I think my prophecy has been justified. I do not think the right hon. Gentleman should be so satisfied with the progress of commerce during the last 10 or 15 years as he seems inclined to be. We have not been advancing with those leaps and bounds with which we did advance in former times; and it is the conviction of a vast number of people, and of men who are competent to judge, that the contraction of the currency has had the effect, which it has always been declared must be its effect — namely, a fall in prices. That is very much to the benefit of holders of sovereigns, and to the detriment of those who have to find the means to pay the sovereigns. Can we be surprised that the agricultural community and the operatives of Lancashire, who feel the pinch in a different way, say, "Law, and not nature, has made it necessary for us to produce more in order to pay our debts, and, therefore, we do not think it unreasonable that currency legislation should take place, by which the legal, the Government causes—not the natural causes which we are ready to accept—may be remedied?" I am not prepared to say that on that account we should undertake the tremendous change which bimetallism would bring about; but it does seem to me to justify us in exhausting every effort to see whether, by a greater introduction of silver, we should not be able to counteract to a certain extent the evils which I must say I believe to exist. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the fixity of gold. What is felt so much now, when we are asked whether we will tamper with our currency, is that our currency has been tampered with already by causes beyond our own control. I saw an eloquent passage by an able writer which I will quote to the House— English prices are as certainly dependent on foreign currency legislation as the level of the waters in the four seas is dependent on the level of the Atlantic. We may refuse to have a share in determining the world's monetary policy, but we cannot avoid being vitally affected thereby. Shall we continue to take a share in the world's monetary policy? Here is an opportunity. There is a Conference sitting, and ought we not to do what we can to ask them once more to resume their labours? We need not be frightened by the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, that because the United States summoned the Conference they are now bound to take the initiative in summoning it again.

MR. W. E. GLADSTONE

was understood to say his statement was that the United States must take the initiative in the matter of the Conference.

MR. GOSCHEN

We are most anxious to impress upon Her Majesty's Government the urgent desirability of continuing these negotiations.

SIR W. HARCOURT

What negotiations?

MR. GOSCHEN

The right hon. Gentleman asks what negotiations. The right hon. Gentleman must not stand at words. If he does not wish to say "negotiations," at all events, let us continue in the Conference, and attempt to solve questions in which Lancashire is deeply interested; in which India is vitally interested; and in which labour more and more begins to feel an interest. The right hon. Gentleman must know right well what negotiations took place. We want a further honest attempt on the part of our delegates to see whether they cannot assist in a solution of these questions. Let the Chancellor of the Exchequer call in Lord Herschell, who said that it was desirable we should communicate with the nations of the world. Do not let us give up this task. I hope I have convinced the House on two points. The one is, that this is not simply a bimetallic question. We have not got in gold at the present moment, unaided by silver, that standard of value, that fixity which the right hon. Gentleman attributes to it, and which we all desire to have. We wish to sustain gold, and to put gold back again into that position that silver may be able to do more work under it than silver has been able to do during late years. Surely that is a task in which we may ask Her Majesty's Government to assist us, and I hope, in the name of those great interests I have mentioned, that they will do so. And I may add to those interests the question of labour. The right hon. Gentleman pointed to the fact that the price of labour had risen all over the country, and he said that the price of labour having risen was a proof that there was no appreciation of gold. In the same way, as right hon. Gentlemen with perfect propriety say, that the ingenuity of man, that discoveries and many other circumstances have contributed to the fall in prices, in which we contend that the appreciation of gold plays a considerable part, so we may contend that that increase in the price of labour, which is satisfactory from the national point of view, has come about in spite of the appreciation of gold through many other circumstances; by the combined action which has taken place in many parts of the country, and by the determination of the working classes to take a larger share in the profits of the business in which they are engaged than they had hitherto done. What would have been material would have been to show whether, when the value of labour had increased, the profits of employers had not been diminished. And when the right hon. Gentleman pointed to the amount of cotton now imported, let us be grateful for the employment that it gives to the manufacturing population, but let us also ask whether that employment is upon such a remunerative basis to all concerned, that the great industry of Lancashire will be able to hold out against the bounty which is given to India. Has labour no interest in this question? If there is a further appreciation of gold—and those who are very competent to speak believe that if silver continues to be excluded a further appreciation of gold will follow—what is to be the position in India? That question must be dealt with, whether this Conference at Brussels comes to an agreement or not. But, looking to the further appreciation of gold, it means that everyone who owes a pound has to give more to pay that pound than he has paid heretofore. I say this is a question of national importance. It is a question which, notwithstanding the delightfully bright tones of the speech of the Prime Minister, he will acknowledge is one which those who believe there are serious dangers in the present situation are entitled to bring before the House of Commons. We should be almost neglecting our duty if we were not to do so. I hope I have not been betrayed into any extravagant statement in what I have said. I have been most anxious to put some considerations before the House on the other side of the question, because it is impossible that these great issues can be settled simply by the dogmatic statement that everything connected with bimetallism— and it is a pity that the name of bimetallism has been so prominent in the matter—is a dream and is Utopian. The question is far too grave for that, and I shall venture to do. what little I can to continue to contribute to a solution of this question, and I believe the more the matter is discussed, the more urgency will there appear that some further plans —plans which are more or less shadowed out even in the Report of the Royal Commission—should be accepted by the nations of the world, who will be more than grateful to any English Government which would co-operate with them.

MR. E. W. BECKETT (York, N.R., Whitby)

I rise, Sir, for the purpose of proposing the Amendment which stands in my name, and which reads as follows:— To leave out from the word "That," to the end of the Question, and add "seeing that the deliberations of the International Monetary Conference mainly turned on the question of bimetallism; that after protracted sittings no agreement could be arrived at by the representatives of the assembled Powers; and that any interference with the single monetary standard now by law established in this country is open to the gravest objections, this House thinks it inexpedient that the Government should take any steps to procure the re-assembly of that Conference. I hope it will not be thought an act of presumption on my part that I should join in the discussion of this most important and complicated subject. I can only plead in excuse that I have some slight practical knowledge of it, and, like all who have practical knowledge of it, I am filled with misgiving and alarm by the rash and dangerous proposals made by those who, for very insufficient reasons and with little discernment of the consequences, would alter the basis upon which our monetary system rests. There is one advantage I enjoy in this Debate, which is that I do not think it would be possible for the bimetallists to advance any argument I have not heard before. I do not require to be posted up on the subject by professors at the Westminster Palace Hotel. I have bad the honour of being present at bimetallic breakfasts and banquets. I have heard the most distinguished bimetallists state their case with the cool precision of the morning and with the inflammatory enthusiasm of the evening. I have sat at the feet of the Gamaliel of Bimetallism, M. Cerunsdir, and I have been exposed to the blandishments of my right hon. Friend the late Minister for Agriculture, and, in spite of all this, I remain unconverted, and am anxious to say a word on behalf of that system under which this country has achieved unexampled prosperity. Sir, this Resolution invites the Government to take steps to procure the re-assembly of the International Monetary Conference. I should have thought that no one who had read the Report of our Delegates and who had studied the views of the various countries represented could for a moment anticipate that the re-assembly of the Conference would lead to any practical result. Eleven years ago a Conference met and separated without arriving at any decision. Last year the Conference met and separated without arriving at any decision. What reason is there for thinking that a Conference this year or next year would be any more likely to meet with better success? As a matter of fact, it is certain that nothing would or could be agreed upon. What does the Report say?— Upon the attitude of the Latin Union to a great extent the situation turned. A partial bimetallic agreement might have been within the range of possibility had these States been willing to enter it. But M. Tirard—Delegate of France, and speaking on behalf of Belgium, Italy, and Greece—declared himself opposed to any union for the adoption of bimetallism unless such union included Great Britain, Germany, Austria, and Russia. And the Report goes on to say that— Unless there should be a radical change in the declared monetary policy of Great Britain, Germany, Austria, and Russia, an International agreement for fixing a ratio between the values of gold and silver must be regarded as beyond the range of practical politics. Without such radical change there is no prospect of the realisation of the conditions which, in the opinion of the bimetallists themselves, are necessary for the establishment of an efficient bimetallic system by International agreement. In the face of such a declaration as this, I think the Government which sought, without there being any change in the situation or the views of the Powers assembled, to procure the re-assembly of the Conference would only stultify itself; and though I cannot be suspected of any undue desire to see the credit and reputation of the present Government maintained at any high pitch at home, I confess I should be sorry to see it exposed to rebuffs or ridicule abroad. But, Sir, the House sees through this Resolution. It is intended not so much to procure the re-assembly of the Conference as to evoke an expression of opinion in this House on the subject of bimetallism. Under its innocent phraseology it conceals a deadly intent, and I must say I should have thought more of the courage of the bimetallists—who, to do them justice, are not, as a rule, wanting in courage—if they had come boldly out to fight in the open, instead of skirmishing behind a Resolution which they would say does not commit those who vote for it to a decided opinion one way or the other. But let the House beware of their wiles. They are a canny folk, and their insidious advances should be eyed with suspicion. What they want is nothing more or less than to substitute a double basis for the single basis on which our monetary system now stands. That sounds simple enough, but the effect of such a change it would be almost impossible to exaggerate. Consider the state of society in this country in all its grades and orders connected by financial arrangements to an extent and on a scale never exceeded in any country; consider the landed and propertied interest bound on one side by leases and on the other by mortgages and settlements, all expressed in money; consider our manufactures and commerce all dependent on, and existing by, one fixed and ordered system of pecuniary credit; consider the public debts and taxes and revenues, calculated on a known and ascertained basis, and, considering all these things, I ask if you can conceive any change more certain to produce extensive disorders, more pregnant with the seeds of derangement, danger, and calamity than the one which the bimetallists with so light a heart recommend us to adopt. Governments have been proverbially slow and reluctant to touch or tamper with the currency, and nothing can excuse their doing so but the prevalence of the most terrible evils and the pressure of the most urgent necessity. Do we stand in such a case now? I am not concerned to deny the existence of the present depression in trade. Unfortunately, the reality of it is too manifest to be denied. But the bimetallists have to show two things: first, that the depression is due to our gold standard; second, that by associating silver with gold, the depression will be removed, and the possibility of its recurrence is so remove that it need not be taken into consideration. Being, as I said, bold men, they apparently adopt both these theses; but they do not support them by arguments that will convince any practical man. If the depression is due to our possessing but a single standard of value, then as we have lived under a single standard of value since the year 1816 the depression ought to have lasted from that time to this. But as the development and progress of the country since 1816 has been marvellous and wholly unexampled in our history, one is almost tempted to believe that the maintenance of our single standard has had something to do with them. "Oh, but," say the bimetallists, "you had the advantage of the bimetallic system being kept in operation by the Latin Union up to 1873. What has happened since 1873?" Well, Sir, what has happened since 1873? And what happened before 1873? One would think to hear the bimettallists talk that before 1873 there was the Saturnian age—an era of smiling content, of universal unremitting prosperity. It is true, as I have just said, that there was wonderful progress and steady increase of wealth; but there were also periods of stagnation, periods of exhaustion, when we seemed to be going back instead of going forward. On looking back through Hansard one is surprised to see the frequency and regularity, and I may add the similarity, of Debates on agricultural distress and commercial depression, in which the same statements are made, the same grievances paraded, the same complaint uttered; and, furthermore, the same remedies suggested, among which proposals for tampering with the currency constantly recur. Well, Sir, that is before 1873 when the bimetallic system was in full swing, and, therefore, if it had possessed the magic powers attributed to it, distress and depression would have been banished altogether from those countries which fell within the range of its beneficent influence. Anticipating a possible objection, I may say that France no more enjoyed a happy immunity from distress and depression than England. And since 1873 how do we stand? Has there been no advance? Have we had no fat years? Did 1873 sound the knell of our commercial prosperity? There is no fairer test of the general prosperity of the country than the Income Tax Returns. Let us apply this test. In 1870–1 the gross assessments under Schedules D and E amounted to £215,888,000; in 1890–1 they rose to the total of £399,298,000. And when we remember that during these 20 years the limit of exemption has been raised from £100 to £150, and that abatements have been granted, first of £80 upon incomes under £300, and then of £120 on incomes under £400, this means that the gross assessable income has been nearly doubled during that period, and the vast increase in the Post Office and Savings Banks Returns year by year, fully discounting the increased facilities now offered, proves that the collective wealth of the working classes is also growing at a prodigious rate. How, with these facts staring them in the face, the bimetallists can seriously contend that our adherence to a single gold standard is paralysing our industries and bringing the country to ruin passes the wit of any ordinary mortal to understand. But then I am aware that one of the most cherished and continually repeated theories of the bimetallists is that all who do not agree with them suffer from a congenital stupidity, which no doubt does prevent us from seeing things that are quite clear and easy to the illuminated intelligence of the advocates of a double standard. Another favourite argument these gentlemen employ is that a double standard gives stability to silver, and consequently stability to the prices of commodities. This argument implies an assumption that hardly rests on facts, the assumption being that there is a necessary connection between the fall in prices and the fall in the gold value of silver. It is true that there has been a fall in both since 1873, but we find that a fall in one does not always correspond with a fall in the other; on the contrary, that sometimes a fall in one is coincident with a rise in the other. This is unfortunate, because the farmer has been taught to believe that the fall in the price of his produce is due to the fall in silver, and that bimetallism is the true remedy for agricultural distress, inasmuch as by rehabilitating silver it would send up the price of corn. But the price of corn does not move in sympathy with the price of silver. In 1873 there was a fall in silver and a rise in corn; in 1874 and 1875 there was a slight fall in silver and a heavy fall in wheat; in 1876 there was a big drop in silver; and a slight rise in wheat; in 1877 a slight rise in silver and a big jump in wheat; in 1884 there was a big drop in wheat, while silver remained steady; in 1891 a fall in silver with a great jump in wheat, and in 1891, with silver at 45d. per oz., wheat was higher than in 1884, when silver stood at 50d. per oz. I have seen the price of wheat tabulated from the year 1774 to 1873, and, to avoid wearying the House by quoting statistics, I must ask hon. Gentlemen to take my word for it that there have been in those 100 years fluctuations far more violent and extreme than any that have occurred since 1873.

