§ *(4.40.) MR. GOURLEY (Sunderland)In moving the Resolution which I have laid on the Table, I may say that I think the time has come when it is highly desirable that a Select Committee should be appointed to inquire how far the plans of the present shipbuilding programme are in harmony with the requirements of modern warfare or with the wants of the Empire. It is perfectly true that we have had at times Committees to inquire into and discuss these matters, but these Committees have invariably been Departmental Committees. So far back as the year 1859 Lord Derby's Government appointed a Committee to inquire into the alterations necessary consequent upon the experience gained during the Crimean War, and also into the respective merits of sailing and steaming vessels. That Departmental Committee unfortunately recommended the conversion of 19 ships of the line into screw vessels. We all know the result of that recommendation. It was that the money was literally thrown into the sea. The Committee unfortunately neglected to take heed of the experience gained during the Crimean War, and they also neglected to notice what had been done by the French Government, which at that time had commenced to build four ironclad ships. Then followed a new departure in the building of ironclad vessels, and the 1016 Admiralty built the Warrior. Another Committee was appointed—and that also was a Departmental Committee—in the year 1867. Another Committee, too, was appointed by the Admiralty to inquire into and sit in judgment upon the acts of the first Committee. A number of private shipbuilding firms in the country were asked to send in designs for ironclad ships; but only one of the designs sent in met with even partial approval, that design having been sent in by Mr. Land, of Liverpool. In the long run, the Admiralty adopted none of the designs, but rejected them all, and, as a result of that proceeding, the Comptroller of the Admiralty made a record in the books of the Department to the effect that he thought the Admiralty had acted with partiality, and that, instead of rejecting the designs and tenders of the private firms, which had been invited to send them in, they ought to have nominated an impartial Committee for the purpose of deciding how far and in what respect those designs should be adopted. The next inquiry was conducted by a Royal Commission, the appointment of which was not the outcome of Admiralty wishes for such an inquiry, but arose from the terrible disaster caused by the capsizing of the Captain and the loss of many hundreds of lives. The outcry which arose throughout the country in consequence of that terrible disaster compelled the Admiralty and the Government of the day to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the designs upon which the Admiralty were then building ships of war for the defence of the Empire. But even this Commission in 1871 was limited in its scope. It was limited with regard to its inquiries; it was directed to examine only as to the types of ship then being built and then on service in the Navy, but it was debarred from making inquiry into new types or designs of ships or new inventions. The first type of vessel as to which they inquired was of the Monarch class, which included the Sultan, the Achilles, and the Devastation. Then there was the ocean cruising class, including the Invincible, the Iron Duke, and the Vanguard. Another type of vessels was of the Inconstant and Alabama class, intended for the protection of the commerce of the country; and, 1017 finally, there was the class of vessels intended for coast defence, which were of the Cyclops type. These, practically, were the only classes of vessels into which the Commission were allowed to inquire. They were, as I have said before, debarred from making inquiries into all new types or designs, with regard to ships or with reference to floating batteries or torpedoes, or any other kind of new invention. What did the Commissioners report with regard to these several types of ship? I do not propose to trouble the House at any length, but I will state as briefly as I possibly can the gist of their Report. It was that while approving of one class of ship—the Devastation class—they condemned the whole of the other classes. With regard to the Monarch, they said that it represented both in men and money a larger proportion of the British Navy than it was desirable, in their opinion, permanently to set up as a fighting machine. They also condemned the Invincible class. It is not necessary for me to quote their remarks as to that class, because we all remember that the first time two of the vessels came into collision in the Irish Channel, one of them, the Vanguard, sank immediately. One point they stated in regard to this type of vessel was, that it was too weak in structure; that the strength of the lower structure ought to be increased; and yet, although 20 years have passed since that recommendation was made, none of these vessels have been improved in that respect; and should they come into collision, or get grounded, the chances are that they will immediately founder. Then, again, the Inconstant or Alabama class was condemned because of want of speed and coal capacity, and also on the ground that the vessels were too big for the work for which they were required. I may add that the Inconstant class is now represented by the protected and unprotected cruisers. The Royal Commission condemned in toto