§ Considered in Committee.
§ (In the Committee.)
§
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That 74,100 men and boys be employed for Sea and Coastguard Services for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1893, including 14,505 Royal Marines.
§ (7.5.) CAPTAIN G. E. PRICE (Devonport)We have now an opportunity of going into a discussion of the statement laid on the Table of the House by the 799 First Lord of the Admiralty. It is a very clear and able statement, and, on the whole, a satisfactory one. It divides itself into two heads: It gives an account of what has been done with the money granted by Parliament up to the present time, also some forecast of what is to be done in the future. I think the latter branch of the subject is more open to criticism than the first. The First Lord of the Admiralty, I think, describes it as a modest programme. I wish myself the noble Lord had gone a little further and taken us into his confidence. We know what it is that he proposes to do now; but I think it is very important the country should know what he proposes to do in the next twelve months. The noble Lord has now been in Office for a very long period; and I think it would be a right and very proper thing for him to tell us what his great experience and the experience of his colleagues shows him to be the programme of the future. It may be that, in the course of a few months, another gentleman may take his place, and I think that this country now, when the elections come on, should be in a position to consider whether the policy of the Admiralty has been a wise one, and whether the policy of the programme which he proposes is a wise one; or whether, on the other hand, we are to take up that policy which was enunciated at Newcastle the other day, and very largely reduce the Army and Navy expenditure. He tells us that the new programme comprises at present only three battle ships and ten torpedo boats. I confess I am disappointed with the programme. A great deal has been said about our want of cruisers. I should like to say that we want both more cruisers and battle ships. I say we should, first of all, have our battle ships. I do not think that we at present stand in the position laid down by the noble Lord of being able to compete with the Navies of any other two countries.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONWill be.
§ CAPTAIN G. E. PRICEYes; I know the noble Lord said that would be our position in 1894. I am alluding to the present. The noble Lord makes some comparison between the English and French ships, and says— 800
In December, 1891 (excluding the Mediterranean Station), there were only 13 French ships on foreign stations, as against 47 of our Navy.I daresay the attention of the noble Lord has been drawn to a letter in the Times of Saturday last. I have not had time to verify that letter; but it appears to be written by an able pen, and the writer said the figures were not 13, but 31; that the two figures had got reversed, and that 31 was the number of French ships actually in commission at that time, and he pointed out that in the Channel even—
§ LORD G. HAMILTONI beg pardon; my figures are correct. I have taken vessels of a certain size, but nothing below a sloop, and we have 47 as against 13 French vessels. If you include every little vessel of both nations, the French have 31 and we have 81.
§ CAPTAIN G. E. PRICEYes; I notice that the writer included torpedoes, which was not a fair comparison, and pointed out that in the Channel alone there were ten French ships in commission against eight of the English, and in the Mediterranean the Force of France was slightly inferior. France had a very large number of large ships in the Mediterranean in reserve, and we had none. I still think the noble Lord ought to make some correction in that statement, because it is a very important thing to put before the country. As regards the size of the battleships to be laid down, I am sorry to hear that they are going to be so enormously large as some of the ships built lately; but I hope before these ships are laid down some other size will be adopted. The noble Lord pointed out, I think, very lately the growing importance of the fire of smaller guns, but he did not seem to carry out his views to a practical conclusion, because, if those smaller guns had been found to be more useful than the large ones, why was it necessary to build those large ships when smaller vessels could carry the guns? Because you could get more ships for your money; and I believe it would be better to have ten small ships than six or eight very large ones. As regards torpedo vessels, a good deal has been said about them in the Press and elsewhere. It is a well-known thing that France and many other countries in Europe have far more torpedo vessels than this country. But the noble Lord says 801 the object for which they require torpedo boats is not the same as that for which we require them. I do not follow that argument; but, at all events, he goes on and says we intend to beat these torpedo-boats by vessels of a larger type—what are called torpedo-boat catchers, a well-known Admiralty name for them, which. I think, is a misnomer. But these torpedo vessels, I think, have gone to an extreme in their size. What is the object of building these vessels so large? It is not to gain speed, because we are told here that these vessels are only to be capable of steaming from 17 to 17½ knots. Then about their armament. I think it is a mistake to have these comparatively large, quick-firing guns. We must sacrifice two or three things. We must sacrifice a large draught of water for one thing, and the large number of small guns which we might have in their place; and consequently we shall be spending a great deal more money. For the money which is to be paid for the five ships that yon are going to lay down you might have seven or eight smaller vessels, which would do the work equally well. I am sure the Committee will be glad to hear what has been said of the unfortunate accident to the Victoria. The result of that accident has evidently been greatly exaggerated, and it is very pleasing to hear that the repairs to that vessel only cost £1,500. There is one lesson which we might learn form it at any rate, and that is the great importance of the Malta Dockyard. As regards the docks which have been promised at home, we are promised another dock at Devonport, and I hope that it is going to be a full-sized dock. I look upon it as a most important thing not only that we should have this new dock, but also that there should be a considerable increase in the basin accommodation in that harbour. I think the Committee who have read his statement will agree with me that one of the most important features of it is the undoubted superiority and economy which has been shown in building ships in Royal Dockyards rather than in private yards. I see the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) laughs. I know he differs very much from me on that point. He stated in the House not very long ago that in his opinion the establishments of Royal 802 Dockyards ought to be very much reduced, and that we ought to build our ships in private yards rather than in Royal Dockyards; and I wonder whether he adheres to that statement now. There have lately been great changes in the Dockyard policy of the Government. Last year a very large sum of money was granted for increasing the wages of the men employed in the Dockyards. After all what was done was inevitable. But I should like to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty if he can really inform the Committee now taking that rise into consideration, whether the wages of the men employed in Royal Yards are really in the majority of cases on a par with what is received in private yards? The impression at Devonport is that very few of the men employed in the Dockyard receive as much as could be obtained outside; and I do not think it a wise policy to give men in a Royal Dockyard anything like a lower scale of wages than they can receive outside. There is one considerable blot on that scheme of re-organisation, which I think was made last year. Everyone knows that the system of classification which was introduced is a great grievance in the Shipyards. I want to know for what reason this classification was carried out? If it can be shown that it was for the benefit of the Service I will say nothing, but I cannot understand how any benefit to the Service could possibly be obtained from it. If we are to commence de novo in organising our Dockyards, and there had been no such thing as Dockyards before, it might be a wise thing to adopt some sort of classification. But there is this objection: that it is not a new thing at all. The work in the Royal Dockyards has been going on for very many years. The various classes of shipwrights have been employed there for a great number of years, and they have always hitherto worked as one trade. We have on the port side a gang of shipwrights who are being paid 30s. per week, and on the starboard side a gang of shipwrights doing exacting the same work and being paid at the rate of from 32s. to 33s. per week. There can be no sense in that, and I do ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether something cannot be done to modify a system which nobody defends? Sir, there is another subject to which I should like to refer, and that is this—the man whose 803 pension does not fall due until he attains the age of 60 or 65, and who dies before receiving any portion of the considerable sum to which he would then become entitled, altogether loses his pension. There is no arrangement by which that pension or any part of it can be given to his widow or to his nominee, and something should be done in that way following the example of the Insurance Societies. As to the personnel of the Fleet, I can agree with what my hon. and gallant Friend below me said about the scarcity of lieutenants, and I think steps should be taken to raise the number to 1,000, at least. There is another point. During the last year or two there has been considerable difficulty in getting engineer officers of the same kind as we have hitherto had. The qualifications have been reduced. Why? Simply because we could not get the sort of men we got before. In face of that I cannot agree with those who think we shall have no further difficulty in getting engineer officers. Then, as regards the engine room artificers, a very useful body of men, they are by no means contented. Their complaints are not being attended to, and something ought to be done for them; certainly it would be in the interests of the Navy that the higher grades of engine room artificers were given the rank of warrant officer. It is a lasting disgrace that although every year in the Army men are given these higher ranks, there is in the Navy no means of giving commissions to seamen, however able a man may be. As to the chief petty officer's, I am very sorry nothing has been done to remedy their grievances. They complain that they are not treated in the matter of pensions as other classes are and this is a great grievance with them. I understand there has been some little difficulty with the Treasury about the matter; but that I am sure the First Lord of the Admiralty would speedily overcome if once he put his foot down and said that justice must be done. I hope the various points I have raised will receive the attention of the Admiralty.
§ (7.35.) MR. R. W. DUFF (Banffshire)Sir, I think we have a right to complain of the very incomplete form in which the Estimates have been delivered. They are usually accompanied by a statement of the progress of shipbuilding, giving in detail the work of the incoming financial year; but it is quite impossible 804 for anyone to form, from the Estimates that have been presented, any correct idea of what the Government programme is. We do not know how far the rearmament of vessels, to which the noble Lord referred at the time the Naval Defence Act was passed, is to be carried out, though that is a most important matter. It may be said that this matter can be postponed until we reach the Shipbuilding Vote; but it has often been taken very late in the Session. Last year, though the Session commenced in November, it was taken on the 17th June; in 1890 it was taken on the 8th August; and in 1888 it was not taken until the Autumn Session, on the 13th December. I had put down on the Paper a Motion to reduce the Shipbuilding Vote at that time, but the vessels were half-built before the Motion could come on. I therefore join in the request that the Shipbuilding Vote should be submitted at an earlier period of the Session than has hitherto been the case. With regard to the new programme, as far as it is possible to judge in the absence of the information to which I have referred, and which the Committee have a right to expect, the Admiralty seem to have succeeded in turning out a very satisfactory number of cruisers. But if we come to line-of-battle ships I really do not know what the Admiralty are doing, because we have no information on that point. Some of my friends think they are behindhand with these vessels. I am told, for example, that they have been delayed to push forward the Royal Sovereign. With regard to the vessels building by contract, there is no doubt they are very much behindhand, and I hope we shall have an explanation of this. We are all very much interested in the designs of these new battle ships, and I hope, if not to-night, at least before long, the noble Lord will tell us something more about them. I should also like to know what is to be the calibre of the guns to be placed on board these vessels? I do not share the view that we are getting short of cruisers. I think the number built ought to be sufficient. The Times says these cruisers are the "eyes and ears" of the Fleet. I am rather disposed to look for the eyes and ears of the Fleet to the merchant cruisers. They are faster vessels, and not so liable to break down. I should like to know what the cost of the new torpedo boats is to be, and I should 805 also like some further information with respect to the vessels that are to have new engines and new boilers, particularly the Devastation and the Rupert, and how they are to be manned? With regard to the Victoria, I am very glad to hear she can be made good at a cost of about £1,500. I should be glad to know whether it is intended to bring the Victoria home?
