LIBEL LAW AMENDMENT BILL.

HC Deb 13 June 1888 vol 327 cc3-62

(Sir Algernon Borthwick, Sir Albert Rollit, Mr. Lawson, Mr. Jennings, Dr. Camcron, Mr. John Morley, Mr. E. Dwyer Gray.)

[BILL 17.] COMMITTEE.

[Progress 6th June.]

Bill considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Clause 5 (Where defendant in action for libel has raised plea under s. 2 of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, only special damage to be recovered in certain cases. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 2).

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

MR. ADDISON (Ashton-under-Lyne)

said, that he was altogether in favour of the principle of the clause; but he thought it required a few words by way of explanation; because from what fell from his hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Hackney (Sir Charles Russell), the last time they were considering the Bill, he did not think that its meaning was thoroughly understood. By the section referred to in the clause—namely, s. 2, 6 & 7 Vict. where a libel had really worked no damage, three things were necessary before an editor could get a verdict. He must prove those three things himself, and if he failed in any one of them the case went against him. First of all, he must show that there had been no negligence in inserting the libel; secondly, that an apology such as the Act required had been made; and, thirdly, he must pay into Court a certain some of money. This section sought to do away with that part of the plea which required the payment of money into Court, and to say that it would really be a good plea without the third requirement. It was obvious that the justice of this provision would be manifest to the Committee when he said that news was circulated by means of news agencies, and that it frequently happened that the person who complained had sustained no injury at all. Why should not the editor be permitted to show that there had been no damage, that a mistake had been made, for which he apologized, and that there had been no negligence as far as he was concerned? In that case, why should he have to pay a sum of money into Court? The Committee would be aware that the news circulated by the news agencies, with which every hon. Member must necessarily be familiar, was inserted in a great number of newspapers, and in many instances, although a mistake might have been committed, the person complaining had suffered no real injury at all. This clause provided that in such cases the editor should prove the first of the pleas, and show that no damage had been sustained. The mischief of having to pay money into Court was that it made his position that there had been no damage untenable. He practically admitted that he had done something wrong; because, although he justified what had been done, he said that there must have been some measurable damage sustained, or it would not be necessary to pay anything into Court. When a sum of, say £5, was paid into Court, the jury naturally said—"The defendant admits that he has injured the plaintiff to the extent of £5;" and that being so, they would estimate the damage at probably more than that sum, and find the verdict accordingly. That was the practical effect of requiring the payment of a sum of money into Court. Where a man had not been damaged in any way whatever, why should not the defendant be able to say—"I certainly put this paragraph in my paper; there was no negligence, but a sort of inadvertence, if the word may be used, similar to that which must necessarily occur in carrying on the business of life, even without negligence. I have done all I can in the way of making an apology. You have not been injured in the least, and where a man has not been injured, why on earth should I have to pay money into Court." It appeared to him that in principle the clause was right; because in a great many other matters besides this something wrong might have been done, and yet no actual injury inflicted. For instance, a Hansom cab might drive so close to him as to put him into a fright; but he could not bring that action, as he had not been hurt. Why, in that case, should persons who trade in those sort of actions be treated differently? Why should not the jury be allowed to say to them—"Even if a wrong has been committed upon you, you have suffered no damage from it." If the editor had behaved as a respectable man ought to behave, he should be allowed to plead that the plaintiff had sustained no injury. That was the simple action of the clause.

MR. RADCLIFFE COOKE (Newington, W.)

said, that his objection to the clause was contained in the last part of the 1st paragraph, which provided that if— The defendant has inserted an apology, as by the said Act provided, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover any damages except such special damages as he can prove that he has sustained by the publication of such libel. He agreed with all that his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Addison) had said, and considered it desirable that the 2nd section of the existing Act, 6 and 7 Vict., should be repealed. But there might be cases in which general damage might have been sustained by the person libelled, which such person, from the position he occupied or his professional interests, could not prove to have done him any material damage in the sense of sustaining a material loss of income, or in any other way. That might frequently occur if a man were not engaged in carrying on a trade. At the same time he might be injured in his reputation and general character in his own neighbourhood, and for that injury it was right that the person who inflicted it should give him compensation in the only way in which it could be given by a stranger—that was to say, by a money payment. He understood that his hon. Friend in charge of the Bill (Sir Algernon Borthwick) would have something to say on that point, and would propose an Amendment. He thought it was desirable, before the Committee came to a decision as to whether they should omit the clause or not, they should hear what his hon. Friend had to say on the subject.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER) (Isle of Wight)

said, the point was this: as the clause was framed, it proposed that a plaintiff should not be entitled to any damages unless he could prove special damage. It appeared to him, now that the matter had been discussed, that there might be cases in which a person had been seriously libelled, and would not be able to prove special damages—as, for instance, in the case of a small tradesman who was accused of fraud, or of some sharp practice, but who was not able to show that he had lost custom in consequence. He thought that was hardly a case in which a Committee should say that the person libelled should get no damages unless he could prove that he had suffered special damages, assuming, of course, that the newspaper proprietor could show that he had not been guilty of malice or of gross negligence. He was anxious to give the promoters all the assistance in his power, provided that its provisions did not go beyond what he personally deemed to be just. He would, therefore, ask the promoters of the measure whether it would not be as well to consider whether some limits should not be proposed, otherwise there was a strong argument against the clause in connection with this question of proving special damage. He thought it was possible that the clause might be amended, either by limiting the amount of damages or in some other way. As it stood, it clearly went too far.

SIR ALGERNON BORTHWICK (Kensington, S.)

said, that this was really a question of costs.

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

said, that that was so; it was now held that if the defendant was to get a verdict, there was no power to make him pay any costs at all. There was no power at the present moment to make the defendant pay costs where the judgment passed in his favour. Therefore, the hon. Baronet was perfectly right in saying that the Bill would not affect the case where a judgment was given for the defendant. The Court, however, had the discretion where the judgment was given for the plaintiff. If the judgment passed for the defendant on the two issues of absence of malice and absence of negligence, the plaintiff, although libelled, and justified in bringing the action, would get no costs.

MR. DARLING (Deptford)

said, that he had handed in an Amendment that morning, and though he understood that it would not be in Order to move it at that stage, he should vote for the clause if it were passed, with the intention of moving his Amendment at the proper time. That Amendment was to omit the last words of the paragraph, and to add at the end, that a defendant should be entitled to judgment, unless the plaintiff should recover a verdict of 40s. damages at the least. The effect of that Amendment would be this—suppose a plaintiff went into Court and failed to prove that the libel had been published with malice or negligence, and it also appeared that the defendant had inserted an apology; in that case, although the plaintiff might get a technical verdict, yet, if it were for anything less than 40s. it would not entitle him to what that verdict would otherwise bring. Where the defendant had published an apology and showed that there had been no negligence and that no damage had been sustained, unless the plaintiff got more than 40s. awarded as damages, the plaintiff would not get a judgment that would entitle him to recover costs. That appeared to him to meet the objection of the hon. and learned Attorney General, and he should have been glad if that proposal, consistently with the Rules of the House, could have been put. As he understood that that could not be done at the present moment, the only course left open to him was to vote for the clause as it stood.

MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)

rose to Order. He wished to know whether it was possible to move any Amendment on the Question "that the Clause do pass?"

THE CHAIRMAN

No Amendment can be moved.

MR. DARLING

said, his impression was that any hon. Member voting for the clause could do so with the intention of amending it in some direction at a later stage. For his own part he should like to say that he would vote for the clause if it were pressed that day, only with the intention of moving the Amendment at a later stage.

SIR ALGERNON BORTHWICK

said, he wished to have the clause put as it stood at present.

MR. KELLY (Camberwell, N.)

said, that the hon. and learned Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Addison) had talked about a libel that did no injury. He imagined that it would be very difficult to produce a case in which a libel had inflicted no injury. He would give an instance of a case which occurred a short time ago in order to show the difficulty a man had in proving that he had sustained any special injury. The case to which he referred was one in which, in consequence of a printer's error, the name which should have appeared last in the list of dissolutions of partnership was the first inserted among the bankruptcy notices. That was a somewhat serious matter for the persons concerned; but how was it possible for them to prove special damages. That, he was afraid, was only one case out of many which constantly occurred. The question was whether the existing law in this respect was not better than that which it was now proposed to substitute. It must be remembered that the existing law had been materially altered after much consideration, and as it now stood it was an improvement made by 8 and 9 Vict. c. 75, upon the provisions of an Act passed two years before, viz., 6 and 7 Vict. c. 96. There was one point he desired to lay before the Committee which was of real importance. It was impossible for anybody to secure that an apology, explanation, or contradiction in the shape of explanatory matter should go to the same people who had seen the original libel. It was utterly impossible that that could be secured in any case. If they could insure that all the persons who read the libel should also read the explanation, there might be some argument in favour of the clause, but it was impossible to say that a libel could be published without injury, even if there was an absence of malice. It was no reparation to receive an apology, explanation, or contradiction. It merely put an end to the period during which the unretracted libel went out to the public. In his opinion it would be most unsafe to deviate from the principle that every apology should be accompanied by a payment into Court. That would secure to the libelled person some reparation, and would be a means, he ventured to think, of putting an end to a great deal of unnecessary litigation. If a man found that £5 or £10 were paid into Court he would get his costs, and decline to proceed further with the action. The sum of £5 was very little; but it frequently represented the difference between costs as between party and party and attorney and client. He failed to see why a man who was libelled should not, after vindicating his character by way of action, be pecuniarily in the same position as if he had not been libelled at all The hon. and learned Member for Ashton-under-Lyne said the plaintiff in a libel case should not be in a position to say that the defendant had paid money into Court. But the reason he should be able to say that was obvious. If a man brought an action for injury done to him, it was very easy for him to prove that he had been libelled, but he did not see how the plaintiff in a libel case was to prove special damages. That was a thing he could not do, and he ventured to think that he ought not to be asked to do it. If the clause were allowed to stand in its present form, it would give what the Committee would never wish to give—namely, a practical immunity to libellers.

MR. ADDISON

hoped the Committee would allow him to say a word in answer to the remarks of his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Kelly). He thought that the illustration which had been given by his hon. and learned Friend was a very good illustration of the manner in which frivolous actions for libel were now brought. A newspaper by the merest accident inserted under the head of "Bankruptcy" a notice of liquidation, the words being used in some cases as synonymous terms. What might the gentleman who considered himself libelled have done? If he had gone to the editor, he would have been only too glad to have acknowledged the error, and to have put in an ample explanation of the mistake which would avoid any possibility of injury being inflicted. But, instead of doing so, an action for libel was brought, and now they were told that it was necessary to bring an action, because some persons might have read the paragraph and not have read the apology. They were told that the apology would not be read by the same people, but, if that were the case, would the trial be read any more than the apology. These actions were nearly always brought when the real injury would have been set right at once by the newspaper if it had been allowed to do so.

MR. WOOTTON ISAACSON (Tower Hamlets, Stepney)

said, they all knew that if they gave a libel a day's start, it would take a week to overtake it. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Addison) had given an illustration of a case in which the word "liquidation" was inserted instead of "dissolution." That appeared in a monthly trade journal, and it reminded him of a very important case which occurred to the proprietor of a weekly newspaper, and which he believed was familiar to most Members of that House. It was a case where a newspaper had employed a certain lady of title to act as scout in society, to bring any little matters of information and scandals, the lady being rewarded by the payment of some infinitesimal sum for doing so. In the particular case to which he referred, a young lady was maligned, and brought an action against the proprietor of a newspaper. The newspaper was severely fined, but the lady who committed the libel got off scot-free. He was desirous of making the Law of Libel perfect, and to insure that there was no loophole for letting off a newspaper who, by inserting a libel, had seriously injured the character of an individual. As a matter of fact, in many of those cases no money payment would set the injury right. If, however, the hon. and learned Attorney General would give him an assurance that Clause 5 would not in any way weaken the present Law of Libel, he would be very glad to agree to it.

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

said, that, as he had been appealed to, he felt bound to say that the clause did weaken the Law of Libel, in the sense that the defendant would be able to get off the payment of damages or costs unless the plaintiff could prove special damages in any particular case.

