§
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £1,797,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expense of the Personnel for Shipbuilding, Repairs, and Maintenance, including the cost of Establishments of Dockyards and Naval Yards at Home and Abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1894.
§ MR. HANBURY (Preston)said, the Notice ho had on the Paper for a reduction of the Vote applied particularly to salaries and allowances for the dockyards, and he proposed to limit himself to that subject, and not to go into the general question of shipbuilding. He did not quite know why the Admiralty had put down Vote 8 out of its proper order, unless it was that they wanted money. He rather fancied they had been running very close in that respect, and he hoped they would not for the third time this Session plead the necessities of the Public Service in order to justify the application of the Closure. If the Government desired to avoid lengthy discussions upon the Vote they should give the Committee the fullest information which it was in their power to give upon the different matters which 1221 the Vote dealt with. This year, however, the Government had thought it right to give the most meagre information with regard to those matters, and ordinary.Members of the House of Commons, as well as the.English public, were kept in complete ignorance of what was going on in our various dockyards, and had no means of gaining information in regard to a Vote such as this. It was very different in the United States, where the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty usually published a large volume, which gave everybody a full and clear idea of what was being done. The Navy Estimates Committee which sat five years ago, and whose proceedings were recorded in a Blue Book, elicited some very valuable information, but most of that information had since become obsolete; and he hoped that next year, in order to save the time of the House, the Government would agree to the appointment of another Select Committee on the Navy Estimates, so that hon. Members might obtain all the information they desired as to the Votes. In the present year a good deal of attention had been devoted to the question of labour in the dockyards, and this fuller knowledge was consequently all the more desirable. But to return to the branch of the subject to which his Notice of reduction more particularly applied. At the time when evidence was given before the Committee, to which lie had already referred, Professor Elgar was the Director of Dockyards, and he was evidently impressed with the idea that a great deal might be accomplished to improve the conditions under which work was done in the dockyards.
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHWould not the question of labour in the dockyards be properly discussed on another branch of the Vote—on Sub-head B?
§ MR. HANBURYreplied that the item "salaries and allowances" included labour, and he submitted that he was perfectly within his right in referring to the Director of Dockyards. He did not propose to trench on Section B. Professor Elgar recommended one or two reforms, and he would like to know what effect had been given to the recommendations? For instance, he suggested that contract ships should leave the contractors' yards as nearly ready for sea as 1222 possible. Certain vessels for the Australian Squadron had been sent out from the contractors' yards almost ready for sea, with the exception, of course, of their guns and stores, and he desired to know if the same plan was being adopted in regard to all contract built ships? The old system had the further disadvantage that it made it wholly impossible to draw a comparison between ships built in dockyards and those constructed in private yards. There was evidence that the cost of ships built in the dockyards was enormously increased, owing to the time spent in obtaining their guns and gun-mountings, and also through constant changes which were made in the designs after the vessels were commenced. This could not happen in private yards. Ho hoped that in future more forethought would be shown, that guns and gun-mountings would be ready directly they were required, and that designs of ships would not be tinkered with and altered from day to day. He trusted, too, that the present Director of Dockyards was of the same opinion as the late Director on these points. Another matter which, in his view, ought to be brought more directly under the eye of the Director of Dockyards was the amount of unnecessary repairs to ships. There ought to be proper means for making a fair comparison between the cost of a ship built in a dockyard and the price of a similar ship built in a private yard. To do this a hard-and-fast line would have to be drawn between shipbuilding and repairs, and they would have to separate the charges for clerical work and for police which were not borne by a private yard. The men in the dockyards ought to be spurred on by competition. He was afraid that there was a good deal of old and obsolete machinery in the dockyards, which would not have been retained in private yards for a single year, and which hampered the men in the efficient performance of their work; and this ought to be got rid of. In private yards the sub-division of labour was far more complete, and in this respect, again, the Government yards were at a great disadvantage. Professor Elgar had pointed out that one great obstacle to cheap building was to be found in the personal qualifications of the general officers of the dockyards, who did not show the energy and administra- 1223 tive ability which was displayed in the case of managers of many private yards. Even if there were competition between one dockyard and another, and between private yards and the dockyards, they would be hampered by the fact that all the Government officials at the Dockyards were a close Corporation, and men were set to do work there for which they were in no way qualified. In the ease of a private yard the designs were drawn out at the Admiralty, and the Admiralty sent down a man to see that the designs were carried out, the building and designing being kept entirely distinct. The Naval Constructor was not in any way responsible for the building of the vessel, the designing and building being kept entirely separate, and the same principle ought to obtain in the dockyards. But nothing of the kind happened there, and the result was very unsatisfactory, because it led to frequent changes in the designs. Another evil which followed from that close corporation was that young men from the Naval College, after having been in the dockyard five years, were qualified to take the rank of foremen; and thus men who had no real practical knowledge, and were, in fact, only scientific designers, replaced practical foremen. The late Director of Dockyards was of opinion that these men, being a close Corporation, got too much into the way of a machine, and ships were kept waiting in consequenee. The fact was that there ought to be one man, totally distinct from the designing, who ought to be as responsible for the building of a ship as a similar official in a private yard. He hoped that some such system would prevail in the future. He now can e to the question of salaries —Sub-head A. With regard to Admiral Superintendents, it would, he admitted, seem at first sight that an Admiral was the last man who would be qualified to build a ship. No doubt the hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for East-bourne (Admiral Field) believed an Admiral to be qualified to do anything in connection with a ship. In these matters he felt we had gone too far. We had gone, in fact, to a ridiculous extent in employing Artillery officers in the Ordnance Department, for instance. He had, however, come round at last to the conclusion that Admiral Superintendents were necessary, because in the dockyards 1224 they had to deal with the question of ships' stores as well as repairs to ships, and Admirals were better qualified than civilians to deal with such matters. But he could not see any reason for maintaining the Department of Staff Captains. Five years ago the Director of Dockyards told them that that Department was wholly unnecessary. The sole employment of these officials seemed to be to see after the mooring of vessels; and he really could not understand why for that purpose such an expensive establishment should be kept up. Next, he wished to call attention to the large number of salaried men upon the Vote. Salaries and allowances amounted to £162,000, which was a growth of nearly £4,000 since last year; but, instead of increasing, this Vote ought to diminish. The number of men with salaries was 15 per cent, of the whole, and it was out of all proportion to the number of salaried men in private yards. If the supervision in the dockyards were perfect, something might be said in favour of the system; but Professor Elgar, the late Director of Dockyards, said that the work which was inefficient was the supervision, which was done principally by salaried men, whereas in private yards the supervision was done by men with wages. The argument in favour of salaried men was that they would have no personal interest in overtime; but there was no connection between the two matters. The large number of salaried men caused not only inefficiency, but a great deal of discontent and heart-burning on the part of the men who received wages. That was the opinion of Professor Elgar. Another subject to which he wished to direct attention was one which affected, unfortunately, other Departments of the Public Service, and that was that of money-lending in the dockyards. At the Enfield factory it was put a stop to by the Secretary of State for War two years ago, when it was found that the men who were testing the materials were, by reason of loans, to a large extent under the control of the very men whose work they had to test, and in consequence work was passed which ought not to have been passed. This money-lending system was most mischievous, and many cases had come before the County Court Judge at Sheerness, who 1225 recently made some startling remarks in granting a debtor an administration order, stating that
This money-lending business was the curse of the dockyard business at Sheerness,and hewished the dockyard authorities had no moneylenders in their establishment.He hoped the Admiralty would do its best to put an end to this most vicious system. Another question he had to deal with was that of houses in the dockyards. On that, too, Professor Elgar had expressed a strong opinion, because he felt the existing system tended to create trouble. He thought houses ought not to be provided in the dockyards for any but the chief officials, and it would be infinitely better if the houses were done away with, and a fair allowance made in lieu of them. A much more important question was whether there were too many dockyards. Dr. Elgar had very strongly expressed the opinion that some of the dockyards were superfluous, and had suggested that even Pembroke was unnecessary. The dockyard to which, however, lie made special reference was Sheerness, which cost between £60,000 and £70,000 a year. This was, he believed, only a repairing yard. [Mr. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN: No!] However that might be, Professor Elgar, who was trained in the dockyard, said he could see no advantage in having both Sheerness and Chatham, and the cost of Chatham would not be increased by doing away with Sheerness.
ADMIRAL FIELD (Sussex, Eastbourne)Sheerness would be useful for the purposes of mobilisation in the case of war.
§ MR. HANBURYsaid, that that might strengthen the argument in favour of the maintenance of the dockyard; but Professor Elgar was speaking of it as an establishment in time of peace, and he (Mr. Hanbury) thought they had yet to be convinced that the remaining dock-yards might not be sufficient for mobilisation in time of war.
§ COMMANDER BETHELLWhen were these opinions expressed? Was it not just after Professor Elgar had been appointed Director of Dockyards?
§ MR. HANBURYsaid, the opinions were expressed in 1888, and Professor 1226 Elgar was appointed in 1885. So he had had three years' experience.
§ SIR E. REED (Cardiff)He was educated in the dockyard?
§ MR. HANBURY, continuing, said, that showed he had had very considerable experience, and yet he declared he could see no advantage in having both Sheerness and Chatham, and the establishment charge of £80,000 a year might well be saved. He came next to another dockyard, about which Professor Elgar said he would like someone to tell him what was the reason for its existence. He referred to Haulbowline. [Nationalist cries of "Oh!" and groans.]>He fully expected those groans; but in these matters political considerations ought not to exist, either as regarded labour, or as to the number of dockyards which ought to be maintained. Perhaps some of the hon. Members below the Gangway would give reasons for maintaining that dockyard, which really had never been completed. He had only one further comment to make. Dockyards ought to be kept for National purposes, and not used, directly or indirectly, for gaining votes for any particular Party, as he was afraid had been the case in the past, and as had recently been admitted to be the case in French dockyards. He hoped that in future such considerations would not be allowed to influence the policy of the Government. Certainly most of the dockyard seats were held by supporters of the present Administration, and he hoped the result would be that plenty of work would be given to the dockyards, so that sufficient employment would be found for the men, and they would have no repetition of those complaints of idleness for which there had been so much cause of complaint in recent years. Now that the Government had every reason for giving good work to the dockyards, he hoped they would not allow the old tendencies of Liberal Governments to prevail, but would do their best to keep the Navy up to the high standard of efficiency which was maintained by the late Government, and which certainly had the effect of raising the reputation of the late Government very highly in the opinion of the country.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Item A, Salaries, be reduced by £1,000."—(Mr. Hanbury.)
1227§ *LORD G. HAMILTON (Middlesex, Ealing)I understand that the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. E. Robertson) proposes, on the next sub-section of this Vote, to make a statement with regard to certain alterations respecting the pay of the various branches of employés in the dockyards. If he does that, it is quite clear that the discussion will naturally drift to the important question of what wages are, and will be, at the dockyards. I am anxious, before we get to that subject, to raise the question of the shipbuilding policy of the Government. I have placed an Amendment on the Notice Paper for the purpose of specially calling attention to that part of the Vote which relates to new shipbuilding; but this part of the Vote applies to the salaries of all the officers who are interested in the superintendence of new construction; and, therefore, I think it will economise time if I take this opportunity of speaking to the Amendment of my hon. Friend. The two great branches of Naval Expenditure which always require special attention in this House is that which relates to the provision of men and officers, and that which concerns the provision of material. As far as the first great branch is concerned, the present Board of Admiralty have, I believe, done their best to give effect to the policy of the late Board, and I have no complaint whatever to make on that point, except that I think they have taken scarcely sufficient funds. But when I pass to the shipbuilding programme, particularly that part of it which relates to the new scheme, I am bound to say I am more than confirmed in the opinion I have already expressed on two occasions that Her Majesty's Government have taken insufficient funds this year for the accomplishment of the object in view. I stated that they were at least £200,000 short of the total amount, and only to-day we have Papers distributed to us which show that my estimate was a correct one, because they contain the striking announcement that the laying down of one of the few big ships Her Majesty's Government proposed to lay down this year, and which really form the mainstay of the shipbuilding programme, is to be postponed. I was somewhat sceptical at the time as to the accuracy of the statement made by the Secretary to the Admiralty (Sir U. Kay-Shuttle- 1228 worth) that they are spending more this year than last year. I have since investigated the matter, and find that he is in error. Of course, it is not of much importance, but it is material in showing that the Financial Secretary is under an erroneous impression. Pages 174 and 175 of the Estimates show that the total amount of new construction for 1893–4 is £2,398,606, whilst the amount last year was £2,443,321, showing an excess over the provision this year of £45,000. When we turn to the next item, "reconstruction and repairs"—and the two classes of expenditure must go together—we find that the amount last year was £901,000, against £796,000 this year, showing a diminution of £105,000. There is thus a total deficiency of £150,000, compared with the provision of the preceding year. My complaint of the present Board of Admiralty is not merely that the funds they have provided are insufficient, but that they have shown an indecision and a procrastination in making up their minds as to what they are going to do, which is, perhaps, worse than the other fault. The present Board have been good enough to speak in commendatory terms of the policy of the late Board, and to inform the House that they are carrying out their policy. That is not the case, and I think that if a steady reversal of the policy of the preceding Government is going on the sooner the fact is known the better. I must ask the Committee to allow me to speak at some little length on this point, because I regard this as the most important Debate we have had on shipbuilding since the introduction of the Naval Defence Act. The principle which underlays that Act was! that the naval strength of this country should be equivalent to the combined strength of any two foreign Navies. That was no new principle. Various First Lords of the Admiralty expressed that opinion before I did, but none of them took practical steps to carry it out. The policy assented to by Parliament in that Act was that, hereafter, the expenditure on the Navy should be conducted in accordance with a certain standard, and not be controlled by the personal vagaries of those who happen to be in Office, or the casual financial exigencies of the moment. The standard was to be based on the wants of the country, which were to 1229 be regulated by the expenditure on foreign Navies. The obligation to maintain the Navy at a strength equal to the establishment of two foreign countries did not come to an end with the Naval Defence Act of 1889. That Act was merely the form in which effect was given to the principle. After consultation with the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, we came to a decision as to the number of fresh ships it was necessary to at once add to the Navy for the purpose of bringing it up to the required standard. We charged that amount to the Consolidated Fund. We kept upon the Estimates which were annually presented to Parliament the amount which, in our judgment, was necessary to make good the wear and tear of the establishments, and also to meet any of the augmented expenditure which might be sanctioned by foreign countries. The policy to which the late House of Commons gave its ready assent, and to which, I believe, this House of Commons would give its assent, was that the sum of money annually necessary to meet the waste of the Navy should be sacred from the attacks of the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Treasury of the day. The Naval Defence Act was a warning to him that that was the last branch of expenditure which in times of depression ought to be attacked. The Naval Defence Act was much criticised by gentlemen opposite; but I think no one will deny its great success. My hon. Friend the Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury)—who has, I think, always been an impartial critic of Naval Administration and Expenditure—has expressed the opinion that the principles laid down in that Act have been carried out efficiently and economically. We contended when the Act was introduced that it would result in a rapid and continuous progress of construction; that it would prevent ill-considered alterations in design, and would lead to a much closer adherence to the Estimates than was the case under the older and more dilatory system. Those expectations have been realised. No doubt there has been an increase of our original Estimates, but they can be easily and satisfactorily explained. The total excess over the sum allotted by the Naval Defence Act to shipbuilding is £1,127,000; but, on the other hand, there has been a saving of £442,000, 1230 making the total excess £685,610. That excess was not due to misapplication or improvident Estimates. During the operation of the Naval Defence Act, the wages of dockyard artificers were considerably raised, and consequently an expenditure of £170,000 was incurred. We also had to provide a sum of £150,000 to meet the provision of boats and small craft attached to big vessels. That class of expenditure had never before been included in new construction; but, inasmuch as the Naval Defence Act contemplated that the ships mentioned in it were to be fully equipped and completed for sea, the Auditor and Controller General had held that the cost of those boats must be provided under the Act. Deducting these two unforeseen excesses, the total excesses came to only £365,000, and for that we gained an advantage in the increased size of the older vessels. I think we may fairly say that the fact that there is an excess of only £365,000 on a gross expenditure of £21,000,000 reflects great credit on the permanent officials of the Admiralty. The work under the Naval Defence Act was largely diminished in 1892. That was a somewhat critical period in the shipbuilding history of this country. Unfortunately, in that year a General Election took place, and a change occurred. The new Hoard of Admiralty, no doubt, found themselves in a position of some difficulty. They had to master a large number of complicated facts, ranging over several years. They had, moreover, the misfortune to have to deal with several serious accidents which befel several of the larger ships of the Navy, and their attention was naturally distracted by these accidents, and by the Court Martials which followed. They had a further disadvantage, in which I fully sympathise, for they had to deal with a Chancellor of the Exchequer having a falling Revenue without having any Act of Parliament behind them to protect them. At the beginning of 1892, I was urged by several of my naval friends to try an elaborate and fresh scheme of naval shipbuilding, for the purpose of gradually taking the place of that which was then lapsing. I felt, however, it would be hardly proper to undertake such a task on the eve of a General Election. If that Election had gone favourably for the Government of the day, we should 1231 have been able to elaborate our own scheme, and to push it on with rapidity. If, on the other hand, the Election had gone against us, and a great scheme had been left for our successors to deal with, they might fairly and legitimately have said that they could hardly make themselves responsible for a scheme in which they had not been consulted about, the whole expenditure of which they would have to bear. Accordingly, I abstained from laying before the House any large scheme. I made the most careful investigations, however, as to what was necessary, and I laid before the House a modest programme, for the purpose of making good for one year only the wear and tear of the Fleet. The following is the language in which I described that programme in a Memorandum I laid before the House:—
