HC Deb 23 July 1888 vol 329 cc215-41

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [12th July], "That this House doth agree with the Committee in the first Resolution." 1. "That a sum, not exceeding £27,968, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1889, for the Salaries and Expenses of the Department of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, including certain Expenses connected with Emigration.

Question again proposed.

Debate resumed.

DR. CLARK (Caithness)

, in moving to reduce the Vote by £500, for the purpose of expressing his dissent from the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government with regard to Zululand during the last 12 months, and especially in sending back Usibepu, thus causing a renewal of war in that unfortunate country, said, there had been three settlements of the country since the unfortunate war of 1879. Each one of these had been followed by war, and the cause of each one of those wars was the Chief Usibepu. It would have been wise policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government to support Cetewayo against Usibepu. Usibepu had a large and well-supplied army, which had been drilled and trained by whites. Cetewayo had none of those advantages, and he was defeated; while Usibepu remained in the country, and the settlement previously made was broken up. Usibepu was afterwards defeated, and turned out of the country, and remained out of it until Her Majesty's Government sent him back in January last, when the third war began. Lord Derby had pointed out that he had been accepted only after he had deluged the whole of Zululand with blood and had announced his intention of increasing Cetewayo's territory; but Her Majesty's Government did nothing at all, and there was no settlement, except such as was made by the Zulus and a few Boers who took possession of the country, and in 1884 had Dinizulu, Cetewayo's only son, proclaimed King. The Reserve had in the meantime been filled with anarchy; but Her Majesty's Government would have nothing to do in the matter. Relatives of Cetewayo Dinizulu's uncles and his five half-brothers, now came into power, and governed the country in his name; but the Zulus had to pay the Boers, as the ancient Britons had to pay the Saxons, for foreign aid against their invaders, and the Boers began overrunning the country. The question of the price to be paid was left for some time indefinite, but ultimately 2,700,000 acres were fixed upon, although it was doubtful whether the Zulus generally had any idea of the extent of land that was demanded. By-and-bye the British Government began to interfere, not to protect the Zulus, but because it was found that British interests were affected, as the Boers were getting near the sea. Negotiations were entered into between Her Majesty's Government and the Boers in Zululand, who had formed themselves into a new Republic. The idea was to limit the area of land to be given to the Boers and to keep as much as possible for the Zulus with the primary object of keeping the Boors from the sea. It was supposed that, if they once got to the sea the German or some other Power would obtain a controlling influence in Central Africa through the Boers seeking their aid. Those inland States desired to get to the sea in order to avoid paying what they regarded as unjust taxes upon goods that passed through British Colonies. It was a mistake to suppose that those people wanted to have anything to do with the Germans; and if Germany were to interfere with us, we should have no better troops than the Boers if we would only stop the injustice of compelling them to contribute to the taxation of our Colony. In handing over Zulu territory to the New Republic and in every other way we had sacrificed Zulu interests to our own, which was altogether a mistaken policy, and, of course, the Zulus were not well pleased with us. They wanted to come here to state their case; but they were refused passes to enable them to do so. If they had been fairly heard, they would not have been as dissatisfied as they were now. We had determined the boundaries of the New Republic, we had reduced the area of Zululand, and the question was what was to be done with the remaining Eastern portion of Zululand? There were two courses open to us, either to establish a Protectorate, or to annex Zululand to a Colony. A Protectorate had been proposed, and would have been the best for the Zulu people; but, unfortunately, there were always officials who were looking forward to Governships. If we had waited patiently we, as a matter of fact, might have annexed the Zulu people with their own consent; but, unfortunately, we had acted precipitately and with the consent of petty Chiefs, but without the consent of the great Chief and the King of Zululand. The Government annexed the country, and having made unwilling subjects, proceeded to coerce them, and they had worried the Chiefs into taking up arms against us. That they had done by establishing a system of passes, and in other ways that were most vexatious and irritating. In fact, they seemed to have looked upon this part of Zululand as if it were a new Ireland, and to have determined to adopt a policy of coercion, and the Zulu Chiefs not unnaturally were resisting this interference with their liberty. Sir Theophilus Shepstone had advised the Government to send Usibepu to Central Zululand, saying that his presence there would be as useful as an armed force. Thereupon Usibepu was sent among the Chiefs to overawe them, and he (Dr. Clark) blamed the Government for acting on that advice, for that Chief began at once to clear out all the followers of Dinizulu and to take possession of their villages and standing crops. In that way Usibepu had fomented war, and once more showed himself a curse to the country, deluging it with blood. He (Dr. Clark) did not know what he should be told about the war, because no Papers had been given them about it, and all his information on the subject came from the Chiefs and the people affected by these events, and it was altogether of a most unsatisfactory character. The following account of the circumstances of the first engagement he believed to be true:—A police force, accompanied by some of Usibepu's men, was sent to arrest certain Zulus who were accused of taking property which did not belong to them. Dinizulu's people refused to surrender the accused men, and an armed force was at once sent against them and fired upon them without parley or notice, two messengers sent by Dinizulu being killed. The Government were now calling upon the Basutos and other tribes headed by vagabonds like John Dunn for aid in their operations against Dinizulu, and were thus laying the foundations of future blood feuds. He protested against the employment of Native levies in a South African war, for they often committed great atrocities, and for the conduct of these barbarous savages English commanders could not be responsible. He was glad to think that signs were not wanting that Sir Arthur Havelock was awakening to the fact that he had been misled by his advisers in these affairs. In one of his letters, censuring Mr. Osborn, he said— I am reluctantly compelled to think that more fair and greater discretion might have been exercised in the restoration of Usibequ. Allowances should have been made for the difficulty which the chiefs found in accommodating themselves to the new order of things, which was in some respects disappointing and distasteful to them. Now, who were the men upon whose advice the annexation had been effected? They were men who had already caused a great deal of trouble in South Africa—Sir Theophilus Shepstone, his son, and Mr. Osborn. Those were the men who made the Government believe that the people of the Transvaal wished for annexation when, in reality, they were bitterly opposed to it. Not only did they mislead the Government, but they meanly swindled them. The money spent by these men for clothing, hair brushes, fishing rods, vases, and other articles of use and luxury was, at one time, all put down as money spent on forage. He was glad to know that the bill was surcharged, and that Sir Theophilus Shepstone's pension was stopped. He believed, however, that the present Government intended to restore it. Lord Knutsford was quite wrong in thinking that the Zulus were aiding Dinizulu under the influence of fear. They were aiding him of their own free will, and were ready to lay down their lives in the cause which they had espoused. It was also a mistake to imagine that the Boers were in any way concerned in the disturbances. Boer filibusters did not care to fight, unless something was to be gained by it. He believed that Zululand might be made as peaceful as Basutoland if they worked through and made friends of the Chiefs, and he thought that it was now very necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry into the condition of things in South Africa; without it no information of value could be obtained, and valuable lives and treasure would continue to be spent. Did the Government believe that they would control the northern Zulus, if that people heard, as they certainly would hear, of the conduct of the Government towards the southern Zulus? There were going to be more wars, and if they could get some trustworthy information, the Government might be able to solve the difficulties of South Africa, which was now the only place where such troubles existed. He begged to move the reduction of the Vote.