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,

MR. BECKETT

Before 1875 the price of silver was fairly steady, but when bimetallism was assisted by Protection it did not prevent the price of corn from touching 108s. at one time and dropping to 35s. at another. I think most hon. Gentlemen will admit that the immense extension of the wheat-growing areas of the world, joined with increased facilities for transit and low freights, have much more to do with the fall in the price of corn than the suspension of free coinage of silver in 1873. And I think it is no real kindness to the farmer, when he so greatly stands in need of immediate help, to teach him to look for relief to a quarter from which no help can possibly come. But he is shrewder than his friends imagine, and though he may mumble the dry husks of bimetallism, the Agricultural Conference showed it is the succulent bread of Protection that he really desires; and certainly from his point of view he knows which of the two is best for him. Bimetallism cannot, then, insure stability in the prices of commodities which vary according to the law of supply and demand; therefore, it is of secondary concern to us to know whether it insures stability in the price of silver, inasmuch as the price of silver does not, and cannot, regulate the price of commodities. That it cannot do so will be evident when we consider that silver is itself a commodity. Some gentlemen seem to imagine that there is a sort of natural necessary wedlock between gold and silver; that in the beginning they were tied together by the hand of Providence, and have been separated by the hand of man. But there is no more reason in the nature of things that they should be united as a standard than that gold should be united with copper or tin as a standard. Silver was chosen for purposes of convenience, and as token money has a great part to play; but to exalt silver to the level of gold and expect it to do what gold does is as reasonable as to put a costermonger into the Cabinet and expect him to do the work of a Cabinet Minister. A double standard seems to me a contradiction in terms. The more simple the standard the better. Its very name implies simplicity and unity. It is the measure of value, and why not have one measure of value just as you have one measure of length and capacity? You cannot find a ratio that will unite the two metals on a lasting basis and remain steady under all shocks and chances. It has been tried in England, and England had to give it up; it has been tried in France, and France had to give it up. What virtue is there in a ratio of 15½ to 1? If you can fix the ratio of silver to gold, why not make it equal to gold, weight for weight? If you can fix the value of silver by law, why not fix the value of corn by law? Why not fix the value of everything by law? Bimetallists are invited to prove that it is more possible to fix the value of two quantities like gold and silver by law than that of two quantities like gold and corn or gold and anything else. And this is just what they never do and never can, prove, and so they talk, and so we do not believe it. From the reign of Elizabeth to 1774 silver and gold were legal tender at a fixed ratio to an unlimited amount. During that period the legal ratio was hardly ever the market ratio. At first gold advanced, and, in consequence, people discharged their obligations in silver, and gold was in danger of being driven out of the country. In the time of William III. gold fell and became cheapest, so people discharged their obligations in gold. In 1783 gold again advanced and gradually appreciated in value, till in the year 1774, when the bimetallic system was terminated, it commanded a premium of 39 per cent. That is what happened when bimetallism existed in this country. What has happened in France and the Latin Union? They tried bimetallism, and they have abandoned bimetallism, and are in no hurry to return to it. Bimetallism broke down, and the cause of its breakdown was that when pressure came, when the market was flooded with silver, they found that the fixed ratio could not be maintained if they wished to protect their gold. Their gold was being drawn away in such quantities that it was only by the suspension of their bimetallic system that they were able to prevent it from leaving the country altogether. I do not think much of the stability of a system that can only sail in smooth water. Can it be supposed that a single gold standard was adopted by Germany, Holland, Norway, Sweden, and Italy, and now by Austria, and that the double standard was abandoned by the Latin Union without good reason? This is a question on which authority counts for much. I might quote a long list of the highest authorities who have pronounced most decisively against bimetallism; but I will content myself with two, whose opinions always command respect in this House —Adam Smith and Sir Robert Peel. Adam Smith, who had had practical experience of the working of bimetallism, said, "It is a great evil to have two metallic standards of value to an unlimited extent." Sir Robert Peel, who shares with the Prime Minister the honour of being the greatest Parliamentary financier of the present century, said— Every sound writer has come to the same conclusion with Sir Isaac Newton (another great authority), that a certain weight of gold bullion with an impression on it denoting it to be of that certain weight and of a certain fineness, constitutes the only true, intelligible, and adequate standard of value. The notion of a double standard is totally fallacious and would be found impracticable in effect; nor has it ever been for a moment entertained by Mr. Loche or any others who have advocated a silver standard. And at the present moment go into the City, go to the banking, go to the great financial, houses whose operations extend to all the corners of the earth, and they will tell you that for England bimetallism spells loss and disaster, for in the words of Mr. Alfred de Rothschild England owes a great part of her enormous wealth to the confidence which her monetary system has inspired both at home and abroad— confidence based on the fact that our bank note represents sovereigns, and that a bill drawn upon England from any part of the world will at maturity be payable in the same metal. Against this enormous mass of expert opinion what have the bimetallists got to set off? Sir, they have nothing to set off against it but threadbare theories and wild and windy prophecies of an E1 Dorado where silver is to be as gold. As a matter of fact, it is impossible for a double standard to be maintained for long at a fixed ratio. Yes, say the bimetallists, it is possible if all Governments agree. Governments, Sir, are powerless in such matters. No Government can make the people take coin they do not want. The United States is a silver-producing country. They make laws to maintain the price of silver; but its use cannot be forced upon the public. We have also had an illustration of that at home not long ago. The Treasury awoke one day to the fact that there was a loss on half sovereigns and a large profit to be made out of crowns and double florins, so they endeavoured to substitute as far as they could crowns and double florins for half sovereigns. But it was no use, crowns and double florins couldnot be forced into circulation. The people would not take them. What is the use of talking about unlimited coinage of silver when nobody will take silver except for pocket-money? If a bank cashier were to try to compel a man to take £5, £10, £20, or £100 worth of silver away with him the customer would laugh in his face, and probably remove himself and his account at the same time. "Oh! but," say the bimetallists, "we would issue silver certificates." If for those certificates you could only get silver, they would soon be inconvertible notes. And we know what happens to inconvertible notes. In 1797 the Bank of England issued inconvertible notes, and Parliament tried by heavy penalties to keep them at par and failed. The French Convention denounced the penalty of death against all who refused to take the assignment at par, but failed miserably. If, on the other hand, these certificates were changeable into silver or gold at will they would be practically gold certificates, resting on a gold basis, and only circulating because they represented gold. People and Governments want gold because their ordinary business cannot be carried on without gold, and because in certain emergencies gold is an absolute necessity. Governments must have gold to fill their war chests. Silver will not suit the purpose. So clearly do they recognise this that as soon as they find their stock of gold beginning to be depleted they take steps to protect it at once. What did France care for the bimetallic system when she found that her gold was being drained away? Whenever there was any extra demand for gold you would have to pay premium for gold, and then what becomes of your bimetallic par? Supposing that bimetallism were established at the ratio of 15½ to 1, what would happen? The output of silver would be enormously increased. The banks and Mints would be flooded with silver, and it is obvious that people would not put silver in to take silver out. They would take out gold, which would very rapidly be driven to a high premium. Again, no edict that any Government or all Governments could issue would alter the natural preference in the heart of man, and of woman too, for gold. The demand for gold ornaments—lockets, brooches, and watches—would be insatiable. Every one who had silver dishes, cups, candlesticks, or plate of any kind would rush with it to the Mint to have it melted down, and receive gold in exchange. Under such circumstances, does anyone suppose that the bimetallic par could be maintained for a year, for a month, for a day? All the legislation in the world will avail nothing against a law that would be so certain in its operation that it might almost be called a law of nature. Well, then, what are we to do? Is the appreciation of gold to be allowed to go on unchecked? Certainly, anything is better than tampering with the currency; anything is better than attempting to escape from present and, I hope, temporary, evils by depreciating our standard of value, which would lead to evils far greater than any we endure now. Of such an attempt, Mr. Huskis-son, speaking early in the century, said— If we are unable to rescue many of its victims from the ruin it has brought upon them, at least let it be a warning never to be forgotten against any future tampering with the standard value of the currency. What are we to gain by the depreciation of the currency, and where is it to stop? Depreciation in the currency is always a sign of financial weakness—a danger-signal which spreads dismay. If a depreciated currency is to be so ardently desired, the Argentine Republic—where a dollar has sunk to the value of 1s.— must be the land to which hon. Gentlemen turn their eyes full of envy and admiration. Prices there have gone up by leaps and bounds, and yet somehow no one seems to be any better off, and the country, so far from becoming more rich and prosperous, is rapidly tending towards bankruptcy. I suppose hon. Gentlemen would say, "This is carrying matters too far. We only want a little depreciation; not too much, but just enough." What is enough? Is 10 per cent. enough or 20; then why not 25, or 30, or 100?— the same arguments apply in every case. No, Sir; once begin to depreciate the currency, and you cannot set bounds or limits to its possible decline in value. You cannot tell where it will stop, or what mischief it will do. It is like the letting out of water. At first only a few drops may percolate, but behind them comes a flood that will overthrow the barriers and sweep everything away. The bimetallists attribute the appreciation of gold—that is the fall I prices— to a scarcity of gold. I say without hesitation that there is no scarcity of gold. There is an ample supply of gold in the world for all purposes of business and commerce. I point to the Bank rate as a proof of what I say. No man who wants gold is refused gold if he can pay value for it. Bimetallists who have studied this question theoretically do not understand that the value of gold depends not only on the quantity of gold itself, but on the aggregate of gold and all promises to pay gold. The extension and development of credit which our monometallic system has produced, fostered, and stimulated, with all its attendant machinery of bills, cheques, notes, and promises to pay in gold, has placed at our disposal means and resources expansive and elastic enough to satisfy all the needs of individuals, all the requirements of trade and commerce; and the bimetallists cannot produce such evidence as would be necessary to support the conclusion that this fall in prices is due to a scarcity in gold. Any such cause would operate with tolerable uniformity over the whole field of prices, when, as a matter of fact, some have fallen, some have remained stationary, and some have risen. In every case where a fall has occurred some specific and satisfactory reason can be adduced for it other than the scarcity of gold. And it is a striking fact that when there has been no change or cheapening in the conditions of production; and when the demand has kept pace with the supply there has been no fall in the price whatever. Admitting the appreciation of gold, is it such an unmixed evil? We must consider the effect it has on all classes, especially the most numerous and needy classes of the community. I have already quoted figures which testify to the immense increase of wealth in this country. If incomes have doubled during the last 20 years, and the purchasing power of those incomes has increased by 30 or 35 per cent. surely this is not a result to grumble at and deplore. The working classes are vitally interested in this matter, and perhaps more so than any other class. The general level of wages is higher than it was 20 years ago, and they receive those wages in an appreciated currency—they are paid in sovereigns, and, therefore, their spending power is increased by 30 to 35 per cent. Sir Robert Peel asked what is £1? The bimetallists say £1 is to be 16s. Let them go to the working man and tell him that the value of every £1 he receives is to be knocked down to 16s., and see what he has to say in reply. The chief sufferer by the depreciation of the currency would be the working man. The rate of wages would not be increased simultaneously with the reduced value of money. It is by no means certain that it would be increased at all; but it is certain that the price of labour does not vary so rapidly as the price of commodities, and the working man would have to pay more for everything he bought, and it would be some time before he had more money in his pocket to pay with. All classes but one would suffer from the depreciation of the currency, but undoubtedly the working classes would suffer most. What is the class I exempted from the general suffering? It is the debtor class —a large and important and respectable class, among which is to be numbered many of the worthy agriculturists who are such hot advocates of bimetallism. I admit that the debtor class are deserving of consideration, and even of encouragement, for most businesses are carried on, most new enterprises are started, on borrowed money. But I do not think even the debtor class would derive unmixed advantage from bimetallism, or that they have lost so much by the appreciation of gold as they imagine. For the reasons I have given business men would not believe that silver could be permanently maintained on a par with gold. They would take precautions against a possible fall, and creditors as would protect themselves in this country by the same expedient as they have resorted to in America. The International Conference were informed that "it is stipulated in all contracts for a long term, such as mortgage deeds, that payment must be made in gold, i.e., in gold coin of the United States of the denomination weight and standard at present current, or its equivalent. Those who will not accept this condition are unable to borrow." Then, Sir, depreciation of currency means contraction of credit, which would not suit debtors at all. Debtors, generally speaking, have to put up cover for their loans, and have to pledge mortgages, bonds, and securities of all kinds. Now, the value of these securities, all expressed in gold, would depreciate as gold depreciated, and bankers and others would therefore have to curtail, reduce, and limit their advances according to the measure of the depreciation in gold. This would hardly stimulate business or add to the prosperity of the country. Again, as long as debtors pay away in interest less than half of their incomes, they have not lost, but gained, by the appreciation of gold. Say the debtor has an income of £100, and that he has a fixed charge of £40 upon it. That £40, by the appreciation of gold to the extent of 30 per cent., becomes equivalent to £52, which he has to pay; but the remaining £60 becomes equivalent to £78, which he has to receive, so that he is better off by £6 than he was before. So the debtors are not in such a bad case as they imagine, and the change to bimetallism might easily do them more harm than good. There remains but the creditor to be considered, and I would like, in conclusion, to say a word on behalf of him. It is not denied that this movement is aimed at him; it is not denied that he is to be paid in a depreciated currency, and that, therefore, he will receive less than he is entitled to. You ask us to break faith with the public creditor. You dismiss him in your elegant transatlantic phraseology with the contemptuous epithet of "gold bug." The profession to which I belong is especially singled out for attack. For what is a banker? A banker is a person who for a trifling consideration takes care of the money of the public. We are trustees for the public, and it is because we see clearly how greatly the public would suffer by the depreciation of the currency, what confusion it would create in trade, what disorganisation and uncertainty it would give rise to in business, that we resist the plots and plans of those who seek to gain a doubtful and temporary advantage for themselves and their class at the cost of enormous public suffering. Bankers feel bad times as much as anyone else. Look at the banking returns for last year. Bankers are best suited when business is brisk, traders full of enterprise and confidence, money in good demand, rates of interest remunerative, which things do not, as a rule, accompany appreciating money. Sir, we have no interests apart from the public interests. We are not so much creditors as the guardians of the creditors. What is a creditor? Every man who has a sum of money to his credit, whether in Consols, Railway Stocks, Banks, Friendly or Building Societies, or such things as houses or lands that can be turned into money is a creditor, and you cannot strike at the creditor without striking at the overwhelming majority of the people of England. England itself is a creditor country. Think of the vast sums invested abroad, put by some as high as £400,000,000, and by some much higher—all payable in gold. By a stroke of the pen you knock £100,000,000 or more off the national wealth. But that is not all. The Deputy for Russia said in eloquent language— One of the sources of England's strength is that she has become the monetary centre of the world, the place where you may be always certain of getting payment in gold. This is now one of the conditions of her greatness; interfere with that certainty, and you will break one of the conditions of her greatness. Another condition of her greatness is that under every trial and temptation England has always kept her faith inviolate. England is the model and type of financial honesty, and her credit stands higher than that of any other nation in the world. She has inspired such absolute confidence in her good faith that she can command the most favourable terms in every market, and is able to morrow money at a lower rate of interest than any other country. This is a position and an advantage not to be lightly thrown away. The depreciation of the currency by an Act of the Legislature would amount to little short of a legal fraud on the public creditor, and would be most prejudicial to our public credit. The public creditor derives his title from the same source as that which gives to every subject of the realm security in what he possesses, and that source is the guarantee of the good faith of the State. Many hon. Gentlemen who support this Motion belong to the Conservative Party, and I would ask them to remember that property of any kind is only the creation of law. Are not all the means of possession established and upheld by law, administered and enjoyed according to law; and can you make an inroad on one without endangering the whole? Your blow may be aimed at one corner of the edifice only, but its recoil, depend upon it, will inflict frightful injury on the whole fabric. I do not wish to use exaggerated language. I do not say we should be permanently and irretrievably ruined by bimetallism; but I do say that if we depreciate our currency we make a breach in the most honourable record of financial integrity that the world has ever seen; that we should open the door to a host of evils, great and small, immediate and remote; and should be committing an act which would damage our credit, diminish our resources, reduce our national wealth, and be a stain on our national honour.