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 89; Noes 41: Majority 48.—(Div. List, No. 146.)

Clause 6 (Power to defendant to give certain evidence in mitigation of damages).

MR. JENNINGS (Stockport)

said, he did not know whether the hon. Baronet (Sir Algernon Borthwick) proposed, in accordance with his Motion on the Paper, to move to strike out this clause.

SIR ALGERNON BORTHWICK (Kensington, S.)

was understood to say that he did not propose to do so.

MR. JENNINGS

said, he hoped the clause would be retained. It was one of the most important clauses in the Bill, its object being to prevent newspapers being subjected to black-mail by persons who brought actions for libel, very often one after another, for no real damage, but in order to make money out of newspapers not able to defend themselves. There were many respectable newspapers against whom an action for libel was absolutely ruinous. In most of these cases no real damage was done, and in many cases the newspaper proprietor would be glad to make a compromise by paying costs. It was not desired in the least to give any protection whatever to those who were really guilty of reckless libels, and the rights of all persons who were libelled were preserved under the Bill. All that the clause said was that it should be open to a newspaper to explain or to plead in mitigation of damages, that the plantiff had already recovered damages or had received, or agreed to receive, compensation in respect of the libel to the same purport or effect as the libel for which the action was brought. That seemed to him to be a very reasonable provision indeed. No one was prepared to say that a newspaper proprietor should not pay damages to a person who had been libelled or injured by a libel, and the libelled person might bring as many actions as he chose. But the newspaper proprietor was to be at liberty to go into Court and plead that the plaintiff had already brought 20, 30, or 40 actions against different newspapers, and had recovered damages in each ease for the same libel. It was further provided that that was a matter which should be considered by the jury in mitigation of damages, and that was the sole object of the clause. The Committee must not suppose that the actions for libel which were reported in the newspapers by any means included all the actions which the newspapers had to meet. There were cases in which newspapers paid money over and over again to persons who were no better than professional black-legs, rather than run the risk of going into Court and being cast in damages for the most frivolous of so-called injuries. This clause was intended, in point of fact, to protect respectable newspapers from blackmailers, and not to give greater facilities to libellous or reckless writers than were given at present. On the contrary, he thought the promoters of the Bill would deal more severely with libellous matter recklessly inserted in newspapers than any other hon. Members of the House. He hoped the Committee would not reject the clause without full consideration as to what it led to, and what it involved. He ventured to think that no one who looked closely into it would be of opinion that it did more than confer on respectable newspapers reasonable and adequate protection against injustice.

MR. OSBORNE MORGAN (Denbighshire, E.)

said, he thought he might be considered something of an expert in this matter, for there was a time when he had been regularly libelled once a month, though he had not found that the process did him much harm. He must say that he was very much inclined to agree with the views of the hon. Member who had just spoken (Mr. Jennings). It seemed to him that if they gave up this clause, the Bill would be so emasculated that it would not be worth having. The clause proposed to allow a defendant to take steps to prevent a plaintiff making money out of a libel by going about from one Court to another, and making a good thing of it. Surely that was a thing which no one, however he might object to the Bill, could wish to see allowed. Therefore, if the clause were carried to a Division, he should certainly support it.

MR. KELLY (Camberwell, N.)

said, he did not concur in the view of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. He thought that the Committee would admit that there were cases in which a plea of this kind would be most misleading. For instance, take the case of a paper in the Lake District. Why should that paper, if it had libelled a man, be benefited by an action brought against a Manchester paper which had also libelled him? The plaintiff might have brought an action and recovered damages in Manchester, but what those damages had to do with the amount of injury inflicted upon him by a libel published against him in the Lake District, he (Mr. Kelly) failed to perceive. The paper in the Lake District would not have to pay a farthing morn on account of any injury inflicted by the Manchester paper. Of course, if a defendant got a friend to publish a libel against him, and then went about bringing actions against the newspapers in which it appeared, he could understand the force of the observations of the hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. Jennings) about black-mail, but such things did not happen. But these newspapers were published for the profit of the persons who published them. Sometimes the insertion of a scandalous libel increased the sale of a paper, and it was ridiculous to say that because the person libelled claimed a proper amount of compensation for the wrong which had been done, it should be characterized as an attempt to levy black-mail. He trusted the Committee would accept the clause. [A laugh.] He saw that hon. Gentlemen connected with newspapers were prepared to take advantage of any slip, and he could not imagine how they should then object to the other people taking advantage of the slips calculated to do immense injury made in newspapers. He trusted the Committee would reject the clause, because it would mislead juries, and induce them to take into consideration matters with which they had nothing to do.

MR. LAWSON (St. Pancras, W.)

said, that, as one of the promoters of the Bill, he must object to the course taken by his hon. Friend opposite (Sir Algernon Borthwick) in regard to this clause. He thought they were bound to arrest the eviscerating process which had been going on with regard to the Bill. The remarks of the hon. and learned Gentleman were altogether inapplicable to the clause, because the jury were not forced to be influenced by the fact that a plaintiff had received compensation already for the same libel, and the clause, at it stood, would not necessarily affect the interesting friend of the hon. and learned Member who lived in the Lake District. It must be borne in mind that this was not a compulsory but a permissive clause. It was directed against professional litigants, and those unscrupulous solicitors who put in action groups of libel cases on the bare chance of obtaining costs for correspondence. He knew of several papers which had three or four cases of that kind pending against them; and what was their position? They found it necessary to pay heavy sums of money in order to escape the inconvenience and expense of a law suit, because they knew that if they went into Court and succeeded in getting a verdict, their opponents were men of straw, from whom they could recover nothing whatever. Under those circumstances, he thought the Committee would be of opinion that this important clause should be retained in the Bill. He might instance a case which occurred about three months ago, where a solicitor brought an action against 42 papers for stating that he had been struck off the Rolls. Another solicitor of the same name was struck off the Rolls, but an official of the Court made a mistake, and gave the reporter for the news agency the address of the solicitor who brought the action, and who happened himself to be a bankrupt. He claimed £2,000 in each case, or £84,000 in all.

MR. KELLY

asked, whether any of those actions were ever tried?

MR. LAWSON

said, he did not see how that mattered in the least. He was only giving the case as an example to show what the professional litigants could do. This was the way in which newspapers were black-mailed under the licence given to professional litigants and unscrupulous solicitors. He sincerely hoped the Committee would allow the clause to be retained in the Bill.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER) (Isle of Wight)

said, he wished to point out one matter to the Committee. He had already opposed the last clause—that the plaintiff should not be entitled to claim compensation at all, assuming that there had been no negligence and no malice, unless he proved special damage. Therefore, it would now be necessary for a man who had been libelled to prove that he had sustained special damage by the publication of the libel. Therefore, if a libel were published in The Manchester Guardian, for instance, the plaintiff would have to prove that he had lost a portion of his Manchester custom; but what right had the defendant to give evidence of damages having been recovered upon a similar libel in another part of England? He certainly could not assent to the present clause, now that they had passed the 5th clause. It involved a most serious alteration of the law. The hon. Gentleman below the Gangway who had just spoken (Mr. Lawson) was careful to argue the clause in regard to its effect upon the black-mailer; but as the clause was framed it would apply equally to the honest plaintiff who might have been grossly libelled.

MR. LAWSON

The question would be left to the jury.

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

A person might be libelled, and grossly libelled, by a newspaper. He was ready to admit that the managers of newspapers, as a rule, carried on their business without wishing to publish libels, although there were undoubtedly some who did not pursue that course, but were in the habit of indulging in libels. There were very many respectable newspapers which never inserted libellous matter. He failed to see why a man who suffered special damage from a publication in a newspaper circulated in a particular county should not recover those damages, and why it should be given in evidence that damages had been obtained in respect of that libel to the same purport or effect. It seemed to him that the clause went much too far, and he should feel compelled to vote against it.

SIR ALBERT ROLLIT (Islington, S.)

said, that the point raised by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General was an important one. No doubt, in the case of a newspaper published in Westmoreland and another in Cornwall, there would be such a distance between them that the argument against giving evidence in regard to damages recovered in another action might apply. But take the case of London. A series of London newspapers might contain the same libel, and a plaintiff would be able to bring numerous actions which were practically one and the same. Therefore, it seemed to him to be only right that the whole of these facts should be placed before the jury, and all that was asked to be done by the clause was that the defendants should have liberty to give evidence to the jury to satisfy them what the extent of the injury had been. That being ascertained, it would rest with the jury to assess the damages, and they would be in full possession of the facts. Therefore, the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General did not apply in such cases at all. The whole of the facts of the case would be placed before the jury before they came to a conclusion upon the subject. The hon. Member for West St. Pancras (Mr. Lawson) had spoken of the actions brought against 42 newspapers for the same libel. In that case, in which it happened that he was professionally engaged for most of the papers, the libel was one over which the newspaper editor had no control whatever. In fact, the error originated with one of the officials of the Courts. A certain solicitor was struck off the Rolls, and a reporter for a news agency asked an usher who the solicitor referred to was. The usher referred to the official Court Law List and gave the name of a man which was identical with that of the solicitor struck off, but who turned out to bethe wrong one. Instead of 42, there were from 60 to 80 actions brought, and the total claim amounted to about £160,000. It was quite true that those actions were not tried; but large sums of money were paid into Court, inasmuch as there could be no disclaimer on the part of the newspaper proprietors that the paragraph was a libel, and settlements were made which were altogether excessive, and beyond any real injury sustained. The actions were not tried on account of the death of the plaintiff. All the newspaper proprietors wished that in such a case, in future, the defendants should not be placed at a disadvantage by not being able to place the whole of the circumstances as to damages and settlements before the jury who would be called upon to decide the case.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT (Sussex, N.W.)

said, he had had no intention of taking part in the debate in Committee on that Bill; but he thought it was of the utmost importance that they should have fair and reasonable laws with regard to libels, and they ought to bear in mind those newspapers which were anxious to do what was fair and right towards the general public. When he read the clause he certainly thought it was a fair and reasonable one, and he would ask his hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General, or the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary, whether there were any words in the clause which ought to be omitted, or anything that could be inserted to amend it, so as to secure that every person who was attacked by the Press should have a fair and impartial hearing, and to prevent as far as possible those persons whose only object was to make large sums of money out of the Press in connection with libel cases that were never intentionally com- mitted. Unless he heard stronger objections than had yet been urged, he should feel bound in the interests of the Press to vote for the clause.

MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)

said, his hon. Friend the Member for West St. Pancras (Mr. Lawson) had mentioned a case in which more than 40 actions were brought for the same libel. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for North Camberwell (Mr, Kelly) asked if they were tried. Probably he was not aware of the difficulty which arose in regard to getting them tried, the fact being that a sort of punishment fell upon the person who brought them, and he died before the actions could come on. As a matter of fact, it often happened that cases of that kind were not tried because the man who brought them went round to the different newspapers. The newspaper proprietor had to put in a justification, but he saw that by the present law he must lose the action; and, in order to avoid further loss to himself, he agreed to pay a sum of money to the person who brought the action. In that way there was a perfect and persistent system of blackmailing now going on. The hon. and learned Attorney General rested his objection to the clause, as far as he could gather, on the fact that Clause 5 had been carried.

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

Not entirely.

MR. LABOUCHERE

Not entirely?

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

No; only partly.

MR. LABOUCHERE

The hon. and learned Gentleman rested his objection to this clause upon the fact that the 5th clause had been carried. He did not, however, rest it entirely; only partly—probably very much partly. The hon. and learned Attorney General had opposed the 5th clause. He did not approve of it, and therefore opposed it.

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

said, the hon. Gentleman was in error, but he had no wish to interrupt him. He did not vote against the 5th clause. He objected to the clause as it stood, but he proposed to amend it on the Report.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, he wished to know whether, before the discussion took place in the House, the hon. and learned Gentleman did not intimate to the promoters of the Bill that he would not agree to the Bill being supported by the Government unless they consented to omit the 5th and 6th clause? It was against that decision that he entirely protested, and he wished to know whether it was a fact that an intimation was given that Clauses 5 and 6 would be opposed by the Government? Was he to understand that the hon. Gentleman the Member for South Kensington (Sir Algernon Borthwick) really believed himself that those clauses ought to be eliminated from the Bill? If not, why did he move that they should be eliminated?