MR. SPEAKER

said, that at that stage the hon. Member could not move the reduction of the Vote. The Question before the House was that they agree with the Committee in their resolution to pass the Vote. The hon. Member could say "No" to that proposition.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir JOHN GORST) (Chatham)

said, he hoped the House would allow him to represent his hon. Friend the Under Secretary for the Colonies (Baron Henry de Worms), who was prevented by his official duties from attending at the House. He hoped the House would come to the conclusion that neither the present Government nor the preceding Governments which had administered the affairs of Zululand had deserved the very wholesale censure which had been cast upon all Governments and every Administration by the hon. Member opposite (Dr. Clark). If there was one subject more than another which those who had held Office in this House could not afford to reproach one another about, it was about the condition of Zululand; because all Governments had to deal with this extremely difficult subject. All Governments had no doubt made some mistakes in dealing with it, and all the House of Commons could do was to watch the administration of successive Governments, and hope that ultimately this extremely difficult problem might be satisfactorily solved. He hoped the House would forgive him if he did not follow the hon. Member for Caithness into all the topics with which he adorned his speech. He did not intend to follow the hon. Member into the personal matters to which he referred. He did not understand that the hon. Member brought any specific charge against any of the persons he had named, except Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and that was a very old story about his expedition prior to the annexation of the Transvaal. He happened to know something about that, because he was Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts at the time when those accounts were brought before it, and they were disallowed and reductions were made. He could only say, speaking from recollection, that nothing was done by Sir Theophilus Shepstone that merited the charge made against him. No doubt the accounts were irregular, and as being so were disallowed; but the Committee were unanimously of opinion that there was not a word against his private honour or public integrity, and he thought it was on the recommendation of that Committee that the disallowance of his pension was rescinded, and that he now enjoyed his full pension. He did not like to go back quite so far in the history of Zululand as the hon. Member. He thought it was quite enough to begin in 1879, when the conquest of Zululand was accomplished. From that moment the British Government became virtually responsible for some settlement or other in that country, and the effects of successive Governments since that date had been to extricate themselves as honourably as they could from the liabilities which that conquest had thrown upon us, and to endeavour to make a settlement at once beneficial to the Zulu people and not onerous to the British taxpayers; and he felt bound to say that up to the present time, the honest efforts which had been made by successive Governments had not led to very considerable success. The hon. Member opposite had referred to the restoration of Cetewayo. Whether the restoration of Cetewayo to supreme power in Zululand would or would not have been a settlement of the affair was a vexed question; because, although it was understood that that was the sort of settlement which was promoted by the Government of 1880–5, of which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. W. E. Gladstone) was the head, yet that policy was never actually carried out, because, instead of Cetewayo being restored to supreme power in Zululand, the country was divided into three parts, and an attempt was made to maintain a Reserve under the direct government of British authority, a portion of the residue was placed under the command of Cetewayo, and the remainder under the powerful Chief Usibepu, of whom the hon. Member had spoken. Usibepu and Cetewayo quarrelled. Usibepu proved the stronger and drove Cetewayo to the Reserve, where he afterwards died. Neither did he propose to follow the hon. Member into the settlement made by the Secretary for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) in 1886. That was made under circumstances of some difficulty. Although consummated by the present Government, it was initiated and was entirely due to the Government of the right hon. Member for Mid Lothian. Dinizulu had made a compact with the Boers in 1884 by which he ceeded 4,234 square miles of territory to the Boers. It was not until after that—not until March, 1886—that the Zulu Chiefs appealed to Sir Arthur Havelock to save them from the utter destruction which the incursion of those Boers threatened; and it was not until that appeal from the Zulu Chiefs themselves that the Government commenced the negotiations with the New Republic about the line of demarcation which were finally consummated by his right hon. Friend. The responsibility for the initiation of those negotiations therefore rested with the late Government. He did not follow the hon. Member into the question of the Customs Duties. The hon. Member attributed the very worst motives to the late and to the present Government in regard to the negotiations. He (Sir John Gorst), on the contrary, believed they were actuated by the best motives, by the desire to save the remnant of the Zulu people from the very certain fate that would have overtaken them if the Government had not interfered. He did not think the late or the present Government were animated by those motives attributed to them by the hon. Member.