MR. E. B. HOARE (Hampstead)

said he rose to second the Amendment, and he had very little to add to the exhaustive speech just made by his hon. Friend.

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,

MR. E. B. HOARE,

continuing, said the bimetallists always reminded him of the mediaeval alchemists who, with a desire to enrich the world, sought continually after the "philosopher's stone," but always failed to find it. The objects which the bimetallists set before them were twofold: The first was the raising of the value of the rupee and the improvement of the exchange of India, while the other was the raising of prices everywhere, and especially in this country. The first object was always based upon the most philanthropic motives. The House had been told by the hon. Baronet who moved the Resolution that India was suffering bitterly under the depression of the rupee, and that increased taxation would be a dreadful burden upon the people of India. There was no doubt whatever that a fall in the value of the rupee was inconvenient, and that it might possibly be a source of danger to the Indian Government. It was also a fact that it caused very grave loss to very many estimable Government officials in India, who, receiving their pay in rupees, had to remit it home to England. But what was the case with regard to the natives of India? He held in his hand a Blue Book published about four years ago, in which the following passage occurred:— So far as ordinary tests can be applied, the average Indian landowner, trader, ryot, or handicraftsman is better off than he was 30 years ago. He consumes more salt, more sugar, more tobacco, and far more imported luxuries and conveniences than he did a generation back. Where house to house inquiries have been made, it has been found that the average villager eats more food and has a better house than his father; that to a considerable extent. brass and other metal vessels have taken the place of the coarse earthenware vessels of earlier times, and that his family possess more clothes than formerly. This statement gave an authentic picture of the condition of the natives, and showed that it was one of rapidly increasing prosperity. The burdens of taxation had to be measured, not only by the amount of the taxation, but also by the capacity of the people to bear it. On this point he would read another extract from the very valuable Blue Book he had just quoted— The total increase in the gross land revenue during the past 30 years has been from Rx17,903,000 to Ex23,658,000. This increase of 32 per cent. in the land revenue has been concurrent with a rise of nearly 100 per cent. in the value of the gross agricultural yield in consequence of the extension of cultivation, of the rise in prices, of increased irrigation facilities, and of the introduction of new staples. In the year 1856 the land revenue was more than one-half of the total public income of the country; now it is less than one-third of the total revenues, so that the basis of the public income is broader than it was, and the comparative incidence of the revenue upon the land is lighter. He thought those two paragraphs were a tolerably conclusive answer to the question of how the present state of things was affecting the people of India. The people of India were prospering under the present régime. They were now growing corn, which they did not formerly grow, and their cotton and other industries were rapidly advancing. His bimetallic friends might say that they did not want to have India competing with our Manchester manufacturers. That, of course, would be perfectly intelligible, but they could not have it both ways; they could not be perfectly philanthropic to India and at the same time philanthropic to our fellow-countrymen. If the bimetallists were going to raise the value of silver with the view of improving the position of our fellow-countrymen, with the result of injuring our fellow-subjects in India, that would be no doubt intelligible, but it could hardly be described as philanthropic. He maintained that they had no right to tamper with their currency. The hardships from which officials in India were suffering ought to be met by some adjustment by which they could remit their exchanges home at a reasonable rate—and unless that were done the Government of India would fail to get that high class of officials it had hitherto obtained. The House knew, however, that the Indian question was a mere piece of by-play. What was really wanted was to raise prices in this country. There was no harm in low prices in themselves, for self-adjustment would shortly come round. The question was not what a man was to get for his goods, but what profit he was going to make by his transactions. It was said that what was wanted was to stop the fall in prices. With falling prices it was very difficult to have a prosperous trade, but he did not admit that by an artificial bolstering up of prices they could make trade prosper. The only effect would be a great fall of prices afterwards. Prices would adjust themselves by a natural law, and if people tried to adjust them and sent political economy to Saturn, as had been done before with very evil results, they would only make matters worse. The proposal before the House, although the Amendment was not so worded, was that there should be an international agreement to make silver and gold a legal tender at a certain fixed price, so as to have a certain ratio, the one to the other. But at what price? No one had yet answered that question. If there were an agreement throughout the world that all nations should purchase silver at the price of the day—say, 38d. per ounce—the free coinage of silver at that rate would stereotype the Indian exchange, and if they did that it would benefit neither the Indian Government nor Indian officials. Would it increase the money in circulation? No. A wealthy country like this was always saturated with money. There was always in the pockets of the people as much money as the people required. By that he did not mean as much as one would wish to have, but as much as one had the pecuniary means of getting. There was no difficulty whatever in getting that ordinary small change which they carried about in their pockets, and that was the only money used. The Prime Minister said that they had got beyond the stage of barter. On the contrary, he held they had got back to barter. They did not use gold in their daily contracts, except to pay for their dinners and their cab fares. It was a false notion that they ever paid or received a great amount of gold in the ordinary business of life. If silver was freely sent to the Mint and freely coined, who was going to use it? Who was going to ask his banker to give him £10 worth of silver? No one, except for the purpose of paying his workmen. There was such a thing as the Gresham Law, which showed that if a nation put into circulation an inferior currency it would drive the superior currency out of the country. In early life, some 40 years ago, he was travelling with his father in France, and his father gave him a bag full of 5f. pieces to take with him—and he left it behind. What did his father, who was a reasonable man, want a heavy bag of 5f. pieces for? Because he could not get anything else. They were at that time under bimetallism in France, and that was the sort of thing that would happen in this country if they were to have a gold and silver currency next year. The result would be a useless mass of silver accumulating in the Mint, and the producers of silver would always have a perfectly solvent and willing purchaser for the whole of their produce. They would know that, whatever might be the state of the market, they would always be sure of getting for their silver 38d. per ounce. Suppose there was a silver mine where they were producing silver at Is. an ounce, and they could sell it for 3s. 2d., he would like to be the owner of such a mine as that. By bimetallism they would not increase the currency; what they would increase was the production of silver, and what they would diminish was the ordinary amount of silver which would come upon the silver market if they gave it fair play. The remedy for the present state of things might be found elsewhere. He had often thought it exceedingly likely that China might open a perfectly insatiable gulf for silver; but the hope of such a thing would be checked to a certainty if we were to put an artificial price upon silver. The Chinese people were at this moment carrying about with them what they called "cash "—a heavy copper coinage. It would be of immense advantage to the Chinese to have a silver substitute. If they put a high artificial price on silver the existing evils would be intensified. There would be no hope of maintaining either the price or the currency. It was said that an international agreement on the subject was perfectly possible. He believed that nations, like individuals, were actuated very much by their own self-interest, and when he looked at the different positions in which nations stood he did not believe that any such agreement would be kept. The United States was the principal producer of silver, and their principal object was a good market. In France, of course, it was the interest of the Bank of France to get other people's necks into the same noose as they had got their own into. The position of England was adverse to that of either the United States or of France, because they had no large store of silver such as the others had. In these circumstances, how was it possible that they could have any permanent interest in common with them in this question? The reason why he supported the Amendment was because he objected to this question being kept open. In his opinion, it ought to be settled at once for good and all. The proposal to establish a system of bimetallism was impracticable, and if adopted it would necessarily lead to confusion and to loss. The Monetary Conference had come to the conclusion that they could do nothing in the matter, and he trusted that that evening's Debate might put an end to what he looked upon as a very mischievous agitation.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That," to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "seeing that the deliberations of the International. Monetary Conference mainly turned on the question of bimetallism; that after protracted sittings no agreement could be arrived at by the representatives of the assembled Powers; and that any interference with the single monetary standard now by Law established in this country is open to the gravest objections, this House thinks it inexpedient that the Government should take any steps to procure the re-assembly of that Conference,"— (Mr. Beckett,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. HOWELL (Bethnal Green, N.E.)