the vessels of the Cyclops class, which were intended for coast defence, in consequence of their want of speed. There was also a complaint against them as to the imperfect arrangement of the watertight compartments; and, further, it was found that they were weak in the lower structure, and when employed in shallow waters they would be apt to go aground, 1018 so that it would be impossible to navigate them in such waters with anything like safety. I have read these extracts from the Report of the Royal Commission in 1871, and now the question naturally arises: What is our position with regard to the ships and designs which are being prepared by the Admiralty at the present time for the defence of the Empire? For many years after 1871, notwithstanding the recommendations of this Royal Com mission, very little was done either by one Board of Admiralty or another to carry out those recommendations and to place the Navy in a proper condition. Up till about five or six years ago the only thing we used to hear from successive First Lord of the Admiralty was that so many tons of shipping had been produced during the year just concluded, and the First Lords for the time being would tell the House and the country that he had built so much more than his predecessor. In fact, there was a duel between the two sides as to the number of tons produced, and nothing whatever was said or done as to new designs of ships or guns. It was not until five or six years ago that, through the action of the Press, the rottenness of our Navy as compared with the Navy of France was exposed, and what was the consequence of that? It was that the Admiralty of the day immediately, without any objective plan, began to design and to build ships at haphazard, with the result that we now have a large number of battle ships and cruisers, as to the utility of which there is a considerable divergence of opinion among experts. Is the administration of the Admiralty as to designs better now than it was five or six years ago, or than it was in 1871? I shall be told that the system of control at the Admiralty is better than it was. But you must judge of a Department by its fruits. What is it that the Admiralty have given us in ships during the last few years? I must call the attention of the hon. Members to the results with regard to the few designs which have been completed. The Impérieuse and the Warspite, with all their stores on board, were to have 18 inches of armour above the water-line. But in their construction 430 tons more iron was used than was originally intended, and when the two vessels went to sea their armour was actually 18 inches below the water-line. The consequence was that these vessels, 1019 instead of being armoured, were so far unarmoured, inasmuch as the armour was 18 inches below the water-line. Two other vessels—the Ajax and the Agamemnon—were built to steam 14 or 15 knots; but, when they were completed, it was found that, unless they deviated from the direct "compass" course, they could not be propelled more than nine knots. I come now to the Colossus and the Collingwood. We all know what occurred in the case of the Collingwood. In consequence of the defects which were found in her guns, she lay at Spithead for nine months as a monument of the failure of the Admiralty. Then, again, take the case of some cruisers of the Scout and Mersey class, which, after being brought from the private yards, were nearly all pulled to pieces. In consequence of the alterations which were required from the original designs, ships of the Mersey class cost nearly £50,000 for alterations. I consider that this condition of things is a disgrace to the Admiralty. I will pass from this to another point. I find that the condition of the Navy, with respect to guns, is scarcely credible. The great bulk of the ships in the Navy are still armed with the old muzzle-loading guns. There were 26 ships in the manœuvres last autumn which were still armed with the muzzle-loading guns. To have ships appearing on the Navy List as first and second-class ships armed with this gun is misleading not only Parliament, but the country also. I do urge that these guns should be replaced with guns of a modern type. The latest illustration with regard to Admiralty administration is the Victoria. This vessel was commissioned eight or nine months ago with a great flourish of trumpets, but, owing to defects discovered in the large guns, the vessel has only just been sent, or just made ready, for sea. Several questions have been asked in this House with regard to the guns of the Victoria. If the reports with regard to the trials of the guns be correct, they amount to this—that the guns, when tested at the full charge, "wobbled." [Lord G. HAMILTON: What reports?] The reports in the Press. Those are the only reports which the House has to guide it in such matters. As to the Anson, it was reported at the Naval Manœuvres that the electric 1020 apparatus required for firing the large guns got out of order, and the consequence was that for some time the vessel lay upon the water as useless for fighting purposes as a log of wood. I was at Gibraltar at the beginning of January, and the Benbow was also there at that time. It is notorious that one of the guns of the Benbow was said to have the same defect as was found in the guns of the Victoria. The Trafalgar was tried the other day, and in the Times' report it was stated that in firing one of the guns with a