The new programme commencing modestly comprising at present only three battleships and 10 torpedo boats, but in the course of the next 12 months I propose to extend and elaborate a much larger scheme for submission to Parliament next year, so that the material may be bought and the arrangements made for a fresh start early in 1893-4.Before I left Office I placed on record, both privately and publicly, what were the intentions of the late Board of Admiralty. Those intentions wore to lay down three fresh battleships in the year just terminated, and to lay down two more in the present year. The present Board of Admiralty have been in Office for a considerable period. During that period they have had plenty of opportunity of elaborating their plans, and laying before Parliament their shipbuilding scheme. I am bound to say that, making all allowances for the difficulties they have had to encounter, singularly little work has been done in the 12 months. I was anxious not to embarrass my successors in embarking on any expenditure which the Estimate I left behind me would not meet; but the Board of Admiralty of the late Government were absolutely unanimous in the opinions at which they arrived. These opinions were that the number of battleships I proposed for last year and this year were the minimum necessary to keep the Fleet up to the strength which the Board had fixed. I cannot admit that any change of opinion has occurred since on the part of my old Naval Colleagues; and if there has been any 1232 change of policy, it must be owing to the change of Government, and to the fact that there is a different civilian clement now associated with the First Lord of the Admiralty. It is a very difficult task to adjust and dovetail a new shipbuilding programme into an old one. It is sound policy to try and keep your expenditure from year to year as even as possible, and to keep the dockyards at the same level with as few fluctuations as possible. Therefore, to fit a new shipbuilding programme into an old one requires a great deal of care, and the closest possible supervision of details; and unless this is done, and a scheme is mapped out for years to come, inevitable financial disturbance would subsequently occur, and will result either in wholesale discharges at the dockyards or in very large increase of the Estimates. I looked very carefully into the weak parts of our Navy, and I found that a great addition which the Naval Defence Act had made to the strength of the Navy had given us a superiority as far as cruisers were concerned. But foreign nations had laid down a very considerable number of battleships; and it was necessary, if we wished to keep pace with them, that we should add considerably to the number of battleships we are building. I also found that we are short of torpedo boats, and that the number of small crafts we possessed contrasted very unfavourably with those of certain foreign nations. I proposed, as far as I could, to remedy these deficiencies by laying down the battleships I have mentioned, and by placing orders for the provision of a certain number of torpedo boats. Twelve months have elapsed since the present Board of Admiralty came into Office. I do not know whether they are aware how invaluable that time would have been had proper use been made of it. As it is, the result of nothing material having been done—no doubt from the causes I have mentioned—has been unquestionably to put us in this position: that unless a strong and determined effort is now made in two or three years our supremacy will undoubtedly be endangered, and certainly wholesale discharges will have to take place at the dockyards. It has often been said that our strength is so great that the loss of a ship or two is immaterial, and that we can afford to pass it by without making immediate efforts 1233 to replace it. If the Committee will be good enough to give me their attention, I think I shall be able to show that this is altogether an illusion. I made a most careful analysis before I left the Admiralty of the strength of the British Navy and of the Foreign Naval Powers, and we were fortunate enough to arrive at the unanimous decision as to the different classes of vessels at home and abroad for the purpose of accurate analysis and comparison. That classification was the basis of the statement I made in 1892-3, and I assume it is still in force, because I cannot believe that any change of Government could in any way have resulted in the repudiation of the classification unanimously accepted by the experts when I was at the Admiralty. Taking that classification we found that, so far as second-class cruisers and smaller vessels are concerned, we have an unquestioned superiority over the combined vessels of any two Towers. When we come to first-class cruisers and armoured cruisers we have a slight superiority over the combined forces of any two Powers. But the essential part of the matter, and that on which our superiority depends, is the relation in which our battleships stand to other battleships. Nothing has been more clearly proved by that distinguished naval writer Captain Mahon, and nothing is more clearly accepted by naval men of all countries than that, comparatively speaking, little damage can be done to the commerce of any nation as long as its fighting power is supreme at sea. But let it once lose that battle for supremacy at sea, and the loss cannot in any way be compensated by any number of cruisers. Therefore it is most essential, when we talk of our strength as compared with that of foreign nations, that we should be perfectly clear in regard to the vessels which will have to bear the brunt of the fray. Taking the coast-defence vessels, and comparing them with those of the two most powerful naval nations, Russia and France, we find ourselves in a position of inferiority. Then we come to second-class and first-class battleships. I am in a difficulty in dealing with them, because I cannot allude to documents of a confidential character. But Lord Brassey is good enough to give to the public an annual which is of very great value, and which 1234 is extremely accurate and carefully done. I will take the battleships of England, France, and Russia, as given by Lord Brassey, for the purpose of emphasising my argument that at present we have not that superiority in battleships which many people imagine. We undertook that in 1894there should be a superiority; but what we have now to look at is not 1894-5, but the years subsequent to that date, and it is from that point of view that I ask the Committee to allow me to somewhat closely analyse the figures. Lord Brassey, on pages 202 to 204 of this year's Naval Annual, gives the present number of first-class battleships belonging to England at 35, whilst France's number is 16, and Russia's 11. In the case of second-class battleships England has 13, against 14 for France, and four for Russia. I agree with the numbers, but I differ altogether from the classification. If the classification be an accurate one, and according to most modern ideas, a very large reduction has at once to be made in the assumed superiority of first-class English battleships. There are certain criteria by which first-class battleships are to be judged. They must have great offensive and defensive power, and the offensive power should consist of speed and powerful armament, and the tendency of modern times is to attach more importance to secondary or subsidiary armament than to guns of a large calibre, because the rapidity of fire of the smaller guns is such that their fire can be concentrated into any given area with great effect. For the purpose of defence the vessel should be defended by armour, affording protection both to the hull, guns and gunners. Vessels deficient in these attributes cannot be classified as first-class battleships. I have, therefore, in the first place, out of the list of 35, taken the five échélon turret ships, Agamemnon, Ajax, Inflexible, Edinburgh, and Colossus. Three of these vessels are very slow, and none of them have any subsidiary armament which is in any way protected; and when we look at their fighting qualities, compared with those of other vessels of later date, it is impossible to classify them as first-class modern battleships. Then we have to deduct four more, the Devastation, Thunderer, Dreadnought, and Vulture, all excellent vessels of their time, but 1235 which, again, are somewhat antiquated in their disposition of armaments, and none of which have any subsidiary armaments. Then there are three more, the Alexander, Superb, and Téméraire, two of which were excellent broadside vessels at the date at which they were built; but, so far as their armaments are concerned, they have muzzle-loaders some 15 years old; and the third is another powerful cruiser which did not come within the first-class. These three vessels certainly ought not to come in the category of first-class modern battleships. In addition to these 12 has to be added the Victoria, which was recently lost. If you deduct these 13 vessels from the 35 here enumerated, you only get 22 as the present total number of first-class battleships appertaining to England which are both built and being built. I apply exactly the same test to the French and Russian ships. Out of the list of 16 French ships given by Lord Brassey, only one, the Redoubtable, can be struck out. That brings the first-class battleships of France to 15; and applying the same test to the Russian vessels, there is only one that can be eliminated from the 11—namely, Peter the Great, leaving 10 first-class belonging to Russia; so that we find, applying an accurate classification and test to the battleships belonging to the chief Powers, that England has only 22 as against 15 for France and 10 for Russia, making a combined total for the two Powers of 25 against our 22. Of course, these 12 vessels which I have taken out of the category of first-class battleships can be added to the list of second-class battleships; and the result of my calculations, which formed the basis of my Estimates last year, is that, whilst our second-class battleships and coast-defence vessels may be put on an equality with the second-class battleships and coast-defence vessels of the two Powers, we are three short as regards first-class battleships, comparing the number at our disposal with those of two Powers in combination. How is it that we are three battleships short? For this simple reason: The present Board of Admiralty declined to commence two battleships which the late Admiralty Board added, and we have lost the Victoria. If the policy of the late Board had been carried out, and we had not lost the Victoria, we should only 1236 just have had an equality of 25 battleships compared with the two combined Powers; but as our ships were larger, and we build more rapidly, we might say we had a certain superiority. But a further division has to be made in the battleships. At the present moment we have this disadvantage: Out of the 22 vessels, we have 19 either afloat or in the last stage of revision, while France has 10 and Russia five in that condition. The weakness of our position is that, while those Powers have 10 vessels building, we have only three. Therefore, unless the present Board of Admiralty set to work resolutely and increase the number of battleships proposed to be laid down, in two or three years we shall be in a position of inferiority. I do not know whether this is intentional or not, but the action or inaction of the Board has not been in accordance with their statements in Parliament. Lord Spencer, in his statement, enumerated the reasons which influenced him in laying down new ships in 1893-4. He said—In 1893–4 it is proposed to lay down in the dockyards some new ships in order to maintain the strength of the Navy with a due regard to the ships in course of construction by other Naval Powers, and to the actual waste which goes on in our own ships.Since that Memorandum was written the Victoria has been lost, and questions have been put both in this House and in the House of Lords as to whether it is the intention of the Government to replace that ship. The reply in each case has been that our margin of superiority is such that it is not necessary to take notice of a single ship. But we have no superiority; and if the principle is to make good actual waste, how much more necessary is it to replace a ship that has suddenly disappeared. What is going on abroad? There has been an increase in the French Estimates this year of £675,000 for construction and repairs, and Russia is spending £160,000 more than last year; but our Estimates under this head are £150,000 less than last year. Therefore, it is self-evident that Lord Spencer has not adhered to the reasons given by him as influencing his shipbuilding policy, and that we are most unquestionably going backward. Among the Papers issued to-day is one giving the designs of two cruisers, and it is stated at the close of the Paper that it is 1237 not proposed to go on with one of them this year. Why? £57,000 was taken in these Estimates for the purpose of commencing that cruiser. The reason is that the money is wanted for something else.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONThe reason given is that during the present financial year it is intended to advance more rapidly than was at first intended the construction of 14 new torpedo-boat destroyers provided in the programme. [Sir U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH: Hear, hear!] But I am afraid these new torpedo-boat destroyers were not to be commenced until some of the ships which had preceded them had been completed, tried, and tested. Have they been tested? No; therefore, it is perfectly clear that this is a mere reason to cover the position taken up at the beginning of the year by the Admiralty.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONI have a right to assume that the Admiralty mean what they say. I have aright to assume that when the Admiralty published Estimates, which for mouths were on the Table of the House, they intended to adhere to them. What is the amount taken for each of the torpedo-boats? £3,000, and it is intended to spend a little more than £3,000.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONThe words that are used are that these vessels will be advanced somewhat more rapidly, and I assume from that that a somewhat larger expenditure will be incurred than this £3,000, which does not in any way meet the sum which is taken from the new constructions, and which I do not believe will be altogether devoted to the more rapid construction of these vessels.
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHsaid, the intention of the Government was what might easily have been inferred from the Taper laid before Parliament—namely, to devote what was saved from postponing one of the cruisers to pushing on more rapidly these torpedo boats.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONThe right hon. Gentleman has been good enough, to give me the latest form of the Estimates. In these there is a statement relating to these 14 vessels, and it appears that, the orders for these vessels have not yet been placed. I understood—and I think the Financial Secretary will not contradict me—that these vessels were not to be placed out until a trial had been made of the vessels laid down last year. Am I correct?
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHThe noble Lord is speaking under an entire misapprehension. It is intended at once—and the first steps have already been taken—to place these orders. It is necessary to push on these torpedo destroyers rather than the second of the new cruisers, and the money proposed to be spent this year upon one new cruiser will be spent upon these torpedo-destroyers.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONWait until the end of the financial year, and I think it will be then found that £57,000 will not be entirely absorbed by the torpedo boats to which the right hon. Gentleman alludes. But I have not yet done with the finances of the Admiralty. The Howe, is being repaired night and day. I believe the Estimate for her repairs is very large—I assume £40,000 or £50,000. Where does that money come from? There is no provision whatever in the Estimates for repairs to the Howe; therefore, the money must be taken from some other purpose for which it has been appropriated and devoted to another purpose not stated in the Estimates. When the Naval Defence Act was under discussion my hon. Friends on this side the House will recollect that one of the arguments used by gentlemen who sat on that (the Government) side of the House was that they should not take away from Parliament the control over the Naval Expenditure. All the gentlemen who made use of that argument were, as a rule, ex-Treasury officials, and what they meant by Parliamentary control was Treasury interference. Just let us contrast the position the House is in with regard to these Estimates with the position it was in as regards the Estimates prepared under the Naval Defence Act. In every single case under the Naval Defence Act it was necessary to lay before them full details of all designs of 1239 ships before the House would assent to and give sanction to their commencement and prosecution, and every year there was an exact statement made with regard to every single vessel, and the expenditure once sanctioned could not be appropriated to any other purpose whatever. After the Admiralty had been a year in Office they proposed to transfer the expenditure, according to the statement of the Financial Secretary, to one cruiser to take the place of the battleships. We gave way as regards the battleship; and the Board of Admiralty having laid down that it was absolutely essential five battleships should be commenced in the two financial years, the present Board of Admiralty converted that five into three, and two cruisers, and now one is converted into a torpedo-boat. It seems to me that the Board of Admiralty have not thoroughly known their own mind, and an indecision and vacillation have characterised their proceedings which, I am afraid, will be very detrimental to the Dockyard Establishments. Now, Sir, let me recapitulate what changes have taken place since the late Board of Admiralty left. We proposed to lay down three battleships last year. One only has been laid down. Two battleships, it was arranged, were to be commenced in November last, and the present Board postponed this undertaking until March. Since then they have postponed the other two battleships, which, I believe, have not been commenced yet, and to-day we got very good designs of two new battleships—the Majestic and the Magnificent—which were practically assented to in all their main features 12 months ago, and when I left the Admiralty I placed it on record that these designs would be ready in three months. If the Admiralty considered it necessary to begin three battleships last year and two this year, why have they delayed this necessary work? If these designs had been presented to Parliament earlier, of course the ships would have been commenced earlier. A large sum is taken in these Estimates for the commencement and construction of the Magnificent. Does the Financial Secretary think that money will be spent? The amount is £180,000, and in order to spend that money the vessel ought to have been commenced in the summer months, when the working hours 1240 are longer. April, May, June, July, and August have passed over, and, as far as I am informed, that vessel has not been commenced yet. You will not, therefore, be able to spend that money, which can be appropriated to other services, which was not the case under the Naval Defence Act. Looking through the Estimates, I can come to no other conclusion than that the Board of Admiralty took insufficient funds in the first instance. This is a year of great financial depression, and I think they have had the heavy hand of the Treasury upon them, and have been compelled to divert sums from their original purpose. This is a somewhat technical matter; but there is another branch of the subject which may, perhaps, interest gentlemen present even more than that I have already mentioned, and that is, what will be the result of this delay and procrastination upon the Dockyard Establishments? I will leave my right hon. Friend (Mr. Forwood) to deal with this subject, because he has made a calculation with reference to every detail of every ship which it is proposed to lay down. The Committee will bear in mind that new constructions vary very much in the proportion of material and the amount of labour they require in the different stages. The new ships, in the first stage of construction, require a large amount of material and employ a small amount of labour. In the middle stage the material corresponds to the labour, but in the final stage a small amount of material employs a large amount of labour. If the Committee will look at page 174 of the Estimates, I can there make my meaning and contention very clear to them. Roughly speaking, the wages of an artificer in the dockyards amount to about £70 or £75 a year. I will take it at £70, because that is a convenient figure. If you divide £100,000 of wages by 70 it gives 1,450 men. If the Committee will bear those figures in mind, they will see that the total amount of new constructions, so far as payment of labour is concerned, is £833,000. If £100,000 of wages employs 1,450 men, £833,000 will employ about 12,000 men, and these 12,000 men constitute the great bulk of the Dockyard Establishment. Of these 13,000 men and of these wages of £833,000, 10,000 1241 man or £697,000, are engaged in the final stages of the work of the ships under the Naval Defence Act, and £136,000, or 2,000 men, are employed on new constructions as to which I am blaming the Admiralty for not more rapidly advancing. If the Committee will look at the third column, they will see the amount of material which has been issued in order to employ these men. They will see that £300,000 of material employs 10,000 men in the final stage, and that an issue of —290,000—which is practically almost the same amount—only employs 2,000 men in the first stage of shipbuilding. Next year nearly the whole of your labour will be taken out of the category of completed ships and put in the first category—that of commencing ships. I have made a calculation, and I find that only 2,000 men out of 10,000 are employed under the Naval Defence Act, and can be employed in that work, and that 8,000 men, or £500,000, will have to be transferred to the other stage of shipbuilding—namely, the construction. These 8,000 men, representing in wages £500,000, require at least £1,000,000 worth of material to keep them in employment, and the inevitable result will be, either there will have to be wholesale discharges of dockyard men or the bills for materials must run up by hundreds of thousands of pounds. I am not making this statement hastily. My right hon. Friend and I have had a great deal of experience in dockyard matters, and we were compelled during the time we were at the Admiralty to watch personally, month after month, the state of employment and how the issue of material corresponded with the amount of labour. What the present Board of Admiralty ought to have done was to have pushed to their utmost the new constructions, and possibly have delayed that other part of the work—namely, the completion, which gives so large an amount of employment in proportion to the material which is used. The dockyards at the last Election voted against the Party to which I belong because we did not accede to certain requests of theirs, but still I think we could guarantee them—I personally could—that there should be no wholesale discharge of men. There might possibly have been a gradual reduction of numbers which could have been effected by stopping the entries, but 1242 I never contemplated anything like wholesale discharges.