said he would merely detain the House for a short time in dealing with the proposal of the hon. Member the Mover of the Amendment. He admitted that those who ventured to speak on this question felt the same difficulty with which the Conference found itself burdened. The Conference found it difficult to get beyond general discussion. He held the view that what they wanted was a stable rate of exchange. That was, in his opinion, what lay at the root of the whole question. The difficulty seemed to be that some countries used gold as a standard measure of value, and others used silver. This had been interpreted as meaning a double standard— something differing one from another. That was not the view of those with whom he (Mr. Howell) agreed. They held that the measure of value should be-one uniform standard. They should have an equivalent value all round if they wished to promote the prosperity of the great nations of the world. They could not slur over the question of India, which was a most important part of the British Empire. To say nothing of the resources of its vast area, it had a population of 280,000,000 of people. Why should they not have one standard of value between India and the Mother Country? They should have it, whether they were to call it in England the £1 sterling or in India the rupee. Some gentlemen on both sides, he thought, had dwelt upon the prosperity of India. He did not know how they measured that prosperity in regard to this question; but India's position relatively to England was a grave matter. There could be no doubt that India had progressed, and he hoped, and many would join in that hope, that she might continue to progress. But India had progressed owing to British gold being poured into that country, but she had certainly not progressed at the rate she ought to have done in her trade with the Mother Country, for having a silver currency she had found the natural outlet for her produce in countries like China and Japan, which, like herself, also had a silver currency, and her trade with them had grown out of all proportion to that with England. They knew those facts from statistics. Should they endeavour to imitate Germany and institute for India a gold coinage, it would make things a great deal worse. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian did not seem to be very clear as to the object of the Motion. What was the object of the Motion? It was an endeavour to bring about that which it in terms contemplated—the reassembling of the Conference. There was something more which they had a right to expect, and that was that the British Delegates should not go with their minds filled with ideas contrary to the spirit of the Conference, and should not put, as it were, a veto upon the discussions before the Conference had been very long in operation. The facts proved that this was the case at the late Conference, and complaints were made in this spirit by various gentlemen who addressed that Conference. He did not suggest that this appeared in what was technically called the Report. That report was made by the Delegates, upon whose part there was not that open mind which should exist on the part of representatives of Britain. But any hon. Gentleman could read the proceedings for himself. He would see that he (Mr. Howell) was quite right in his conclusion. This was abundantly clear from the speeches of the Delegates at the Conference. It was also clear that British Delegates did not go to the Conference with that open mind that there should have been on the part of the representatives of the British Empire. He said that advisedly, after having read the Reports as carefully as any Member in the House. At any rate, the United Kingdom having such vast interests, not only at home but abroad—having such vast trade with various parts of the world that were purely silver-raising countries—the British Delegates should have been the first at the Conference to endeavour, if possible, to find a way out of this great monetary difficulty. Mr. de Rothschild, one of the four—or, as he preferred to say, one of the six—representatives of Great Britain at the Conference, had indeed made some important suggestions, and if they had been acted upon with frankness, and if other British Delegates had not made observations which tended to limit the discussion, some way might have been found out of this difficulty—a difficulty which, however it might be sneered at, there was not a statesman in Europe or America that had attended that Conference did not recognise, and seeing that great monetary and industrial difficulty staring them in the face, did not almost beseech the Delegates of Great Britain to take steps to bring about a solution of that difficulty. Under these circumstances, they had a right to call on the British Government to afford facilities, such as those suggested in the resolution for the re-assembly of the Conference, and that the Delegates of the United Kingdom should enter into the discussions with, at any rate, an open mind, that they might be able, if possible, to discover a way out of these great financial and industrial difficulties, not only for the United Kingdom and India, but for all the other nations of the earth. It was not only with India that our trade had fallen off; our trade with South America and other silver-using countries had also declined, owing to these monetary difficulties. If they went to Sheffield, to Lancashire, to the Midlands, and even to Yorkshire, which sent their goods to silver-using countries, and asked what was the state of trade with South America, they would learn that what he had said was true. There were difficulties in the way of trade in South America. Some might think that the difficulties in these countries were purely political, but though they might appear political to us, they were financial to the States concerned, and they had brought about the commercial difficulties and the falling off of trade to which he had referred. He did not think that the Government had a right to complain that the Resolution was a harmless Resolution, and that it did not provide a solution of the difficulty. That was for the Conference and not for Parliament. As a loyal supporter of the Government, as one who had supported the Liberal Party in its dullest as well as in its bright and sunny days, he was astonished that a Whip had been sent out to the Party to oppose the Resolution. He thought that was a matter that might well have been left to the House, for it was a matter that did not affect the Government. The late Government assented to the Conference, the present Government went into it on precisely the same instructions. And what should have been done was that not only should the Government have honestly carried out these instructions, but an effort should have been made by the British Delegates at the Conference to bring about such a reconciliation of interests at the Conference as might have led to the solution of this monetary difficulty. He was sorry that the Government, instead of doing this, had thrown difficulties in the way of the re-assembly of the Conference; but he should certainly support the Resolution.

MR. NAOROJI (Finsbury, Central)

said he did not wish to go into the question of the merits of monometallism and bimetallism. He wished merely to refer to the chief argument of bimetallists, which was that France had stood by bimetallism for 70 years, and had thereby introduced a fixed ratio between gold and silver. The question now was whether the bimetallism of France had been the cause of keeping the ratio between gold and silver steady, or whether it was not the fact that the ratio of gold and silver was not steady even when the system of bimetallism existed in France. He would ask if bimetallism had steadied that ratio why had it been broken up, and why had France given it up? When bimetallism existed in France there had been no universal consent between France and the other nations of the world, and why was that universal consent required now if bimetallism had any virtue in it? His contention was that when the time came that the ratio between gold and silver had become steadier they might have bimetallism or not, for it would come to the same thing. But India was the subject on which he wished to address the House principally. It had been said over and over again in the course of the Debate by one side that India had been largely benefited by the fall in exchange, and by the other side that India had been injured by the fall in exchange. It was difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to which side to believe, for each side had said it had official authority for its assertion. Instead of making general statements of that kind he would lay before the House a simple ordinary trade transaction from which they would be able to judge how far the difference in the two currencies in England and India, and the rise and fall in exchange, affected India. But in considering the subject they should always remember that India was in an unfortunate economic condition. They should consider India in two aspects—both as a self-governing country, like China independent of outside political influences, and as a country under foreign domination, with many important forces influencing her for evil and for good. Let them first take India as situated like China or any other self-governing country that had a silver currency. As far as trade and commerce between two independent countries were concerned it made no difference what currency existed in those countries. He would illustrate that by a simple trade transaction. A trader in India had to sell a hundred bales of cotton which cost him R.10,000. He sent the cotton to an agent in England to sell with directions to forward him the net proceeds of the sale. When the exchange stood at par rate of 2s. a rupee the trader had in calculating his profits to take that into consideration, as well as freight and insurance, and he would know exactly that he had to get a certain price, say 6d., for his cotton, in order to get his original R. 10,000 back and a profit of say another R.1,000. But suppose the rupee stood at 1s. instead of 2s. in exchange. In that case the trader would get only 3d. per pound instead of 6d. per pound for his cotton to cover his R.11,000. As exchange fell prices fell with it proportionately in England, and all the talk about India getting immense quantities of silver when there was a fall in exchange was simply absurd. The Manchester manufacturer was not such a fool as to pay 6d. per pound for cotton in England when by sending a telegram to Bombay he would be able to get the same cotton for 3d. per pound. His contention was, that whether there were two separate currencies in the two separate countries or not it had no weight or effect on the one country or the other, commercially, and in any case the Indian trader in the business transaction he had mentioned got back the money he had invested and in ordinary circumstances a profit of 10 per cent. In these controversies there was always a reference to prices. It was said that on such and such an occasion prices were high, and that on such another occasion prices were low. That was a very fallacious test, because the ultimate prices of commodities were not the result of one particular force, but the result of many forces, such as supply and demand, exchange, cost of production, &c. He was exceedingly thankful to those hon. Members who had shown so much sympathy towards India, but somehow or other the argument was always on the side for which it served its purpose. India was at one time exceedingly poor, and at another time exceedingly prosperous. But whatever the state of India might be, the system of exchange had nothing to do with it. Then take India, as it was, under foreign domination. It was true that India, under her peculiar circumstances, felt the pinch. India had to remit £16,000,000 sterling to this country every year. This year, or perhaps next year, it would unfortunately be £19,000,000, because for several years the India Office had got capital paid by Railway Companies in England, and did not require to draw their bills in India to that extent. The whole evil arising from the fall in exchange was this: that the disease already existed in India, and that fall in exchange came in and complicated it. If the disease of excessive European Services did not exist it would not be the slightest consequence whether the exchange was 6d. or 1s., or 2s. or 4s. the rupee. The position was, therefore, this: India had to send from her "scanty subsistence" a quantity of produce to this country equal to the value of £19,000,000 in gold. As gold had risen, India had to send more produce in proportion to the rise in gold, no matter what the currency was — silver, or copper, or anything. The sympathies of those who wished well to India in the course of the Debate were therefore a little misdirected. The remedy for the evils from which India was suffering did not lie in introducing bimetallism, or changing the currency into gold or restricting the silver currency, but in reducing the expenses of the excessive European Services to reasonable limits. After a hundred years of British administration—an administration that had been highly paid and praised— an administration consisting of the same class of men as occupied the two Front Benches, India had not progressed, and while England had progressed in wealth by leaps and bounds—from about £10 in the beginning of the century to £40 per head—India produced now only the wretched amount of £2 per head per annum. He appealed to the House, therefore, to carefully consider the case of India. He knew that Britain did not want India to suffer—he was sure that if the House knew how to remedy the evil they would do justice to India, but he wished to point out that bimetallism and the other artificial devices that had been put forward were simply useless, and that India would get no relief from them whatever. On the contrary, much mischief would be the result. With regard to the meeting of the Conference again, he thought it would be useless. In 1866, when Overend, Gurney, and Company failed, when many of the East India banks broke or were shaken to their foundations, and Bombay was in ruins, entirely on account of the fall in the price of cotton, no man in his senses tried to save this or that merchant, and raise the price of cotton somehow or other. The storm raged and ran its course. Many a well-known name passed into oblivion, but in a year or two no one thought anything more about it; cotton came in as usual from the interior, new men came into the field, and all the ruin was forgotten. The mischief was done in the present instance by the United States. There was a commercial disturbance, coming from demonetisation I Germany, or the excessive production of silver in America; just as storms arise in the physical world. The United States undertook the absurd feat of trying to stop it, and keep up the price of silver, and the result was that the more it was stemmed the greater force it acquired. Twenty years of suffering had been due entirely to this one mistake. The Indian people would be the greatest sufferers, but the storm must take its course. They could no more stop it than they could order gravitation to become non-existent, or make water run upward. Silver would go on falling until it had reached its proper bottom; the Indian and Chinese currencies would remain; there would be silver-using and gold-using countries, and the amount of silver that would come into operation would be useful in one way or another. On the one hand they were told that it was law that had made all this confusion, and the very same gentlemen who told them so would rush to the same law again to produce an artificial and worse condition of affairs. They must allow laws, commercial, physical, moral, or political, to be governed by nature. If they tried to stop the storm, the result would be far more disastrous. Conferences might meet, but they would not reach any conclusion except some artificial device which would merely cause more mischief. It was said that France was anxious for bimetallism and laid the blame of her not adopting it on England. But when France and the other Latin nations had bimetallism silver took its own course, and there was no use laying the blame on England now. He was of opinion that England must stick to the sound scientific principle of currency that she had adopted. Nor should she allow the currency of India to be tampered with. He thanked the House for the favourable hearing accorded to him, and hoped that before any step was taken to change the currency system either of this country or of India they would think once, twice, and three times.