DR. CLARK

said the hon. and learned Gentleman misunderstood him. What he said was, that the reason believed in Zululand was that the Government wished to make them still pay blackmail.

SIR JOHN GORST

said, he trusted that that delusion was in course of being entirely removed. There had been a conference on that subject which had ended satisfactorily, and it only awaited the approval of the Legislatures of the various Colonies concerned to bring that vexed question to a conclusion. He did not think, however, that result would be at all assisted by the hon. Member's speech. The result of the negotiations had been that, instead of 4,234 square miles, which the Zulus ceded in 1884, 2,854 square miles only had been ceded, and the remainder of the territory was brought under British protection, part as Reserve, and part as what was known as the territory of Eastern Zululand. That agreement having been come to, it became the duty of his right hon. and noble Friend the Secretary for the Colonies (Lord Knutsford), at that time a Member of the House of Commons, to determine in what way that territory—for the government of which this country had then taken a very much more admitted responsibility by that settlement with the New Republic—was to be governed. He (Sir John Gorst) did not know that that subject was under discussion in the house at the present moment. It was discussed last year, though not perhaps under the best possible auspices, for it was interpolated as one of the dilatory Motions which were brought forward during the progress of the Crimes Bill. At any rate, it was discussed, and, although the senior Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere), with that profound knowledge of the British Empire which characterized him, denounced the Government in no measured terms, he did not think the hon. Member's denunciation was supported by the official Opposition. He would, therefore, pass by that question. He now came to the questions whether, since the annexation of Zululand, Her Ma- jesty's Government had in the administration of that country made mistakes which deserved censure, and whether they were now endeavouring to administer the affairs of Zululand on principles which the House of Commons would approve and support. He thought he could show that, on the whole, the administration of the Government had been sound, and that the policy they were pursuing in South Africa was such as to deserve the confidence of the House, such as it could well approve, and the country also at large. The hon. Member (Dr. Clark) had a much easier way than he (Sir John Gorst) had of settling the present difficulty. The hon. Member said that Usibepu caused all difficulty in Zululand, and that he was the man who had brought about the present war. The hon. Member saw Usibepu everywhere—that Chief was to him the cause of every difficulty, and he really talked as if her Majesty's Government had invented Usibepu. Unfortunately, having undertaken to govern the country, the Government had that awkward customer to manage as well as the other Zulus. If Usibepu were not in East Zululand he would be in the Reserve, where he might be as troublesome as, or even more trouble-some than, he was in his present position. When they undertook to govern a semi-civilized people like the Zulus, they must necessarily encounter a great many difficulties, and must deal with them as best they could. He did not think that the mode in which Usibepu had been treated deserved the censure of the hon. Member. It was true that when Usibepu was defeated and driven into the Reserve, Lord Derby refused him military aid, on the ground that he had been distinctly warned and told that he must maintain himself by force of his own arms. The hon. Member represented to the House that Lord Derby cast some censure on Usibepu; but, in reality, his Lordship did nothing of the kind. His Lordship said, that this country was not bound to go to war for the purpose of restoring Usibepu; but that, as he had been driven into the Reserve, we would give him an asylum there, though he could do nothing further for him. It was also true that in 1886 Lord Granville, acting on the advice of Sir Arthur Havelock, refused to let Usibepu return to his own territory. The ground for that decision was the unsettled state of Zululand. At the same time, a promise was made to Usibepu that when affairs were on a more satisfactory footing, his position should be considered. But when we assumed the Sovereignty of Zululand, the state of affairs changed. Every Zulu was entitled to our protection, and there was no logical ground for withholding permission from Usibepu to return. Accordingly, in August, 1887, Sir Arthur Havelock, who had recommended Lord Granville to refuse Usibepu permission to return in 1886, himself earnestly begged the Secretary of the Colonies to entrust him with the authority to arrange the repatriation of Usibepu, under certain conditions. That request was backed up by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Mr. Osborn, and the other officials. The Secretary of State, writing on September 12, 1887, said— Having regard to the strong opinions expressed by those best qualified to form them, I am prepared to leave you full discretion to act as you think best in this matter, it being clearly understood, however, that Usibepu is not to resume his former position as an independent Chief, but that he will be a British subject, exercising only such powers over his own people as the Government may assign him. Shortly after the receipt of that despatch, Sir Arthur Havelock thought proper to restore Usibepu to his old position in Zululand. Looking at the matter in the light of the evidence of subsequent events, he had not the slightest hesitation in saying it would have been better if Usibepu had been kept in the Reserve, instead of being restored to his own country. There was no doubt that the experiment had been unfortunate, and soon after the experiment was tried, Sir Arthur Havelock admitted that there was considerable uneasiness in the minds both of the Usutus and the other Zulus. On the 18th of January in the present year, Sir Arthur Havelock stated that he was alive to the necessity of great care and circumspection. The hon. Member for Caithness attributed the outbreak of the present disturbances in Zululand to Usibepu's turbulence and determination to fight, but nothing was more remote from the truth, for in reality he had not been engaged in any operations which were calculated to promote disturbance. In the Papers which would shortly be laid before Parliament, hon. Members would find that every effort was made to explain to Dinizulu the grounds and conditions on which Usibepu was restored. The real cause of the disturbances was that Dinizulu and Undabuko had been induced to give ear to reports which had been industriously circulated, to the effect that the British Sovereignty was not going to be maintained in Zululand; that they were likely to draw back, and leave their allies to their fate; and it was the hope inspired in that way that led Dinizulu and Undabuko to make preparations for securing to themselves the reversion of the Sovereignty of Zululand. As long ago as April 6 last, Dinizulu left Zululand and entered the Transvaal and the New Republic, endeavouring to obtain recruits and adherents for his intended resistance to the British Government. He was, however, glad to say that neither the Government of the New Republic nor the Government of the South African Republic lent any heed whatever to his proposal. Both those Governments had acted in perfect loyalty to the British Government, and had given no countenance whatever to the disturbances. Although there might be an odd filibuster or two in Dinizulu's camp, they were merely independent and isolated personages, and had received no encouragement, direct or indirect, from the Government of any Republic in South Africa. On May 13 Dinizulu returned to Zululand, and on June 2 the attempt was made to arrest him and Undabuko, which, if it had been successful, would probably have prevented any of these outrages. No doubt, that was a very unfortunate attempt. It was made by Mr. Osborn, in conjunction with the Military Authorities, and it was made after distinct warning from Sir Arthur Havelock that no such attempt was to be made, unless the authorities were satisfied that the force at their disposal was sufficient for the purpose. But he would like the House to mark clearly that the attempt was made because Dinizulu had actually seized the cattle of Umnyamana, who was one of the most loyal and reliable Chiefs in Zululand. As hon. Members knew, reinforcements had been sent in the shape of one regiment from the Cape of Good Hope, and one of the regiments now in Egypt would, on its way to the Cape, stop at Durban, and, if necessary, proceed to Zululand, and the Military Authorities there assured the Government that when these reinforcements arrived they would have a sufficient force to put down the rebellion. There was in the camp at Ceza an unknown number of Zulus headed by Dinizulu and Undabuko, and it was against that body that these reinforcements would be directed. It must be admitted that, having undertaken the government of Zululand, and having annexed the territory to the British Crown, Her Majesty's Government must put down all armed resistance which existed within the territory, and it was quite impossible that anything could be done until these Chiefs had been compelled to abandon their present attitude of attempting to take the Sovereignty of Zululand out of the hands of Her Majesty's Government. The contest would be simply one between the British force, representing the authority of the British Crown, and Dinizulu and his friends, who were now in armed opposition to it. There was no intention whatever, when the camp was broken up, to punish the people committing these outrages with any undue severity, and the moment armed resistance was put down and Dinizulu's force dispersed, every attempt would be made to induce the Zulus to go back to their old peaceful avocations, and no vindictive measures would be resorted to with the object of punishing them for the part they had taken in the war. The ringleaders must, however, be punished.