SIR ALGERNON BORTHWICK

said, he wished to explain that the hon. and learned Attorney General had been kind enough to point out certain defects in the Bill, and in consequence of the hon. and learned Gentleman's observations he took the course which he had adopted. With regard to the present clause he should vote for it.

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

said, he had made no arrangement with the hon. Gentleman below the Gangway, but he had intimated that he intended to endeavour to amend the clause.

MR. LABOUCHERE

asked, if he was to understand absolutely that there was no sort of arrangement in regard to any clause of the Bill, and that the hon. Baronet the Member for South Kensington, in his Motion to leave out certain clauses, merely acted according to his own view of those clauses? Had he taken the initiative in moving the rejection of this clause from his own belief that the clause was bad?

SIR ALGERNON BORTHWICK

said, he distinctly approved of the 6th clause, and should vote for it.

MR. LABOUCHERE

Then what was this entry upon the Votes? Could his eyes deceive him? "Sir Algernon Borthwick"—he presumed Sir Algernon Borthwick was Member for South Kensington—"to leave out Clause 6."

SIR ALGERNON BORTHWICK

You may be permitted to change your mind.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, that no doubt the Committee would always be glad to receive back a repentant sinner, but he must say that the course adopted by the hon. Baronet was a very singular one. The Bill passed the second reading as it stood in its entirety. No intimation was made then that the promoters intended to alter the Bill in any sort of way. But what did he find now? That one of the best clauses was moved to be omitted by the promoters of the Bill. He could not help supposing that there must have been some sort of communication with the Government, seeing that the hon. Baronet was a supporter of the Government, or the Bill would not have been emasculated in this way by the promoters themselves. It appeared now that the hon. Baronet saw reason to change his mind, and was in favour of the clause. He (Mr. Labouchere) was exceedingly glad to hear it, and he was sure the intimation would induce many hon. Members to follow him rather than the hon. and learned Member for North Camberwell. The hon. and learned Member for North Camberwell came forward as a lawyer, and not as one of the public. He seemed to imagine that he ought to get up there on every occasion as the advocate of the people against newspapers. Now, the newspapers did not desire to have any exceptional law in their favour, but all they wanted was justice. There were certain Members in that House who, like the hon. and learned Member for North Camberwell, seemed to think that a newspaper proprietor or editor was to be treated like a stoat or a weasel, or some other animal feræ naturæ, and that they were not to have the benefit of the same law that was dealt out to other people. He trusted that that fact would be thoroughly remembered by hon. Members when the vote was taken. The clause simply said that a newspaper might submit to the jury the fact that damages, special or otherwise, in an important case had been already given to the plaintiff, who had thus received a solatium for his wounded honour, feelings, or interest. That was all the jury would consider—whether a man, having been injured, had received a sufficient solatium. It was directed against a system of blackmailing by which a man was unable to obtain more than a sufficient solatium.

SIR ALGERNON BORTHWICK

said, he wished to explain that in the course he had pursued in reference to this matter he had not been acting by himself, nor in any arbitrary fashion. He had felt bound to consult those who were concerned with him in promoting the Bill, and the course he had taken had been guided by the advice he had received.

MR. KELLY

said, he had only one word to say as to the course he had pursued in reference to this clause. He had all along opposed the clause, and he had placed an Amendment on the Paper for its omission. He thought the House was under a little misapprehension with regard to the effect of the clause. The Committee had heard of a case which had led to a large number of actions. Now, he had reported that case himself, but he did not libel the gentleman in question. The hon. Member for South Islington (Sir Albert Rollit) said there had been no negligence in that case, because the person who made the false report got his information from the usher of the Court. Now, he should have thought that a person who was content to obtain information of that kind from the usher of the Court was certainly guilty of the grossest negligence. He would tell the hon. Member how the mistake arose. An application was made to strike off the Roll of Attorneys a person whom he would now call John Smith, and who had carried on business at Liverpool. There was only one John Smith on The Law List, and he practised in Salters' Hall Court, London. The reporter, instead of leaving out the address as to where the man carried on his business, asked for information from the usher, who handed him The Law List. Finding a John Smith there, the reporter inserted the name as that of the man who was struck off the Rolls. The mistake arose from the ignorance or carelessness of the reporter, who ought to have known that most frequently men whom it was sought to strike off the rolls did not take out certificates, and that, consequently, their names did not appear in The Law List. In his (Mr. Kelly's) opinion, that was just the one case of all others in which damages ought to be given against a newspaper proprietor for employing an incompetent, ignorant, and careless reporter, who might have done the greatest possible injury to a respectable practitioner.

MR. RADCLIFFE COOKE

said, he intended to support the clause, but he did not think there was much advantage to be derived from discussing it in reference to individual cases. He thought the clause was an extremely valuable part of the Bill, though certainly what it proposed to do directly could now be done indirectly in every case of libel. It only provided that all the facts should be laid before the jury when an action for libel was brought against a newspaper proprietor. If it were calculated injuriously to affect the interests of a person who had been libelled, he should certainly vote against it; but it only proposed to do what was done in reality in every action already. No doubt, the defendant could not bring forward evidence of previous actions taken by the plaintiff; but he could cross-examine the plaintiff, and in that way do so. But, as a rule, the learned Judge told the jury that evidence thus obtained ought to have no effect or influence upon their minds. What was now done indirectly this clause proposed to do in future directly; so that instead of the jury being told by the learned Judge that they were not to take this fact into consideration in assessing damages, he might inform them that, if they were so pleased, they might do so. The hon. and learned Attorney General had argued the question as if Clause 5, which they had just agreed to, would remain as it stood; but it had been agreed to on the understanding that it should be amended on the Report. The effect of the clause under consideration would be to prevent plaintiffs from multiplying actions, and as he regarded that as a valuable part of the Bill he should vote for it.

SIR JOHN SIMON (Dewsbury)

said, he believed that the clause was practically just and fair, and should be sorry to see it struck out of the Bill. The object of the Law of Libel was to enable a man, if libelled, to vindicate his character; and if he brought an action and succeeded in vindicating his character, what more could he require, or what more should he obtain? If he recovered damages in one action, that was all that he was entitled to, and all that the law ought to allow him. The hon. and learned Member for West Newington (Mr. Radcliffe Cooke) had pointed out the uncertain condition in which the law stood—namely, that although there was no direct law to entitle a man to give evidence as to other actions brought against newspapers, yet he was indirectly enabled to obtain that evidence, because if the plaintiff had given his evidence he might be cross- examined as to whether he had brought actions before, although Counsel or the Judge would be justified in telling the jury that they ought not to take that fact into consideration in assessing damages. He thought that was a most unsatisfactory and unfair state of the law. Honourable men would not bring a multiplicity of actions; but it would open the door to men of another stamp, who would seek to make money out of an accidental publication or an indiscretion that might have been committed. It was said that a newspaper proprietor should be punished for employing an incompetent or negligent servant. Well, he thought that what all employers did was to try to get the best men to serve them that they could, and if they failed to do so in some cases, it was their misfortune and not their fault, and they ought to be visited with punishment in consequence. He would be the last person to seek to exempt newspapers from responsibility in regard to what they published; but, on the other hand, he was not prepared to become a party to doing anything which would facilitate the levying of blackmail, or subjecting them to being victimized by any person of questionable antecedents who might choose to take advantage of an accidental slip on the part of a newspaper proprietor. He thought the clause was a very fair one.

MR. ADDISON (Ashton-under-Lyne)

said, the Committee must bear in mind that this clause was only to put an end to a barbarous technical rule which no one would ever think of incorporating in the law in the present day if these rules were now being considered for the first time. The rule was that evidence was not admissible that a man had already cleared his character elsewhere, and had obtained damages against some other newspaper. Though a man might have been already in the box and submitted to cross-examination, and though the facts of the case might have been proved by other evidence, all declarations to that effect were technically inadmissible according to this barbarous rule. A man was not allowed to show that the plaintiff had brought other actions and had obtained certain damages. He asked the Committee to put an end to that technical and barbarous rule.

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 159; Noes 38: Majority 121.—(Div. List, No. 147.)

Clause 7 (Defendant may in certain cases obtain security for costs).

SIR ALGERNON BORTHWICK (Kensington, S.)

said, he begged to move that this clause be omitted. The reason for his Motion was this—that although the clause was an excellent one in itself and of great value, nevertheless he admitted that it would be exceptional, and, therefore, perhaps unfair. He wished to see the clause in some way or other become the law of the land; but he quite admitted that it would be invidious to give to the Press a privilege which was not possessed by railway and other companies in actions for damages, and for that reason he begged leave to withdraw the section.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER) (Isle of Wight)

said, that the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) had, unintentionally no doubt, just now attempted to put him (the Attorney General) into an altogether false position. In the first speech he (Sir Richard Webster) had made in Committee on this Bill, he had stated that he simply spoke on the measure for himself, and not on behalf of the Government. He had stated that distinctly, and he had further stated that he had been asked by the hon. Baronet in charge of the Bill to point out what he considered were the objections to be taken to it, and that the hon. Baronet had adopted Amendments that would meet those objections so far as he (Sir Richard Webster) was personally concerned. That was the state of the case—there was no pledge of any kind. The hon. Baronet had, on the occasion to which he referred, adopted the course he had taken that day—namely, that although he had moved an Amendment, it had only been in order to get the expression of the Committee upon it, he himself voting against it. As to the clause, might he (Sir Richard Webster) point out two or three reasons why it seemed to him impossible to accept it? It was not suggested that newspaper editors and proprietors did not carry on their business on commercial principles, and some of them very successfully. This clause would give them immunity against plaintiffs not able to pay costs; but it must be obvious to everyone that newspaper proprietors and editors were not the only persons against whom these actions were brought. Actions were frequently brought against employers for negligence, for which, as a matter of fact, they had no moral, and very little legal responsibility, and then they had to fight the cases with no chance of getting a fraction of their own costs. There were a great many cases, no doubt, which should not be taken up against newspaper proprietors; but, on principle, it would not be fair to give a special privilege to that class of defendants, although it might be true that, as a rule, they conducted their newspapers very carefully and well. Then, again, it would be unfair to prevent a plaintiff, who might be a poor man, from bringing an action. The character of such a man might be seriously impugned by a libel, and yet, if he brought an action in order to obtain satisfaction and rehabilitate himself in the opinion of his neighbours, the newspaper proprietor might be able to stop him by showing that he was not able to pay the costs. Newspapers, it might be, ran extra risk; but he (Sir Richard Webster) looked upon the clause as wrong in principle, and, therefore, should oppose it.

