NAVY ESTIMATES, 1891–2.

HC Deb 02 March 1891 vol 350 cc2002-39

1. 71,000, Men and Boys.

(8.56.) MR. DUFF (Banffshire)

I should like to avail myself of the opportunity of a general discussion to congratulate the Board of Admiralty upon the energy with which they have persevered with the new programme. I think that the manner in which the new vessels have been turned out is very creditable to the Board and speaks well for its business capacity. But I feel that more might have been done in the direction of refitting and repairing some of our older ironclads. The hulls of many of these vessels are in good order, and it is the opinion of many competent naval officers that the Northumberland, Minotaur, Alexandra, and other vessels of that class might be rendered very useful at a cost of from £150,000 to £200,000. In fact, they might he made as good as the Admiral class, costing three-quarters of a million. I therefore quite approve of the policy of thus taking these ships in hand. With regard to the re-armament of the vessels of the Devastation class, I am glad to see by the statement that in all cases, with the exception of the Rupert, the work has been satisfactorily undertaken. I may say with regard to the Rupert that if you are going to spend so much money on a vessel capable of going 14½ knots you might give her some better armament than a 10-inch muzzle-loader capable of penetrating 11 inches, whereas a modern breech-loader of the same weight would penetrate twice that thickness. And so with regard to the Hercules, Achilles, and Superb, and similar vessels. I do not think it worth while spending a large sum of money on them, unless you give them better armaments than the old muzzle-loader. It is very desirable that modern breech-loading guns should be substituted for the old muzzle-loaders on the ships still armed with these. I fear that there is still an insufficiency of heavy breech-loading guns at the disposal of the Admiralty; but it would be more charitable to suppose perhaps they think it right to wait for the perfecting of the new smokeless powder before they supply additional breech-loaders. I do not quite approve the official programme as to repairs. For example, I doubt whether it is wise to spend money upon the Swiftsure and Satellite and some of the other ships classed with her. When I come to the Wrangler, the Racer, and the Starling, I confess I do not at all understand the proposals of the Admiralty. The Wrangler, the Racer, and the Starling belong to about the most inefficient and obsolete class in the Navy List. The Wrangler and Starling are vessels that can only be depended to go about nine knots. They are hopelessly slow, and no money spent on them will repay the outlay. I do not think the so-called Racer ever steamed more than 11 knots, and I doubt if you can get nine knots out of her now, and yet on this vessel you propose to spend £6,447. The Admiralty are only going to spend £307 on her propelling power and machinery, so you cannot make her much faster. I should like to know what service you propose to employ her on. I cannot find in the Estimates what amount you intend to lay out on the Wrangler and Starling; but, assuming it to be about the same as on the Racer, you will be throwing away on this obsolete class some £20,000. In 1889, when the First Lord made his statement, he certainly led the Committee to believe that as the new ships were completed we would get rid of a number of the obsolete vessels which now encumber the Navy List. The torpedo cruisers and the Pheasant class were, it was understood, to take the place of the obsolete gunboats of the Wrangler class. But if the Admiralty intend, as seems to be the case, to retain on the Navy List the older and obsolete class, in addition to the new vessels they are building, then I say they are not dealing fairly with the House and the country. In his statement the First Lord said that he had some difficulty at the time of the mobilisation of the Fleet in officering and manning all the ships, and that to meet this he was endeavouring to reduce the number of officers and men in our non-fighting ships. But if this is his policy, then I am entitled to ask, What is the use of lumbering the Estimates with charges for the repair of the vessels I have been referring to—wretched, obsolete gunboats, too weak to fight, and too slow to run away? Unless some reason, not apparent in the Estimates, is given for this expenditure, I shall certainly move its reduction when we come to the Shipbuilding Vote. Passing from the shipbuilding programme to the Ordnance Department, I am very glad to see that the Admiralty are steadily moving in the direction I have so frequently urged in the House, namely, that the Admiralty should assume the entire control and custody of all naval ordnance stores. When I brought forward a Motion urging this course two years ago, it was rejected on the advice of the Secretary for War and the First Lord by a majority of two to one. I am glad to find that since then wiser counsels have prevailed, and, except on one important point, as I understand the present arrangements, they have practically conceded all I then asked for. The point I refer to is in regard to the ordering of the guns. This, I understand is still to be done through the War Office. The reason assigned for this is the necessity for interchangeability between the two Services; but this is a totally insufficient reason. Interchangeability can be perfectly well secured if the Admiralty order their own guns direct from Woolwich, or from a private firm. It is the Ordnance Committee that insure interchangeability. I have never proposed to relieve the Committee of this responsibility. The Committee consists of military officers and engineers, and the Admiralty are represented by a naval officer. A gun is agreed upon suitable for forts and ships. The pattern of the gun and the charges are the same whether the gun goes to a man-of-war or to one of the forts at Malta. Therefore, so long as you retain the Ordnance Committee as designers of a gun adapted for both Services interchangeability is secured. Let me remind the House what the present system is, and I think they will see it is somewhat complicated. The Admiralty take the money for naval guns; they order and are responsible for their own gun mountings. They are in future to have the custody and charge of their own ammunition, but the Admiralty decline the responsibility for the gun itself. There is no doubt about this. The First Lord, in his statement last year, said— The Navy speak on ordnance questions as users of the article supplied, but they are not responsible for the design or the manufacture of the weapon with which they are armed, except so far as gun mountings and torpedoes are concerned. But if the Admiralty are not answerable for the gun, do the War Office accept the responsibility? On this point General Alderson, the Director of Artillery, is quite as explicit as the First Lord, because, in his evidence before Sir James Stephen's Commission, he said— The Ordnance Committee are responsible for the design; but the Admiralty, not being obliged to accept a design of which they do not approve, become also responsible. It thus appears that neither the Admiralty, War Office, nor the Ordnance Committee accept the responsibility for the design of a naval gun. Supposing the Admiralty insist on arming our ships with 110-ton guns. They are not satisfied with the present service qualities of that weapon, and they ask the Ordnance Committee to design them another pattern. The Committee may think, as most people now do, that a gun of this enormous size is not suitable for naval purposes. The Admiralty may reply that they, and not the Committee, are the best judges of this. The gun proves a complete failure. I am only putting a hypothetical case. Have the Admiralty no responsibility? It would be absurd to make the War Office responsible in such a case. If the Admiralty ordered their own guns, subject always to designs approved by the Ordnance Committee, they would relieve the War Office of a duty with which they have no right to be saddled; they would bring the Admiralty into direct communication with the manufacturer in all questions concerning gun mountings, and they are many; they would save a deal of useless correspondence now passing on this subject through the War Office; they would thus accelerate the delivery of guns, and they would limit the responsibility, at any rate, to the Ordnance Committee and the Admiralty. I should like to say one word about the supply of guns. In his statement the First Lord takes his usual optimistic view of the supply of guns, and he informs the Committee that "the satisfactory rate of progress has been maintained. "He also dwells at some length on the number of breech-loading guns that have been delivered. Now the supply of guns between 4in. and 6in. in diameter has, I believe, been satisfactory enough; no complaint, so far as I know, has been made about them. It is in reference to the larger guns—over 9in. in diameter—that the great delay has occurred. Of these guns I maintain that we are still short. The noble Lord in his statement says that we have 1,410 breech-loading guns afloat. To hon. Gentlemen who have not looked closely into this subject, and no doubt to the general public, this may seem a very satisfactory statement; but, in regard to recent shortcomings in the delay of delivery of guns, it is not one which will bear a very close investigation. Out of the 1,410 breech-loading guns I can only make out 122 above 9in. in diameter. The first naval breechloader was delivered in 1883. Up to the 31st of March, 1889, the latest Return I have been able to get, we had only in the whole Navy 68 breechloaders of the class I am dealing with. In the year 1890 the First Lord took credit for 27 guns, and he takes credit for an equal number this year, making 122. In his statement last year the First Lord told us that we wanted, to complete the old and new programme, 112 guns. Well, if we go on at the present rate of delivery we shall not get the 112 guns required till the middle of 1894, and I understand most of the ships are to be ready in 1893. No doubt I shall be told that the rate of delivery will be accelerated; but I have heard this so often that I am getting a little sceptical on the subject, especially when I contrast our accomplished achievements in this respect with the promises which have been held out. It is always difficult to extract from right hon. Gentlemen opposite what their calculated output of guns is to be in the year. After a certain amount of pressure, the First Lord told me in August, 1888, that 45 guns above 9in. in diameter would be delivered by the end of the financial year—that was by March 31, 1889. Last year, after the close of the Session, I got the Return I had moved for, which it took the War Office six months to produce, enabling me to verify the accuracy of the First Lord's forecast. How many out of the 45 guns promised were actually delivered? Only 17! In 1889 the Secretary of State for War told us that up to the end of the financial year he expected to deliver 81 guns over 22 tons in weight. But on the 17th of last March he had a very different story to tell the House. Only 67 guns had been delivered, but these were not 22-ton guns, but guns over 6in. in diameter, and we have yet to learn how many of these were 22-ton guns. I should be glad to have the information. I think that the War Office have not kept faith with regard to these guns. There is one matter of considerable importance about which in his statement the First Lord has maintained a complete silence, and about which the country is getting very anxious, namely, the question of the 110-ton guns. After the repeated failure of the Sans Pareil's guns I should like to ask the Government what their policy is concerning these guns? The Sans Pareil guns were ordered as far back as 1886; they were promised in 1888, and now in 1891 the Sans Pareil, which has cost £800,000, is practically unarmed, as she has not got her principal armament. That is, in my opinion, a scandalous state of things. So far back as 1886, when I went to the Admiralty, there was a strong opinion in naval circles against these guns. The preponderating opinion of naval members of the Board was opposed to them. It may be asked, if that was the case, why we did not stop them. To that I have to reply that the time of the Board was then a good deal occupied about the Collingwood guns, and besides that when Lord Ripon came to the Admiralty he was not at all satisfied with the organisation of the Naval Ordnance Department, and he appointed a Departmental Committee to inquire into it. That Departmental Committee was sitting at the time the present Admiralty came into office, and we did not like to settle the large question of the 110-ton gun, until the large matter of the organisation of the Naval Ordnance Department had been settled. So impressed was I with the opinion of my naval colleagues in 1886 that as far back as 1887 I pressed the First Lord of the Admiralty to give up the 110-ton guns on board both the Victoria and the Sans Pareil. My reason was that the then Controller, Sir William Graham, had impressed me with the impolicy of putting those guns on board a ship, and I urged the First Lord very strongly to give up the 110-ton guns, and to substitute for them 67-ton guns.

