§ Considered in Committee.
§ (In the Committee.)
§
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £5,632,700, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge of the Pay, Allowances, and other Charges of Her Majesty's Army at Home and Abroad (exclusive of India) (General Staff, Regiments, Reserve, and Departments), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1892.
§ (7.11.) MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)I was somewhat surprised at the very sanguine observation of the First Lord when this Vote was before us on the last occasion that though Debate had lasted only some 10 or 12 minutes he hoped that this enormous Vote would be granted at once. If the right hon. Gentleman will carry his memory back to 1884, he will remember that the entire month of February in that year was occupied in discussion of this very Vote, and Motions for its reduction, all because there had been an expedition to Tokar, and, therefore, the right hon. Gentleman must not expect us to refrain now from discussing the recent Tokar expedition, and, indeed, the Army in 298 Egypt, altogether. It is obvious that if we did not keep this portion of our Army in Egypt the expense of maintaining our Army would, by the cost of so many, be reduced. Here let me make a correction in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. He stated that the number of English troops in Egypt had been considerably reduced, and that during the time the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian was in office the number of troops in Egypt was 12,000. I think he will find he is mistaken. The numbers went up and down. If is perfectly true that when there were military operations going on either in Alexandria, Suakin, or in the Soudan, when operations were in progress for the defence of the Southern Frontier, there were as many as 12,000 men in Egypt; but I think if he takes the figures he will find that on an average there were not more men in Egypt, when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian was Prime Minister, than there are at the present moment.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. E. STANHOPE,) Lincolnshire, HorncastleOh!
§ MR. LABOUCHEREI understand that the right hon. Gentleman disagrees with me, and believes there were many more men in Egypt then than now. But if he will take the average from two years, say, after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir up to the time when the late Government left office, and not taking into account periods when active military operations were going on, he will find that the number was considerably less than 12,000, and not probably more than the present number.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEI will give the hon. Gentleman the exact figures, as I know he loves accuracy above all things. On August 1, 1886, the number of troops in Egypt was 9,113, that being a considerable reduction from the beginning of the year.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREYes; but I think then there were certain military operations in progress.
§ MR. E. STANHOPENo.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREWell, they were still hanging on at Suakin. But I will not quarrel about the figures. The reason why troops were kept in Egypt after Tel-el-Kebir was because we were 299 told it was very possible a revolution might break out either in Cairo or Alexandria, and that the revolutionists might destroy the Canal. Therefore we were asked, in the interests of civilisation and the Empire, to retain the troops there until an efficient Egyptian Army was established able to defend the Suez Canal. That was the main argument used, but there were a dozen others equally bad relied on as justification for imposing this increased charge upon our taxpayers. During the tenure of office by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian, although the troops were not withdrawn from Egypt, it is an undoubted fact that there was the intention to withdraw them. I will go further, and say that it was agreed absolutely that at some time they should be withdrawn. There was always some unfortunate circumstance occurring—once sickness broke out amongst them, and then again disturbances broke out in the Soudan—which prevented their withdrawal, but it was the normal intention, if I may call it so, of the Government of the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw the troops from Egypt. At any rate, the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues again and again stated that they would withdraw them as soon as a proper Government was established in Egypt, as soon as there was sufficient Egyptian military force to keep down any revolution that might lead to the destruction of the Suez Canal. But the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs has expanded this matter very largely; he has told us we are not to withdraw so long as we may imagine it possible that any Foreign Government may take our place and occupy Egypt. The only possible Government he could have in his mind is the Government of France; and, therefore, I ask whether any negotiations have been instituted with France to neutralise Egypt or not to occupy Egypt, or whether the great European Powers have been asked to place Egypt under International Law, so that it shall remain a neutral country? If anything of that sort has been done, that will, to a certain extent, change my attitude; for I should believe there is some intention, some desire, on the part of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw from Egypt. But, so far as I know, nothing of the sort has been 300 done, and I can only say that the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that we must remain in Egypt until we, in our own minds, are convinced that there is no danger of any Foreign Power going there is tantamount to saying that we shall remain there until doomsday, or until we are turned out. I notice that the organs of the Government complain of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, and say that he ought boldly to have asserted that we are there, and, no matter what objections may be raised, we are going to remain there. At any rate, the statement of the right hon. Gentleman is most unsatisfactory as to any expectation that within a reasonable number of years our occupation will cease. Since these Estimates came before us there has been a great extension of our occupation in Egypt; the Soudan is being re-annexed under the auspices of Her Majesty's Government. So far as I can make out the answer given to me this afternoon, the Egyptian Government have no right to the Government of the Soudan; the sovereignty rests with the Sultan, and the Khedive has nothing to do with it; yet suddenly Egyptian troops go and annex a large portion of the Soudan for the benefit of the Sultan. That, of course, is not actually the case; part of the Soudan is annexed for the benefit of the Egyptian Government. Memories are short, so let me refer to what has taken place. No doubt Members do not remember the discussions of 1884. After the fall of Ismail the Soudan was a Province under the Khedive of Egypt. On Arabi's revolution there were disturbances in the Soudan, and the Egyptian troops had been withdrawn. There was a general state of revolution. Hicks Pasha went there with troops, and was defeated. Her Majesty's Government then disconnected themselves as much as possible from those proceedings. Lord Granville wrote to Mr. Cartwright at Cairo—
I notice in your Despatch that you enolosea a telegram from General Hicks to Sir E. Malet on the subject of the military operations of the Soudan. It is unnecessary for me to repeat that Her Majesty's Government are in no way responsible for the operations in the Soudan, which had been undertaken under the authority of the Egyptian Government, or for the appointment or action of General Hicks.There we have the fact that this Army was sent there without the approval or 301 assent of Her Majesty's Government. Subsequently, in debate, Lord Granville said it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to urge the Egyptian Government to give up the Soudan until some attempt had been made to settle the position there. The position in the Soudan in 1884 was this: Hicks Pasha was vanquished, the Mahdi was in possession of the Soudan, Gordon Pasha had been sent to Khartoum to withdraw the garrison, and an attempt was being made to relieve the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat. It was then fully believed that the Egyptian Government were simply going to withdraw the garrisons from Tokar and Sinkat on the one side and Khartoum on the ether, and that the exercise of Egyptian authority in the Soudan was to be limited to Suakin and Massowah. We may dismiss Massowah, for it is now practically in the hands of Italy. Her Majesty's Government made representations to the Khedival Government to induce them to abandon the Soudan. On January 9 Sir E. Baring sent the following telegram to Lord Granville:—His Highness the Khedive said that he accepted cordially the policy of the abandonment of the whole of the Soudan.That includes Tokar. We are told that the Soudan is a geographical expression, but the expression in the telegram includes the whole of the Soudan under Egyptian authority—so Tokar was included. The whole of the Soudan must be understood with the exception of Suakin on the Red Sea littoral, and the Eastern Soudan was included, where there has been the recent fighting. We have always claimed that the Egyptian flag shall fly over Suakin and Massowah, though I do not quite understand why. The argument for Suakin is that it is on the line of our communication with India, and that we ought to retain influence there, because we have expended a great deal of money to suppress the over-sea Slave Trade which has been carried on from Suakin. In any case, it was agreed that the Egyptian flag should fly over Suakin, but certain conditions were imposed. On February 19th the noble Lord the Member for Rossendale said—We imposed a veto upon any attempt to re-conquer the Soudan, and when the Ministry of Cherif Pasha, after a period of hesitation, 302 appeared to be disposed to adopt half measures—that is to say, that the re-conquest of the whole of the Soudan was impossible—it wished to retain a portion of it, which we advised them was far beyond their power, we imposed a veto on that policy, and we informed the Government that a Government of Egypt which relied on our support must in questions which are considered vital accept our advice or forfeit our support.About this time Gordon Pasha was in Khartoum, and there was a small English garrison at Suakin, and a considerable force of Egyptian troops under Baker Pasha. Tokar