MR. JENNINGS (Stockport)

said, that he, no doubt like others whose names were on the back of the Bill, heard, with great regret, that this clause was to be withdrawn by the chief promoter. He must say that the treatment received by those who had put their names on the back of the Bill, from the persons who had induced them to take that position, was very extraordinary. They had heard a great deal about the clause being withdrawn by the chief promoter after consultation with the other promoters; but he (Mr. Jennings), as one whose name was on the back of the Bill, must declare that no consultation had ever taken place with him. He confessed that it was with the utmost dismay that he had heard that the hon. Baronet had determined upon killing his own child; and now, not content with that, the hon. Baronet attempted to throw the blame upon his fellow promoters, who were entirely innocent of the crime. He (Mr. Jennings) looked upon this clause as a very material part of the Bill, and there was but one objection to the working of it. That objection was that a really poor and honest plaintiff in a suit might be debarred from bringing an action by its being shown that he could not pay the costs, or might be subjected to hardship of some sort. He thought every effort should be made to meet such cases, and that nothing should be allowed to prevent a person with a real cause of complaint from bringing an action against a newspaper proprietor, in order to defend his character. It seemed to him (Mr. Jennings) that an Amendment in some such form as this, "unless just cause to the contrary be shown," should be inserted. He thought those words would be sufficient; but if they were not enough, and if the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General desired to do a service to the promoters of the Bill, he would introduce words in order to make the clause as strong as possible, so as to enable a poor and honest man to bring an action against a newspaper which had libelled him, without being obliged to show, in the first instance, that he was in a position to pay the costs. What this clause sought to do was to prevent adventurers and blackmailers who brought actions for libel against newspapers under frivolous pretexts being allowed to go on unless they could show that, in the event of the verdict going against them, they could pay the costs. This would operate very materially against what had become practically a systematic business on the part of many dishonest persons who brought actions against newspapers, and then got them settled quietly by the payment of a certain amount of money and costs. They had been told more than once that most newspaper writers were libellers, and deliberately traduced people's characters. Well, that was not true. It was quite as unfair to say so as it would be to say that all lawyers lived upon these spurious actions for libel. There were, however, many lawyers who did live upon them—there were many lawyers in this City who would prefer to bring an action for libel to going on with any other class of business, as they knew that, in the event of their being successful, they would be able to get their costs from the newspaper proprietors, and that, in all probability, the paper before the case had proceeded very far would say—"Take £50 or £60, and let the matter drop." Over and over again it had happened that respectable newspapers had, for bonâ fide purposes, published news which reflected upon the characters of individuals, and had actions brought against them by plaintiffs who simply wanted to make a profit out of the matter, and were not in a position to pay their costs if unsuccessful. A shameful case of this kind occurred, in which The Daily Telegraph, through publishing a notice concerning a certain criminal, had to pay a large amount of costs, he believed some £700. This sort of thing frequently happened to newspapers, who said nothing at all about it; the facts, therefore, never came to the knowledge of the public, and these actions were absolutely ruinous to a class of small newspapers—Provincial papers, which did great service to the public, and service of which certain lawyers were very glad to avail themselves, especially when they were fighting contested elections. They did not find these gentlemen running down such newspapers then. These papers were frequently threatened with actions for libel, and in order to settle them and save the expense they were very often induced to pay a sum of money and the lawyers' costs—the lawyers' costs, he need not say, being frequently the largest part of the bill. It was to put an end to such a state of things as that that this clause had been drawn up. He could not, however, express too strongly his hope that the clause might be placed in such a shape that a poor man who had suffered libel at the hands of a newspaper should be able to obtain protection, even if he was not able to give security for the payment of costs. He hoped that the clause would be carried, and that a stop would be put to the career of disreputable adventurers who went about plundering newspapers by the aid of more or less disreputable lawyers.

MR. OSBORNE MORGAN (Denbighshire, E.)

said, that this subject might be dealt with in a separate Bill; and if the hon. Baronet (Sir Algernon Borthwick) would bring in a measure dealing generally with the law, and requiring that, under certain circumstances, plaintiffs who might be men of straw should give security for costs, he should be happy to support such a proposal. He could speak from his own professional experience in regard to that matter. It was impossible to exaggerate the amount of blackmailing which went on against newspaper proprietors. There were hundreds of actions brought in which the plaintiffs were men of straw, and in which there was not the faintest chance of their paying the costs; in fact, they never meant to pay them, however the cases went, and, in fact, never did pay them when they lost. In those cases the costs of the defendants were very much more severe than would have been any amount of damages the jury would have been likely to inflict had the eases gone against the newspapers. But newspaper proprietors were not the only victims in cases of this kind. Employers of labour, railway companies and masters also suffered. Very frequently an employer of labour was only too happy to buy off an employé who threatened him with an action. He (Mr. Osborne Morgan) thought it would not be advisable to pass a special law which did not apply to defendants generally, but only to newspaper proprietors; and, therefore, he thought the hon. Baronet in charge of the Bill had exercised a wise discretion in determining to withdraw the clause.

MR. RADCLIFFE COOKE (Newington, W.)

said, the Committee seemed to be discussing this question under a misapprehension, hon. Gentlemen speaking as though the law laid down in the clause applied only to newspapers. As a matter of fact, it applied to everybody; an though he desired to support the objects of the promoters of the Bill so far as those objects could be gathered, still it was quite clear from the speech of the hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. Jennings)—one of the ablest of the supporters of the Bill, who threw himself vigorously into the debate, flushed with his victory of the previous day—that the clause was so framed that even he himself would be utterly unable to vote for it in its present form. The hon. Member told them that the clause, as it stood, would prevent a poor man who had been genuinely libelled from bringing an action. ["No, no!"] Well, he (Mr. Cooke) had understood the hon. Member in that sense. Not only had the hon. Member said that, but he had urged the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General to put in words in order to prevent a poor man, who could not show his ability to pay costs, from being precluded from bringing an action against a newspaper which had libelled him.

MR. JENNINGS

said, that what he had intended to convey was that he thought the words now in the clause would accomplish this object, and that, if they did not, he trusted that some stronger words would be inserted.

MR. RADCLIFFE COOKE

said, that those words certainly did not carry out that object. If the hon. Member had thought that the words in the clause would accomplish the object in question, why was he so earnest in entreating the Attorney General to put in words to effect it? One main reason why, although he desired to support the Bill in the main, he could not support this clause was that the objects of the clause were practically carried out by the law as it stood. Under Section 10 of the County Courts Act, 1867, it was insisted that it should be lawful for any person against whom an action—and the section named the actions, amongst them being libel and slander—should be brought to make an affidavit that the plaintiff had no visible means of paying the costs of the defendant, should a verdict not be found for the plaintiff; and thereupon the Judge should have power to make an order that the plaintiff should give full security for costs, or that the action should be remitted to the County Court, where the costs would be very much less. The difficulty, therefore, was met, to a large extent, by the existing law; and for that reason, and because the promoters of the Bill themselves admitted that the clause, as drawn, did not provide against a great danger, he (Mr. Cooke) found himself unable to vote for it.

MR. LAWSON (St. Pancras, W.)

said, the clause was another of those directed against disreputable plaintiffs whose cases were conducted by equally disreputable attorneys. He quite agreed with the hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. Jennings) that it was most desirable, if legal ingenuity could do it, to guard against the possibility of the clause being used against a genuine but poor litigant. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General had already assisted the promoters by suggesting several Amendments; and he (Mr. Lawson) would, therefere, ask the hon. and learned Gentleman if he could not, on the point they were dealing with, suggest an Amendment which would render the clause harmless in the particular case to which attention had been called?

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER) (Isle of Wight)

said, he had considered that point, and it seemed to him that no Amendment of the kind ought properly to be proposed, as the principle of the clause was bad altogether. He objected to the provision altogether, and thought it should be struck out. In the case of a man who had been adjudicated a bankrupt, obviously the Judge could not expect him to find security for the payment of costs; and, under such circumstances, a newspaper would be able to libel a man with impunity. The whole scope of the clause was to prevent persons from bringing actions who were not in a position to pay costs, and that would be obviously unfair to many injured persons who happened to be poor.

MR. LAWSON

said, why not, after the words "adjudicated bankrupt," insert words to limit the application of the clause to such individuals? That would be a satisfactory modification. He wished to remind the Committee that in dealing with this matter they should re-collect the way they treated Clause 4. They omitted all those words in Clause 4 which related to the publication of notices issued for the information of the public by order of any Government Office or Department. Well, if the Committee would permit him, he would like to refer to one specific case which had already been mentioned to show how a newspaper could be prosecuted by a bogus litigant if those words were left out which the Attorney General himself had proposed, or assented to, or recommended. In the case mentioned by the hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. Jennings) and official letter came to a London newspaper from the Assistant Commissioner of Police, asking that newspaper to insert a particular paragraph warning the public that a great fraud was being carried out by an ex-convict named Murray, assisted by another well-known ex-convict named Benson. This was a fraud not only being contemplated, but on the point of being carried out to the great injury of the public. Well, the paragraph received from the Assistant Commissioner of Police was inserted in this newspaper, and next morning a letter of thanks was received from him for the publication of the paragraph, which he asked might also appear. These additional particulars were also published, and the publication of this information, society was prevented from being victimised by the swindlers in question, and the newspaper received the thanks of the Assistant Commissioner of Police for what it had done. Well, in consequence of that official paragraph appearing in the newspaper, the man Murray brought an action against the paper, which was put to the expense of some £700, principally in making inquiries in Geneva and elsewhere into the matter, and received very little assistance from the Police. He need not say that the action had failed when brought into Court; but still, the newspaper was put to this great expense, and all because it trusted to the accuracy of a communication received from an official department. The facts contained in the paragraph which formed the subject matter of the libel were true, as it turned out, but as there was no possibility of recovering costs from the plaintiff, who was a man of straw and a bankrupt, it was very little use to the newspaper to prove that it was in the right. What he wished to say was this—that a newspaper might be anxious to assist the Government in matters of this kind as much as possible, but was frequently precluded from taking the action, as in the case to which he had referred, on account of the risks thereby incurred. Supposing this clause were not pressed, would the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General give them any reason to hope that Clause 4, which was omitted in Committee on a former occasion, would be put back on the Report stage so safeguarded that the dangers which were foreseen would be effectually prevented?

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

said, it the seemed to him that for once the hon. Gentleman the Member for West St. Pancras (Mr. Lawson) had lost the real point of the reason why Clause 4 was struck out. The case the hon. Member had cited was hardly in point, but he must say at once that if the hon. Gentleman could suggest on Report any clause which would meet such cases as that to which he had referred, he (Sir Richard Webster) would gladly consider it, though he could not give any pledge on the matter. The words referred to had been struck out because it was not thought desirable to make a newspaper privileged in the case of information received from even a Government office, but the point now under discussion was different. If a police official sent to a respectable newspaper certain information with the request that it should be published, the newspaper proprietor publishing such information with his eyes open would have no right to shelter himself under the authority of that public department. Whatever he published he would publish at his own risk. What he (Sir Richard Webster) wanted to point out was, that because in a particular case a newspaper might think it worth while to act upon instructions received in a perfectly bonâ fide way from a public department, it was no reason why that newspaper should enjoy immunity from an action for libel. As he had said, however, the point under discussion was a different one and was not touched by that other consideration. The point was whether all individuals, it might be the servants of an employer, were not to be entitled to obtain redress for injury inflicted upon them in the way of libel or slander unless they could give security for costs. In many instances men who were unjustly libelled may have lost the whole of their money directly in consequence of that libel, or through the necessity of clearing their character, and then their only chance of reinstating themselves might be by bringing an action for libel, and if this clause were adhered to such a course might be rendered impossible.

MR. KELLY (Camberwell, N.)

said, he desired to say a few words on the clause under discussion, as he considered it impossible that it could be allowed to stand. This question of security for costs was a very serious one indeed. The evil with which the clause sought to deal, was one that rich people must be content to put up with, because it could not be remedied without serious damage to the poor. There were cases, however, in which some such law as this, he thought, ought to be adopted, and he would suggest that a clause should be drawn up to deal with the worst of all cases—namely, that in which a long series of actions was brought in respect of the same libel, and which would provide that where actions were brought against several newspapers in respect of the same libel, the proceedings in the second and subsequet actions should be stayed until the first had been tried or security for costs for the others was given. They might allow a man to bring one action, but if he failed in that, the others should be dismissed. He would thus be prevented from putting a whole series of newspapers to the expense of defending actions without giving security for the payment of their costs if unsuccessful. That would be some protection in regard to the worst cases with which the newspaper proprietors would have to deal. While he was anxious to see protection given to the newspaper proprietors he would ask that body to consider whether there were not other large sections of the community who suffered a great deal more than they did from being unable to obtain security for costs. He did not wish to go into the matter very fully, but merely desired to point out that if protection was given it shoul not be given to libellers only.

SIR JOHN SIMON (Dewsbury)

said, that the objectionable part of the clause consisted of the words "that the plaintiff has been adjudicated a bankrupt or." Why should a man be libelled with impunity because he had been adjudicated a bankrupt? He thought that if those words were omitted there would be ample protection for the poor man. The words which would govern the section would then be, "has no visible means of paying the costs of the defendant should a verdict not be found for the plaintiff," and the Judge under those words would have an opportunity of listening to any circumstances which would justify the action primâ facie. In that way a poor man would not be injured or deprived of his right to redress. If they went to a Division on the question to omit the words, "that the plaintiff has been adjudicated a bankrupt or," he (Sir John Simon) should support the proposal. The matter, however, seemed to him to require grave consideration, and it would, perhaps, be as well for the hon. Baronet in charge of the Bill to withdraw the clause in order to bring up a new one on a later occasion.