LORD G. HAMILTON

Did you ascertain what it would cost?

MR. DUFF

I remember the noble Lord replied that the 110-ton guns were ordered, and to counter-order them and to alter the fittings of the ships would be a very costly process; but, for my own part, I think that the course persevered in will turn out in the end the more costly of the two. I am perfectly willing to admit that the position of the First Lord has been an embarrassing one; and two things have happened since, which, had they been known at the time, might have influenced his opinion, and caused him to arrive at a different decision. The first of these is that experience has proved the 67-ton gun to be a most efficient weapon, and the second is that further experience has proved the 110-ton gun most unreliable. But what I want to know now is what the Admiralty intend doing in the future. Would it not be better even now to replace the 110-ton gun with the 67-ton gun? I am not prepared to say what the cost of the change would be; but if you are going to spend £800,000 on what is really a gun carriage, it would be cheaper to spend £100,000 than to have guns which are of no use to you. Nothing can be more extravagant than to spend £800,000 on a ship, and then put in guns you are afraid to fire.

LORD G. HAMILTON

May I ask the hon. Member on what authority he makes the statement that we are afraid to fire these guns? It is rather an important matter, and statements have appeared in the Press on the subject.

MR. DUFF

I simply want to say this: You have fired the guns on board the Benbow, but you have not been able to reproduce those guns, and you have not a gun you can put on board the Sans Pareil that you can fire with any confidence It is public property. Everyone has read the published accounts of the trials. But even if you can fire these guns, I am prepared to say that even on the First Lord's own showing the 67-ton gun is a better weapon. For my own part, I contend that even now, in spite of the expense, it would be far better to put 67-ton guns on board these vessels than to go on with the 110-ton guns. In his Statement this year the First Lord tells us that the Trafalgar fired four rounds from her 67-ton guns in nine minutes and a half. I doubt whether the 110-ton guns after the first shot could fire two rounds in 10 minutes; and certainly it could not go on at that rate. The 67-ton gun in the four rounds would throw projectiles weighing 5,0001b.; whereas the two shots from the 110-ton gun would only represent 3,600lb. It is true that the 110-ton gun is capable of penetrating 33 inches of iron and the 67-ton gun only 27 inches at 1,000 yards, but as no ship afloat, I believe, carries more than 23 inches of iron, the 67-ton gun would do all we require. These guns need not be wasted if they are handed over to the Secretary for War. In his large schemes of Imperial defence the right hon. Gentleman will, no doubt, be able to find a more suitable place for them than on board one of Her Majesty's ships. I see that Admiral Sir George Elliot has an article in one of the magazines, advocating the fortification of the Scilly Isles. That in many respects would be a suitable place for the 110-ton guns, and there would be lots of sea-room for practice. But, in any event, you ought to get rid of these guns out of the Navy. You are saddled with them in the Benbow, but you ought to get rid of them elsewhere. If you have got the guns for the Sans Pareil why do you not put them on board the ship, and let the gunners try to fire them? I have not heard much about the Victoria guns. It is our business in Committee to look into these questions, and there appears to me to have been a scandalous waste of public money after keeping ships waiting for their armaments. After all that has happened, I think we are entitled to some explanation on these points. As to the promotion of warrant officers to the quarterdeck, that is a very difficult and delicate subject. I do not think any commanding officer would care to trust the safety of his ship to a navigating lieutenant who had never had any practical experience in navigating. I do not see how, at the present time, you can open promotion to warrant officers to the rank of captain. With every desire to assist warrant officers and to do what might be a popular thing, we must give the first consideration to the interests of the Service. Having said that, I must confess I think it is unfortunate that we have not at the present time any connection between the quarterdeck and the forecastle. Warrant officers used to get their sons educated at Greenwich School and passed into the Navy as masters'-assistants mates, from which rank they were promoted to the quarterdeck. I think the Admiralty would do well to revive Greenwich School as a school for warrant officers' sons, and in that way establish a connection between the quarterdeck and the forecastle. I do, not gather that that would satisfy the hon. and gallant Gentleman, and indeed his recommendations were not very definite, but I commend this suggestion, to the attention, of the Admiralty. I am sorry to have detained the Committee at some length, but I hope I have touched upon matters that deserve explanation, especially in reference to the 110-ton guns.

(9.35.) ADMIRAL FIELD

It is with considerable diffidence and hesitation that I follow the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken. The main part of his speech was an attack upon the Government in respect to matters for which they are not responsible, and for deficiencies due to the Government of which the hon. Gentleman himself was a Member.

MR. DUFF

Long before I had anything to do with the Admiralty.

