CIVIL SERVICES AND REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, 1893–4.

HC Deb 02 August 1893 vol 15 cc1101-65

(THIRD VOTE ON ACCOUNT).

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a further sum, not exceeding £2,111,500, be granted to Her Majesty, on account, for or towards defraying the Charges for the following Civil Services and Revenue Departments for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1894, namely:—

CIVIL SERVICES.
CLASS I.
	£
Rates on Government Property	1,500
Railways, Ireland	18,000
CLASS II.
United Kingdom and England:—
House of Lords, Offices	5,000
Treasury and Subordinate Departments	8,000
Home Office and Subordinate Departments	8,000
Foreign Office	4,000
Colonial Office	2,000
Privy Council Office and Subordinate Departments	1,000
Board of Trade and Subordinate Departments	11,000
Board of Agriculture	1,300
Charity Commission	3,000
Civil Service Commission	2,000
Exchequer and Audit Department	5,000
Friendly Societies, Registry	1,000
Local Government Board	20,000
Mercantile Marine Fund, Grant in Aid	10,000
National Debt Office	1,500
Public Record Office	2,000
Public Works Loan Commission	1,000
Registrar General's Office	1,000
Stationery Office and Printing	80,000
Woods, Forests, &c., Office of	1,000
Works and Public Buildings, Office of	7,000
Scotland:—
Secretary for Scotland	1,000
Lunacy Commission	1,000
Registrar General's Office	1,000
Board of Supervision	1,500
Ireland:—
Chief Secretary and Subordinate Departments	5,000
Charitable Donations and Bequests Office	200
Local Government Board	30,000
Public Works Office	3,000
Registrar General's Office	2,000
CLASS III.
United Kingdom and England:—
Law Charges	15,000
Miscellaneous Legal Expenses	3,500
Supreme Court of Judicature	25,000
Land Registry	500
Police, England and Wales	5,000
Prisons, England and the Colonies	100,000
Broadmoor Criminal Lunatic Asylum	2,000
Scotland:—
Register House	3,500
Prisons, Scotland	5,000
Ireland:—
Supreme Court of Judicature, and other Legal Departments	14,000
Land Commission	6,000
County Court Officers, &c.	13,000
Dublin Metropolitan Police, &c.	9,000
Constabulary	100,000
Prisons, Ireland	10,000

CLASS IV.
United Kingdom and England:—
	£
Science and Art Department, United Kingdom	32,000
British Museum	6,000
Scientific Investigations, &c., United Kingdom	1,000
Ireland:—
Public Education	30,000
National Gallery	300
CLASS V.
Diplomatic and Consular Services	25,000
CLASS VI.
Superannuation and Retired Allowances	25,000
Miscellaneous Charitable and other Allowances, Great Britain	100
Pauper Lunatics, Ireland	7,500
Hospitals and Charities, Ireland	7,500
CLASS VII.
Temporary Commissions	8,000
Miscellaneous Expenses	600
Highlands and Islands of Scotland	8,000
Total for Civil Services	£701,500
REVENUE DEPARTMENTS.
Customs	70,000
Inland Revenue	290,000
Post, Office	900,000
Post Office Telegraphs	150,000
Total for Revenue Departments	£1,410,000
Grand Total	£2,111,500

THE MARQUESS OF CARMARTHEN (Lambeth, Brixton)

said, that under Sub-head F he found a great number of matters, amongst them an item of £1,500 for the insurance of Government property, and he thought he should, therefore, be in Order in calling attention to a subject he had been most anxious to raise. He should have preferred to raise the question upon the Estimates, but it was impossible to know when they would be brought on; and as he was anxious to bring the matter forward at the earliest opportunity, he would do so now. He was alluding to the subsidy of £10,000—of which this item of £1,500 was a part—which was voted in aid of the Metropolitan Fire Brigade. He did not wish to move the reduction of the Vote, though it would be necessary to do so to call the attention of the Committee to the fact that this sum was totally inadequate for the purpose. Anyone who had studied the question must have realised that the Metropolitan Fire Brigade is totally inadequate for the needs of the Metropolis. They had a very striking instance of this in July of this year. According to a report from The Times, a fire broke out at 2 o'clock, at 3 o'clock it had enormously increased; and when Captain Simmonds telegraphed for assistance to West Ham he received the reply that all their engines were employed, as they had a fire to deal with in their own immediate neighbourhood. He submitted this showed a very grave state of affairs. This matter received attention some time ago, a Committee being appointed for the purpose in 1876. That Committee in 1877 recommended that the amount granted under this sub-head should be increased. In their Report the Committee saw the strength of the Force was inadequate for the work, and that one consequence of the limited number was that neither engines nor fire escapes could be thoroughly effective. Another consequence was that a station might be left with only one man to keep up communication, and perhaps without any, in which case the station would be closed, and thus the district would be left in quite a hopeless condition in the case of a fire occurring whilst the station was closed. The most serious result from short-handedness was that there was no reserve adequate to deal with any extraordinary emergency such as might happen if two or three conflagrations took place at the same time. That was exactly what happened on July 18 of this year, and it was then found that the force of the Metropolis was totally inadequate to deal with the outbreak efficiently. In 1866 Captain Shaw was asked to report the lowest standard at which the Fire Brigade should be kept, and he reported there should be 189 fire stations, 139 fire escapes, and 351 fire engines. In 1876 Captain Shaw gave an estimate of what he considered would be the lowest cost of maintaining an, efficient Fire Brigade. His estimate was that the lowest annual cost would be £70,000 a year, and that it ought to be £120,000. He was asked to make a reduced estimate, and he made a second estimate, in which he fixed the cost at £52,000 a year. He was told that that was still too high, and was asked to make an estimate that would not go be- yond £50,000, to give the lowest number of engines, stations, fire escapes, and men that would keep London safely preserved. The lowest estimate he then made was that it would take 169 stations, 330 fire engines, 200 fire escapes, and 931 men. That was the lowest strength Captain Shaw gave as compatible with the safety of London. He need hardly point out to the Committee how enormously London had grown since 1867, and yet the strength of the Brigade was only 55 land stations and four floating stations, instead of 169; only 179 fireescape stations, instead of 200; and only 132 fire engines, instead of 320.

THE SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY (Sir J. T. HIBBERT,) Oldham

I hope the noble Lord will excuse me for interrupting him, but I think this is a matter more for the London County Council than the Committee. The noble Lord has no power to move an increase, and I should be sorry to stop him but for the fact that he will have another opportunity to raise the question. I do not think this is the time to go into the question of whether a greater expenditure is necessary.

THE MARQUESS OF CARMARTHEN

said, of course, if he was decided against he would cease his remarks; but he thought he could show from an extract from the Report to which he had referred that in recommending that the ½d. rate should be increased to 1d., they urged that the Government contribution should be increased, and it was upon that that he based his case. He knew he might bring the question up on Friday; but, possibly, they would not reach the Vote on that day, and—he might as well make the confession—he should not be here on Friday, and, therefore, he thought he should be in Order in raising it now.

THE CHAIRMAN

I think it is not in Order to go into details, for this is only a special grant in addition to the contribution by the Government to this service, and paid in respect of Government property in London.

MR. J. LOWTHER (Kent, Thanet)

thought that perhaps it would be convenient this discussion should come on in its regular course. No doubt the noble Lord, being prevented from being present at the meeting of the Committee on Friday, thought it desirable to avail himself of this opportunity; but, still, he (Mr. Lowther) considered it would be more convenient that it should stand over.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD (Mr. H. H. FOWLER,) Wolverhampton, E.

pointed out that the Fire Brigade was under the control of the Loudon County Council. The Government contributed certain moneys in respect of the insurance of Government property; the Treasury paid to the London County Council, by way of contribution for expenses, such sums as Parliament from time to time granted for the purpose, not exceeding in any one year the sum of £10,000. For some years they had paid the maximum, and the County Council could not ask for 1d. more. He would respectfully submit that the action of the London County County was a matter entirely for the London County Council, and not for the Committee.

MR. HANBURY (Preston)

remarked that the right hon. Gentleman had convicted himself out of his own mouth; he admitted that Parliament had control—

MR. H. H. FOWLER

I do not admit it.

MR. HANBURY

said, that Parliament was not bound to vote the maximum sum.

MR. MACFARLANE (Argyllshire)

I rise to a point of Order.

MR. HANBURY

said, he was raising a point of Order. What he understood his noble Friend was endeavouring to do was this: Though he would like to see the amount raised, his contention was that before they voted the maximum sum they should have some means of seeing that the sum was properly administered, and that they got full service for it. He thought his noble Friend was perfectly right in endeavouring to get some further information than they got at present. As he understood it, no account whatever was rendered by the London County Council, and what his noble Friend wished was to get from the Treasury some promise that they would see, as they were perfectly entitled to do, that an explanation was given by the Loudon County Council of how the money was expended.

MR. J. LOWTHER

said, that upon the point of Order—though, perhaps, that should be decided at the time it arose—he would point out to the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board (Mr. H. H. Fowler) that, according to the doctrine the right hon. Gentleman had just laid down, all Motions other than those by Ministers of the Crown would he out of Order. The right hon. Gentleman was aware that when any Member of Parliament desired to draw attention to a subject included in the Estimates it was necessary to move to reduce the Vote, although the object avowed in the first line of the speech was to largely increase it. Consequently, if the right hon. Gentleman's objection to the language of his hon. Friend were sustained, it would be fatal to every Motion that might be made for the reduction of any Vote. He pointed this out in order that the right hon. Gentleman might not commit himself to such a doctrine. On the question of their control over the sum, he understood the statutory obligation was with regard to the maximum; that Parliament was prohibited from giving more than £10,000 in any one year; but there was nothing to prevent Parliament in its wisdom reducing the amount by £1,000, or £9,000, or any sum it chose; consequently, the Committee had as much control over the item of £10,000 in respect of the Metropolitan Fire Brigade as of any sum placed at the disposal of the Colonial or Foreign Offices. Parliament had absolute control over the sum down in the Estimates—that was to say by way of reduction, and the right hon. Gentleman knew perfectly well that it was open to every single Member of the Committee to propose any reduction he thought fit.

MR. H. H. FOWLER

said, that what he pointed out was that they had no jurisdiction over the London County Council, who were responsible for the Metropolitan Fire Brigade, though they had control over the sum granted in aid of their expenditure, and could reduce it if they thought proper. They had no control over County Council and Borough expenditure, simply because they made grants to these Bodies; they were not seised of the expenditure of Local and County Authorities. They were at liberty to say they would reduce the sum; but they had no right to control the Loudon County Council, whom Parliament had constituted as a responsible Authority. What he understood the noble Lord to object to was the inade- quate manner in which this duty was carried out. The difference between the right hon. Gentleman and himself was that the London County Council was not a Government Department.

THE CHAIRMAN

It is perfectly clear the London County Council is not a Government Department, and the House has no control over its expenditure. Parliament can subscribe a certain sum towards that expenditure, and it is competent for any hon. Member to move to reduce it.

MR. HANBURY

said, there was this distinction between the contributions to Local Bodies and the County Council of London: that this was given for a definite Government purpose, and for no other reason whatever: and when it was given for that definite and special purpose, they had a right to see that that purpose was carried out, and that the Government property was protected.

MR. POWELL WILLIAMS (Birmingham, S.)

said, the real question was whether the Fire Brigade was efficient for its purpose?

THE CHAIRMAN

That is not the question; the only question is whether this money shall be subscribed or not.

THE MARQUESS OF CARMARTHEN

said, perhaps he might be allowed to explain that he commenced his remarks by saying that he should move a nominal reduction; but after what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman he would not press the matter further. He hoped, however, now that the subject had been brought to the attention of the Government, they would give it their serious consideration.

SIR J. T. HIBBERT

Every attention shall be paid to what has been said.

MR. HANBURY

wished for a definite ruling. His contention was that, contrary to what had been said by the right hon. Gentleman, this contribution to the London County Council was of a totally different nature to all other grants to County Councils, because it was given for a specifically definite and important purpose; that was to say, for the protection of property belonging to the Government in London; and he asked if it was not their duty to see that money so voted was properly applied by the London County Council?

SIR J. GORST (Cambridge University)

wished to say a word on this point, because he was most anxious that the Government, for the sake of the few minutes they would save to-day, might not give away proper Treasury control over the sum they were asked to vote. He apprehended the Committee of the House of Commons, in a matter of this kind, had power to discuss anything or resolve anything the Treasury might discuss or resolve. The Committee had the power to attach any condition; to decide in what mode the contribution should be made, or the way in which the work should be done; and unless the Committee retained that power and exercised it, if necessary, the Treasury would not have that stimulus to vigilance over the Public Expenditure which it ought to have. If, according to the doctrine of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board (Mr. H. H. Fowler), the Committee of Supply was curtailed in its liberty in criticising the Expenditure of this country, he was sure the Treasury would relax in its efforts, and the Public Service would suffer.

THE CHAIRMAN

I think it is perfectly clear that the Committee of Supply of the House of Commons has no control over the administration of the London County Council; at the same time, it seems equally clear the Committee can refuse either the whole sum or any part of it.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL (Tyrone, S.)

said, he was under an arrangement with the Chief Secretary for Ireland not to raise any Irish question on this Vote today. What he wanted to ask, however, was this: He wished to know whether, if they got past an item on which they could raise a perfectly legitimate discussion with regard to rating of Government property and light railways in Ireland, he would be able to raise the question in Committee to-morrow? It was a very important matter, and he wanted to know whether, having undertaken with the Chief Secretary not to raise these questions in his absence to-day, it would be competent for him to raise a discussion on them at another time?