THE CHAIRMAN(interposing), observed that he scarcely thought this matter arose on the present Vote.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONItem A includes the whole superintendent staff—Admirals, Inspectors, and shipwrights, and all those who check labour and issue materials. I only wish to speak once, and I thought it better to raise my point now. Some six or seven years ago there was some dissatisfaction in connection with the dockyards. I had the unpleasant task of revising them, and the discharge of a considerable number of workmen was inevitable. That was a most unpleasant duty for me, and there is none I should be more unwilling to undertake again. But unless the Admiralty considerably accelerate their new constructions, I am perfectly confident that in the course of a year or two their policy will lead to extreme difficulty in giving employment to the bulk of the men in the Dockyard Establishments, and, therefore, the result of the delay of the Government and the Board of Admiralty in starting the new scheme of construction and pushing it on will not only endanger our supremacy two or three years hence and bring us below the standard of strength which four years ago was deliberately fixed by Parliament, and which ought to be maintained, but will also result in great disorganisation in our dockyards. When we consider how admirably the Dockyard Establishments have responded to the calls made upon them—what they have effected by economy and the excellent work they perform—I do think it behoves the Admiralty to look very closely into this matter, and do everything so far as they now can which will prevent the results which I anticipate. I am rather surprised the Financial Secretary should not have taken my observations in a kindly spirit, as my experience at the Admiralty—and I think it was the experience of all who came here to represent the great spending Departments in the late Government—my experience was that observations of a much more hostile character were addressed to us. I certainly wish to speak—not so much in a tone of censure as in that of an adviser—and the suggestions I have to make I make in all 1243 seriousness. I suggest to the Admiralty that they should bring in a Supplementary Estimate for the purpose of making good the expenditure upon the Howe which was never anticipated.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONAnd, in addition, a Supplementary Estimate for the purpose of replacing the Victoria by a new battleship. The designs of battleships which have been laid on the Table of the House, are, in my judgment, quite satisfactory, and I think we might well build one more. I also press on the Admiralty the necessity of going on with the great cruiser if they attach importance to it. Personally. I do not see the necessity of building so many torpedo-vessels and torpedo-catchers. There is no doubt we were deficient in regard to such vessels; but it should be borne in mind that the torpedo-boat is the weapon not of the stronger, but of the weaker, Power; and I think it is far more necessary to build larger vessels than to concentrate our attention on the small vessels which, in any emergency, could be built in a very short time. There is one other subject which, before sitting down, I would say a word or two upon. It is in relation to our shipbuilding programme. The object of every Board of Admiralty is, or ought to be, to so arrange the shipbuilding programme year by year as to make good all wear and tear. Well, I take the list going back three years. In 1891-2 70,000 tons in the shape of new ships were added to the Navy; in 1892-3 110,000 tons; in the present year, 1893-4, 170,000 tons; in 1894-5 40,000 tons are to be added; and in 1895-6 18,000 tons. Yet, Sir, this year, 1895-6, is the year in which, as far as I can judge, the greatest addition of battleships is to be made to other Navies. I think Ave have cause for complaint in the fact that the Returns moved for months ago have only just been presented—some of them on Saturday, and some only this morning. In the absence of information, I find it difficult to express an opinion on some matters—upon the building of the great cruiser, for instance. I understand it is to be the largest vessel ever built for the British Navy. Its displacement is to be 14,000 tons; but it is to carry, if 1244 necessary, 1,500 tons of extra coal, which will make its displacement, when full, 15,500 tons. I am very doubtful whether it is necessary to go to this great size in a cruiser. I have never been in favour of a slavish imitation of the ships built by foreign nations, unless the conditions and circumstances which prompt the building of such vessels are the same in each case. Russia is building enormous cruisers, and those vessels have an enormous coal-carrying capacity. But why is it necessary for Russia to build vessels with gigantic coal-carrying capacity? For the simple reason that if she ever went to war, and those vessels were to prey on the commerce of her enemy, she has only one coaling station, and that is at the other end of the world. We, on the contrary, have got many coaling stations; and, therefore, it is not necessary for us to have ships with unusual coal-carrying capacity. I do not object to the armament or to the speed; but it does seem to me to be, especially at a time when the Board of Admiralty are short of money, and are deliberately postponing the construction of vessels which preceding Boards wished to lay down—it does seem a rather curious policy to indulge in the luxury of this enormous and costly cruiser. I am more in favour of long vessels, and I think it is a little reflection on the designers at the Admiralty that we had never yet been able to get a vessel constructed with a greater length than 380 feet. The building of this new vessel indicates an entire departure in naval policy. Hitherto it has been the practice to spend a limited sum on cruisers, and not to put very many men in a vessel which necessarily is not protected by armour. This new vessel will have a complement of 600 to 700 men. When the Admiralty adopt a new course and a change of policy, it is very desirable that the reasons which induce them to do that should be fully stated. I think the money in this case might be spent to better advantage. I will now conclude my observations.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONI hope that, as the House is supposed to be composed of gentlemen, people will try and behave as such. I hope the Board of Admiralty will seriously consider the proposal I have made. 1245 I am confident a Supplementary Estimate is necessary, and that if one should be laid on the Table the great bulk of the House would assent to it. The introduction of such an Estimate would be a clear indication that the present Board of Admiralty are, both in spirit and in substance, giving effect to the policy of the Naval Defence Act, while the absence of such an Estimate shows that there is a departure in the naval policy of the country—a reversal of that naval policy which at the last Election met with the almost unanimous approval of the people.
*THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Sir U. KAY-SHUTTLE WORTH,) Lancashire, ClitheroePerhaps it would be convenient if I were to follow the noble Lord in the comments he has made. I may at once state the view of the Board of Admiralty—which is that they have done their best to pursue that which is so desirable in the interest of the country—namely, a thorough continuity of naval policy. The noble Lord, in one or two portions of his speech, referred to the Naval Advisers. The noble Lord must be aware that no Board of Admiralty, no civilians coming to the Admiralty, can disregard the advice of their Naval Advisers; and the course the present Board are taking is one in which they have the concurrence of their Naval Advisers. They have acted in thorough concert with their advisors; and a large portion of the observations of the noble Lord has, therefore, been based on an entire misapprehension. The noble Lord suggests that a Supplementary Estimate should be brought in. It is a very easy thing to make such a suggestion when in Opposition; but the noble Lord must know how difficult it is for a Minister to propose and pass a Supplementary Estimate.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONWhen the Sultan went down we brought in a Supplementary Estimate.
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHI am perfectly well aware of that; but it is easy for him in Opposition to say "bring in a Supplementary Estimate." It is not easy, and it is not always necessary, for a Government to bring in a Supplementary Estimate. With respect to the expenditure on the Howe, I am happy to say the salvage of the Howe was conducted not only with great skill, but at extremely small cost. The ex- 1246 penditure on that vessel is probably very much less than the noble Lord imagines. It can be met from that margin which there always is upon repairs for ships. It can be met without any postponement of that shipbuilding which the noble Lord and the present Board has at heart.
§ MR. FORWOOD (Lancashire, Ormskirk)What is the amount?
SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHThe amount that will be expended at Chatham on the repair of the Howe is estimated at about £40,000.
§ MR. FORWOODAnd in Spain?
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHWell, as regards Spain, we have not yet got the account from the Spanish Government. £35,000 was spent on salvage; but the Spanish Government, with great liberality, put their dry dock at our disposal without any charge. I see by the newspapers to-day that the charge amounts to a certain number of pesetas; but the Admiralty have no information upon that subject. The noble Lord also suggests a Supplementary Estimate in respect to the loss of the Victoria. Surely this would be an admission that the naval strength of this country, after all the efforts of the noble Lord, after all the policy of the late Government, after the Naval Defence Act, is so dangerously low, that the unfortunate loss of one ship compels the Government to come at once to the House and say—"We must ask for money to build another ship." The Board of Admiralty do not think it necessary to rush at once to the House of Commons and ask for money to build a new ship; but the fact that the strength of the Navy is less by one battleship has already been carefully considered and taken into account in connection with the future programme. Then the noble Lord condemns the Admiralty for not going on with both the two great cruisers, while, in the next breath, he throws doubt on the policy of building such vessels at all. My answer to the noble Lord on that point is that the very same Advisers who advised him when at the Admiralty differ from him in that opinion. Not only is the opinion of those now at the Admiralty favourable to the building of these cruisers, but also the opinion of Lord Hood, than whom there is no greater authority in the country. Seeing what 1247 is going on in the shipbuilding of other nations, it is imperative that a cruiser should be built which would be superior to any being built in foreign countries. The noble Lord, in a manner not quite worthy of him, declines to believe us when we say that we shall spend the money saved by postponing one cruiser on pushing on the torpedo-boat destroyers. I think he might have accepted the assurance which I gave him across the Table. He also complains that the money is to be spent for this particular purpose of hastening the completion of the torpedo-boat destroyers. The Board of Admiralty are advised and convinced that one of the most urgent needs of this country is to have torpedo-boat destroyers. The noble Lord says the torpedo-boat is the weapon of the weaker State. That being so, the torpedo-boat has to be met. There are many who hold the opinion that the right way to meet torpedo-boats is by torpedo-boats. But we are advised, as the noble Lord was advised, that they should be met by larger vessels. The noble Lord is responsible for a large number of so-called torpedo-catchers, but they do not answer their purpose. They might be able to catch them in a rough sea, but in a smooth sea they are not capable of it. It is absolutely necessary for the security of the country that we should have torpedo-boat destroyers which would be capable of dealing with a swarm of torpedo-boats issuing from foreign ports. Having got to an advanced stage in the construction of six of these destroyers, we have considerable confidence that they will possess the qualities expected of them, and that we shall have the class of weapon that is wanted in the defence of the country—the weapon that is necessary to secure our interests.
§ MR. HANBURYHow many of them will be required?
§ MR. WOLFF (Belfast, E.)Will you use the same boiler as now?
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHA different type of boiler has been introduced. Greater knowledge has been obtained from the experience of foreign nations in tubulous boilers. Boilers of that kind will be introduced in some of 1248 the vessels intended to cope with torpedo-boats; and we hope, by means of these destroyers, to be able to supply a weapon which, as I have said, is absolutely necessary for the defence of the country, and which is now wanting. I will now follow the noble Lord through some of the other statements in his speech. The noble Lord has suggested that insufficient Estimates have been brought in. He has made that suggestion before; but the more the experience of the year goes on, the more satisfied we are that our Estimates are sufficient for the year's work. The noble Lord complains that we are not spending sufficient on new construction, but under that head we are spending about the same figure that the noble Lord spent last year—indeed, rather more. The noble Lord accuses the present Board of procrastination, and of a reversal of a policy of the late Board. We have been guilty neither of procrastination nor of a reversal of policy. It is contended by the noble Lord that he provided in the Estimates of 1892-3 for two battleships, and that the present Board did not proceed with them until this year. But how much did the noble Lord provide for these ships? £30,000 for one, and about £15,000 for the other—a mere commencement. The present Government are now providing £179,500 for one and £81,900 for the other! Then the noble Lord might have referred to the great efforts that arc now being made to push on the completion of the battleships for which he was responsible. The Admiralty hopes to complete them all in the course of the present financial year. Surely that ought to have the noble Lord's commendation. Of those ships the Hood has gone out to the Mediterranean, the Empress of India is completed already, the Ramillies will be completed in September; it is hoped that the Resolution will be completed in September, the Centurion in January, and the Royal Oak, the Revenge, the Repulse, and the Barfleur will all be completed, we hope, within the financial year. Yet the noble Lord tells us we are doing nothing to continue the policy of our predecessors! I think, after what I have shown, I am justified in saying that the line he has taken is unjust and unfair, and not consistent with the facts of the case. The noble Lord 1249 gave some figures, comparing our ships with those of foreign nations. I cannot accept generally his figures. In construction of battleships we are holding our own, but, no doubt, if we are to go on holding our own, we must go on building, and I am not sorry that the noble Lord has called public attention to that necessity. I may safely say that we have so far done our best to strengthen the Navy and maintain it at its proper efficiency. The noble Lord must be perfectly well aware of the programme that he left behind him. As the noble Lord has brought this matter forward, I feel justified in pointing out that we are closely following the programme with respect to battleships left by the late Board of Admiralty. I will not give the exact figures to the Committee unless the noble Lord challenges mo, because be may have some objection to their production; but I may say that we arc constructing already a very considerable proportion of the battleships which he proposed to construct between the time that programme was drawn up in 1892 and April, 1898. We have already in hand three battleships out of those mentioned in that programme, and we propose to go on very much on the lines of the programme, always remembering that we have lost one great battleship. That fact will not be lost sight of. I think the noble Lord, remembering what we have got on record as his own programme till 1898, ought not to have treated so severely what we are now doing. The noble Lord said he laid before the House, after the operation of the Naval Defence Act had come to an end, a modest programme for one year, and he made an apology for not passing another Naval Defence Act. I think the new Board may be excused for doing in their first year very much what he did, for the year after the Naval Defence Act, for shipbuilding. I will not now enter into the subject whether there should be a Naval Defence Act or not. He knows that on that subject we do not agree with him. We may, however, fairly claim that we are doing much the same as he did. Like him, we are laying a modest programme for one year before the House. As to the question of labour in the dockyards, I think that will come much more conveniently under Sub-head B. We are now discussing 1250 the salaries of the officers. I may say, however, that the noble Lord's calculations on the subject of dockyard labour are, as far as I know, entirely fallacious. We have a most careful Controller of the Navy who has given the most attentive study to the question of providing continuous employment in the dockyards and avoiding large discharges, and it is our intention to give continuous employment and not to have large discharges.
§ MR. KEARLEY (Devonport)No discharges are anticipated?
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHNo, Sir; but I believe this question will be better discussed on Sub-head B. There is no intention of making discharges; in fact, our policy is entirely the opposite. My hon. Friend the Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury) asked me a certain number of questions which I hope he will excuse me for dealing with very shortly. I cannot agree with him that it is desirable to alter the present system by which contract ships are finished in the dockyards. I think the noble Lord opposite would have a good deal to say on that subject. My hon. Friend is very inconsistent, because a very few minutes after he had been arguing against giving work on the contract ships to the dockyards he spoke in favour of keeping the dockyards in full work. With respect to guns and gun-mountings, I must reserve my observations for Vote 9. When the lion. Member opposite (Mr. Hanbury) sat on the Committee some years ago, he learnt that there was a great deal to be desired; but I do not think that he will find that ships are now completed without having gnus and gun-mountings ready for them. On the subject of repairs, he asks that the Director of Dockyards should give a personal eye to these matters. If the hon. Member knew the system in force, I do not think he would have any anxiety under this head. Ho would know that every repair goes under the review of the Director of Dockyards and the Controller, and even so poor an authority as the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty. He would find that unnecessary repairs are minimised as far as possible. I do not say we have reached perfection in this matter. I agree that those interested in particular ships have 1251 a strong desire to see all kinds of repairs effected in them, some of which are hardly necessary. My hon. Friend knows that that is the case; but the present system of carrying out repairs is an efficient check upon that tendency. Then my hon. Friend says there is no effective competition between the dockyards and private shipbuilding yards. In my opinion there is such a competition going on between public and private yards, and the former come very well out of the contest, inasmuch as battleships are built in them more cheaply than in the private yards.
§ MR. HANBURYDoes that take into account the profit of the private contractor?
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHYes. Depreciation is taken into account in the indirect charges for dockyard ships. With regard to the Staff Captains, I do not think it has over been contemplated to abolish those persons. As to the houses in the dockyards, I will inquire into the matter. The hon. Member has complained that we have too many Government dockyards, and he especially singled out Sheerness Dockyard and Haulbow line for condemnation; but the fact is that that dockyard has special uses for defensive purposes, and would be found most valuable in time of war. My hon. Friend is mistaken in supposing that no ships are built at Sheerness. It is a good place for building vessels of a small size, and some very fine ships have been built there of late. But on these points I see the hon. Member for the Faversham Division ready to fall upon him from behind, and the Irish Members from below the Gangway. So I will only express my regret at having been compelled to take up the time of the Committee so long.
*MR, FORWOOD (Lancashire, Ormskirk)ventured to say that the right hon. Baronet had entirely misconceived the drift and meaning of the remarks of the noble Lord (Lord G. Hamilton). They had been made in that spirit of fair criticism which the Navy Estimates should receive, and the Navy Estimates were likely to have 1252 that full and fair criticism this evening for the first time for six years. [Laughter.] The right hon. Baronet (Sir U. Kay-Shuttleworth) ironically cheered his statement that there had not been a full and fair debate on naval policy in the last six years. St. Patrick's Day and other circumstances had intervened, and the Estimates had passed through the House almost unchallenged. He was one of those who believed—from his experience of the Public Service—that nothing strengthened the hands of a Minister more than the idea that all questions must be submitted to the criticism of the House. The right hon. Baronet had said that it was easy for the Opposition to suggest a Supplementary Estimate; but it was a very difficult thing for the Government to bring one in. He had proceeded to say that a Supplementary Estimate was not necessary in the case of the Howe, because they would be able to provide for that exceptional expenditure out of savings. Well, the dockyard expenditure, lie gathered, would be £40,000, the salvage would amount to £35,000, and there would be a charge in Spain as yet unascertained; but it would not be placing it at an extravagant figure if he put it at £25,000. So that he calculated there would be a charge on this year's Estimates of £100,000, which the Secretary to the Admiralty had mentioned in a casual sort of way would be met out of the ordinary Repairs Estimate. But that meant no less than 25 per cent, of the total Repair Vote asked for, and he doubted if there was such a margin as to allow this to be done. The right hon. Baronet had said it was not necessary to rush into new ships, as we were not short of vessels. He claimed that he was keeping up the continuity of naval policy of his predecessor, and that the amounts provided in the Estimates of last year for two battleships—neither of which had been commenced—were sums for the mere commencement. And then the right hon. Baronet had told them that lie hoped to complete the battleships of the Naval Defence Act this year; that credit ought to be given to the present Board of Admiralty for what they had done; and that the line of argument taken by the noble Lord was not fair. He (Mr. Forwood) had quoted all this to show that the right hon. Baronet had not appreciated the point made by the noble 1253 Lord. The point of his noble Friend's speech with regard to new ships was that it would be impossible to continue the policy laid down unless next year the Chancellor of the Exchequer—whoever he might be—was prepared to provide a much larger sum for material and contract work than was asked for in the present Estimates. He was glad the Chancellor of the Exchequer was in his place. If the right hon. Gentleman should be—as he did not believe—in Office next year, he would have to provide excessive Estimates, arising out of the present want of appreciation of the necessity to have work in hand for the labour which ceased to be employed under the Naval Defence Act. Ho was aware that the policy of the Naval Defence Act had always been questioned by right hon. Gentlemen opposite; but the principles of that Act were the only ones upon which the dockyards could be conducted on a businesslike footing, unless they were to have large discharges of men in one year and large engagements in the next. The Naval Defence Act provided that the moneys which it was estimated would be expended on vessels in a given year, and which was voted but unexpended, should, instead of being refunded to the Treasury and re-voted, be paid into a fund available for the next year's expenditure. Another point of the utmost importance to the economical and good administration of the Service was that the Act contained a proviso allowing advances by the Treasury for payments on account of armour-plates and other costly materials, which advances were repayable out of the Vote of the next year. In 1890-1 contractors earned for machinery and materials which wore to be employed in the construction of dockyard-built vessels £200,000 loss than was provided in the Estimates, and, on vessels built by contract, the sum earned by contractors, by reason of the slower progress of the ships, was £1,000,000 less. Now, if it had not been for the provision in the Naval Defence Act to which he referred, the Estimate for the year 1890-1 would have been £1,200,000 more than was necessary, and that sum would have had to be surrendered to the Treasury and in the next year the taxpayer would have been called upon again to provide it.