§ LORD G. HAMILTONNo.
§ MR. R. W. DUFFI am very glad to hear that. The cruisers the Admiralty have turned out appeal to have given satisfaction. I understand they have all had satisfactory trials, and all go 20 knots. Are these measured mile trials or the more exhaustive trials recently established?
§ MR. FORWOODThe new trials.
§ MR. R. W. DUFFNow, Sir, as regards the Blake, which is to be the flag ship on the North American station, and the Blenheim, these are the two largest cruisers in the world. They were designed for a speed of 20 knots and 22 knots forced draught, and even if they had come up to expectations they would have been expensive vessels. About the Blake I know nothing, but as to the Blenheim we know from the First Lord's own statement that her forward boilers leaked on the natural draught trial on the measured mile; that she had to go to Plymouth, where the after-boilers gave way, and that she was only able to go 19 to 19½ knots. I am sure the First Lord will admit that that is extremely unsatisfactory. He holds out some hope of getting rid of the difficulty—but at present it is disappointing to have spent so much money entirely on speed and not to have got what we want. These vessels appear to have been built before it was fully realised how important a feature boilers are in vessels going at a high rate of speed. A much larger speed is given to engines and boilers in passenger steamers than it is possible to afford in men-of-war; still the Admiralty might with advantage have consulted some of these engineers who build for the Mercantile Marine vessels, some of which in the course of a year run from 60,000 to 70,000 miles under steam. Now, as to the Ordnance Vote, I congratulate the Admiralty on the accelerated rate at which large guns have been delivered. I see by the Estimates that 51 guns above nine inches in diameter have 806 been completed and delivered as against 27 in the two preceding years. That was quite insufficient for our requirements. If the present rate of delivery is maintained it will be amply sufficient to meet the demand of the new vessels, even if the contractors for the ships keep their time, which at present does not seem likely to be the case. I am also glad, under this department, to acknowledge an improvement in the form of the Ordnance Vote. I have repeatedly asked that the Vote should specify the calibre of the gun we are asked to supply. This alteration has been made, for the first time, in this year's Estimates, and it will bring before the House much more clearly than in the old form, when all the guns were lumped in one sum, what is the policy of the Board concerning our naval ordnance. In connection with this Vote, I should like to ask why we are taking money for five 16-inch guns—only three ships carry the 110-ton gun—making six guns altogether. Is it necessary to have five of these guns in reserve? They cost £18,000 apiece; and in spite of the First Lord's defence of them last year, I am satisfied that they are not popular guns in the Service. I will only say in conclusion, Sir, that while I have to complain of the incomplete manner in which the Estimates have been presented; while I think we are entitled to some further information regarding the delay in the delivery of our vessels building by contract, and some further explanation concerning the Blenheim, and whether she is ever likely to realise not only on the measured mile, but in continuous steaming, the speed she was designed to attain; while I wish information on these points, I desire to give the Admiralty credit for the rapidity with which they have pushed forward the cruisers building in the dockyards, and for the accelerated rate of the delivery of our heavy guns. As to the personnel of the Navy, we are told that there are now many more men abroad than in 1886, and I should be glad if the noble Lord will explain his change of view in keeping so large a squadron on foreign stations.
§ THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. FORWOOD,) Lancashire, OrmskirkIt will be for the convenience of the Committee if I interpose now in 807 order to afford some reply to the questions that have been raised, and more particularly as to the boilers and as to the pay in the Dockyards. First, as regards the so-called breakdown of some of the recent vessels on their trial. There can be no gainsaying the proposition that the efficiency of a vessel depends upon her boilers, more, perhaps, than upon any other part of her construction; and although, individually, my feeling has been for some time that the boilers that were placed in some of these vessels were inadequate in size and defective in point of construction, yet I am bound to say that, by the light of the information the designers had before them at the time these boilers were proposed and constructed, I think they were justified in the course they pursued. Hon. Members and the outside public are too apt to contrast the performances of merchant ships with those which are expected of Her Majesty's cruisers, and sufficient allowance is not made, as one hon. Member suggested ought to be made, for the difference in the conditions connected with propulsion between a vessel of war and one intended for the Merchant Service. Speed is talked about, and it is said that if such and such a merchant vessel goes at 20 knots, why should a war vessel go at only 18 or 15? These remarks can only come from persons who are not well informed as to what is meant by the relativespeed of vessels. That being so, I should like the Committee to note the particulars of the progressive trials of one of our recent ships which will show what is meant by an increase of speed. The Edgar has a displacement of 7,350 tons. That vessel attained nine and a half knots with an indicated horse-power of 890. Increasing the speed to 14 knots raised the horse-power to 3,600, 19½ knots made it 10,000, and 20 knots 13,000. It would be impossible, within the limited space allowed in a vessel of such large dimensions and large displacement of engines as the Edgar, to supply that ship with boiler power on the same scale that would be supplied to a merchant steamer. A merchant vessel steaming 9½ knots Mould have boilers weighing about 60 tons, and if you are to give a vessel 13,000 horse-power to propel her 20½ knots, you must practically and positively load her with boilers. It is perfectly impossible in a cruiser to apply the same 808 rules that you could apply to a merchant ship. There must be some other mode of obtaining that power which is necessary if we are to have speed in a reasonably sized ship. The engineers and designers of the vessel about which the question has been raised did not adopt the type of boiler which has been used in several vessels of the Fleet, such as the Blake and one or two other ships, without having before them the results of previous experience. In 1885 the pressure of the boilers had gradually increased from about 80 lbs. to 130 lbs. on the square inch. At that time what was called the Northbrook route programme was in progress or in contemplation, and it was proposed by the constructors that they should be allowed to use the triple-expansion engines, and they would guarantee that with boilers of their own design they would give a power far in excess of what had hitherto been obtained in engines of war ships, and upon a comparatively light weight. They were allowed, and I think properly, to make the experiment, and upon a weight of 196 tons of boilers they guaranteed to give a power of no less than 8,500 horses, whilst formerly it required 248 tons of boilers to give a power of only 5,000 horses. These vessels, the Australia and Galatea, were turned out of hand, and their trials were most satisfactory, and, as the result of their trials, further boilers of a similar construction were ordered. The late Chief Engineer to the Navy, than whom there was no more competent and thoroughly able man, whose works are text books in engineering schools at the present day, thought the result which, had been obtained from these vessels was sufficiently satisfactory to justify him in going even further in that direction. I want hon. Members to understand this question. From these experiments the exceptional powers to be obtained were never contemplated to be realised or to be tried except in emergencies, and then only for a comparatively few hours. And on these conditions the vessels were ordered, and the boilers were made of a more limited size even than those that had been constructed for the Australia and Galatea; and when they came to be tried the vessels and boilers did not fail in the sense of not being able to propel the vessels at a high speed, but they failed to produce the power 809 under abnormal circumstances of high forced draught. In other words, it was found, if a high velocity of air was forced into the furnaces to create rapidity of combustion, it led to trouble in the tube plates and in the tubes; and, as the Admiralty never contemplated that this exceptionally high speed should be obtained except on an emergency, it was thought far better not to strain these boilers at the earliest stage of their existence by this excessive pressure, but to test them with that with which they were ordinarily intended to work, not the forced draught, but the natural draught. As regards the natural draught, the boilers have done their work with few exceptions; and, although recent vessels have not been tried at a forced draught, yet I have no reason to doubt, if an emergency arose, and increased power should be wanted, the forced, draught might then be used to advantage. I think it would be a mistake to force new machinery to the highest possible power in the first use without allowing the bearings of the machinery to settle down into their proper faces. It is also a fact that if you require too large a power from a boiler in its earlier stages you may injure it, and it will not produce the normal power which it would produce with ordinary usage. My hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Duff) has been referring to the opinions of mercantile men on this question; but, as far bade as 1887, when our Chief Engineer contemplated putting out to contract more of these boilers, there was some doubt in the minds of some, and my noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty consulted with four leading engineering firms of the country, and asked them the question as to whether, in their opinion, the weight, design, durability, and the maintenance of the required speed would be found in the specifications and designs of our engines and boilers of that day? One and all of the four firms to whom that inquiry was put said:—"You have a good design and specification; they will be durable; they are sufficient, and they will provide the steam required."
§ MR. R. W. DUFFDo you refer to the engineers or the engine-makers?
§ MR. FORWOODI refer to the engine-makers—four of the largest marine engine-makers in the Kingdom. And, I think the highly technical question 810 of the boilers and engines and the sufficiency of design submitted by the Chief Engineer and endorsed by four such firms as I have indicated was an absolute justification for any Board of Admiralty to proceed upon in regard to the construction of boilers. Certainly, for myself, I must say my difficulties were set aside because I considered the opinion of such eminent firms was much better than that of any man of possibly only limited practical experience. I desire to say further, and to insist on it, that these vessels are not failures in the sense indicated. My hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Duff) questions that. They are failures in this however: they do not attain that abnormally high power for which they were designed. The Vulcan, for example, on her eight hours trial made a speed averaging 19.4 knots per hour, and the boilers did not fail—19.4 knots is a great speed, a wonderful speed—I only know three merchant ships in the world that could do it.
§ MR. R. W. DUFFI referred to the Blenhiem.