COMMANDER BETHELL (York, E.R., Holderness)

Is that a definite statement of policy?

SIR JOHN GORST

said, it was. The Secretary of State for the Colonies had not yet, of course, received full details as to what had occurred; but it seemed clear that it was impossible for the British Government to tolerate the presence in Zululand of men who had stirred up the people to attack the Sovereignty of the British Crown. Moreover, it was essential that Undabuko and Dinizulu should be removed; because it was quite clear that there could be no peace or good government in the country as long as the ringleaders who had incited the people to take up arms against the authority of the British Crown remained there as a centre of disaffection. When the insurrection was put down, there was no desire or intention to act harshly towards the people, because the Government believed that they had been encouraged to engage in these hostilities in ignorance, and without any complete knowledge of the facts, and that they deserved rather the compassion of the Government than anything like severity of punishment. It must, however, be distinctly understood that from the duty of asserting the Sovereignty of Great Britain over Zulu territory the Government would not go back. Having once undertaken the government of that country, it was impossible to tolerate any power setting itself up against the authority of Great Britain, and any attempt to negotiate with persons while actually in armed resistance to our power would be a most cruel wrong even for the Natives themselves, and would cause a great deal more destruction and bloodshed than a short, sharp engagement. In mercy to the Zulu people themselves, it was imperative that the armed resistance should be immediately put down, and that the inhabitants should be made to know that Her Majesty's Government intended to maintain the Sovereignty they undertook two years ago. So far as the action of Her Majesty's Government in London was concerned, he did not think that even the hon. Member for Caithness could find fault with that. So far as the conduct of the local officials was concerned, he admitted at once that the restoration of Usibepu was unfortunate; but he thought that he had a very strong claim to be allowed to go and enjoy his own territory, and he thought he had shown that at the outbreak of hostilities Usibepu was not concerned. In conclusion, he hoped, now that it was known distinctly that Her Majesty's Government would not surrender the Sovereignty of Zululand, and intended to reduce the country to a state of order and obedience to the law, this temporary outbreak might speedily be put down. He was afraid, however, he would be too sanguine a prophet if he were to say that that was the last the House would hear of Zululand. Still, he hoped that the manly and direct responsibility the Government had now undertaken for the administration of the affairs of the country might, at least, lead to a more settled state of affairs in it, and that ultimately the task which this country had been compelled to take upon itself of governing Zululand might be accomplished with honour and success.