and Sinkat were supposed to be held by Egyptian garrisons, and it was deemed reasonable that these garrisons should be relieved. It was determined to advance to relieve Tokar. Baker Pasha advanced to El Teb; he was defeated, and fell back on Suakin, which was attacked by Osman Digna. General Graham and 5,000 soldiers who had been intercepted on their way home from India were ordered to defend Suakin, which they did. They advanced to El Teb, and vanquished, the forces of Osman Digna. Then they fell back upon Suakin. General Gordon objected in a telegram to that, and fully recognised not only that Eastern Soudan was a part of the Province of the Soudan, but that Tokar was a portion of the Province which the Egyptian Government had abandoned. He telegraphed—About Tokar and Sinkat you can do nothing, except by proclaiming that the chiefs of tribes should come to Khartoum to Assembly of Notables, when the independence of the Soudan will he proclaimed.He absolutely asked the British authorities at Suakin to ask the Notables at Tokar to join in the Assembly of Notables at Khartoum for the purpose of declaring that the whole of the Soudan was independent of Egypt. On March 6th the noble Lord the Member for Rossendale said—General Graham has been directed not to undertake any operations at a considerable distance from Suakin. It is believed that the force under the command of Osman Digna is at a spot about 10 miles from Suakin. The force which General Graham found in position at El Teb was encamped at no distance from, but directly threatening, Suakin. Therefore, if that post was to be satisfactorily defended, it was absolutely necessary that General Graham should not retire in face of a victorious force in such a position, but that he should take efficient measures to defeat or disperse it at the spot where it was encamped.My object is to show that the expedition 303 was made with the simple object of freeing the approaches to the garrison of the presence of Osman Digna and his hordes. The noble Lord afterwards added—There is every reason to hope that within a short period General Graham's force will have accomplished the purpose for which it was sent—that is to say, the relief of what remained of the garrison of Tokar and the effective protection of Suakin. When this is done I should be disposed to think that the retention of a force of any magnitude such as that at General Graham's command will be certainly unnecessary, and probably it will be easily in the power of the Navy to provide for the security of Suakin during the short interval which may elapse before the final decision is come to as to the permanent garrison—a garrison probably of moderate dimensions—by which Suakin will be held. We have no intention of undertaking any operations for the purpose of punishing or taking any revenge on Osman Digna. We have no intention of undertaking any operations for the purpose of exterminating or making war upon his adherents, so soon as they shall cease to menace the positions which we have announced our intention to maintain and to protect.A few days ago I found to my horror from the accounts in the newspapers that there had been an advance of the Egyptians upon Tokar, accompanied, of course, by one of those abominable and horrible massacres of Dervishes which characterise these advances. Seven hundred out of 2,000 Dervishes were found dead on the field of battle, and no doubt very many were carried off by their friends, and have since died of their wounds. We may take it that one out of every two was killed, and on territory which no more belongs to the Khedive of Egypt than it does to me. I have knocked the bottom entirely out of the theory that these people are rebels against the Khedive, and the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs has said we are to regard them as rebels against the Sultan. It practically amounts to this: that the Sultan has nothing whatever to do with it, and that the Egyptian Government, who have to do with it, are our dummies, and that we are violating our pledges to abandon the Soudan. The intentions of the Egyptian Government are apparently to lay hold of the oasis of Tokar, to establish a civil Government there, to establish a military force there, and to prevent Osman Digna and his people going back. There was a distinct understanding that the Egyptians should 304 not stay there, and it is in violation of that understanding that they are endeavouring to annex the country now. The last news is that they are building a fort 12 miles south of Tokar, and situated in the midst of an extensive area of cultivated country, and that a telegraph line 55 miles long is recommended by the Sirdar. It is clear that a very considerable portion of the Eastern Soudan is occupied by the Egyptian Forces at the present moment, and that the intention is to remain there. Does the Government approve of this? It is quite contrary to the policy of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. Gladstone), and to the opinions expressed by Members of the present Government when they were in opposition. There was unquestionably the strongest feeling against any attempt to reacquire for the sake of Egypt, or for Egypt to attempt to acquire any portion of the Soudan. It may be asked, "How do you bring this into this Vote?" I answer, "In a simple way." We are responsible for these things; the Egyptian Government is nothing but our dummy. We forced our policy on the Egyptian Government. Perhaps the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the present Government is not so strong as the Foreign Secretary in the former Government; but as we could force our will upon Egypt so far as an invasion of the Soudan was concerned formerly, so we are able to do it now. If we do not do so it is because we do not desire to do so. The Egyptian Army is officered by British officers. You may say they are not on the Estimates. Perhaps they are not, but how is it that that Army can go to the Soudan? The fact is that the unfortunate British taxpayer has to pay for this Eastern Soudan expedition. We keep a garrison in Egypt of 3,300 men to maintain order, and this garrison enables the Egyptian troops, instead of remaining at Cairo and doing their primary duty, to go forth filibustering in the Soudan. Therefore, we are precisely as responsible for what occurs as if we had sent British soldiers there. If the Egyptian Army is really strong enough to maintain order it is not necessary for us to remain in Egypt. Therefore, I say that we are not only responsible for what occurs, but we are 305 actually paying for it. If Osman Digna bangs about in the neighbourhood of Suakin, and you drive him off and occupy Tokar, 55 miles away, will be not bang about in the neighbourhood of Tokar, and will you not have to make a further advance? The right hon. Gentleman opposite scoffed at me the other night when I said that, and he declared that there was no place to which we could go. There is Kassala, and a straight road leading up to it. There is no desert there—at any rate, during a portion of the year; and I have no doubt that if the Government remains in the weak bands in which it is at present, just as they have allowed the Egyptians to lay bold of Tokar so they will allow them to lay hold of Kassala. And supposing the Egyptian troops should be defeated and driven back, first to Tokar, and thence to Suakin. Will the Secretary of State for War deny that his Government would not feel it incumbent on them to send a British Army to Suakin? There are in Egypt a great many influences at work—there is the Military Party, who think that they are bound in honour to re-acquire the Soudan, and there are the Egyptian Pashas, who not unnaturally have made a good thing out of the Soudan, amongst other things by the Slave Trade, and who are anxious to have the chance of it again. Then there is the Financial Party, who are interested in retaining us there, and who, therefore, wall not be sorry if there are disturbances in the country which will render it difficult for us to leave. The Egyptians are in this position. They know very well that if a Liberal Government comes into power, Egypt will be evacuated in six months or a little more. ["No, no!"] Yes, I say this; there are so many on this side of the House in favour of Egypt being evacuated that (unless the Liberal Government were not a real Liberal Government, but was supported by hon. Members on the other side of the House against a majority on this side) if they did not leave Egypt in six months they would leave their offices. ["No, no!"] Hon. Members say "no." Why, I have voted a hundred times against the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian on these questions, but never succeeded in getting many to vote with me beyond a number of gentlemen from 306 the opposite Benches who were influenced by factious motives. Now, however, go to any constituency you like and tell them you want to remain in. Egypt, and if you are a Liberal they will have nothing to do with you. The pressure will be brought to bear by the constituencies upon Members on this side of the House. The Egyptians knowing this are doing everything they can to compromise the situation so that instead of withdrawing from Egypt we shall be obliged, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian has observed year after year, to remain there. I know that the right hon. Gentleman's most anxious wish and desire is—and I have beard him say so a dozen times to withdraw from Egypt. Under the circumstances, I think the matter ought to be thoroughly debated. I think it ought to be frequently debated, and for my own part whenever I see Votes proposed which, directly or indirectly, are intended to maintain our position in Egypt, I shall move Amendments and make speeches, and ask Members who agree with me to vote with me. To bring home the facts to the minds of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen it is necessary to recur to them again and again. In the year 1884 the country was in a great state of excitement and indignation at the massacres which took place of thousands of dervishes. Now we have another massacre of 700 dervishes—a circumstance which the country has not yet thoroughly realised. If this annexation takes place it will not merely be hundreds who will lose their lives, but thousands—and thousands of men who, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian has said, are rightly struggling to be free. I shall support every Amendment to these Votes, from whichever quarter of the House they come.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREI beg to move to reduce the Vote by £100,000.
§ Motion made and Question proposed, "That '£5,532,700' be granted for the said Service."—(Mr. Labouchere.)
