HC Deb 19 February 1891 vol 350 cc1161-7
(10.15.) ADMIRAL MAYNE (Pembroke and Haverfordwest)

I give notice that I intend on the Vote to call attention to the question of fortifications and submarine mines. I find I am unable to do that in the Navy Vote because if my views were carried out there would be an augmentation of that Vote. If, however, these are carried out on this Vote the Vote will be decreased, and therefore I am at liberty to move my Motion. The position I take up is justified by the fact that not only has the Chancellor of the Exchequer lumped the two Services together, but one of the Admiralty officers has said that although we are not building ships we are building forts, as if the one in every way takes the place of the other. I hold that nothing that we can do in the way of fortifications and nothing that the Army can do enables us to reduce the Navy, and if the Chancellor of the Exchequer says that he is expending money on the Army and cannot expend it on the Navy, then we must look to some reduction in the Army Vote to augment that for the Navy. In 1801 the Army Vote was £17,750,000, and that for the Navy £17,250,000; that is to say, there was only a difference of £500,000. In the Waterloo year £22,000,000 was voted for the Navy, our population was 16,000,000, and our sea trade £4 per head of the population; now the population is 37,000,000, our sea trade £17 per head, and we have 1½ tons of shipping for every person in the United Kingdom. The value of our sea trade in 1800 was £70,000,000 and now it is £100,000,000,000. In 1890–91, when the area to be protected by the Navy is enormously increased, the gross Army Estimate is £21,000,000, and the gross Navy Vote is only £14,500,000. Attention has been called to this disproportion, not only by naval men, but also by military men; quite recently by no less an authority than Sir D. Jervis, at one time the Inspector General of Fortifications. He was also curiously enough the Secretary of the Commission in 1859 which came to the conclusion that, should the Fleet be unable to keep command of the Channel, our insular position would be at a disadvantage as it would enable a superior Naval Power or Powers to concentrate a large body of troops on another part of our coast more rapidly and secretly than would be done in the case of any neighbouring country having only a land frontier. And they then go on to report hat it is necessary either to augment greatly the regular Army or to justify what has taken place. That Commission voted £11,000,000 for fortifications, and by a Return granted last Session, I find that the sum of £17,639,000 has been spent on fortifications, the greater part of which, if not all, are now utterly useless, being more obsolete than the ironclad ships which were built about that time. If the Vote for the Navy is adequate for the defence of the Kingdom no amount of alternative measures can make good the deficiency. Who is going to land an invading army on our shores? It is known, I suppose, to those who have studied the question that to land 75,000 men on our coast would require 120 transports at least, varying up to 4,000 tons, and having 50 men-of-war to protect them. If such an invasion were to take place, say in the Thames, where there are sands and shoals, and various other impediments, the Fleet would have to be far larger. I ask any gentleman who talks about the invasion of England, is it possible that such a fleet could congregate in any port within reach of England, get up steam and move the troops necessary without our knowing the circumstances well in advance? Such an invasion would require long and careful preparation. Transports would have to come from differents ports, and after the commencement of war, it would be our fault if any nation had transports. It is assumed you must either increase the Army or fortify. I have shown that a vast sum has been spent in fortifications. The fortifications at Portsdown have never been finished, and would be useless, and at Devonport and Dover things are equally bad, while at Malta some of the defences are as useless as those which I have seen at Gibraltar, where there is a spot which the engineers say requires a gun, in which no gun has been placed, because it would cost £500 more to place it there than in the place where it has been put. Guns are so placed that vessels with long-range guns could shell Gibraltar without themselves being within shot from the land. With regard to submarine mines, at present naval men dread a zealous engineer. If engineers did nothing, it is quite possible we might get our ships with safety in or out of our ports, but at the present time the whole aim and object of engineers seems to be to block our harbours when rapid egress and ingress would be needed. There are many places here where defences are not needed in the least. At Malta a few ground mines would be sufficient, and at Jamaica the system at present adopted is of little or no use. The latest and most ridiculous, perhaps, of all these submarine entertainments is the attempt to mine across the Severn Mouth where there is a considerable rise and fall of the tide, and where mining operations are dangerous principally to our own vessels. There should be some fixed policy on which these submarine mining operations should be carried out; and I maintain that if there is any mining at all, the scale of defence should be fixed by the Admiralty. If this were done there would be great saving. The Brennan torpedo has been worked on the principle that as a large sum was paid for it, it is necessary to spend more. The ridiculous system of defences for London never should have been undertaken. We are now going to starve the Navy, but the strength of the Navy cannot be reduced by one vessel though all our harbours are sown with torpedoes. I hope the Secretary for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty will take into consideration the transfer of the control of both forts and submarine mines and that being done that some definite system will be adopted for the protection of our coasts, and the defence of our ports by sailors.