SIR T. ESMONDE (Kerry, W.)

said, he also had a question to raise, but at the request of the Chief Secretary he would not do so to-day.

SIR J. T. HIBBERT

said, the hon. Baronet would have every opportunity for discussing the question he desired to bring forward on Friday, and he thought it would be waste of time if they were to discuss these matters twice over. The questions as to the rating of Government property and light railways would come on in their natural course on Friday, and he thought his hon. Friend behind him (Mr. T. W. Russell) would then have an opportunity of discussing the questions he desired to discuss. He understood his hon. Friend did not wish to raise, upon the question of the Chief Secretary's Vote, the subject of light railways, but only to raise those matters for which the Chief Secretary was responsible. The Vote for light railways was specially fixed for Friday.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

said, he understood that the Vote on Account was to be taken to-day and to-morrow.

SIR J. T. HIBBERT

said, two days were given for it.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

asked whether, in that case, the right hon. Gentleman proposed to give him an opportunity of raising the question on the Report stage or the Vote on Friday?

SIR J. T. HIBBERT

said, he understood an opportunity would be given tomorrow on the Vote on Account.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

said, he thought that opportunity was vanishing. Supposing Vote 33 was disposed of today, and another item came on which had nothing to do with the Chief Secretary's Office, he would have no opportunity at all, unless the Government were to put down the Report stage as the first Order of the Day on Friday.

MR. SEXTON (Kerry, N.)

said, he wished to point out to the hon. Gentleman that after all the items had been disposed of he could raise the question on a Motion to reduce the entire Vote. Therefore, his opportunity would not be passed, oven though the special items referring to it had been passed. He understood that the conversation between the Chief Secretary for Ireland and the hon. Member for South Tyrone (Mr. Russell) bad reference to matters for which the Chief Secretary was responsible, lie was not responsible for the light railways, as they would come under the Treasury; so that if the Committee should be disposed to postpone that item, the hon. Member would be in no better position than he now was, There was another Vote for light railways in Ireland coming on next Friday, and upon that Vote the hon. Member, he thought, would be able to raise a discussion, but he certainly hoped the Committee would not agree to postpone discussion upon any item in the Vote.

THE CHAIRMAN

It would be out of Order to postpone the Votes in this Vote on Account; and if any particular Vote should be passed, it would be impossible to go back upon it. I understand that the two Votes on the rating of public property and light railways in Ireland are the two that are next in Order.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

asked whether, under these circumstances, the undertaking that he had given to the Chief Secretary was to deprive him of rights which he now possessed?

SIR J. T. HIBBERT

was anxious, if possible, to meet the wishes of his hon. Friend, but it was necessary that they should proceed according to the usual order. They could not break the Rules of Committee of Supply, and, therefore, all the items in the Vote on Account must be taken seriatim. If Vote 33, the one in which his hon. Friend was interested, was reached to-day, they would be obliged to consider it even in the absence of the Chief Secretary; but it would be possible for his hon. Friend to bring forward any question he thought proper on the Report on Friday. Even if the hon. Member was not able to bring it on upon Report, unless the matter was particularly urgent, he would have another favourable opportunity within a few weeks, when the Vote would be taken in its usual course.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

said, that under these circumstances it would be impossible to again enter into any arrangement with a Minister. His right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary distinctly arranged that any question affecting Ireland should not be raised on Wednesday. Upon that he (Mr. Russell) consented not to bring forward his questions until Thursday, when the Chief Secretary said he would be back. He hoped the Committee would see that he was rather hardly dealt with. As the points connected with Ireland that he wished to raise were of extreme urgency, he could not afford to wait until the ordinary Estimates came on.

MR. SEXTON

asked whether, after all the items had been dealt with, it would not be in Order to move the reduction of the whole Vote, and upon that Motion to raise a discussion on any question relative to the sum in which a discussion was desired? Otherwise, what meaning was there in moving a reduction of the whole Vote?

THE CHAIRMAN

I am afraid it would be impossible to go back upon a former item once it has been passed.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

Then I move that you report Progress in order that this may be fully discussed.

Motion made, and Question proposed? "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. T. W. Russell.)

MR. H. H. FOWLER

said, he thought that some arrangement might be come to. He knew that the hon. Member for South Tyrone (Mr. T. W. Russell) had agreed to the wish of the Chief Secretary that the discussion on the Vote on Account should take place to-morrow. What he would suggest was that they should proceed with the discussion on the Vote on Account until they reached Vote 32, and then, when they reached Vote 32, there were two courses open to them—either the Government should give special facilities for raising the discussion on the Report stage, or his right hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury could withdraw the two Votes from the Vote on Account and bring them up as a fresh Vote on Account for to-morrow night, or the first thing on Friday morning.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

said, another course might be followed. Supposing they reached Vote 32 to-day, it might be possible to report Progress then and go on with the balance of the Votes in Class I.

* SIR C. W. DILKE (Gloucester, Forest of Dean)

said, there was also another matter that ought to be considered, and that was that the hon. Member for the Ince Division of Lancashire (Mr. S. Woods) was placed in some difficulty. The hon. Member came down yesterday intending to move the Adjournment of the House respecting the contract of M'Corquodale & Co., but was induced not to do so on the understanding that he would be able to raise the question upon the Stationery Vote, and the hon. Member went away under the impression that the Vote on Account would be began tomorrow. ["No, no!"] He only stated what was his impression of the hon. Member's belief. He thought he ought to mention this case, as trouble might arise out of it afterwards. Undoubtedly the question the hon. Member wanted to raise was a matter that would be properly dealt with upon the Stationery Vote.

MR. SEXTON

asked whether it would be in Order to move a reduction of the whole Vote after the reduction of items had been moved?

THE CHAIRMAN

It is quite in Order to move for the reduction of the whole Vote, but you cannot go back to an item in the Vote which has been passed. That is in accordance with Rule 3 regulating the subject.

MR. SEXTON

asked, after the items had been passed, what question would be in Order in moving the reduction of the whole Vote?

THE CHAIRMAN

Any subsequent items—that is to say, you cannot go back upon any item.

MR. SEXTON

If a Member moves the reduction of the whole Vote is it open to him to discuss anything that is contained in the whole Vote? Otherwise, I cannot see what object there would be in moving a reduction of the whole Vote.

THE CHAIRMAN

It is competent to an hon. Member to move a reduction of the whole Vote rather than take the course of moving the reduction of any particular item. Suppose a Motion was made to reduce an item, and that that was disposed of, it would be out of Order to go back to it.

MR. SEXTON

Supposing the hon. Member, on reaching Item 33, chooses to pass that by, would it not be open to him afterwards to move the reduction of the whole Vote, and raise a question upon that item?

THE CHAIRMAN

It would be distinctly out of Order.

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

said, he would withdraw his Motion to report Progress, but would renew it if Vote 33 was reached to-day.

SIR J. T. HIBBERT

said, he was about to ask the hon. Member to withdraw his Motion so that they could have time to make arrangements to meet his wishes. There was a third course that could be adopted, but he felt some difficulty in suggesting it to the Committee; it was that they should be allowed to take the Vote on Account to-night, and the Report stage could then be taken the first thing to-morrow, when every item contained in the Vote on Account could be discussed upon the Report stage just as well as it could be discussed in Committee.

MR. TOMLINSON

No, Mr. Mellor, we have had experience of that this Session.

MR. J. LOWTHER

said, be would be glad to see the question raised in some way.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Original Question again proposed.

* SIR R. TEMPLE (Surrey, Kingston)

said, he rose to draw attention to an item of some considerable importance—

MR. WYKEHAM CORNWALLIS (Maidstone)

said, he rose to a point of Order. He asked whether he should not have precedence in raising a matter as to the collection of Land Tax?

THE CHAIRMAN

ruled that the hon. Member for Maidstone was in Order.

MR. WYKEHAM CORNWALLIS

said, he would not detain the Committee for many minutes. Hon. Members, he thought, would remember that in 1886 an Act was passed making the extraordinary tithe rent-charge a perpetual charge, instead of one which varied according to the crops and cultivation of the laud. Up to the beginning of this year it was doubtful whether or not the Laud Tax ought to be charged on the new tithe rent-charge. This question had been settled in the beginning of the year by the Vicar of Marden, in Kent, who appealed against the Laud Tax. The Court upheld the view of the Vicar that the extraordinary tithe rent-charge was not liable to the charge of Land Tax. The costs of this appeal on the part of the Vicar amounted to £177, and they fell on the Land Tax-payers of the parish, who felt that they had a grievance in being called upon to pay the whole of the costs in what was, to all intents and purposes, a test case.

* THE CHAIRMAN

Is this a matter for the Treasury?

SIR J. T. HIBBERT

Yes, Sir. It is a matter for the Treasury.

* THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. Member is in Order.

MR. WYKEHAM CORNWALLIS

said, in the circumstances which he had stated, he should like to know whether the Secretary to the Treasury could inform the Committee as to the existence of some means of obviating what was generally felt to be a considerable hardship?

SIR J. T. HIBBERT

said, he could assure the hon. Member that he sympathised very much with what the hon. Member had said of the hardship suffered by the parish he mentioned. So far as he was personally concerned, he could tell the hon. Member that every effort had been made at the Treasury to see whether there was any mode of relieving the Parish of Marden from the payment of this sum. Unfortunately, no fund was available which could be applied to this purpose. The hon. Member was, no doubt, aware that there were a certain number of persons rated for this purpose who had not paid the amount due from them. As they were supposed to be persons who were unable to pay, he did not think that, as far as they were concerned, they would suffer any inconvenience from the position in which they were placed. A test case had been undertaken for the benefit of the whole country; and if there had been any funds available at the Treasury which could have been applied in relief, the Treasury would have assented to their application. He again acknowledged the hardship, and regretted it was not in his power to say more.

MR. JACKSON (Leeds, N.)

May I ask a question? I do not gather from the statement of the right hon. Gentleman whether, in the case of those persons who were unable to pay, the amount will be levied?

SIR J. T. HIBBERT

No.

* SIR R. TEMPLE

said, he was now in Order, he presumed, and lie would proceed to deal with Item 5, Class II., Foreign Office. He was sorry to be obliged to move a reduction of the Vote. He was about to do so, however, not because he meant any particular mischief, but because he wished it to be understood, in the Parliamentary sense of the term, that they on that side (the Opposition) of the House meant business, and must insist upon having a satisfactory—

COLONEL NOLAN (Galway, N.)

rose to a point of Order. He wished to ask whether he could call attention to one or two Irish railway matters if the hon. Baronet was allowed to proceed? Would he have forfeited his right at this stage if he did not ask his questions now?

* THE CHAIRMAN

The questions must now be raised on the Report, if at all.

COLONEL NOLAN

Yes, Sir; but—

* THE CHAIRMAN

The hon. Baronet is in possession.

COLONEL NOLAN

said, considering the hon. Baronet had not given in his Amendment, perhaps he might be allowed to intervene. He was not going to detain the Committee more than a moment.

* THE CHAIRMAN

If the hon. Baronet wishes to give way he is at liberty to so so.

SIR R. TEMPLE

I give way, Sir.

COLONEL NOLAN

said, he was obliged by the hon. Baronet allowing him to mention one or two small matters. He was not entering into controversial questions, and he only wanted to have this information from the Treasury. First of all—regarding the Tuam and Claremorris Railway—he noticed that the money on the Paper was not wanted until March, 1894, and he would inquire whether that would not prevent the opening of the line? Then there was the Galway and Clifden Railway—what arrangements had been made in regard to that?

MR. T. W. RUSSELL

said, the hon. and gallant Gentleman was probably not in the House at the time, and did not know that it had been arranged to take these railway questions for discussion at a later stage. If they were going to discuss them at all, they should be discussed all together, and he would like to know where they now stood.

COLONEL NOLAN

said, he was not raising any controversy. He was only asking for information, and he hoped his questions would be considered if the information wore not now available. As to the Galway and Clifden line, he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would say whether it would not be possible to open a portion of the line. It had been said that something had happened to a contractor—it was not clear whether he had failed or not—and they might have some statement on the subject. The third question he had to put was not one to which he expected an answer now. It was as to whether money had been refused for the pushing forward of a line at Ballyghadareen. He had not been able, owing to the duties of the Session, to visit the West of Ireland for some time, and he was not aware how these matters stood; but he had no doubt the Financial Secretary could tell him.

SIR J. T. HIBBERT

said, with regard to the third question, he would make inquiry. The fact that the money for the Tuam and Claremorris line was not wanted until March next would not delay the opening of the line. It would be opened as soon as possible. The work on the Galway and Clifden Railway was now being pressed on. The whole of the line was expected to be completed at the beginning of next year. There were now 1,400 men at work under a new contractor.