§ *(7.52.) SIR G. CAMPBELL (Kirkcaldy, &c.)The other night we dealt with the Vote for the number of men employed in Egypt, and I will not go over that ground again now. I think we 307 might now with great advantage withdraw from Egypt, and from the contingencies which may arise so long as our occupation continues. The point I wish to address myself to is this: that if we are to keep troops in Egypt, Egypt ought to pay for them, as India pays for the troops there. Egypt pays only a small subsidy towards the expense of the British troops. Is India treated in that way? Far from it. India pays not only local but also extraordinary expenses, and the utmost farthing of incidental expenses. The cost of our troops in this country and the colonies, including officers, Secretary of State for War, and all, is about £118 per head, and including barracks it will come to quite £125. In India, with the higher pay given to officers, it will undoubtedly come to £150 per man. Egypt pays £232,000 for 3,200 men, which is only about £70 per head, whereas the real expense to the British taxpayer must be more than £125 per man, as we have to add the cost of armaments, accoutrements, barracks, hospitals, stores, recruiting expenses, headquarters, administrative expenses, transports, and so on. I shall be glad if the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War will tell us whether those figures are right or not. I think it is a very heavy expenditure, and I do not think any reason is shown for it. Why do you not apply to the ease of India the arguments with which you seek to justify the small charge you make to Egypt? The sending out of troops to Egypt disturbs our military arrangements at home. You cannot keep half the battalions at homo and send half abroad. You have to send out more than half the battalions, rather the battalions at home are emasculated. The best troops are sent abroad and the invalids and recruits are kept at home. We were told that Egypt is heavily burdened with debt and cannot afford to pay what she ought, and that, therefore, the British taxpayer must meet the charges. But what is the real state of the case? The financial advisers of the Egyptian Government tell us that they are not only paying their way in that country but establishing a considerable surplus. If that is so, why should not the Egyptian Government defray all these military expenses without involving the British taxpayer in the heavy burdens I 308 have described? My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton has supplied the reason, which is that the moment you have restored order to Egypt, instead of trying to do justice to the British taxpayer by withdrawing your troops, you allow the Egyptian Government to indulge in the commencement of a fresh conquest of the Soudan, and that is the reason why your troops are now chained, as it were, to Cairo, and why we are in our present position. It may be true that we have arrived at a better state of things in Egypt than hitherto. We have restored peace and we have disciplined the Egyptian Army; but at the same time, owing to the aggressive operations in the Tokar district and on the Suakin frontier, we have felt it necessary to occupy the whole of that part of the Soudan territory. The consequence must be that you will have to maintain a strong brigade at Tokar of probably three or four battalions, because you cannot defend the district between that place and Suakin with a smaller force, and it is extremely probable that you will ultimately be obliged to send up a large number of British troops in support of that Tokar garrison. In that case you will have to send more troops from Malta and Gibraltar, which are practically the reserves of the British Army in Egypt, and in this way there will be no end to the expense to which this country will be put. The Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs has told us that the Egyptian sovereignty over the Soudan is not abandoned. I am very sorry to hear this, because it means that we have undertaken vast liabilities which may give rise to all the mischief and extravagance pointed out by the hon. Member for Northampton. I may say that I am very much surprised at this announcement, because, as I have repeatedly said in this House, I have great confidence in the wisdom and judgment of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary. I was therefore exceedingly puzzled when I heard that after the Soudan was supposed to have settled down in native hands for a number of years, we should at the last moment be told that the Egyptian Sovereignty over a vast region of the Soudan is not to be abandoned. I confess that I cannot understand it. I do not think that Lord Salisbury is a man who is likely to give in 309 to a few officers at Suakin who wish to revenge themselves upon the police who follow oar defeated friendlies right up to the walls of that place. I am afraid there is some deeper motive, which is either that it is necessary to conciliate the Egyptian Government in order to induce Riaz Pasha to give Egypt over to us, or that there maybe such an idea as that suggested by the French of reviving the Empire of Sesostris by obtaining control over the whole of the territory which is to be acquired by the East Africa Company from Lake Victoria and the sources of the Nile, and bringing it down to a point at which it will adjoin the region occupied by British forces at Kassala and Suakin. I repeat, because I regard Lord Salisbury as a prudent man who has hitherto shown no disposition for rash enterprises, that I cannot help thinking the motive for re-occupying this portion of the Soudan is something more than that of reclaiming Egyptian Sovereignty over the Tokar region. Believing, therefore, that there is something behind which may involve this country in great liabilities which ought not to be undertaken by us, I beg to support the Motion of my hon. Friend for the reduction of this vote.
§ (8.5.) DR. CLARK (Caithness)I wish to say a few words in supporting the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton. In so doing I would remind the House that there is a certain sum of £250,000 charged on the British taxpayer for the Army of Occupation in Egypt; but I was told by the Secretary for War that in reality the British taxpayer paid nothing at all for that Army of Occupation. He said we required a certain number of troops, and that whether they were in Cork or Edinburgh, Aldershot or Egypt, made no difference. We required the men, and must support them wherever they were, so that if we kept them in Egypt we had only to pay for them there as we should have to do if they were maintained anywhere else. This would have been a good reply had it been accurate; but I doubt its accuracy. For instance, I find that in three of our Crown Colonies, the Mauritius, Ceylon and the Straits Settlement, we have about the same number of men that we have in Egypt, so that if this theory were sound 310 the cost would be pretty much the same; but the fact is that we charge the Governments of the Crown Colonies of Ceylon and the Mauritius, omitting the Straits Settlement, over £200,000 for the troops we maintain there, whereas in Egypt we are only charging the Egyptian Government £80,000. I understood the Financial Secretary (Mr. Jackson) to say that the reason why £80,000 was charged in Egypt was because the battalions there had to be increased from 720 to 801, and that Egypt had to pay the difference; but I want to know why Egypt should pay the difference, because if you want so many men it can be a matter of no importance where they are. I have as yet had no satisfactory reply from the Government, and unless I do get one that is satisfactory I shall go to a Division. It is quite certain to my mind that one of two things must be the case; either Egypt is not paying sufficient, or we are overcharging the Crown Colonies I have named. With regard to the general question before the Committee, I should like to ask a question or two. I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War whether he intends to have a railway constructed from Suakin to Sinkat; because you will want Sinkat ultimately, and must have a garrison there, inasmuch at it lies amongst the hills and is necessary to the health of our troops during the hot season. Moreover, it will be necessary if you maintain a garrison at Tokar, to have a railway there, otherwise the convoys might be cut off between Tokar and Suakin; and supposing you have the railway at Tokar, why should you not go. on to Kassala and Berber? I must say that so far as the Egyptians are concerned, there is a good deal to be advanced in defence of a forward policy. They depend upon the Nile; and if the people living in the upper regions adjacent to that river are to divert it for irrigation or for other purposes, Egypt will necessarily suffer. Thus you see that the further you go into the Soudan, the more arguments you find for extending your progress still further; and that process will go on until at last you will have acquired the whole of the Soudan. But it seems useless to question the Government on 311 this subject. They do not know anything. They do not know whether there has been any declaration of war. All they seem to know is that the dominions of the Soudan are still a portion of the Sultan's sovereignty. If it is intended to occupy the whole of the Soudan territory, why should you not carry the doctrine still further, and apply it to the French, turning' them out of Algiers and Tunis? I regret that we have not been able to extract any information on these points from Her Majesty's Government. We now see that our troops have been attacking those of the de facto Government of the Soudan territory adjacent to Suakin. In doing this, I say we have been guilty of carrying out a high handed and a filibustering policy, and I hope that this House will no longer sanction such a course. Egypt is said to be in a prosperous position; and, therefore, I do not see why we should be called upon to pay this money.
§ (8.15.) MR. E. STANHOPEThe hon. Member has put to me several questions and it is only right I should rise to answer them. His first question was, "Why should we pay the whole cost of the Army when we make some of the Crown Colonies pay the whole cost of the troops maintained in those Colonies"? The answer is perfectly clear. If we left Egypt the 3,000 troops we maintain there would not be disbanded; we should use them for our general purposes. At present, in Egypt, we are only carrying on from hand to mouth, believing that the time will come when we will be able to withdraw the troops for the general purposes of the country. When you come to the Crown Colonies the case is altogether different. We actually raise troops for the purpose of defending those colonies; they appear on the Army Estimates, and we get the money from the Colonial Government. Where we garrison distant coaling stations, it is difficult to call upon those colonies to pay the whole cost, but as much as they can afford. The cases are wholly different, and there is no analogy between them. The hon. Member asks what we propose to do with regard to Tokar. There is not the smallest suggestion of making a railway there. We have yielded to the strong representation of 312 the Egyptian Government that their frontier should be extended in that direction. The hon. Member for Northampton admits that he has made 201 speeches on this subject. I myself can assure him that I have heard him make the same speech 30 times, and that he has used almost the identical words. The Committee will not be surprised, therefore, that I have nothing to add to the answers I have already given, and that I decline to re-open the political question of the occupation of Egypt or the expedition to the Soudan. The argument of the hon. Member is that we ought to leave Egypt at the earliest possible moment, and leave her to carry on her own affairs. And we are actually to begin with the process of telling Egypt that she may not undertake operations for her own defence, though the Government thinks them essential. When the time comes to leave Egypt, you are to turn to her and say, "It is not necessary to make on your frontier proper provision for your defence." We have been attacking a hostile tribe of dervishes who have been attacking the Egyptians at Suakin. We have no desire to interfere with the native tribes in the neighbourhood; on the contrary, we desire to encourage them to assist the Egyptian Government in carrying on the government of the country around Suakin. We certainly have no intention whatever of re-conquering the Soudan, nor have we any intention of interfering with the Egyptian Government in taking steps that are necessary to her security. With these assurances I hope the Committee, if we go to a Division, will support the Government in doing what is for the interest of Egypt.