§ MR. FORWOODI had the case of the Blake before my mind. In her eight hours' trial the natural draught was all right, and she averaged 19¼ knots, and with very great difficulties, and that in shallow water. The Blenheim made her eight hours' trial, developed 14,900 horse-power, and made 20 knots of speed with natural draft. After her trials were over there were some leaks in the tube at the ends. It is not at all improbable—in fact, professional men believe—that those difficulties which have been experienced with these boilers will be overcome by an alteration in the fixing of the tube, and that it does not depend upon the question of size or construction of the boilers, but more upon the fixing of the tubes into the tube plates. There are experiments going on which they are confident wall remedy these troubles. However that may be, when the new Naval Programme was laid down in 1889, my noble Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty was determined there should be no question whatever about the boilers of these ships, and these vessels, cruisers and war ships alike, have boilers from 16 to 20 per cent. in excess of the size and weight, proportionate to their powers, of those placed upon the vessels, such as I have been describing. Those new vessels have all fully come up to 811 the speed and power like the Edgar, and their boilers have given good results, both during trial and after trial. It may possibly be, however, that the smaller-sized boilers used in the vessels of six or seven years ago did not have sufficient steam or water space to allow of the circulation of water which the very high degree of heat, engendered by a forced draught, occasioned; and, therefore, my noble Friend has taken a further step with reference to this question of boilers. He is submitting questions, in connection with any new boilers, to a most competent committee, and it will be seen that a better committee could not be selected when I mention that it will have upon it the chief surveyor of the Board of Trade, than whom no one in this country has more experience of mercantile boilers; the engineer surveyor of Lloyd's, and the superintendent engineer of that great mercantile concern "the Peninsular and Oriental Company. Those gentlemen, associated with three naval engineers, will have under their consideration the question of the type of boilers we are now using. We have no doubt about their being sufficient and good; but to make security doubly sure, my noble Friend has called in this committee to his aid, and I believe that from the experience and knowledge these gentlemen possess we shall have a type of boiler for any new vessels that are laid down which must inevitably give satisfaction. I should mention that, besides the representative of the Board of Trade, and the three naval engineers, there will be the important addition of the principal partner in the firm of Messrs. Humphrey and Tennant, manufacturing engineers, and the Committee will be presided over by that competent naval officer, Admiral Buller. I have mow dealt with the question of boilers, but there are one or two other matters to which I must refer. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Devonport has asked a question as to whether the wages paid in the dockyards are on a par with those paid in private trade. In reply I would say that, before determining what those wages should be, and what advance should be made in the wages at the dockyards, the utmost care was taken to ascertain what wages were paid in private yards engaged in war shipbuilding in different parts of the country. We also asked what these wages were 812 seven or five years before, as our desire was to strike a fair average between what they were in private yards in good times and in times of depression. A fair average rate was struck, and it forms the basis on which the advance was given to the employés in the dockyards. My hon. and gallant Friend asks what is the benefit of classification? I think anyone who considers the matter will see that there must be a benefit in being able to reward the man who attends to his work and shows himself to be a competent and good workman. If you have one uniform wage paid to every man in every trade, whether industrious, skilled, or incompetent, I want to know what incentive there is to a man to display extra ability or attention to his work? The system is an advantage both to the men and the State. For all time there has been a system of classification in the dockyards. All the hired men have been paid varying rates of pay according to the ability and diligence with which they performed their work, and on the establishment list most of the trades had a classification. But it so happens that the established shipwright's trade was one that had not a classification. What was the result? We had a uniform rate of pay for every man who was on the establishment, and that uniform rate was out of proportion to what the hired men obtained; and, therefore, the best hired men would not take a place on the establishment, because they would have to sacrifice too much money by doing so. The establishment, therefore, instead of being a position which was regarded as promotion, and as an incentive to men to do good work, practically became in some cases a refuge for the less competent. It would have been manifestly unfair to put good, bad, and indifferent workmen into the highest rate of pay on the establishment, and, therefore it was essential to grade men entered on the establishment, prior to 1st April last, and so be able to say to those who might be graded at the lower rate of pay, "If you are diligent, you will have a chance of being promoted to the higher rates." That is the procedure as regards the establishment men who are graded; but my hon. Friend asks me if it cannot be modified. I think it can be modified, and in this way: The present rule is that if there is a vacancy in the higher grade of pay among those men who were on the 813 establishment before 1st April, a competent man from the lower grade shall be appointed to the higher grade. But these vacancies will no doubt be necessarily slow, and there will be disappointment. Therefore, my noble Friend has consented to a scheme being drawn up by which there shall be a certain number promoted from the lower to the higher grades every year. That will give the men at the lower rates of pay an incentive to do their duty. As to the question of pensions, it has long been a difficult one. A man does not get the same rate of pay he would get if he were not entitled to a pension; and if he dies the amount he has so sacrificed is lost to his family. But that principle applies to the whole Civil Service—from top to bottom; and if any alteration is made in one rank, it will have to be made in the others. I would call attention specially to a change made in the regulations last year. Previously, while some men were called upon to pay as much as 3s. a week to get the benefit of the pension scheme, others were called upon to pay 1s. or 1s. 8d., and there was no uniformity. We have now established grades of pay at such a rate that, practically, we give to the establishment men pensions costing double that which they pay for during their time of service.
§ (8.25.) ADMIRAL FIELDI wish to correct an impression of the First Lord of the Admiralty as to my previous remarks. I was not so foolish as to contend that we ought to keep the whole of our ships due for completion in 1894 with their full complement of seamen and marines without reference to the Reserve. I never intended to make any such proposition, but I wish to emphasise what I said as to the personnel of the Navy being unsatisfactory by quoting Sir Thomas Symonds, who says—
Admiral Sir A. Hoskins, the present Senior Sea Lord of the Admiralty, admitted in his evidence before a Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Navy Estimates in 1888 that we were 300 lieutenants short. How much more shall we be short, in 1894, when ten battle ships and sixty cruisers are added to our Navy? The Bight Hon. W. H. Smith told me, shortly before his death, that the Navy was much too short of officers. Other Admiralty officials have also admitted the same to me.I want to draw the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to another matter of importance. It is as 814 to the present system which prevails of allowing admirals to choose their own flag captains without any limit of choice. The recent stranding of the Victoria has drawn public attention to this matter, and, without wishing to cast any reflection upon the captain of that fine ship, I must say I think the present is not a right system, and ought not to be any longer continued. I admit that the custom prevailed in old times, but now the conditions of the Service are entirely altered, and we have enormous battle ships, each a squadron in itself, costing from £800,000 to £1,000,000; and I boldly affirm that the time has come when a limit ought to be placed on the admiral's power to choose the flag captain to command such a ship. I venture to suggest that the question should be considered whether a young officer, be he ever so smart, should be put in that responsible position—in command of a first-class ironclad—unless he has commanded a seagoing ship as captain for two or three years. Until these officers have had experience in command of seagoing ships they should not be allowed to put the national property in jeopardy. The present First Sea Lord of the Admiralty (Admiral Sir A. H. Hoskins), when in command in the Mediterranean, chose a first-class man as his flag captain, who had commanded a ship in the Training Squadron for three years; but I believe there are three Admirals now afloat who have chosen men who have never before commanded a ship as captain. I cast no aspersion on the flag-captain of the Victoria; but such occurrences draw attention to the point I have raised. The Admiral's choice should be limited in the way I have suggested. One word more. A very important Memorandum has been circulated amongst the Naval Members of the House by certain warrant officers, in which they ask for the creation of a new rank—fleet gunner, fleet boatswain, and fleet carpenter. You have already fleet surgeons and fleet paymasters. I express no opinion on the question; but I think it should be considered, as no men do better service than the warrant officers. There is another question to which I have before referred, and which the First Lord said he would look into. It is a great scandal that chief petty officers in the Navy, on retiring, should not have their rank recognised, as is done in the 815 case of their brother officers in the Army. Their rank should at least be recognised by an additional halfpenny a day in their pensions. The noble Lord says the Treasury is not disposed to grant the money. I am sure the House would give it at once. If the First Lord will only make a fresh appeal, and say he has all the Service at his back, I am sure our excellent Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Goschen) would yield at last.
§ (9.6.) MR. MORTON (Peterborough)The hon. and gallant Gentleman who spoke last (Admiral Field) complained, with much force, of favouritism in the appointments in the Navy. I have no doubt favouritism exists in other departments, but the gallant Gentleman's complaint is a sufficient assurance that the grievance is felt in the Navy. The real remedy will be to have a more democratic House of Commons, and a more democratic Government. I should be glad to hear that the appointments were made altogether, not because of the class of any particular officer, but on account of his merits and experience; and until that is done we cannot expect to have good officers or an efficient Navy. The hon. and gallant Member declared that more money was required for the Navy, but I think we vote too much money for these Services. It is a question, too, whether the money is properly applied. Those officers who do the work do not get the money; the large salaries are paid to the show officers. The Navy is a popular Service, and I confess that I have an affection for it which does not extend to the Army, which I should like to see done away with altogether; but if this popularity is to remain, favouritism must disappear. I am glad the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Duff) has paid so much attention to the Debate, because in the next Parliament it may be his business to reduce the Vote, and see that the men who do the work get a proper proportion of the money. If he does not do that, he will have to leave the Government, for the House of Commons will be democratic and will insist on these reductions taking place. Then I think we ought to have some information on the subject of the contracts for these boilers.
§ MR. FORWOODI gave the explanation which the hon. Gentleman requires, but at the time I spoke he was out of the House.
§ MR. MORTONThat was when we went into Committee, and I was not present. As the question was raised before, I think the explanation should have been given when the Speaker was in the Chair. But with respect to these contracts, it seems that it was not only in one case, for which there might have been some exceptional reason, but in the cases of eleven ships that money was advanced to the contractors without a final certificate. That arises from having ships built by contract, but I am at a loss to understand why money should be paid to the contractors for machinery which turns out to be of no use, and which has not been submitted to the final test. If conditions are put in the contracts why are not those conditions enforced? and if they are not, we must expect to have inferior ships and inferior machinery. We want an assurance from the Government that they will not advance money in this way any more, or, at all events, that the contracts should be made in such a form that they can be carried out. We have an efficient Auditor General who brings these things to our knowledge, and it is our business to see that this money is no longer advanced in such an irregular and improper manner. I desire also to call the attention of the First Lord to the subject of high-class explosives. I do not pretend to know much about them, neither do I think the Government know much about them, but I understand they are very dangerous, and it has occurred to me that if we could get all countries to use them the result would be that every one would be glad to give up the use of them, because of the extreme danger, and I think that would be a good job for the world at large. Then, with respect to submarine vessels, it would be a good thing, rather than otherwise, if we could hide them under the water, and I should be glad if the Government could give us some further information on the matter. In the statement of the First Lord, the naval expenditure for the year was put down at £14,240,220, which showed an increase of £35,100 over the previous year. But, as a matter of fact, the naval expenditure for the year was £15,266,811, and thus, while an impression was given to the public that the Navy was costing 14¼ millions, it was really costing a million more. I 817 am afraid we shall see no reduction of the expenditure this year, and perhaps not next, and we shall never get anything done till independent Members criticise these Votes, and insist on reductions. I object to this total expenditure, as being more than is required for the defence of our commerce and business, and I should like to see it reduced by two or three millions. We want, above all, to give notice to the next Government that when we have a more democratic House of Commons, as we shall have after each succeeding General Election, that the country will insist that so much money is not wasted on the fighting departments. (Laughter.) Hon. Members on the opposite side of the House venture to laugh; but though I should be the first to regret it, they may not be here in the next Parliament to see the reduction. I hope the hon. and gallant Admiral will be here, but the rime has unquestionably come when there will have to be great reductions in the expenditure for fighting purposes.