ADMIRAL FIELD

Everyone is aware of the miserable condition in which things were left by that Government, not only as regards the Navy, but the coaling stations; and it is rather hard for the hon. Gentleman to present an embodiment of virgin purity on behalf of his late colleagues to attack the present Board of Admiralty. It is notorious, the country knows it, the Press of the Kingdom has rung with it, articles upon articles have shown how six line-of-battle ships were kept waiting for their guns by the Government of which the hon. Gentleman was a Member. Yet the hon. Gentleman has the hardihood to speak with righteous indignation of the misdoings of a wicked Tory Government, and accuses them for deficiencies for which the colleagues of the hon. Gentleman are really responsible. The hon. Member found fault with the Admiralty and the War Office because the Admiralty have not got an absolute control of the milking of the guns. The hon. Member assisted myself and others in a work that has been of some service—the transfer of the Vote for Naval Ordnance to the Navy Estimates. Year after year we endeavoured to bring about this transfer. In 1886 the Vote for guns was transferred from the Army to the Navy Estimates, and that transfer involved changes of very great magnitude and difficulty. I fail to see why the Admiralty should not get their guns from the War Office if they got them as good there as elsewhere. It was a great responsibility for the Department to take over the control of this one and a quarter millions of money. It is well, surely, to provide our Woolwich operatives with plenty of work if we can get good guns from the War Department; but it is equally open to the Admiralty to avail themselves of the Armstrong firm, Whitworths, and others. As to the 110-ton gun, we none of us like it, but I believe it was ordered by the late Government. But having the ships ready and the gun carriages, surely it would be the height of folly not to use them out and then have no more of them. But I will not further follow in the path pursued by the hon. Gentleman. I turn to matters in the Memorandum issued by the noble Lord, in which naval men take deep interest. I do not like the First Lord's statements in the Memorandum as to the manning of the Fleet. It seems to me the Admiralty are almost afraid to face the question of the increase in the personnel of the Navy, and are taking refuge in an untried Naval Reserve. The noble Lord says— An investigation into the actual duties which engage the Naval Service shows how large a proportion of officers and men are locked up in training establishments and educational courses, and in performing subsidiary work, such as surveying and transport of troops, &c. Well, I do not consider this is subsidiary work. Surveying has ever been an important work in the Service, and I hope will continue to be, and the transport of troops is work in which Her Majesty's ships may be usefully occupied in time of peace, and I hope it will not be changed. Then the noble Lord goes on to say— At the time when the ships in commission were insufficient to give adequate work and training to the officers and men of the Fleet, such employment was judicious; but when the number of fighting vessels is so increased as to be more than able to employ and train the peace establishments, the employment of very highly trained and instructed men in work of so secondary a nature is a waste of power. I do not call it work of a secondary nature or a waste of power. Further, the noble Lord says— I am, therefore, taking steps to reduce as far as I can the number of officers, men, and boys afloat in non-fighting vessels,"— all very right, so far as it goes. Ships in harbour, I suppose, are meant— and at the same time, to shorten the general course of study for officers at the Naval College, and of gunnery and torpedo instruction for all but those who show special aptitude and ability. I hope I do not read in this an intention to shorten the course of study. The words may cover much or little. Of course, I do not want men to go on studying gun and torpedo service when they will not be in that branch of the Service. Then I come to the words in which the First Lord seems to contemplate an addition to the personnel of the Service, and yet seems afraid to face it— In looking ahead to the increased demands which the gradual completion of the new shipbuilding programme will make upon our manning resources, I have endeavoured to keep in view and combine certain definite objects. It seemed to me to be quite unreasonable to expect that the whole of the extra force required to man, three years hence, our greatly increased Fleet should exclusively consist of officers and men on the permanent establishments of the Navy, of continuous service, and entitled to pension. I was, therefore, anxious to associate the increase of the permanent establishments with a steady growth in the numbers and efficiency of the Royal Naval Reserve. The additions which have been made to the personnel of the Navy since the Naval Defence Act was passed have been large. Vote A stood at 62,600 in March, 1889. It has now reached 68,800, and I propose to raise it to 71,000 this year, and gradually to work up in subsequent years to a total of 75,000. Now, no time is fixed for the increase to the maximum of 75,000. If we are to wait until the ships are built, then I reply the men will not be ready for the ships. You cannot make seamen in two years. The noble Lord is very properly going to establish a new training ship, but you cannot, I say, make seamen in two or three years. Therefore, it seems to me from the attention I have been able to give to this Memorandum, that the Admiralty have not faced this question of an increase in the personnel, but are relying too much on the Naval Reserve, as to whom there is this paragraph in the Memorandum— The sufficiency of my proposals entirely depends upon how far the Royal Naval Reserve is a reliable auxiliary force upon which the Naval Authorities can in emergency lay their hands with confidence. But are we to wait until war breaks out until we discover whether reliance is to be placed on the Reserve? Will the noble Lord do as his predecessor did in 1869 when the Reserves were called out by notice? The retention or abolition of the Reserves depended upon the result of that call, and the result was most praiseworthy. I forget the percentage, but the men of the Royal Naval Reserve responded to the call in very large numbers, practically all we may say who were in the country, and went afloat in the reserve squadron, and upon a rare occasion the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Childers) flew the Admiralty flag. The call was a success then. If the noble Lord has any doubt now, let him repeat the experiment. Let him call out the Reserves this summer, and with a proper proportion of men-of-wars men let them man the ships if they rally to the call. But if there is any doubt, do not let us place a reliance where we may meet with failure in the hour of trial. The noble Lord is bound to test whether we can have confidence in the Reserves or not. The additions to the number of men and boys this year are satisfactory so far as they go, but I am sorry no addition is proposed to the force of Marines. I trust that steps will be taken to secure proper training for stokers. I am glad to see that there is to be an increase of Naval Reserve officers. With the claim of warrant officers for promotion I have no sympathy. I do not want to say anything about it, and I am sorry it was started; but, being started, I am glad it has met with the reception it has received. It is, I think, an unwise proposal, and would be of no advantage to the Service. The changes on the South African station will, I think, be viewed with gratification by naval men. I shall be glad to hear from the noble Lord as to the chief petty officers, who have had no increase of pension in proportion to their increase of pay. It is perhaps a small matter, but it has been promised that it shall be considered. I have seen a report in the papers that the Admiralty have granted it, but the petty officers themselves are uncertain. There is another small grievance on the part of majors of the Royal Marines and the Marine Artillery. They claim that they should be put in the same position as majors in the Sister Service. There is at present a difference of a year in the period after which extra pay is allowed; in the Army it is two years, in the Marines it is three years. Then I must refer to the dock accommodation, or want of it, at Bombay. For years past I have called attention to this subject—ever since I visited Bombay and saw the necessity for a dock there. And then when I saw a flagship for the Indian Station coming from Bombay to be docked at Malta, I said I would be unceasing in my efforts to get such a gross scandal remedied. We have been three years at it, and at last the Admiralty seem willing enough to undertake the work. I do not think the Admiralty are now to blame; I understand that the objection comes from the Treasury. But the Admiralty have no right to claim credit for the dock accommodation now provided at Bombay. It is no information to naval men. We have been aware of it for some time, and I may say that naval men do not approve of the dimensions of the dock. In any case, it is not the Imperial Government that can claim any credit for it, but the Bombay Trust, and they have done fairly well with the means at their disposal. I am very glad, indeed, to find that communication is to be made between the Admiralty and signal stations round the coast. If that were the only result from the late manœuvres, the expenditure would have been quite justified. One more question I should like to ask, and that is, "When will the dock at Malta be finished?" (Dock No. 4). This closes the subjects on which I have to speak at the moment. Some of them may seem of small importance; but they are of importance to naval men. I do not intend to now go into larger questions, upon which a great deal more might be said.