§ *(8.22.) SIR G. CAMPBELLI entirely differ from the view of the right hon. Gentleman. Egypt, with a quiet population and a large revenue, might succeed in self-government, but the Egyptians are not capable of governing the Soudan, inhabited by warlike tribes, and with little revenue and small means. It was the prudent policy of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian to abandon the Soudan, as the Egyptians were not fitted to govern that country. The Secretary for War said 313 that if we trusted Egypt we should leave the Egyptians free to occupy the Soudan.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEI never said that. I said we should leave them free to give attention to their own frontiers.
§ *SIR G. CAMPBELLI contend that, if the Egyptians continue in the Soudan, and the tribes are moved to reprisals, they will have to remain there, and they will have to occupy the whole district. I think you had much better draw the line at Egypt proper, leaving them as the utmost hope, to govern themselves, but never deeming them able to govern other people.
§ (8.25.) MR. S. STOREY (Sunderland)When the hon. Member says that it is the policy of Egyptians not to go outside Egypt, I am afraid he has not met those officials in the full pride of official costume, but in circumstances and places of a more pleasant character. If he had seen them officially he would probably have ascertained what is the prevailing opinion of Egyptian officers, who, almost to a man, are in favour of extending the bounds of Egypt. Their conviction was that they should sustain Anouan by going to Dongola, Suakin by going to Tokar, and Tokar by going to Berber, and Kassala. I opposed this occupation of Egypt from the first. I have not made 201 speeches about it, but I have spoken eight or nine times in six or seven years against the occupation of Egypt, and against the projection of British arms into the Soudan. Formally, I must make my protest against this projection of Egyptian arms some distance into the Soudan, because I know it carries out the hidden intentions of the Pashas, who, when we leave Egypt, will be the masters. Their conviction is that they ought to have the whole territory which belonged to Egypt 15,20, or 30 years ago. It is because the little movement at Tokar is as the beginning of the letting out of water that I am disposed to take objection to a matter which may appear extremely trivial. Somebody on the Treasury Bench talked as if Tokar were a fertile oasis. What nonsense. Why, there are a hundred more fertile oases around Egypt. It was not Suakin or the defeat of Osman Digna, but the carrying out of a secret policy of the Turkish Pashas that was fought in going to Tokar under the cover 314 of English guns and the leadership of English officers. I am one of those who wish England to leave Egypt. When it was said that we would leave her to manage her own affairs I never believed it from the first. I remember warning the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) that if we went to Egypt we would have to stay there. With every step we take forward we add to our responsibilities. I am not one of those who condemn the Tory Government for not doing that which the Liberal Government did not do. I have been in Egypt on more than one occasion, and if the opportunity were a proper one I would say to the House that, although I opposed the original occupation, and although I still feel that there are important interests which make it desirable that we should get out of it as soon as possible, yet it is impossible to deny that the occupation of Egypt by England has been productive in more than half a dozen directions of great, and I hope permanent, advantage to the Egyptians. For my part, although, as hon. Members know, I am not fond of officials or of officialdom, yet when I was in Egypt it was my good fortune to meet a great many gentlemen who are concerned in carrying on practical works in that country, and a more self-sacrificing and a more successful body of public servants was, I believe, never possessed by any Government on this globe. What they have done in increasing the cultivable territory would alone suffice to justify a great deal of affection on the part of intelligent Egyptians for the English. I freely admit that all our officials there have done their duty, and more than their duty. But while I say that our occupation has been useful and advantageous to the Egyptians, I must at the same time draw this distinction that every step we take forward towards mastering the control of Egyptian affairs render the Egyptian people, and Egyptian officials, less capable of undertaking the management of their own affairs. That is a deadly evil we have before us, I fear, from the fact we have gone there that we shall never get out of it, and it is because I feel that, and because I object to it, that I want to diminish as far as possible the chances of our continuing in that country. This I 315 know, that the further Egypt advances into the Soudan, the more the Egyptian Government enlarges its responsibility there, the more will it depend upon the British Government which is behind it; and the less the Egyptian Government is permitted to mix itself up in the affairs of the Soudan, the better will be our chance of escaping from our untenable position. Therefore I have joined with my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, and shall continue to join with him in pressing upon the Government the extreme impolicy of giving to these Pashas any free hand whatsoever. It is of no use saying that the Military Authorities recommended this advance. I do not think that military men in Egypt, except for the flurry of engagement, would care in the slightest degree about advancing into the Soudan. It is the Pashas and perhaps behind them the Khedive who advocates this; it is men who want to live in the history of the country as having been responsible for advancing its frontiers, and it is because I believe that if they are permitted to do it they will draw the British Government insensibly on from one project to another until they commit themselves to the re-conquest of Berber that I am now making the strongest protest I can against the re-occupation of Tokar. In this House, unfortunately, very little notice is taken when hundreds of men are slain; they are said to be only Dervishes; they are what the Government are pleased to call rebels, though I always feel when I hear an English gentleman thus stigmatise them that he is guilty of insolence, for they are in no sense rebels, simply because the Sultan of Turkey, sitting at Constantinople—or rather lying there—chooses to pretend that he has territorial rights over the Soudan; that simply because the people of the Soudan choose to manage their own affairs, men in England talk glibly about the Dervishes being rebels. I deny the applicability of the term. In no English sense can they be called rebels, and then to declaim about the necessity of this advance in the interest of the protection of the Egyptian ports is all nonsense. I always notice that when we deal with matters such as these some official or other discovers the place to be of immense importance. I say that if 316 you left Suakin, Egypt would not be merely as strong, but stronger, for the permanent object which we have in view. If you allow Egypt to retreat upon herself, she would be an area easily governable, absolutely controllable, and easily defended; while every day the possibility of our leaving the country would increase. But if you allow these Pashas to control you, and compel you to undertake one expedition after another, you will end at last with exhausting the resources of Egypt, and you will be compelled to remain then in your own interest, and have permanently to hold possession of the country for the sake of your honour and credit. I, therefore, feel I must join in the protest against the recent advance on Tokar, and against our continued occupation of Egypt. If the right hon. Gentleman had assured us the Government would do as Sir Evelyn Baring committed us to do four or five years ago, I would have said: "Very well, I think the present condition of Egypt is such, and the signs of improvement are such, that you have made out a good case for a further continuance of your stay." But if the Government will not do that, if it will lay itself open, as in this case, to be induced by the Pashas to pass on to other exploits, which involve slaughter of the Dervishes and then permanent occupation of the country, accompanied by ill blood between ourselves and other Powers, I feel bound to protest. I know that the services we have rendered Egypt have been of great advantage to the Egyptian people, but I am sure that the international evils which would follow upon our continued occupation would more than counterbalance those advantages, and I venture to point out that one effect would be to bring us close to territory likely to come under Russian dominion. I believe we can only come out of Egypt, if at all, by minimising the responsibilities of the Egyptian Government, by curtailing its territory, and resisting her leaders from undertaking expeditions to the South. I say that if we allow these, whatever may be the intentions of the Government, there will be no escaping the duty of permanently occupying Egypt. I therefore think we ought not to have permitted the advance on Tokar. It 317 would be Letter to curtail the ambitions of these Pashas, and make them devote themselves to improving the condition of the population, reforming their judicial system, and educating their people. If that policy were pursued, then the necessity for our remaining there would gradually disappear, and Egypt could be left to work out her own destiny. Whatever may be the result of the present Vote, the permanent policy of this country—whether the Liberal or Conservative Party be in power—should be to limit the ambition of the Egyptian Pashas and to take the earliest opportunity of honourably escaping from our unfortunate and untenable position in Egypt. (8.25.)
§ (9.24.) Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,
§ (9.25.) MR. LABOUCHEREI do not think the right hon. Gentleman has given us a fair explanation of the reasons why we are going to take the Eastern Soudan. No doubt, the right hon. Baronet the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs will address the Committee, and I ask him to make a full statement of the arrangements with the Egyptian Government. We wish to know, for instance, whether the recent military operations have been undertaken with the consent and at the desire of the Sultan, and whether it is attended to absolutely reverse the policy laid down by the noble Lord the remember for Rossendale (the Marquess Hartington) as to the abandonment the Soudan. Are we to understand that the province of Tokar is to be seized; is there to be an Egyptian civil and military Government there? Have the Government taken into consideration the great contingency there is of these Dervishes drawing the Egyptians into a real war with the Soudanese, in which the shall have to go to their aid? It must be remembered that the Soudanese strongly object to our holding Suakin. Undoubtedly, they have not engaged in military operations of late against Suakin, but I have no doubt they are very disagreeable neighbours. There is the widest difference between holding Suakin alone, and holding this large territory. What is being done must 318 inevitably get us into great difficulty, unless we have a clear understanding. It may be said I am pressing this unduly, but in 1884 there were debates which were continued day after day. The country was horrified at the massacres which took place there. We have had a similar massacre now, but there is this difference between the two years—that whereas then the troops returned and it was said there was no intention of laying hold of any portion of the Eastern Soudan, now we have the massacre followed by the Egyptian troops seizing or annexing a very considerable tract of the Soudan, which is claimed, lightly or wrongly, by the Dervishes to belong to them. I do trust we shall have some sort of statement as to what is really intended.