§ (9.25.) ADMIRAL MAYNEIt may be, Sir, that we on this side of the House will not be the only people who will not be here after the next General Election. I entirely agree with the hon. Member who has just sat down (Mr. Morton) that it is the duty of the Opposition to criticise all Government measures, but I would recommend him to remember that there are some subjects which cost men a lifetime of study to master, and we have noticed that some hon. Gentlemen speak most frequently and at greatest length on subjects of which they know least. I would also point out, as showing the deep interest taken in the subject by hon. Gentlemen on the other side, that when the hon. Gentleman the Member for Banff (Mr. Duff) was speaking the whole of the Benches opposite were empty. The hon. Member has spoken of the great danger of high-class explosives, but he has proposed what seems to me to be a far greater danger—lamely, that we should go in for submarine vessels. The Navy is not given to "striking," but I think we should strike if the First Lord of the Admiralty required us to go under water for any length of time. I rose to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty if he will give an answer to the question I put to him this afternoon; and I may at 818 the same time remark that I think the hon. and gallant Member (Captain Price), when he counted the number of vessels in the Channel and contrasted them with the number at Brest and Cherbourg, must have omitted our Coastguard ships, which are now being made thoroughly efficient. Naval men have just been charged with being sanguinary but amiable, but we do not want to fight at all; nor does it in any way rest with us whether we have to fight or not. The motto of our gunnery ship is, "If you desire to have peace you must be prepared for war." That is why we want to be thoroughly armed. My experience, and I have no doubt the experience of other hon. Gentlemen, is that you cannot stop a bully at school by turning tail and running away. But a bully rarely attempts to bully if bethinks the other boy will turn round and hit him. I am entirely in accord with the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Admiral Field) in hoping that the First Lord of the Admiralty will find some way of altering the present system with regard to flag captains. No doubt there are very clever and able officers among them, but the Admiral is very often away from the flagship for months, and then the flag captain has power to make signals and give directions in the Admiral's name, which I know are sometimes extremely annoying to officers very much his senior. Flag-captains have been practically abolished in the Channel. The Admiralty reserve to themselves entirely the right of appointing flag-captains in the Channel Squadron flag ships and the Home ports, and I think, if selection were confined to men who had been at least a year or two in command as post captains, there would be ample material to choose flag captains from. I was sincerely glad to hear from the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) that some modification of the dockyard system is proposed, and that they have found some way out of, at any rate, part of the difficulty. The Secretary to the Admiralty knows well, for he was at the deputation which came here on the subject, that the real difficulty about this question is that the men do not trust each other. They would trust the Admiralty; they would trust anybody else, but they do not trust their own immediate superiors, though promoted from their own 819 ranks. Their fear is that the best men, who, undoubtedly ought to get higher pay, do not get it on account of favouritism and on local grounds. I have letters with regard to promotions in which the writers say that promotions have been given to very indifferent men, because they have a particular turn of mind as regards politics or religion which suits the foremen. I, therefore, hope the noble Lord will see some way of modifying seriously the system of classification, because, upon those local grounds entirely, it does not work well in the dockyards. I have heard to-night one or two curious remarks about the amount of ships we employ and the amount of ships the French employ, but hon. Gentlemen who talk on this subject seem to me to forget that in war time our Fleet would have to be double theirs. No other nation has the ground to cover that we have, or the same interests to protect. Therefore, any comparison with France or any other foreign nation is idle, because there is no nation which has the trade or the colonies to protect all over the world that we have. It is useless, I think, to say that any comparison can be made. I am bound to say that, whether from my sanguinary character, or my amiable character, or both mixed, I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Morton) in proposing that we should reduce this Vote. I think I could tell him some Votes that might be reduced with some better effect, but I do not think he will find that the country would agree with him in reducing the Naval Vote. My opinion is that any amount of money that the First Lord of the Admiralty chooses to ask for the Navy would be gladly given by the country. I have never heard of money for the Navy being refused by this House. Indeed, I was told by a gentleman, who said he heard it himself, that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Midlothian (Mr. W. E. Gladstone) stated on one occasion that he would rather ask for, £20,000,000 for the Navy than £2,000,000 for the Army. I do not say a word against the Army, but after Trafalgar, in those days when people talk about ships costing comparatively nothing, the Navy had £22,000,000, and the Army £11,000,000. Why that position should be reversed remains a mystery to me.
§ (9.25.) MR. SHAW LEFEVRE (Bradford, Central)Before the Vote is put from the Chair I desire to offer some remarks on the explanatory statement of the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty. I understood from various statements which the noble Lord made in course of the Recess that he intended to lay before the House in the present Session a programme of a large character in the same direction as that he did in 1889 under the Naval Defence Act. I have felt a great sense of relief in turning to the statement of the noble Lord, that he has abandoned any wide scheme of that kind, or, at all events, has postponed it.
§ LORD G. HAMILTONI never said so.
§ MR. SHAW LEFEVREI certainly understood from speeches made by the noble Lord outside the House that he intended to put before us some great programme, and I think I see some indication of an abandonment of that intention in the statement he has laid before the House. Apparently the abandonment has been due to the pressure of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for unquestionably there are difficulties of finance in the present year. Certainly the money available in the Estimates for the current year for new ships other than those building under the programme of 1889 is comparatively small. I find the total sum available for new construction and the laying down of new ships is not more than £75,000, and I am not surprised that the noble Lord should not have submitted any very large programme for the present year. His statement, as I understand it, is mainly directed to an explanation, to a justification of, and to some extent an apology for his naval policy under the Naval Defence Act. The time has not yet come when we can form a full and final opinion as to the result of that measure. The noble Lord himself in the year previous to introducing that measure gave expression to a fear and dread of what might be the result of laying down a very great number of vessels at the same time. He said in the year 1888, in answer to pressure which was brought to bear upon him for the purpose of a large scheme of re-construction and laying down a great number of vessels at the same time— 821
Any great and spasmodic increase of the Navy by the laying down by wholesale of vessels at any one time would be most unwise, and a certain portion of the expenditure would be wasted. There was no single instance in the past in which ships laid down by the dozen had not shown defects common to all, which might have been avoided if they had been laid down continuously over a term of years.I hope these predictions will not be verified, and that he will be more successful than many of his predecessors to whom he alluded had been. But as I said, the time has not yet come for expressing an opinion on this subject, inasmuch as very few vessels which were laid down in 1889, which have been constructed under the Naval Defence Act, have been yet sent to sea, and therefore there is little opportunity yet of judging what the effect of the measure will be. But there are other matters connected with the Naval Defence Act on which, with reference to the statement now before us, I will say a few words. The first is on this point. One of the main objections we took to the policy indicated in the Naval Defence Act was the confusion that it would bring into the Naval accounts, the extreme difficulty, if not the impossibility, there would be in future of seeing what the aggregate expenditure on the Navy would be in any one year. I think that is very well illustrated by the Estimates for the present year. The Navy Estimate for the present year shows an expenditure on the Navy of £14,290,000. That is the total amount voted for the year. With some difficulty I have ascertained, by bringing into the account several other items, that the actual total expenditure for this year is within a very few pounds of £17,000,000. That is provided for in this way. There are £14,290,000 voted for the Estimates; £1,426,000 are provided out of the Consolidated Fund under the Naval Defence Act of 1889; £677,000 represents unexpended balances in previous years, which, under a clause of the Naval Defence Act, may be expended in the coming year, and, I presume, will be expended; and £700,000 is borrowed and will fall on future years under the Naval Defence Act. That, I believe, to be an accurate statement of the actual contemplated expenditure on the Navy for the coming year and the method of providing for it; and I venture to say 822 that very few people could ascertain that or make it out from the statements provided in the Estimates before us. There is another point in connection with the Naval Defence Act which I also wish to allude to. One of the main arguments in favour of that Act was that it would ensure with absolute certainty the completion of the vessels to be laid down within the period provided under the Act, and would remove every kind of temptation from the Admiralty to delay in completing vessels or postponing any work on them. It is worth while to compare the results with expectations, and for that purpose I will ask the noble Lord to look at the programme which was laid before the House in 1889 at the time the Naval Defence Act was passed. I will first call attention to that part of the programme relating to ships which were to be laid down by contract. The Douse will recollect that there were 32 vessels to be built by contract at a total cost of £10,000,000. The payment for these 32 vessels was to be spread over seven years, but the vessels themselves were to be completed, so far as the contractors were concerned, in about three and a half years. The statement then laid before the House showed that on the 31st March, 1892, the end of the present financial year, the estimated expenditure upon these 32 vessels would be £9,160,000, leaving £740,000 only for the year 1893–94. I deduce from that that it was estimated that all these 32 vessels would be completed so far as the contractors were concerned, in the middle of the year 1892–93. What is the state of these vessels? So far as I can learn from the statement of the noble Lord the actual expenditure upon those vessels up to the 31st March, 1892, will be only £5,924,000.
§ MR. FORWOOD£7,000,000 to the 31st March.
§ MR. SHAW LEFEVREI think the right hon. Gentleman is wrong in that. I have very carefully gone through the statement of the noble Lord, and I understand that, up to 31st March the actual expenditure will be, as I have stated, about £6,000,000, and that during the year 1892–93 the sum of about £2,000,000 will be expended.