* SIR R. TEMPLE

again rose, and said: I have once more to ask the attention of the Committee to a question of considerable importance. It arises on the item for £4,000 for the Foreign Office. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I move the reduction of the Vote by £1,000. I do so not because I mean to be particularly hostile, but as an indication that we on this side of the House, in the Parliamentary sense of the term, mean business, and that we must have a clear and satisfactory explanation with regard to what is known as the Franco-Siamese difficulty, which is still open, I understand, between those two countries. The reason I do so is because the question is becoming a burning one in England; it has attracted the attention of almost every Chamber of Commerce in the country, and it is a matter of deep and earnest anxiety to the London Chamber of Commerce especially. The impression is prevalent that British diplomacy has received a check. [An hon. MEMBER: No.] That impression is prevalent most undoubtedly. It is felt that Siam has been very hardly treated, and that British interests have not been sufficiently safeguarded. I hope this impression will be proved to be erroneous. No one has a higher opinion than I have of the admirable, courageous, and patriotic manner in which Lord Rosebery has conducted the foreign affairs of the country. But while I am willing to believe that there is an explanation, that explanation has not yet been given; and it must be given, if not at once, on the very earliest occasion possible. Until then the Foreign Office is on its defence. With regard to the trouble between France and Siam, it is quite possible that Siam may be in the wrong. But is not the fact that France demanded the cession of the territory in dispute a confession that it is not hers, and that she is, in a certain sense, the aggressor? Hitherto British interests in Siam have at least been co-equal with those of France. The British understanding with Siam dates from ancient times; the British Consul at Bangkok has always been on an equality with the French Consul—he has, indeed, been the more influential of the two, because four-fifths of the trade at Bangkok is British. All this gives us a great and predominating interest. Well, Sir, I congratulate the country and the Government on being relieved from the anxiety of a blockade. If the blockade were to take place, there would be very serious feeling in this country. With British vessels flying the British flag, manned, or at, least commanded, by British sailors, and carrying British cargoes, and with steamers carrying British mails, all to be stopped by French war-vessels in a time of profound peace, it would be difficult to induce the British nation to accept the technical explanation that it was a "pacific blockade." I do not think my strong-handed, clear-headed, and practical countrymen would accept such an explanation. The impression would be that British interests had been forcibly interfered with by France in time of peace, and that would have a dangerous effect on the public opinion of this country. As regards the territorial cessions demanded by Franco, they relate entirely to the left bank of the Mekong River. Cambodia, in the deltaic region of the Mekong, is undoubtedly French: but above that region both banks of the Mekong are in the possession of Siam for more than 1,200 miles, and up to the 23rd degree of North latitude, where the Shan territory, an appanage of British Burma, is reached. On the left, or east, bank of the Mekong the Siamese territory is abutted by Annam and Tonquin—French territory. It is from these French territories that the aggressions of individual Frenchmen and French officers have been made. No doubt the object is to form a junction between the French dominions in Cambodia, on the one hand, and Tonquin, on the other hand, by annexing a part of the left bank of the Mekong. Perhaps a certain amount of annexation here on the part of France might be tolerated. Her interests are great, and those of Siam much less. But, whatever may be the merits of the dispute, whatever the provocation offered by France, certain outrages were committed on Frenchmen, some French blood had unhappily been shed, and France demanded as reparation a territorial cession. From Cambodia northwards to the 18th degree of North latitude the cession of the left bank of the Mekong would have been no great matter if France had been satisfied with that. She would have obtained her desired connection between Cambodia and Tonquin. But France, as we understand, was not satisfied, and this is the first matter on which I press for specific information. From the 18th degree of North latitude there begins a great bend of the river westwards. If France had demanded the cession of all the territory on the loft bank of the Mekong, that, geographically, would mean the cession of that great piece of territory included within the bend. That is the next point we are anxious to have information on. The question is, is that territory included in the cession made by Siam? If so, French dominion will not exactly have penetrated into the heart of the Kingdom of Siam, but into the northern portion of it, and it will have an effect on England, because it will have brought France far nearer to Burma than she has ever been before, and nearer to the Shan States, which I have just mentioned. It will make France hang like a great war-cloud over Siam. Then at the top of the river bend is the State of Luang-Prabang. What are the boundaries of this State? How much is on the left or eastern bank of the Mekong, and how much on the western? I wish to know whether it will be possible by British negotiations to arrange that, if the cession to France is to reach as far as Luang-Prabang, a straight line shall be drawn along the Eastern end of the bend, so as to exclude all the great Western portion from the cession. If that could be arranged diplomatically, the result would be highly satisfactory to Siam and to British interests; and if France is sincere in saying that she only desires to have a full territorial communication between Cambodia and Tonquin, then she ought to be satisfied with the drawing of a straight line from the Southern to the Northern end of the bend. That, again, is a point on which I desire explanation. We fear, of course, that the French are determined to go as far as Luang-Prabang; that is, as far as the 20th degree of North latitude. But the queston is, will Franco be content with that? I believe the first demand was the whole of the left bank of the Mekong till it touched the Shan States, which are under British rule, in the 23rd degree of North latitude. That demand has been wisely abated. I understand, and I hope it is correct, that the British Foreign Office is negotiating for a neutral zone from the 20th degree to the 23rd degree of North latitude, to the frontier of Upper Burma, that is, to the Shan States. I hope that such an arrangement will be agreed to; but, at the same time, I wish to point out that if France succeeds in acquiring all the territory enclosed in the bend she will come very near to that neutral zone, and we shall then require a neutral zone between the middle part of British Burma and the new French territory. This would, undoubtedly, greatly complicate the question. I hope the Government will be able to give an answer to the effect that the negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily on this point. With regard to the Luang-Prabang State, I wish to know what is to become of it, if it is truly supposed to be a tributary or a feudatory of Siam, doubtless with a Chief and Government of its own? When the half of it has been ceded to France, is the Chief to live under French protection or Siamese protection? Is he to be domiciled in the French limit or in the Siamese? Hitherto, in all the negotiations between England and Siam, conjointly with France, it has always been understood that, whatever protection has been extended to Siam, the same protection is extended to the tributaries and feudatories of Siam; and, therefore, it behoves England to look after the interests of the State of Luang-Prabang. I hope I have made the geographical point as clear as it can be made without the aid of a map to illustrate the lecture. I am glad to see that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General is following me by the aid of a map. For my own part, I do not require one—I have these districts pretty well mapped out in my brain. I need not say that, as an old Member of the Government of India, this is not the first time I have had to turn my attention to Siam. I now desire to refer to what is spoken of as the indemnity. The House has no information as to what is the amount of indemnity that has been asked by France; but we have heard of a claim which appears to be enormously and extravagantly large. I earnestly hope that Lord Dufferin's diplomacy will obtain some abatement in this respect. It is too cruel that a great European Power should demand such a large indemnity from a country like Siam over and above the full cession of admittedly Siamese territory. It is understood that France is now asking from Siam that she should have the collection of the Revenues in certain Siamese districts, in order to secure the payment of the indemnity claimed. I wish to know what are those districts? my own opinion being that they must be those rich districts which abut on the West of the great lake north of Saigon. I know from the writings of French explorers that France has long cast covetous eyes on the territory on the West shore of the lake; and the House has a right to exact information on this point. Some day this territory will fall into the lap of France like a ripe pear. I imagine that this is the district in which France has secured the right to collect the Revenue. Beyond this, I think we are entitled to ask that the terms of the French occupation for collecting-Revenue shall be such that there shall be no excuse for the continued occupation of the districts referred to after the indemnity is paid. Indeed, so important is it that France shall have no excuse for continuing such an occupation indefinitely, that I think it would be worth while for England to support Siam in raising the money necessary to satisfy the French claim, so that France shall have no excuse for retaining possession of the rich districts which abut on Cambodia. The next question is as to the islands. It is said that the occupation of certain islands in the Siamese Gulf by France is in contemplation. This is an important matter, on which I think the House has a right to receive exact information. I wish to know what are the islands that are to be occupied; where they are situated; what is their value as strategical naval points; and on what possible ground France can demand the right to take possession of them? There is something to be said on behalf of the desire of France to secure a communication between Cambodia and Tonquin; but what possible ground France can have for seizing islands in the Gulf of Siam as compensation for injuries supposed to have been inflicted upon her hundreds of miles inland passes my comprehension, and it does seem to me a case of naval aggression. And, mark, such strategical points, if they are established, will lie right between our great naval position in the Straits of Malacca and our greater naval position in the Island of Hong Kong. That is a thing against which we have a right to remonstrate in most energetic terms, and on behalf of all our Imperial interests and the safety of our naval position in the China and Indian Seas. I do trust that the British Government, by resolute action, will check French aggressiveness in the matter of these islands. I hope the statement as to the French claims in this direction are not correct, and it will be satisfactory if the hon. Baronet (Sir E. Grey) can give the House some information calculated to allay the apprehensions that have been aroused on the point. Another point is that a third Power—China—is interested with regard to the territory lying between the 20th and 23rd degrees of North latitude, the cession of which France claims from Siam. My impression is that China has rights which will be interfered with by compliance with the claims of France. Doubtless Lord Rosebery will take care to preserve the acknowledged rights of China. But there is another portion of the globe that is largely interested in this question, and that is the British Indian Empire, and through that Empire the whole manufac- turing interest of Great Britain is concerned. The Committee will recollect that the whole of the Western frontier of the Siamese Kingdom abuts on British Burma, and the whole of the Eastern frontier of British Burma abuts immediately and conterminously with the Western boundary of the Siamese Kingdom. If Siam is to become a sort of dependent or vassal, and it is to be entirely under the beck and nod of the Republican Government of Paris, will not the security of British Burma be affected? Nothing is more essential to the safety of our Indian Empire than to have a buffer State—namely, Afghanistan, between us and Russia on the West, and between us and France on the East, and that buffer State is the Kingdom of Siam. I notice that some French authorities lately have been decrying this doctrine, and saying that buffers of this kind are not needed; but I hope the British Government will not accept that view. If France arbitrarily annexes Siamese territory, and England has to patiently look on, and acquiesce in secret negotiations between the Court of Bangkok and the French Republic, what, I ask, is eventually to become of Siam? If the present demands of France are conceded, an excuse will be made to pick some further quarrel, and other demands will follow, another blockade will be declared, and British commerce and interests will be threatened. With regard to our relations with India, I think that in these days it is dangerous that we should exhibit before the 300,000,000 of Her Majesty's subjects in India the spectacle of England virtually acquiescing in the moral, if not actual, subjection of Siam by France. The annexation of Siam to the British Empire is the very last thing England would think of. She claims no exclusive position. But she does for herself an equality with the most favoured nation. All she demands is the real independence of Siam. There is no desire to exclude French influence from Siam. I am willing to acknowledge fully the just aspirations and susceptibilities of France, and to admit the advantages that have been derived from French explorations in that portion of the world; but, at the same time, I think it right to say that, inasmuch as the trade of Siam is mainly British trade, and that the proportion of French trade is insignificant—four-fifths being British and the other fifth being divided among other nations, of which France is one—Eugland has a right to say that, as British capital has established this commercial condition, Great Britain is morally entitled to the benefits to be derived there from. In conclusion, I hope I have said nothing unkind to our French neighbours; but, as an Englishman, I feel it my duty to stand up for England, and I do not think a word has escaped me that can justly be said to be offensive to the French. No man in the House has a more friendly feeling towards the French than I have. I fully acknowledge the difficulties under which the British negotiators are placed, and the hard task they have before them. I have merely propounded questions which, sooner or later, must be answered. If I cannot be answered at this moment, all the hon. Baronet (Sir E. Grey) has to do is to say so. I hope the answer which may be given will be such as will allay the apprehensions that must have been aroused in our Eastern Empire, and which will grow more and more urgent if the situation should, unhappily, become worse instead of better. All British people who have served their country in our Indian Empire have a friendly feeling towards the French. During the past century we admired them as our gallant foes and rivals in the great struggle for the Indian Empire. During this century we have always looked upon them as sincere friends, because, if English power in the East is to fall, then the fall of French power would soon follow. Men who have been in India will never forget that in the dark days of the Indian Mutiny England received every expression of sympathy from the French nation, and every co-operation that could fairly be afforded by France herself.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Item of £4,000, for the Foreign Office, be reduced by £1,000."—(Sir R. Temple.)