(9.55.) MR. SHAW LEFEVRE

I wish to say a few words on the finances of the Navy. Last year I pointed out that the Estimates as they stood for the Army and Navy were utterly unreliable, and that they gave no real indication of what the expenditure would be. My statement that the expenditure would be £6,000,000 more than appeared on the Estimates was denied at the time by the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty and by the Secretary of State for War. But a Return subsequently laid on the Table of the House by the Chancellor of the Exchequer showed that I had understated the figures. The estimates for the two Services provided for £31,000,000; but the expenditure, under various subterfuges, shifts, and devices, reached £38,320,000, a difference of £7,000,000. When I come to the present year I find very much the same thing. We have an additional cause of confusion arising from a Supplementary Estimate. I have no hesitation in saying that this Supplementary Vote is for the purpose of relieving the Vote of the present year. It cannot be supposed that last year there was an under estimate of £350,000. I have no doubt that the purchase of armour plates and other materials has been hastened in order to relieve the Estimates of the coming year. In my experience that course was never permitted by the Treasury, and Supplementary Estimates were only allowed in the case of some unforeseen work having to be undertaken. The actual expenditure contemplated in the Estimates for the coming year upon the Navy is £14,215,000, but in addition to this there will be an expenditure under the Naval Defence Act of £3,400,000, and out of unexpended balances £140,000, and I understand a further expenditure out of the unexpended balances of previous years of about £300,000 more. When I come to the Army I find much the same state of things. The expenditure on the Army under the Estimates will be £17,897,000; but beyond this there would be an expenditure of £600,000 on fortifications, £300,000 on armaments under the Imperial Defence Act, whilst the Financial Secretary to the War Office told me he thought it probable that the expenditure under the Barracks Act would be between £400,000 and £600,000. Adding these various sums together, I find that the total expenditure on the two Services in the coming year will amount to no less a sum than £37,800,000, out of which only £32,000,000 appear on the Estimates of the year, £1,400,000 will be provided by the Consolidated Fund, £700,000 will come under the Imperial Defence Act, £600,000 under the Barracks Act, £3,440,000 under the Naval Defence Act for ships building by contract, and £500,000, I believe, out of the unexpended balances of former years. I say that, by providing for the expenditure in this variety of ways, you altogether destroy anything like financial control, and make the Estimates of the two Services absolutely unreliable as an index of what the expenditure within any financial, year will be. I should like to call attention to what the real increase of expenditure has been in the two Services as compared with past years. I find that the average for the 10 years ending 1884 in the two Services was £25,000,000 a year. In 1884 it rose to £26,700,000; in 1889 it rose to £29,790,000; and in the coming year the amount will be £32,000,000 on the ordinary Estimates, and, besides that, there will be an expenditure provided for in the course of the last three or four years under the Naval Defence Act, the Imperial Defence Act—for fortifications, armaments, barracks, and ships—of £17,000,000. Therefore, there has been an increase on the ordinary Estimates within the last four or five years of £5,500,000, and a further and extraordinary expenditure provided for amounting to no less than £17,000,000. That appears to me to be a serious increase, and the only way to check it in future, in my opinion, is to insist on the payment of the expenditure for the year within the year. It is only in that way that the increase in the expenditure can be continually brought home to the House and the country. In 1879 the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Goschen) made a most vehement protest against the addition of extraordinary to ordinary expenditure. He said— The cause of economy was unpopular enough at all times. Even when increased expenditure meant increased taxation it was difficult enough for its advocates to make way; but when increased expenditure did not mean increased taxation, but only the accumulation of burdens in the future, where, he should like to know, would be the cause of economy? The payment of taxes acted as a sobering force on our national policy. It sobered those who had to impose the taxes and those who had to pay them. It seems to me that those words of the right hon. Gentleman are exactly applicable to the present state of things and to the expenditure which the Government is now incurring. The general effect of the Naval Defence Act, the Imperial Defence Act, and the Barracks Act has been to postpone payments which ought to come within the financial year and to throw the burden on the future. It seems to me that the main object of all these transactions has been, in the first place, whilst expending considerable sums of money on the Army and Navy, not to increase the apparent burdens of the country; and, in the second place, to conceal the real expenditure of the country, and at the same time to claim credit for not largely increasing the Estimates, and to enable the Chancellor of the Exchequer to claim a surplus when there has really been no surplus. I believe that if in the current year you had provided sufficient money to meet the expenditure within the year there would have been not a surplus, but a deficit. What the position in the coming year may be I do not know, but I think that in all probability there will be very little surplus, even taking into account all these payments. If they were made within the year, not only would there be no surplus, but there would be a large deficit. These considerations appear to me to be very weighty ones, as bearing on the continually growing expenditure of the country. My belief is that that expenditure will always grow unless we lay down as a matter of principle that the expenditure for the year is to be borne by the taxation of the year. That is the only real check that can be imposed on expenditure of this kind. With regard to the actual proposals of the Government for the year, I find that the increase on the Votes is about £350,000, after making certain deductions. Of this, £126,000 is due to the Wages Vote; but there would have been a still greater increase of payment under the Wages Vote if it had not been that there are for the first time considerable payments made to the credit of the Vote out of the contract with the Australian Colonies, and also payments coming from the Indian Government. Taking these two items into account, there would have been a further increase of no less than £130,000. I am unable to trace to what this large increase on the Wages Vote is due. No doubt there is an increase of 2,200 men to the Navy, but that only accounts for £80,000. I may here remark that I do not consider it at all satisfactory that this increase in the number does not include a single able seaman, but is composed of 900 boys, 412 pensioners, and 764 who are engineer-men. To my mind, it is open to objection that an addition should be made to the number of pensioners employed in active service. I know that when the Chancellor of the Exchequer was at the head of the Admiralty it was his policy to discourage very much the entry of pensioners into the Service. By that system you have side by side men performing similar duties, some of whom receive pensions for length of service in addition to their pay, whilst the others receive only their pay. And, after all, these 412 pensioners are no real addition to the strength of the Navy, because under any circumstances they would be bound to serve in time of war, and form, in fact, a kind of reserve. This addition really means a calling up of men from the Reserve to act as seamen in the Fleet, and I do not think that a desirable process. What is the cause of the increase in the number of men which has been going on for some years? Ten years ago it was not thought desirable to add to the number, as there were so many men at the home ports. I take it that the increase in the personnel is due to the increased number of ships on the foreign stations. I have no objection to the increase which has been made on certain stations in respect to very powerful vessels; but what I do think is open to consideration is whether, when we are making these additions to our foreign squadrons, we should not reduce the number of the smaller class of vessels which are really of no great use for war purposes. We have many of the latter class—vessels which steam at a small rate of speed, and which in time of war would not add to our strength, but would fall an easy prey to the enemy. On this point I would like to quote from one of the ablest writers on naval subjects in France. M. Weyl, in his work on La Marine Francaise, says— The Colonial Powers, and England more than any others, have numerous ships maintained for the empty purpose of exhibiting the national flag in distant seas, which are useless in a fighting sense Such vessels may inspire the negro with awe, and gratify Englishmen by displaying their flag in foreign ports, but on the first alarm of war they must disappear from the seas. Again, my noble Friend Lord Brassey, with reference to the withdrawal of vessels from our foreign squadrons, says— The policy should be to replace as far as may be the permanent squadrons abroad by flying squadrons, and to keep in commission a less number of ships of an efficient type in lieu of the inefficient ships hitherto maintained. An occasional visit to foreign ports by an effective foreign squadron always makes a telling impression. Without going the length of saying that all our foreign squadrons should be replaced by flying squadrons, yet I cannot but think that the demand for seamen might have been met to a considerable extent by reducing the number of very small vessels on the foreign stations—vessels which are practically of no great use for war purposes, and which really seem only to be used for the purpose of showing our flag in the manner described by M. Weyl. I should like to ask the noble Lord to state at some greater length what is the real nature of the operation he is going to perform in respect of the squadrons on the West Coast of Africa and the North-East Coast of America. Perhaps the noble Lord will also inform the Committee whether St. Helena will be the new station on the West Coast of Africa, and also whether it is proposed to make any addition to the number of ships employed in that squadron. The noble Lord states in his Memorandum that Ascension Island will be the centre of the new station. Last year I brought under the notice of the House the subject of Ascension Island, showing to the best of my ability from high authorities that St. Helena is a far better station than Ascension; and I propose, at a later stage of the Estimates, to raise the question again this year. The subject was discussed late one night at the end of last Session, and the House will recollect, perhaps, that the discussion came to an end through an extraordinarily irrelevant speech made by an hon. Member, which induced the Deputy Speaker to allow the Closure to be moved as a means of putting an end to that speech. I shall propose to bring the subject on again when the Victualling Vote is before the Committee. In the meantime, I would merely ask the noble Lord to say what the increased establishment on the island will be, and whether there will be an addition made to the vessels on that station, and also what the cost of making a new station in that part of the world will be? In conclusion, I would only repeat that, in my opinion, the continual increase of expenditure both on the Army and the Navy can only be checked by bringing the burden of that expenditure on the taxpayers within the year.