full charge right ahead, one of the beams, stanchion, and bow plates were damaged. This proves that the Trafalgar has not been finished with that structural strength which is needed in a huge ship which fires large guns. I maintain that the huge ironclads which are still being provided by the Admiralty are an utter waste of money. Before the eight ships mentioned in the Naval Defence Bill were laid down, they were condemned by such experts as Admiral Commerell and Lord Armstrong, Admiral Commerell said he had always been averse to these large vessels being built. It was like putting too many eggs in one basket, and smaller vessels would equally well serve our purpose. This is the opinion of one of our most able Admirals. Then Lord Armstrong speaking at the launch of a vessel of the cruiser class which had been built for the Italian Navy, said that at the steam trials it had obtained the highest speed ever obtained by any sea-going ship, and he had always held that that new class of ironclad would be more serviceable to the nation than armoured battleships such as were now being built. I think these opinions will satisfy the House that in laying down such vessels the Admiralty have made a grievous mistake. Indeed, the Department has been too much in the habit of providing ships of war without any, what I may call, objective grouping. The time has come when the House ought to have a Committee to supervise and ascertain what the Admiralty are really doing. We have learned one thing from the Naval Manœuvres, and it is that blockading an enemy's ports and convoy are things of the past. How, then, do the Admiralty intend in future to protect the country against attacks in our different channels, against our commercial, naval, and 1021 military ports around the coast? How do they intend to provide protection against stray cruisers which might creep around points for the purpose of attacking unprotected harbours? One part of the Admiralty policy is to blockade an enemy; another part of their policy is to convoy ships in time of war. I hold, however, that they can do neither one nor the other, inasmuch as blockading is a thing of the past. Should it be intended to have naval manœuvres in the autumn, I hope that all the dodging witnessed about Bantry Bay last year will be abandoned, and that more modern tactics in the game of war will be practised. How do the Admiralty intend in their new programme to protect our channels, ports, trade routes, and colonies? One of the Admirals engaged in last year's manéuvres reported that lie had shelled the City of Newcastle from a distance of nine miles. We might just as well be told that Calais had been shelled from Dover. Believing as I do that the Admiralty in the matter of all these designs, both of ships and of guns, are going on without any objective point in view, and without system with regard to grouping, or any plan of campaign, I hope the House will grant the Select Committee I am asking for.
§
Amendment proposed, to leave out from the word "That," to the end of the Question, in order to add the words—
A Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the designs under which Vessels of War are being built and equipped for the Navy,—(Mr Gourley.)
—instead thereof.
§ Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
*(5.1 5.) ADMIRAL MAYNE (Pembroke and Haverfordwest)I do not propose to occupy the time of the House at any length, but I should like to express my sincere hope that the House will not grant the Committee. Indeed, it would appear from the speech of the hon. Member that he really wants three Committees to inquire into the three matters he has brought before the House—the proper protection of our trade and commerce, the question of the guns, and the question of the design of our ships. Last year when a similar Committee was proposed by the hon. Member for Brad- 1022 ford, I asked who were to form such a Committee—who are the Members of the House competent to judge whether the ironclad vessels proposed by the Admiralty are of the right kind or not. I repeat the question now. We have already had a Committee of Naval Officers altogether outside the Admiralty, combined with the Chief Constructor and other experts. And as to the opinions of the two distinguished men whom the hon. Member for Sunderland has quoted, I think it will be found that Admiral Commerell, although in favour of smaller ships, never proposed to put large guns into little cockle-boats which would bob up and down in the sea in such a way that no steady aim could be taken with them. Then, with regard to the ship which Lord Armstrong built for the Italian Navy, it was not intended to put large guns in such a ship. She was not meant for a battleship at all. The hon. Member says that this type of ship is rapidly becoming more popular. Undoubtedly it is, lint neither Lord Armstrong nor anybody else has even suggested it could take the place of a battleship; and so long as foreign nations have these ships, so long must we have them. The hon. Member has found fault with the limitations of Lord Dufierin's Committee. As a matter of fact, he will find, if he reads the evidence and the Report carefully, that, although, the scope of Committee was to a certain extent limited, they by no means limited themselves in their Report, but that they expressed very distinct views as to what should be the character of our battleship. One of the results of their recommendations was the