"MR. CURZON (Lancashire, Southport)

Mr. Mellor, I am much obliged to the hon. Baronet the Member for Kingston (Sir R. Temple) for having intervened in my absence to call attention, by moving a reduction of the Vote, to the question of Siam. I am certain that the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Sir E. Grey) will acquit both him and me of any desire, in raising this question, to embarrass or to force the hand of the Government in the least degree. I think he will allow that the proceedings of the Opposition in this House upon the question have hitherto been devoid of any such interpretation, and that the questions which I and others have put to the Government have at no time exceeded the bounds of legitimate Parliamentary inquiry, both as to the progress of events on a matter deeply affecting British interests, and as to the policy of the Government in relation to them. On one occasion we refrained from moving the Adjournment of the House; and if we call attention to the matter to-day it is only because an opportunity which may not recur is afforded to us at a time when the events may be said almost to have terminated. There are also some points which require elucidation. The replies of the hon. Baronet to the queries I have addressed to him have throughout been characterised by great ability and courtesy; but they have been marked by a reserve which may be very admirable from an official point of view, but the impenetrability of which has left our appetite for information on a great many points unsatisfied. I will not now go into the origin of this dispute. It is the experience of history that when a feeble Oriental State, whose borders are not precisely defined, and which, perhaps, has not exercised a very firm grip on the confines of its own jurisdiction, comes in contact with the more highly civilised organisation and military system of a European Power, disputes about frontiers arise, and claims for territory are made, and there is almost an inevitable tendency on the part of the stronger Power to advance at the expense of the weaker. Such an advance on the part of France in this case, and such a retreat on the part of Siam, were, I imagine, more or less inevitable from the start. But though we may make that admission, we cannot be altogether indifferent to the highhanded manner in which the French conducted their operations from the start, and to the very scant consideration shown to their unhappy victim. Nor need we refrain from expressing our sincere sympathy with the present enlightened Monarch of Siam, whose Go vernment has conducted itself with great dignity throughout these proceedings, and who, if ever he has shown independence, has cruelly suffered for doing so, since he has only resisted in order to be punished for obstinacy, and where he has yielded has only yielded in order to be humiliated for his weakness. I do not think I should have made that remark if it had not been for the fact that the fresh terms which have been wrung from this unhappy and humiliated State in the moment of its final surrender—terms stated for the first time by Lord Rosebery in the House of Lords yesterday, and appearing in to-day's papers—are so serious in their effect upon the independence and integrity of Siam that I feel bound to recall to the recollection of the Committee the exact promises and assurances that were given at an earlier stage by the French Government. On July 17 Lord Rosebery made a statement in the House of Lords, and it was repeated in this House by the hon. Baronet. He said— There is the question of frontier between France and Siam in or adjacent to the Mekong Valley. This is a question which, if it is kept within certain limits and does not assume such proportions as to affect the independence and integrity of the Siamese Kingdom, Great Britain is not directly interested.…Finally, there is the question of the independence and integrity of Siam. Her Majesty's Government are fully sensible that this is a subject of grave importance to the British, and more especially to the British Indian Empire; but the French Government declare themselves to be not less anxious than ourselves to maintain and respect that independence and integrity. It was in consequence of that statement, which was definite, unmistakable, and most re-assuring, that I refrained some weeks ago from moving the Adjournment of the House; and I venture to say that that statement amounted to a definite and binding pledge on the part of the French Government that whatever steps they might feel themselves called upon to take to recover territory to which they believed they had a legitimate claim, or to exact damages for injuries which they conceived to have been inflicted on French subjects, they would leave the political autonomy of Siam untouched, and that the territorial integrity of Siam should not be further impaired. It was a notable fact that on the very next day, July 18, speaking in the French Chamber, M. Develle, the Foreign Minister, though he said nothing about the integrity of Siam, yet three times expressed the desire and intention of France not to impair the independence of Siam. M. Develle said—and I quote from the official version of his statement in the French Chamber of Deputies— The independence of Siam is a thing which we do not wish to touch. We desire, we wish, that no blows should be struck at it. And again, later on, he said— We have no intention whatever of menacing the independence of Siam. Towards the close of his speech he said— It is the defence and preservation of our Indo-Chinese Empire which has been the sole object of our action towards Siam. We have never wished to strike a blow at its independence. Those statements, though less strong than those of Lord Rosebery, were sufficiently strong to exercise a re-assuring effect on those who in this country were watching the course of events. Having stated to the House both the English and the French versions of the pledges given by the French Government, I will now briefly proceed to show how those pledges have been kept, and what steps the French thought it necessary to take in order—to use their own words—to insure the safety of their Indo-Chinese Empire. First, I will take the region of the middle and upper Mekong. Not merely in that region have the French demanded and obtained the surrender of the territory between the left bank of the river and that which has hitherto been thought to be the border range of Annam, a district 360 miles long, 100 miles broad, and comprising an area of 36,000 square miles; but they have also demanded, and obtained, one-half of the Siamese vassal State of Luang-Prabang, upon the Eastern bank of the river, which for over 100 years has admitted the Suzerainty of Siam. In addition to this the French have also claimed, under the terms of the ultimatum, the whole territory to the North and West of Luang-Prabang, right up to the Chinese frontier, subject only to the Siamese rights to the Province of Chieng Kheng, which was recently ceded by Great Britain to Siam, on condition that it was not subsequently handed over to any other Power, and subject also to the creation of a neutral zone or buffer State between France and ourselves. Those were the terms of the French demands for surrender up to yesterday afternoon. But we now know that, in addition to all this, Siam is to be allowed to keep no armed vessels on the Mekong River, and no military forces within 16 miles of its own bank of that river. In other words, a cordon of 16 miles is to be drawn down the whole length of the Mekong River on the Siamese bank, and the Siamese are to be held responsible for order along that bank without being allowed to keep even the most elementary armed force wherewith to preserve order. In her final ultimatum, France also demanded, and obtained, the right to establish French Consulates at the towns of Nan and Korat, which are situated in the heart of the territory still remaining to Siam on this bank of the river. I only desire to say, in reference to this matter, that I hope Her Majesty's Government will take prompt steps to insure, if French Consuls are placed at these spots, that, considering that the whole trade of these towns is British, particularly in the case of Korat, which is to be the terminus of a railway now being made by Englishmen, British Consuls shall also be, without any delay, placed at the same spots. I invite the Committee to judge to what extent it can be said that the integrity of Siam has not been impaired by the forcible cession of a territory 70,000 square miles in extent, and how far the independence of Siam has not been interfered with by the refusal to allow the employment of military forces in a part of the territory still left to her. But that is not all. Attention has been called to the Provinces of Battambong and Angkor. These Provinces once belonged to Cambogia, but were wrested from it 100 years ago, and have belonged to Siam ever since. Although guaranteed to Siam by the French Treaty of 1867, M. de Lanessan has openly repudiated that Treaty and advocated their seizure. Speaking from a personal visit which I have paid to the country, I can state to the Committee that these Provinces are situated in the heart of Cis-Mekong, in the lower part of Siam. They are rich in rice and other produce, and include the upper part of the Great Lake, with its important and lucrative fisheries. They are only 12 or 14 days' marches from Bangkok. The possession of the Provinces is essential to Siam; and, in fact, the independence and integrity of Siam will be irretrievably injured if those Provinces are allowed to pass into the hands of any Foreign Power. Those Provinces have not been seized by the French, but let me explain the ingenious substitute for seizure which is contemplated. The papers of to-day contain the text of the Note of the French Government to the Government of Siam in reply to the acceptance of the ultimatum, which was in these words— Paris, July 30.—Minister of Foreign Affairs to Consul-General Holland, Bangkok.—The delay of the Siamese Government in accepting the ultimatum sent to it by the French Minister at Bangkok, on July 20, justified the Government of the French Republic in making its conditions heavier. Desirous of giving a fresh proof of the sentiments of moderation which have constantly inspired it, the French Government will be content, as an indispensable guarantee of the practical execution of the clauses of the ultimatum, with the occupation of the river and the port of Chantaboon, until the complete and pacific evacuation of the posts established by the Siamese on the left bank of the Mekong. With a view also to guarantee the good relations happily re-established between France and Siam, and to prevent any conflict in the region of the Great Lake and of the Mekong, the Siamese Government will bind itself not to maintain in future any military force in Battambong and Siemreap, nor in the localities situated within a radius of 16 miles on the right bank of the Mekong, starting from the frontier of Cambogia. It will maintain there only the police force necessary to insure order. It will, besides, abstain from keeping up armed vessels in the waters of the Great Lake and those of the Mekong. The French Government reserves the right of establishing Consulates at Nan and Korat. The acceptance by Siam of these guarantees will allow the French Government immediately to raise the blockade.—JULES DEVELLE. I invite this Committee to consider how long this lake with no vessels upon it, and these provinces with no soldiers inside them, will be able to retain their independence against the encroachments which are inevitable. I must add a few words about the Port of Chantaboon. It is the second port of Siam, and is situated on the coast of the Gulf of Siam, about 180 miles south-east of the mouth of the Menam. It is the maritime outlet of the two Provinces of Battambong and Angkor, and from it access is gained to the mines of rubies, sapphires, and other gems which are either wholly or almost wholly in the hands of British concessionaires, and are being worked by British Companies. Chantaboon is the market from which, and from which alone, occurs the great pepper export of Siam, which trade is entirely in the hands of British establishments at Bangkok. From that port in 1891 came 1,541 tons of pepper of the value of £79,500, while the export in 1892 amounted to 1,175 tons, valued at over £53,000. I gather from what I have read that this port is to be temporarily occupied by the French as a guarantee that the Siamese positions on the left bank of the Mekong will be evacuated according to the terms of the ultimatum. From the ultimatum I find that that evacuation is to be effected within the space of one month. Now I am acquainted with those regions, and it is a fact that many of the Siamese positions are situated at great distances from each other on the left bank of the Mekong, and are separated from that river by a country of pathless jungle, in which there are no roads and no communication; and it is very likely that the intelligence of what has happened and the fact that they are to be evacuated may not even have reached the positions of which I am speaking within the month. The Committee, therefore, will see how easily circumstances may arise under which the temporary occupation by France of Chantaboon will be transferred into a permanent occupation. This is a question as to which the Government cannot forswear or deny our interest. Just as, in the Upper Mekong, Lord Rosebery has felt himself bound to interfere, both because the States we got from Burmah came up to the river, and because of the danger that would accrue both to France and ourselves from coterminous relations, so in the Southern Provinces, in the heart of Siam, we cannot be indifferent to steps which will practically place in the hands of the French a region in which British subjects have very large interests at stake, in which British trade is the sole trade that exists, and where the existence and the predominance of a Foreign Power must inevitably exercise a most serious and a most damaging effect upon Bangkok. In view of the facts which I have put before the House, I think hon. Members will find it difficult to see in what manner the promises with which they were re-assured as coming from the French Government have been kept, or in what manner the integrity and independence of Siam have been maintained. There is also the question of the islands. I have heard since I came into the House that France is, at the present moment, in occupation of four islands in the Gulf of Siam. The hon. Baronet suggested, if he did not actually state, that the possession of these islands was claimed by France as heir to the hereditary rights of Cambogia. Those islands are a portion of the Siamese Coast, and are situated between Chantaboon and the Menam River, scores of miles away from all territory that could by any pretence be said to have belonged to Cambogia. One of them commands the entrance to the Gulf of Siam, and the occupation of them by any Foreign Power must inevitably constitute a menace and danger to all shipping ascending the Gulf of Siam. I venture to suggest, therefore, that before the matter is finally settled, some explanation should be invited by Her Majesty's Government from the French Government as to the course of action they propose to adopt with regard to islands which are admittedly Siamese—to which the French Government have advanced no claim n the ultimatum, and their occupation of which will be a menace not only to Siamese interests, but also to British trade. While I am speaking about the assurances of the French Government, another point occurs to me on which I venture respectfully to ask for explanation. On June 29, when the first rumours reached this country that the French Fleet had been ordered to Bangkok, I asked the hon. Baronet opposite whether there was any truth in the statement, and he replied— It is not true, so far as we are aware, that a portion of the French Fleet has arrived off the bar of the Menam River. The French Representative has warned the Siamese Government that the French Fleet has been ordered to Saigon, and that it may be sent to Bangkok should the situation demand it. The French Government has given us an assurance that we shall receive notice before such a step is taken, and we are awaiting a reply to inquiries we have made with reference to statements in papers. Nothing could be more clear than that declaration. On July 14, however, a telegram appeared in the newspapers to the effect that two French vessels of war had forced their way up the river, either in obedience to orders from the French Home Government or in violation of their instructions. I am not discussing the legality or the illegality of the proceedings of these vessels. I only wish to ask the hon. Baronet whether the assurance that French vessels would not be moved to the Menam River without previous reference to Her Majesty's Government was fulfilled? The third question with regard to which I hope the hon. Baronet will give the Committee some information is in respect to this point. I have already read Lord Rosebery's statement that the question of the Mekong frontier was one in which, provided it was kept within certain limits, Great Britain was not directly interested. At that statement no one was disposed to cavil. But if we turn to M. Develle's speech in the Chamber on July 18, we find him speaking as follows:— As long ago as March 9 Lord Rosebery came spontaneously to say to M. Waddington that the night before he had received a visit from the Siamese Minister in London complaining of the encroachments of France on the Mekong, and that he had told him that he had nothing to do with the affair. Lord Dufferin did me the honour of calling upon me at the Foreign Office and made the following declaration to me:—'I am directed by my Government to tell you that, in the conflict in which you are now engaged with Siam regarding your frontiers, you will not find England in any way opposing you.' I thanked Lord Dufferin for his communication, telling him that the conduct of England was all the more natural, inasmuch as we had in no way any intention of threatening the independence of Siam. It seems to me so extraordinary if any such assurances were given, that I venture to ask whether M. Develle's statement was correct? I cannot help thinking that the friendly and diplomatic assurances given by Lord Rosebery to the French Government were misinterpreted by them, and that they were thereby encouraged to a forward policy; and I believe that if a clear statement of the interests and responsibilities of Great Britain had been made earlier in the day by Her Majesty's Government to the Government of France, much that has occurred would not have happened. These movements on the borders of Siam have long been anticipated by those who have kept an eye upon the inarch of events in that region; but Her Majesty's Government seem from the start not to have been fully alive either to their imminence or to their gravity. On February 4 the French Minister for the Colonies made a speech, in which he indicated what was about to happen with regard to Siam; but on February 17 Lord Rosebery, in the House of Lords, said— The French Minister, M. Delcassé, did not go quite so far as to claim the Mekong River as the Western boundary to the French Lido-China Possessions; but he rather spoke of it as the Western limit of their sphere of influence. It is not for me to judge what the French view of their sphere of influence may be; that is a vague term. But no such sphere of influence has been recognised by Her Majesty's Government. On June 1 I put the following question to the hon. Baronet:— Whether the attention of Her Majesty's Government had been called to the recent action of French troops in occupying Siamese posts upon the; Mekong River: whether they had invited or received any explanations on the matter from the French Government; whether the French claim to all territory lying upon the left or East bank of the Mekong River was recognised by Her Majesty's Government; and whether Her Majesty's Government considered these proceedings of the French inimical to the political or commercial independence of Siam? To which the hon. Baronet replied— Her Majesty's Government have received Reports from different quarters with regard to the recent action of the French troops on the Mekong. They have not thought it desirable to address to the French Government any request for explanations on the subject, and the French Government have not as yet offered such explanations. So far as Her Majesty's Government know, the French have not distinctly intimated what territory they claim on the East of the Mekong, and in the present state of the question Her Majesty's Government are not in a position to express an opinion as to the effect which these proceedings may have on the political or commercial independence of Siam. Then, on June 15, Lord Rosebery, in reply to Lord Lamington, said— I am very imperfectly acquainted with the causes of the dispute. As I do not wish to acquire the reputation of meddling too much in the affairs now pending between France and Siam, I have not acquired that necessary information which would enable me to reply properly to the questions. Finally, there are the statements to French Ministers that were quoted in the French Chamber. Now, I cannot help saying that I believe that if early in the present year, when the first news of the French advance came to this country, Her Majesty's Government had entered into perfectly friendly communications with the French Government, and intimated that, without any desire to interfere in the dispute between Siam and themselves, in which we had no concern, we could not look with dispassionate eyes upon an appropriation of Siamese territory upon the Upper Mekong, or upon an infringement of the independence of Siam, the whole of the subsequent crisis might have been averted, and Siam and ourselves might not now be deploring her humiliation. It is the function of statesmanship not merely to make a display of tardy vigour after a crisis has arisen, with a view of compensating for its occurrence, but also to show foresight, and to take precautions before events have occurred. The concession which we have at last procured of a slender buffer upon the Upper Mekong is but an inadequate consolation for the irretrievable damage inflicted upon the substantial buffer that before intervened. There remains one more question. No one will deny the great—I will even say the supreme—importance to us of the integrity and independence of Siam. Situated as Siam is in close proximity to our Indian Empire, and having a conterminous frontier with the Malay States, Burma, and the Shan States for many hundreds of miles, the orbit of Siam falls inevitably within the Indian system. We cannot be indifferent to her destiny; we cannot acquiesce in her extinction. Moreover, the facts that 93 per cent, of the import and 85 per cent, of the export trade are carried in British vessels, and that the main industries of the country—the rice and teak and the exploitation of the mines—are mainly in British hands, will enable us to realise the vast commercial preponderance of Great Britain. Now, it has been the principle of successive British Governments to preserve intact the integrity of Siam. I have never heard from any individual or from any Government in this country a proposal to impair or destroy it; and I imagine that it would only be in the last resort—at the request of Siam herself, and in defence of Imperial interests—that we should be induced to extend our responsibilities in that country. But if any excuse or provocation had been needed for any such step, it has been supplied by France in this case; and I imagine it will be agreed that any further encroachments upon her stability or integrity can hardly fail to provoke some response from ourselves, both to safeguard British interests and to save India from peril. I do not wish, however, to enter into speculations as to the future, but I venture to express a hope that the Government will take steps to procure a guarantee or assurance from the French Government that no further encroachments will be attempted by them upon the integrity and independence of Siam. The most sensitive of Frenchmen must admit that ample hostages have been given for the satisfaction of French honour, the vindication of French claims, and the protection of her Indo-Chinese Empire. There matters should rest. Unfortunately, the examination of the ultimatum in its final form suggests sources of almost certain friction and certain danger. There is likely to arise trouble on the Mekong River because the Siamese are not allowed to protect their own territory, and on the borders of the Great Lake because the Siamese are stripped there of even the slightest evidence of sovereignty. These things are the more likely to occur because the capacity for resistance of Siam has been so recently tested and found to be worthless. I hope to obtain from Her Majesty's Government some declaration that any further encroachments on Siam cannot be regarded by this country with indifference; that British interests, commercial and political, will prevent us from acquiescing in her further degradation; and also that they will invite from the French Government assurances that Siam will now be left free to work out her own fortunes, and to remain independent within the restricted range of the territories left to her.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir E. GREY,) Northumberland, Berwick