(10.26.) THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. FORWOOD, Lancashire, Ormskirk)

If I might venture to offer a suggestion as to the best mode of keeping down the expenditure of the Army and the Navy—certainly of the Navy—it would be to follow a directly contrary policy to that adopted by the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken when he was Secretary to the Admiralty. In the three years during which the right hon. Gentleman occupied that responsible position the expenditure on new construction fell to about the lowest ever known in recent years. The result of allowing the expenditure in any year to fall so far below that which is necessary to maintain the Fleet—

MR. SHAW LEFEVRE

I would remind the hon. Member that the right hon. Gentleman the present Chancellor of the Exchequer was at the head of the Admiralty at that time.

MR. FORWOOD

Whoever was at the head of the Admiralty during those three years, the fact remains that an abnormally low rate of expenditure involves an increased expenditure in future years, and disturbs all calculations either as to taxes to be laid or as to the condition at which the Navy ought to be maintained. The right hon. Gentleman has stated that our Estimates are unreliable as to the total expenditure, and that we are providing the money by devices and subterfuges. The devices and subterfuges are Acts passed by Parliament, and every sixpence we have spent has been based upon proposals approved by the House. The right hon. Gentleman says it is clear to his mind that the Supplementary Vote is taken for the purpose of relieving next year's Estimates. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that it is nothing of the sort. The Supplementary Vote of £350,000 is required for the expenditure of this year. I will explain shortly the reason of it. We are administering the programme of new construction under an Act of Parliament that very properly is very rigid, but at the same time very difficult. In interpreting that Act in connection with the preparation of last year's Estimates, we anticipated that certain sums, savings that had been paid into the bank, would have been placed at our disposal during the past year. But they were not; and in lieu of those savings the Admiralty have to ask the House for the Supplementary Vote of £350,000. Whilst we ask for that sum, the House will see that we have a considerable sum of money at our credit. Whilst we ask the House for £350,000, we have no less than £540,000 at our disposal in the Bank of England, available, under the Act, for expenditure in future years. I cannot follow the right hon. Gentleman in his figures, seeing that he mixes the Army and Navy expenditure together. I am here to answer for naval administration, and for expenditure under the Naval Defence Act. I think it will be seen that we have kept very closely in our expenditure to the Estimates we have laid before the House. I will give one or two figures to show what have been our performances compared with the statements contained in our Estimate. We estimated that in our statement of March 1889–90 our expenditure would be £1,290,000 on the new programme; whereas we have really expended £1,183,000. We estimated for 1890–91 that we might spend £2,394,000; whereas we really expended £2,386,000. It was estimated that the expenditure for the coming year would be £2,560,000; whereas, in fact, the amount actually provided for in the Estimates is £2,524,000. In order to complete the new programme, it is estimated that for the next two years the expenditure will amount to £2,390,000; whereas it will amount to £3,300,000, or an excess of £1,000,000. Of this over £300,000 is due to the cost of unexpected alterations and improvements which had to be made in vessels under construction, leaving the sum of only £600,000 in excess of the original Estimate of the cost of ships and armaments under the new programme of contract and dockyard work. This excess I claim to be a very small one on an original Estimate of £22,000,000 for the construction of new ships and armaments, and it certainly compares very favourably with the excess on the estimated expenditure under the programme of 1885 of £8,000,000 of money when the excess was something like £750,000. The right hon. Gentleman opposite has twitted my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer with not having provided the funds necessary for carrying out the programme year by year. Now, as regards the shipbuilding programme, the full cost of the ships built in the dockyards has been provided year by year out of the Revenue as acquired, and by the end of the present year we shall have spent in carrying out our programme something like £7,800,000, or at the rate of £2,600,000 per annum for three years. Therefore, the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman opposite can only be made applicable to the case of the contract ships, which are regarded as being outside the normal building Vote. These were required to make up the strength of the Fleet to the necessary point which in previous years a false economy has allowed to fall below the actual requirements. Of the £10,000,000 required for the construction of vessels by contract within the period allowed, no less than £7,000,000 will be provided in the five years, leaving a little over £2,000,000 to be provided from the Revenue of the two following years, so that out of the £22,500,000 to be expended under the Naval Defence Act for the construction of new ships and armaments, no less than £20,500,000 will have been provided for out of the taxation of the current years. I claim, therefore, that I have thus shown that the provisions of the Act have been well and wisely administered, and that Her Majesty's Government are not open to the charge either of not having kept within their promises as to their programme of expenditure, or of having constructed a large fleet of ships without paying for them out of the taxation of the country. The hon. Gentleman opposite the Member for Banff (Mr. Duff) and the hon. Member for Cardiff (Sir E. Reed) have congratulated the Admiralty on the progress they have made in carrying out their programme, and their remarks have emboldened me to make the statement I have just made with regard to the work we have done. Both those hon. Members have pointed out very properly that the rate at which Her Majesty's Government have pushed on the construction of the various new vessels has been of material benefit in reducing the cost of the ships; comparing their cost and the estimates made of them to the cost of the ships built under the former system, I think it will be seen that a great saving has been effected, and that whereas formerly the cost was about 20 or 30 per cent. over the Estimates, as a normal state of things it does not now exceed 3 per cent. The hon. Member for Banffshire alluded more especially to guns and ships of the old ironclad type. I may state that we have within the last two years done much towards making the old ironclads fit to take their place, in case of emergency, in the second line of Naval Defence. Some of these vessels which naval officers have thought worth the cost, have been re-engined, re-boilered, and re-armed, while those which are not quite so up to modern requirements have had new boilers put into them, and no doubt will serve as excellent vessels for defence around the coasts of this country. The hon. Gentleman opposite stated with regard to the armament of the old ships that we were not re-arming the Rupert. The fact is, however, that she is to be armed with breech-loading guns. The hon. Gentleman added that he regarded this as a proof that we were short of heavy breech-loading guns, and he stated that although my noble Friend takes credit for having over 1,400 breech-loading guns, the majority of those guns are the 4.7 inch and 6 inch guns. Undoubtedly, Sir, guns of these calibres must be the majority, because where a ship now carries two, or, at the most, four, heavy guns, she will have, in addition, from 10 to 16 guns of a smaller calibre. I think the hon. Member said there are only 67 nine-inch guns.

MR. DUFF

I said there were only 68 nine-inch guns in 1889, but that since then 27 were added last year, and an almost equal number this year, making altogether 122 guns of the nine-inch calibre.

MR. FORWOOD

But that statement refers to a period some time back. What I say is, that we have now already delivered, mounted, or in reserve, 163 guns of eight-inch calibre and upwards.

MR. DUFF

I referred to guns of over nine-inches diameter.