THE CHAIRMANI do not see how this arises on the present Vote for Salaries and Allowances. The policy of the Naval Defence Act is not before the Committee.
§ MR. FORWOODsaid, he bowed to the ruling of the Chair; but he only desired to show that the present proposals of the Government, viewed in the light of the experience derived under that Act, were not framed as they should be, and were not sufficient for the labour and material required in the construction of the new ships—it could only result in great disturbance of the Estimates of future years. Shipwrights and others would be liable to be discharged unless better provision were made for a proper sequence in the construction of ships. In the construction of a vessel, the amount of labour and material which might be required varied very considerably from year to year, and the difficulty was to keep an equal ratio between them, as far as possible. He should be able to show, he thought, that the present proposals did not meet that at all. The cost of labour, including the work of Inspectors and shipwrights, in constructing a battleship, amounted to about 25 per cent, of the total cash outlay, excluding guns and incidental charges; while, on cruisers, the proportion was about 35 per cent. The proportions, however, as already stated, varied from year to year. For example, under the Naval Defence Act, for every £150 or £500 spent in the first year on the construction of a battleship, employment was found for only one man; while, in the second year, the expenditure of £300 to £100 gave employment to one man. As regarded cruisers, the figures were £350 and £300 for the first and second years respectively. If all the ships were commenced, as they probably would be under the present programme of the right hon. Baronet, there would be little employment for the Inspectors of ships and shipwrights in the first year, while an abnormal amount of labour would be required in the second and third years. The total expenditure on the completion of the Naval Defence Act and in commencing new ships was shown to be £1,890,000, which included £818,000 for labour. Taking this', after amount at £75 a head, this meant the employment of 10,900 men. But the Estimates only provided for 1255 labour and material on the basis of £170 for each man employed, which was clearly much below the normal requirement, since it required an annual average expenditure of £300 to employ one man on an ironclad and £250 on a cruiser. This was due to the special circumstances of a large number of vessels completing and few being begun. This must lead to a serious disturbance of the Estimates for next year if the number of men in the dockyards were to be maintained, unless a great increase were given in the Material and Machinery Vote. He would now examine the probable effect upon the future of the policy adopted by the present Board of Admiralty. The mistake had been in not commencing the work earlier, as intended by the late Board, and in not putting in hand a sufficient amount of new work and ordering material this year to properly absorb their labour in the next and following years. The total labour bill in this year's Estimates on new construction was £833,000, of which £700,000 was devoted to the completion of the vessels under the Naval Defence Act. Next year, however, these vessels would only want labour to the value of about £135,000, leaving a balance of labour available for other new construction to the value of about £700,000. They were commencing ironclads which would cost £2,300,000, and cruisers which would cost £850,000. The labour on the ironclads would represent a sum of £560,000, and on the cruisers £300,000. In the present year the labour bill on these new ironclads would be only £100,000, and on the cruisers £30,000, so that future years would have to provide £730,000 for labour to complete the Board's new programme. The success that had attended the late Board had been in the rapid construction of vessels, and he could point out the enormous saving to the country that had accrued from this rapid completion of ships. In 1891-2 and 1892-3 it would be found that 26 ships were completed at a cost of over £4,000,000, which was £100,000 less than the sum asked from Parliament. Compare that with what was done in previous years. The Collingwood, the Edinburgh, the Howe, the Impérieuse, the Colossus, and the Conqueror took an average of seven years to build, and cost £348,000 more than Parliament was told they would 1256 cost, whilst the ships built under the late Board—
§ MR. J. BURNS (Battersea)asked if the right hon. Gentleman was in Order in discussing the late Shipbuilding Programme?
THE CHAIRMANI think he is in Order in discussing the shipbuilding, as this is the Shipbuilding Vote; but he would not be in Order in discussing the wages of the men.
§ MR. FORWOODsaid, he was endeavouring to keep as close to the Vote as possible, and the Vote now under discussion contained a largo amount of expenditure for the wages of the men engaged on the ships. He wished to impress upon the Admiralty the importance of pushing on the work, and to show the saving which followed rapid construction. If they were to retain in the employment of the Admiralty the same number of men as were occupied to-day in new construction, they would have in 1894-5 to lay down new vessels which would absorb something like £300,000 value of labour; and the result would be that, in consequence of the delay in the construction, the Admiralty would have to come to the House next year or leave to their successors' Estimates from £1,000,000 to £1,500,000 more than were borne by the present Votes. It was difficult to separate the cost between one part of the programme and another; but Vote A included charges for men employed in connection with the contract programme. Under that programme the House was committed to an expenditure of £2,250,000 for vessels to be built by contract; but by the omission of the Terrible the amount might now be taken at £1,650,000.
§ MR. FORWOODsaid, if he was making a mistake it was because the figures wore not given; these Estimates were quite incomplete, and it was impossible to find out what amount Parliament was to be committed to in connection with the vessels to be put out to contract. The right hon. Gentleman had supplied him with some information, from which he had endeavoured to estimate the cost of those to be put out to contract, and he had estimated the cost of the Terrible and the Powerful at £600,000 each, and 1257 he believed he was under the mark in fixing that figure. If he was right, the total cost of the ironclads, cruisers, and torpedo boats proposed to be put out amounted to £1,600,000 less the Terrible; and if he was wrong his error arose from want of information in the Estimates. Perhaps the light hon. Baronet would say what the Estimates would be of the vessels to be put out to contract, after deducting the Terrible?
*SIR U. KAY-SHTTTTLEWORTHThe right hon. Gentleman will see that if the Admiralty postpone for a few months the building of the Terrible it makes no difference in the amount to be put out to contract—it simply alters the order in which the vessels are to be built.
§ MR. FORWOODsaid, he was sorry he had not made his meaning clear. His point was simply this—that the vessels which they were going to put out to contract would cost £1,650,000. Of the total amount to be spent on contract work the present Estimates provided for only £470,000, leaving £1,000,000 to be provided for in future years, while the financial difficulties of the future would also be enhanced by the postponement of the bulk of the cost of the repairs to such ships as the Warrior, Monarch, Phaeton, Agincourt, and Comus. This year, £186,000 was to be taken towards the construction of these ships, leaving £263,000 still to be provided. It appeared, therefore, that everything was being done in connection with the Naval Estimates this year to make a great show and to give small performances, throwing upon the future a disproportionate amount of cost. It was only a repetition of previous policy of throwing these large charges on future years. If that was not done, there must be a large displacement of men in the employment of the Government at Tier Majesty's Dockyards, and a large increase in the Naval Expenditure.
§ *THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Sir W. HARCOURT,) DerbyThe right hon. Gentleman has been good enough to give notice to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that next year there is to be a great increase in the Naval Estimates, and was good enough to assure me that I should not be in that position, and, therefore, I may take a disinterested view of this question, and that notice 1258 may be given to whomsoever it may concern. But he laid down a principle in which I very much concur—that nothing can be worse in connection with the Estimates than the practice of making a great show and leaving the cost to be paid by the future. Well, that was exactly the position which the late Government bequeathed to us. There was a great show made under the Naval Defence Act; but very great care was taken that the people who passed that Act should not pay the cost of the vessels. The hon. Member says that we shall want £1,500,000 more next year, and still more the year after. Yes; and what is to become of the £1,500,003? It is to go in paying the debts of the late Administration. Curiously enough, this is the very amount which they have charged on the Consolidated Fund for the ships built under their programme; and for two years we shall have to pay £1,500,000 to discharge the debts the late Government have incurred. No one could he a bettor authority on this question than the hon. Member. The policy of the Naval Defence Act was a policy which, I hope, no Government will hereafter adopt, and which certainly the present Government will never follow. A worse financial policy it is impossible to conceive, and then we are told that there is to be a great increase of the Naval Estimates. We protested, when in Opposition, against this policy of shoving off the cost upon another generation. We protested against this reckless finance, and certainly we have not the smallest disposition to follow the example. We shall have enough to do to pay off the debts of the late Government. The hon. Member said the Chancellor of the Exchequer must meet greatly increased Estimates. That was not the policy the late Government adopted when they came into Office. The first object of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer was to reduce the Navy Estimates by nearly £1,000,000.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONNo.
§ *SIR W. HARCOURTWell, it was £800,000. The noble Lord, in the speeches he made on the condition of the Navy, said—
I am happy to say that, in consequence of the condition in which the Navy has been placed by my predecessors in Office, I am able to reduce the Navy Estimates.1259 And I am certainly right in saying the sum was about £800,000 in the first Budget, and about £1,000,000 in the second. They justified their reduction on the ground of the great efforts made in previous years. No doubt it is the duty of every Government, to whatever Party they belong, to take care that the supremacy of the British Navy shall he unquestioned. That is the principle which we all accept, and the policy of the Government will be governed by those considerations. But we must have regard to the condition of the Navies of other countries. I have always made it a special subject of interest to inquire what are the relations of the British Navy to the other Navies of the world, and I would undertake to say that the superiority of the British Navy was never so great as it is now.
§ MR. HANBURYTo any one Navy, or to two?
§ *SIR W. HARCOURTTo a good many of them. I have taken very great care to investigate the matter; and if you examine as to the great battleships, those of 10,000 tons and upwards, you will find that, with reference to their tonnage, their numbers, their speed, their capacity, as compared with other Navies of the world—the Navies of France, Russia, the United States, and Germany—the superiority of the British Navy was never so great as it is now. Again, when you compare the great cruisers of this country with those of other nations you will find Great Britain possesses an immense superiority. One thing the Government are not going to do. They are not going to propose to build a number of ships and leave their successors to pay for them. That was the policy of the Naval Defence Act. The battleships will be completed before the 1st of April, 1894. There is a matter of importance in this respect. One of our greatest battleships has been completed in three years; but I see from the Estimates as to the French Navy that they make a special boast that a battleship was completed in five years. That shows the great advantage which this country possesses in the point of construction. The right hon. Member who has just spoken has, no doubt, given his notice to the right hon. Gentleman sitting beside him (Mr. Goschen), and I have spoken as an entirely disinterested party.
§ *SIR E. J. REED (Cardiff)thought the Secretary to the Admiralty might have waited until he had heard what the Committee had to say; but there was one advantage to be derived from the discussion that had so far taken place, and that was that after the speeches they had listened to they would not be so much trammelled in their observations. He hoped, however, the Committee would not infer from this that he intended to make a long speech, for, on the contrary, he intended to address himself only to one or two points. The noble Lord the late First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord G. Hamilton), in appraising the value of our own and other Navies, laid down the proposition that what they had to consider was first their offensive, and secondly their defensive power; and the noble Lord went on to remove from the first-class ships a number of vessels on the solo ground of their being without a minor armament, without a number of small guns. It was essential to the argument of the noble Lord that ho should have gone on and have dealt with their defensive powers; but on that question, unfortunately, the noble Lord said nothing. On this point, however, he (Sir E. J. Reed) had a word or two to say. The Chancellor of the Exchequer a few moments ago assumed we had a good Navy, and spoke of the number and speed of the vessels and various other matters; and there seemed to have grown up a habit in this House of believing that anything they put together in the form of a steel structure and called a first-class battleship was really a contribution to the naval strength of the country. He wished once more to dispel that delusion. A few years ago a strange class of vessels was introduced into the British Navy, and as soon as it became known to some of them they were denounced as dangerous structures which might end in disaster to the country. Many Members would remember the exciting Debates there were on the subject. The character of the Debates was indicated by this remark in The Standard in 1887—
Mr. Reed's objection to the Inflexible, as the world pretty well knows by this time, is that when the unarmoured portion of the vessel has undergone extensive damage the ship will capsize. The idea of a great ironclad turning keel uppermost is extremely harrowing.1261 Sir Spencer Robinson, writing in The Times eight years ago, said—Do not let us forget we have 11 first-class ironclads built and building, on the principle of armoured central citadels with unarmoured ends, these ends being more than half the length of the ship, and we have the highest authority for saying that, with the armoured citadel intact and an unarmoured end destroyed, the ship is in immineut danger of upsetting.He quoted these extracts to show that when the catastrophe occurred the other day to Her Majesty's ship Victoria, it was nothing unexpected or unforeseen that happened. That happened which every Administration for years past had been told would happen. An unarmoured end of a ship suffered injury, and the ship capsized and went to the bottom, lie saw indications that attempts would be made to attribute this catastrophe to some of the doors of the watertight compartments having been left open. He did not know whether the Committee would take it from him or not—and they need not unless they pleased—but be told them it was nothing of the kind which brought about the catastrophe. He believed it was not from any cause of that kind that the Victoria capsized. She was bound to capsize with the injury she received. There were other ships that were equally bound to capsize if they were injured in the same manner, and under similar conditions. The reason was that, instead of the armed citadel being the major part of the structure, and the unarmoured ends of the ship being the minor portion, they had chosen to make the unarmoured ends the major part of the structure, measuring more than half the entire length of the ship. The ships that were likely to capsize in a similar manner if they received like injury, in peace or in action, were the Agamemnon, the Ajax, the Anson, the Benbow, the Camperdown, the Collingwood, the Colossus, the Edinburgh, the Howe, the Inflexible, the Rodney, and the Sans Pareil. If any of these were badly injured in their unarmoured ends they would inevitably capsize and go to the bottom. Ho did not know how many ships the country should require to sacrifice before they took warning. He must recur again to the fatuity of pretending that watertight doors could be so kept closed as to save vessels of this character. What was forgotten was that the whole of this unarmoured part of the 1262 ship was occupied. Between the decks the principal space was the residence of the crew, the place where 600 men had to live, and below that were the places where the work of the ship had to be carried on. Because they had chosen to make that the residential part of the ship, exposed as it was, he would defy any naval architect—including the hon. Member opposite the Member for Belfast (Sir E. Harland)—to devise a vessel like the Victoria with bulkheads so that the men could live in the ship and the service of the ship be performed with all watertight doors kept closed. It was absolutely impossible. Therefore, those who went on producing ships of this character knowingly imperilled the lives of 10,000 seamen. The probable loss of the Victoria was foreseen; and if any of the other ships he had named similarly collided with a ram they would doubtless go down in the same manner. He wished to read a few sentences which had been spoken four years ago by a naval officer, who was now a Superintendent of one of Her Majesty's dockyards, as a reason for not troubling himself further about this matter—I do not propose to follow Sir Edward Reed through his diagrams here. I do not know that he is a better judge of the risks of battle than we are. He may be, perhaps; but if we are prepared to accept the risks he points out to us, and the fearful pictures of drowning men and bursting boilers, and so on, why not? He is not going to fight in the ships. If we like to risk drowning for the sake of being able to hit harder, as Lord Charles Beresford put it, Lord bless my soul, let us have the risk, and let us be the judges! Do not say anybody is a better judge of what we have to risk than we are.All be would say was that neither the House nor the country could pretend, when another catastrophe like the Victoria occurred, that they knew nothing about these things. At all events, if the House and the country cared anything about their vessels and their seamen, they would do something to prevent the recurrence of these great catastrophes. He would turn to another subject of quite a different character arising out of the remarks of the Secretary to the Admiralty. In discussing the question of the dockyards the Secretary to the Admiralty stated that dockyard ships were more economically produced than contract ships. The other night he had asked why the Estimates for four first-class protected cruisers had 1263 been so much exceeded, and it was stated in reply by the Secretary to the Admiralty that there had been alterations of design, additions, improvements, and increase of pay. There were nine ships to be begun in 1889 and 1890. Four were sheathed with wood and copper, and, as alterations were made in them, he would leave them out of consideration. He would take the case of the unsheathed vessels. There were five unsheathed vessels of the Edgar type. Two were built in the Royal Dockyards and throe by private contract. The Estimate for the Edgar was £364.000 and for another vessel £349,000. The Estimates included incidental charges, which varied enormously. It would be a convenience to know a little more about these charges. The prices of the ships built under the private contracts were £334,000 in one case and £337,000 in the other. So the cost by private contract was £30,000 less than the Admiralty's own Estimates. The Admiralty, having made contracts £30,000 less than the amount to be expended on their own ships, next ascertained that their Estimate for their own ships was £37,000 less than was required. The Secretary to the Admiralty explained that this increase was due—first, to additions and improvements made to the ships during their construction; and, secondly, to the increase in wages. The increase in wages was only £4,000. Consequently, £33,000 had been expended on additions and improvements. These additions and improvements had likewise been forced on the contractors, who had naturally applied for some corresponding allowance. But the Admiralty had refused to give them more than a third of the sum they had themselves expended on additions and improvements, with the result that the contractors were, if not practically ruined, subjected to a loss of a most shameful kind. He could not understand the principle on which the Admiralty had acted in these matters. He had himself been engaged for many years in carrying out contracts, and the principle ho had always acted upon was this: that whatever was just and right under the interpretation of the contract should be enforced, but that the moment the contractor was called upon to do something that could not have been contemplated at the time of the making of the contract the proper thing was to pay 1264 him. He certainly thought that in these cases the Admiralty should take into account the extra outlays they had imposed upon the contractors.