§ MR. FORWOOD£2,419,000.
§ MR. SHAW LEFEVRE£2,419,000 will be expended during the year 1892–93, and the residue during the year 1893–94. The vessels will not themselves be completed, for they will then have to go into the dockyards to be completed, and I gather, therefore, from this statement that these vessels are about a year and a half delayed. That is to say, they would take about a year and a half more for completion than was estimated in the year 1889 when the Naval Defence Act was passed. I now come to the dockyard ships. In respect of these ships, 38 in number, I find that the total expenditure was estimated at £11,500,000. A sum of £2,650,000 was to be provided out of the Shipbuilding Votes of the next five years, minus a certain amount which was to be expended upon vessels already commenced before the Naval Defence Act was passed. £600,000 was to be annually expended upon their armaments, but the £2,650,000 upon the Shipbuilding Votes, multiplied by the five years, would produce a larger sum than was necessary for the completion of all these vessels. The actual estimated cost of completing these vessels, so far as the Shipbuilding Vote is concerned, was £8,650,000. I gather from the statement to which I have referred that there ought to have been a surplus upon that part of the expenditure available for new construction in the year 1892–3 of £1,000,000, and for 1893–94 of £2,000,000. The noble Lord will find a note saying that the £3,000,000 which represents the difference between the estimated cost and the provision made out of the Navy Estimates for the five years would be available for either new ships hereafter to be laid down or else might be voted towards a reduction of the Navy Estimates. I wish the noble Lord to look at what the actual provision is at the present moment. So far as I can ascertain, the actual available surplus for the coming year 1892–93 applicable to new ships will be only £75,000, and the estimated surplus on the next year, 1893–94, instead of being £2,000,000, will be £840,000. Adding the two together they come to over £900,000, instead of £3,000,000. In other words, whereas we in 1889 anticipated there would be a surplus on this Naval Defence account of £3,000,000 applicable 824 to the construction and laying down of new ships not to be provided for by the Naval Defence Act, the actual surplus now estimated will not be more than £900,000. I want an explanation from the noble Lord as to these figures, because there is nothing in this Paper which accounts for so large a deficiency. I understand from the noble Lord there has been a rise in prices and in wages, and that accounts for about £1,000,000 on that part of the year. Then I find it stated in one part of the explanatory statement that it will be necessary for the purpose of economically working the Dockyards to delay the completion of the Dockyard vessels, or some of the larger vessels amongst them, so that they will not be completed within the five years specified in the Naval Defence Act. The completion of them will be carried over into the year 1894–5. I gather that the noble Lord contemplates the possibility, for economical reasons, of postponing the completion of the ironclads built under the Dockyard portion of the Naval Defence Act into the year 1894–5. Therefore, if I am right in this, it would appear both in respect of ironclads and larger vessels being constructed by contract, and also in respect of ironclads being constructed in the Dockyards under the Naval Defence Act, that the same result will follow—namely, that they will not be completed within the specified five years, but that their completion will be spread over the future years. I am not finding fault, because I believe that, for Dockyard purposes, it will be necessary not to attempt the completion of all these vessels at the same time. The justification given for it in the explanatory statement, I think, is sufficient and satisfactory—namely, that it will be difficult to complete all these vessels at the same time without withdrawing men from other work in the Dockyards, or, rather, without leading into the Dockyards other men without work. But that appears to me to be an argument against the scheme for laying down so many new vessels at the same time. I believe, therefore, the wiser course is that which had been hitherto adopted—namely, laying down a certain number of vessels in each year and completing these as quickly as possible. I wish to ask the noble Lord a question in reference to the Naval Defence Act. I understand that he intends to expend 825 the surplus of £70,000 which he says will arise from the Naval Defence Act within the coming year and the £800,000 next year upon the construction. Out of the £70,000 which arises this year, he proposes to commence three ironclads. I want to ask him whether he can do that consistently with the Naval Defence Act? As I read the Naval Defence Act any surplus which arises after the completion, or which is estimated to arise after the completion, of vessels laid down under the Act, must be put into the Sinking Fund—that he cannot, without an amendment of the Act, apply any surplus of that kind to the construction of new vessels. Indeed, I go further, and say that I think he must, under the Act, if the vessels in the aggregate which are building in the Dockyards exceed the cost of £8,650,000, provide for the excess by an amendment of the Act. I wish also to ask whether he can carry any surplus arising from the saving upon the armaments, also in aid of the Shipbuilding Vote, under the Naval Defence Act? As I read the Act none of these three processes are possible, and he will be compelled to bring in a Bill to amend the Naval Defence Act. I hope I make my questions clear, but I have very carefully considered the Naval Defence Act, and I have come to the conclusion that if he wishes to avoid amendment of that Act, and to lay down the new vessels which he proposes to the extent of about £70,000, he must increase his Naval Votes for that purpose. There is another point in connection with the Naval Defence Act which I also desire to allude to. I ventured myself, and so did many others on this side, to predict that the effect of that Act—the laying down of a large number of vessels at the same time—what I may call a spasmodic increase of the Navy in this manner—would act as an inducement to other Powers to do the same. I pointed out in the Debates on the Naval Defence Bill mat the probability would be that France and other Naval Powers would follow our footsteps in increasing the strength of their Navy almost exactly in the same proportion as we were proposing to do. I think that the prediction has practically been verified. I pointed out on that occasion that it was the policy of France to maintain its Navy, as far as the ships of real power are concerned, in 826 the proportion to the Navy of this country of two to three. Everybody knows that in the case of the United States there has been a very large increase of the Navy, avowedly on account of the great increase in this country. The same increase has taken place in Prance, especially in the case of the larger vessels, namely, the ironclads, which constitute the real strength of the Navy. I find that we laid down in 1889, under the Naval Defence Act, ten new ironclads, eight of them of the larger size, and two of them somewhat smaller. I find that since that time France has laid down eight ironclads, which include two laid down in 1892. Comparing the ironclads building in France with the ironclads building in England, I find that the English vessels are very much larger than the French vessels. The average of the English vessels is very much larger than that of the French. I also find that during the last three or four years the French Government has paid unusual and very great attention to the repairs and maintenance of its old ironclads; and I think I am right in saying that at the present moment there is hardly a single ironclad of the older type, other than those in course of construction by France, which has not been fully repaired and put in order, and in respect of which the crews are all detailed in readiness in case of an emergency, and arrangements have been made for taking the sea at the very earliest moment. During the same period I think I am not unjustified in saying that there has been some delay in this country in maintaining and repairing the older ironclads. I think the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty admitted that in his explanatory statement, and that he proposed to make some arrangement during the coming year for the purpose of maintaining and repairing these vessels. I venture to think, therefore, that after the Naval Defence Act, in some three years, the relative position of the French and English Navies is almost identical with what it was three year ago. Both countries have laid down a considerable number of ironclads, and France has spent a very considerable sum in maintaining, repairing, and putting into good condition its older ironclads and confining construction to vessels of that kind which constitute the real strength of a Navy. I quite admit 827 that in the case of cruisers we have attained a considerable advantage. I think that a very great advance has been made in cruisers in this country during the last few years; and I observe that France has not paid the same attention to her cruisers as she has paid to her ironclads which constitute the real strength of a Navy. Cruisers, however, do not constitute the real strength of the English Navy; and therefore, for my part, I attach the utmost importance to maintaining our position with regard to other countries with respect to our ironclads which constitute the real force of the country. It is for this reason that I venture to express approval of the scheme of the noble Lord for the coming year. I know there are some people who think that it would be very much more important to lay down a certain number of cruisers than to commence the construction of three ironclads; but I believe myself it is far wiser that we should lay down the ironclads as is proposed by the noble Lord. But I make this qualification—that I venture to doubt whether it is wise to construct vessels of the enormous size proposed. I agree with the remarks made by the hon. Member for Devonport (Captain Price) on this subject. I think it is a very great question whether it is wise to construct ironclads of the enormous size of 14,000 or 15,000 tons; and I believe no other country has followed our example in building ironclads of that size. The French are building vessels of a much smaller size. So that I think it would be wiser to build vessels of a small type, say about 6,000 or 7,000 tons, and have a considerable number of them, than to build a small number of large vessels. After all, numbers constitute a very important element in time of war; and it is not wise to put so many eggs in one basket. And, for myself, I believe it would be better to expend the same amount of money that is to be expended on these vessels in constructing a larger number of vessels of a somewhat smaller size. I must say I am also glad to find that the noble Lord has not given way to the pressure which was brought upon him during the Recess to enter into a great scheme for building torpedo vessels. These vessels may be very quickly built in time of emergency, and may be multiplied almost indefinitely in a few weeks; and considering the uncertainty 828 of these vessels as to what the ultimate best type may be, I think the noble Lord acted wisely in not listening to the advice of those who tried to induce him to build more of these vessels. I must, in conclusion, complain of the want of information in the Estimates for the coming year. The detailed accounts of the Dockyard expenditure are not before us. I believe last year is the first year in the memory of any man connected with the Admiralty when we had not the detailed information before us. As I have said, the total expenditure of the present year on the Navy is £17,000,000, and the amount which appears on the Estimates is only £14,250,000. May I venture to point out to the Committee how very enormous has been the expenditure on the Army and Navy during the last six years. Comparing the expenditure for the last six years of the two Services with the expenditure on the previous six years, I find that the increase amounts to the average of £6,000,000 a year; and the total, excluding extraordinary expenditure, for the last six years, compared with the six previous years, amounts to no less than £34,000,000. That seems to me a very large amount. And I believe I am right in saying that of the £34,000,000 £7,000,000 have been borrowed. I myself, however, never will resist an application made by the responsible Minister of the day for increasing the Strength of the Navy. I have never done so, and I never will do so; because I believe that I should be incurring very great responsibility—but always subject to this qualification and condition, namely, that the money provided for the Service should be provided out of taxation within the year, because I am satisfied that if that principle be maintained we shall never go very far wrong, and that principle is the only test of the necessity for the expenditure, and the only security against its being wasted.