MR. OSBORNE MORGAN (Denbighshire, E.)

said, it was high time this important Question, which had been so often postponed, should be fully discussed. It was to be regretted that the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Baron Henry de Worms) was not able to be present; but he could not have selected a more able substitute than the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India (Sir John Gorst). Lord Knutsford had said the other night that the situation in Zululand, though not dangerous, was serious. But for the last 10 years the situation in Zululand had been a serious one. Ever since that disastrous Zulu War by which we had crushed the life out of a brave and high-spirited people and had turned a nation of soldiers into a nation of serfs Zululand had been a thorn in our side. He would not go through the long and dismal tale—the Wolseley settlement—the restoration and death of Cetewayo—the irruption of the Boers and the so-called cession to them of the greater part of Zululand—those were matters of history. He would come at once to the settlement of May last, and the tripartite division of Zululand. Of that settlement he had remarked at the time that we were making the best of a bad business. But, be that as it might, it was essential to its success that it should be loyally and permanently accepted by all parties, Yet the ink on the Proclamation was hardly dry before two of these Zulu Chiefs, Dinizulu and Uzibepu, were flying at each other's throats. That was hardly surprising, for the normal state of these men was one of inter-tribal warfare, and considering the hereditary character of their feuds it was about as probable that a cat and dog should live in peace and amity together. That was a contingency against which he thought the Government ought to have been on their guard, and he could not acquit them of blame. Indeed, Lord Knutsford admitted that our force was not equal to maintain order in the country, and it was impossible to ignore the fact that while Dinizulu, as Cetewayo's son, represented what was left of the national sentiment in the country, his rival, Usibepu, was hated by the National Party among the Zulus. There was another fact, however, which greatly aggravated the difficulties of the situation. About a week ago a paragraph appeared in The Times from the Durban correspondent of that paper, who appeared to be well informed, which stated that it was beyond doubt that Dinizulu was receiving assistance from White men, and that the authorities of the New Republic were powerless in the matter. We had now, according to the statement of the hon. Gentleman, some 1,500 or 1,600 European troops and some 600 Native levies in Zululand, so that we had there all the materials for a war on a small scale. No doubt that force, especially if strengthened by the reinforcements which were under orders to proceed from Egypt, would be sufficient to cope with the Zulus. But a Boer war in the background was, as they knew to their cost, a very different thing. Lord Knutsford had said that the authorities in the Transvaal and the New Republic were behaving loyally at this crisis; but he must be excused for not placing absolute confidence in the Rulers of those territories, or rather in their power to hold in hand their own people. At such a juncture the death of Sir John Brand—the President of the Orange Free State—a man of great ability and scrupulous integrity, who had always acted with perfect loyalty to this country, was an incalculable misfortune. He had no wish to embarrass the Government, who had enough on their hands already. It might be necessary to put down this rebellion by force, for we had annexed the country, and we must assume the responsibilities of annexation. A mere paper annexation was of all evils the worst, and we must be prepared to govern as well as to conquer. It was difficult at this distance to say how far the problem was a military and how far an administrative one, and he observed with regret from The Times of to-day that a serious friction existed between the Civil and Military Authorities. It was not the first time that such a state of things had arisen; but it was always to be deplored, and the sooner it was terminated the better. What was really wanted was that as soon as this rising was over Zululand should be administered not only with a firm hand, but with some regard to the wishes and sentiments of its people. The history of Basutoland—not much more than 100 miles distant—presented a marked contrast to that of Zululand. Basutoland, thanks to the good sense and firmness of one of the best public servants the Crown ever had (Sir M. Clark), had been administered in a manner most creditable to the British Government, and he devoutly hoped that the authorities in Zululand would learn a lesson from that distinguished man, and would not attempt to ride rough-shod over a people who, like most other savage nations, were easy enough to govern provided they were governed in the right way. If the hon. Member went to a Division he could not support him, and he would tell him frankly why. The expression of a strong difference of opinion in the House of Commons might weaken our authority in South Africa when it was of the utmost importance just now to strengthen it; and if, as he had always maintained, there was to be a continuity in our Colonial policy, it was desirable, except upon grave questions of principle, that the action of the Government of the day should not be lightly challenged.