§ COMMANDER BETHELL (York, E.R., Holderness)asked whether the hon. Gentleman's figures included the dockyard charges on contract ships?
§ SIR E. J. REEDsaid, the figures he gave comprised not only the contract price of the hull and machinery, but also the charges for work to be done in the dockyards on delivery. He did not think the Chancellor of the Exchequer quite understood the point raised by hon. Gentlemen opposite. They did not, in his opinion, say they would press the Government to spend more money next year, but they pointed out that there was in the Dockyard Establishments a largo mass of labour which the Government, being supported by the Dockyard Members, did not wish to interfere with; and they said that if the Government did not in time start the building of ships, they would have to make provision for the material at a heavy loss or get rid of that labour. Ho would recommend the right hon. Gentleman not to resist that argument, but to regard the question as one requiring business investigation. He was sure that if the right hon. Gentleman considered the matter in that light it would be properly dealt with.
§ MR. GOSCHEN (St. George's,) Hanover SquareI rise to say a word or two in reference to the extremely important observations which have fallen from the hon. Member for Cardiff' (Sir E. J. Reed), which I think ought to be immediately taken notice of. The hon. Member is undoubtedly in error if he thinks the country does not care for the lives of its seamen or the loss of its ships. The hon. Member, who is a distinguished member of the shipbuilding profession, attacked these ships in the past. Now a ship has gone down, and the hon. Member has read out a list of ships and has informed the Committee and the country that they exhibit the same errors of construction as existed in the Victoria, and that the same fate may await them under similar circumstances. I do not know what the Government may think; but it seems to me, in view of that statement, that there must be a thorough and searching inquiry without delay into the 1265 cause of the loss of the Victoria. The Government, I am sure, will feel, from the views which I have expressed on previous occasions, that there is not the slightest wish on my part, and certainly not on the part of anyone on this Front Bench, to interfere in any way with regard to the time, mode, or circumstances of that inquiry. But I venture to appeal to the Government whether it is possible to allow statements such as have been made on the responsibility of the hon. Member for Cardiff to go forth, and to inform the country and foreign countries, and, above all, our sailors, of the dangers alleged to be in those ships. I do not press Her Majesty's Government for an answer on the spur of the moment. The matter is far too serious to be made in the slightest degree a Party dispute of. Therefore, I do not wish to embarrass the Government by putting a question which they are not prepared to answer; but I think they will agree, and the Committee will agree, that it is a subject that cannot be passed over lightly, and I doubt that it will be possible for the Government to give a satisfactory reply without an inquiry. That subject outdistances in importance anything else that has been touched upon in these Deflates. But there is one other matter upon which I should like to say a few words, and that is with regard to the gap the loss of the Victoria has made in our battleships. I think the gap made in the strength of the Navy by the loss of the Victoria has been treated too lightly by the Secretary to the Admiralty. In my opinion, the loss of one out of 22 battleships is a very heavy one. While the late Government placed a largo programme before the country, we nevertheless felt we had not increased the Navy by one unnecessary ship. It was not a maximum programme. It was a fair programme; and I say that whatever may be the position of the Government at the present moment, the country will expect the Victoria, to be replaced in the constructive programme of the future. I should like to reply to what the Chancellor of the Exchequer has said about the Naval Defence Act. I am perfectly ready at any time to have the whole argument of the Naval Defence Act out with the right hon. Gentleman. For my own part, I can say that there is no Act to which I have 1266 been a party with the success of which I am more satisfied than that of the Naval Defence Act, and we have received it from the mouths of our opponents, for the right hon. Gentleman has given us the pleasing information that every ship included in that programme will be completed in the year 1894.
§ SIR W. HARCOURTBut not paid for.
§ MR. GOSCHENI have an answer to that retort. I am coming to it. It has been shown, therefore, that it is possible for the Admiralty, if carefully tied, as it is tied by the Naval Defence Act, to have done with mere fiddling with ships, changing and altering them in different directions, and really to carry out a programme. The Naval Defence Act has saved money and time, and it has been a complete administrative success. The Chancellor of the Exchequer says the late Government has left the present Board a legacy of two annuities to pay. Does the right hon. Gentleman know what was left, to the late Government when they came into Office? There were left liabilities of £6,000,000 in uncompleted ships. The late Government left completed ships and two annuities of £1,400,000.
§ SIR W. HARCOURTYou diminished the Naval Estimates £1,000,000 in each year.
§ MR. GOSCHENNot since the naval programme was begun. What the late Board did in the two previous years has nothing whatever to do with the naval programme which we established. I did not intend to say a single word with reference to the Naval Defence Act, but that the Chancellor of the Exchequer made an unnecessary excursion into the past.
§ SIR W. HARCOURTIt was made by the right hon. Member for Ormskirk.
§ "MR. GOSCHENThe right hon. Gentleman says that we diminished the Estimate in the beginning of our Administration, and then established the naval programme. Does the right hon. Gentleman not know that the Administration, of which he was a distinguished Member, during its early years diminished its Navy Estimates; then The Pall Mull Gazette insisted on a naval programme, and the Navy Estimates were put up again? An example was, therefore, set us by the 1267 previous Administration, who first diminished the Naval Estimates and then increased them. I am very sorry to trouble the Committee with this matter at all, but I could not allow the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statement that we left him two legacies to pass unchallenged. If we put on those annuities we at the same time put on the taxes to pay for them. If we left £1,400,000 to pay we put on special taxes—the Estate Duties—which, within £100,000, pay for these annuities. Therefore, what hon. Members opposite said in the country with regard to the late Government pledging the future and putting burdens on their successors was entirely wide of the mark, considering that we imposed the taxes necessary to pay for these ships. There is only one point more. As the hon. Member for Cardiff pointed out, we do not wish to force any large increase either in construction or expenditure upon the present Board of Admiralty. What my right hon. Friend here pointed out was that as the Estimates are drawn you will be put in this position: that you will have either to diminish your dockyard labour, or you will be obliged, in order to find work for them, to spend very largely on materials. In any case you will decrease the resources of our dockyards, instead of adding to the power of the country by building new ships. I do not think my right hon. Friend has put this matter unfairly to the Government, and his remarks have been reinforced by the hon. Member for Cardiff, who is an impartial critic of all Administrations.
§ MR. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN (Kent, Faversham)said, that as a Dockyard Representative he wished to say a few words on this Vote. First of all, he entirely agreed with the complaint of the hon. Baronet the Member for Cardiff (Sir E. Reed) of the extreme inconvenience of the Minister in charge of a Department rising to make his reply before Members generally were heard. The consequence of that course in the present instance was that the Committee had been entertained with a great many Front Bench speeches, and that though this Dockyard Vote had been four hours under discussion not one single Dockyard Member had been heard. Before he came to the subject on which he particularly wished to address the Committee he 1268 desired to protest, on behalf of his constituents, against the extreme inconvenience of postponing the discussion of these Votes until August. Of course, he was well aware that the Naval Dockyards were only suffering the same inconvenience as the other interests of the country—naval, military, commercial, and agricultural—owing to the insane attempt of the Government to force on an unwilling country their scheme for the destruction of the Empire. He was perfectly certain that not only dockyard constituencies, but other constituencies, resented this neglect of their interests, and that that resentment would be shown in no uncertain way at the next General Election. Ho had intended to speak on the classification of dockyards; but as the Chairman had previously ruled that that subject would more properly come under Sub-head B, he would only say that he entirely endorsed the complaint made by the Secretary to the Admiralty in the late Government in regard to the inexplicable delay on the part of the Government in presenting their Report on this matter. He had frequently urged this question on the attention of the Government, and had been assured on one occasion by the Civil Lord of the Admiralty that the Report would be out before Whitsuntide; but it was only now that the Report on this very important question had been placed in the hands of Members. His hon. Friend the Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury) had surprised him by advocating the abolition of Sheerness Dockyard. His hon. Friend added that no doubt he, as the Representative of Sheerness, would be prepared to defend the continued existence of the dockyard. Well, he was prepared to defend its continued existence, though he had not for one moment thought that such a question would be raised as tile-abolition of Sheerness Dockyard, and still least of all that it should have been raised by an hon. Member sitting on the Conservative Benches, for it was not in accordance with Conservative policy. Some years ago the question was mooted whether it was possible to do away with Sheerness, and the answer then given by the late Conservative Government was that under no circumstances would they contemplate the removal of Sheerness Dockyard. That view had been endorsed by the present 1269 Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, for the hon. Gentleman had referred to the suitability of Sheerness for many purposes. If he had been completely unprepared to defend Sheerness he would have found ample reason for the continuance of the dockyard in the speech of his hon. Friend himself. What evidence had his hon. Friend brought forward in support of his contention that Sheerness should be abolished? The evidence of one gentleman, Mr. Elgar, who for seven or eight years had been Controller of the Dockyard. He did not dispute the capacity, the ability, or the energy of Mr. Elgar; but what had Mr. Elgar said about Sheerness? He said he was in favour of the discontinuance of Sheerness Dockyard, unless the Naval or Military Authorities said that it was necessary for mobilisation purposes in time of war. That was precisely what the Naval and Military Authorities did say about Sheerness, and that was a sufficient reason why the continuance of the Dockyard was absolutely necessary. His hon. Friend the Member for Preston had based his reason for the abolition of Sheerness on the statement that no ships were built there. If that were accurate it might be a reason for the abolition of the dockyard, but it was absolutely inaccurate. Not only had ships been built there, but at the present time some of the most useful vessels of the Navy were being constructed there. He thought that his hon. Friend, before he made a proposition of such importance, should acquaint himself more carefully with the facts, and arm himself with a little more authority than the authority of one official, whose utterances really were more in accord with his view than the view of the hon. Member for Preston.
§ *MR. GOURLEY (Sunderland)said, he believed that in regard to Naval Expenditure the present Admiralty Board had no intention whatever of reversing the policy of the previous Government, although the Liberal Leaders when in Opposition had found considerable fault with the Naval Expenditure of the late Board of Admiralty, with this exception, that the so-called battleships and cruisers were to be larger—in his opinion a mistake. They also intended building six swifter torpedo catchers, whilst ignoring altogether the work of our neighbour in regard to smaller 1270 craft. He thought the Government should take into consideration the necessity of providing the Navy with a number of these boats equal to the number possessed by the French Government, who had now 250 of them in use. It was stated the other day by the Secretary of State for War that it was impossible for the country to maintain more than one Army Corps. It, therefore, became more essential to maintain the Navy in a most efficient state, depending as the country must for power at home and abroad for supremacy upon its naval and mercantile superiority over that of other Maritime Powers. He was desirous of ascertaining, if possible in specific terms, the naval policy of the Government. Was their programme based upon comparative lines with regard to the strength of Foreign Navies? Had they thought out a programme for the naval offence and defence of the Empire, in all its ramifications and parts; and, if not, he should like to hear what was their policy? He would instance Channel defence and offence, and the protection of trade routes. Would the Admiralty indicate how the various squadrons had been told off and grouped for this purpose? Unless this could be done, he was bound to conclude that the Government and the Admiralty were without a system. He would like to know whether the nation possessed a Navy double that of France and another Naval Power? for upon this they had had no authoritative Return, save that issued the other day on the Motion of the late First Lord, which failed altogether to give correct information regarding the comparative force of this and other Maritime Powers. He joined issue with the Admiralty on their policy with regard to huge ships, which he regarded as a fraud and a delusion. The only purpose for which they could be employed in time of war was for coast defence. Before building more huge battleships the Admiralty ought to make further inquiry with regard to their machinery and vulnerability; but, in his opinion, it would be far better to devote the money which one of those vessels cost to building four smaller vessels of the cruiser class, with which, he believed, future battles at sea would be fought. For ocean fighting they must depend on swift protected cruisers, armed with quick-firing guns. He condemned huge 1271 vessels and guns because of their complicated and delicate machinery. With regard to the range argument, battles were not likely to be fought in the future beyond the range of human vision, as in the Naval Manœuvres off Newcastle, where the Admiral reported that he shelled Newcastle at a distance of nine miles. The most recent opinion of the American Press was against these huge vessels, and the Victoria disaster made him think that in the event of war they would be nothing less than death-traps. Henceforth, instead of trying to build enormous unwieldy craft, whose only merit was thickness of armour, greater attention must be paid to speed and mobility. Thickness of armour only provided against one of the dangers to which a warship was liable, and the one which was steadily decreasing in relative importance—an attack by guns. The ram must hereafter play an important part in naval warfare. Why should they follow other nations in a policy condemned by experts at home and abroad? As the Power needing the first and most powerful Navy in the world, we ought to strike out a line of policy for ourselves instead of following nations with less experience than ourselves. All recent experience condemned the building of any more huge battleships, and pointed to the construction of ram cruisers and torpedo-catchers, not of the Polyphemus type— which had proved a failure in her design, unfit for sea, and useful only for coast defence—but rather of the type of the Blake and Edgar. As he had said, in the event of war huge battleships would prove to be nothing less than death-traps. Some of them only carry four days fuel; the proposed new vessels, at full speed, only six days. This meaning that every second or third day they would have to return to their base for coal. Coal at sea could only be supplied in smooth water, thus proving that for ocean fighting we must have a totally different type of ship.
*MR. GIBSON BOWLES (Lynn Regis)said, it would be felt by the Committee that there was a greater necessity for discussing the Navy Estimates and all that concerned the naval programme than ever there was before. Last year there was practically no discussion of the Estimates at all, which arose from 1272 the situation that then existed. He did think when they came to discuss the Estimates of the year, and matters of so high an importance as the naval programme, they might to some extent be spared the irrelevancies of the Front Benches. They had had that night wrangles as to the merits of different Governments and different programmes, and they had had irrelevancies, more especially from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He only wondered the President of the Board of Trade did not join in. He would only deal with one of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's statements, in order to show with what complete indifference, not to say contempt, the House might treat any statement regarding seafaring matters from one so little qualified to speak on such subjects as the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman said that comparing the Navy of this country with the Navies of other countries we were far and away ahead of them, and he compared our vessels of 10,000 tons and over with, among others, the warships belonging to the United States of America. He might just as well have compared them with the vessels of Switzerland. The United States had not a single vessel of 10,000 tons, and they did not mean to have one. They were building two new battleships, but not one would reach 10,000 tons; therefore, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer came forward with all his magniloquence and asked them to compare their vessels of 10,000 tons with non-existent ones, all he did was not to bring a serious contribution to that Debate, but to show his ignorance of the subject he was talking about. In any battles of the future our part of the fight must be carried on on the enemy's coasts. They should not attempt to enter into an enemy's country, but should skin him alive on his outside—on his shores. By means of the Navy they could coerce an enemy in the very remotest corners in the land. In the last war with France, sugar was driven up to 7s. per lb. in France, whilst we could purchase it for 3d., 4d., and so on. That was what they wanted to do with the Navy—namely, to affect the material resources of the enemy. He did not care if he killed a few men belonging to the enemy, for if he made him pay 7s. per 1b. for sugar he was his 1273 victim. Besides sugar, other articles of merchandise rose in proportion, which went to prove his position—that with the predominance at sea they could command and coerce the laud without using soldiers or any elements of a war force. But what did they find in this maritime country, which was dependent upon its Navy? That whilst in the Estimates the Navy was put off with £15,250,000, the Army received £20,750,000, more than half the sum allocated, but, instead of that, the Army had devoted to it one-third more than was expended on the Navy. These proportions ought to be reversed. He did not say that they should settle a very long or continuous programme of shipbuilding, because every month witnessed very considerable improvement in shipbuilding and in the art of navigation. But the fact that improvements were constantly being made did not dispense us from laying down ships. Before going further he wished to say that it did seem to him that it was a pity the First Lord of the Admiralty did not sit in that House instead of in another place. If he were in that House he could deal with the matters relating to his Department. He trusted that before long the Secretary to the Admiralty would return to the House, as he wished that gentleman to hear what he had to say. He should be in his place to answer any questions put; but as he was not, and as he was the responsible Minister, he (Mr. Bowles) begged to move that Progress be reported.
MR. GIBSON BOWLESIn the absence of the Minister concerned with the Vote, I move that you report Progress, and ask leave to sit again.