I must begin by taking the Committee back to the opening remarks of the hon. Member for Southport, in which he asked me to recognise that he had hitherto shown a most scrupulous desire to say or do nothing which could in any way embarrass the policy of Her Majesty's Government. I fully admit that in the questions he has put in this House, and in the interest he has shown in this matter, he has displayed an amount of consideration, and even of confidence, in the policy of Her Majesty's Government, to which we have been fully alive. It is not unnatural that the hon. Gentleman should have taken up this question. He has travelled in the country, and in no spirit of listless curiosity, but with a desire to acquire real knowledge which might be of use to his country and people. I am sorry that to-day he has rather departed from the attitude he previously observed, and that he has indulged in criticisms which I think are not quite warranted by the policy of the Government; and, above all, he has gone at length into a criticism of the French policy in that part of the world at a time when negotiations of the most delicate kind are proceeding. He has raised many questions on which I can give no full explanations to the House until the Papers are produced; but I venture to think that the confidence he has hither to displayed in Her Majesty's Government is fully justified, not only by the attitude observed towards his own Government when they were in power by those who now sit on this side of the House, but it is also justified by the merits of the case and the transactions which have taken place since the present Government came into Office. The hon. Gentleman complained that my answers have been remarkable for a reserve which might be admirable from an official point of view. I am afraid that my speech to-day will be also marked by reserve from the official point of view, but that at the same time it may be compatible with the patriotism, the wisdom, and the success of the policy we have in hand. The hon. Member complained that the Government have not been strong enough, and have not laid down clearly and emphatically enough, what British interests in that part of the world wore. But when the Papers are laid upon the Table, it will be found that Her Majesty's Government have been quite strong and emphatic enough.

MR. CURZON

I did not say that Her Majesty's Government have not been strong enough, but that they might have moved a little earlier in the day.

* SIR E. GREY

This is a question which has not arisen since the present Government came into power. I cannot help thinking that the logical conclusion of dwelling so much on the great importance to us of the status quo and on the tremendous interests which this country has in preserving the further side of the Siamese Possessions would be that the late Government and preceding Governments must be considered remiss in having taken no steps to establish a Protectorate over Siam. This is not so. As a Government we had to regard this as a question between two thoroughly independent nations; nothing had been done to suggest that the Government of Siam was not as independent as the French Government. The hon. Member complains that, that being so, assurances were given by Lord Rosebery that this country did not intend to interfere in certain operations going on on the further side of the Mekong River. Any such statements were made at the time when the French operations were confined to that district South of the 18th parallel. How does the question proceed from that point? Afterwards an ultimatum was presented by the French Government; and then Her Majesty's Government did think British interests were, for the first time, concerned, because the ultimatum would undoubtedly have brought the French and British frontiers together and made them conterminous. That, I think, was distinctly admitted by the French Government to be a matter in which Great Britain had some concern. That was a matter to which Her Majesty's Government were most anxious to give attention immediately, and to obtain the consideration of by the French Government. The question for this House, it seems to me, is this—What were our interests in the dispute going on between France and Siam? The first interest was that there should not be a conterminous frontier between British and French Possessions. The question the House has to ask is—Has that interest been secured by the policy of Her Majesty's Government? And I venture to say that it has, because it was announced yesterday by Lord Rosebery in the House of Lords that the French Government, admitting the principle of a buffer State, had agreed to negotiations on that basis. If you have a buffer State, a neutral zone, you will not have a conterminous frontier; and, therefore, the first British interest has been cared for by Her Majesty's Government, and you have received from the French Government direct recognition and agreement that that interest is to be regarded, not only on our account, but also on their own account. I now pass to one or two criticisms which the hon. Member made with regard to the Provinces of Battam-bang and Angkor. No question has arisen as to the Siamese not being prepared to pay the indemnity demanded from them; and, if any further question does arise, it will not be one of territorial possession, but it will be one of occupation, and can only be dealt with as it does arise. With regard to the islands in the Gulf, I think the same consideration applies. Some of these islands certainly have been occupied in connection with the blockade. They were occupied as part of the operations necessary to the intended blockade; and there is no reason to suppose that the occupation is intended to be permanent. As to other of the islands, I am not quite sure that the hon. Member is quite correct in stating that they are so far removed from the coast of Cambodia. Considering that the question of the blockade so confuses the intensions of the French in occupying the islands in the Gulf, it is a matter on which it is impossible to make a further statement at present. As regards the limit of a month, there is every reason to suppose that that limit will be impartially—not to say generously—interpreted by the French Government. I pass to the second interest we have; and I ask the Committee to bear in mind that I do not wish any words of mine to be considered as going beyond the letter of those interests. The second British interest is that of interruption to British trade. The French announced that they would institute a blockade. If it had been a belligerent blockade, as under the circumstauces it might have been, it would, undoubtedly, have interfered with British trade. What has actually happened? Has there been any direct loss to British trade. So far as we know, but one British steamer was stopped, and she was allowed to proceed to, and discharge her cargo at, Bangkok. We have further assurance from the French Government that the blockade is to be raised to-day. I do not see that directly any great loss has been inflicted on British trade. Indirectly some loss will have been sustained, for undoubtedly apprehension and fear must have interfered to some extent with commercial plans. But when the blockade is actually raised I hope that, even if some loss has occurred owing to apprehension and confusion in anticipation of the blockade, there will be a corresponding briskness which will, in some degree, compensate for any indirect loss that may have occurred. There was reason for apprehension that it might be much greater than it has proved to be. Another question Her Majesty's Government are bound to answer and defend is whether they took proper precautious to insure that our trade should not be damaged. There was a further danger that, with the approach of the French Fleet, there would be disturbances in Bangkok itself. There might have been risings of native or Chinese labourers, who might have damaged the possessions of British merchants and interfered with British trade. Her Majesty's Government, in ample time, sent gunboats to Bangkok, which would have been sufficient to protect our own interests from any native riot. After Her Majesty's Government had sent gunboats to Bangkok, French gunboats appeared at the mouth of the Menam, being sent, it was alleged, for the similar reason and to guard against the same dangers. When that was done the French Government sent us assurances that their gunboats were not intended to proceed further than the bar. The hon. Member for Southport wishes to know why the assurances were not fulfilled. The French Government told us that their gunboats were not intended to proceed to Bangkok; and it is a matter of subsequent history that, owing to a misunderstanding and sudden conflicts, those gunboats proceeded further up the river. Undoubtedly in France the presence of our gunboats did exercise a prejudicial effect on public opinion, and gave rise to the idea that Great Britain was in some way acting precipitately and prematurely in hostility to what France regarded as her legitimate demands. The statement was often made in the French Press that Great Britain had no interest in this quarrel. The presence of British gunboats was not intended in any way to prejudice the French negotiations with Siam or French policy; they were sent solely to protect British subjects and British trade against possible danger that might arise from riot; and the mere fact that Her Majesty's Government had no interest in this quarrel up to a certain point was all the more reason why they should take care that their own trade should be damaged as little as possible. I think the necessary steps were taken in time, and that, as regards the second British interest, it cannot be said the Government have been to blame, or have been remiss in the action they took to guard British interests. On this question as a whole we ought to remember, in listening to the strictures of the hon. Member for South port, that the French have a point of view of their own, and that when they talk about the integrity and independence of Siam they do it from their own point of view as to how far Luang-Prabang is to be in the expression. It is a State which has paid tribute to China, to Annam, and also to Siam, though in recent years to Siam only. It is not worth while entering into a criticism of what passed between France and Siam, excepting so far as our interests are concerned. The true policy, and the one pursued by Her Majesty's Government, has been to lay down and define what British interests in that part of the world were—not to lay down interests greater than we were prepared to defend, but to view those interests with impartiality and moderation, and to state them clearly. Those interests have been stated clearly to the French Government; and as regards details of one which is still the subject of negotiation with the French Government—namely, the neutral zone—I can say but little. It has been accepted in principle, and the details are still the subject of negotiation. On this point we have met with a ready agreement from the French Government. It is an agreement which, I think, arises from a real desire on the part of both Governments that the neutral zone shall be preserved. A neutral zone makes it easier for each Government to administer its own district, because in these semi-civilised parts, inhabited by loosely-compacted tribes, it is obvious that the reputation for strength of a Government must have a great effect on public order. That applies to France as well as to us. It also gives a feeling of security that you will not be liable to sudden attack, and it renders it easier for each nation to direct its own resources to the peaceable and commercial development of the country without having regard to the imminent danger of war. In conclusion, I have only to say that I believe every desire exists on both sides that a neutral zone, a satisfactory and substantial zone, shall be laid down between the territories of the two countries; and, that desire being a real one, it will smooth the path of future negotiation as to details. I will add that the respective interests of France and England in these frontier questions are likely to be settled amicably; and there is every prospect that, if there is no interruption caused, by Debate in this House or by public opinion in France, a settlement will be made which will leave the French Government free to develop its possessions in security in that part of the world, and will also leave our Indian Empire undisturbed, without endangering those good relations which exist on either side.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR (Manchester, E.)