MR. CHAPLIN (Lincolnshire, Sleaford)

Everybody will agree, I think, that nothing has been lost by the concession of the whole of the day for this Debate, which has been made remarkable by the striking speeches of the Prime Minister and of my right hon. Friend (Mr. Goschen). That was, Sir, indeed, a conflict of giants on currency and finance, and I confess that it is only with fear and trembling that I venture to enter on the same arena. I desire to reply, in the first place, to one or two of the statements which fell from the Prime Minister. He said that fixity and invariability were qualities to be sought in a standard of value. But he seemed to think that the same amount of fixity could not be obtained by having a double as well as by a single standard. It has been pointed out by one of the most eminent monometallists of the day— Professor Jevono—in his able and interesting book on money, that that is an entirely erroneous idea, and that, in order to attain the greatest possible amount of stability, it is absolutely necessary to have a double instead of a single standard. He gave a very admirable illustration of this, by citing the case of two reservoirs of water, into which the water was conveyed by two separate pipes, and pointed out that as long as they were separated, the fluctuations would be infinitely greater than if they were connected by a central pipe extending over the whole of the area. That is an illustration which it is not very easy to answer, and in which it will be difficult to find a flaw. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the disadvantage of a country like this, the greatest creditor country in the world, accepting a bimetallic system. He said that the debts owed to us amounted probably to £2,000,000,000, and I admit that is a very large amount, but it must be remembered that part of these debts are investments in silver securities, and that we should gain rather than lose by that change. More of them still are invested in countries that use a silver standard, and it must not be for- gotten that if you press these countries too hard, and reduce them to poverty and bankruptcy, you will probably be met with a repudiation of the debts, and be the losers in the long run. Again, it may be pointed out that a still larger share of all these debts are invested in industrial undertakings abroad, and would be repaid by the rise in the prices of commodities anticipated from a change of this description. But are there no such things as debts at home? It is estimated that the debts owed in England alone amount to no less than £4,000,000,000. My hon. Friend the Member for Whitby questioned the fact of the appreciation of gold being an evil at all, but what is the meaning of the appreciation of gold? I venture to remind him that the meaning is that as gold appreciates, and precisely in the same proportion in which it does appreciate, so much more of the labour and the product of the country is required in order to obtain the gold necessary to meet these obligations. The only way of getting gold that I know of is by exchanging for it something that there is to sell, and I am aware of nothing, with the exception of land which is unreclaimed and therefore valueless, which is not the product of the labour of the country. That is why, in a society like our own, it is beyond all doubt a most serious evil when there is an appreciation of the standard of value, and especially to the workers and producers of the country. The Prime Minister said silver had fallen 40 per cent., and he was horrified because it was asked that it should be restored to the artificial value given it by the law. But, why not? Has gold no artificial value given it by the law at the present moment? What does the House suppose would be the value of gold to-morrow if you passed a law to demonetise it, as silver was demonetised 20 years ago? Gold, you must remember, is the rich man's money; silver is the money of the poor man. The Prime Minister is rather fond, very often, in this House and elsewhere, of posing as the friend of the poor man. But when it comes to a question between silver and gold he is ready enough to protect the money of the rich man and let the money of the poor man take care of itself, so far as he is concerned. The Prime Minister also said wages had risen enormously. Since when, I should like to know? I absolutely deny that wages have risen since 1874. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said the same thing the other night, and told us the story of some old man in the New Forest who declared that 50 years ago he was getting only 7s. a week, whereas he was now getting 12s. or 14s. a week. Yes, but if the right hon. Gentleman will take the trouble to refer to the wages paid some 15 or 20 years ago, before the demonetisation of silver occurred, he will find that wages, so far from having risen, had fallen very considerably indeed. I do not know if it is worth while to refer to another extraordinary argument used by the Prime Minister when he said that the salaries of first-rate actresses and first-rate members of the medical profession had increased. What does that show? It simply shows that first-rate actresses and first-rate doctors, like first-rate Prime Ministers, if I may say so, are rather rare. But it has no bearing whatever upon the question of the appreciation of gold. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Whitby said two things, to which I turn for a moment to reply. He said one of the conditions of England's greatness was the fact that she possessed a gold currency. I believe there is no greater fallacy in the world. We owe our supremacy to the character and the reputation of our merchants and men of business, and to the credit of the country as a whole. Since when is it, I should like to know, that we have attained this commercial supremacy? It is not a thing of yesterday or the day before. If my hon. Friend will take the trouble to refer to Alison's History, he will find it stated that— England has the whole of the trade and commerce of the world in her own hands to-day; and that, if you please, was in reference to a period some years before 1816, while England was still a bimetallic country. Mr. Disraeli, who was usually reckoned a tolerably good authority upon most things, also said the same thing in a very celebrated speech he made at Glasgow some 14 or 15 years ago. He declared that the idea that we owed our commercial supremacy to the fact of our having a gold currency was the greatest delusion in the whole world. "Our gold currency is the consequence," he said, "not the cause of our supremacy." Sir, my hon. Friend also said that to adopt the system of bimetallism would be a fraud upon the public creditor. Now, who is the public creditor? I suppose it is the holder of Consols. But is my hon. Friend not aware that the whole of the National Debt was contracted at a time when silver was legal tender money in this country, and now the taxpayer has to repay it in appreciated gold? That is to say, that at least 30 or 35 per cent. more of the labour and produce of the country is required in order to pay the burden of our National Debt than would have been required if bimetallism still prevailed, and gold had not appreciated to that extent. The hon. Member who has just sat down said that during the time the bimetallic régime prevailed in France the ratio varied as much as 25 per cent. The hon. Member is absolutely and entirely mistaken. No variation approaching that ever occurred, and it was only after the Mints of France were closed to the free coinage of silver in the midst of the Latin Union that any substantial variation occurred at all. My hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead said he opposed this Motion because he desired to close at once and for ever a question which, in his opinion, led only to a most mischievous agitation. I am not surprised when I hear such desires expressed by gentlemen who are fortunate enough to be engaged in the very lucrative business to which he belongs. It is a curious and instructive fact that whereas almost everyone engaged in productive industry in this country, who has carefully studied this question, supports it, it is invariably opposed by the bankers, and I am not at all surprised at it, because they are the great owners of gold. Of course, the more gold appreciates and the more valuable it becomes, the more it is to the interests of those who own it. But I am afraid the hon. Member will never succeed in closing this question, however much he may desire it. The force of circumstances and the evils of the present situation will be far too strong for him. Now I come to the Motion on the Paper, of which we have not heard as much as I should have expected during this discussion. Now, Sir, that Motion was called the other night, by no less an authority than the Prime Minister, a Bimetallic Motion. I think that was a most inaccurate description. As far as I am concerned, I wish most emphatically to state that there is not a syllable in that Motion which would pledge any human being to the adoption of the bimetallic theory. I acknowlege that I am myself a convinced bimetallist, and upon a proper occasion I should be perfectly prepared to give what I believe to be conclusive reasons in support of the views I entertain, and I am also of opinion that it would be the best, the simplest, and the most effective remedy for all the evils of which we complain at the present time. I go so far as to say that so great, in my opinion, are those evils, that if I could not obtain bimetallism without it, which is what I would like to do, I would even consent to the adoption of bimetallism in this country. But I also know that practical men have to consider what is attainable as well as what may seem to them to be desirable, and although it may be taken for certain that the large majority of the nations abroad would come to an agreement for this purpose to-morrow, if England would agree to it, yet I see so little chance of her doing so at present that I am not going to urge that course to-night. What I am going to urge as a matter of the very first importance is that the Conference should re-assemble at an early date, with a view to coming to some understanding, upon bimetallism certainly, if they will, but, if they will not, then upon some one or other of the alternative projects which have been submitted to the Conference, or which may possibly be proposed in the future; and, above all, that our English Delegates should be instructed, at all events upon this occasion, to join heartily and cordially in the endeavour to bring about such an understanding. I do not wish it to be supposed that I have any desire myself to change the currency in this country, if it can be avoided. Part of this Empire uses a gold standard; part of it uses a silver standard; and what I should like to see is this—namely, that that part of the Empire which uses a silver standard should be permitted to make an arrangement with the other nations and come to an agreement upon bimetallism with them. But, at the same time, so important are the evils, in my opinion, that I should be prepared to agree to a change even in this country, if there were no other means or possibility of obtaining it. These evils are very grave; they are notorious; they are not denied; and there is not a doubt that every day it is becoming a more and more imperative necessity that something should be done to meet them. What is the nature of the evil from which we suffer? It is stated in the Motion; it has been stated over and over again in the course of this Debate. It is the great divergence in the relative value of the metals at the present time; a divergency the tendency of which is always to increase. Silver, which up to 1874 was worth 62d. an ounce, has now sunk to 37d. or 38d. There is the more familiar illustration of the rupee that used to be worth 1s. 11½d. What is it worth to-day? Something, I believe, over 1s. 2d. Now, Sir, that immense divergence has occurred entirely within the last 20 years; and if the House will only take the trouble to remember and to examine into the history of the precious metals, it will be found that it is in reality one of the most remarkable occurrences in the world. It is a change of immeasurably greater magnitude than any other which has occurred in the value of the metals—I had almost said since the creation of the world—but undoubtedly since the time when the system of barter was abandoned by civilised mankind, and gold and silver first became the joint money of the world. I believe that statement, startling as it may seem, can be positively established on the highest authority. Under those circumstances, it is not uninteresting, I think, to endeavour to arrive at the truth of the causes which have produced that very extraordinary result. Are we to account for it by any sudden increase in the production of either of the metals? Nothing of the kind, because it is a positive fact that the variations in the productions of these metals have been infinitely greater in former years than have been any of the variations since the years 1873 or 1874, and yet no change occurred all that time in the relative value of the two metals. Is it to be found in the anticipation of a greatly increased production of silver in the future? If Members would take the trouble to study the Report which we have received of the proceedings of the Conference they would find, on the contrary, that it is stated and generally believed that the production of silver has already reached its maximum, and that entirely irrespective of the circumstances under which it may be produced. No, Sir, the explanation of this extraordinary revolution must be sought on wholly different grounds, and it is not very difficult to find them. Up till the year of which I have been speaking, the Mints on the Continent and of the United States of America were open to the free coinage of silver—that is to say, they were bound by law to take all the silver and all the gold that was brought to them and to coin it into legal tender money. Unfortunately, in these years, for reasons into which I need not enter now, those Mints were closed to the free coinage of silver, and for the first time I the history of the metals gold and silver were absolutely divorced. Gold alone since then has been coined into legal tender money, and, consequently, gold ever since that time has had to do the work which formerly was done partly by gold and partly by silver, and as the necessary result, in relation to the work it has to do, it has become comparatively scarce, and, therefore, dearer than it was before. Gold, in other words, has appreciated, and this is shown by the heavy and general fall in the prices of commodities. The Prime Minister asked my right hon. Friend how he proved this, and he answered, with perfect truth, that it was a matter on which it was very difficult to give absolute proof. But the right hon. Gentleman must know that by the system of Index Numbers, with which he must be familiar, it has been tried and tested by a great number of the most eminent statisticians in the world, who have, one and all, come to the conclusion that we are in the presence of the phenomena known to economists as the appreciation of money, and it is appreciated to the extent I have described. I am aware that the Prime Minister, the hon. Member for Whitby, and others have disputed this altogether, and they say the fall in prices is owing to other causes — to increased production, to the inventions of science, to the improved facilities of transport, and various other matters of that kind. But, if that is so, the fall in prices must have been universal. It must have occurred in silver-using countries as well as in gold. The evidence on this point, however, is conclusive that in countries where silver is legal tender there has been no change in prices at all. That seems to show that it is gold which in reality has risen, not the other things which have fallen, and that, I believe, is the real and simple reason of the great and growing divergence in the metals. And, indeed, it could not well be otherwise, unless gold differs altogether from every other commodity in the world; for if you suddenly increase or double the demand on any given commodity, without any corresponding increase in the supply, it must of necessity become comparatively scarcer, and, therefore, dearer than it was before. But be that as it may—and whether I am right or whether I am wrong as to the causes which I have endeavoured to describe—there remains the fact of this great divergence; and it is that fact and its consequences with which we have to deal. Now, what have those consequences been? I should like to read a short extract from an admirable paper written by one of the ablest professors of modern days. He says— All property and Stocks are depreciated, hence the numerous failures of Building Societies and ruinous foreclosures of mortgages. The burden of fixed charges is increased, and the producer finds the margin of profit disappear. Thus employment becomes restricted and wages fall; the weight of taxation increases automatically; the burden of all debts, including the National Debt, in which every taxpayer is concerned, is steadily aggravated. That is the statement of Professor Fox-well, and it is deserving of our attention. Sir, I might also point out, if I were inclined, the wide depression which we see at present almost everywhere around us, and which bimetallists believe is largely due to the continuous fall in prices resulting from the appreciation of gold. And certainly