SIR GEORGE BADEN-POWELL (Liverpool, Kirkdale)

said, that he could not agree with the right hon. Gentleman opposite that they ought to ignore altogether the history of this question, because it was from the past history that they could best learn what they ought to do now. He believed that the present position of affairs in Zululand was a very serious one, and while it called in question our whole policy in South Africa, it would, he hoped, prove the turning point in that policy. The hon. Member for Caithness (Dr. Clark) had spoken that night as the advocate of what he might call the Royal Party in Zululand; but the Royal Party had been destroyed in war. The ancient history, as it had been termed, of Zululand stopped with the complete break up of the organization of Cetewayo as a party system. He would remind the hon. Member for Caithness that Cetewayo was neither by blood, election, or other constitutional means, the head of the Royal Party; he was only one of Panda's sons, selected chiefly by the aid of the British Government from among all the sons, who fought among themselves, the object of the British Government being that there should be some representative of the Zulu nation. But in 1879, whether rightly or wrongly, the Zulu nation was broken up, with the result that the Zulus were left without any organization or head. The restoration of Cetewayo, which was strongly deprecated at the time by the present Secretary of State for the Colonies (Lord Knutsford), failed, because there was no central authority to maintain law and order over everybody. The annexation of Zululand followed, and the restoration of Usibepu. In taking over that country he maintained that we became morally responsible not only for law and order, but for the peace and prosperity of the country, and he contended that it was our duty to retain in our hands sufficient territory in Zululand for the Zulus to live upon. No mention had yet been made in that debate of the views of the Colony of Natal on the subject; and he wished to emphasize the fact that they ought to pay the greatest attention to the opinion of that essentially English Colony. There had been a proposal from Natal which he very much respected, that they should relieve the British Empire of all trouble in the matter by taking Zululand over and ruling it themselves. That proposal should be treated with great respect. Though he did not think Natal was as yet sufficiently advanced in power or wealth to take over the control of so turbulent and disturbed a country, we should not forget that we had out there a band of prosperous Englishmen, ready to assist us in bearing the responsibility the Empire had incurred in Zululand. With regard to the feelings and intentions of the Boers, he must really deprecate the incursions made by the hon. Member for Caithness into the commercial policy of the Free State, because that policy had nothing whatever to do with our policy in Zululand. He fully re-echoed what had been said by the right hon. and learned Member for East Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan) as to the loss which South Africa had sustained by the death of Sir John Brand. He had seen a great deal of him, and it was quite true that, while he was first for his own country, under him the Orange Free State always worked hand in hand with the British Government. He hoped the day had gone by when we might look upon the Boer States as our foes. The events which had occurred in Zululand showed that the Boer Republics had loyally acted in our interest and their own in opposing anything like turbulence or rebellion on their borders. A pamphlet had recently been published with regard to South Africa to which he should like to draw the attention of the House. It was entitled Boers, Blacks, and Blackguards.

MR. JOHN MORLEY

British.

SIR GEORGE BADEN-POWELL

said, he thought that must have been a parody, because the one he saw was as he had quoted it, and he wanted to refer to the last class in that book—the blackguards. In South Africa there were a great number of persons who were Europeans in blood, but who were certainly not Boers in the ordinary sense of the term. Those men were ready at the slightest sign of turbulence to join on either side, hoping out of the scramble to obtain somethipg to their own benefit, and those men were our greatest trouble. It was said they were siding with Dinizulu already, and unless we showed a strong front there were hundreds, if not thousands, ready to flock to the standard of any rebellious Chief in the hope of sharing the plunder, and it was against these men chiefly they had to guard; and we could best do by a greater display of strength and a more consistent policy. There was another point with regard to the administration of Zululand that he wished to mention. Careful inquiry in Bechuanaland had convinced him that if we had set up a firm permanent administration there at a cost of £10,000 or £15,000 we should have avoided an expedition which cost the country over £1,000,000 sterling. He hoped we should be forewarned this time, and avoid anything like that in Zululand. He fully agreed with the hon. Member for Caithness as to the weakness of the administration that had taken place in Zululand up to this. When they found their Representative there addressing such language as he did to Dinizulu after he had become a rebel against the Queen's authority, it was time that he should be either rebuked or recalled. What was wanted was a sufficient show of force to call upon the Chiefs to attend before a magistrate and give an account of themselves when they did wrong. No half-measures were of any effect with these people. He hoped that Her Majesty's Government were taking measures to send sufficient troops to South Africa. They had most wisely ordered reinforcements out, and he trusted that they would not hold their hand, but would send more reinforcements. He trusted that the Government would give them some explanation of the very serious telegram that appeared in that day's Times, which told them, rightly or wrongly, that serious friction existed between the Civil and Military Authorities of Zululand. He hoped that this was not the case, and now that the Civil Government had broken down in Zululand full and complete responsibility would be thrown on the Military Authorities to re-establish the Queen's authority. That, he thought, was absolutely necessary. When law and order were restored there then a strong civil administration could follow. He could wish nothing better than that Sir M. Clarke should be sent out to Zululand. That would be much better than the Royal Commission which the hon. Member for Caithness advocated. He was not at all confident that the removal of Dinizulu and Undabuko would settle everything; for they must remember that the removal of Cetewayo and Langilebalele did not settle the country, and he thought they ought to send a strong and experienced administrator to Zululand. The Government must show by our force that we were willing to undertake the responsibility of Empire, and that we remembered that cardinal political maxim that in a Government weakness was wickedness.