MR. ISAACSON (Tower Hamlets, Stepney)

said, he thought the clause should be remodelled. It could not stand in its present form, because it would prevent a poor man from bringing an action against a wealthy newspaper. In certain localities at election time there was often a race between the Conservative and Radical papers as to who should be the first to libel people taking a prominent part in politics. He knew perfectly well, in the neighbourhood that he was acquainted with, that there were many persons rendered miserable and unhappy by the libellous statements made in certain newspapers; but their circumstances were so poor that they were unable to bring actions against those newspapers. He thought that every facility should be given in this new Libel Law Amendment Bill to poor men to resist the libellous attacks of newspapers. It was a well-known fact that there were wholesale libellers as well as blackmailers—that there was a certain class of papers that actually lived upon libelling unoffending persons. They sought for libels, and even courted actions for libel. He was acquainted with a newspaper, which boasted of a very large circulation, which made this statement to a solicitor—"We should be very glad indeed if you would bring an action for libel against us, as that is the very best advertisement we could have." He should certainly not support the clause unless it were remodelled, and, if it were remodelled, he hoped it would be in favour of the poor man.

SIR ALBERT ROLLIT (Islington, S.)

said, his name was on the back of the Bill, and he gave it a hearty support; but he must say that there was some ground for seeking to be especially prudent as to this clause. In remedying an evil which affected newspaper proprietors at large, and which also touched a large number of other persons, they must be careful not to create an exceptional privilege which would tell against the ultimate success of the Bill when it came before the House for third reading, or in "another place." He did not think the clause under discussion should pass in its present form, and the question was, Could it be modified? He felt great diffidence in following the hon. and learned Gen- tleman the Attorney General, who had pointed out the great difficulty existing in the matter; but he (Sir Albert Rollit) thought that words might be inserted which would place the law under this Bill in analogy with the existing law, and give it that generality which it did not in the clause seem to possess. He would suggest that the clause should be amended, so as to enable the Judge to allow an action to proceed, whether or not the plaintiff could show that he had means to pay the costs of the defendant, if he (the Judge) should be of opinion that there was a good cause of action on the merits. In this way, the Judge would have an opportunity of considering—first, whether the plaintiff had the means of paying the defendant's costs; and, secondly, whether there was a good cause of action on the merits. If the Judge thought that there was not a good cause of action on the merits, in pursuance of the principle recognized in the existing law, he might say—"If you wish to bring this action, you must give security that you are in a position to pay the costs if the verdict is against you." He (Sir Albert Rollit) thought that if these words were adopted they would, in a large number of cases, remove the objections which had been stated to the clause.

MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)

said, he really thought the House had a right to complain of the system adopted in taking the Committee stage of this Bill. The hon. Member for South Kensington (Sir Algernon Borthwick) brought in the Bill with this clause in it, and a very important clause it was. The Bill was at first blocked; the blocks were afterwards taken off by those who had looked into the measure, and had come to the conclusion that they could allow it to be proceeded with. Well, he always thought the House had a right, when it was intended by the promoters of a Bill to make such an important alteration in it as to strike out one of its principal clauses, to be notified before the measure passed the second reading; otherwise, the Bill passed under false pretences—if he might say so—and he did not wish to use the words in any offensive sense. They had heard a great many legal Gentlemen speak upon this matter, and, as was usual, they knew less now what the law was than if those hon. Gentle- men had held their tongues. He should like to know exactly what the law was at the present moment with regard to plaintiffs who might be poor persons? The hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General was not in the House, but he saw another eminent lawyer on the Front Bench opposite—namely, the right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary, and probably he would enlighten the Committee on the subject. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for North Camberwell (Mr. Kelly) had pointed out that in an action for tort before a Superior Court the Judge might, on application, remit the action to the County Court, or insist that the plaintiff should give security for costs. Was that the law at present? [Cries of "Yes!"] Then what was the complaint against the clause? The clause would only give practical effect in the case of actions for libel to the existing law. Hon. Gentlemen said that this was an attack upon the poor man, and that a poor man ought not to be libelled with impunity. ["No, no!"] Yes; the hon. Gentleman behind him said so, and he should go with his hon. Friend if he thought with him, but he (Mr. Labouchere) denied that the clause would press with undue severity upon the poor man. ["Read the clause!"] An hon. Gentleman said, "Read the clause." He would suggest to the hon. Member that he should read it himself, because he evidently had not done so, or, at all events, had not understood it, as he seemed to think that this clause was an attack upon the poor man. What did it say? Why, that the Judge, when a defendant first put in an affidavit that the plaintiff had no visible means of paying the costs of the defendant should a verdict not be found for the plaintiff, unless just cause to the contrary were shown, should make an order that the plaintiff should, within a time specified, give full security for the defendant's costs to the satisfaction of one of the Masters of the Court. Hon. Gentlemen opposite suggested that alterations should be made in the clause in order to safeguard the interests of the poor man, but the hon. and learned Attorney General had said he did not see how it could be done, and he (Mr. Labouchere) confessed he was surprised to hear that, because it seemed to him that it would be as easy as possible to make those alterations. In the first place, they might leave out the words "has been adjudicated a bankrupt, or has no visible means of paying the costs of the defendant," and so on, &c., and they might then introduce in line 7 the words "shall have power to make an order" that the plaintiff should within a time specified give full security for the defendant's costs. The effect of the clause would then be to require the Judge to look into the matter, and decide himself whether there was a fair and legitimate case for the poor man to bring an action, or whether it was a case of blackmail and there was really no reason for bringing an action. The assumption might be, if a man had "no visible means of paying the costs of the defendant," that the action was a speculative one brought by a solicitor, because if the plaintiff had no visible means of paying the defendant's costs if he lost, one might reasonably suppose that he had no visible means of paying his own solicitor if he won, unless he got something from the defendant. The Judge would, therefore, as the practically responsible person, look into the matter, and if he thought the case was in its nature not a reasonable one he would insist upon security being given for costs, but in no case would he do it when he had reason to think that it would tell unfairly against a poor man. They had had instances of hardship quoted during this discussion, and so far as he was concerned he need not go beyond his own experience for such instances. He had been much persecuted in this matter, and he would tell the House what had occurred to him. He only spoke of himself, because he was familiar with the details of the case in question, but he had no doubt that similar circumstances had occurred to other people. There was the case of a man who brought an action against an individual who had inserted something in a newspaper which he (Mr. Labouchere) was connected with. This plaintiff brought an action and lost it, and costs were given against him, but he did not pay those costs. He was a man living in an hotel in London. He was not domiciled in England, and they would not often be able to get security for payment of costs from a man who was not domiciled in England, although if one could show that he was living at an hotel there would be reason to think that the costs would be paid—and in this matter he (Mr. Labouchere) might say that he knew as much as the lawyers, having had to interest himself very largely in these matters. Well, this man brought his action against this individual and lost it, and was ordered to pay the defendant's costs. Well, in reality, he (Mr. Labouchere) was responsible for the alleged libel, and he had practically put himself into the position of the individual who had inserted the information in the paper. He (Mr. Labouchere) had to pay the costs. This person brought another action against him (Mr. Labouchere) not having paid his own costs, and he (Mr. Labouchere) had to employ eminent lawyers—one was obliged to have eminent lawyers, although they were very expensive luxuries—and on a particular day, after a number of interlocutory motions had been made, they went into Court to defend him. An affidavit was then put in by the plaintiff declaring that he was ill and not able to attend, and the case was put off for some weeks. He (Mr. Labouchere) had to pay the expense caused by this delay, and again they went into Court. The plaintiff on that occasion did not appear at all, and he (Mr. Labouchere) had to pay his own costs. He had to pay the costs of practically three actions, owing to the course pursued by this plaintiff, who never for a moment had intended to have the case tried, but had been simply actuated by a nasty, disagreeable disposition, desiring to make him (Mr. Labouchere) spend money. Well, let them take another instance. There was a Turk. That Turk was a swindler—he might say so now, because a jury had decided that a swindle had taken place. The French police had given him a statement referring to this Turk, and he published it in order to warn persons against him. The man immediately brought an action, and the case went on for a considerable time, and finally it was decided in his (Mr. Labouchere's) favour. His costs in that action amounted to £3,000 or £4,000—for he had been obliged to send to France and other places for evidence—and the Turk was ordered to pay those costs. But what did the Turk do? He went back to Turkey immediately. He (Mr. Labouchere) could only say that that was an instance of the way in which newspapers were black- mailed. The proprietors of newspapers were the persons who were supposed to attack unoffending persons, but this was the way in which they themselves were attacked. As an instance of the way in which newspapers were blackmailed, he could say that at this moment he was owed at least £7,000 for costs, which had been awarded to him by Courts of Justice, and that he would be happy to sell his entire claim to any hon. Gentleman in that House for a £50 note.

MR. HUNTER (Aberdeen, N.)

said, he did not see how the evil that his hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) mentioned could be entirely remedied, unless they said in the Bill that no action for libel could be brought against any newspaper proprietor whatever. He (Mr. Hunter) objected to this clause in the strongest manner possible. He had strongly supported the other clauses, but this seemed to him to be an unjust provision, because it would deprive 90 out of every 100 persons of any sort of legal redress. The libel might be as notorious as possible, as palpable as possible; but under this clause a poor man would have no means of getting redress, as the poor men who would come under the description given in it would amount to 90 per cent of the population. The hon. Member for South Islington (Sir Albert Rollit) suggested that the clause should be amended, so as to allow poor men to sue in cases where there was an apparent or primâ facie case. Well, he (Mr. Hunter) had considered that very carefully beforehand, and the hon. and learned Attorney General carefully considered it, and he could not find any form which would enable him to carry out that object, and he did not think anybody would be able to propose an Amendment which would have the effect of carrying out that object. What protection was now given to newspapers by the existing law? It was in the Superior Courts, and the Superior Courts alone, that these enormous costs were run up, that the hon. Member for Northampton had alluded to; but in any case where they had a man of straw bringing an action in a Superior Court, they could, as the law now stood, have that case submitted to a County Court. That was the proper way to deal with such cases. It did not deprive a poor man of justice, or of any means of de- fence, while it protected the defendant against excessive and enormous costs; and he had no doubt that if advantage had been taken of the existing law by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Labouchere) he would have been able to show that the plaintiff was without visible means of paying his costs. Lot him point out what was the real difficulty that lay behind this case. He admitted to the fullest extent the hardship inflicted upon wealthy men and wealthy newspapers by spurious actions being brought against them, but it must be remembered that newspaper proprietors were not the only persons liable to this evil. It was one of the disadvantages of wealth. If they were going to say to rich men that they were not going to be shot at by poor men, that would be tantamount to saying that poor men should not have redress from rich men. The general principle upon which they should act was, without depriving a poor man of justice, to give as much protection as possible to rich men in cases such as those referred to. It would be perfectly right in bogus cases for the Court to stop an action, but how could that be done? It could only be done by practically bringing the action before a Master or a Judge. If it was to be understood that an action was to take place "unless just cause to the contrary were shown"—which words the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General understood to mean unless a man had visible means of support—that would necessitate the whole facts of the case being gone into; but suppose the words were inserted, "unless the Judge is of opinion that there is a cause of action on the merits," that would mean that the case was going to be tried before the Master on affidavits instead of before a jury on evidence, and what did that mean? Why, that a defendant was to be allowed to heap insult upon injury. It would enable a defendant probably to make out a strong case on affidavits, and the poor man might be entirely deprived of his remedy. He should be ready to protect the rich man by giving a preliminary trial before the Master; but, as the clause now stood, it would inflict the grossest injustice upon poor men to give newspaper proprietors protection to which they had no claim.