MR. FORWOOD

The hon. Gentleman spoke of two years ago, and I was dealing with the figures given by the noble Lord the head of the Admiralty. I can assure the hon. Member that the construction of the heavier guns for the ships in the programme is proceeding as rapidly as possible. The hon. Member also dealt with the 110-gun, and suggested that we should condemn that gun. Does the hon. Member realise the fact that in condemning that gun we shall be condemning all the fittings for the gun and the gun-carriage itself, which, in point of fact, is the ship which carries it. In doing this we should be wasting a very large sum of money. I doubt if the hon. Member is aware of the cost involved in the alteration of one of the new ships from its adaptation to the 110-ton gun to that of say two 67-ton guns. According to the information we have on this point this could not be done for a much less cost than £200,000, inasmuch as it would involve almost a complete reconstruction of the vessel in all its fittings, carriages, and everything else which adapts it to its intended purpose, besides which it would take at least two years to make the new guns, and to re-construct and re-fit the ships. I can hardly think the hon. Member is prepared to suggest that the three ships which carry these heavy guns should be re-fitted with other guns at a cost of £600,000. We maintain that the 110-ton guns are good and efficient weapons, and those who are able to form the best opinion on the subject say there is nothing to impugn their safety or power of penetration. We have the Victoria and the Benbow with these guns on board, and so far no complaints have been made. With respect to the armament of the Sans Pareil, one gun had been proved and fitted and another is in the course of proof. But even supposing that one of the 110-ton guns of the Sans Pareil does not pass proof, two more are to be delivered nest month, either of which can be placed on the Sans Pareil. Although the Admiralty admit that the 67-ton guns are the better, it would be a mistake to displace the 110-ton guns already mounted; and, as a matter of fact, these 110-ton guns were not first adopted when the present Government was in office, but by its predecessor. We have endeavoured loyally to carry out the policy assigned to us, and we have placed on the ships those guns intended for them. As regards smaller vessels, no one could be more opposed to the multiplication of small vessels than the First Lord of the Admiralty. The policy of the Board has been to replace smaller with larger vessels whenever practicable; but a certain number are needed for the demands of the Service, and so the Racer, a well-armed vessel, was launched in 1884. She has breech-loading guns on board, and is fit for many purposes. It is better, moreover, to spend money in refitting the two other small gunboats which had been referred to for the services they are required to perform than to spend a greater sum in building new vessels at an extra cost. I trust I have now answered all the points raised by the right hon. Gentleman.

(10.50.) SIR E. J. REED

I am rather surprised that the hon. Gentleman took so much to heart the observations of my right hon. Friend, who spoke of the subterfuges by which the actual expenditure has been brought down to a nominal point; because everybody must know that the old form which was adopted for the purpose of making public the great increase of the Navy, and involving the inclusion in the aggregate amount of the current expenditure of the following five years, was in itself a colossal subterfuge, though fortunately one we all clearly understand. If the Government, when they proposed the scheme for adding to the Navy, had put it before the country in two parts, one as relating to mere normal expenditure sanctioned by Parliament, and the other as an excess of expenditure to constitute an actual increase over and above the normal expenditure, it would not have been open to the objection that has been raised. I am bound to say that there is a very great deal of force in what my right hon. Friend has held as to this House of Commons losing control over the expenditure because of its being brought in so many forms in excess of the Estimates for the year. I am satisfied that a few years hence it will be difficult to trace the present progress of the expenditure on shipbuilding, and it will be found, owing to the present system, almost impossible to extricate it from its confusion. At the same time, I must say that I, for one, care less about the form of these things than about the substance. As I have already stated, I think the redeeming feature of the Admiralty policy with regard to excess expenditure has been that they are doing their very utmost, and with marked success, to carry out the promise which they made to the House. That is, after all, a great point. My hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty has made reference to the enormous saving resulting from that policy—an actual saving in outlay upon the ships, which results from a quicker and more energetic construction, and the saving of the interest during the progress of construction upon capital that would lie idle while awaiting the adoption of a policy. From whichever side of the House that policy has come, it is deserving of the utmost credit. With regard to the suggestion of my hon Friend the Member for Banffshire that 68-ton guns must be substituted for 110-ton guns on certain ships, I was annoyed to hear the Secretary to the Admiralty say that the cost of the change of guns would amount to £200,000 per ship. It seems to me an impossible amount, seeing that the weight of the armament proposed to be substituted is less than that to be unshipped. I should like to see how that estimate is made out. I do not think it can be altogether satisfactory. The Secretary to the Admiralty has made a statement with reference to the progress of ships now building. I must say that this is a feature of Admiralty administration which I am disposed to watch with the greatest closeness. I think it would be a very extravagant thing indeed to interfere with ships during their progress by amending the plans or making alterations in the designs which are not beneficial, and might be the source of incalculable expenditure. As far as the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty goes, I acknowledge readily that the changes made have been for good. The changes that have been made consist mainly of raising and lengthening the forecastles of the fast steamships, and mounting guns upon the elevated forecastle, with the result of improving the capability of the vessel in chasing an enemy. Consequently, I am not disposed to take exception to the course the Admiralty have taken. I rose to congratulate the First Lord on having published a preliminary Statement. It has had the effect of making the Debates in this House much more satisfactory than they could otherwise have possibly been, while it discourages anything like captious criticism. The Statement shows that matters of the greatest possible importance are engaging the attention of the Admiralty, and but for that knowledge the Debates might have very much extended, for during the past year there has been much to criticise. Take, for instance, the numerous trials of ships which have resulted in distinct failure. Had this fact been extracted in Debate the criticism would probably have been much keener; but the First Lord has dealt with the matter very fairly in his Statement. The noble Lord has been very wise to change his first intention with regard to many of these vessels, and to enlarge their boiler power instead of depending on forced draught. It is all very well to look to forced draught for steam service, but I hold that nothing can compensate for deficiency of boiler power. That fact seems to have been fully recognised by the Admiralty. There is one feature of the Estimates with which I am not satisfied—that is, the manner in which this scheme is being dealt with as regards the engineering of the Fleet. It must be known that the greatest calls are made upon, and the greatest responsibility falls upon, naval officers of the engineer class. I am astonished that in the days of a Steam Navy so little consideration should be given to the engineering management of the Navy. I have put together hastily the figures which are proposed this year to be expended on non-engineer officers. I find that the sum of £400,000 is to be paid to officers who are in no way capable of dealing with actual difficulties should they arise in connection with the machinery of a vessel. I remember very well the case of a trial with ships in the Channel Squadron, when a 13 knot vessel left entirely behind a 14 knot vessel which kept company as a matter of fact with an 11 knot vessel. I was asked for an explanation of the fact, and I suggested that the Board of Admiralty had better inquire of the captain. That gentleman was accordingly sent for, and he said that he had given the signal for full speed, and did nothing else, believing that he had completely executed his duty. I took a somewhat different view, and so, I am glad to say, did the Board of Admiralty. I want to know why we are to spend £400,000 a year on officers who do not understand steam machinery, and who are not charged with the responsibility of its management, while we only pay £153,000 a year to the Engineering Staff. Having regard to the great expenditure upon steam machinery, and the responsibility and importance connected therewith, I cannot understand why there is no representative of the engineering class on the Board of Admiralty. Why are there three Naval Lords and not one single representative for the vast concerns of the Machinery Department? But how is the engineering interest dealt with within the Admiralty? I say the system of representation is antiquated to the last degree. Will it be believed that this very year, when the amount of money to be expended upon steam machinery is £750,000, the gentleman responsible for the design and construction of this great mass of machinery receives £1,000 a year? I do not believe there is any man connected with a large mechanical enterprise in this country who would for a single moment defend such an arrangement as this. I think it shows a want of consideration and of appreciation of the circumstances on the part of the Admiralty. And my objection to it is, not that it is wrong in itself, but it injures confidence in the Admiralty. I can assure the First Lord there is a widespread want of confidence in Admiralty administration—and I am not speaking now of the Engineering Department—but it is looked upon with the greatest contempt by men totally unconnected with the Service. I do not understand why the Admiralty do not make some improvement in that respect. With regard to the engineer officers, their case is one which must be brought forward on another occasion. I can only say that at present the Navy is not properly supplied with engineer officers, and this is a subject which must receive early attention. Before I sit down I should like to say that I think the form of the Estimates and the additional figures which my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford has laid before the Committee will make it necessary to ask the Government to put the expenditure on the Army and Navy into a more compact form, so that the House may really know what they are dealing with. I should like to ask the First Lord whether, in view of the Debate and the criticisms made, he can next year present the figures relating to naval expenditure in such a form as to be available for comparative uses?