it is remarkable that that depression should have continued so long, not only in this, but in every other gold-using country in the world, and in almost every industry that can be named, and it does seem as if there must be some general and common reason for the whole. Go where you will to-day in England, you will not find a tradesman who will not tell you the times never were so bad. There is not an operative anywhere in the North of England who will not tell you he has seldom known them worse. You can hardly find an agriculturist who will not declare that he is on the verge of ruin, and you have thousands of poor people in all parts of England out of employment. Looking further abroad, I might point to the agrarian upheaval rising so steadily and rapidly in Germany, and to the social revolutions which are hardly restrained in other countries on the Continent at the present time. And of all these I think I might say with justice that they constitute part of the evils of which we are complaining and for which we desire to find a remedy. But I will not dwell upon these points to-night, because I think it possible they may be disputed, and also because I am perfectly well content to base my case and my claims for support on those evils which were described by Lord Herschell, the present Lord Chancellor, in the Report of the Gold and Silver Commission which he signed, as "the proved evils" of the present situation, and which, God knows, are enough in themselves! What are those proved evils? There is the question of our trade with other silver-using countries, and there is the question of Indian Finance. Everybody knows how enormous is the injury which is done to our trade at present with silver-using countries. Legitimate and successful trade with the East has become hardly possible at all; it is practically converted into nothing but a gamble on the Exchange. As to the state of Indian finance, that is a question the gravity of which it is hardly possible to over-estimate. I understand the deficit in the Indian Budget is estimated already at £1,500,000, and by any further fall in silver that deficit may be indefinitely increased at any moment. Now, Sir, as long as we continue to govern India at all, I hold it is our duty to govern India for its good. You are confronted, as I say, with an enormous deficit already, and every further fall of 1d. in the value of silver means an additional £1,000,000 to the deficit in your Budget. How are you going to meet it? You may reduce expenditure or you may increase taxation. Is either of these courses open to you at the present time? You may lessen your Expenditure in either of two ways: You may reduce your Army or you may stop the outlay on public works. To do the first will be to abandon the national defences and to lay the country open to the attacks of the enemy. To do the second will be to vitally interfere with the prosperity of India in the future. Neither of these alternatives, therefore, I think I am right in saying, can be accepted or even considered for a moment. Well then, can you increase the taxation of the country if these other sources are not open to you? I am informed by very competent authorities that India is already taxed as heavily as she ought to be, and probably as heavily as she can be, and that any considerable increase of taxation in that country would probably lead to the most serious discontent, and very likely to even more serious disturbances. I express no positive opinion on that point, because there are many Members in this House better entitled to speak on the Indian situation than I am. But I believe it to be true. There is indeed a fourth alternative, which I venture to think would be as dangerous as it would be foolish if it were adopted. You may seek to establish a gold standard in that country and to fix artificially the value of the rupee. Are you really going to tamper with the currency of that part of Her Majesty's dominions? It is a favourite expression of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. We heard a good deal the other night in another Debate about tampering with the currency in England. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will tell us in the course of this Debate whether it is true or not that the Government are going to tamper with the currency in India in this case. You appointed a Committee upon this subject: and it certainly has been sitting for an unwontedly long time, and there is no Report yet. What is the meaning of this great delay—this very unusual delay? Does the right hon. Gentleman know? If he does not, I think I can tell him. They cannot make up their minds about any Report. A little bird whispered to me the other day that no two Members of that Committee were of the same mind. I am not surprised. He would be a bold man indeed who would make the recommendation, and until I know it to be true I will not believe that Lord Herschell, whom I have always regarded as a man essentially prudent and cautious, will dare to advise so rash and so dangerous a course. If you do, in my humble judgment, you will embark upon an illimitable and unknown field of danger, and the last state of India will be worse than the first. Now if I am right in the view I am venturing to submit to the House, what is the position of the Government if, by voting against this Motion, you declare that you will have no further meeting of the Conference in Brussels or anywhere else? What can you expect if this Conference is finally broken up without coming to any result? Your own Delegate, Mr. Alfred de Rothschild, one of the strongest monometallists of my acquaintance, says— I need hardly remind you that the stock of silver in the world is estimated at some thousands of millions, and if this Conference were to break up without any definite result there would be a depreciation in that commodity which it would be frightful to contemplate, and out of which a monetary panic would ensue, the far-spreading effects of which it would be impossible to foretell. Now, Mr. de Rothschild may be right or wrong. I myself should be disposed to think that he is most likely to be right, but you cannot shut your eyes to this: that if nothing at all is done it is practically certain that America will very shortly cease her purchases of silver. If she does, it is almost certain silver will go down again with a run, and all your difficulties in India will be pro tanto aggravated and increased, and you may find yourselves landed at any moment in a deficit to a frightful and untold amount. What are you going to do under these circumstances? That is a question which all Parties in this House will admit to be of the gravest possible importance. That is a question which the Government must have considered, and it is one to which I am certain, if it can be given with propriety, the House would desire to have an answer. For my own part, looking at this question from the point of view of India alone, it does seem to me, for our own interest and even for our safety in that country, to be a matter of the highest importance that the Conference should meet again and should endeavour to come to some solution of the question. I hope with all my heart— I would fain believe—that the Government will re-consider their intention, if they have formed the intention, of refusing the Motion which is submitted to the House. Now. Sir, that being my opinion, perhaps the House will allow me for a few minutes more to inquire how it was that the Conference was so barren of results before. It was said that it was owing to the attitude of England and to the conduct of some of the English Delegates. I endorse most thoroughly that opinion; and I go further, and say I shall be prepared to prove that the conduct of some of these Delegates was deserving of the greatest blame, and that they grossly violated the instructions they had received. I am not speaking of the Delegate whose apparent object was to break up the Conference and bring it to nothing from the first, and who on one special occasion, when the whole of the 48 Delegates were present (I am speaking of Mr. Bertram Currie) found himself in a minority of one—a position, I venture to say, neither very dignified nor very creditable to the representative of a great country like our own on an occasion of great national importance. However, as no member of the Conference apparently attached the slightest importance to his opinions, I think we may dismiss Mr. Currie from our minds. I am speaking of the official Delegates, and of Sir Rivers Wilson in particular, of whom I am afraid I shall have a good deal to say. What are the facts? It has been already stated that the proposal for the Conference was made by the United States, and it was cordially assented to by the late Government. In due course three delegates were appointed to represent England. One was an official representative of the Government; another was a monometallist, a representative of what may be called the moneyed interests of the country; and the third was a distinguished bimetallist—the hon. Member for Manchester, who represented the industrial interests of the country. No one can question the fairness and the perfect equity of these appointments. But then came a change of Government, and the matter passed into the jurisdiction of the right hon. Gentleman opposite. What did he do? In order, I suppose, to make quite safe of his own views, he immediately added two strong mono-metallists to the three Delegates already named, the first of them being an official and the second being another representative of the moneyed interest; and here I wish most emphatically to protest against the preponderance which has been given to the representatives of the moneyed interest on that Conference. I quite admit that that interest is of extreme importance, but the industries of this country are even more so. So, again, I acknowledge that an effective and good banking system in this country is of great importance; yes, but the welfare and the happiness of the people do not depend upon the perfection of a banking system, but, on the contrary, they depend on the prosperity of its industries, and the labour and the wages which they provide. Now, the Conference met on the 22nd of November; and here I would venture also to appeal to the right hon. Gentleman that in case of the Conference ever meeting again some alteration should be made in the respect I have mentioned and that the industries of this country should be properly represented in future. Now, in the absence of any definite proposals from the United States, a scheme was presented by Mr. Alfred de Rothschild on the 25th. On the 28th that scheme was referred to a committee. On the 2nd December the Report of the Committee came before the Conference. I need not say that Mr. Bertram Currie on that occasion took the opportunity of making a speech which was no doubt intended to prevent everything and anything being done, but Sir Rivers Wilson on that occasion supported the Motion for Adjournment. The Conference met again on December 6. It appears to me that something extraordinary must have happened during that interval; because, when Sir Rivers Wilson came back to the Conference on the 6th December to consider this motion of Mr. Alfred de Rothschild, he did everything in his power to oppose it and bring it to nothing. And not only did he oppose Mr. Alfred de Rothschild's proposal, but he opposed another scheme before the Conference which was known as the scheme of Mr. Moritz Levy. His conduct appears to me to have been so remarkable that I was tempted carefully to examine the instructions which were given to the Delegates, and I am going to ask the House to consider what these instructions were. In the first place, they read as follows:— The invitation to the Conference contemplates the study of any measure for the extended use of silver which may be proposed. So that this instruction was as wide as possible; it excluded nothing. Then they go on— Under it a Delegate may suggest a scheme for a double standard, but it admits also the discussion of any scheme for promoting the use of silver as currency, So that this instruction again in no way excludes the discussion of bimetallism. On the contrary, it distinctly contemplates its discussion, and, in my opinion, very properly. Thirdly, the instructions say— Her Majesty's Government do not limit the powers of the British Delegates in the first instance by any prohibition to enter on such field of inquiry as the members of the Conference may desire to cover. It is of the essence of the question that the ideas of the Delegates should be reduced to working plans, and should thus be subjected to practical criticism. For that purpose it is neither necessary nor desirable to exclude any particular idea from discussion, provided always that it is put forward in practical form. Then comes the last part of the instructions— Above all things the Delegates should study with the greatest care every measure suggested to ensure a wider use of silver in currency, before they come to the conclusion that matters must be left as they are. To sum up these instructions, then, they were as wide as possible; any measure which might be proposed was to be discussed; the discussion of bimetallism was distinctly contemplated, no limit was placed on the Delegates, and nothing was excluded. They were, moreover, distinctly told to study with the greatest care any measure which might be suggested before they came to the conclusion that matters should remain as they were. How did Sir Rivers Wilson perform his duties under those instructions? On December 6, the day on which the Conference met to consider Mr. A. de Rothschild's proposal, he entered on the debate at once by reciting his instructions. He knew perfectly well what they were, and he said— The instructions we have received from our Government require us, before concluding that matters must be left as they are, to examine with the greatest care any plan which may be submitted. So far so good. But how did he begin his speech on Mr. de Rothschild's Motion? And it should be remembered that at this time bimetallism was not even before the Conference. He said— In order to avoid all misunderstanding I desire, on behalf of Sir Charles Fremantle and myself, to make in the face of this assembly our profession of faith. Our faith is that of the school of monometallism pure and simple. We do not admit that any other system than the single gold standard would be applicable in our country. Yet his instruction was to consider every proposal that might be made. Then he goes on to the plans of Mr. de Rothschild and Mr. Moritz Levy— The only plans which have as yet been studied by the Conference are those of Mr. Moritz Levy and Mr. de Rothschild, and we are willing to admit that the adoption whether of one or both of these plans would perhaps not be incompatible with the principles which we hold. Well, it is something to find that there were any proposals which were not incompatible with Sir R. Wilson's principles. But it did not serve them much, for he checked them both at once, and went on to say— Has either of those plans the least chance of meeting with such a preponderance of support as would justify the representatives of Great Britain in recommending Her Majesty's Government to take them into consideration? So far as concerns Mr. de Rothschild's plan, it can hardly be said that it has received such a measure of support. This fact, apart from other considerations, is sufficient to decide us to abstain from taking part in a discussion of detail which we know beforehand would be absolutely fruitless. How was it likely that this plan could have support when the English Delegate met it in this way at the outset? He may answer that it had been considered in the Committee and rejected by a majority of 7 to 6. The Committee was not the place to decide this question. It was the Conference which had the right of coming to a decision upon it; but in order to prevent its being entertained the official English Delegate said he would not have anything to do with the proposal. I will tell you directly what was thought of its summary rejection by other members of the Conference. But, first of all, let me tell you what he said as to the other proposal, Mr. Moritz Levy's— There remains the proposal of Mr. Moritz Levy, which would involve the withdrawal of the half-sovereign. It would be equally useless for us to discuss this measure, since Great Britain would undoubtedly be unwilling to submit to the inconvenience of such a withdrawal unless it were presented in conjunction with a plan offering advantages which a preponderant majority of the Powers would recognise. In what part of his instructions had he authority to make that statement? It is all the more remarkable because I think the calling in of the half-sovereign was part of the scheme which was suggested not long ago by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer in a speech delivered in the country; and certainly no decision either of Parliament or of the Government or of the country was ever taken upon it. I have said enough as to the manner in which these instructions were carried out. What was thought of this treatment by the Delegates from other countries who were present at the Conference? They were intensely annoyed at the hostility which was shown to any of the proposals by the English Delegates. I need not repeat the quotation which has been read as to the view of M. Tirard, the French Delegate, who avowed that France was a bimetallic country, and that it was prevented from accepting bimetallism owing to the attitude of England.