Everybody who has heard the speeches of my hon. Friend and the hon. Baronet must congratulate themselves that the House has amongst its younger Members two gentlemen so well qualified as they have shown themselves to be to discuss these important questions of International policy. The hon. Baronet has given full credit to my hon. Friend for never having shown the slightest desire to embarrass the Government, though he appeared to think that salutary rule had been somewhat departed from by my hon. Friend in his speech to-day. I do not agree with that criticism, although I admit it was not made in a very hostile spirit. My hon. Friend has special personal knowledge of the districts and countries in question, and he speaks with a peculiar personal authority on these matters; but I feel bound to say that in all my hon. Friend has said, and in all previous questions asked, he has not been acting as an independent Member of the House, but as representing the other Members on the Front Opposition Bench, and we endorse every question he has put, and every word which has fallen from him to-day. The last thing we desire to do in the present crisis, or tiny crisis, is to embarrass Her Majesty's Government in the conduct of negotiations the delicacy and difficulty of which are fully recognised. I do not think—I do not believe—anything my hon. Friend has said, or anything that will be said on this side of the House, can be justly considered as falling outside the limits of the most carefully-considered and patriotic criticism. My hon. Friend did, no doubt, allow himself to observe that, in his judgment, had Her Majesty's Government, at an earlier stage, intimated to the French Government that they took a keen interest in anything which might seriously menace the future of Siam, many of the difficulties which have supervened might have been avoided. I will not, on that question, presume to offer any final opinion. We must wait until Papers are laid before us. We are forced to judge by what appears in the public prints, and from questions answered in both Houses of Parliament. I confess my own suspicion that probably Lord Rosebery did show somewhat undue anxiety to advertise the fact that he regarded controversy between Siam and France as outside any influence we possessed, and that possibly had he abstained from that he might have found his own diplomatic path somewhat smoother during subsequent months. There are certain points on which the Government have given us no assurance, and one is with regard to the strange provision in the ultimatum by which the Siamese are not allowed to be masters in that part of the territory to be left to them. There is a strip on the right bank of the Mekong, from North to South, for which the Siamese are responsible, where they are bound, as we understand it, to keep order, and where any failure on their part to keep order might be met by France as a fresh ground for requiring new indemnities and new cessions, and where the Siamese Government, though responsible, are not allowed to keep a single squadron of troops. That appears to be a provision which does not hold out to us a prospect that the present arrangement between France and Siam will be of an enduring character, and there is a suspicion that this maybe only the beginning of further encroachments on the territory of Siam, and a further extension of the Colonial Possessions of France in that part of the world. There is a similar provision, though not of so permanent a character, affecting the important Southern Provinces of Siam. There it appears also that the Siamese have had to make concessions to the French which, while they do not nominally increase the territory of France, will materially diminish the power of the Siamese—provisions which, I confess, I think will have the effect of limiting the control of Siam within the frontiers left to that country by the ultimatum. I would venture to remind the Government that that would be a very serious state of things in any country, especially in an Oriental country, and one which, from the nature of the ease, has not precisely the same standard of internal order and political civilisation which have been reached in Western countries. The difficulty in all Oriental States is unquestionably the difficulty of keeping order; and if by the same public instrument you declare that a State is to be responsible for order, and prevent it from using the ordinary Oriental methods of keeping order, you open the door to further complications and disturbances, which may seriously affect, not only the integrity of Siam, but possibly, also, great British interests which exist in that corner of Asia. There is only one further observation I would make. It is, no doubt, perfectly true, as the Under Secretary said, that neither the late Government nor any of its predecessors have ever asserted that Siam was under their protection, or that they had any special title to interfere between Siam and other countries. But, at the same time, neither the late Government, nor the present, nor any other Government would be disposed to admit that we could view the practical extinction of Siam with equanimity. Nor do I think the Under Secretary or Lord Rosebery would hold the view that the mere construction or the building up of a small, powerless buffer State between India and France was an adequate substitute for the existence of an independent and autonomous Kingdom like Siam. Under those circumstances, we have to consider the future. Although I do not take upon myself the responsibility at the present time, in the inadequate condition of our information, and during the currency of difficult negotiations, to press the Government for any declaration of policy as to the future of Siam, I must express my own personal view that we cannot regard with perfect equanimity the fact that Siam has been stripped as she has been—that we cannot be indifferent to a proceeding which may have the effect of wiping her out of the map of the world as an independent State. If the autonomy of Siam has not hitherto been a British interest, I think recent events have brought the period very close when her autonomy will be a British interest. I earnestly trust that the Government, even if not prepared to make any declaration on the point, will, at all events, not lose sight, in airy negotiations they may make, of the very great embarrassments and difficulties which must ensue if the ultimate result of what has lately occurred should be the absorption of the Kingdom of Siam in the growing power of any other Foreign State, however friendly.

Mr. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)

It is only due to Lord Rosebery that those who have not entirely agreed with him in some of his actions in Africa should recognise the wisdom and statesmanship of his conduct in this matter of Siam. The noble Lord has done his best to allay any ill-feeling or distrust on the part of France towards England. He has laid it down that Siam was an absolutely independent Power, and that as England had no alliance with her, and no guarantee with regard to her independence, France and Siam must settle their own differences between themselves. At the same time, the Foreign Secretary stated that our personal interests were concerned in the territories belonging to the Shan tribe, above the 18th parallel. This was fully recognised by France, and France has agreed to look into the matter fairly, admitting that we have certain interests there, and that a buffer State should be established between our territory and that of France. With regard to the blockade, the matter has settled itself, and is a thing of the past Seeing what has already occurred, I think we might fairly leave the matter in the hands of Lord Rosebery. I know there are certain gentlemen who seem to imagine that England has special rights with regard to every part of the world, and which are not shared in by any other Power. Because we possess India, it is said, we have the right to tell other European Powers what they might take and what they might not take in Asia. I do not share those views. I recognise that as we have India we must defend it, and I recognise that when military operations take place in the neighbourhood of India we ought carefully and sharply to look to see that our own interests are in no sort of way injured. That appears to me to be what Lord Rosebery has done. He has acted so wisely in this matter-that I entertain the fond hope that he will act as wisely in the matter of Egypt, and put an end to the bone of contention which exists between France and England with regard to Egypt, so that the two countries hence forward may live in peace, amity, and love with one another.

* MR. GIBSON BOWLES (Lynn Regis)

said, undoubtedly it was unfortunate they should have a Debate upon this matter; but he submitted it was absolutely inevitable. There had been statements made in the House contradicted by succeeding facts. Again, there was a general impression abroad in the country that if Siam had surrendered to France it was in consequence of advice received from the British Foreign Office; therefore it was inevitable some discussion should take place in that House. Of course, they were under a great disadvantage in carrying on the discussion. The Government had all the information, whilst they had none. The Government had told them that their language had been strong and emphatic; but they would be able to judge of that from the Despatches which would be published, he supposed, in a short time. Allusions were made by the hon. Baronet the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in regard to the blockade, to the steps the Government took. He did not know what steps they took. So far as he could see they took none whatever, except to submit to the imposition of the blockade announced by France. The hon. Baronet also stated that an agreement had been come to satisfactory to one category of our interests. But that was an agreement not for the establishment of a buffer State, but an agreement to negotiate for a buffer State. He did not wish to misrepresent the hon. Baronet, but he believed he was right in saying no agreement had been arrived at as to a buffer State, but only an agreement to commence negotiations in regard to such a State.

* SIR E. GREY

The agreement is that there shall be a neutral zone, and its limits are to be fixed by negotiation.

* MR. GIBSON BOWLES

said, the chance of success which they would have for negotiations with regard to a buffer State would be greatly diminished, as France was now in occupation of the islands and port and territory up to the Mekong River, and had sent away all the Siamese troops. He thought that, under those circumstances, France would be found by no means in a yielding disposition in regard to the delimitation of this buffer State which it was proposed to set up. It was quite clear the last word would not be, and could not be, said that day with regard to this matter. They should await the Papers published by the Government; and he thought the Members of the Opposition could claim that they had entirely refrained from any steps calculated to embarrass the Government in this matter. For many months a struggle between France and Siam had been first impending and then actually going on, and Members on that side of the House had carefully refrained from asking any questions or taking any action which was at all likely to embarrass the Government. One word with regard to France. There was no man in the House, and there were few men in this country, who were in any degree jealous of France. On the contrary, they felt in the most friendly manner towards her; but no true friend would advise France to embark in these distant expeditious from which she could get neither gain nor glory. We were not enemies. We had been allies of France in the past, and when what he might term the existing European anarchy had come to an end he trusted that we might again be her allies. But we could not avert our attention from what had taken place in Siam. The hon. Member who sat beside him, and the hon. Member for South port (Mr. Curzon), had given full and conclusive reasons why it was impossible for us to remain indifferent to the future of Siam. The hon. Member for Southport had reminded them that again and again the integrity and independence of Siam had been promised to be respected by France. But what did they see to-day? Neither the independence nor the integrity of Siam was to be respected. Both were to be violated. Siam's integrity was to be put an end to, and a large part of her territory was to be given up. Her integrity was to be violated, and it was impossible she could long continue to be independent with her second port occupied by the French and certain Provinces obliged to make payments of large contributions—extravagant contributions he should call them—for wrongs of a most infinitesimal nature, and many of them no more than acts of warfare. In face of these circumstances it was impossible to maintain at this moment that the promises of France to England, solemnly repeated in that House as well as the other House, had been thoroughly, or, indeed, in any way, properly fulfilled. They did not at present know what had taken place between France and England; but if five, four, or three months ago definite language had been held by the Foreign Secretary to the French Ministers with regard to what England would be content to allow and what she would not be content to allow in Siam, he felt sure that France would never have thought of over-passing the line so laid down. If there had been trouble, and if there was to be trouble in future, it would be because the Government had not been definite in their language, and had been vacillating in their conduct. As the Leader of the Opposition had said, they could give no final judgment on that matter to-day, hut must reserve their final judgment until they should have the necessary Papers before them. And now as to the blockade. The hon. Baronet lightly told them the blockade was raised that day, and the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr Labouchere) then stood up in his place and told them they had nothing to do with the blockade—that it was all over, and was a thing of the past. But he thought they had a great deal to do with it. The question whether this blockade was submitted to by England, and properly submitted to by England, would, no doubt, be cited as a precedent for further blockades and operations of war; therefore it certainly did be hove them to pay some attention to this matter. This blockade, so far as they knew, was proclaimed, postponed, and re-proclaimed, many days ago; no protest was ever made against it by the British Government; in fact, the British Government absolutely and completely submitted to the proclamation of the blockade made by France. He assumed that must be so, because, as a matter of fact, a British steamer was absolutely seized under this pretended blockade. It was no blockade at all, but a mere imposture, as he should proceed to show on the authority of no less a person than the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Of course, if a blockade—that was, a properly lawful blockade—on the Coast of Siam had been proclaimed, there was no man in that House who would argue we should not submit to it. A blockade was one of the most undeniable rights of war, and when lawfully imposed, we, of all people, should be ready to submit to it. What was a blockade? He would quote a few words from Sir William Scott, who was a great authority— A blockade is a sort of circumvallation round a place by which all foreign connection and correspondence are stopped. And he also calls it "this right of war." He might quote numerous other authorities: but he would pass over Grotius, Vattel and Bynkershoek, in order that he might go to the authority of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, in his ingenuous youth, was a great authority on International Law. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, who wrote under the name of "Historicus," said— Having shown what, by the Law of Nations, is not held essential to an effective blockade, I will proceed to point out what is the English doctrine on the subject, which I believe to be in complete and accurate accordance with the usage of the civilised world. The chief principles of Maritime Law, as held by Great Britain, are stated in five propositions drawn up with great care and precision by Lord Grenville. The fourth proposition states the Law of Blockade, and I believe is as correct and defensible now as it was 60 years ago. It is in the following wore Is: —'That it is lawful for Naval Powers when engaged in war to blockade the ports of their enemies by cruising squadrons bonâ fide allotted to that service, and duty competent to its execution; that such a blockade is valid and legitimate, although there be no design to attack or reduce by force the port or arsenal to which it is applied, and that the fact of the blockade, with due notice given thereof to neutral Powers, shall affect not only vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have been destined to such port with knowledge of the fact and notice of the blockade.' The Chancellor of the Exchequer adds— It is satisfactory to find that M. Ortolan, who, if not always perfectly correct and unprejudiced, is a paragon of impartiality compared with M. Hautefeuille, —he (Mr. Gibson Bowles) thought he was generally correct and almost always unprejudiced— states the general Law of Blockade in terms which, if a little less full and precise, are substantially and in effect equivalent to the definition of Lord Grenville, and conformable to the decisions of Lord Stowell. There they had it that blockade was essentially an act of war. Of course, blockade could only be an act of war; it flowed from war, and could flow from nothing else. If a vessel attempted to enter or leave the lines of circumvallation, how did they stop her? First, by hailing her, and requiring her to stop, and then if site refused, by firing on her, and sinking her, and destroying her crew. But what possible sanction or authority could there be for the exercise by one nation upon a neutral nation not at war with it of such a right as this, in such a manlier as this? There was not, nor never had been, such a thing as a pacific blockade. No one had ever conceived of such a contradiction of terms as a pacific blockade. They might as well talk of a peaceable war, or a warlike peace. No doubt, in the year 1827 it did occur to an English Government to combine peace with war, and there had been other instances in which a "pacific blockade" took place; but every one of those instances was a violation of the law, and a submitting to it by a weak State under the duress of a powerful State. There was no writer, since the pacific blockade so-called was first attempted, who had not condemned it. There was a very excellent book, Abdy's Edition of Kent's International Law, and what did Kent say? He said— Among the rights of belligerents there is none more clear and incontrovertible, or more just and necessary in the application, than that which gives the rights of law to blockade. They would observe they could not get the rights of blockade unless they were belligerents— The Law of Blockade is so harsh and severe in its operation that, in order to apply it with effect, actual blockade must be established by clear and incontrovertible evidence. Hall, in his work, spoke in exactly the same way. Hall said— There have been instances, no doubt, of so called pacific blockades; but they are neither sanctioned by usage nor the Law of Nations. As to a blockade, Hall said— The belligerents must intend to institute it as a distinct and snbstantive measure of war. When there was no war there could not possibly be any blockade. A French writer, M. Ortolan, in his work Diplomatic de la Mer, said as to a blockade— The object of a blockade is in fact to make war "(faire la guerre). He could quote other writers to the same effect; but the point he wished to emphasise was that ever since 1827, when this so-called pacific blockade was first invented, it had never been more than the exercise of superior force upon an inferior and weak State; it had never been sanctioned by any decision of any Prize Court, and had never been sanctioned by any writer whatever on the Law of Nations. He submitted, therefore, he bad proved that such a thing as a pacific blockade, so called, could not exist. The only kind of blockade which could exist was a belligerent blockade, and the recent blockade in force against Siam, if existent at all, was of this character. In these circumstances, it was the duty of the Government to have announced to France either that they did submit to this blockade, or that they did not. If, as had been stated, they had submitted to it, and a British steamer had been captured, or bad been forced to land her cargo in pursuance of this pretended blockade— this imposture—and in consequence of its improper recognition by the Government, he believed that one day Her Ma- jesty's Government would have a long reckoning to settle with the people of England.