THE LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. J. H. A. MACDONALD) (Edinburgh and St. Andrew's Universities)

said, he would point out to hon. Gentlemen who had spoken already this remarkable fact—that scarcely a single individual who had risen to speak in favour of the clause had expressed himself in favour of it as it stood, but everyone who had spoken declared that something ought to be done to put everything right. One hon. Member had suggested that uncertified bankrupts should be taken out of the Bill, and that that would put everything right. Another hon. Member had suggested that a plaintiff having no visible means of being able to pay the costs should be struck out, and that that would make everything right; and the hon. Member for Northampton had suggested that to insert the words "the Judge should have power to" before the words "make an order," would set the matter right. Many recommendations had in this way been made, but it was a remarkable fact that no one who had made one of these suggestions had had the courage to write down what he suggested on a piece of paper and submit it to the Chairman. This clause was undoubtedly intended, and very properly intended, to meet a particular case, but he supposed all those in favour of the clause would agree that it was desirable that whatever the circumstances were, where a libel had been committed, there should be the means of taking action against the proprietor or editor of the newspaper. The great difficulty of dealing with a clause of this kind lay in the fact that they could not draw a line. No one could draw a line in his own mind, nor could they draw up an Amendment on the Paper which would give a fair and just line. It was proposed by the clause to leave it to the Judge to require a plaintiff to give security for costs unless just cause to the contrary was shown. But what was "just cause" in such a matter? Was it just cause that a man was poor? Surely, everyone would at once repudiate the idea that a man was to be excluded from getting redress for a grievous wrong—which they would for argument's sake assume was a grievous wrong—merely because he was a poor man. Everyone would repudiate that idea. Well, was it strong cause that the defendant was able to assert in the strongest words to the Judge that there was no ground for the action? Surely, everyone would admit that no affidavit, however strong, made by a defendant should have the slightest weight attached to it in such a case; therefore it came to this—that a Judge, before he could ascertain whether there was just cause or not, must make a slip-shod, but still a pretty full inquiry into the merits of the case, and should practically decide the case before there was an opportunity for its being tried by a jury. The hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) told them of the vast cost he was put to in the case of the Turk to whom he referred—the vast cost he was put to in making inquiries in France and elsewhere. But he would have had to make those inquiries before he could prove the ground why the Turk should be precluded from bringing his action against him. Supposing that the Turk had been right and the hon. Member for Northampton wrong—an assumption which, he admitted, was very difficult to make, but he thought for argument's sake it might be ventured upon—assuming that this Turk suing the editor of a well-known newspaper was right, and that the editor of a well-known newspaper was wrong, in that case the poor Turk would have had to incur all the expense of making those inquiries in France for the purpose of satisfying the Judge, preliminary to the hearing of the action, that he had just cause for raising his action. The result, therefore, would be that that would put a man of no means under the absolute necessity of going to the expense, probably by the aid of some friend, of getting up an enormous case preliminary only to the question as to whether or not he was to be allowed to sue? He (Mr. J. H. A. Macdonald) thought that in many cases such a provision of law as this would lead to great injustice and oppression. He concurred in what the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter) had said, that while it was hard upon rich people to be mulcted in certain sums of money in defending themselves from such actions as those referred to, it would be still more hard that poor men should be precluded from bringing their cases before a Court in order to obtain redress merely because of their poverty. Grave injustice would result from any such provision of law. He himself felt very much astonished to hear that the law in this country had gone so far as hon. Members represented it had gone. He thought it had gone a very great length indeed when a suitor, however strong his case might be, and however certain he might feel that a jury would award him a certain sum, should be precluded from having his case decided in the best Court to hear such a case, and was obliged to go to a County Court. ["No, no!"] Yes; he thought that that was the law; he had been so informed. The Judge seemed to have a discretion in the matter that the choice of the Court was not left to the plaintiff. However good the case he might have, if it was shown that he had no means of paying costs, the Judge might in his discretion send the case—it might be a very important one—to a very inferior Court. That was going a long way indeed towards relieving defendants of the difficulties of this clause, and if the Committee were to carry it any further they would be doing an act of gross injustice.

MR. HENRY H. FOWLER (Wolverhampton, E.)

said, he agreed that they should have one uniform law applied to all cases, whether cases of libel or of employers' liability, whether the cases were against railway companies, or whoever they were against. The Committee should be alive to what was already the state of the law. The hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) was not in his place, therefore he would not reply to some observations of that hon. Gentleman; but the hon. Member had asked what the existing law was, and he (Mr. Henry H. Fowler) was speaking in the presence of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General, and, therefore, would be corrected if he was inaccurate in what he was about to say in reply to that question. At the present time, as he understood it, the County Court had no jurisdiction to try libel cases, except special cases provided for in the County Courts Acts proposed to be inserted in the Consolidation Bill now before Parliament. He would ask the House to see what protection was given to poor litigants, and whether it was not ample to meet the special cases put before the Committee with reference to the actions brought against newspapers? The existing law said that any person against whom an action—say for libel—was brought, on affidavit made that the plaintiff had no visible means of paying the costs of the defendant—not, as the hon. and learned Lord Advocate (Mr. J. H. A. Macdonald) had said, had no visible means of subsistence—if the verdict was given against him, thereupon the Judge had power to do two of three things, to make an order that unless the plaintiff gave security for the costs, or satisfied the Judge that he had cause of action fit to be presented to the Court, all proceedings in the action might be stayed; and there was the alternative case of the plaintiff being unable, or unwilling, either one or the other, to give such security, or failing to satisfy the Judge that he had good cause of action, the Judge could make an order remitting the whole case for trial to the County Court, which would then have jurisdiction to try the ease at, as everyone knew, a very moderate rate of costs. That was the general law with reference to these actions of tort. Was there any reason why actions for libel should be treated differently to all other actions? The hon. Member for West St. Pancras (Mr. Lawson) put very powerfully the case of actions brought by poor men who had been guilty of offences, and whose proceedings were made known for the benefit of the public. But there was also the case of the innocent poor man wishing to bring an action for libel which had to be considered. He (Mr. Henry H. Fowler) wished to reserve to himself every right to extend or modify this clause which it was proposed to re-enact this Session in the Consolidating Bill; but he thought that if the general law of the land was to be altered in this manner it ought to be in a Bill for the special purpose. For his own part, he should have some difficulty in supporting the third reading of this Bill if this clause were left in it.

Question put, and negatived.

Clause 8 (On prosecution for libel knowledge of person proceeded against to be shown).

MR. OSBORNE MORGAN (Denbighshire, E.)

said, he had several Amendments to move which would make the clause read as follows:— No person shall be found guilty upon the trial of any indictment for information for the publication of a libel, if it be proved on behalf of the defence that such person was not party or privy to the publication of the libel charged in such indictment or information. These Amendments—the effect of which would be to transfer the burden of proof from the prosecutor to the defendant, on whom it naturally rested—were so reasonable that he thought no objection would be taken to them.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER) (Isle of Wight)

said, he desired to say that he had an objection to this clause; yet he quite agreed that the Amendments proposed were improvements, and he thought, therefore, that the hon. Baronet in charge of the Bill would be well advised if he allowed the Amendments to be accepted, and then any further question which would arise could be discussed when the Question was put that the clause stand part of the Bill.

On the Motion of Mr. OSBORNE MORGAN, the following Amendments made:—In page 3, line 12, leave out "unless," and insert "if;" line 13, leave out "by affirmative evidence;" same line, leave out "prosecution," and insert "defence;" and, in line 14, after "was," insert "not."

MR. DARLING (Deptford)

said, on this clause he desired to move the following Amendment:—In page 3, line 15, after "information," to add "or to the publication of the newspaper wherein such libel was published." The object of the clause was to provide that no person should be found guilty of libel unless it were proved by the prosecution that he was privy to its publication. It was obvious under this clause, as it stood, that an editor or proprietor of a newspaper might escape punishment for libel by saying that he was away when the particular libel was published, and that, though it was true he was responsible for the publication of the paper, he had no connection with the offence complained of, having been away amusing himself somewhere else than at the office of the newspaper, and he might plead that the libel was really the work of some reporter or sub-editor. Newspaper proprietors were very frequently persons in very flourishing circumstances—for instance, a person to whom £7,000 was owing in the shape of costs awarded, but not recovered, must be a gentleman in flourishing circumstances. Well, it might happen that this gentleman—this editor or proprietor—was fulfilling duties in Parliament, and that, although responsible for the production of his paper, he interested himself not in its management, not in its supervision, in order to see that persons were not libelled in it, but in discussing the provisions of a new law for the amendment of the Law of Libel in Parliament. While he was doing that it was possible that a very bad libel might be inserted in his paper which would have never appeared had he paid closer attention to its supervision. In such a case he might simply say—"I left the management of the paper in the hands of persons in an inferior position, and though I have taken no trouble to see whether or not they are inserting libels I have divested myself of responsibility by handing the matter over to them." His (Mr. Darling's) Amendment was to provide that no such answer as that should be sufficient to release a newspaper editor or proprietor from responsibility.

Amendment proposed, In page 3, line 15, after "information," to add the words," or to the publication of the newspaper wherein such libel was published."—(Mr. Darling.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

SIR ALGERNON BORTHWICK (Kensington, S.)

said, he thought the hon. and learned Member had entirely mistaken the object of the clause, as he spoke as if it were intended to shield some guilty party. It would do nothing of the kind, but would entirely protect the innocent. The Committee had had its attention drawn to the fact that in certain cases newspaper proprietors managed their own businesses, and were directly responsible for what appeared in the columns of their journals—that was to say, they had given such and such orders, and were responsible for the carrying out of those orders. The clause was not for the protection of such as those at all; it was intended for the protection of another class of proprietors. Newspapers were generally owned by a number of proprietors who were essentially absentees from the places where those newspapers were published. Papers, for instance, in Liverpool and in other Provincial parts of the country, were very often owned by persons who had nothing whatever to do with their production beyond supplying the funds for carrying them on. If proprietors took part in the management of their papers they certainly ought to be responsible for what appeared in them; but the object of the clause was to prevent the imprisonment of gentlemen who had nothing to do with the libels, and very little to do with the newspapers, and also to save the publisher—an unhappy person, who was very often punished in these cases. It was an old joke against the newspapers that some of them kept a man who was ready to go to prison if they were prosecuted. The publisher was a man who had nothing to do with the production of a newspaper or its issue, except to hand over the sheets which he had never read to the newsmen and newsboys. In these modern days the publisher knew nothing whatever as to what was in the papers, and this law making a publisher responsible came down from times when those individuals occupied a very different position in connection with newspapers—from days when they took a responsible part in the production of the papers. But in these days the publisher and the proprietor were persons who ought not to be held criminally responsible for libel. That a proprietor should have to pay costs was, however, natural—that he should have to bear the responsibility for the negligence or the misdeeds of his servants was very proper; but he should not be held criminally guilty of libel when he could show that he was not privy or party to the publication of the libel charged.

MR. OSBORNE MORGAN

said, he hoped the Government would not accept the Amendment, as its effect would be to render the clause entirely nugatory.

MR. BRADLAUGH (Northampton)

said, he did not know whether the Committee were quite aware—he begged to draw the attention of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General to it—that the clause as now amended, even with the addition of the hon. and learned Member, would entirely change the law. He said that was a great submission. It had been his duty, unfortunately, to have to argue the point more than once at considerable length, and he would point out that in the case of the "Queen v. Holbrook" the law was held to be just the reverse of what they now proposed to make it, with reference to the person publishing a paper, by the clause as it now stood. The clause, with the words proposed to be added by the hon. and learned Gentleman, would read— No person shall be found guilty upon the trial of any indictment or information for the publication of a libel, if it be proved on behalf of the defence that such person was not party or privy to the publication of the libel charged in such indictment or information. By the decision to which he had referred, it was not for the defendant to prove that he was not privy or party to the publication of the libel, but it rested with the prosecution to prove that he was privy to it. [The ATTORNEY GENERAL dissented.] With all respect for the superior knowledge of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Attorney General on this matter, he begged to say that he knew something of the case, the task having been more than once imposed upon him of arguing the matter before the Courts of Law. He had the clearest conviction that the law as laid down by the majority of the Judges was as he stated it. There had been a difference of opinion, no doubt, amongst the Judges; but the law as laid down in the case of the "Queen v. Holbrook" was the opinion of the majority. It was clear, therefore, that, by the proposal they were now making, they were changing the old Law of Libel. He did not say whether this was wise or not; but he would point out to the promoter of the Bill that he was very much more likely to go to prison for libel if he passed his own provision than he would be under the existing law.