*(9.29.) COLONEL BLITNDELL (Lancashire, S.W., Ince)Every military man who heard the statement made by the Government at the time of General Grenfell's action, that we were to hold Suakin by itself, knew that it was a dangerous statement to make, because there is no such thing as a passive defence. Any General defending Suakin ought to have full liberty to hold a certain zone of the territory around it, so that an enemy should not be allowed to come up to it at all. Pull liberty should be allowed to the commanding officer defending Suakin to occupy and hold the country near, in order to secure that town from attack by an enemy.
§ (9.30.) DR. TANNER (Cork Co., Mid)This is a short but expressive statement from a supporter of the Government. But we may ask where, in the name of common sense, is this region of attack to end. We were told not so long ago by Her Majesty's Government that the occupation of Egypt is to continue to a remote period. Then again we are told that the possession of Suakin is indispensable as part of our policy. It is of no practical use to England as a military station, but our holding it or Egypt holding it constitutes a sort of sore on the surface of that part of the world, it provokes irritation among the natives; and how long is this to continue? We are to have an extension of telegraphic communication, and other expenses are to be incurred in connection with a district which is of no good to the 319 country, and has no advantage really from a military point of view. I really cannot help supposing that this is only one of the many methods made use of by Her Majesty's present advisers to provide posts for the assistance of impecunious relatives. If we accept the doctrine of the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just spoken, it must lead to the permanent occupation of the whole African coast until we find ourselves on the boundaries of another European Power. Really I think we ought to have some substantial declaration from the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. When will the limit be reached of this systematic land-grabbing of the territories of free people? As far as in me lies I must protest against this wasteful, foolish system. I do not quite agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland that the permanent occupation of Egypt will bring about a conflict of British and Russian interests; the place where we are likely to feel any difficulty on that account is the Indian North-western frontier. But I merely want to press for an answer from the right hon. Gentleman, and it cannot be matter of surprise that we are not satisfied with a bald statement from the responsible Minister when we are asked to vote this very large amount of money.
§ (9.35.) MR. H. J. WILSON (York, W.R., Holmfirth)I feel bound to join in offering this protest against the whole of this Egyptian business. I have not been in the House through the whole of the discussions, and therefore I do not know whether this point has been alluded to. It is acknowledged that we have a certain amount of responsibility for the action of the Egyptian Government, and when we see that English officers lead the Egyptian troops in these expeditions it is assumed by the people that these expeditions are undertaken upon instructions from the English Government. As a matter of fact it is the English Government promoting these attacks, because by the presence of our troops in Egypt we liberate a certain number of Egyptian troops for the purpose. The speech of the hon. and gallant Member has let the cat out of the bag, and shows the real position—that, once established anywhere, we must then go a step 320 further; and that is what is indicated by what we are told about telegraphs and other arrangements. I suppose the Egyptian Government now hope that all is to be recovered in the Soudan. Again and again have we asked what is going to be done in the country, and the answers we have received are examples of what out of doors we should call downright shuffling. I am not fully posted up in all the details of this question, and have no desire to take up time, but I must join in the protest of my hon. Friend.
§ (9.40.) MR. E. STANHOPEI hope we may now be allowed to come to a decision, for it is clear we are discussing over again exactly the question that was discussed at the last sitting on the Army Estimates. I have this evening again answered the observations of the hon. Member for Northampton, who, however, did not do me the favour of remaining in the House to hear my reply.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREI was absent swallowing a hasty cup of tea, but I know what the right hon. Gentleman said; a friend of mine has told me.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEThen we have had a speech from the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir G. Campbell), who never fails to give us the benefit of his views on this subject. No one can deny that the speeches of to-night have been the a réchauffé of the last Debate on the subject; no additional fact or argument has been adduced. I did not wish to curtail legitimate discussion in the least degree, but I must earnestly appeal to the Committee to pass from this to the next Vote in the Estimates, which raises more important matters than this.
§ (9.41.) MR. STOREYThe right hon. Gentleman thinks there are more important matters to discuss on the next Votes, but I venture to differ from him because in this question the honour of this country and the honour of the Government are involved: the honour of the country because we have pledged ourselves to Europe that we will at a convenient time come out of Egypt, and we on this side hold that the futher you advance into the Soudan the more you retard the time of our departure from Egypt—the honour of the Government of this country because the foreign 321 policy of our Government is supposed to be continuous, and the late Government was pledged up to the eyes to retire from Egypt at the first convenient opportunity. What we urge here, and what we mean to urge throughout the country is that by permitting themselves to be seduced into military proceedings in the Soudan the Government are practically eating their pledges and putting off to the Greek Kalends the time when we can honourably retire from Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman thinks the time has arrived for us to come to a decision and that we have put no new facts before the Committee. The Committee? What is the use of putting facts before empty benches with neither heads or hearts or intelligence? Wood and leather have we been addressing our arguments to, interspersed here and there with a representative of the Government or the Treasury Bench. An audience of five or six gentlemen have we had opposite. We might as well talk to leather and wood as talk to the intelligence and endeavour to pierce the pachydermatous skins of Her Majesty's Government. Now they invite us to come to a Division, and that means that, having exhausted argument, and made convincing speeches to which they have made no reply, we are to be met by numbers and voted down. Beaten on a Division we know we shall be—beaten in argument the Government are. The Financial Secretary smiles at the idea, but I invite him to rise and give us some tangible defence in regard to the matter we are contesting. We say the Government by meekly permitting the Egyptians to go to Tokar, innocently I will admit, without any desire of their own, but unfortunately for us and for Egpyt, are provoking another war in the Soudan and delaying our departure from Egypt. One point there is which has not been dwelt upon in these discussions. We allege that these advances in the Soudan are prompted by the ambition of the Egyptian Pashas and by the influence of the Military Authorities anxious to gain a little military glory at the expense of the half-armed Soudanese. But how far do these schemes of conquest and annexation, apart from military spirit and the greed of the Pashas, originate in those financial circles whence came the 322 hateful influence which induced the late Government to embark on their disastrous career in the Soudan? All of us who were Members of this House in 1882 know that we went to Egypt in the interest of the bondholders, not because the honour of England was involved or the safety of Egpyt at stake, but to save the pockets of the financiers whose influence is now felt by those who hold high places on the Treasury Bench. This financial influence projected the Egyptian policy of the late Government, and have we not now the same cabals, the same schemes, the same inspired newspaper paragraphs, the same direct and indirect efforts on the minds and inclinations of the governing authorities in Egypt and at home for the purpose of permanently securing those financial interests, which would have been destroyed if we had not gone to Egypt, and which everybody knows will be jeopardised if we leave Egypt. How to keep up the English occupation is the constant endeavour of the bondholders, and so it is that these ideas of exploiting the Soudanese are fostered, that the difficulties arising may prolong our occupation of Egpyt. We do not mean to divide until we have had some more definite engagement than we have yet secured. We are not going to permit the blood of Egyptians or Englishmen or Soudanese to be spilt time after time—and these occurrences the Recording Angel must have written with a double-dyed pen—without impressing upon the Government that it was by weakness the Liberal Government entered on these projects in the past; and that it is by weakness the present Government are being led on to a war which is likely to be conducted in a manner to cause permanent mischief to Egypt. The hon. Member for Carlisle thinks these enterprises have been entered upon not through weakness, but through wickedness. I do not think the Government of 1882 had wickedness in its composition or purposes. If it had, those who composed that Government have shed it or got rid of it since. For my part I believe it was weakly led on step by step until events culminated in the wicked bombardment of Alexandria, and a war which, though not productive of much loss of life, yet was productive of 323 much suffering to Egypt. It is by weakness that the present Government has been led on. You had Alexandria, Tel-el-Kebir, and Khartoum to record against the last Government; what have you against the present Government? I cannot remember the petty names, for the Government has done nothing great, but the records show that they have been going on foolishly from one petty conflict to another and sacrificing with no permanent effect the lives of men belonging to three nations. And that is going to continue to be done; I can see it from their present policy. They will go to Tokar and, if permitted to remain there, a few months hence they will discover another oasis beyond Tokar. Some military gentlemen or some enterprising Pasha who wants to distinguish himself will discover, 30 or 40 miles from Tokar, another oasis. Having found that Suakin could be best defended from Tokar, it will then be said that Tokar can be best defended from this other oasis, and advances will be made in one direction upon Kassala and in another direction upon Berber, and this country will be committed in "honour" to projects which will involve the re-conquest of the Soudan, or, at all events, the Nile portion of it. It is because our past experience has made us jealous and has prevented us from putting confidence in the promises of Governments—knowing how their promises are falsified—that we make protests against these military projects. For the reasons I have given I have felt it my duty to renew the protests made by the hon. Member for Northampton and the hon. Member for Caithness, and I would ask from the Treasury Bench some declaration to the effect that for the future this country shall not be committed to pledges of conquest in the Soudan for the purpose of giving security to the dividends of the bondholders, and with the result of continuing to an unknown date the occupation of Egypt.