٭(10.31.) MR. BRODRICK

My hon. and gallant friend has taken the opportunity of making his speech after my right hon. Friend has exhausted his right of reply, and when the time is very far advanced for making the statement which is desired and expected upon the Army Estimates. If it had not been for the extremely ingenious piecing of the hon. and gallant Gentleman nobody would have connected the speech he has just delivered with the Army Estimates. It was in reality a speech in favour of the extension of the Navy. I will only say that, although my hon. and gallant Friend takes such a very low view of the advantages of fortifications, he stands in that opinion, if not in an absolute minority of one, at all events in a position very radically opposed to the vast majority of those who advise the War Office and the Admiralty in these matters. My hon. and gallant Friend says that any amount of fortifications will not enable us to reduce the Navy by a single ship, and I may add to that that with any addition to the Navy there still remains the necessity for fortifying our ports and the access to our dockyards, coaling stations, and arsenals. No naval strength can prevent the danger of bombardment of these places. There never has been the smallest thought of starving the Navy in order to improve the military defences. On the contrary, I think the Army might, if anything, have reason to complain of the enormous amount of attention that has been paid to naval affairs during the present Parliament. What the Chancellor of the Exchequer has said and what has been the tendency of our policy has been to devote to each Service the expenditure required.

ADMIRAL MAYNE

What the Chancellor of the Exchequer said was that £38,000,000 were spent on the two Services and the Government could spend no more.

٭ MR. BRODRICK

Just so. Upon each the expenditure has been to meet requirements, and if anything the Army might complain of undue expenditure upon the Navy, though I do not put in any such complaint. But I make an appeal to my hon. and gallant Friend. My right hon. Friend is anxious to make his statement. We have to-night had a general discussion on a variety of military topics; and surely if the special discussion which my hon. and gallant Friend has initiated is to be carried on, it should be begun at an early hour of the night, and upon a concrete Motion, upon which we could come to a decision. Surely it is not convenient at a time when no formulated Motion can be put, and it can be but a haphazard, half-hearted discussion. I therefore appeal to my hon. and gallant Friend and to my hon. and gallant Friend who was about to follow him not to continue the discussion at full length, but rather, if they still wish to discuss the matter, to bring it forward on another occasion, when my right hon. Friend can reply to them.

٭(10.35.) SIR JOHN COLOMB (Tower Hamlets, Bow, &c.)

I do not intend to occupy more than a few minutes, but after the speech of the hon. Gentleman I think it is incumbent upon me to point out the real question at issue. The drift and object of my hon. and gallant Friend's remarks went to show that there is included in the Charges coming before us a considerable sum for fortifications, garrisons, and stores for sea coast defences, which should fall within the Navy, and not the Army, Estimates. I think the subject initiated by my hon. and gallant Friend is very germane indeed to the general discussion on the Army Estimates, and I contend that the attitude taken up by the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken is not a proper attitude, though I appreciate his desire to terminate this discussion. The object of my hon. and gallant Friend is to point out that these charges as to sea defences ought to go into the Navy Estimates and not into the Army Estimates. First of all these charges are in some sense for the maintenance of a fleet, and all questions connected with the fleets are naval questions. Secondly, upon the distribution of British commerce depends the distribution of the coal depots of the fleet and that is another detail of a purely naval character. Again, in the matter of the coaling stations, the coal-carrying capacity of the ships on each station has to be considered as a determining influence on the number and nature of depâts necessary, and that cannot be said to be a question for the War Office. Then the provision for the works and maintenance of a sea base depends upon the probable nature of the attack, and, inasmuch as all these ports can only be attacked by sea, that becomes a question for the Admiralty, not for the War Office. Under the Admiralty we have a body of specially trained officers for work which the War Office insist upon appointing military officers to do. For garrison purposes the War Office control entails the employment of an expensive staff; the Marine Forces under the Admiralty can and does do such duty, at a limited expense, so that, on economical grounds, there is an advantage. Again, the coaling stations abroad are a part of the organisation of naval stations, and under the present system there is a dual control. The Admiral on the station should have control, as he has knowledge of the requirements of the station With mixed arrangements under the direction of the War Office you get duplication of stores. There is no reason why stores for the defence of coaling stations should not be under naval administration, and instead of the War Office sending special transports you would have unification of stores, economy, and the prevention of confusion. I think that the hon. Gentleman who has rather harshly criticised my hon. and gallant Friend will see that there is a very serious matter involved in this question. In my opinion, my hon. and gallant Friend is entirely justified in bringing the matter before the House on this occasion.

(10.43.) LORD HENRY BRUCE (Wilts, Chippenham)

There are certain points in the Memorandum issued by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War upon which I should be glad to have information.

MR. E. STANHOPE

I rise to order. My Memorandum relates to the Army Estimates, and I am perfectly unable, by the rule of Debate, to answer questions now upon the Memorandum. I respectfully submit that questions upon it should be raised in Committee.

٭ MR. SPEAKER

No doubt it will be more convenient if the observations are made in Committee.