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

said, he would point out that, although the hon. Member for Northampton said he was not entitled to be described as "the learned Member," he had studied legal questions very deeply, and was as deserving of that title as a great many learned Members. The hon. Member had intimate knowledge of many legal points, and he therefore could scarcely be looked upon as a layman in putting this matter before the Committee. In the present instance, however, the hon. Member had for once made a mistake in a point of law. The clause of the Act 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, upon which the case of the "Queen v. Holbrook" was decided, provided that whenever on the trial of an indictment for the publication of a libel evidence was given which established a presumptive case of publication against the defendant by the act of any other person under his authority, it should be competent for a defendant to prove that the publication was made without his knowledge or consent, and that it did not arise from any want of due care on his part.

MR. BRADLAUGH (Northampton)

said, that under the section there was no presumptive case of publication required to be made out.

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

said, that the hon. Member probably thought that the omission of the words "presumptive of publication" might alter the law. As a matter of fact, Section 8 in the Bill, as amended, would be more in favour of defendants than the section of the old law to which reference had been made. There must be publication by servants or by himself, but in order to remove responsibility for the act of a servant it was competent for a defendant to show that he was not privy or party to the publication. Whether that was a prudent alteration of the law he did not argue; but he submitted that the hon. Member for Northampton was not quite correctly informed when he said that the law would be strengthened as against the defendant.

MR. LAWSON (St. Pancras, W.)

said, he would point out to the hon. Gentleman in charge of the Bill that, supposing the Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Deptford (Mr. Darling) was carried, the clause would become so meaningless that it would be better to drop it altogether. He thought that the Amendment was moved with the object of making the clause nugatory; and under the circumstances, if the opinion of the Committee was in harmony with that of the hon. and learned Gentleman, he thought the clause had better be omitted.

MR. HUNTER (Aberdeen, N.)

said, that the clause related entirely to criminal charges, and he thought that some hon. Members were under a misapprehension. It was quite right that a newspaper proprietor should be held responsible in damages to the fullest extent for the conduct of his servants; but to say that a newspaper proprietor should be punished for an act of which he had no knowledge would be to introduce the principle of what might be called Chinese or vicarious punishment. It would be just the same as hanging a man for a murder committed by someone else. In Scotland, while damages might be recovered for libel, he did not recollect in the whole course of his life a single case of criminal prosecution for libel, and he would venture to say that, so far from the Press in Scotland being more licentious than the Press of England, it was much less so. He thought they would find that, notwithstanding the absence in practice of any criminal proceedings for libel in Scotland that there was not a single newspaper published in that country which would call itself a society newspaper—the class of newspaper in which these libels mostly occurred. If the hon. Member (Sir Algernon Borthwick) had proposed that all criminal indictments for libel should be done away with, and a civil remedy only retained, it would be an improvement in the law.

THE LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. J. H. A. MACDONALD) (Edinburgh and St. Andrew's Universities)

said, the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down was correct in his statement that criminal prosecutions for libel against newspapers were of rare occurrence in Scotland. It would not be well, however, to do away with a law which would prevent libels of a gross kind, such as those published, for instance, to extort money; and there had been actions in such cases. At the same time, he acknowledged that criminal prosecutions against newspapers for libel were practically obsolete in Scotland.

MR. BOWEN ROWLANDS (Cardiganshire)

said, that while no one desired to relieve the proprietors of newspapers from their civil liability and from damages for the acts of their servants, a very different class of considerations came before them when they considered their criminal responsibility. He wished the conditions in England were the same as those represented by several hon. Members to exist in Scotland, and that criminal prosecutions for libel were of rare occurrence, so that they should only be resorted to in aggravated cases in which such remedy appeared to be imperatively demanded. He thought that the Committee should be very careful before it did anything which would imply, on its part, a desire to extend the liability of newspaper proprietors. They had heard a great deal in the course of the discussion on this clause of hardship to private individuals who were sued; but there was a class of hardship which had not hitherto been mentioned, arising from the fact that sometimes a newspaper was published by a Company. The signature to the original memoranda or articles of association might be that of some person who was met in the street, and induced to contribute a small sum. Although that person might live some distance away, he was liable to be brought from a distance and to be criminally prosecuted—nay, to be fined or imprisoned—unless he could prove to a jury—and this at his own cost and inconvenience—that he was within the ruling in "the Queen v. Holbrook." The general consensus of opinion in the Profession with regard to the case of "the Queen v. Holbrook" was in accordance with the opinion which had been expressed by the hon. and learned Attorney General. He entirely agreed with the hon. and learned Attorney General that the words "presumptive case of publication" really meant nothing, because the presumptive evidence might be given by proof of some such act as signing the articles of association, or memoranda, or something of that kind, which, if it were absent, the Judge would not be justified in leaving the case to the jury at all. He (Mr. Bowen Rowlands) was sensible of the great pain and injury individuals might suffer from the abuse of the great powers which the Press in the country possessed; but that was not sufficient to induce him to accept, or to hope that the Committee would accept, the Amendment of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Deptford (Mr. Darling), which would have the effect of rendering nugatory the clause, whether in its original shape or in the altered shape proposed by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for East Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan). Whether it was wise to add to the Bill any clause which affected the onus of proof he did not pretend to say; but, inasmuch as the Committee had already accepted the Amendment of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for East Denbighshire, it would be simply stultifying itself if it went further, and accepted the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Deptford, which would render the previous resolution of the Committee on the clause entirely nugatory.

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

said, he was not satisfied with the language of the Amendment, and it was as well that he should state fairly at once how he regarded the Amendment. He agreed with the hon. Gentleman the Member for West St. Pancras (Mr. Lawson) that the words of the Amendment were too wide. But in all probability there was one particular class of persons with regard to whom some words should be inserted. He thought some words should be inserted to meet the case of a newspaper proprietor who went away leaving the whole management and control to someone else, reckless as to what might be the actual conduct of the persons in charge of the paper.

MR. DARLING

said, that after what had been said by the hon. and learned Attorney General, he thought the Committee would agree with him that it would not be wise to press the Amendment. The object he had in putting the Amendment down had really been served, because it was perfectly obvious that before the Bill became law something would have to be done to meet the difficulty which he had in his mind. He begged leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Amendment be, by leave, withdrawn."—(Mr. Darling.)

MR. HOWELL (Bethnal Green, N.E.)

said, he was sorry the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Deptford had consented to withdraw the Amendment, because it seemed to him, after all was said and done, that somebody must be made responsible for these libels. He was exceedingly sorry—and he was sure that anyone who knew anything of his past history would know he had reason to be sorry—to support anything which would impose further restrictions on the newspaper Press. But what some of them asked was not that there should be further restrictions—the object of the measure was to remove restrictions which already existed—but under the words of Clause 8, "such person was party or privy to the publication of the libel," it would be difficult, in a great number of cases, to find out anyone who was actually responsible for what took place. It was all very well for hon. Gentlemen in the House who were connected with newspapers to speak of newspapers as though they were all of them conducted as certain newspapers were which one would undoubtedly have in his mind when discussing this matter. But there were newspapers and newspapers, and anyone acquainted with the Press of this country knew very well that some newspapers, instead of being edited in the ordinary sense, were practically handed over to what might be called the "printer's devil," and what kind of responsibility they could get out of that kind of editing was well known. The hon. and learned Attorney General intimated that it was possible to meet this difficulty by fixing the liability upon someone; if anything was done so that the liability should be absolutely fixed on some persons responsible, then it would be all right enough; but some hon. Members seemed to him to treat very lightly this question of libelling individuals. He could quite understand that many actions for libel had been brought against newspapers which ought never to have been brought. But let them take a bonâ fide case, the case of a man who had been robbed of his good name and his good character, and hon. Members would agree that the Press possessed the power of robbing a man of his good reputation. He thought it was a very grave thing indeed to relieve persons who might do as much injury to an individual man or woman, as the case might be, as though they half murdered him in the streets and robbed him of his watch. In many instances men had been absolutely ruined for life by the way in which they had been libelled by newspapers which had escaped penalty. There was one instance which might be known to hon. Gentlemen in the House, the case of a man who would have been an ornament to the House itself. That man tried to get into the House, but he was grossly libelled by some portions of the London Press. He referred to Mr. George Odger. When that man was dead some of the newspapers which had libelled him so grossly made much ado with regard to a public funeral. He (Mr. Howell) wanted to preserve the character of a man while he was living, and not to raise a monument over him when he was dead. He wished they could get rid of the Law of Libel in so far as it appertained to a criminal indictment, but if that were done there must be some other means of reaching men at fault. There were men of straw connected with newspapers as well as among those who took action against newspapers, and, therefore, civil liability might not be enough to deter such men from libelling others.

Question put, and agreed to.

MR. RATHBONE (Carnarvonshire,) Arfon

said, he was as anxious as anyone in the House that the Press of the country should be protected in its public functions, which, they must all admit, it discharged with great power and greater advantage to the public than the Press of any other country in the world. He thought it was also clear that those connected with newspapers should be protected against any criminal prosecution if they could show that they had used due caution in carrying on their trade. He had previously had to consider this question from the defendant's side, as it were, and not from the plaintiff's, because in the case of ship-owners the same question arose. Ship-owners carried on a trade which might be dangerous to life, and what they had always contended was that they were quite ready to be made responsible, even to the extent of being imprisoned, unless they could show they had used due care and caution for the protection of life and property, Therefore, what he proposed to add at the end of the clause was— And if it be shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the defendant had used all reasonable means to guard against such offences. He did not think that any respectable newspaper proprietor would object to those words. It would be, of course, for them to show that, if they had absented themselves from their business, they had left it in charge of a competent and proper person.

Amendment proposed, In page 3, to add at end of the Clause "and if it be shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the defendant has used all reasonable means to guard against such offence."—(Mr. Rathbone.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there added."

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER

said, he thought that the words "to the satis- faction of the Court" were scarcely apt to use in the case of criminal proceedings. Possibly the hon. Member would be satisfied if his Amendment ran "and that the defendant has used all reasonable means to guard against such offence." Of course, it was for the Committee to say whether they thought any such words as these should be inserted. The words of the law at present were "and that the said publication did not arise from want of due care and caution on his part." If such a set of words were added, he thought that, in all probability, newspaper proprietors would be quite satisfied, and that would provide protection in cases in which proprietors took no active part in the conduct of the newspaper, and in other exceptional cases. The words certainly would do no practical harm to those respectable newspaper proprietors who desired to see the law strengthened in cases where there was careless and improper conduct.

MR. RATHBONE

expressed his willingness to accept the suggestion of the hon. and learned Attorney General, and asked leave to withdraw his Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed, In page 3, at end of Clause, insert "that the said publication did not arise from want of due care or caution on his part."—(Mr. Attorney General.)

Question, "That these words be there inserted," put, and agreed to.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill."

MR. RADCLIFFE COOKE (Newington, W.)

said, that, of course, if the Committee thought it desirable to paraphrase a section of Lord Campbell's Act, as they did in this clause, they were at liberty to do so. In his judgment, however, the law at present provided a far better remedy than that proposed by this clause for the protection of newspapers or of persons who were criminally prosecuted. This clause rather weakened than strengthened the position of such persons.

MR. JENNINGS (Stockport)

said, he hoped the Committee would accept the clause as amended, because the object of it was not in the least degree to give protection to newspapers from the consequence of libel, but simply to protect persons who were connected with newspapers from being sent to prison for matters of which they had no cognizance. At present a part proprietor of a newspaper, a man who might probably have had a share in a newspaper left to him, and who had no control in the management, might be proceeded against criminally by any person who felt himself aggrieved, and possibly sent to prison for a libel of which he had no knowledge whatever. It was to prevent this that this clause had been introduced. The objection of the hon. Member for North-East Bethnal Green (Mr. Howell), and the very reasonable demand expressed by the hon. Gentleman that the guilty persons should be found out, were sufficiently met by the fact that, under the law as it at present stood, the guilty person was punished, and the newspaper had to pay heavily for the libel. He earnestly hoped that provision would be made that no one should be punished who had no knowledge of the libel complained of.