Inflexible, which is, at the same time, one of the most costly and the least effective of our battleships. Indeed, it is not a matter for wonder that these gentlemen, able as they were, did get into some sort of confusion after having so many persons before them, each recommending the adoption of different kinds of vessels. It was enough to puzzle any one, and I believe any such Committee of this House as is proposed would be still less able to avoid confusion. Besides, the opinions of experts have changed, even since Lord Dufferin's Committee sat, as to both the armour and the design of battleships. I believe the hon. Member for Cardiff, who is an expert in these matters, has 1023 considerably changed his opinions as to the class of vessel which should be built. If we have arms of precision we must get the steadiest possible platform in order to secure the full advantage of these costly weapons. I am not going to follow the hon. Member into the question of the muzzle-loader and of the "wobbling" of the gun, for it seems to me that anybody who could describe the action of a gun in that way must have been himself somewhat in the condition the word expressed. I am altogether unaware how the muzzle of a gun could "wobble," in the ordinary acceptation of the term. The history of the guns, however, is no new one, nor is it to be remedied in the way suggested by the hon. Gentleman. The facts have been published in every newspaper in the country for the last year or more. There is no concealment, and over and over again we have been told that the most strenuous efforts are being made to remedy what we all know has been a great fault, and to provide the guns more quickly. Nobody, of course, doubts that our battleships should be most carefully designed, and no persons could have half the interest in urging this which the officers and men have, who have to go afloat in them. I will again say that such a Committee as is proposed could not possibly do any good; the responsibility must rest with the Admiralty, who, of course, before deciding on any particular design consult experts and officers.
§ *(5.25.) THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord GEORGE HAMILTON,) Middlesex, EalingI think there are conclusive reasons why the House should not assent to this Motion. Three years ago the hon. Member for Sunderland made a similar Motion, and it was not then favourably received by the House. Last year we had a most exhaustive discussion on the question, and the House then decided to place in the hands of the Admiralty the responsibility of carrying out the designs, the full details of which were laid before it. The designs which are being carried out at the present moment, in fact, have been more thoroughly discussed than the designs of any other ships ever built by the country. Last year I undertook before any battleships were built to appoint a number of naval officers to confer with the Lords of 1024 the Admiralty as to the designs of our warships, and a practically unanimous opinion was come to on the matter. The hon. Member for Cardiff challenged the decisions arrived at, and there was a further examination before the Society of Naval Architects, with the result that the designs of the Admiralty were almost unanimously approved. Subsequently a statutory obligation was placed on the Admiralty by Act of Parliament to complete the ships ordered. Contracts were then entered into, the ships were laid down, and they are now in course of construction. It would be absolutely impossible, therefore, in these circumstances, to appoint such a Committee as that proposed. I will go further, and say that if we want to get satisfactory designs I do not think we shall ever get them from the Select Committee of the House. I should like to remind the House that last year, when I spoke on the question of the designs of our ships, I said, speaking on behalf of the Admiralty, that the Board would do their best to meet the general wishes expressed both by the Service and the House; and in regard to all the matters particularly referred to, including higher free board, guns of greater elevation, more engine power, and other points, those wishes have been met. It is very easy to criticise the armament of the Navy; but it is essential that those who do so should bring a little knowledge to bear on the subject. The hon. Member has found great fault with the Admiralty because a large number of British ships are armed with muzzle-loaders; but our latest typo of muzzle-loader is not inferior to the great majority of the breech-loading guns of foreign nations. It is not so easy to re-arm a ship as the hon. Member seems to believe. Such a work involves much more than the substitution of one gun for another, it necessitates the placing of new gun platforms, the re-arrangement of the magazines, and sometimes it requires almost the re-construction of the interior of a vessel. Some of our ironclads could not be re-armed at a less cost than £100,000. With regard to the 110-ton gun, a great many inaccurate and absurd statements have been made about it. If only the gun had an individuality, it could get an enormous amount of compensation in the Law Courts for the 1025 damage done to its reputation. The hon. Member seems to think it wobbled at the muzzle whenever it was fired. Let me remind him that when these guns are officially tested they are fired, not merely with a full charge, but with a charge 25 per cent. in