*MR. GIBSON BOWLESsaid, he had not understood that that was what the Chairman had said. He would, therefore, proceed, in the absence of anybody whatever competent to attend to his speech or to answer it. [At this point Sir U. Kay-Shuttleworth returned to his seat on the Treasury Bench.] The right hon. Gentleman said he wished to put the English Navy in a condition which would render it equal to any two other 1274 Navies in Europe. As the right hon. Gentleman was now at last in his place he wished to remind him that he had distinctly committed himself to that view —that the Navy of England should be superior to the combined Navies of any two other countries. In that opinion the right hon. Gentleman told them he was supported by Vice Admiral Sir A. Hoskins, K.C.B. That was the view of the late Lord of the Admiralty and the present Lord, and how had they begun with regard to it? Had they now a sufficient superiority over the combined Navies of any two other nations? He could show that they had not; and that even if they had now, it was certain they would not have two years hence, assuming that the plan which the right hon. Gentleman had laid down were pursued. Fortune had diminished their Fleet by one ship, and the right hon. Gentleman had diminished it by another. They were not only deprived of the Victoria, but the Secretary to the Admiralty had announced that the building of the Terrible was to be abandoned. That left them worse off by two ships. He (Mr. Gibson Bowles) objected to putting too many eggs in one basket, and he did say that it was better to build three small vessels than two large ones. The right hon. Gentleman said he could not understand Members insisting upon the necessity of replacing one ship; but, behindhand as they were, and in view of the progress other nations were making, it was absolutely necessary that the Victoria should be replaced at the earliest possible moment. He could not forget what Admiral Hoskins had said with regard to the relative superiority in which they ought to stand. They must go on the same basis as before, but they should keep as far ahead as possible. The right hon. Gentleman said it was very easy for men in opposition to talk about a Supplementary Estimate for the Victoria. If the Secretary to the Admiralty came down to the House and asked for another £1,000,000 for the Navy he would get it without a dissentient voice being raised. Not a finger or voice would be raised on the Opposition Benches against it. In this country anything that the Government wanted for the Navy they could get. Let the right hon. Gentleman take heart of grace; let him come down tomorrow and tell them he wanted 1275 £1,000,000 for another Victoria, and he (Mr. Bowles) would answer he should have it. He would answer for the House of Commons, because he was perfectly certain that nothing was easier in this country than to get any money that he reasonably demanded for the British Navy. The hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir E. J. Reed) had called attention to the cost of building ships of the Edgar class in the dockyards and in private yards. The Edgar was estimated to cost £364,000, but in reality it cost £401,000, while an exactly similar class of ship built by private contract cost £334,000. The hon. Member for Cardiff used these facts to show the hardship inflicted on the contractors; but he (Mr. Gibson Bowles) would use them in another sense—to show the enormous extravagance of the dockyards. He thought the time had arrived when we should take into consideration whether we had better not build all our ships by private contract. He could not conceive what answer would be given on this point. There had been extravagant expenditure in this case. The hon. Member for Cardiff alluded to the loss of the Victoria, and contended—as he (Mr. Gibson Bowles) contended—that after they had wept for the dead it was their duty to learn the lessons that were to be learnt from that awful catastrophe. He (Mr. Gibson Bowles) was rebuked the other day by the Secretary to the Admiralty for asking whose duty it was to call up the engineers and stokers on the Victoria when it was seen that there was imminent danger of the ship foundering. He was told his question was a reflection upon someone on the vessel. He now asserted boldly that it was the duty either of the Captain or the officer of the watch, or whoever was in charge of the ship, when the ship was in imminent danger of foundering, to call up all the men in the engine-rooms and stokeholds.
*MR. GIBSON BOWLESsaid, very well. He should pass to the question of construction. As he understood the system they had adopted, they had committed very grave and very fatal blunders with regard to the principle adopted of late in their battleships, and those blunders had almost all been copied from 1276 foreign nations. They had gone exactly contrary to the rules of common sense with regard to their cruisers and battleships. They put all the weight on the top of the ship, and then they wondered that she "turned turtle." Although the enormous increase in the weight of armour protected the men at the guns, as well as the crew generally and the machinery of the ship, they were left absolutely unprotected against what they feared most—the ram and the torpedo. He thought their object in naval construction should be to seek to develop the offensive rather than the defensive power of their ships. He would rather have a ship and weapons that could hit hard than one that would escape being hurt itself. He believed that what their sailors most valued was the power of hitting their enemies. That was the principle upon which they should proceed—giving that power; and he would impress upon the right hon. Gentleman the necessity of carrying out that principle. They ought to extend it as much as possible. There were one or two other matters which he should like to mention, but the hon. and gallant Admiral below him (Admiral Field), as representing the Navy, wished to address the House, and he would not detain them longer. He trusted the Government would see the necessity of allowing them to discuss these important questions at greater length than they appeared to be willing to grant on this occasion.
§ MR. W. ALLAN (Gateshead)said, he had listened with very great interest to the speeches which had been made on this Vote, and he had been interested especially noticing the number of Members who possessed information of a valuable character with regard to shipbuilding matters and naval architecture. One point that struck him occurred in the speech of the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury). There was a very simple way out of the difficulty pointed out by the hon. Member with regard to dockyard management. The Government ought to make the dockyards tender for ships in the same way as private yards, and ought only to give them the contract if they were cheaper than such private yards. He would allow no repairing work to be given to dockyards unless the head manager 1277 gave a tender for that work. With regard to the hon. Member for Cardiff, he thought in his condemnation of certain classes of ships he was acting too much as a nautical Jeremiah. He (Mr Allan) would impress upon the Committee that if a ship were struck by a ram she was rammed, and her stability was destroyed.
§ SIB E. J. REEDNo.
§ MR. ALLANsaid, yes; she became like au inclined plane, and the working of her screw drove her down. A ship had foundered under him, and he had watched the process of her descent to the bottom.
§ *SIR E. J. REEDsaid, the ironclad Vanguard had floated for an hour after being struck; she only sank because the water-tight doors between the large engine and boiler rooms wore open.
§ MR. ALLANsaid, if the Victoria had been rammed suddenly while standing she would have gone down head foremost, and would not have tilted over. It was very easy to say that they should have vessels built one way instead of another. He would ask, what was to be done about the displacement? Would it be possible to get speed with increased displacement? They could not have everything in a man-of-war all at once— speed, and offensive and defensive power. They could only improve things bit by bit. That was all that any country could do. The junior Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) was of opinion that the warships were far too big; but he (Mr. Allan) did not believe that—he thought they were not big enough. It was impossible to get a higher speed unless they increased the length of the ships so as to give room for the engines. The weakest spot in the Navy was the cramping of the engines into a small space in order to increase the speed. The future ships of Great Britain would be big ships, although they might be very difficult to handle. Now, what had been done under the Naval Defence Act? He looked at this matter, not from a Party point of view, but from a national point of view, and he considered that, their Fleet being their first line of defence, it ought to be invincible. What had the Act done for them? He found that under the Act there had been built 10 1278 ships of 10,000 tons displacement, nine ships between 10,000 and 5,000 tons, 83 ships between 5,000 and 2,500 tons, and 18 ships below 2,500 tons. These figures showed, certainly, that a large number of small ships had been built under the Act. He did not wish to take up any more time. There had been a great waste of time—such a great waste that he almost shrank from intervening in the Debate; and he should not, therefore, detain the House for another moment. He cared not who sat on the Front Ministerial Bench; he cared not who was in Opposition; for his impression was that the soul of British patriotism lived with equal strength in the breasts of Members of both Parties. There need be no fear for the future of the British Navy whoever was in Office. The endeavour would always be to maintain the naval strength of this country equal to that of any two combined Powers in the world.
ADMIRALFIELD (Sussox, Eastbourne)said, he was sure they were all greatly pleased by the remarks which had fallen from the hon. Member who had just sat down, than whom no one had had a wider experience and had a better right to speak on these subjects. Naval men, who remembered the hon. Member's career, were proud to think that he had been associated with them, and trusted that he would continue to give them the benefit of his commanding abilities. The remarks which had fallen from the hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Gibson Bowles) he would not analyse. Much that the hon. Member had said be (Admiral Field) did not approve of. For instance, he did not approve of what the hon. Member had said as to the naval construction of big ships. Those remarks grated on the ear. Then the hon. Member was rather hard on the Secretary to the Admiralty for not being present when he (Mr. Gibson Bowles) was speaking. The right hon. Baronet was, no doub, better engaged elsewhere—in the dining room. The hon. Member also expressed regret that the First Lord of the Admiralty was not in the House of Commons, but in the House of Lords. It was, however, not fair to complain on that head. There was no good reason why Members of the House of Commons should monopolise all the chief Offices of the State. The hon. Member had made 1279 some ironical remarks about his (Admiral Field's) representing the Navy; and if he did not represent the Navy he did not know what on earth he represented. He could tell the hon. Member that naval men did not share his views. They were thankful to the Board of Admiralty, presided over by the nobleman referred to, and to the high-minded gentleman opposite and his talented colleague. No doubt the position of these gentlemen was difficult. The Secretary to the Admiralty had defended himself very ably from the remarks of the noble Lord the late First Lord of the Admiralty, though in a rather irascible manner. It was to be regretted that the right hon. Baronet had not more of the spirit of naval men, so as to be able to take the attacks of an opponent in good humour. Some important remarks had been made by the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir E. J. Reed). The hon. Member complained that there were in the Navy 11 ironclads of the type of the Victoria—that was to say, with unarmoured ends. The hon. Member asserted that vessels such as this were dangerous to the lives of officers and men. Well, this was no new matter. The hon. Member himself had called attention to the subject before, and he had been answered before. The hon. Member made similar remarks when the Inflexible was being designed, and he was instrumental in causing the construction of that vessel to be postponed for many months. A Committee of experts were appointed to consider the question of the stability of the Inflexible. The Report was not in favour of the view of the hon. Member for Cardiff, but in favour of the ship being built according to her design.
§ SIR E. J. REEDBut the Committee most earnestly urged the House to build no more vessels of the kind until great changes had been made; but the Admiralty did build more, and the Victoria was one.
§ SIR E. J. REEDThey did.
ADMIRAL FIELDNo; they did not condemn the design, although they advised that no more should be built. As to the ships of the Victoria class, there they were. Did the hon. Member propose that anything should be done to make them better? Did the hon. Mem- 1280 ber say that if there had been an armour belt round the Victoria there would have been any difference in the result?
§ SIR E. J. REEDIf the vessel bad had an armour belt there would have been 500 times the resistance to the inroad of the ram.
ADMIRAL FIELDsaid, of course, this was a question for the experts in naval construction, and he hoped the hon. Member for Belfast, who was so well qualified to speak on the matter, would give them his opinion. His own belief was that the impact of an immense vessel like the Camperdoivn going at six or seven knots an hour would be such that the vessel rammed could not survive. As a matter of fact, the ships were not built to stand collisions, but to resist shot and shell. This was the object aimed at, and it had yet to be shown that shot and shell going into the unarmoured ends of these vessels would compromise their stability. He did not think the remarks of the hon. Baronet would shake the confidence of the officers and men on board these ships. As everybody knew, they carried their lives in their hands when they went into battle, and everyone knew that no ship could be designed which would not endanger life in some form or other. As to appointing a Committee of Inquiry, he did not think that this was at all necessary, for we had long ceased to design vessels of this class; and, doubtless, the hon. Baronet would admit that the design of the first-class ironclads now left nothing to be desired. Coming now to the remarks of the Secretary to the Admiralty, he noted that the right hon. Baronet spoke of the present Board as preserving the continuity of our naval policy. He (Admiral Field) was not, however, satisfied that continuity was really being preserved. Lord Hood of Avalon, who had been quoted, advocated the carrying out of a progressive scheme of shipbuilding; but there was nothing progressive in the scheme of the Government, for of the three line-of-battle ships spoken of two belonged to last year's programme. The right hon. Baronet deprecated Supplementary Estimates. Did he mean that there was to be no proposal to replace the Victoria? He believed the Naval Lords, if they could speak here, would say that the Victoria should be replaced. He should, certainly, hold that view 1281 until it was contradicted by the right hon. Baronet. The Naval Programme was certainly deficient in not taking into account vessels which were lost by accidents. Of course, in war time, if ships were lost it was expected that the enemy would suffer in proportion, and that, therefore, the balance of strength would not be disturbed. But vessels lost in time of peace should be replaced. The right hon. Baronet had laid much stress upon the value of that part of the programme which related to so-called torpedo-catchers, and he had said that the desire of the Admiralty to provide these vessels had caused them to postpone the building of a cruiser. They would not thank the right hon. Baronet for that. If the torpedo-destroyers were wanted so were cruisers. As to these torpedo-destroyers, the late manœuvres had shown that so far those which we possessed wore too slow for their work. He had heard that in one case a signal was made to the commander of a torpedo-catcher to prepare for higher speed in 20 minutes, which ought to have been ample time; but the answer signalled was—"I cannot do it; it will take me 40 minutes to prepare for higher speed." These vessels were valueless. They were admirable to look upon, but failures in practice. The reason, as stated by the hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. W. Allan), was that they had not enough reserve boiler power. Now torpedo-catchers of a superior type were needed; but he hoped that in constructing these the Admiralty would not confine themselves to one pattern, or carry out the work all at once. Naval men would rather see one or two constructed rapidly and tried before others were built. He remembered that 50 torpedo boats were built in a hurry from one pattern. When they came to be tried it was found that they were not fit to take to sea with their bottle-nosed bows, and all of them had to be altered at a heavy cost. With regard to the observations of the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury), one or two of them had put his (Admiral Field's) back up. They had heard some of them before, therefore the matter was not new. The hon. Member was a reformer, no doubt, but he was anxious to reform what had already been reformed. His remarks would apply to the state of things which existed in 1884 or 1885; 1282 but improvements had been made since then. He had talked about abolishing the Admiral Superintendents of the Dockyards—or rather the hon. Member had begun that way. He (Admiral Field) had looked at the hon. Member, and he had given up some of the remarks he had evidently intended to make. The earlier part of the hon. Member's view would be reported and the latter part would not, so that a false impression might be conveyed to the public, who were inclined to regard the hon. Member as the friend of the Services. He would ask the hon. Member to read the evidence of Sir James Graham, the Duke of Somerset, and other civilians, as to the desirability of retaining the Naval Superintendents. The hon. Member had proposed that they should dispense with Sheerness Dockyard. The great body of naval opinion, however, was in favour of retaining Sheerness Dockyard, as it was essential for purposes of mobilisation. They could not mobilise the Fleet in two harbours only—Portsmouth and Plymouth; they wanted Sheerness also. The hon. Member had also questioned the desirability of retaining Haulbowline Dockyard. Naval men would be in sympathy with Haulbowline. They were glad that it existed, and in war time especially it might be very useful for ships of the Navy, and even of the Mercantile Marine. A warship might find it very convenient to go there for repairs, and for this purpose it would be no difficult matter to transport shipwrights if necessary. With regard to the general question, they were told that the Government would not do more than carry out their general programme. Naval men desired to sec the Victoria replaced. He did not feel himself competent to pronounce an opinion on the policy of the Admiralty in building the two enormous cruisers which they had heard about—the Powerful and the Terrible. It might be right. The Russians had two, if not three, such vessels. The French wore, he thought, building two. Such vessels might, therefore, be necessary in the British Navy. He was glad that the Admiralty were making 45-ton guns instead of those of larger calibre, and making provision for a larger supply of guns which could be loaded by hand. He should like to hear the opinions of experts 1283 as to whether the engines and boilers were sufficient for the work they had to do; and it seemed to him that where our ships failed was in being unable to carry sufficient coal. Another point which naval men were naturally anxious about was as to the reserves. When the present programme, was completed—about 1895—this country would have about one-third more ships than the French, which was not enough. But a very strong opinion had been expressed that no time should be lost in placing our Navy beyond comparison with that of any two Powers. That, however, was not at all the standard which should be aimed at. It was simply a phrase. The true standard should be based on the work which our Navy had to do. This should be carefully thought out, and a programme arranged accordingly. Sir George Elliot had pointed out that we ought to have a reserve of at least 10 battleships and 10 cruisers; and Lord Nelson, who was supposed to know his business, had remarked, on leaving our shores, "Look to your reserves." It never seemed to have dawned upon the intellect of any Government that it was necessary to have reserves. But the experience of the last Manœuvres had shown that we must provide against losses. The torpedo boats had succeeded in torpedoing eight vessels; and if that could be done in the Irish Channel when every precaution was being taken to avoid it, what might not be done in war? He would here quote from an authority for whom hon. Gentlemen opposite would have regard. The late M. Thiers once expressed his impression of the naval enterprise and policy of this country by saying—" One ship lost, one ship launched." He evidently thought that this was our policy, and we should certainly make it our policy. They should have a certain well-determined standard, and never allow the Fleet to fall below it. We were dangerously weak in the Mediterranean. Russia, by some arrangement with France, was said to contemplate having a naval force in those waters, and it was also rumoured that France was going to make a naval port near Tunis. If this project should be carried into effect, and war should break out between England and France, if we had no reserve in the Mediterranean, it might become necessary for us to with- 1284 draw from there, falling back on Gibraltar, and leaving Malta to defend herself. He thought he was justified in complaining that not a single word was said in the Estimates about the new torpedo catchers, although those vessels were urgently wanted. There were many lessons to be learned by the late Naval Manœuvres; but the Chairman would stop him if he referred to some of them. He thought the Admiralty ought to commend the young officers in the torpedo-boats for the gallant way in which they did their work, especially Lieutenant Prowse. They had no doubt heard of that young officer, who in the late Manœuvres, by disguising men in a fishing boat, had torpedoed the Narcissus. He was told that the Captain was angry, and threatened to have the young officer put in irons. In his (Admiral Field's) opinion, however, the commander of the torpedo-boat deserved better treatment; he should have been invited on board, and asked to a champagne supper. The young officer claimed his prize, but was bullied into relinquishing it. There were not a sufficient number of torpedo-boats at Gibraltar or Malta. It was all a question of money; therefore they would only growl and accept the inevitable. He believed the right hon. Baronet opposite and his colleagues at the Admiralty were as desirous as he (Admiral Field) was of doing more, and would do more if they had the power. But their master sat beside them in the form of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and, unfortunately, they might as well appeal to a rock as to the present Chancellor of the Exchequer.