MR.EGERTON ALLEN (Pembroke)

was very unwilling to obtrude himself on the Committee, but he should only make a few observations. There was only one point to which he wished to address himself. The hon. Member for Southport (Mr. Curzon) had said there was no one in that House who did not consider that the orbit of Siam did not fall within the Indian system. It seemed to him it would be cowardice on his part if he did not get up and say he was one who did not hold that opinion, and he felt be ought to protest against the doctrine that the orbit of Siam was part of the Indian system. He submitted that there was no obvious responsibility on the part of England towards Siam in the sense attributed by the hon. Member for Southport. It appeared to him that the integrity of Siam had not up to the present been interfered with by the occupation of the French to the East of the Mekong so as to place our Indian Empire in any peril whatever. Quite a sufficient amount of Siamese territory was left to act as a buffer State necessary for the protection of India, and it was an exaggeration to say that no one could possibly differ as to whether the attack on Siam was eminently dangerous to the British Empire in India. He also protested against the assumption that the occupation of the islands by the French would necessarily be a menace to British trade.

MR. CURZON

It would be a menace to British trade, because the islands are situated in the entrance to the Gulf, and command the mouth of the River Menam.

MR. EGERTON ALLEN

understood that the only menace to British trade would be the supposed hostility of France towards Britain. Undoubtedly it was a large infringement of the independence of Siam which was contemplated, and which in all probability would be carried out, but it would hardly bear the interpretation that it constituted the absolute destruction and annihilation of that country. He hoped he was not wanting in a sentiment of patriotism. No one would be more ready than he to defend to the last our possessions in India, but he must record his protest against the crying out at the operations of another Government because it approached our Indian Empire so far as to be coterminous with it.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Sir W. HARCOURT,) Derby

I am sure the House will recognise that on both sides there has been a disposition to deal with what is unquestionably a difficult and delicate matter in a spirit of moderation and patriotism. I am sure there is no one in this House who would not do everything in his power to lead to a perfectly friendly settlement of this question as between England and France. I hope nothing has fallen in this Debate which in any way would discourage such a view as that. The hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Gibson Bowles) is not present to receive my answer, which is an entire adherence to all the doctrines which he has recited from some early writings of mine. Her Majesty's Government do regard the act of blockade as a belligerent one. They have also so declared it, and they have acted throughout in this way. You may call a thing what you like, but when a Power takes upon itself to act against a Neutral Power, it can only do so in virtue of the right of war. In time of peace the high seas are free to all the world, and no one has a right to interfere with that freedom. It is only war that can give any Power the right to interfere with neutrals in the way of blockade. That is a perfectly clear doctrine, and, I believe, undisputed in the Law of Nations. The hon. Member for King's Lynn has said it is one which has been sometimes abused. I think it has been often used by a strong country when it has to deal with a weak country, and it is not desired to proceed to all the extremities of what publicists call a justum bellum, and when against its enemy it declares what is called a "pacific blockade"—that is to say, it seizes the vessels of its antagonists, and does not proceed to all the other extremities of war. Writers on International Law have treated that as a question of reprisal. As we all know, it is adopted by all countries who do not desire to go to all the extremities of war. That is all very well as long as you are in contact with your antagonist alone, but the question becomes totally different when you are acting against neutrals and confound those two things. A pacific blockade against your antagonist and a specific blockade against neutrals are totally different things. There is not such a thing as a pacific blockade against neutrals, because your right to act against neutrals can only arise out of a condition of war. I do not mean to say that we cannot find in history violations of the principle, and that it is not a sound one that ought to be asserted and defended. In the case of the Civil War in America they were not willing to admit that they were at war with the seceding colonists One of their great complaints against us was that we recognised the belligerents in the South, and one of the most convincing arguments, to my mind, in defence of that position on our part was that they established a blockade. So, in the case of the present blockade, it could only take place as a belligerent blockade. That is a view of which, I think, there is no doubt whatever, and it is a matter of very great importance that the greatest maritime nation in the world should have clear and definite doctrines to act upon in matters of this kind. I hope now that the House will consider that all that can justly be said on this point has now been said, and that the matter may be allowed to conclude, so that we may proceed with other questions.

[The subject then dropped.]

MR. F. S. STEVENSON (Suffolk, Eye)

desired to ask one or two questions of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to certain matters of great importance in Asiatic Turkey, for the purpose of eliciting information with regard to a definite and urgent matter. It was stated the day before yesterday, and was confirmed in the newspapers of yesterday morning, that a revision of the sentences in the case of the Angora prisoners had taken place, and that five of them who had been condemned to death were to have that sentence carried out. The remaining prisoners had been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, ranging from two to eight years. A rumour had just reached London that the five prisoners condemned to death had had that sentence carried into effect. He now wished to ask whether any information had been received at the Foreign Office on the subject; whether, if the sentence had not been carried out, the Government would continue to use every effort to prevent such a thing being done; and whether, if the prisoners had already been executed, intercession would be exercised on behalf of the remaining prisoners? As hon. Members of the House were aware, two of the prisoners tried at Angora had been released, but had been condemned to perpetual exile in place of death, and they were now in this country. These two prisoners had been recognised to have been absolutely innocent of the charge, and they had declared publicly that they believed that the other prisoners with whom they had been confined were as innocent as themselves. The Earl of Rosebery, in the House of Lords, in answer to the Archbishop of Canterbury, had already pointed to the fact that the trial at Angora was manifestly unfair. It had been stated—and these statements were uncontradicted—that false evidence was brought forward, incriminating documents were forged, and confessions extorted by torture. In some cases the torture inflicted was of too loathsome a kind to describe. He wished to know whether fresh instructions would be sent to Sir A. Nicholson, our able Chargéd' Affaires at Constantinople, directing him to do all that could be done in the interests of the prisoners? He wished also to ask whether the attention of the Foreign Office had been directed to the acts of torture upon prisoners at Cesarea, and the vicinity, and whether they could confirm the reports as to the torture of prisoners at Aleppo? He should also like to know whether information would be obtained about the Armenian prisoners in other fortresses in the Ottoman Empire? It was worthy of note that in places where there was a British Consul or Vice Consul the same barbarous treatment had not been meted out to prisoners as was meted out to them in places where there was no British Representative. The number of British Vice Consuls within the last few years had been reduced in Asia Minor; and considering the interest that was taken throughout Asia Minor in the condition of the Armenians, he would ask whether it was not desirable to increase the number of Consuls and Vice Consuls in Asia Minor? There was just one other question, and that was with regard to certain dignitaries of the National Church of Armenia, who had been confined in prison for many months past. Two Archbishops of the National Church of Armenia were tried by a tribunal which was recognised by the Foreign Office to have been a mock tribunal, and yet after that they were kept in prison. Several Bishops were also similarly imprisoned, and he should like to know whether the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could give the House any information on this subject? He had no intention of speaking until two hours ago, but the news that had reached London to the effect that those five men had been executed was of so grave a character that it was impossible to further delay the matter. If these executions had taken place, they would be fraught with the gravest consequences to the peace of Asiatic Turkey. He contended that England could not divest herself of responsibility in connection with these matters, having regard to the obligations undertaken by her as a signatory of the Berlin Treaty and to her understanding with Turkey under the Cyprus Convention. It was most desirable that every possible step should be taken to induce the Turkish Government to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty of Berlin to this country.

MR. SPICER (Monmouth, &c.)

said, he desired to emphasise what had been said by his hon. Friend the Member for the Eye Division of Suffolk, and he trusted that the answer would be a satisfactory one. He assured the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that there were many people in this country, belonging to all denominations, who felt strongly that this country had undertaken responsibilities regarding our fellow-Christians in Armenia and were bound to do all we could to fulfil them. He trusted, therefore, that the Government would not be slow to urge upon the Turkish Government to deal justly with the prisoners who had not, according to Lord Rosebery, received a, fair trial.

MR. LEGH (Lancashire, S.W., Newton)

said, he thought it would be admitted by most hon. Members that there was considerable difficulty in obtaining information from Asiatic Turkey at all, but he had always observed that some hon. Members opposite never found any difficulty in accepting any statement which was retailed against the Turks. For his part, he failed to see why they should believe one side more than the other, and he was not disposed to give greater credence to imaginative foreign correspondents or to Armenian Associations in this country, which were composed of members who had never been to Armenia and probably knew very little about it, than to the official utterances of the Turkish Government. There were in Armenia two Parties, a so-called Constitutional Party and a Physical Force Party. There had been a conspiracy of some kind, and it was only natural that strong measures should be taken by the Turkish Government. It was also possible that some innocent people had suffered with the guilty. These conspiracies were set on foot with the object of overthrowing Turkish rule and setting up an independent Government. He would admit that the Turkish Government was not an ideal Government or a pleasant one to live under, but he had reason to believe that the Armenians in Asiatic Russia were not so well treated as they were in Asiatic Turkey. In the latter neither their religion nor their system of education was interfered with, but Armenians in Russian territory were not allowed to teach their own religion. He was not at all sure this country had any special right to interfere, either under the Berlin Treaty or the Cyprus Convention. There was in the Cyprus Convention an Article which clearly pointed out that we did not go to Cyprus to insure reforms in Armenia, but to counteract the action of the Russians in going to Kars and Batoum. He must enter a protest against the idea that it was our special mission to enter upon a sort of Armenian crusade, diplomatic or otherwise. Each of the Signatory Powers under the Treaty of Berlin was just as much pledged to interfere as we were, and it appeared to him we were wasting our time and frittering away our energies by continual appeals which we were not likely to support by force. If anything was to be done on behalf of the Armenian claim for semi-independence, it ought to be done not by ourselves only, but in agreement with other Signatory Powers to the Treaty of Berlin.

* SIR R. TEMPLE

said, that in virtue of the Cyprus Convention England was in a more responsible position with regard to Asia Minor generally, and Armenia in particular, than any one of the Signatory Powers to the Treaty of Berlin. He desired to mention the ease of one or two of the other prisoners whose fate was still pending. Owing to the friendly offices of the British Government, no doubt two of the most important of the prisoners had been released on condition of perpetual exile from Turkish territory, and were now in London. The Committee was doubtless aware that he himself took a good deal of trouble with regard to those prisoners, who were Protestant pastors, and concerning whose innocence there could be no question. But there were four or five other prisoners whose case he ventured to recommend to the favourable consideration of the Foreign Office for kindly intervention—diplomatic intervention—before it was too late. The prisoners to whom he alluded specially were five men who had been religious teachers. They were well-known to the two pastors who had been released and who had come to this country, and these exiles affirmed that the men were innocent. The Principal of the College at which they were teachers would testify to their good character, and show that it was extremely improbable that they could have engaged in acts of high treason. Religious Bodies in this country took great interest in these cases; and if the men were dealt with unjustly the conscience of the religious world would be offended, and the effect would be very bad for Turkish interests, for there was no doubt that the welfare of the Ottoman Empire must always largely depend upon the goodwill of the British people.