§ *(10.7.) MR. MORTON (Peterborough)I can understand the anxiety of the Minister for War to get this Vote. I suppose this is what he would call the dangerous part of the Army Estimates, and that he thinks that if he can get this item he will be able to go on for 324 another twelve months exploiting in the Soudan, and bringing about further annexation. As I understand it, we want an answer on two points from the Secretary for War and from the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. We want to know when the Government are going to leave Egypt for good, and whether they intend to re-conquer the Soudan. I could quite understand the Government saying candidly that they mean, as far as they are concerned, retaining possession of the Soudan, and to go on conquering and re-conquering as much territory as possible. I was not a Member of the House in 1882, when these proceedings commenced, but outside the House, in connection with political associations, I have always opposed this occupation of Egypt and this interference with the Egyptian people. I have no hesitation in saying—for this is not a political matter—that I objected even more strongly to the action of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian than I do to the action of the present Government in continuing the occupation of Egypt. It was a mistake to go there in the first instance. I believe the late Government meant to retire as soon as they could, but what do the present Government mean? Why do they not say they mean to leave by a certain date, and why do they go to Tokar at all? I cannot see that it is of any use at all, unless it is intended to go further and conquer more territory. To my mind, we have no right to interfere with the Soudanese, who we were told were a people "rightly struggling to be free." Another strong objection I have to these proceedings is that they annoy and irritate the French people. It may be that the Government desire to annoy the French people and their Government. I know they do not like a Republic, but I cannot help that. My point is that we have no right to irritate neighbours with whom we should live on terms of amity and good feeling. Besides, we are likely to suffer by giving this annoyance in Newfoundland and elsewhere. Having promised the French Government that we would retire from Egypt, why should we not do so honestly and as quickly as possible. So long as I am a Member of this House I shall vote against spending money on these 325 Egyptian affairs, and I now give my hearty support to the Amendment.
§ *(10.14.) MR. KEAY (Elgin and Nairn)The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War complained a short time ago that all that was said from this side of the House was in the nature of reiteration of matter already uttered in previous Debates. I think, whatever may be my feebleness and defects I shall be able to contribute, if allowed by the Chair, to the information which ought to be placed before the House concerning matters which hitherto have not been mentioned. The hon. Member for Sunderland maintained—and I think rightly maintained—that the cause of all the difficulty in which this country has been involved was our original advent into Egypt through means which we all know, namely, the bombardment of Alexandria. I have no doubt that many Members of the House would be glad to consider that that was entirely ancient history. For my own part I cannot consider that it is ancient history until the last corporal's guard of the British Army has evacuated Egypt. The occupation of Egypt was not the doing of the present Government. The events I am about to mention, they were not, at all events directly, responsible for, and they may even have forgotten some of them, miserable as they were. The first of these events was this: We went to Egypt without any declaration of war violating in that respect, the law of nations. We also invaded Egypt absolutely without permission of the English Cabinet.
§ *MR. KEAYI submit to your ruling, Sir, but I am only taking the historical latitude which was accorded to other speakers.
THE CHAIRMANOrder, order! The hon. Member did not understand the argument of the hon. Member for Sunderland. The hon. Member for Sunderland suggested motives for the present position in Egypt.
§ *MR. KEAYI am alluding to the hon. Member for Northampton when he went over the history of the case. I wish to show that we went to Egypt merely through the action of officials.
§ *MR. KEAYThen I cannot pursue that part of the subject. The next point which I have in my mind is the devastating effect which our action has had on Egypt, inasmuch as through our very first act the whole civil population of Alexandria disappeared at the time of the bombardment, and has never been heard of more.
§ *MR. KEAYI can only obey the ruling of the Chair. I do not know whether it will be in order to mention that I have heard questions put in this House as to the fact of the disappearance of these people.
§ *MR. KEAYI suppose I must understand that the history of the causes which led to our occupation of Egypt is not to be discussed on this occasion. I will, therefore, confine myself to a few remarks as to the financial question. I contend that the financial position in Egypt is such that either this reduction should be passed, and the Egyptian Government should pay the extra expense of our troops out of their own surplus, or else that Her Majesty's Government should prove to the Committee that there is some British reason why the British taxpayer should be mulcted in the amount now asked for. From the examination I have made of Egyptian affairs, I cannot congratulate either the late Government or the present Government upon any real improvement in Egyptian finance. I do not deny that they have, by hook or by crook, extorted from the Egyptian peasantry a large amount of revenue by their scientific system—because I must confess that the British revenue system is, so far as exaction is concerned, a very scientific system of extortion. They have succeeded in extorting from the Egyptian fellaheen all that was obtainable before the war, and a large sum in addition for the maintenance of British soldiers and British Departments. The surplus which is spoken of in connection with Egyptian finance clearly owes its existence to severer revenue laws, and severer extortion from the unfortunate cultivators of the country. I cannot understand—taking even the 327 official view of the matter—how anyone can maintain that the surplus has not been obtained by extortion. If the surplus had been due to the increased prosperity of the country, we should have had some proposal to relieve the British taxpayer of, at any rate, a part of the burden of this Vote. These are my reasons for—as far as your ruling, Sir, will allow me—saying that I shall certainly record my protest against the passing of this Vote.
§ (10.23.) Mr. JOHNSTONrose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put; "but the CHAIRMAN withheld his assent, and declined then to put that Question.
§ Debate resumed.
§ SIR W. LAWSON (Cumberland, Cockermouth)It has been complained that we sometimes speak twice on this aide. Well, Sir, I have not yet spoken on the subject which I take to be the question of our occupation of Egypt and whether certain contingencies of an evil nature in the Soudan do not arise from that occupation. I am surprised to hear a right hon. Gentleman opposite say that there are more important questions to be discussed than this. I do not think there could be a more important question discussed than this. Nobody can have forgotten how we went on and on, and employed our Fleets, Armies, in stifling Home Rule in Egypt, merely for the sake of securing the extortionate profits of a few bondholders. Can there be anything on which it is more important for everybody in this House to do all that within them lies to prevent the renewal of such crimes as have occurred. You may have a renewal of one of the greatest international outrages of the century—a foul blot on the record of the Liberal Party. The occupation of Egypt to my mind was commenced in outrage and carried on with fraud. It was to the everlasting shame of the Liberal Party that they carried out these proceedings, and I am glad to see that some of the Pashas of that Party have now arrived. I hope that they will tell the Committee that they are as much opposed to this forward policy in Egypt as any of those who sit below the Gangway. Why have our soldiers been kept in Egypt? Have we not been told over 328 and over again that they were only to be kept there until order was established; and are we not told that order has been established, and that everything is now going on happily? Why are you keeping your soldiers there? I can do nothing but repeat the question as the right hon. Gentleman opposite has said, and I do so because it is never answered. The only possible excuse for keeping up this expenditure is that you want to do something or other in the Soudan. That is no excuse. I sit down by asking the right hon. Gentleman to answer one question, and if he will answer it in a straightforward manner it will be simplifying matters a good deal. I want to know whether the Government adhere to the policy laid down in the Despatch of January 8th, 1884, by Sir Evelyn Baring, who said that the Khedive accepted a gradual policy of abandonment of the whole of the Soudan, which he believed on mature reflection to be for the best interests of the country. I want a straightforward answer to the question: Have the Government abandoned the policy of ruling the Soudan or have they not? If we got a straightforward answer to the question we could not have a surer ground. I feel sure the right hon. Gentleman will be glad to give us that answer.
§ MR. WILLIAM HENRY SMITHrose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."
§ Question put, "That the Question be now put."
§ (10.30.) The Committee divided:—Ayes 135; Noes 68.—(Div. List, No. 74.)
§ Question put accordingly, "That '£5,532,700' be granted for the said Services."
§ (10.45.) The Committee divided:—Ayes 65; Noes 140.—(Div. List, No. 75.)