§ (10.12.) MR. PENN (Lewisham)I rise to congratulate the First Lord of the Admiralty on his statement, and also upon the formation of that Committee as explained to us by the Secretary to the Admiralty. It has always appeared to me that in the hands of the chief of the engineers there is a great responsibility. I would point out that there is in the question of naval engineering an essential and very great 829 difference between that of the Navy and of the commercial marine; and I think a very large number of people criticise somewhat ignorantly and adversely the failures, shortcomings, and breakdowns that occur in the Navy, which are reported much more continuously than the shortcomings and breakdowns that occur in the commercial marine. I would not for one instant minimise the mishaps that have occurred to ships in our Navy during the last few years; but I believe the introduction of this Committee now will have a very good effect, and will prove of enormous benefit in getting rid of those large troubles which arise from the use of those essential elements, boilers, in a ship. Somebody has said that the naval battles of the future will be largely fought in the engine room and the boiler room; and that largely may excuse me for troubling the Committee with any remarks of mine on the subject, because I am more or less intimately in contact with these very questions. The statements laid before us by the First Lord are both satisfactory and unsatisfactory. In some cases they scarcely reconciled themselves, in the view of the profession; but I sincerely hope that some form will be discovered whereby the difficulties under which the Navy has suffered will be largely relieved. It has always appeared to me that forced draught in itself has been over-abused. The five hours forced draught trial of the Blenheim, I think, shows in itself that a forced draught is not altogether the dangerous weapon it is sometimes supposed to be; but I venture to point out that the Blenheim on this occasion was under extremely skilful management and in extremely able hands, and it would not always be possible to attain such satisfactory results with a lot of men pitched into a vessel who did not understand the particular ship or her machinery. Now, I trust that the Committee which has been appointed will in its wisdom discover some form of boiler or some form of forced draught, that shall once and for all satisfy the adverse criticism passed with some fairness and propriety on the shortcomings of the vessels in the Service, and that shall enable commanders of vessels to take their ships into action with no fear of a breakdown below, so that that fear which now possesses the commanders of 830 Her Majesty's ships will absolutely disappear, and whatever may be the cost I trust that that form will be largely adopted by the Admiralty.
§ (10.20.) LORD GEORGE HAMILTONI feel sure the House will welcome the assistance which it will derive from the practical knowledge and experience of my hon. Friend who has just spoken, and others like him who are acquainted with the difficulties which Naval engineers have to contend with and overcome. No person is better able to speak on this subject than those really acquainted with it; and I think this furnishes the best answer to the different questions put to us on this Bench—why, in the building of vessels we did not take them away and submit them to the maximum amount of pressure? I wish to answer a question put to me by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford. The right hon. Gentleman criticised the Naval Defence Act, of the principles of which he has always been an opponent, and I am bound to say that he did so with fairness. But the right hon. Gentleman sums up his denunciation of the extravagance of the present Government by saying that the expenditure on the Army and Navy during the last six years was £34,000,000 in excess of the preceding period of six years. But from that amount the right hon. Gentleman has excluded the sum of £20,000,000, which was spent on war preparations. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford has always been an opponent of the principles of the Naval Defence Act. The right hon. Gentleman said that the expenditure on the Army and the Navy during the last six years was £34,000,000 in excess of that during the preceding period of six years. But the right hon. Gentleman excluded from his calculation the £20,000,000 which were expended in war and in preparation for war. The great mistake, in my judgment, which the right hon. Gentleman and other persons in his position make, is to judge of the administrative power and success of a Department by the amount of money spent, and not by the return obtained for that money, and it is because of that mistaken and mischievous opinion that we have had numbers of ships without guns and of guns without ammunition. The first business of everybody connected with a Department, be 831 the expenditure small or be it great, is to make the Fleet as effective as possible, and to keep the amount of money as low as possible without detriment to that Fleet. But, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman forgets—at any rate he makes no allowance for the fact—that our predecessors commenced works which they never finished, built forts that they never armed, constructed ships for which they never provided guns, and guns which they left without ammunition. Therefore, Sir, I say that you cannot properly take the question of expenditure into consideration, unless you likewise count the results. Now, the Naval Defence Act was intended to accomplish certain definite purposes. It was a large operation; it involved an expenditure of £21,000,000, and we hoped to accomplish these three objects (1) to give to the House greater information than it has ever had before concerning the ships in the programme; (2) to complete more rapidly that shipbuilding programme, than had ever been done before; and (3) to complete it more cheaply than any shipbuilding programme of such dimensions had ever before been completed. Sir, I do not for a moment say that we have come up to our ideal standard, but we have undoubtedly achieved results far superior to those accomplished in the past. We have given the House an amount of information such as it never had before in reference to the shipbuilding programme and we have accomplished the completion of that programme with a very small excess upon the original estimate; and I believe that, although certain vessels might be a little behind the dates at which we believed they would be completed, they will certainly be much closer to the original dates than under any other shipbuilding programme. Now, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman and others representing the same political views have frequently expressed the opinion that it would be advisable to limit and curtail the amount of work in the Government Dockyards on the ground that it could not be accomplished as cheaply as in the private dockyards. But, Sir, the Admiralty may claim as the result of the reforms and alterations which they have carried out, that they have placed the dockyards on a far better footing to compete with private yards than has ever been the case before; and that as regards con 832 struction, they have put the dockyards in such a position as actually to have beaten the private yards. Therefore, Sir, we may claim that we have, tested by the severe ordeal of the Naval Defence Act, increased the capacity of our dockyards, and worked them up to a far higher state of efficiency than they ever were before. Now, Sir, it is quite true that a certain number of vessels which are being built by contractors will not be built as quickly as we had anticipated. That is not our fault. There was a difficulty in supplying a certain class of material, and thus delay occurred, and it was mainly in connection with armour—the hull and the horizontal armour required for the decks—that the delay has arisen. It is quite true that a certain and a very limited number of vessels may not be completed within the stipulated period, but this may be taken into consideration: that 72 vessels will have been completed in the period at a cost of £21,000,000 sterling; and when that work is put alongside any great private engineering enterprise such as the Forth Bridge or the Manchester Ship Canal, the contrast in the work done by private individuals and the work done in the Government Dockyards is such that there can be no reason whatever for blaming the Government. There have been some cases of delay, but nothing compared to what took place under the old system. The hon. Gentleman asks how it was I permitted to appear in the Paper, which was laid on the Table of the House in 1889, the statement that there would be a surplus of £3,000,000 available for new construction, whereas there is now only £950,000 available for that purpose. In the first place, we propose to reduce by £600,000 the sums on new construction, and an increase of £350,000, which is partly due to an augmentation of wages, and which was to have been on the normal Vote, but which we had to transfer to the Naval Defence Account. Taking these figures, it brings up the Vote to £1,900,000. Then we have an increase to the cost of the dockyard ships, owing to their large size, amounting to £800,000. Further, in addition to the old programme, there is an excess of expenditure of about £200,000, and that makes up the difference. The right hon. Gentleman took the old programme that was drawn up 833 before the financial year of 1889 was closed, and consequently any sum which was unexpended of that large sum was surrendered or transferred, and the amount thus postponed or transferred, together with the additional cost of the old programme, makes up the difference of the accounts. The right hon. Gentleman asks whether the savings can be applied. Well, according to the authorities who interpret this Act, they can be applied this year and next, even though we do not reach the maximum of £2,650,000, but it is not intended to apply them to any other purpose than ships under the Naval Defence Act. We do not this year exceed the maximum under Statute of £8,000,000, which is to be devoted to the construction of these ships, and, therefore, it is certainly not necessary for us, in this particular, to bring in a Bill this year. Whether a Bill will be ultimately necessary is a nice and delicate point upon which I would rather not express an opinion. Then the right hon. Gentleman went on to say that the result of introducing the Naval Defence Act had been to accelerate the expenditure of foreign countries. I know that is an assertion which the right hon. Gentleman has made more than once. I can find no evidence of it. France has not laid down nine ironclads since the Act was passed. She had three in hand before the Naval Defence Act, and the only vessels added are vessels that were laid down since in the ordinary course. France has laid down some smaller vessels for coast defence—four in number—and three large vessels; but the success of the progress of any foreign nation, as I have frequently asserted, is not to be measured or tested by the number of vessels laid down, but by the progress which is made with those vessels. If we concentrate our attention on the vessels we have in hand, and build them 50 per cent. quicker, it does not matter what foreign nations do. If we work up to that standard, our Navy will advance steadily, and foreign nations will be less disposed than formerly to try to regulate their naval expenditure by ours. The right hon. Gentleman objected to large ironclads. I am quite aware his feeling is shared by others; but it is a feeling to which, as long as I have the honour of being at the Admiralty, I will give an uncompromising opposition. If you have 834 an ironclad, it must be a large one. If you have not a large ironclad, it is better to have none at all. Thirty years ago we had a number of magnificent armoured warships—the Warrior, the Minotaur, and the Agincourt, and others—all splendid specimens of their class. They were the biggest ships in existence. One or two accidents occurred and a vessel went aground, and the consequence was that pressure was brought to bear on the Admiralty to build smaller vessels. A number of smaller vessels was built, but the architecture prevailing when these smaller vessels were built was just as faulty as that which obtained during the period of larger vessels was good. Three qualities must be combined in a battle-ship: the ship must be able to give punishment, to take punishment, and must have a certain speed. When its dimensions are diminished and reduced to a certain displacement one of these three qualities has to be abandoned. If our Navy is called upon to act, it must be in foreign waters; and the ships must have speed and great coaling capacity; and, therefore, you must diminish their offensive property—which will make them a mark for the enemy—or their defensive property, if you reduce their size. Therefore, to diminish either would be an error. It is open to question whether you should have armoured vessels at all, but if you are to have them they must be of a certain size. That is the almost universal experience. The biggest vessel in the Navy is the Royal Sovereign. She will cost less than the Hero and the Conqueror, and any naval man will tell you she could knock them both to pieces. Being large and more powerful, the Royal Sovereign could stand the sea, in any weather, and could go anywhere. But that is not the only objection to the smaller vessels. There is another: that you must, if you adopt them, increase the numbers of yourmen—taking them early, and giving them a long training, and, finally, pensions. If you work the matter out from the point of view of figures, and figures alone, it will be cheaper