(11.7.) LORD G. HAMILTON

The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford has moved for a Return corresponding to that produced last year, and I believe that this Return will give all the information required. If not, I shall be glad to supplement it with further information. As to the remuneration of engineers, it is well known that technical ability is not too highly paid either in Her Majesty's Service or in other Departments. The right hon. Gentleman has asked for reasons for the proposed increase in the number of men. Before the number of men is fixed there is a special estimate of all the men that are required to man the ships for which there are guns; and it has been part of the policy of the Admiralty to increase the personnel of the Navy so as to make it adequate to the increasing number of ships. The additional number of ships that has been brought into commission lately have been big ships, and there were now fewer small ships than there have been for many years past. This is a policy that will be continued. In my judgment, one cruiser showing the flag is worth two or three gunboats. The gunboats will be concentrated on the stations where they will be useful. With regard to the reduction of the standard in which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for East bourne has asked a question, my belief is that it is now too high for everybody, and I have substituted a lower standard for the gunboats; but, of course, those who show special aptitude can go higher—a change which I believe will be beneficial to teachers as well as to the taught. The hon. Member for Banff has made a violent attack on the 110-ton gun; and I must protest against the hon. Member's annual speech of one hour's duration.

MR. DUFF

I never spoke an hour in my life.

LORD G. HAMILTON

The hon. Member censured me because I did not condemn everything done by the former Government. Personally I had nothing to do with the 110-ton gun; and I assume that the hon. Gentleman's colleagues when they introduced it took every care that it was likely to be useful to the Service. The hon. Gentleman has spoken of these guns as the laughing stock of the world. The Italians have a powerful Navy, and every ironclad is armed with the 110-ton gun, which have given the Italians no trouble. Yet their Navy certainly cannot be said to be the laughing stock of the world. Out of their twenty 110-ton guns none have given them trouble. But of the nine guns we have ordered two have given serious trouble. One was rejected and sent back, and the other is still under proof. I am surprised the hon. Gentleman should say we are afraid to fire it while it is still under proof. For this statement the hon. Member has no authority; but I will now road an opinion from one whose name will carry weight. Sir Benjamin Baker is probably of all engineers alive the man who has had the greatest experience of the strength and tensile power of steel, and he has made a most careful examination of this gun. It must be remembered that this is the worst of the guns delivered. We have been told that it has split from top to bottom, that it will burst next time, and that it has deflected so that it is utterly untrustworthy and cannot be fired. I have had a Report drawn up upon this gun, because I wished to know what the exact state of things is, and the following is the paragraph relating to this particular gun, endorsed by Sir Benjamin Baker after careful examination:— Some of the 110-ton guns on being tested exhibited defects which, although not affecting the power of penetration or the safety of the gun, pointed to the necessity of modification of designs, which has since been carried out, with the result of bringing them to the required level. Therefore, the opinion of one of the first engineers in the country is that this defect neither affects the safety nor the power of penetration of the gun. I have seen every officer who has been in command of a vessel where the 110-ton gun has been placed, and I have never heard one single word of complaint from any naval officer who has had the handling of them. Some may have objected to the calibre, but all have expressed themselves contented as to the safety and accuracy of fire. Therefore, I hope that Members of Parliament will not catch up any gossip or anonymous paragraphs they see in the newspapers, and give currency to rumours which are absolutely untrue. I should like to inform the House what the effect is of circulating these rumours. A Government which has previously got its guns in this country has refused to get the guns for a ship any longer in this country, on the ground that Members of Parliament are constantly finding fault with the guns made in this country, and those guns have been made elsewhere, though I maintain that they will be inferior to the guns which would have been made in this country. All that I have done is, on finding that gun settled upon by my predecessor, to see that it has fair play. The hon. Member says that somebody told him that it was a bad gun, and he recommended that we should take it out and put in 67-ton guns. That would mean a cost of £100,000 or £200,000 in every ship, besides laying up the ships for a long time. The 110-ton gun penetrates 37in. of iron at a close range, and although no ship may carry that amount of armour, with the 110-ton gun there is the probability of the shot penetrating armour even when the blow is an oblique one. I maintain that we have made a most careful examination of the question, and have taken care that no gun in any way unsafe has been put on board any of Her Majesty's ships.

(11.26.) MR. SHAW LEFEVRE

Do I understand the noble Lord to say there will be no increase in the West Coast Squadron?

LORD G. HAMILTON

None.

MR. SHAW LEFEVRE

May I ask whether St. Helena will be within the ambit of the new squadron?

LORD G. HAMILTON

I cannot answer that question offhand. It is just upon the line, and my impression is that it is just outside the ambit.

MR. SHAW LEFEVRE

Will the noble Lord lay on the Table of the House a comparative statement of the ships on Foreign Stations as compared with the number six years ago? I think it is desirable we should know what change has been made.

LORD G. HAMILTON

I will consider that.

MR. SHAW LEFEVRE

There is another question I should like to ask. Why is the contribution of the Island of Ceylon not included in this Vote? Formerly the Island used to pay £4,500 a year for naval purposes. Has that contribution ceased? I hope on some future occasion the noble Lord will give us some reason why that contribution has ceased—if that be the case.

(11.28.) SIR J. SWINBURNE (Staffordshire, Lichfield)

I wish to impress upon the First Lord of the Admiralty the importance of having one or two ocean despatch boats capable of steaming at the rate of 25 knots per hour continuously for six days without stopping to coal, thus steaming at the rate of 600 knots per 24 hours; and thereby carrying a despatch from England to the Cape of Good Hope in six days. These despatch boats might require a double or even a treble set of boilers, to enable one set to be cleaned during the passage; but there is no good reason why such a vessel should not be built, considering there already exist steamers which are capable of steaming at the rate of 27 knots per hour for short distances. In the case of an European war there is little doubt that the Suez Canal would be immediately closed to our men-of-war and despatch boats. It is, therefore, all-important that we should be able to communicate with the Cape quicker than any other nation, for it must be borne in mind that immediately war is declared it invariably happens that the submarine cables are broken or become disabled. During the Russian difficulty in 1885 the Cape was without telegraphic communication with Europe for many weeks. Such a despatch boat would be capable of carrying at least two long-range guns and a sufficient number of rapid-firing machine guns for self-defence, if surprised. One of these despatch vessels should always be in readiness in England, another at the Cape, and a third should be stationed either in Ceylon or at Singapore. They would be of enormous importance not only in time of war in protecting our commerce, but in preventing war when any complications had arisen with foreign Powers. I would ask the Admiralty whether they cannot see their way to laying down, at all events, one of these ocean despatch boats in the present year.