SIR W. HARCOUKT

No, no.

MR. CHAPLIN

The right hon. Gentleman says "No." Then I will read to the right hon. Gentleman the declaration which was made by M. Tirard— M. Tirard declared that France was bimetallist in fact, and that if she would not resume the free coinage of silver, and if she would not go back to absolute bimetallism, it was only because England and other countries of Europe had declared in the most formal way that they intended to remain monometallic. Does the Chancellor of the Exchequer pretend for a moment to believe that there would be the slightest difference of opinion on the part of any country, unless it might possibly be Germany, with regard to accepting bimetallism if England proposed or agreed to that course herself? The right hon. Gentleman knows that there would not be a moment's hesitation. Sir William Molesworth, the Indian Delegate, was outspoken in his censure. He said— For these reasons I regret the hasty and premature action of Sir Rivers Wilson in his declaration of uncompromising hostility to the double standard as in a measure prejudging the whole case before an opportunity could be allowed for its fair discussion. The quasi-official declaration of the hon. Delegate's views (absolutely opposed, it is to be noted, to those of his colleague, Sir William Molesworth) not only precludes any advance by other Powers towards a solution of the difficulty, but places Great Britain in the invidious position of being the principal if not the sole obstacle to a satisfactory solution of the difficulties under which we labour. Then the Netherlands Delegate, M. Boissevain, said— Mr. de Rothschild's proposal has been withdrawn, and before he withdrew it we heard Sir Rivers Wilson declare in his own name and in that of Sir Charles Fremantle that,considering the proposal had not been received in a sufficiently favourable manner by the great majority of Towers represented in the Conference, the British delegation would be unable to recommend it to their Government. I think I am not mistaken in saying that this declaration and the withdrawal of Mr. de Rothschild's proposal were a great disappointment to many of us. M. Zeppa, the Italian Delegate, said— Mr. de Rothschild's scheme seemed to me to be the practical starting-point for the carrying out of these principles, although some essential modifications in it might have been necessary. Unfortunately, the declarations made at the last sitting by Sir Rivers Wilson leave us at present no hope that Great Britain will give her support to the Rothschild proposal. And so I could go on and quote a number of the Delegates, all expressing their regret at the attitude of the English Delegate and their anxiety to have come to some understanding. I think that I have said enough to justify the statement that if the Conference failed so far it is due to the attitude of England and to the official Delegates who represented her. I am hound to add that, if Sir Rivers Wilson had received from the Chancellor of the Exchequer instructions to do his utmost to break up the Conference and bring its deliberations to nothing, I do not think he could have taken an attitude more calculated to serve that purpose. I put a question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other night, and I asked him if the instructions contained in the Blue Book were all the instructions that were given to the English Delegates, and the right hon. Gentleman answered, "Yes, Sir; that is the case." I accepted, of course, to the full the statement he made, and I cannot refrain from saying that that being the case, in my deliberate judgment the attitude of the English official Delegates is deserving of the severest censure. I have endeavoured to put before the House, not dogmatically, I hope, some reasons which seem to me to lead to the conclusion that it is a matter of vital and supreme importance to the interests of this country that the Conference should meet again. I hope the Government will even yet meet the question in the same spirit. I would almost fain believe that they would be willing to accept the Motion, for great indeed will be the responsibility which rests upon them if they refuse it. Great and just will be the condemnation which will be theirs hereafter if by doing so they precipitate a situation which may bring with it confusion and destruction not only to the interests of India, but to the interests of the Empire over which they rule.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Sir W. HARCOURT,) Derby

It was a saying of Voltaire that the English shot an Admiral to encourage the others. The object of the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down is that the Delegates should return to the Conference, and you have heard the language in which he has spoken of the Delegates who are to return. I must say that a more extraordinary proceeding I have never heard of. The right hon. Gentleman and the late Chancellor of the Exchequer have stated that the British Delegates were the people who broke up the Conference. I will undertake to say that the exact opposite is the truth; that the English Delegates were the only people who prevented the Conference from separating as soon as it met.

MR. CHAPLIN

The official Delegates.

SIR W. HARCOURT

Official Delegates? I do not distinguish between the one and the other. In all International Conferences hitherto the Delegates have gone expressly to represent the opinions of the Government. The United States and Europe did not want to know the opinions of individuals; they wanted to know the opinions of the responsible Government. In my opinion, it is a totally novel and unfortunate experiment to try and balance the Delegates and to send one man to represent one set of opinions and another to represent another set of opinions. No delegation would have any influence whatever unless it spoke in the name of the Government it represented. What took place? The United States invited this Conference. It was natural that the United States should make a proposal for the Conference to consider. The French Delegates expressed some surprise at the fact that the United States did not submit a proposal to the Conference, and it seems to me that the one thing that bimetallists do not desire to do is to bring their favourite theory to the test of a proposal on which they are prepared to take issue. The representatives of the United States said they would not, in the first instance, bring for ward a bimetallic motion, but they did make a motion. The motion brought forward at the very commencement of the Conference was this—and I ask the attention of the House to it. The United States representative concluded the speech in which he introduced the programme by moving a general resolution— That, I the opinion of this Conference, it is desirable that some measures should be found for increasing the use of silver in the currency system of nations. That is the very thing which the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down and the late Chancellor of the Exchequer say they desire. It appears, from the Report of the English Delegates, that this resolution was merely a recapitulation of the terms that had been accepted by Her Majesty's Government, and accordingly Sir Rivers Wilson, on behalf of the British Delegates, at once declared that they accepted the resolution in that sense, at the same time reserving to themselves full liberty of action as to any particular proposal. They were the first persons to support the resolution relating to scheme 5 for the better use of silver, and what became of that resolution? The Delegates of almost all the Powers of Europe declined to support it, and the United States were obliged to drop it. How did the matter go on? Who had a scheme to propose to the Conference for discussion? The British Delegate, Mr. A. de Rothschild. He proposed a plan which was referred to a committee. What became of it? It was defeated in the committee by the vote of the Latin Union, and it was made known that the United States of America were opposed to it. Such was the action of the British Delegates, who, according to the right hon. Gentleman opposite, broke up the Conference. They supported the first practical motion that was brought forward, the motion before the committee for buying up more silver, and the two States that one would have thought would have principally supported the proposal — the United States and France, who are the great buyers of silver—denounced it, and voted it down. The majority of the committee even passed a resoution declaring that if the plan were adopted by the Conference the majority would be unable to recommend it to their Governments. Was that the doing of the British Delegates? It was not. It was the declaration of the representatives of the other Powers concerned. I can only believe that the right hon. Member for the Sleaford Division and the late Chancellor of the Exchequer have never read the Report. If they had they could not have so mis-stated the case. What, then, was the situation? Sir Rivers Wilson found that the proposal of the British Delegates had been defeated in the committee by the very Powers who were expected to support it, and he was informed that the United States were about to vote against it in the Conference. Naturally he did not wish to expose that proposal to a formal defeat in the Conference, and with the consent and approval of Mr. de Rothschild he said that in the circumstances he did not feel himself entitled to press it forward. It would have been absurd, in that situation, to go on with it. In spite of what the right hon. Member for Sleaford has said, bimetallism from first to last was at the bottom of the whole thing, just as it is to-night. From the very first the Delegates recognised that it would be impossible to exclude the question from the discussion at every point, and it was resolved that the speakers would be allowed to treat the whole subject from a general point of view. Thus the whole question of bimetallism was open at that time as at every other time. Then it became necessary for Sir Rivers Wilson to express his own opinion. How was it possible for him to address the Conference and not state whether he was for or against bimetallism? In my opinion, when the Government of Great Britain sends a delegation to meet the Powers of Europe at the invitation of the United States, it is the duty of that Government to let Europe and America know what views they entertain. There is no doubt, after the speech of the Prime Minister to-night, what are the views of the present Government. I do not know what Europe and America will think of the views of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. I am not sure that they will know whether he is a bimetallist or a monometallist. He told us that he wanted this Conference to meet. He condemned the Conference in the severest terms two years ago. This is what the late Chancellor of the Exchequer said on the 18th of April, 1890, when the restoration of bimetallism was quite as desirable as it is now— We are asked to convoke another Conference to see whether some International agreement cannot be arrived at. Conferences have been held, and very exhaustive Reports made, and no result has been possible. We appointed a Royal Commission, and what was the result? A divided Report; and it is certainly not upon a divided Report that we have a right to take the very responsible step of tampering with the general currency. I was not the author of the phrase "tampering with the currency as applied to bimetallism." These were his views when the right hon. Gentleman was Chancellor of the Exchequer. And then he went on to say— The argument is used that we might by general agreement adopt a bimetallic system. I have no time now to state what I think the dangers of such a course. But though you might have a Conference which would come to some agreement, I have very great doubts whether that agreement would be permanent. These were the right hon. Gentleman's opinions two years ago. What are his views now? Can anyone tell? Is that the position which, in the face of Europe and of America, the first commercial nation in the world, ought to take? No; let us be bimetallists or monometallists, but let us not take up this vacillating and shilly-shally position. Let the world know that those who have been Finance Ministers have courage and character enough to say what they think. What the opinions of Her Majesty's Government are upon this subject there is no secret about, and there never will be; but what would be the views of any Government which might take its place on a matter of such profound interest to the people of this country is quite uncertain. There was one voice in the Debate to which I have referred which unfortunately now is silent. There was no man more fit and capable of judging in these matters, and of speaking with authority upon them than the late Leader in this House of the Conservative Party — Mr. W. H. Smith. Nobody who heard it will have forgotten the speech, characterised by great practical knowledge and great practical common-sense, which was delivered by Mr. William Smith on that occasion in this House and from this place. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer made an attack upon what was said by the Prime Minister with regard to the statement of Mr. Herries, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, as to the danger of creditors calling in their money. The right hon. Gentleman ought to have remembered that that quotation from Mr. Herries was referred to by Mr. Smith upon that occasion, and this is what he said— To pass such a resolution Mr. Herries said would be the greatest of disasters to a mercantile country. It would result in this, that those entitled to demand money advanced by them would instantly require that it should be paid in the coin and currency in which the debt had been contracted. Mr. Herries pointed out that the inevitable result of such a change in the basis of mercantile transactions would be to produce a panic which would be disastrous. The right hon. Gentleman opposite said that Mr. Herries spoke in a totally different condition of our mercantile affairs and our banking system. Does the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that Mr. Smith was not acquainted with the present position of our mercantile affairs and our banking system? Mr. Smith says— I have not been able to find any evidence, either in the arguments addressed to this House or in the Report of the Commission or elsewhere, which is absolutely conclusive to show that the fall in the value of silver is necessarily connected with the fall of prices in any part of the world. Well, the late Chancellor of the Exchequer and the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down appealed to the opinion of Lord Herschell, and denied that he, on the Royal Commission, had stated that there had been no substantial appreciation of gold. This is what the Report, signed by the noble Lord, contained— We do not think there is any conclusive evidence of a substantial appreciation of gold to be derived either from a review of the variations in prices or from the circumstances relating to the production of and the use of that metal. When I am told that there is no doubt whatever about the appreciation of gold, and when I find a Report of this kind signed by, among others, Herschell, Fremantle, John Lubbock, and Leonard H. Courtney, I think I am entitled to say that the fact is not conclusively established.