MR. JOHN MORLEY (Newcastle-upon-Tyne)

said, that no subject could come before the House which more required us to see in what direction we were going than that now under discussion. No one could be more competent to address the House upon this question than the hon. Member who had just sat down; and he (Mr. John Morley) had been surprised to hear him repeating exactly the remarks which had laid the foundations for the admitted mistakes into which Mr. Osborn, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and Sir Arthur Havelock had fallen with regard to Zululand. The hon. Member had said that the Royal Party in Zululand had been entirely destroyed, and that they were entirely broken up, and that we had no longer to deal with a nation. The Blue Book had shown that the mistaken theory of the three gentlemen he had just named, able as they were, had been that there was no National Party in Zululand, and that there was no Zulu nation. But, in that case, how was it that whenever any Members of the Royal Family came forward they were sure to attract to themselves these tribes, and that the whole of the people rallied round them? The fact was that there now existed a great number of the Native inhabitants of the district—by far the greater portion of it—who were National, and by the course we were taking we were sending regiments of soldiers to coerce the very people who, we were told, were yearning for our presence. He was afraid that a more grievous mistake had never been made in history than that which we had committed with regard to this unfortunate country, and which, apparently, we were about to repeat. By the disastrous policy which had been pursued by Sir Bartle Frere the Zulu nation had been broken up. The greater portion of what remained of the nation was following Dinizulu; and it was with them, led by their voluntarily chosen and adopted Chieftain, that we were going to fight, following exactly the same lines that had led us to disaster in Zululand. We had got into a fresh mess in the same manner that we had got into the old one. How could anyone talk, as the Under Secretary had talked that evening, of our acting for the benefit of the Native race, when he remembered that our intervention, coloured and veiled by exactly the same honourable plea in its intention, but by the same mistaken plea for that policy, had deluged Zululand with blood, had led to the destruction of far more thousands of Zulus than Cetewayo and other Chiefs had ever destroyed? He wished the hon. Baronet the Member for the City (Sir Robert Fowler) to say whether the intervention of the English power in Zululand had not been as great and cruel a disaster to the Native races as could possibly be. He would, therefore, utter his protest against the renewal of that mischievous and mistaken policy upon exactly the same principles and plea urged by Sir Bartle Frere in 1879. Some sort of peace must be restored in this portion of Zululand, but the Government were going the wrong way about it in insisting upon the restoration of Usibepu. He merely wished to ask the Government on that occasion whether they intended to insist upon the removal of Dinizulu, and trusted they would not conclusively pledge themselves to do so.

SIR ROPER LETHBRIDGE (Kensington, N.)

said, he should have supported the proposal for a Commission of Inquiry if the hon. Member for Caithness had urged the demand on other grounds than those which he put forward. Those who had watched the course of events since the annexation of Zululand would agree with much that had been said as to the doubtful character of the policy that had been pursued in that country of late. But the hon. Member went further. In demanding this inquiry he took up the cause, not of a nation, but of one faction only. The hon. Gentleman had blamed the Government for permitting Usibepu to return from the Reserve into his own country in Eastern Zululand, and he certainly had gone out of his way to attack those who were at the present moment British officials in that country. The fact they had to remember was this—that the National power in Zululand had been destroyed; we had no longer to deal with a nation, but with a small faction headed by Dinizulu and his friends. It was necessary that we should put down armed resistance to the authority of the Queen before entering into negotiations with those carrying on the armed resistance. Any attempt to invest Dinizulu and his faction with the dignity pertaining to a nation would be a very great blunder indeed, especially so long as those men were in open opposition to the power of the Crown.

MR. PICKERSGILL (Bethnal Green, S.W.)

said, he had to complain of the absence of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Baron Henry de Worms), who seemed to be away on business in no way connected with the Colonial Office. No doubt the business on which the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State was engaged was important from the Government point of view, but the appointment seemed to be an illustration of that unfortunate chopping and changing of Offices, in the course of which the square man happened to be put into the round hole. The other evening the affairs of Mauritius were brought under the notice of the House, and the reply on behalf of the Government was made by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General for Scotland (Mr. J. P. B. Robertson), whose conspicuous ability was universally recognized, but who had no kind of responsibility for the Colonial Office. Scarcely a day passed without some difficult question being raised in the House; and there was absolutely no one from whom they could elicit full information and upon whom they could fasten responsibility. This was a most unfortunate condition of things. It was not respectful to the House, and scarcely showed, on the part of the Government, that regard for the interests of our Colonies about which they so loudly protested.

SIR ROBERT FOWLER (London)

said, he would remind the House that the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India (Sir John Gorst) had, during a long course of years, taken a prominent part in the debates on South Africa. They regretted the absence of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, but there was no man more entitled to speak with authority on South African questions than his hon. Friend. As to the Mauritius debate, he believed that the hon. and learned Solicitor General for Scotland on that occasion had sat with Lord Knutsford, the Colonial Secretary, during the protracted discussions with Sir John Pope Hennessy; and therefore his hon. and learned Friend was able to represent the Government in that debate. The right hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Mr. John Morley) had made personal reference to him in this matter. He (Sir Robert Fowler) had always looked with great regret at the attack made by Sir Bartle Frere on Cetewayo, and he had always looked upon the war as a great mistake, and believed that it laid the foundations of the subsequent events which they had to deplore. He had encouraged the restoration of Cetewayo, which he thought at that time was justified, though it had turned out to be unfortunate. At that time the Government and statesmen of Natal disapproved the course taken by Lord Kimberley; and if Lord Kimberley's action in the restoration of Cetewayo turned out to be unfortunate, the fault was not to be laid on Lord Kimberley, but on those subordinates in Natal who did not support him. It seemed to him, however, that moving the reduction of the Vote was a most unsatisfactory way of expressing approval or disapproval of a policy, and he, therefore, could not support the Motion. He had very great confidence in the Secretary of State for the Colonies. He thought it would be admitted on all hands that no one holding that Office had had so much previous experience as his noble Friend; and he knew that the noble Lord would carefully consider what course we ought to pursue. He joined his hon. Friend (Sir George Baden-Powell) in paying a tribute to the statesmanship of Sir John Brand, who had left behind him a great reputation, and whose death was a loss, not only to the Free State, but to the world at large.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN (Birmingham, W.)