§ MR. CONYBEARE (Cornwall, Cambourne)Mr. Courtney, I have to state that by accident I have been excluded from voting. I was in the Lobby at the time of the Division writing a letter, and my vote was not recorded.
§ MR. CONYBEAREYes, Sir.
§ Original Question again proposed.
§ (10.52) SIR W. LAWSONI move, Sir, that you do now report Progress, and ask leave to sit again, and I will give my reasons for so doing. I think that this is a most extraordinary way of voting national supplies. We have been discussing as important a question as it is possible to discuss, namely, the policy of this country in Egypt. Hardly anybody on the other side of the House came to hear or take part in the discussion, but all of a sudden in comes the First Lord of the Treasury, and without having listened to the Debate for five minutes—I do not think the right hon. Gentleman even heard my speech—he gets up and moves that the question be now put. The Government even refused to answer a question I put. I put it seriously, respectfully, and earnestly, a question which arose out of the discussion then going on, namely, the policy of the Government in the Soudan, which is the cause of the necessity for voting this number of men and the amount of money asked for. I put the question seriously to the right hon. Gentleman the Minister for War, and directly I sat down, having asked the question, up jumped the First Lord of the Treasury and moved that the question be now put. Was anybody ever answered in that way in the House before? More than that; I happen to know that others wish to take part in the Debate and express their opinions on the Egyptian policy of the Government. In these circumstances I have no hesitation whatever in moving to report Progress.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Sir Wilfrid Lawson.)
§ (10.54.) MR. E. STANHOPEI had no intention to show any want of courtesy towards the hon. Baronet in not answering his question. I have not answered it for the simple reason that if the hon. Baronet had only listened to the Debate which took place on the last occasion when the House discussed this subject, he would have known that his question had already been answered. The question of Egypt was discussed on the last occasion 330 when the Army Estimates were taken, although it was admitted that the question was but remotely connected with the subject before the Committee but it was discussed at very great length and an interesting Debate took place. That Debate was resumed again to-day, when not a single new argument was adduced, nor, I believe, a single new fact brought forward. Three hon. Members addressed the Committee twice at inordinate length. One hon. Member spoke for 41 minutes and then again spoke for 30 minutes. I venture to think that that was a very considerable waste of the time of the House, and the Government would have been wanting in their duty to the country—their duty being to get through the business of the country in an efficient manner—if they had not endeavoured to bring the Debate to a conclusion. Therefore, the Government cannot for one moment think of consenting to the proposal to report Progress.
§ (10.56.) MR. LABOUCHEREI began the Debate by moving the adjournment. I then asked a question of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The right hon. Gentleman has said that nothing new has been adduced yet. Since I had the honour of making speech we have had an entirely now phase of the question put before us. We have had this attack upon Tokar. On the last occasion it was only known indistinctly from the first telegram, and I confess I was so aghast that I could hardly believe it was a fact. But, unquestionably, we never have got clearly from the Government any statement as to whether it is intended to annex that country or not. The Government have simply played with the question. They said it could not be called annexation because the Egyptian Government had not abandoned the country, and because the Sultan had not given up his Sovereign rights. I have read to the House a statement made by the Minister in 1884 in which there was a distinct pledge that the Khedive was to abandon the Soudan, and that that was the policy of Her Majesty's Government. But now the old policy is entirely altered. Things have got to such a pitch, we are so down-trodden on this side of the House that we are not allowed when this 331 enormous alteration is made in the policy of Her Majesty's Government, which we find has already cost the lives of some hundreds of persons, and which we believe will lead to an enormous expenditure of blood and treasure, and which will require us to retain an Army in Egypt for years to come—we are not allowed to discuss the matter. There has been no discussion, because it requires two to make a discussion, and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have not attempted to answer us. We have asked the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs to make a distinct statement of the policy of the Government, and it is because we do not get that statement that we are continuing the Debate. The First Lord of the Treasury by moving that the question be now put has endorsed the action of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. We are therefore justified in moving to report Progress in order that the Government may have an opportunity of reconsidering their position, and of inventing some reason for the policy which they are adopting.
§ (11.1.) MR. STOREYThe exact position of affairs is this. A question was asked of the Government from this side. The Gentleman whom we particularly wanted to answer it was not in his place—I refer to the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. We have now been told that the reason for not answering the question was that it had already been answered; and the head of the Government, when he told us that, complained that one 'Member of this House had spoken first for 40 minutes and afterwards for 30 minutes without adducing a single new fact. Thereupon all the hon. Members opposite, who had not listened to the Debate, with that astounding faith and gullibility of disposition which distinguishes the Tory Party, accepted the statement of their chief. Now, I contravene the statement that the question we have asked has been answered. The question was this: Sir Evelyn Baring, in 1884, said the Khedive accepted gratefully the policy of the abandonment of the whole of the Soudan, which he believed, on mature reflection, to be best in the interests of Egypt. If that be correct, then how do the Government reconcile it with the forward movement 332 on Tokar? We want that answered by the Government, and if we do not get the reply to-night we shall proceed on future convenient occasions to (Parliamentarily) compel them to answer us.
§ (11.4.) MR. CONYBEAREI may give another reason which justifies the action of my hon. Friend. The responsible chiefs of the Party which sit on this side of the House have in no way assisted us in our attempts to get satisfactory assurances from the Government. I have noticed a lamentable absence and ominous silence on this question on the part of those who usually occupy the Front Opposition Bench. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Birmingham is smiling in unusual fashion. He has been enjoying——
§ MR. CONYBEAREI was only employing it for purposes of illustration. The right hon. Gentleman is always willing to criticise the action of his former colleagues; but I had hoped he would have helped us in getting an answer from the Government. It will, no doubt, be in his recollection——
MR. CHAIRMANOrder, order! I have already told the hon. Member he is speaking irrelevantly. I must now warn him of the consequences which will ensue if he persists in that conduct.
§ MR. CONYBEARECertainly, Sir; I bow to your ruling. But it cannot be denied that we had no satisfactory assurance from the Government. Cannot the right hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs do away with the necessity for further discussion by giving us the answer we require? Our demand has been met as usual with a Closure Motion. We want the Government, however, to closure the forward movement in the Soudan. Complaint is made that we have been wasting time. I do not think that charge can fairly be made against me. I have been in Egypt and done something to make myself acquainted with the issues involved in this question, and I might justly have asked the indulgence of the House in order to raise certain points. Having regard to the immense importance of this matter from 333 an international standpoint, I do think we have a right to an answer to the questions asked. If the Government intend to adopt this attitude they will find it difficult to make progress with their business. I hope the right hon. Gentlemen will be wise in time and tell us whether they intend to continue the policy of annexation in the Soudan.
§ *(11.11.) THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir J. FERGUSSON,) Manchester, N. E.The only reason why I did not answer was that I dealt fully with every point raised when this matter was discussed a few nights ago, and I felt that to repeat what I said on that occasion would be to waste the time of the Committee. I listened to the speech of the Member for Northampton and to some others which followed and I certainly did not hear one question which has not already been amply answered. Having made the most specific declarations as to the policy of the Government, having stated that there has been no departure from the policy of 1886, that the movement on Tokar was made in connection with the defence of the Red Sea ports, and that there is no intention of advancing into the interior of the country, I felt it to be unnecessary to take up the time of the House by repeating these assurances.
§ *(11.14.) SIR J. SWINBURNE (Staffordshire, Lichfield)Are the Government going to maintain the policy of occupying Tokar and Handoub? That is what we want to know.
§ (11.15.) DR. TANNERI hope the Government will take to heart the interesting lesson they have received tonight. We have had dilettanti utterances from two or three right hon. Gentlemen who receive large salaries, the larger portion of the supporters of the Government have been indulging in the luxuries of Morpheus, and we have tried in vain to get a satisfactory answer to our question; I want to try and prevent the recurrence in future of the action of the First Lord of the Treasury in performing the part of the bogie man.
§ (11.16.) The Committee divided:—Ayes 68; Noes 160.—(Div. List, No. 76.)
§ (11.25.) Original Question again proposed.
334§ *SIR G. CAMPBELLI now want to move a reduction of the Vote in respect of the troops employed in South Africa. I have constantly protested against the system of making the British taxpayer pay the whole of our military expenditure. These colonies are called upon to contribute only a nominal sum. Now the Government propose to give responsible Government to Natal, and I want to know if any arrangements have been made as to the cost of the military defence of Natal? The right hon. Gentleman the Undersecretary for the Colonies, with that audacity which characterises some of his statements, told us that no very serious civil or military questions were involved in this matter, but I do not agree with him. This is a matter worthy the attention of Parliament that involves the expenditure of a large sum, and I, therefore, think we are entitled to know what arrangements have been made, and if the taxpayers of this country will be relieved of the cost of the military defence of Natal. I beg to move the reduction of the vote by £80,000.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That '£5,552,700' be granted for the said Services."—(Sir George Campbell.)