(11.31.) MR. MARJORIBANKS (Berwickshire)

The First Lord of the Admiralty and my hon. Friend the Member for Banff shire (Mr. Duff) have been exchanging shots on the biggest bores in the Service. I am going to challenge the noble Lord on the smallest bore. I trust that by continually pegging away I shall be able to instil into the minds of the noble Lord and his colleagues that the magazine rifle does not possess all the excellent qualities with which they credit it. It seems to me very remarkable that though so much has been heard about the re-arming of the Army with the new magazine rifle, not a word has been said by the First Lord of the Admiralty as to re-arming our sailors and marines. I should like to know what is to be the policy of the Admiralty with regard to this matter? Our sailors and marines are quite as frequently called into action as the Army, and it is very desirable that, as they are often employed side by side, they should be armed, if not with identically the same weapon as the Army, at any rate with a rifle of the same bore and using the same cartridges. Does the Admiralty approve the new magazine rifle? If not that is a strong argument against its adoption for the Army. If the Admiralty do approve it, why is it not proposed to distribute it to the sailors and marines? I would advise the First Lord and his advisers at the Admiralty not to look at this new magazine rifle with the same rose-coloured spectacles as the War Office. I would like to give two instances that have occurred during the last few days of the way in which the rifle is viewed in the Army itself. An hon. and gallant Member, a supporter of Her Majesty's Government, told me that he had asked several of his Service friends what they thought of the weapon, and that they only smiled and said, "We had rather not say anything about it; we do not want to be quoted;" and the commanding officer of one of the regiments of Foot Guards told me that upon the command to "order arms" it is no longer possible to judge of the smartness with which it is obeyed by the simultaneity of the sharp rap of the rifles on the ground, as this has been abandoned owing to its being considered that the mechanism of the weapon will not stand the blow on the ground. I would remind the noble Lord of the unfavourable Reports which were sent in by the Naval Authorities to whom the rifle was in 1888 forwarded for trial.

LORD G. HAMILTON

Might I say one word. We are taking no Vote for the magazine rifle.

MR. MARJORIBANKS

That is just my point. If I am out of Order, I have no doubt the Chairman will call me to Order. My point is that, if this weapon is as good as it is represented to be at the War Office, it is a monstrous shame that the Navy should not have it. It is because it is not included in these Estimates that I am finding fault.

THE CHAIRMAN

Order, order! The right hon. Gentleman is quite entitled to find fault with the Navy for not adopting the rifle if he is prepared to advocate its adoption, but not otherwise.

MR. MARJORIBANKS

I am prepared to advocate the adoption of a different rifle to the one now in use in the Navy, and I am endeavouring to show the reason why, though a different rifle should be adopted, the Admiralty should not adopt the weapon recently adopted by the War Office. I want to show that the Reports received from the various ships bear out my view, and justify the noble Lord in taking the line I am about to suggest. The officers of H.M.S. Excellent, in reporting on the weapon, said:—"The mechanism appears too weak to stand the usage of active service," and similar Reports were received from other ships.

THE CHAIRMAN

The right hon. Gentleman is not in Order in adducing evidence against a rifle which the Vote does not refer to.

MR. MARJORIBANKS

I wish to know whether the noble Lord thinks it a desirable thing that the Army should be armed with a weapon of one calibre and carrying one sort of cartridge, and the Navy with another weapon carrying another sort of cartridge. We know perfectly well what took place on the expedition across the desert to Khartoum. In a single square, consisting of 1,120 men, there were no less than five sorts of ammunition in use, and the consequence naturally was the greatest confusion. I want to know whether the Admiralty think the Navy should be armed with the Martini-Henry, with a bore of 450, and the Army with a rifle having the bore of the magazine rifle. Then I want to know why, if it is necessary for our Army to have a magazine rifle, it is not necessary for our Nary; why should our Blue Jackets and Marines be placed on a different footing to our soldiers?

(11.41.) MR. DUFF

I am bound to make one or two remarks in reply to the noble Lord. The noble Lord went out of his way to attack me, and I appeal to the Committee whether he was justified in that attack. There were several Motions on the Paper on going into Committee of Supply. Upon one or two of those Motions I was prepared to speak, but I refrained from speaking on any of them to facilitate the progress of public business. My hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Forwood) asked me if I would make my remarks on the Vote, and I consented to do so. When we got into Committee I made what I thought was a rather conciliatory speech. I congratulated the Admiralty upon the progress they had made in the building of ships. In regard to the 110-ton gun. I said I did not blame the First Lord and his Board. But the First Lord has made a very violent attack upon me. He said I am in the habit of speaking for an hour and making the same speech every year. I have not said a word about the 110-ton gun since 1887. In that year I did appeal to the noble Lord not to put such guns on board the Victoria and Sans Pareil—we could not help ourselves with regard to the Benbow—and I am satisfied that if the advice which I then gave had been taken, the country would have been saved a great deal of money. An hon. and gallant Member (Admiral Field) has said to-night that the insufficiency of guns for the Navy is the result of the policy of the Liberal Government in letting down the Navy. From that I altogether dissent. I assert that the reason of the insufficiency will be found in the action of the present Government who reduced the Estimates in 1887–88 by £793,000, and in 1888–89 by £905,000, making £1,698,000 in two years. Nothing could exceed the vacillation of the Government in their naval policy, for after making these reductions they came to the House and said "we want £21,000,000." Before resuming my seat, I wish to ask what the Admiralty intend to do with regard to the two small vessels which have been sent to the Zambesi. I understand that the rate of mortality amongst the crews is very heavy owing to the unhealthiness of the climate, and that the vessels can only do useful work for three months in the year, the water during the other nine months being too shallow for them to operate.

(11.42.) LORD G. HAMILTON

The position of the Admiralty as to the magazine rifle is this:—They tried the magazine rifle, and one of the Reports was not entirely favourable, but the other was that the weapon was a great improvement on the heavy Martini-Henry rifle. There is no hurry for the magazine rifle in the Navy. It is well that the two Services should have the same weapon, but the duties of the sailors vary very much from those of the soldiers, and there is not as much necessity for the Navy to have the new rifle as for the Army. The Admiralty do not propose to order any this year, and I hope that the result of postponing the orders will be that we will not only get the rifle much cheaper, but that the improvements indicated will be perfected. The hon. Member for Banff has complained of my remarks concerning him. I thought those remarks were harmless; but if they have given him any offence, I retract them. The vessels in the Zambesi will be there for some time. Certain parts of the Zambesi are healthy; and as these vessels have a draught of l½ only, they can go anywhere. We have not heard from the officer for some little time, but the last Report was that the vessels were doing excellent work. In reply to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) I have to say that by some arrangement with the Treasury the appropriation in aid lapsed this year. If the right hon. Gentleman will put a question on the Paper in regard to the matter, I will answer it.

MR. MARJORIBANKS

I do not in the least say that because the Army is to have the magazine rifle the Navy, therefore, must have the same weapon, but I maintain that all small arms should have the same calibre and carry the same cartridge.

Vote agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £3,404,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of wages, &c., to Officers, Seamen and Boys, Coast Guard, and Royal Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1892.

(11.53.) Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Channing.)

THE FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H SMITH, Strand, Westminster)

I appeal to the hon. Member not to press this Motion. If this Vote is not taken now I shall be compelled to ask for the time of private Members next week.

SIR E. J. REED

Can the right hon. Gentleman give us a promise that the general Debate may be taken on the next Vote?

MR. W. H. SMITH

I will endeavour to meet the reasonable wishes of the hon. Gentleman on that point. I hope the Report of this particular Vote may be taken at an early hour. If we cannot take the Report at an early hour I will undertake that an opportunity for discussion will be afforded on the next Vote.

MR. SHAW LEFEVRE

I presume that if this Vote is taken to-night the Government will not take private Member's nights next week.

MR. W. H. SMITH

I shall be glad if there is no necessity to take private Members' nights next week; but I must remind the hon. Gentleman that we must have certain Votes by the 16th of March.

MR. CAMPBELL - BANNERMAN (Stirling, &c.)

I hope that if the Vote is taken now a further opportunity will be afforded for a general discussion of Navy questions, so that hon. Members who desire to do so can range over the whole question of Navy expenditure.

MR. W. H. SMITH

We are in the hands of the Chairman, but, so far as the Government are concerned, they will raise no objection to such discussion.

MR. DUFF

May I ask you, Mr. Chairman, if it would be in order to take a general discussion on a subsequent Vote?

THE CHAIRMAN

A general discussion has been allowed upon the Victualling Vote.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Original Question put, and agreed to.

Resolution to be reported to-morrow.

Committee to sit again upon Wednesday.