excess of a full charge. During the past year these guns have been subjected to the most exhaustive trials, and no gun was ever more severely tested than the one intended for the Victoria, which has been sent back to the contractors in consequence of some defects it showed. It will probably surprise the hon. Member to know that, in the opinion of Sir B. Baker, probably one of the foremost engineers of the day, who, in conjunction with Sir J. Fowler, designed the Forth Bridge, a gun of the length and weight of the 110-ton gun must, from its own weight, show some depression. The hon. Gentleman went on to speak of the Trafalgar; but, in reference to that vessel, it should be borne in mind that on all these turret ships of low freeboard it is anticipated that the whole of the deck will be shot away in action. Having given us his opinion of the ships of which he does not approve, the hon. Gentleman also gave his opinion of the ships of which he does approve, and in this category he mentioned the Piemonte. For my part, I do not wish to detract in any way from the performances of that vessel. The Piemonte has certainly exhibited a speed never before attained by a ship of that size, and carries an enormous number of guns; but I do not think she will be found to be a very comfortable sea-going vessel; and it is certain that no vessel of her construction can carry a sufficient number of men to man all her guns and a sufficient quantity of ammunition to meet the demands which might be made upon her for any length of time. It may be that she would prove useful to the Italian Government for the purpose of making a rush out of port upon some hostile cruiser; but, in my opinion, she would be entirely unsuited to the purposes of the British Navy, in which ships are wanted that are able to keep at sea and tight their guns in all weathers. After having examined very carefully into this subject with the assistance of my professional advisers, I have arrived at the conclusion that vessels of that character would not 1026 be suitable to the British Navy. I think I have now given sufficient reasons why the Committee should reject the proposal to refer the matter to a Select Committee, and I hope the majority of the House will accept the views I have stated.
§ *(5.33.) MR. SHAW LEFEVRE (Bradford, Central)I merely rise to say that I cannot support the Motion of the hon. Member for Sunderland to refer this question relating to our ships to a Select Committee. I do not believe that this House could form a Committee that would carry sufficient authority or weight with the country generally on so difficult a subject. I have myself long been of opinion that it would be desirable to appoint a Royal Commission, composed of the highest scientific and professional knowledge outside this House, with a view of considering the designs of ships of a larger class; in 1887 I made a proposal of that kind to the House. The noble Lord on that occasion said he did not propose to lay down any more ironclads of the larger type. But only two years had elapsed when last year the noble Lord made a great change in his policy and proposed to lay down eight battleships of the largest kind. If at that time my hon. Friend behind me had proposed that we should appoint a Royal Commission, such as I have suggested, I should have been ready to have given him my support; but this House has, after full consideration and discussion, agreed to adopt the proposals made by the present Board of Admiralty, and I believe that those eight vessels have already been laid down and advanced to a certain stage; I think, therefore, it would be useless for us at the present moment to ask the House even to appoint a Royal Commission. Much, therefore, as I regret the loss of an opportunity of appointing such a Commission, I think it would be useless at this moment to make the proposal. Should it, however, be intended to add any number of ironclads of the largest type to our fleet, I should be inclined to ask this House to consider whether it would not be advisable to appoint a Royal Commission. Looking back to the Royal Commission of 1871, presided over by Lord Dufferin, I have always considered that was a body of a very important character, and that it made a very valuable. The noble Lord 1027 has told us that he has taken the advice of some 8 or 10 of the best professional advisers, and I am sorry he did not also call in some of the best scientific anthorities, such, for instance, as Sir William Armstrong and other eminent men of that character. With regard to our Naval officers, I do not think that any advance which has been made in naval construction is attributable to them so much as to the scientific men of the day in and outside the Admiralty. I therefore think it would have been better if the noble Lord had taken into consultation some of those eminent scientists in addition to the professional advice he has sought. However, the thing is now done. The vessels have been commenced, and are somewhat advanced, and any fresh Commission or further advice on the subject would be useless. Under these circumstances, I hope my hon. Friend will not put the House to the trouble of a Division, but will content himself with the speech he has made, and the speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty, that has dealt with a number of interesting topics.
§ * MR. GOURLEYI beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Main Question again proposed.