Question put, and agreed to.

Clause 9 (Person proceeded against criminally and the husband or wife of such person a competent witness).

MR. TOMLINSON (Preston)

said, that this clause raised again a question which had been dealt with on one of the previous clauses—namely, whether it was desirable to introduce in a special department of justice changes of procedure which, for the entire Criminal Law, were continued in another Bill? It might be said that there were exceptional circumstances connected with the law of libel. It might be that an indictment was sometimes preferred to a civil action in order to keep certain evidence out. At the same time he would like to hear something from some responsible Member of the Government as to whether it was desirable to enact for the purpose of a special department of law that which was already proposed to be made the general rule in the Criminal Law.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER) (Isle of Wight)

said, he hoped the Committee would allow this clause to be inserted. There were 15 or 16 existing Acts of Parliament, in every one of which they had recognized the prin- ciple that the law should be amended in the direction of this clause.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 10 (Act not to extend to Scotland).

MR. DARLING (Deptford)

said, his object in putting down the Amendment that this Bill should not apply to Ireland was that by the clause which they had just passed a proposal of the Criminal Evidence Amendment Bill became law in this Bill. They knew very well that hon. Gentlemen representing Irish constituencies particularly objected to the provision which had just been inserted in this Bill—they particularly objected that in criminal cases the defendant should be competent to give evidence. That had been objected to in former discussions, and it was because he was solicitous respecting the prejudices of hon. Members that he had put down this Amendment. He put it down in order that, if the Irish Members desired to do so, they might give expression to their opinions that, after all, it was advisable that in some cases, at all events, the defendants should be allowed to give evidence in criminal cases in Ireland, and that Judges and magistrates in Ireland were a class of people who might be trusted not to abuse the rights of prisoners to give evidence. He did not himself consider that Ireland should be excluded from the benefits of this Act, unless the Irish Members wished it. It had been said by a Scotch Member that the only good thing in the Bill was that it did not apply to Scotland. If Irish Members wished it to apply to their country they would say so. He would not press his Amendment.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER) (Isle of Wight)

said, he sincerely trusted that the benefits of the Bill would be extended to newspaper proprietors in Ireland, who ought to have those benefits just as much as any other proprietors. Out of 16 Acts of Parliament which created new offences, in regard to which defendants were allowed to give evidence, 14 applied to Ireland, and it would be a monstrous thing if the Committee were to exclude Ireland from the operation of the Bill.

THE CHAIRMAN

I do not understand the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Darling) to move his Amendment.

MR. DARLING

said, that he would not move it.

MR. EDWARD HARRINGTON (Kerry, W.)

submitted that the hon. and learned Gentleman had moved the Amendment.

THE CHAIRMAN

Before I attempted to put it to the Committee, I asked the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Darling) whether he intended to propose it.

Clause agreed to.

Clause 11 (Short title) agreed to.

MR. SYDNEY GEDGE (Stockport)

said, he had now to propose a new clause, which had been entrusted to him by a society representing many of the most important booksellers of the country, in order to give them what they felt to be a necessary protection from actions for libel to which they were at present subjected, under circumstances which certainly did not render them guilty of having taken part in the libel. It was a common thing for a gentleman to write to a bookseller, or to go to a bookseller, and order a particular book to be sent from London through that bookseller. The bookseller very possibly knew nothing about the contents of the book, and had nothing whatever to do with any libel which it might contain. It had often been made a matter of complaint against Mr. Mudie and other large firms that they really selected the books which appeared on their stalls, eliminating some on the ground that they contained matters that they did not approve of, matters of a political, libellous, or scandalous nature. It might be said that the clause, as it stood on the Notice Paper, would enable booksellers to sell books which had been printed and published abroad, and the printer and publisher of which could not be got at, and that, therefore, the person libelled would in such a case have no remedy. He, therefore, begged to move the clause in the following form:— In an action for libel contained in any book, magazine, pamphlet, or printed document other than a newspaper, such book, magazine, pamphlet, or printed document, having been published within the United Kingdom, and bearing the names and addresses of the publisher and printer thereof, against any person other than the author or part author or publisher or printer thereof, if it shall appear at the trial that the publishing of the libel complained of was the sale by the defendant of such book, magazine, pamphlet, or printed document, —therefore they would always have a printer and publisher in the United Kingdom against whom an aggrieved person could bring an action— And that such sale was made by the defendant in ignorance of the existence of the libel complained of, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover any damages except such special damages as he can prove he has sustained by such publishing of such libel. Therefore, if a particular act of publishing or sale by any bookseller of any book or pamphlet had done injury to the libelled person, then the bookseller, however innocent he might be, might still be rendered liable for an action for damages. He thought that with these safeguards the Committee would see that nothing more was asked than might be fairly asked; and, therefore, he trusted they would assent to the clause he proposed.

New Clause—(Extension of the Act to books, &c.)—(Mr. Sydney Gedge,)—brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be now read a second time."

MR. KELLY (Camberwell, N.)

said, he had already pointed out to his hon. Friend that, as the clause stood, if a book were printed abroad and sent over here, there would be no remedy, however gross the libel was, and in consequence its scope had been limited to matter published in the United Kingdom. He could not help thinking that this clause was wholly foreign to the scope of the Bill; they were dealing in the Bill with the protection of newspapers, and he did not consider it proper to go into the general question of the Law of Libel. That part of the clause dealing with the ignorance of the person selling a book was most illusory, because, if a bookseller chose to state that he had never looked into the book, it would not be in anybody's power to prove the opposite, and it would be absolutely impossible for the aggrieved person to obtain any remedy.

MR. DARLING (Deptford)

said, he hoped the Committee would not add this clause to the Bill. It appeared to him to be a most dangerous clause, because it provided that a man who already was liable to a criminal prosecution for publishing a libel should not be liable to a civil action, unless the person he published the libel about could prove he had sustained special damage. They had passed Clause 5, which made provision concerning special damage. He was quite certain many Members of the Committee voted for that clause in the belief that the provision about special damage would somehow or other be removed, and some other qualification substituted for it. A newspaper proprietor or editor, or those who got up the newspaper from day to day, had control over it. The only reason that a man had for not selling scurrilous books was that he knew very well that if in one of them there was a libellous passage, he might be sued and liable in damages for scattering broadcast a libel. If the Committee passed this clause, anyone who was libelled would have no remedy against a bookseller, unless he could prove that he had sustained damage owing to the sale of the particular books the bookseller had sold. Booksellers ought to be careful as to the kind of literature they dealt in. For these reasons, and also for the reason that the clause was not germane to a Newspaper Libel Bill, he hoped the clause would not be read a second time.

Question put, and negatived.

SIR ROPER LETHBRIDGE (Kensington, N.)

said, the object of the clause of which he had given Notice was to extend to writers in newspapers and others similarly situated the protection already extended, or supposed to be extended, to the proprietors and editors and other persons concerned in the publication. With the permission of the Committee, however, he would alter the exact terms of the clause, in deference to representations which had been made to him by his hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General that the wording of the clause, as it stood on the Paper, was somewhat too wide. As he proposed to move it, the clause would stand thus— No summons shall be issued by any magistrate against any person charged with having committed a libel, nor shall any criminal proceedings be initiated in any Court without the written fiat of the Director of Public Prosecutions in England or the Attorney General in Ireland being first had and obtained. The wording that he had now adopted was exactly that which was already to be found in the existing Act, with the exception of the first words, which extended the protection of the law not only to proprietors of newspapers, to editors, and to other persons connected with the publication of newspapers, but also to writers in newspapers. With regard to the general principle of the advantage of there being a public officer to stand between vexatious complainants—between blackmailing enterprizes and a writer for, or proprietors, or editors, of a newspaper—he might say he was himself somewhat in the position of an expert, because, in the official position which he had the honour to hold in India, he was, in a way, the intermediary between the Government and Government officers and the Vernacular Press, and when Government officers desired to put into action the procedure of the Vernacular Press Act, the proposals were, in due course of official routine, submitted to him for his opinion, in order that he could advise the Government. He was strongly of opinion it was very desirable there should be a public officer of this description, and that protection should not only be extended to proprietors and editors of newspapers, but also to all writers in newspapers and other persons similarly situated. He should have preferred to have adhered to the terms of the clause on the Paper; because he had been informed that, as the law in England stood, the direction of the Public Prosecutor was not very often efficiently exercised in this matter. No doubt, the Attorney General would correct him if in that impression he was wrong. He certainly thought that the direction, such as it was, should not be confined merely to proprietors and editors of newspapers, but should extend to writers in newspapers. He, therefore, begged to move the clause.

New Clause— No summons shall be issued by any magistrate against any person charged with having committed a libel, nor shall any criminal proceedings be initiated in any Court without the written fiat of the Director of Public Prosecutions in England or the Attorney General in Ireland being first had and obtained,"—(Sir Roper Lethbridge,)

—brought up, and read the first time.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be now read a second time,"

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER) (Isle of Wight)

said, it was perfectly impossible for him to support the clause, and he hoped he had not led his hon. Friend to think that he had the slightest intention of supporting it. What he had done was to point out to the hon. Gentleman that the clause he had put down was one which would create an entirely new tribunal, and one which was practically incompatible with the discharge of Public Business. Let him say why he thought the clause ought not to be adopted. The proprietor, publisher, editor, or persons responsible for the publication of a newspaper, could not be proceeded against criminally, without the fiat of the Public Prosecutor, and he never heard it suggested that there had been any unfairness in the working of the existing Act. What did the hon. Gentleman suggest? Why, that the exemption should be extended to the writer and publisher of every single libel. He was sure there were some Members of the Committee who remembered the discussion at the time the Act of 1881 was passed. It was felt then that some protection was required for newspaper proprietors and editors, and accordingly exceptional legislation took place, though not without considerable misgiving. Some thought even then they were going too far. Could it be suggested that a man who sat down and wrote a malicious libel, not only in newspaper but in a letter, should also be protected? On what public grounds could it be said that this protection should be extended to the writers in newspapers? In order to justify such an amendment of the law, his hon. Friend must have an overwhelming case.

MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)

said, that when the Newspaper Libel Bill was brought in in 1881, it was argued that this protection must be limited to proprietors and editors of newspapers. The Attorney General now said it would be perfectly monstrous that this protection should be extended to a writer for a newspaper, because he wrote his article in cold blood. [Sir RICHARD WEBSTER: No, no!] The editor himself very frequently wrote a libel, and wrote it in cold blood. [Cries of "Oh!"] Well, in hot blood. An editor was supposed to look over all the articles which appeared in his paper, and that, at least, he did in cold blood. The writer of a libel might be carried away by his feelings; but the editor sat calmly and coolly at his desk, and decided whether the writer had gone further than he ought to. Under these circumstances, it seemed to him (Mr. Labouchere) it was perfectly reasonable that this protection should be extended to the writers for newspapers. He never before understood the distinction between the proprietors and editors of newspapers and the rest of the public. He had always asked that the same protection should be afforded to the entire public as was afforded by the Newspaper Libel Act to editors and proprietors of newspapers.

Question put, and negatived.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, that Clause 7 was not passed. He was under the impression it would be passed, and, therefore, he did not put down his own clause. The Committee would remember that when the discussion on that clause was proceeding, he pointed out, as one of the monstrosities of the present system, that it was impossible to obtain security for costs against anyone who was not domiciled in this country. His right hon. and learned Friend the Member for East Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan) contested that point with him. He (Mr. Labouchere) went to the Library and got an authority which he had no doubt the right hon. and learned Gentleman would accept; it was a book by George Osborne Morgan, Q.C., M.P.

THE CHAIRMAN

I do not understand what the hon. Gentleman proposes.

MR. LABOUCHERE

My clause relates to the question of domicile.

THE CHAIRMAN

The Committee has refused to grant any privileges with regard to costs, and, therefore, it is not now competent to submit any proposal for the security of costs.

Bill reported; as amended, to be considered upon Wednesday next, and to be printed. [Bill 294.]