and better to have war vessels which are large and effective seagoing vessels than a number of small ships which cannot keep the sea in all weathers. It is open to question whether in the warship of the future you should have large guns. If you dispense with 835 them you considerably diminish the cost of building ships. It is a great mistake to suppose that the size of a ship necessarily regulates its cost. Whether it is 10,000 or 12,000 tons does not practically make a very great difference in its cost, unless you increase the area of its armament. Certainly I would strongly urge that ships should be of adequate size, and that they should be capable of performing the functions for which they are intended. The ships we propose to lay down will be considerably less costly than the preceding class, because of a new distribution of armour, which will be as effective and much cheaper than that under the old system. We do not propose that these ships shall be armed with guns of the same kind, and the only question we are considering is whether we shall take the 10-inch gun of the most modern type or another type of 12-inch gun. I should add that in these ships the primary object will be to give as large a subsidiary armament as possible. But the details will be laid on the Table before we come to the Shipbuilding Vote, so that hon. Gentlemen will have ample opportunities of putting further questions to me on the subject if they wish to do so. Now, I will answer the various questions which have been put to me in the course of the evening. There has been a good deal of criticism upon the use of the word "modest," which was associated with the programme I have proposed for this next year. But my hon. Friends behind me must not imagine that, because for this particular year we propose only to lay down three ironclads, that is to be the programme for future years. We have shown that there is available for the next five years £8,000,000 sterling for shipbuilding alone; but, as only £70,000 was available this year, I did not think it right to tie the hands of the House as to any decision it might wish to arrive at next year. But next year it will be necessary for the Admiralty to carefully consider—and I think the right hon. Member for Bradford admitted that—how they should develop their programme, so that when the following financial year begins they may be able to lay down a programme which will be sufficient to give full employment to the establishments of the various Dockyards. When the programme is complete, I have no doubt it will contain a number of 836 cruisers. We have this year made considerable advance in that part of the programme, and as two more cruisers will be finished before April, 1894, we shall, under the Naval Defence Act, have made provision for no less than 43 efficient sea-going cruisers. I will now deal with questions relating to the officers and men of the Navy. My hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke called attention to the special request made by the warrant officers that their position might be improved, and more chances given to them of becoming commissioned officers. I have looked very carefully into the request which was sent to the Admiralty within the last few months. In it a comparison was drawn between the warrant officers of the Army and of the Navy, and on the strength of that comparison certain proposals have been made by which the warrant officers of the Navy thought they would be put on an equality with the warrant officers of the Army. In looking through that statement, the first fact that struck me was the very much larger proportion of warrant officers there was in the Navy than in the Army. There are 750 warrant officers in the whole Army of 150,000 men, but in the Navy there are 1,050 out of 24,000 men. Therefore one man out of 24 has a chance of becoming a warrant officer in the Navy; that is to say, the inducement to the blue-jacket to join the Navy is that, if he conducts himself properly, he has one chance out of 24 of attaining to the grade of warrant officer. That makes a great difference, and shows that inducements are offered to men to join the Nary in far greater proportion than they are in the Army. The warrant officers do not complain, according to this statement, of their pay or treatment, except that after they have been a certain time warrant officers they have no sufficient inducement of promotion held out to them, and practically remain during the term of their service in their position of warrant officers. They, therefore, propose that a certain number shall, after ten years' service, be put up to a higher grade, and that a certain number, after 20 years' service, shall be raised to a grade still higher. I looked very carefully into this statement from a general as well as a financial point of view. The financial point of view is that it would cost 837 £75,000 a year, and practically raise the pay of the warrant officer by something like 30 per cent. If we were to do that, we should at once bring upon us demands from every grade in the Navy for an increase; and, one class having had its pay thus raised, it would be only fair to give a similar consideration to the other classes. Consequently, the proposal is not one which, from a financial point of view, I can approve. There are what are called chief warrant officers; but the description is a misnomer, because those who occupy the position of chief warrant officers are commissioned officers, and I think we might fairly consider whether we could not adopt some name to denote that position; and, also, whether we might not increase their number, and thus cause additional promotion. In addition to that, we ought to do our best, in connection with the Ordnance Store Department and other Departments, to comply with the warrant officers' request. There are a certain number of appointments held by commissioned officers at present which might fairly and legitimately be given to warrant officers of a certain standing. I had hoped that it might be possible to create some grade in the sea-going Service equivalent to that of chief officer of the Coastguard, but I find that that is almost impossible. If, however, we cannot go so far as my hon. and gallant Friend would wish, he will see that we are prepared to look into this question in a kindly spirit, and to do our best to meet the wishes of this most respectable class of officers. As to the question of pensions to chief petty officers, I have shown that it has been considered only fair and legitimate that before a large increase, amounting to several thousands a year, is made in the Non-Effective Vote, the experiment should be tried of seeing whether or not the attractions of the Service are sufficient to get men of good character to volunteer for this particular grade. Both my hon. and gallant Friends have called attention to what is rather a matter of discipline regarding the "juniority," if I may use the word, of certain Flag Captains. My hon. and gallant Friends know, however, that this is a very delicate question to consider. A Commander-in-Chief sent abroad has great responsibilities put upon him. In time of war he is absolutely responsible 838 for the great mass of duties connected with the whole area of the station. I do not think it is a reasonable thing to interfere with any man placed in that position, by confining the selection of Staff officers to be placed under him. Commanders-in-Chief have always possessed the light of selecting the officer who should be their Flag Captain. At the same time I think it only right that all Admirals should recollect that the flag ship is the largest ship on the station, and, if the Admiral happens to be absent, the Flag Captain will have to take charge of the navigation of the vessel. And nowadays, when ironclads represent such a large sum of money, I think it advisable that the Commander-in-Chief should select some officer for the post of Flag Captain who possesses some experience in the command of a large ship. No doubt the expression of opinion which has been given in this House will be sufficient, because no Admiral would dream of selecting, when his reputation depends upon the selection, other than competent officers. Moreover, it is desirable that officers of greater seniority should be Flag Captains in the future.
§ ADMIRAL MAYNEMight I ask the noble Lord for information regarding the duties of lieutenants and the application of senior officers for an increase of pay?
§ LORD GEORGE HAMILTONAs to the lieutenants, I have to say that no demands have been made by them except for a re-arrangement of duties. It is a small matter, however, which I think the Admirals in command might dispose of themselves. As to the request made by the senior officers for an increase of pay, I expressed my opinion last year, and I am bound to say I can see no reason whatever to depart from the position which I previously arrived at when the officers asked for an increase of pay on the ground that other officers in the Navy were, in their opinion, more highly paid than they were themselves. I am bound to say that I do not think the Admiralty and the Treasury ever ought to raise the pay of any particular grade because it is found that another grade entirely different may have had higher pay. Whether a man is paid sufficient or not ought to be regulated by the work he does. We can get plenty of officers, and they will be sufficient to keep our work 839 up to the requisite strength. I cannot hold out any hope of assenting to the proposals which were made last year and repeated this year; but the Admiralty have made two concessions to the engineers of the Navy. Complaints were made that the Engineer-in-Chief was inadequately paid, and his salary has been raised from £1,000 to £1,300 this year. The second concession is that the engineers should have charge of the machinery of ships in reserve; and this concession will entail an expenditure of £4,000 or £5,000 a year. Beyond that I cannot hold out any hope of acceding to anything that will make this year different from last year. As to the position in the Service of engine-room artificers, what I have to say on that matter has been already covered by what I have said on the status of petty officers. I think I have answered all the questions which have been put to me, and I trust that my hon. and gallant Friends who asked them are satisfied.
(10.58.) COLONEL NOLANI would like to know what the Admiralty are doing, in the first place, with regard to the adoption of high explosives; in the second place, with regard to sub-marine vessels; and, in the third place, with regard to controlable torpedoes? This is not a Party question, and it was brought before the House by one of our most respected ex-Members, Lord Charles Beresford, who particularly drew the attention of the Admiralty to the value of high explosives. They have a minimum explosive force of three times and a maximum of five times to gunpowder, and shells filled with them spread much wider and do far more damage. It is therefore of the utmost importance if they can be safely used for shells. Very great progress has been made with the dynamite gun, which would be useful for firing these shells, and I should like to ask the noble Lord what steps he has taken with regard to it. Are there any of these shells afloat? Are any of them charged with high explosives? If they are considered too dangerous to store on ships in time of peace, are there any in store for use when required? Is the noble Lord aware that other nations are dealing with high explosives, and that a shell charged with them would do immense damage to a vessel of even 14,000 tons? I think we are entitled to some information on these points. At a time when 840 several nations and experts say that high explosives are perfectly safe to use we are entitled to some information as to what the Admiralty is doing in the matter. Then there is the question of submarine vessels. I should like to know what progress has been made with them, and whether any experiments have been made in that direction. These vessels are not entirely under water, but they show very little of their bulk above it, and one of our 14,000 ton ships would be in great jeopardy if an enemy's submarine boat were in its vicinity. These boats have arrived at a practical stage; France has several, Spain has one or two, and Russia has been making experiments. I think we ought to have some statement on this matter from the First Lord of the Admiralty. It is little use looking to the Estimates. I should naturally look for information on these points under the Scientific Vote, but I find nothing there but astronomy; that is very useful, but it does not reply to these questions. There is a third form of warfare which has got into an advanced state — the control of torpedoes, torpedoes which can change their direction. At the beginning of this Session we voted £100,000 to the inventor of one torpedo which was only to be used from land. It is a very clever torpedo managed by two piano wires, and the Admiralty now say they cannot use it. Since that time Edison's electric torpedo has come to the front, and it seems to be of considerable importance. It can be used from a ship as the base of operations, and can be turned upon another ship in any position. It goes perhaps ten feet under water, and if charged with about 150 lbs. of high explosive it would utterly destroy a large vessel; the force of the explosion would set the water-tight compartments at absolute defiance. All these points are worthy of attention, but because they are out of the ordinary run of the work of the Navy they receive no attention from the authorities. I do not believe the British Navy has any secrets at all, and I, therefore, think the First Lord might very well state in what position these points now are in the British Navy.