§ (11.30.) MR. E. STANHOPEI think the hon. Gentleman might have had his desire gratified by simply asking a question. For the last two years we have had a Departmental Committee sitting. That Committee has been composed of representatives of the War Office, the Colonial Office, and the Treasury, and has already called upon certain colonies to pay increased sums towards the cost of troops who are maintained in those colonies. The question of the Cape has not been approached yet, but as to Natal our hope is that there shall be no military force permanently maintained there. We have had troublous times in Zululand, and we have not deemed it right to remove the troops.
§ *(11.31.) SIR G. CAMPBELLI gladly acknowledge that Her Majesty's Government are doing a good deal in regard to the question. I have often brought to the notice of the House, the necessity of the colonies making an annual contribution towards the troops employed within their borders. I am surprised to hear Her Majesty's Government 335 hope that troops will not be permanently employed in Natal. We have been told by the Under Secretary for the Colonies that the Government are prepared to give responsible Government to Natal, and what I want is a distinct assurance as to whether, when responsible Government is given, we shall be relieved from charge. I was a little alarmed at what the Secretary said in regard to Zululand. Natal and Zululand are mixed up with one another, and it will be a real evasion if you are going to keep troops in Zulu-land at the expense of the people of this country. Again, I want to know whether any precaution will be taken that Natal will, out of their own resources, keep up a sufficient force, and whether we shall, before matters are finally settled, have an opportunity of discussing them?
§ (11.34.) MR. E. STANHOPEAn opportunity for discussion will be given in the Colonial Vote: certainly the question does not arise in the Army Estimates.
§ DR. CLARKAm I to understand that the sole garrison will be the garrison we maintain for Imperial purposes at Simon's Bay, and that the entire cost of all the men required in Natal will be defrayed by Natal?
§ MR. E. STANHOPEI have not said anything of the kind. The Departmental Committee will presently consider the case of the Cape.
§ *SIR G. CAMPBELLWill Her Majesty's Government make it a stipulation that Natal will keep up a force sufficient for the protection of Natal so that the taxpayers of this country will not be burdened with any charge?
§ (11.36.) MR. CONYBEAREI think the apprehensions of my hon. Friend are somewhat exaggerated. I do not imagine that when the troops are removed from Pietermaritzburg there will be any greater danger to the white population of Natal than there is at the present time. I have every reason to believe that responsible Government in Natal will be quite competent to look after itself and not involve itself in complications either with the population of Natal or the population of Zululand. And if they do, I am not aware it will be incumbent upon us to send out troops there any more than we are in the habit of sending out troops in the case of disturbance 336 in New Zealand. I am extremely glad to hear the troops are to be withdrawn from Natal. My own belief is it will be an advantage to our people there as well as to the natives, and it certainly will remove the inducement to employ our troops whenever there is any difficulty over the border. The troublous times in Zululand, to which the right hon. gentleman referred, resulted from our own wretched mismanagement of the Zulus. If it had not been for the disgraceful way in which we treated some of the chiefs I believe we should not have had any trouble whatever. I hope that, in connection with the withdrawal of troops from Natal, England will pluck up courage, and pursue a policy more in consonance with common sense than that pursued by the Colonial Office in times past.
§ SIR G. CAMPBELLI beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Original Question again proposed.
§ (11.40.) SIR G. CAMPBELLI have given notice of my intention to move another reduction, but the point I wished to raise has been to some extent answered by what the Secretary of State for War has just said. I wished to move a reduction in respect of the troops employed in colonies which at present pay no contributions whatever. There are several colonies which do not pay one farthing towards the cost of troops. I hope we are to understand that the Committee which is sitting will consider the whole subject. If I am right in that understanding, it is not necessary I should raise that particular point. I am glad to see the Secretary for War assents to that. While I am on my legs, I want to refer to the general subject of this Vote—the cost of the men and officers of the Army. The more I see and read, the more and more convinced I am that we are going too much on the old-fashioned line of sacrificing to a morbid desire to maintain a totally inefficient Army the defensive forces of the country. The real defensive forces are emasculated in order to maintain an offensive regular force which is really quite contemptible from a European point of view. The Militia is far below 337 its strength, and there is the greatest possible difficulty in getting officers. A good deal has been done for the Volunteers, but we are told that the different corps are short of officers. I do not think you are spending enough money on the Volunteers, and I am sure you are not doing enough for the Militia. I wish to enter a protest against the way in which we expend our men and resources in India, Egypt and other parts of the world, while we neglect an auxiliary and popular force in this country.
§ *(11.48.) SIR J. SWINBURNEAre the Government in a position to say when they intend to withdraw the troops from Natal?
§ MR. E. STANHOPEI am afraid I cannot answer the question of the hon. Baronet. Personally I am very anxious to withdraw the troops from Natal at as early a date as possible, consistent with the material interests of Natal. It is better the troops should be concentrated as far as possible in the Cape Colony, but looking to the present condition of Natal and the districts bordering on Natal I cannot fix a date for the withdrawal of the troops.
§ (11.50.) MAJOR RASCH (Essex, S.E.)I desire to call the attention of the Secretary for War to a matter which may have his cognisance, but which I am sure has not his approval. Large Government works are under construction at Shoeburyness. They are under the control of the Engineer Department, and that Department have made a practice for several years of turning off old soldiers when work is scarce elsewhere, and they can get the young fellows from the brickfields in the neighbourhood. I do not say that old soldiers because they are old soldiers should have a preference, but I think that old soldiers when once they are employed on work in garrison towns should not be sent about their business at a moment's notice without any reason whatever. The Secretary of State for War has frequently expressed his interest in the employment of Reserve and discharged soldiers; he has now a practical opportunity of showing such interest and of preventing the continuance of a practice which creates much dissatisfaction amongst very respectable old soldiers who now live in and about garrison towns.
§ *(11.53.) THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY TO THE WAR OFFICE (Mr. BRODRICK,) Surrey, GuildfordOur experience is whenever an officer has the opportunity of employing old soldiers he does so, and the men receive proper consideration. I am surprised, therefore, to hear the statement made by the hon. and gallant Member, and some inquiry shall be made into the matter.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEThe hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Hanbury) is going to raise the question in the form of a question. We shall then have an opportunity of explaining what we propose to do with regard to agents.
§ *(11.55.) MR. BRODRICKI can explain the position in a few words. The present Army Agents have undertaken to continue to issue the pay of officers without any charge, and this will cause a large diminution in the amount voted from January next. The right of the officers to a continuance of agency has been recognised for a long period, and is based on a surrender of pay by the officers in consideration of agency being established.
§ (11.56.) MR. BRUNNER (Cheshire, Northwich)I should like to know from the Government whether there is any official organisation to which employers in the country can apply when they want to obtain the services of old soldiers. The only organisation of which I have 'any knowledge is, I understand, an entirely voluntary one. It has an office in London, but it is not sufficiently known. There are, I believe, a very large number of employers who would be very glad to have old soldiers of good character in their service. I have some in my service, and I find them exceedingly steady and intelligent.
§ *MR. BRODRICKThis subject has been several times previously brought before the House, and the Secretary of State for War will undertake that the reference to the Committee that is about to sit on the Recruiting Question will be drawn in such a way as to enable them to take the matter into consideration. That will certainly be the most efficient way of dealing with it.
§ MR. BRUNNERMy desire was that the Government should adopt some means of making the organisation in Pall Mall better known, and I trust that the point will receive attention.
§ (11.58.) DR. TANNERI think that insufficient attention has been paid to the point raised by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy. The hon. Member drew attention to the fact that while certain colonies pay towards the cost of troops employed within their borders, there are several colonies who contribute nothing to such cost. If we are to be fair all round, the Government ought certainly to take into consideration the fact that there are colonies who do not pay any thing towards the troops. We ought to have some distinct assurance from the Government that no invidious distinction will be made between——
§ It being midnight, the Chairman proceeded to interrupt the business.
§ Whereupon Mr. WILLIAM HENRY SMITH rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."
§ Question put, "That the Question be now put."
§ (12.0.) The Committee divided—Ayes 157; Noes 49.—(Div. List. No. 77.)
§ Original Question again proposed.
§ DR. TANNER (Cork Co., Mid)May I call the attention to the fact that the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy made a Motion proposing to reduce the Vote by £50,000, and it was to that Motion I was speaking at 12 o'clock?
§ DR. TANNERBut may I ask whether the Question was withdrawn by the Chair?
§ Question put, and agreed to.
§ Resolution to be reported to-morrow.
§ Committee to sit again to-morrow.