MR. GOSCHEN

Will the right hon. Gentleman go on with the quotation?

SIR W. HARCOURT

There are many passages of the kind. The right hon. Gentleman does not deny that?

MR. GOSCHEN

I deny that any passage is signed by a majority of the Commission which does not acknowledge the appreciation of gold.

SIR W. HARCOURT

I have very little time at my disposal, and I do not wish to waste words upon that point. Everyone interested in the subject knows that on the Commission there were an equal number on both sides, and that this Second Report contains the passage quoted by the late Mr. Smith in this House. Let me go back again to the Conference and the charge—I repeat, the unfounded charge—which is made against the British Delegates. I am bound to say this, in consequence of the language of the right hon. Gentleman, that I was officially informed by the Delegate of the United States, when he came to England after the Conference, that they had received more support from the British Delegates than from the Dele- gates of any other States in Europe. I say that upon my responsibility, after official communication with the Delegate of the United States. Now, I should like to tell the House why the Conference failed and why it broke up, and I will tell it in the authoritative language of the Italian Delegate, who was the gentleman who moved the adjournment of the Conference. We are told that it was the British Delegates who broke up the Conference.

MR. CHAPLIN

I did not say it was the British Delegates who broke it up. I drew a distinction between the official Delegates and the others—and I named Sir R. Wilson, and I read out his instructions.

SIR W. HARCOURT

The plan of the Conference was one which was never adopted before. When the late Chancellor of the Exchequer went to Paris in 1878 he went there as a Delegate of great experience and of great authority in the name of the British Government, and how did he then treat this question? I will read to the House a sentence from the right hon. Gentleman's own Report. The right hon. Gentleman said— We ourselves considered that the impossibilities of establishing any bimetallic system by common agreement for all the world were so obvious that it was scarcely worth while to argue the matter. I hold the opinion now that the right hon. Gentleman then held. He added— We declined as also unnecessary any discussion on the general merits of the single or double standard. It would have been interesting to have heard what the right hon. Gentleman would have said if anyone had got up in this House and had spoken of his conduct, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite has spoken of Sir R. Wilson. And now I come to what I may call the official reason why the Conference failed. The Italian Delegate came forward and moved the adjournment of the Conference, and, in the course of his speech, he said— Well, gentlemen, why have we arrived at no result thus far? Because, frankly, no proposal was ripe. And the English translation hardly give an idea of the fine satire of the French phraseology. They were improvised, so to speak, for the needs of our discussion. What could we do without preparation, without precise instructions from our Governments? He meant that he regarded no proposal of any value which was not a formal proposal made by some responsible Government. He said— In these conditions an adjournment is desirable. Let us, in the first instance, give the Governments time to gain a knowledge of our discussions and of the speeches of the eminent Delegates from all countries of the world. In six months it is possible that, in returning here, we shall find ourselves face to face with more mature and more practical proposals. We have planted the fertile germ; give it time to develop and to grow. We know already that in a new meeting there will be no question of discussing principles. Our Latin ancestors said in such circumstances, 'Roma locuta est.' Now that all has been said we know with what we have to count. Each wishes to stay in his entrenchments, and we must not hope that the mono-metallists will yield any more than the bimetallists. But we know their respective tendencies, and that is a great deal. We can see clearly ahead. That was the view taken by persons who moved the adjournment of the Conference, that it was idle to come back again to discuss amateur proposals, and that if it was to do any good in the future it must have before it for discussion proposals made by some responsible Government. Well, Sir, if the Conference should be called together again by the United States, and if this condition is fulfilled, Her Majesty's Government will be perfectly ready to discuss these questions, as they have been ready to discuss them before. They will not consider only their own opinion in the matter. They will discuss, in a courteous and friendly manner, any proposals that are laid before them on the responsibility of some of the Powers. As regards the former meeting, there was no proposal laid before them, except at the end. The bimetallic proposal was discussed and withdrawn at the former meeting by the United States. It will be seen at once that if it had been put to the vote it would not have had support from any of the Powers of Europe. The condition of European opinion on this subject is described in, the Reports of the Delegates. This is the opinion of Europe— Certain countries declared themselves frankly as adherents of the monometallic faith. The Representatives of Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway were clear in their declarations that no change would be made in the gold basis of the currency of those countries. Switzerland, though a member of the Latin Union, declared explicitly that she was an unshaken adherent of the monometallic principle, and the Delegate of Austria-Hungary was equally explicit in his statement that his Government had every intention of abiding by the gold standard which they are in course of adopting. On the bimetallic side the lead was taken by the United States. The Netherlands were prepared to join a bimetallic union, provided that Great Britain formed a part of it; and Spain and Mexico were ready to adopt a bimetallism or other measures which would have the effect of raising the price of silver. No declaration of policy was made on behalf of Eussia, though one of her Delegates, speaking personally, was an active supporter of the gold standard. The Roumanian Government did not consider bimetallism a practical possibility, and Turkey and Portugal expressed no opinion. Then the Delegates say— It appeared to us that the discussions had shown such divergence of interests that there was little more prospect of an agreement after an interval of a few months. We did not, however, think it politic to oppose a wish generally entertained by the Conference, and therefore contented ourselves with expressing doubts as to the advantages to be gained from further meetings, and urged that under no circumstances should the Conference be called together again except for the consideration of a definite proposal emanating from the Government of the United States, or some other Government. Now, I venture to say that that is a very sensible and rational explanation on the part of the Delegates. They said, as the Italian Delegate had said, that it was a mere waste of time to meet without having definite proposals before them, authorised by a responsible Government. If the Government of the United States will inform the Government of this country, and the Governments of the other countries of Europe, that they are prepared on their responsibility to propose a scheme, then, of course, the Government of this country will be ready in the fairest and frankest way to discuss it, but what are we asked to do in this Motion? Are we to go and propose a scheme? If so, what scheme? We are told to-night that it is not to be bimetallism. When the adjournment of the Conference was moved it was agreed that it was not to be bimetallism, and the Italian Delegate said it was to be some scheme that did not propose a fundamental change—that if they met again it must be to discuss no scheme which would affect fundamentally the monetary system of any country. Then, what is the scheme? Has the late Chancellor of the Exchequer got a scheme? If he were now responsible, what are the instructions he gave to the Delegates? What ought to be put before the Conference? How can you ask a Government to go round the world and say, "Come to a Conference," and when they arrive there have no proposals to lay before them? If the right hon. Gentleman thinks there are any proposals which ought to be laid before the Conference, why has not he, or the right hon. Gentleman who followed him, attempted to enlighten the House and the country as to what they are? The right hon. Gentleman has questioned the attitude of Germany. The attitude of Germany rests not upon the language of the Delegates, but upon the emphatic statement of Count Caprivi, that nothing would induce Germany to depart from her monetary system. Why will not Germany depart from that system? Why — because she has seen the splendid success England has obtained under that system. Does the right hon. Gentleman suppose that Germany, having undertaken to establish a gold standard at very great expense, is now going to abandon it? What has happened? Austria-Hungary has followed her example, and all the other countries of the world are becoming monometallists, finding that in practice the system is the most sound and the most successful. Then the right hon. Gentleman opposite endeavoured at the close of his speech to alarm us on account of the terrible misfortunes that have overtaken this country since 1873. Does not the right hon. Gentleman know that in the last 20 years there has been a greater growth of the produce of the Income Tax than at any former period, and that the Probate and Death Duties, which indicate the accumulated wealth of the country, have increased to an enormous extent? Are these the effects of a false monetary system? When I hear Protectionists and bimetallists preaching these woes and sorrows and this ruin, I ask them to look at the evidences of the growth and progress of the country. Everybody deplores the present depression. I hope it is only a temporary depression, but depressions of this kind have occurred under the bimetallic system quite as much as under the monometallic system. We are told that the cotton industry is depressed, but the number of spindles and power-looms in the last 15 years has enormously increased in Lancashire. How, then, can you say that the industry is ruined? Sir, what is the avowed object of this Motion? It is to raise prices—to raise prices by an artificial system. In my opinion, a rise in prices is not an object desirable in itself. I believe, on the contrary, that cheapness is an advantage, especially to those classes of the community who have not much money to spend. The right hon. Gentleman, whom we are all glad to see again in his place to-night (Mr. A. J. Balfour), said at Manchester that, for his part, he preferred a depreciated currency, because it would raise prices. Therein lies the whole secret of bimetallism. That is the true history of bimetallism, but those are not objects which we desire. If there is a wish to summon a Conference, and to lay before it practical proposals, Her Majesty's Government will be perfectly ready, not only from motives of courtesy, but from motives of every kind, that the English Delegates shall go there. They have done everything they could to encourage its deliberations, and they will give fair, careful and courteous consideration to any proposals that are laid before the Conference. They are willing and anxious to act in that spirit. If the United States summons the Conference again the English Delegates will be perfectly prepared to go to Brussels. No doubt, if their Report is not in accordance with the views of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for the Sleaford Division (Mr. Chaplin) they will be subjected again to his invective if they do not take their instructions from him. They will, however, sit and give fair and careful consideration to any proposal submitted to them as they have done before. That is the desire of the Government, and all the Government think they are able to do. They have no proposals of their own to make; and none have been made to them from the opposite side. Under these circumstances, I think I have given the right hon. Gentleman all the assurances he ought to expect, or that we are able to give.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR (Manchester, E.)

Nobody will complain of the length of the speech just delivered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but by the inevitable lapse of time it has not left me a sufficient interval in which to discuss this question. I make no complaint that the right hon. Gentleman should have exhausted the subject, but he has left me time to contradict a statement as to my views which fell from him at the end of his speech. He quoted from an address I made at Manchester on this subject, and he interpreted my words as if I had stated that in my view the best possible currency was a currency where a portion decreased in value, with prices therefore steadily rising. I said, if not precisely the reverse of that, something entirely inconsistent with that. I said the currency reform to which I would put my hand would be the establishment of a stable standard of value, but if in the fallibility of human endeavour, if in the difficulties in carrying out our intentions, we had to choose between the standard which appreciated and the standard which depreciated, then I thought the whole experience of the world showed that of these two evils—of these two great evils if you will—a depreciating standard was the less. Having corrected that misrepresentation of the right hon. Gentleman, I will only say that his speech, though it did not contribute, and was not intended to contribute, very largely to the speculative basis of any opinions we ought to form upon this question, at all events made the attitude of the Government perfectly clear. Our position, therefore, is this. We live in a time when, according to the opinions of the Commission—and this is a Government that believes in Commissions—in the opinion of the Commission, at the head of which sat their own Lord Chancellor, on whose opinion on currency matters they have so much confidence that they have also made him Chairman of the Commission now sitting upon the Indian aspect of the question—in the opinion of that Com- mission falling prices were due to appreciation in currency, and the appreciation of currency carried with it grave evils. That was the opinion of the Commission. It is certain that among these evils is the condition of things in India, which is so perplexing to yourselves that you have to appoint a Commission to look after it—a Commission which has not yet reported, and which, so far as I can discover, is not likely to report. You have a condition of things in which at any moment the confusion already introduced into our finances by the alteration of the standard of money may be largely augmented by the legislative action of the United States, over which we have no control, and over which we have no title to interfere. It is also certain, in the opinion of the Commission, that these evils might be mitigated by some International agreement which would add greater stability to the standard of value. Under these circumstances, with all these evils threatening us, the Government have determined to do nothing. Now, Sir, those who vote for this Motion do not vote for bimetallism. They neither vote for bimetallism nor for any other specific scheme for dealing with the matter. They do recognise the great evils that arise from the present condition of our currency; they do regard the change in the value of that currency, or rather the change of the standard of value, as carrying with it very serious consequences to all productive trades, and they therefore think that this Conference should be encouraged by the Government, in the hope of finding some remedy by which these great evils could be remedied. Under these circumstances, I have no doubt whatever in which direction I should give the vote I am about to record.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 148; Noes 229.—(Division List, No. 15.)

Words added.

Main Question, as amended, put, and agreed to. Resolved, That, seeing that the deliberations of the International Monetary Conference mainly turned on the question of bimetallism; that after protracted sittings no agreement could be arrived at by the representatives of the assembled Powers; and that any interference with the single monetary standard now by Law established in this Country is open to the gravest objections, this House thinks it inexpedient that the Government should take any steps to procure the re-assembly of that Conference.