§ MR. GILHOOLY (Cork Co., W.)I wish to draw the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to a grievance of which we have to complain. I mean the practice of boycotting Irish harbours at the time of paying off the sailors in 841 the Navy. Sailors who have sewed a long time in Irish waters are taken into English waters to be paid off. When it is remembered that Ireland contributes largely to the Imperial Exchequer, it is only fair that her people should be allowed to reap some benefit in these matters. I should also like to know if it is the intention of the Admiralty to maintain the buoys at either end of Horse Island in Bantry Bay. Before these buoys were placed ships were frequently injured in the bay, but since they have been placed no such accidents have occurred. I understand that orders have been given for these buoys to be removed. There is no harbour authority at Bantry Ray, and no Local Authority which can maintain the buoys, but they are of such advantage to vessels using the bay that I think they should be maintained. Will the noble Lord also tell us when it is intended to build the Coastguard station at Berehaven? Some years ago I asked the question, and was told there was a difficulty with the landlord.
§ MAJOR RASCH (Essex, S.E.)I wish to call the attention of the First. Lord of the Admiralty to the fact that there is great dissatisfaction amongst navigating officers and first and second engineer officers joining the Naval Reserve at what they feel to be inadequate pay. I call attention to the point because I am anxious that these specialists, as I may call them, should be fairly and properly treated. I hope the noble Lord will give the matter his attention.
§ (11.15.) MR. FLYNN (Cork, N.)I wish to draw the noble Lord's attention to one point. At one time it was the practice of the Admiralty to pay off some of their sailors in Irish ports, but now the practice has grown up of sending warships that have spent, a long time in Irish waters to English waters to be paid off, and such vessels have even been ordered to sea the day on which they were due to be paid off or the day before. We consider this most unfair and unequal treatment. Then as to utilising Haulbowline Dockyard for building and repairing. The site of that dockyard was selected by a Select Committee 25 years ago; £600,000 was spent on it and yet it is not used. There are only a carpenter, a storekeeper, and ten or twelve labourers there. I wish to know if the Admiralty 842 are not going to allow this yard to be utilised for shipbuilding and repairing?
§ MR. R. W. DUFF (Banffshire)I do not think this side has any reason to complain of the answer of the right hon. Gentleman. But there is one remark I cannot allow to pass unnoticed. In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) the First Lord said that one of the reasons for the increased expenditure on stores was the deficiency when the present Admiralty came into existence. My answer to that is simply this. The first two years the present Government were in Office they persistently reduced the Navy Estimates—in 1887 by £700,000, and the next year by £900,000, making £1,600,000 in two years. During that time the Admiralty surely had ample opportunities for communicating with all our foreign stations, and finding out what supplies they had in hand. The present increased expenditure is the consequence of the policy of cutting down in the two years I have mentioned. Reference is made in the First Lord's statement to Admiral Sir George Tryon's Report on Manning the Navy. It is very important that we should have this Report before us, and I hope the First Lord will lose no time in placing it on the Table.
§ LORD GEORGE HAMILTONI cannot undertake to lay the Report of Admiral Hoskins on the Table of the House. It contains much confidential matter; but I will undertake to give a summary of it to the House. The Committee of which Sir George Tryon was the Chairman did make their Report last year; but as it involves a number of questions which are now being considered by the Admiralty, I consider it inadvisable to lay that Report upon the Table until we have come to a decision on the subject of the matters contained therein. The hon. Member for Galway (Colonel Nolan) asked me a question on the subject of torpedoes, but I can scarcely give him any satisfaction. The controllable torpedoes are all run by engines fixed on land; and until some means can be found, or some torpedo invented that can be run from a sea-going ship, the controllable cannot be considered effective. The only attempt that has been made in that direction was not altogether a success. I cannot agree with the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Morton) 843 on the subject of high-class explosives, but experiments are being pushed on; and until we are perfectly certain that we have an explosive which may be fired with safety from a gun, I do not propose to introduce them on board a man-of-war. I have no doubt that science will soon discover what is required, and we shall avail ourselves of it. An hon. Member asked me a question with respect to the Coastguard Stations which I cannot answer now; but if he will repeat it on some future occasion, on notice, I will obtain the information he requires. With respect to the paying-off of ships, it is not always possible that the vessels can go back to the port to which the majority of the men belong; but as I stated before, if there is anything that can reasonably be done, I shall be pleased to consider it. With respect to the using of the Dockyards, I may say that when the two new docks which are now being constructed are finished, they will be available for vessels of the largest draught, and I hope then we shall receive some benefit from the very large expenditure on the construction of docks. With respect to the question of officers of the Naval Reserve, I may say that that subject is being considered, and if the hon. Member will put a question later on, I will give him an answer.
§ (11.25.) MR. MORTONEarlier in the evening I asked the First Lord of the Admiralty for an assurance that in future the Government would see the contracts carried out before the money was paid. The noble Lord has made no reply whatever, and, as a protest against this way of carrying on, I shall move a reduction of the Vote. It may be very well for the noble Lord to sneer at me and at other hon. Members; but he cannot sneer at the Report of the Auditor General, and I move to reduce this Vote by 1,000 men.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That 73,100 men and boys be employed for the said Services."—(Mr. Morton.)
§ MR. FORWOODI replied at considerable length upon this question, but the hon. Member was not in the House. For his information I stated that the boilers, engines, and machinery in question were supplied upon plans and specifications approved of by the Admiralty, and the work was certified 844 by the Chief Engineer of the Admiralty as good and sufficient, and the Admiralty thought it was sufficient without submitting these boilers to the severe and abnormal pressure mentioned in those specifications, as that pressure is not required for general use, but only in emergency, and it was believed that the contracts had been fulfilled as set out.
§ (11.30.) MR. FLYNNMay I point out to the hon. Gentleman that, there is a considerable difference between paying off and paying down? Our complaint is that ships which have been in Irish ports for a considerable time have frequently been sent to Plymouth and Devonport to be paid off. The noble Lord says this is because the men live in those ports, and it is necessary to go there to get a fresh complement; but there is also the practice of paying down—that is, paying what is due to the men up to a certain time. We complain that ships are very rarely paid down in Irish ports, with the result that they have no money to spend in the locality. On many of Her Majesty's ships there are large complements of Irish sailors, and what we want the First Lord to do is to see that when there is a considerable number of Irishmen on board, the ships, if possible, should be paid off in some Irish port. That would save both money and time, and I hope the First Lord will carefully consider a matter which is regarded as very important in Irish ports.
§ (11.34.) LORD G. HAMILTONI have never had my attention called to this matter before. It seems to me that for a ship to be paid off in any particular port might be inconvenient, but I will inquire into the matter.
§ (11.35.) MR. MORTONThe reply given to my inquiry was, I consider, no reply at all. The system carried on is most improper, and it seems to me useless to make contracts which cannot be carried out.
§ Question put, and negatived.
§ Original Question put, and agreed to.
§
(2.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £3,520,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Expense of Wages, &c., to Officers, Seamen, and Boys, Coastguard, and Royal Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1893.
§ (11.40.) MR. MORTONI object to the total expenditure of this Department, and, therefore, I want to see this Estimate reduced merely as a matter of principle, and with a view to getting the expenses of our naval affairs reduced, I shall content myself with moving a small reduction. Until we do get such a Motion largely supported we shall never get a Government to take a serious view of the extraordinary expenditure upon our lighting forces. My desire is, and I know I am at one with the desire of a large section in the country, that our Government should give up a lighting policy, and adopt a policy more in accord with the views of Christianity, of which we make so much profession. I should like to see it something more than a profession. Only by our influence here can we induce such a change of policy. Unless we can here in Committee of Supply refuse a portion of these immense demands we cannot hope to make much impression on a Government. The only way to exercise any influence and control over such expenditure is to draw attention to it on these occasions. I want to see this country show an example and take a leading position in a policy of peace. A good many years ago a Resolution was passed in this House calling upon the Government to take means to induce foreign Governments to adopt arbitration instead of war; but I am not aware that much has been done in that direction since that Resolution was passed. My efforts are in the same direction. I want to compel the Government of the day—not only this but other Governments, for one is as bad as the other—to take steps to carry out that Resolution, to try and induce other nations to adopt arbitration instead of resorting to war to settle their disputes. I am pleased to know that the Government of the United States have taken steps in that direction, and are prepared to pledge themselves to offer arbitration as an alternative to war. Let our Government commence by making such an arrangement with the United States Government and set an example to the world. I do not desire to detain the Committee now, but I shall take the Constitutional method by Division of making my protest against warlike expenditure, and of showing the people of the country that their opinion 846 does find expression in the House. I want to emphasise the strong feeling that exists in the country in favour of arbitration as opposed to war. I am well assured, from noting the course of events in Continental countries, that the people there are getting tired of this state of preparation for war, and fear the outbreak of hostilities; and the example of a powerful Government like ours will do much to bring about a more rational state of things and conduct consonant to the principles of our common Christianity. On the part of the Radical Party I raise this protest. Do we not hear from candidates in every constituency declarations in favour of reductions of warlike expenditure? Joining in this protest, I now move the reduction of this Vote by £500.
§ Motion made, and Question put, "That a sum, not exceeding £3,515,000, be granted for the said Service."
§ The Committee proceeded to a Division, and the Chairman stated he thought the Noes had it; on his decision being challenged, it appeared to the Chairman that the Division was frivolously claimed, and he directed the Ayes to stand up in their places, and Fifteen Members having stood up, the Chairman declared the Noes had it.
§ Original Question put, and agreed to.
§ Resolutions to be reported.
§
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £717, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1892, for Expenses on account of the Treasury Chest in the year 1890–91.
§ (11.55.) DR. CAMERON (Glasgow, College)I think that at this hour the Committee will be disposed to report Progress.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed. "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Dr. Cameron.)
THE SECRETARY TO THE TREASURY (Sir JOHN GOBST,) ChathamI hope the Committee will agree to take one or two non-contentious formal Votes on the Supplementary Estimates.
§ DR. CAMERONIt is hardly the time to proceed further now, seeing that there is other Business of a more or less contentious character which may occupy 847 the House to an hour somewhat later than usual.
§ Question put, and agreed to.
§ Resolutions to be reported to-morrow, at Two of the clock.
§ Committee also report Progress; to sit again to-morrow, at Two of the clock.