* SIR E. GREY

I did not know that the hon. Gentleman had any intention, until quite recently, of raising this question. I am afraid I have very little information to give the Committee, and what information I have I am afraid will be not only unsatisfactory, but also painful. It is to the effect that five of the Angora prisoners have been executed, and that the sentences on the others have been reduced to terms of from two to eight years' imprisonment. Her Majesty's Government have taken some trouble in following the proceedings of the trial, and in investigating, as far as it was in their power to investigate, evidence laid before a Foreign Court, and affecting persons who were not British subjects. It appears to be perfectly clear that two of the prisoners, and probably more than two, were quite innocent of the crimes laid to their charge. Two of them have, happily, been released on condition that they do not return to the country. But all through Her Majesty's Representative at Constantinople has used his influence to represent to the Ottoman Authorities that the trial had not been a fair one, and that there were, to say the least of it, grave doubts as to there being any trace of guilt to be attached to many of the other prisoners. Detailed statements, though made on authority which require confirmation, have been received of tortures such as it must be a shock to anyone in the civilised world to read of, and those statements have been communicated to the Ottoman Authorities, who will no doubt investigate them, as they must know that such reports must be injurious to their own Provinces, and must affect the attitude of the civilised world towards them. With regard to Aleppo and the case of the Bishop and Archbishop, lean only say that they come under the category of subjects belonging to this general question which Her Majesty's Representatives have permanent instructions to attend to, and to furnish the Government with information upon. It is impossible on every rumour to send fresh instructions to Her Majesty's Representative. The general policy of Her Majesty's Government has been to act up to the obligations which they consider rest upon this country. With regard to the question of Consuls in Armenia, the Government are continually receiving complaints from British traders and subjects in many parts of the world that there are not Consuls enough to look after purely British interests. There are already Consuls in Armenia who send Reports. The improvement of affairs in that part of the world does not depend upon the righting of this or that case of wrong. It depends on the general policy of the Turkish Authorities themselves. When improvement is wanted the necessity for improvement must be brought home to the Ottoman Authorities. The Treaty of Crypus no doubt laid obligations on us, but hon. Members who desire to use that Treaty as an argument and a lever should read the whole of it. My hon. Friend has urged that this country has special obligations in this matter, lint I do not think they are so special as has been contended. As regards our obligations under the Treaty of Berlin, they are most fully recognised by the Government. This country has done more than her share in upholding International obligations under that Treaty. The policy of Her Majesty's Government has not fallen short of any obligation that might fairly attach to it; and if their efforts have not been completely successful, it has not been from any want of goodwill, or from any failure to recognise their obligations. It is a want of success that is inherent in the circumstances of the case, and any improvement in that part of the world which has been the subject of discussion must necessarily be one of slow growth, and probably result from the co-operation of many Powers, and not from the individual efforts of one alone.

* SIR C.W. DILKE

said, his hon. Friend had asked that more Consuls should be appointed in Armenia. There was a time when we had Consuls in every village there, and it was only after the most careful consideration that Lord Granville—who, he was sure his hon. Friend would admit, was a good friend to the Armenians—withdrew most of them. Their number was steadily reduced during the years when the Government of 1880 was in Office to the number it stands at at present. The Foreign Office at that time was burdened with Reports from those Consuls. No good came from them; on the contrary, more harm was done than good to the Armenian cause.

MR. J. LOWTHER (Kent, Thanet)

said, that what the right hon. Baronet had just stated was, he thought, a matter well within the recollection of all who took any part in public affairs during the period to which he had alluded. He did not intend to take any exception to what had fallen from the Under Secretary; but there was one thing against which he must protest, and that was Members coming down to the House, which was already overburdened with grave affairs at home, and asking them to embark upon a criticism of the administration of the internal affairs of a Foreign State which was in alliance with this country. The hon. Member for Eye (Mr. F. S. Stevenson) took upon himself—upon what evidence he had not told them—to sweep away the whole Ottoman system of judicial administration as absolutely worthless. He was not himself prepared to deny that the Turkish judicial administration might not be, as his hon. Friend behind him had observed, ideally perfect; but when they found a difficulty constantly presenting itself as to judicial proceedings much nearer home, he thought it should be a warning to them not to embark upon a crusade so far off as Armenia. It had been said that these proceedings in connection with the Armenian prisoners were conducted without judicial form, and that the evidence upon which the prisoners were convicted was worthless. The hon. Gentleman who made that statement had given no evidence whatever of that fact. The evidence the hon. Gentleman brought before the House as conclusive in his mind that other prisoners were not guilty was the authority of their released fellow-prisoners that they were as guiltless as themselves. He remembered Mr. Disraeli warning the House of Commons in the last speech he delivered to that House to beware of coffee-house babble, and he hoped the House of Commons would not now lend its countenance to receiving ex parte statements as conclusive evidence that established tribunals in a friendly country had departed from their duty. He did not think the Government would thank the hon. Gentleman for asking them to add to their duties the revision of the Ottoman Criminal Jurisprudence. This was a matter they might leave to the Ottoman Authorities themselves. If there was one thing more than another less calculated to advance the interests of the Christian population in Turkey it was the comments made in that House and in the English Press, which had created great irritation in high circles in Constantinople, and tended to make the Turkish Authorities jealous of interference with their prerogatives, and turn a deaf ear to the diplomatic communications made to it in regular form by the Government. The veriest tyro in diplomacy knew that newspaper comments did more to stiffen the backs of Ottoman administrators than any course which could be pursued. Of course, if it were to be announced that unless certain steps were taken offensive operations would be undertaken—an announcement which no British Minister dare make—it would be a different thing. The Committee would remember the reply Prince Gortschakoff gave to Lord John Russell when he addressed a remonstrance to him about Poland. The Prince told the British Minister to look to Ireland, than which Poland was not in half as bad a condition. The truth was that, if Foreign Governments or the subjects of Foreign Governments converted themselves into political partisans in regard to the affairs of other States, they stood a very good chance of getting a snub, and of aggravating the grievances which they desired to alleviate. Not one of the persons whose cases were now under consideration was a British subject, and it was only by a strained reading of certain International Agreements that we had any locus standi in these cases. He hoped the Government would not be driven to adopt any course which would give colour to the idea that this country was in favour of interfering in the interests of persons of any nationality who had grievances against the Government of the country in which they lived.

MR. PAUL (Edinburgh, S.)

said, the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had told the Committee that the worst thing possible for the subjects of the Sultan in Armenia was that their case should be taken up in the House and brought to the notice of the Sultan—

MR. J. LOWTHER

I referred to irritating language used in this House.

MR. PAUL

said, he was not aware that anyone who had taken part in that Debate had made use of irritating language. He had understood the right hon. Gentleman to deprecate the practice of interfering in these matters altogether.

MR. J. LOWTHER

said, he had referred to the great injury done to persons whose interests were affected by irritating language in the House, and by irritating comments in the British Press. The hon. Member was aware that, in response to a very statesmanlike appeal from the Government, irritating observations on the present occasion had been avoided.

MR. PAUL

said, he would point out to the right hon. Gentleman that, as the result of the matter having been brought forward in the House by the hon. Members for Kingston and Eye, certain persons who had been condemned and who would have been executed had been released. The right hon. Gentleman had stated we had no reason to suppose that the Armenian prisoners, who had been convicted, were innocent, and that the opinions of their fellow-prisoners were worthless. He would remind him, however, that the British Vice Consul had satisfied himself that the two Professors who had been condemned were undoubtedly innocent, and the other 13 prisoners were condemned on evidence of the same nature. He was surprised to hear the right hon. Gentleman quote the phrase used by Mr. Disraeli in the House n regard to "coffee-House babble," when they knew that that phrase had reference to the Bulgarian massacres.

MR. J. LOWTHER

said, that Mr. Disraeli used the phrase in relation to certain alleged occurrences in Bulgaria. If the hon. Member would refer to the Report of Sir Henry Layard it would be found that the bulk of those allegations were untrue.

MR.PAUL

said, he did not think that the Reports of Sir Henry Layard themselves would bear close investigation. At any rate, it was by the intervention of hon. Members of that House, and, through them, of the Government, that the lives of two of these prisoners had been spared, and he hoped that this intervention would continue. Under the Treaty of Berlin this country had undertaken, with other Rowers, to introduce reforms in Armenia, and to do what they could to secure the lives and property of men who, though they might not be British subjects, had some claim on our protection. That protection had been afforded to them in the past, and from the tone of the Under Secretary's statements he hoped it would be afforded to them in the future.

* MR. GIBSON BOWLES

trusted that the Government would not allow themselves to be beguiled by the sirens of the back Benches on the Ministerial side into roaming round the world revising the Judgments of Foreign Courts. It might be that Turkish Courts were not perfect, but they were often told that the same thing might be said of English and Irish Courts. Each country had a right to decide questions according to its own methods; and if the Government were to undertake such a task they should commence with Russia, where the greatest cruelties were perpetrated, where people were condemned without trial, persons being ordered off to Siberia as an administrative act. The responsibility of England in regard to Armenia was of the slightest kind, and it was shared entirely with the other Rowers who were signatories to the Berlin Treaty, and he objected to people forming themselves into Committees and trying to induce the Government to take action upon the statement of a few loquacious Armenians. It must not be forgotten that when Russia attacked Turkey Turkey invoked the intervention of England; but we de- clined to interfere, because the other Powers were not prepared to join us. Turkey was not oppressive or intolerant—its toleration, indeed was something incredible. Roman Catholic and Greek processions took place in Constantinople with more freedom than would be allowed in England. But undoubtedly there was a very serious state of things in Armenia, because that Province formed the next step towards Constantinople that Russia had to take. She had got Batoum and Kars, and she was carrying on her scheme by means of pretended grievances inflicted on pretended Christians. It was by exploiting the Armenians to their disadvantage that Russia could take the next step. He denied the title of the British Government to interfere with the Turkish Courts in their dealing with crime, especially when we had heard only one side, and that the Armenian side. The hon. Member opposite (Mr. Paul) had said that the evidence against these prisoners was known. Then why had it not been communicated to the House? It might have materially changed the tone of many hon. Members.

MR. PAUL

said, the British Vice Consul had heard the whole of the evidence.

* MR. GIBSON BOWLES

said, he did not know whether the Vice Consul was judge, Advocate, or what. Whatever he was, he (Mr. Bowles) preferred the opinion of the Judge who presided over the properly-constituted Court, and who heard the evidence and gave his decision in the regular way. He protested against hon. Members coming down to the House and giving them one side of the case, and that the Armenian side. He admitted that Turkey was not perfect. He was aware that the only country that was absolutely perfect was Great Britain under a Liberal Administration, and that directly a Tory Government was in power it became imperfect. The Turks were not perfect; but they had one quality, which was the quality of silence. The Turks suffered calumny in dignified silence, the result being that we got the Armenian side, the Bulgarian side, the Russian side, and the Gladstonian side, but never got the Turkish side. They ought, therefore, to suspend their judgment whenever these wild and frequent allegations were made against Turkey of impossible atrocity. Severe the Turks might be; but we had been severe in this country. A hundred years ago we were burning women for witchcraft in London, and less than 100 years ago we were hanging men by scores for sheep stealing, and it was not much to say that Turkey was 100 years behind us. He lost patience when he heard these constant representations made on behalf of a people who were not worth them. Everybody in the East knew what the Armenian was. It was said that it took two Jews to cheat a Greek, and three Greeks to cheat an Armenian. The Armenians were anxious to get all they could for themselves. His belief was that Her Majesty's Government, like the previous Government, had acted beyond the strict limits of their duty, and lie trusted they would in future entirely refrain from interfering with the conduct of justice in foreign countries, or, if they could not refrain, that they would begin in those countries where interference was most urgently needed, and that was not in Turkey.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (Mr. BRYCE,) Aberdeen, S.

said, the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. J. Lowther) appeared to him to ignore entirely what was the critical point of the position—namely, the duty which was imposed by the Treaty of Berlin upon every British Government in reference to this subject, and which every British Government had recognised. He trusted the present Government would never be found wanting in the discharge of the duty of making those representations and taking those steps which their position as a Signatory Power of the Treaty of Berlin required in endeavouring to see that its agreements were carried out. The right hon. Gentleman could not forget what took place in 1878. In that year Russia made a Treaty with Turkey by which the Turks undertook to introduce reforms in the Armenian Provinces, and by which the protection of the Eastern Christians was given into the hands of Russia. Against the Treaty the British Government raised its voice. Lord Salisbury's famous Circular was sent round to all the Courts of Europe, and in pursuance of the suggestion of Her Majesty's Government the Congress of Berlin was convoked. At that Congress the Treaty of San Stefano was set aside, and the protection of the Eastern Christians, which Russia had undertaken, was transferred to the Signatory Powers. Therefore, the case rested upon the obligation which Her Majesty's Government undertook by the Treaty of Berlin, which legally was the same upon them as upon the other Signatory Powers— and which they had never repudiated—but which morally rested in a primary and an exceptional degree upon them; and in pursuance of that obligation they conceived it to be their duty, as it was also the practice of the late Government, to discharge that obligation. It would be remembered that in the case of the Kurdish Chief Moussa Bey, the late Ambassador at Constantinople, whose loss they all deplored, made the strongest representation, at the instance of Lord Salisbury's Government, with regard to the trial of Moussa Bey. This trial at Angora was a case as much—in fact, more—demanding the intervention of Her Majesty's Government than the case of Moussa Bey, and the Government had done nothing more than their bounden duty in calling the attention of the Turkish Government to the failure of justice in the case of the two gentlemen who had now been released, in criticising the proceedings of the trial, and in calling attention to the method in which it had been conducted. He should be sorry if his hon. Friend the Member for South Edinburgh (Mr. Paul) supposed that Her Majesty's Government complained in any way of the representations that had been made. The matter was one of grave concern. It affected the interests of the Turkish Empire itself, and it might ultimately affect the whole peace of the East. The Government conceived it to be their duty to continue the policy they had adopted in these matters, which policy he believed every British Government would consider it their duty to follow in like circumstances.

MR. TOMLINSON (Preston)

said, he wished to ask a question on another matter. There had been some rumours in the papers of anarchy in some parts of Morocco, and he should like to ask if the Foreign Office had received any information on the subject?

* SIR E. GREY

said, he had not been able to make inquiries during the last few hours, and he had not been aware of the fact that the question was to be raised. He had not. received any information tending to confirm the rumours of trouble in the northern parts of Morocco, and he would be very much surprised to be told that there was any chance of disturbances existing which would need any special measures for the protection of British interests there.

* SIR R. TEMPLE

I withdraw the Motion to reduce the Vote.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Original Question again proposed.

Motion made, and Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again,"—(Sir J. T. Hibbert,)—put, and agreed to.

Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.