§ *SIR E. HARLAND (Belfast, N.)said, he objected to the Vote of £261,000 for the Majestic and the Magnificent, and in referring to those two vessels he must ask the right hon. Baronet (Sir U. Kay-Shuttleworth) to rest assured that he approached the consideration of the matter in no Party spirit. He should have made the same observations if he had been sitting on the other side of the House. As a matter of fact, he had not had the opportunity of expressing his views on this class of vessel, seeing that they were constructed under the Naval Defence Act, and were decided upon before he had the honour of a seat in the House. In addition to the reason afforded by the lamentable disaster which 1285 had recently occurred, he thought he had abundant ground for drawing attention to these vessels. His objection to these two vessels which it was proposed to build was, first, that the vessels presumably would be built on similar lines to the other ships of the same class—that was to say, in the absence of information to the contrary—which he had done his best to obtain—he assumed that the lines of these ships would be similar to the lines of the others. He assumed that the coal bunkers would be arranged similarly to those in other ships of the same class, and considered such an arrangement extremely dangerous, because in case of collision it was almost impossible to close the watertight doors, and the ship would probably capsize. The next point he would call attention to was the ram of these vessels. An immense amount of money was spent in producing something which looked like a ram, but which was practically useless and not deserving of the name. As he had said, he had been unable to obtain precise information from the right hon. Baronet as to the coal capacity of these ships. The statements which had been submitted to the House with regard to these two ships were to the effect that good provision would be made in them for coal, and that they would carry more than the Royal Sovereign. Still, he had a right to assume, as no precise information was forthcoming, that the ships would carry no more than 900 tons. Assuming that that was the case, their coal supply would be only equal to three days' full steaming, or 1,260 knots, which would mean arriving at Gibraltar or at Riga with empty bunkers. He considered that, having regard to the services which our Fleet might be called upon to render, it was necessary that the vessels should have a greater coal capacity than this. One of these ships on reaching Riga would be absolutely useless unless followed by a number of colliers of equal speed with herself. It seemed to him that such a vessel should be able to steam at the rate of 17 knots to Malta, consuming 1,350 tons, and should then have one day's coal in her bunkers. She should be able to steam to Cronstadt, consuming 950 tons, and should then have two days' coal in her bankers—sufficient to enable her to assume the offensive or defensive. At 15 knots she should be able to go 1286 to Halifax, consuming 1,200 tons, the donkey engines and electric engines all having their supplies. She should arrive at Halifax with one day's coal in her bunkers. She should, therefore, be able to carry 1,550 tons, whereas provision had only been made for 900 tons.
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHsaid, the hon. Baronet was mistaken in supposing that capacity was only provided for 900 tons. That was the capacity on the designed load-draught.
§ *SIR E. HARLANDsaid, that when they were handed a specification in which it was stated that the ship's draught would be 27½ feet, they presumed that that would be the draught when the vessel was loaded and equipped ready for service, and he hold that such a ship was not equipped and ready for service with only 900 tons of coal in her bunkers.
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHsaid, the arrangements in those ships were different to those made in the older vessels. They would be able to carry a much larger quantity of coal.
§ *SIR E. HARLANDHow much more?
§ *SIR E. HARLANDsaid, he had asked questions on the subject at question time to-day, and was sorry that he had not been able to obtain the information he sought. He had been obliged to reason the matter out for himself. If more coal was put into the vessels, unless they were increased in size, they would be sent to sea in a very inconvenient condition.
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHsaid, the only result would be that the vessels would be a few inches deeper in the water.
§ *SIR E. HARLANDsaid, his contention was that the vessels should carry 650 tons more coal; and if the right hon. Baronet thought that that would make a difference of only a few inches in the draught of the ships he was very much mistaken. It would make a difference of over two feet. To carry 1,550 tons, instead of 900 tons of coal, the bunkers of each ship would have to be two-thirds larger than was intended. 8.7 feet in the length of the ship ought to give a carrying power of 290 tons, or one day's supply, so that if they increased the 1287 length of the ship by 19½ feet, it would give them 650 tons—or, say, 20 feet, which would give an additional coal capacity of 666 tons. If the amount of coal which appeared to him to be necessary were carried, and the length of the ship were increased by 20 feet, that would make the dimensions 410 feet by the 75 feet proposed. They could not place too much importance on this matter of coal. He could imagine one of these vessels with a number of torpedo boats and torpedo catchers all looking to her, like young pigs to a sow, to providethem with coal. Such a ship could not expect to be followed at a speed of 17, or 15, or even 12½ knots by a fleet of colliers. These vessels must be their own colliers. They could not imagine a more lamentable thing than a splendid ship of this kind with empty bunkers. Her position would be pitiable. She would be at the mercy of the enemy to be rammed at leisure, and would be treated practically as a conquered vessel. He thought, therefore, that of all measures taken to insure the safety of battle-ships, that of making provision for giving them an ample supply of coal was the most important. Without steam these vessels were mere logs in the water. They had no masts; only something in the nature of a pole for signalling purposes. Could they conceive anything more helpless than one of these ships would be, in the presence of an enemy, with empty bunkers? It might be said, as an objection to increasing the length of these ships, that heavy cost would be entailed. Then make them, say, 420 × 73—with six inches loss draught. They would be better seagoing vessels—steadier and able to make much better weather. But coal, and to spare, in the bunkers should be the first consideration. He spoke especially of bunkers, because they had been told that other vessels of this class had spaces near the bunkers where they could stow large quantities of coal. Well, setting aside the fact that that would make the vessel draw more water, imagine the condition of a ship with these various outlying holes filled with coal coming into collision, or meeting with an accident which would render it necessary for the officer in command to order the watertight doors to be closed. All these bunkers would have watertight doors between them and the stokeholes, and 1288 these various outlying holes would have the same. If the order were given "Close bulkhead doors," what would it mean? Why, that the stokers would be able to get no more coal; and if the ship were on the offensive or defensive, in a few hours she would be helpless. What should be done? They should arrange the bunkers in the way in which they were arranged on merchant ships, where there were bunker doors letting the coal out of the bunkers into the stokeholes; but those doors had nothing to do with the bulkheads of the ship. Unless they had bunkers of the proper size, and properly arranged, there would soon be melancholy results to chronicle. He could not emphasise too strongly the importance of this coaling question. It was absurd to suppose that a large ironclad could always count upon re-coaling in the open sea. The operation was difficult in fair weather, but a ship might be in the centre of a fleet of colliers without being able to obtain a single ton of coal if there was anything like a sea on. It was foolish to suppose that slow-going colliers could keep an ironclad supplied with coal at sea. Even when the difficulty of coaling at sea could be overcome the supplies would have to be obtained from quick-sailing merchant ships; and, instead of its being said that the Royal Navy protected the Merchant Service, it could then be said that the Merchant Service protected the Royal Navy, because the coal which the merchantmen would bring would be far more useful to the man-of-war than shots in the locker. For his own part, he would rather have a ship with plenty of coal, but without powder and shot, than a ship fully armed, but with empty bunkers. In the former case the vessel could use its ram, but in the latter case the ship would be at the mercy of the enemy. With regard to short ships—a point the hon. Member for Gateshead touched on—they had got into the fashion of designing ships as short as possible, forgetting that the shorter they made them the more they would cramp the engines, the boilers, the turrets, the bunkers, and the stores. They injured the sea-going qualities of the ships in the attempt to make them as nearly round as possible. The hon. Baronet opposite (Sir E. J. Reed) had had experience of building a round ship, 1289 so that in this country we were not likely to hear much more about them—
§ SIR E. J. REEDI do not know what the hon. Baronet refers to.
§ SIR E. HARLANDI was under the impression that the hon. Baronet designed the round vessel for the Russian Government.
§ SIR E. J. REEDI had no more to do with it than the hon. Baronet himself.
§ *SIR E. HARLANDsaid, he was sorry he had made the mistake. With regard to rams as at present constructed, he thought they were not fit for then-purpose. They could not have a better illustration of this than the condition of the Camperdown after its unfortunate collision with the Victoria. Although these ships were going at slow speed, the result of the Camperdown ramming the Victoria was that she nearly sank herself. In warfare, in all probability, the ram would be used at a speed of 12 knots. At such a speed as that the blow given to the Victoria would in all probability have been fatal to the Camperdown. He saw no mechanical difficulty in the way of designing a ram which, with perfect safety to the vessel carrying it, would enable a ship to send half-a-dozen ironclads to the bottom in a day. At present the ram was a steel snout, weighing perhaps 150 tons, but without the necessary backing. He would suggest that better designs should be adopted; also that the Admiralty should utilise some of our old wooden men-of-war now lying in a tidal harbour by placing 2-feet thick armour on their sides and then construct a ram that would penetrate that armour without damage to the ram. Until they put their ram to that test they would never construct a satisfactory one. They spent hundreds of thousands of pounds in constructing ships with rams, all of which were really worse than useless for ramming purposes. They built their torpedo boats with bottle-nosed rams. Not only did this interfere with the sea-going qualities of the boats, but as to the utility of the rain, if they ran into an old 200-ton wooden collier, they would merely crush themselves up. A man might just as well run full lilt at a wall with a thimble on the end of his nose and imagine that it would save his face. He would urge the Government not to put rams of the old design on the new vessels they were about to construct. He 1290 did not wish to disturb the programme which the Admiralty had sot themselves to carry out; but if it were practicable, he should like to see them build a pure and simple ram. They had one—the Polyphemus—but it was a wretched attempt, which did not deserve the name of a ram. Let them build a perfect ram, and, for once, ignore the idea of powder and shot. Let them see what they could do with such a vessel. So sanguine was he as to the value of such a ship that he would undertake with a good ram to destroy more of an enemy's ships than the heaviest armed ironclad afloat could destroy with shot and shell. That brought him to the very lamentable disaster, the recent loss of the Victoria. In ramming the Victoria the Camperdown should have received no injury whatever, as she was only going at five or six knots an hour. That was very slow speed—merely drifting. The results of the collision showed the tremendous momentum acquired by these battleships; and a ram going at 15 or 16 knots ought to crush through an armour-clad, even if its armour were a couple of feet thick, without those at the stern of the ram knowing what had happened. In fact, the enormous iron plates, which were a protection against shot and shell, would only make the case of a vessel that was rammed worse. The armour-plate a couple of feet thick, which would stand a shot from a 100-ton gun, would be simply crushed in at once by a blow of a ram. He therefore thought we were not yet sufficiently impressed with the importance of the ram as a weapon of war. The plating behind the ram of the Camperdown was so thin that it was burst in by merely scratching against the Victoria. The hon. Member for Cardiff said that if these vessels were cut into by a ram they were bound to capsize. But the Camperdown only settled a little at the bows, but without any list.
§ *SIR E. J. REEDsaid, the Camperdown had not been run into, and that he had never declared that an injury to the stem of a ram before the collision bulkhead would mean the capsizing of the ship.
§ SIR E. HARLANDsaid, it depended entirely on how the vessels were arranged.
§ SIR E. J. REEDDo you know how they are arranged?
§ SIR E. HARLANDNo.
§ SIR E. J. REEDWell, I do.
§ *SIR E. HARLANDI know how they ought to be arranged. The hon. Member, continuing, said, that at any rate he did not hesitate to say that the watertight doors played an enormously important part in the matter. The House had not yet been given the most important information about the sinking of the Victoria, and that was information as to the condition of the bulkhead doors. The Victoria went to the bottom entirely on account of something being wrong with the bulkhead doors. His own impression was that the order to close the doors was given in what would have been sufficient time for the closing of modern bulkhead doors, but was not sufficient for the closing of the old doors of the Victoria. There were doors which were capable of being closed instantaneously; and it was lamentable that the Admiralty should not have adopted those doors or have inquired into them. Foils years the Admiralty had had opportunity for seeing how such doors worked; and if those doors had been on the Victoria, he had no hesitation in saying that she would have been afloat to-day. The injury received was not sufficient to sink the vessel, and she had no business to sink. It was not fair to the House of Commons that while all the evidence at the Court Martial on mere matters of discipline should have been put before Parliament, everyone was kept perfectly ignorant on the most vital question of all—that of the condition of the bulkheads. For some years past great stress had been laid on the advantages of side blinkers filled with coal. It was said that they were admirable shot protectors. He wished to know whether experiments had ever been made with projectiles through chambers representing side bunkers in a ship filled with coal, and whether the coal in those chambers offered the slightest resistance to such projectiles? His own impression was that coal was the poorest article that could be used with which to keep out water or turn a shot; and that something of a spongy character, such as India-rubber, or even shavings, would be much more effectual for the purpose than coal, which surely could offer very little resistance to shot or serve to stop the inflow of water.
§ MR. WOLFF (Belfast, E.)said, he did not intend to detain the Committee long, as most of the matters on which he 1292 had intended to speak had been dealt with by his colleague in the representation of Belfast. He did not agree with the statement of the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty as to the amount of coal consumed by a war vessel. He thought the amount very much understated. He expressed his approval of the designs of the new cruisers. They were the best things he had ever seen designed by any Government in power, and he hoped they would be proceeded with as soon as possible. The Secretary to the Admiralty had also said that the cost of vessels built in the dockyards was less than that of vessels built by private firms. He ventured to think, however, there must be a considerable difference in the incidental expenses of the public and private yards. Indeed, the hon. Baronet the Member for Cardiff (Sir E. J. Reed) had pointed out that these incidental expenses ranged from 2½ to 20 per cent. When a private firm got a ship from the Admiralty to build, a certain number of Inspectors were sent down. The private shipbuilder could not do a single thing without consultation with the Inspector, and in nine cases out of ten the Inspector did not know what to do, but had to get an answer from somebody else at bead-quarters, and the result was frequent delays and unnecessary expense. Again, there was hardly a private manufacturer —at all events, those in a large way employing skilled hands—who did not pay the ordinary wages approved by the Trade Unions? That, he believed, was not the case in the dockyards.
THE CHAIRMANOrder, order! The hon. Member is not referring to the Amendment under discussion. It is not in Order to deal with the wages on the present Vote.
§ MR. WOLFFsaid, he thought he was straying a little; but then the discussion had strayed a good deal already. The only other matter he wanted to touch upon was the torpedo-catchers. He asked whether these catchers could not be so improved as to-enable them to catch torpedoes?
§ MR. ARNOLD-FORSTER (Belfast, W.)said, he trusted his right hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty would not regard him as a public or a private enemy for interposing in the Debate. He said that, because it had been his duty last week to ask a few questions in regard to these matters on which he should 1293 say he had not yet got the information he required; and his right hon. Friend, in replying to these questions, insinuated that he was rather trespassing on matters with which he had no connection. He assured his right hon. Friend that his only desire in asking these questions was to obtain information, and not to criticise in any way the conduct or astion of his right hon. Friend. He did not speak without book in these matters, because for many years he had been brought into close relations with the dockyards, and had given them his most careful study. Something had been said by the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the Naval Defence Act. He was not going to discuss the question on general principles; but he said that anyone who looked at the Navy from his point of view must consider that the Naval Defence Act was the greatest boon ever conferred on the Navy. It was true that the expenditure of £11,000,000 under the Administration of Lord Northbrook was a great boon to the Navy; but it was not to be compared to the Naval Defence Act, and it would be most unfair to suggest that the country had not reaped permanent advantages from the improvements made in the Navy. Again and again the necessity-for a fixed and definite programme had been made evident. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had remarked that there never had been a time when the forces of this country were more fit to be compared for efficiency and power with the forces of other nations. That statement, however, was not based on fact. He challenged the right hon. Gentleman to put the question to any naval authority of the country with a knowledge of the conditions of Foreign Navies. He was sure the right hon. Gentleman would get for an answer that he could hardly have made a statement on the Navy more contrary to recorded and obvious facts. The facts were—he took them from the Return furnished to the House by the Secretary to the Admiralty —that we had now built or wore building 60 ironclad ships; but France and Russia combined had 70 such ships. So that we were within reach of the date when we would see ourselves outnumbered by those Powers to the extent of 10 ships. Of ships in commission Great Britain had 27, and France and Russia combined had 29. In face of those facts 1294 ho maintained it was the duty of the Admiralty to take immediate steps to replace the Victoria. The Secretary to the Admiralty had said that it was not an easy matter to come down to the House and submit Estimates to replace the lost ship. The right hon. Gentleman had got a straight and satisfactory answer from the noble Lord opposite (Lord G. Hamilton). The noble Lord had said that it might be hard, but that it was a thing that could be done, and a thing that had been done. He believed that if they had had the information the day he asked his question, the right hon. Gentleman would have found that the opinion of every naval man was that the right thing to do was to ask the House for £1,000,000 sterling for a ship to take the place of the Victoria; and he was convinced that if a statement of the true facts of the case were made, there would be no difficulty either with the House or with the country to repair the great loss which had been sustained by the sinking of the Victoria. The other day he asked the Secretary to the Admiralty how many ships had been begun by the present Government; and, though he would be the last person in the world to suggest that his right hon. Friend would mislead anyone, the answer he received was most misleading to the House and to the country. He was told that 13 ships had been begun since the present Board entered Office. The fact was that two ships, and two only, were in any way due to the initiative of the present Government, and even they were small torpedo boats of 200 tons each. The Renown was a ship for which money was taken by the last Government. They were told that it was laid down on the 1st of February; but, as a fact, prior to the commencement of the financial year no less that £14,500 had already been spent on the Renown. She ought to have been begun at the end of last year; but owing to the dilatoriness of the present Government she was not taken in hand. Then there were five other ships which it was claimed were commenced in the present year, and yet in the previous financial years sums varying from£13,000 to £15,000 were voted and expended upon them. All these matters should be capable of Departmental explanation. There were three great cruisers, the Minerva, the Talbot, and the Eclipse, supposed to have been begun by the present Govern- 1295 ment, whereas the appliances had not even been laid down for them. They were not commenced in the ordinary sense of the word. He believed he might truly say that in the whole naval history of this country a twelvemonth had never before gone by when nothing had been begun for the Royal Navy by the Government in power. He spoke the other day about the deep-sea harbours on the other side of the Channel. He mentioned them now because they were ancillary to the great scheme of construction which the French Marine were about to carry out. In the harbours of Brest and Dunkirk nests of torpedo boats were to be located, and they were protected and organised in a wonderful way. We had only made one attempt to respond to that method of offence on the part of France. We had built a large number, too large a number, of torpedo-catchers, but there was not a single one of those vessels which would run 20 knots. He had taken great pains to get information on that point. A large number of them would not, on the average, run 14 knots, and they had been an almost absolute failure. Their boiler power was quite inadequate, and until their boilers were replaced, or the ships replaced altogether, we were absolutely without an answer to the great torpedo attack with which we were threatened in the Channel. He wished to see somewhere in the Estimates some provision made for altering those torpedo-catchers. He had never been able to see that this country was too poor to get what it wanted in the way of naval construction. These torpedo-catchers were wanted and cruisers as well, and he did not think the Government had a right to refuse them until the House of Commons had said that the country was not rich enough. He trusted that the Government would persist in its intention to build two cruisers, and that it would reconsider the question of abandoning the construction of the Powerful. A Return had been presented to the House, the most remarkable portion of which was the financial summary at the end. This Return showed the dangers to this country and the responsibility which it incurred, the tonage afloat, the value of the sea-borne commerce, and the expense, not only to this country, but to other parts of the Empire, of our sea protection. He feared that England was in danger of 1296 losing the commanding position it had occupied, and of falling back into a kind of naval slough from which the Naval Defence Act, so long as it had been in operation, had fortunately dragged it.
§ SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT (Sheffield, Ecclesall)said, he was sure that hon. Members who had been in the House during the past two hours had derived great advantage from the speeches delivered by the hon. Member for Gateshead (Mr. W. Allan) and others. The hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had brought a very serious charge against the present Board of Admiralty, because, if his statements were true, he had proved that the official Representative of the Admiralty had claimed that 13 new ships had been laid down by the present Board, thus leading the House to assume that these vessels were due to the initiative of the Government, whereas they were in great part included in the old Naval Programme. It was perfectly plain to anyone who had watched what had happened with regard to naval construction that the Treasury had completely overmastered the Admiralty. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, for reasons which might seem to be excellent to the Government, had controlled the Admiralty, and the result was that practically the construction of no new ships of any size or importance had been undertaken. No new battleships and no new first-class cruisers had during the year been laid down by the Government. Of course, he was not speaking of vessels included in the Naval Programme of 1888. The two principal questions that had been discussed were the question of whether the present strength of the Navy was inadequate, and the loss of the Victoria and the practical destruction of some of the ships intended for ramming purposes. In reference to the practical construction of our ships, he held that the Navy at the present moment was below its proper strength, and the Mediterranean Squadron was below its proper strength, and that that deficiency had been increased by the loss of the Victoria. They had the other day an event of great significance, which, so far as he knew, had never occurred before. A powerful French Fleet went round the ports of the Levant, visiting Alexandria and Smyrna, among other places. In point of numbers that Fleet, he believed, was equal to our Mediterranean Fleet, and, in addition, there was a 1297 strong reserve squadron at Toulon. What did that mean? Every circumstance showed that there was on the broad lines of policy a close understanding between the two great Powers with whom if we were ever involved in troubles abroad—and it was to be hoped the day would be long postponed—we might expect to be engaged more than with other Powers. They knew that the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea had been enormously increased of late; and, at the same time, they saw a powerful French Fleet cruising round the Levant. What meant that? In the event of an outbreak of hostilities in the Mediterranean, where at present the centre of naval gravity was established, we should be obliged for a time to abandon our position, and concentrate our naval forces at Gibraltar until reinforcements arrived. That was a serious question, requiring close attention on the part of the Admiralty, and when they found a Government in power 12 mouths without laying down a single battleship, and resting tranquil and unmoved under the loss of one of its largest and most powerful battleships, it was time to consider whether some steps should not be taken to remedy the indifference, if not worse, of I be Government. The only answer that had been given to the complaints with regard to the loss of the Victoria he ventured to characterise as must puerile. The First Lord in another place stated that the loss of the Victoria was not to be met by a Supplemental Estimate, because it would be ridiculous to assume that the power of the British Navy would be seriously impaired by the loss of a single ship. The same answer had been given that night, and be could only say that it was a childish, inadequate, and absurd statement. Everyone knew that the Navy was not too strong, and that the naval programme of the late Government was not too great. It was a great advance, and it was made to counteract and correct the long period of neglect between 1868 and 1874, and between 1880 and 1884, when the Navy was allowed to sink far below its proper strength; and when a battleship, representing 4 per cent, of the ships of the Fleet, was lost, the only proper answer why it should not be replaced would be to show that without it we should be in no serious danger when our Navy was compared with those of France and Russia combined. He quite 1298 agreed as to the importance of an inquiry into the causes of the loss of the Victoria. That was a question which ought to be thoroughly sifted. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Cardiff (Sir E. Reed), who spoke with the authority of a Naval Constructor, had made a series of significant and important statements on the subject. He did not say he agreed with all these statements. They were questions on which experts differed, but they were very grave questions which must affect a large number of our ships and the confidence of our sailors, and it was, therefore, of extreme importance that inquiry should take place. With regard to the policy of the Admiralty in building two new large cruisers, the question was an open one whether or not it was wise to expend their money on great ships which were practically unarmoured. What they wanted at this moment was what the country wanted in 1888—namely, a definite and progressive naval programme. The programme of 1888 was practically exhausted. A great effort had been made to place the naval strength of this country on a proper footing, or, at all events, on a greatly improved footing. A great sum of money was voted for the purpose, and was spread over a number of years, so that they got a maximum of result with a minimum of expense. That policy had been reversed. The present Government had really no policy, no definite programme. They were simply making a show of building ships, whereas they were doing nothing. They were putting off the provision of new ships and the settlement of a new programme for another year, in the hope that something would turn up. They were allowing the supposed exigencies of the Budget to overcome the necessities of the Navy. The Admiralty bad been mastered by the Treasury. The proportion between labour and material, which was so important, was not being observed, and the result was that the present Administration wore laying up a great store of difficulty for themselves. He did not agree with the criticisms of the hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Gibson Bowles) on the subject of large ships. He believed that as in the past so in the future, the naval supremacy of countries would be decided by the big ships. Cruisers, of course, were of the greatest importance for the protection of commerce, and for 1299 the keeping up of communication, and for no country were they more important that ours; but, undoubtedly, the Power that would command the seas in future would be the Power that had a predominance of battleships, and in view of that fact he maintained that the present naval policy of the Government was wholly inadequate.
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHI am sure we are greatly indebted to the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down for giving us a forecast of the kind of speech he intends to deliver on the various platforms of the country, a speech with a good deal of rhetoric, but a very small amount of accuracy.
§ SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTWill the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to point out the inaccuracy?
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHI will pass from him and come at once to some important speeches, and first to the speech made by the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir E. J. Reed). I confess I regret the lengths to which the hon. Member went. The hon. Gentleman mentioned a list of ships in the Navy which he described as being dangerous ships. I will not use all the language he applied to them.
§ SIR E. J. REEDI said that they had the same material defect as the Victoria, and that they would behave as she did under such circumstances.
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHQuite so; and that is a very grave accusation. My hon. Friend stated that what happened in the case of the Victoria was what every Administration had been told would happen. I must remind the hon. Gentleman that the accusations he brought forward on previous occasions against the ships were not that they would capsize if pierced below the protective deck—far below the water line—by a ram, but the objections he brought forward were to the effect that shell fire on the upper part of the unarmoured structures would cause the vessels to sink. These objections were the subject of an investigation by a Committee at the Admiralty, presided over by Admiral Hope, including Dr. Woolley, Mr. G. Rondel, and Mr. Froude. There is nothing new in the matters which the hon. Gentleman has brought forward to-day. They were fully considered at that time by that Committee; therefore, I think I may be excused from going into them now. I 1300 am perfectly prepared to do so if it should be thought desirable, but I only point out to the Committee that the objection taken in the year 1877 by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff was an objection totally different from that which he is now endeavouring to tell the Committee he has long entertained.
§ SIR E. J. REEDI used no authority of my own. I read from The Standard newspaper, which distinctly stated my complaint was that on the occasion of severe injury to the unarmoured ends of ships they capsized. The right hon. Gentleman is completely misrepresenting my argument.
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHThen I shall have to quote from the hon. Gentleman himself. This is the letter upon which the proceedings of the Admiralty and the Report of the Committee had their origin. It is signed "E. J. Reed," dated May 16th, 1877, and is to Mr. Barnaby. What the hon. Gentleman then stated was this—
After what has passed between us, I need hardly say that my objection is confined strictly to the point that, whereas you believe the cork chambers with the cork in them will remain more or less intact during a protracted action, I fear and believe that, exposed as they are to the attack of the enemy's shell fire, they would be speedily and completely destroyed, and in that case the ship's stability would be gone, and she would capsize.That was the objection which my hon. Friend at that time urged to these ships. That question was fully investigated by the Committee. I have their Report here, and it will be found among the Papers presented to Parliament in 1878. I decline, therefore, to go into that old controversy. The hon. Baronet opposite, the Member for Belfast (Sir E. Harland) has contributed a very valuable and interesting speech to this Debate. He pointed out certain facts which, I think, are somewhat overlooked by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff. The first of these points was the immense energy of the blow which was struck by the Camperdown on the Victoria—such a blow as was probably never before struck by one ship upon another. The energy of that blow was such that the hon. Baronet alleges—and I think there will be many who will agree with him— that even if that end of the ship had been armoured down to her keel, or the blow had been struck upon armour instead of being struck on the unarmoured part 1301 of the ship below the protective deck, still the armour would have been smashed in, and the ship would have received the wound she did, or something very much like it. There is a good deal of evidence in support of that view. The Vanguard and the Grosser Kurfürst were both armoured ships, and in both these cases that happened which happened in the case of the Victoria, and both ships went down. It should also be remembered that the spur or ram of the Camperdown penetrated some feet into the hold of the Victoria through her thin plates. This wound below the protective deck was inflicted before ever the upper part of the stern of the Camperdown could strike the part of the Victoria's side which an armour belt would have protected, according to my hon. Friend (Sir C. Reed). I do not want to enter into details. We have not yet before us the full facts in respect to what actually happened in the case of the collision between the Camperdown and the Victoria. The evidence only reached this country on the 5th of August. That was on the Saturday before the Bank Holiday. It was only, therefore, on the 8th August that it was possible the evidence could be taken in hand; and owing to the necessity for its being examined in manuscript by the officials at the Admiralty before it could be passed on to the printers, it has not yet reached even the members of the Board. Until we have that printed, until we have examined the voluminous evidence and seen a Report upon that evidence from the experts of the Admiralty, it is impossible for the Admiralty to say exactly what kind of an inquiry shall take place. That the Admiralty will inquire very thoroughly into the subject the Committee need have no doubt. So serious, so disastrous, so deplorable an event as the loss of this great ship, and the large number of lives which were unfortunately sacrificed, cannot take place without the Admiralty feeling that heavy responsibility rests upon them, and that responsibility, I can assure the Committee, they will discharge. Whether a further special inquiry will or will not be necessary we cannot decide until we have studied that evidence and until we have the Report before us. When we have considered and decided that matter Ave shall give the earliest information to the House. I noticed with pleasure that the right hon. Gentle- 1302 man opposite, the late Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Goschen), said he would not press the Admiralty as to the mode or time or exact nature of the inquiry, and he only urged the necessity of an inquiry. That necessity is recognised by the Admiralty; but we do claim complete freedom according to the facts which we shall ascertain as to the exact mode, time, and nature of the inquiry. I will gladly pass from this subject to the other points mentioned in the course of the discussion. I am sorry, on account of the time at my disposal, that I shall only have to deal with them very cursorily. It is a little difficult to meet the wishes of all hon. Members. If I intervene early, complaint is made that the Representatives of the Government occupy the whole time, and if I intervene at a late stage the limited time will not permit me to answer fully all the points that have been raised. The hon. Member for Cardiff asked me some questions about the expenditure on the Edgar. He very kindly said he would communicate with me, and I will take care that he shall receive the information he asks for. But there were some fallacies in the points he brought before the House which I will clear up now. First of all, the Dockyard Estimate was not in existence when the tenders for the contract ships were received. The hon. Member thought we had this higher Estimate in our hands when we accepted these lower tenders from the contractors. That is not the case. Then with respect to the extras, as to which he seems to think we have treated the contractors rather hardly. I have to inform him that the extras were adjusted item by item on the basis of prices asked for each item by the contractors. However, I will gladly give him all the particulars he desires. The hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Gibson Bowles) referred to the Crescent in connection with the dockyards, and he treated the Edgar and the Crescent as sister ships. I should have thought my hon. Friend, with his great naval know-ledge, would not have fallen into that mistake. The Crescent is one of the Royal Arthur class, and is a vessel of 7,700 tons, whereas the Edgar is a ship of 7,350 tons. If he had carried his eye one line further in the naval programme contained in the Estimates he would have found these figures. The hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) made a 1303 few strictures upon the policy of the present Board; but I observed that he agreed with us on important points, and he congratulated us on not binding Parliament to a programme stereotyped in advance. He asked me a number of questions with respect to Naval Defence ships, which were rather of a character which would be better given on paper than by word of mouth. Meanwhile, I can assure him that the ships completed are not consigned to any limbo, but are either in commission or in the Fleet Reserve, so that in the event of emergencies they can be placed in commission in the smallest space of time. He further asked me whether in laying down our programme we adopted the definite and understood view that our Navy should be equal to that of two Powers combined. I have already answered that question earlier in the Session. There is no difference between us and the late Board on that subject, and we certainly hold that the British Navy should be equal to the combined Navies of two foreign Powers. I do not think my hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Admiral Field) has left me a great deal to answer, and he himself destroyed the arguments of some of his own friends. He tells us that Lord Hood is in favour of a progressive scheme. There is no difference of opinion in that respect between Lord Hood and the present Board of Admiralty, but we do not think it necessary prematurely to publish our scheme. We think it necessary to publish a scheme for the year, and we are not pursuing a policy of having no scheme for the future, or of not contemplating building any ships in future. The other points he has mentioned are being thoroughly considered by the Admiralty and attended to.
*SIR U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTHI have already dealt with that point this evening. As to our position in the Mediterranean, I am very glad to be able to give my hon. Friend some information, and I am pleased to tell him that our Fleet there with respect to battleships will presently be stronger in quality than it has been for a long time. The Hood has virtually replaced the Victoria. And the Anson, Ramillies, and Rodney are soon to replace the Colossus, Inflexible, and Edinburgh The Board of Admiralty have, moreover, come to the con- 1304 clusion that for a considerable time the Mediterranean Fleet has been below its proper strength in respect of cruisers. A strong opinion was expressed by Sir G. Tryon, whose weight as a great naval authority I am sure that the House will continue to recognise, that it was necessary to strengthen the Fleet in this direction, and, within two or three months, this will be done. With respect to the remarks of the hon. Baronet opposite on the subject of the Magnificent and Majestic, I am sorry I failed to give him exactly the information he wished for in reply to questions, and I will endeavour to supply the deficiencies now. When I referred to a speed of 14½ knots, I must remind the hon. Baronet that is about what may be considered the ordinary full speed for long distances. It is not intended to take battleships for long distances at a greater speed than 14½ knots; therefore, the figures which I gave are practically such as apply to full speed for long distances. With respect to what the hon. Baronet says as to coal being all in bunkers, we entirely agree that that is very desirable, as far as possible, and I can tell him that, in addition to the 900 tons which each of these ships will hold, they are capable of carrying an additional 850 tons in bunkers. The effect of that will be to immerse the ship by only about 16 inches more. She would start the voyage 16 inches deeper than her ordinary depth, but as the coal was consumed she would obtain her normal depth. The hon. Baronet described the rams in existing warships as useless, but I am afraid our experience of the effect of rams does not lead the Admiralty to the same conclusion. The effects obtained have, no doubt, been accidental, but they have resulted in immense disaster. The Admiralty are at present investigating the effects on the rams and stems of the Camperdown and the Forth, both very remarkable cases. With regard to the value of coal as a protection against projectiles, experiments have been made by the Admiralty, and it has been found that no material offers a better dispersing resistance to projectiles, or destroys their effects better than coal in a ship's bunkers. I am very much obliged to another hon. Member for Belfast (Mr. Wolff) for the observations which he has made in support of our great cruisers, and I would answer the point he has raised as to why torpedo 1305 gunboats do not catch the torpedo boats. The principal defect lies with the boilers, but as a result of experiments which we are preparing to make, we hope that we shall be able to replace some of the boilers in the torpedo gunboats by tubular boilers. We hope that with improvements these vessels may yet have a useful future before them. As to the torpedo boat destroyers, we have already obtained such satisfactory reports that we are able to proceed at once in ordering some more, but before we have proceeded very far we shall have experience of the actual performance of the torpedo boat destroyer at sea. I now come to the complaints made by the third Member for Belfast, who in succession took part in this Debate, (Mr. Arnold-Forster). In the first place, I can assure him that there was no delay with respect to the Renown. The Renown was to be built at Pembroke, and she was taken in hand as soon as possible in view of the work that had to be completed at Pembroke under the Naval Defence Act. And here I would interpose a remark to this effect: It seems very strange that strong accusations are brought against us about not doing this or that which is new, or not having laid down new ships when the fact is that our programme was laid down for us by our predecessors up to a certain number of mouths ago. We have stuck to the programme; and not only so, but we have hastened the completion of that programme. We have hastened the completion of the battleships, and we ought to receive the gratitude instead of the criticism of our predecessors. My hon. Friend complains of the information I gave him, in reply to a question, and he says that the information, in his mind, was of a different character to that which was indicated by his question on the Paper. He tells me now that what he had in his mind was to ask what entirely new vessels of our own planning and designing we had laid down; but there was nothing of that sort in the question he put on the Paper. His question asked how many ships of the Royal Navy had been commenced in the dockyards or elsewhere since September 1, 1892, and what were their names and the dates they were commenced. I answered him briefly, and I handed him a list afterwards which contained the full information he asked for; and although I did not answer the 1306 question he had in his mind, I certainly answered the question he had on the Paper. I have now endeavoured to answer all the points that have been brought before me, and I hope my hon. Friend will withdraw his Amendment.
§ MR. A. C. MORTON (Peterborough)said, he had been waiting since 4 o'clock to make some remarks on the Amendment, since which time the Debate had been taken up with matters altogether foreign to the Amendment. He wished especially to call attention to the practice of officers in the dockyards lending money to others in the same employment, a system deserving of the strongest condemnation, and which ought to be put an end to, especially in the interests of the poorer members in the dockyards. Another matter was that relating to the Admiral Superintendents. These officers cost £5,649; he was informed that there was no occasion for these officials whatever, and that the spending of the money was an absolute waste.
§ It being Midnight, the Chairman left the Chair to make his report to the House.
§ Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.