said, he agreed with the hon. Baronet who had just sat down as to the advantage which the House enjoyed in the Government being represented on this matter by his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India (Sir John Gorst). Although they regretted the absence of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Baron Henry de Worms), the House would lose nothing in the way of information by the substitution of his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India. With reference to what had fallen from the hon. Member for the South-West Division of Bethnal Green (Mr. Pickersgill), he (Mr. J. Chamberlain) must say he thought that the criticism of the hon. Gentleman was neither just nor generous. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies was absent carrying out a matter as to which he pronounced no opinion at the present time; but nobody could conceive anything more important to our principal Colonies than the settlement of the question of the sugar bounties which the hon. Gentleman had undertaken. He hoped that his hon. Friend the Member for Caithness (Dr. Clark) had no intention of dividing the House, because his object had been fully gained by the discussion which had taken place. They were indebted to the hon. Member for a most interesting statement of the quarrel which had arisen. The hon. Baronet opposite had referred to the old Zulu War. He (Mr. J. Chamberlain) was one of those who were responsible for the restoration of Cetewayo. He was convinced, now as then, that it was the only right policy to pursue at the time, and if it had had a fair chance it would, he believed, have been successful. But it did not have a fair chance, and for this reason—our officials in South Africa were opposed to it. He did not mean that they did not loyally do their duty to the Government which employed them, but it was quite impossible for persons who believed that a particular policy was wrong to carry it out successfully. With the greatest goodwill and the best desire on their part, they could not do justice to a policy of which they personally disapproved; and he thought the only mistake which the Government of which he was a Member made was that when they determined on that policy they did not find other instruments to carry it out. He understood that the policy pursued in the case of Cetewayo was to be pursued in the case of Dinizulu. He hoped not; but if the Government had arrived at any determination of that sort he trusted that it was a matter for further consideration. He had endeavoured to ascertain the facts, and his sympathies, he confessed, were in favour of Dinizulu as against his opponent Usibepu. Dinizulu, no doubt, represented the influence of Cetewayo. They had succeeded in reducing the Zulu nation to little more than a faction, but Dinizulu had more authority over what remained of the Zulus than any other Chief. Dinizulu was by our action put in a defenceless position as against his opponent; but if they put him on an equal footing he thought that Dinizulu would swallow up Usibepu without any difficulty. Inasmuch as Dinizulu had been led to make an attack upon the British positions, and to put himself in direct opposition to the authority of the Queen, he must be put down. He very much doubted whether Dinizulu knew what he was doing. They must remember what sort of a man they were dealing with. He thought that the Chief had been deceived, and led on from what he considered a tribal quarrel with Usibepu until he had unwittingly found himself in opposition to the Queen of England. What he pleaded for was that when they had put down Dinizulu mercy and consideration should be shown to him; and that the most careful consideration should be given to the question whether, after all, it might not be well to restore him to his former authority when he had learnt the lesson that he must not attack the soldiers of the Queen. What was the moral of these continual lessons which they were having with regard to South Africa, and especially with regard to Zululand? That debate and other debates on the same subject had been conducted without the least reference to Party Divisions in the House, and there seemed to be a general agreement of opinion that the difficulty in which they were placed arose from an erroneous interpretation of the situation by those in authority in South Africa. This had always been the case. Our officials advised the Government wrongly in the first instance when the original war took place, and he thought that they had advised the Government wrongly ever since. He did not want to say a word against those gentlemen, who, no doubt, were perfectly loyal and very able men. But when he found that again and again the advice which they gave had been wrong, he thought that the time had come when they should consider whether their places could not be taken, with credit and advantage to the country, by others. It was recorded that Peter the Headstrong said that he hated most of all "unfortunate great men." Our great men in South Africa had been very unfortunate. They had led successive Governments into war and into the most grievous expenditure of life and treasure. He did think that under these circumstances, and now at this moment, when they were suffering from a similar want of correct information, the Government ought, he would not say to remove these gentlemen, but at all events to consider whether they should not supplement them by some fresher intelligences, by whom the Government would be kept more accurately informed of the true state of things.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. E. STANHOPE) (Lincolnshire, Horncastle)

said, he quite agreed that it was inconvenient and difficult to discuss this question in the absence of fuller information than they were in possession of. He believed that Papers would shortly be laid before the House on the subject, and they would show that Dinizulu had no excuse whatever for taking the law into his own hands in the way he had done. When the right hon. Gentleman drew a parallel between the action of Cetewayo and that of Dinizulu, it was important to remember that Dinizulu was a British subject living within the territory; and it had been admitted that in the present circumstances the course now being taken by the Government was an absolutely necessary one. Even in the interests of the Natives themselves, the proper course was to put down, first of all, the state of affairs now existing, and to enforce peace and order throughout the country as quickly as possible. As to the ulterior steps, he could not say much. The right hon. Gentleman opposite made an appeal to the Government not to be too hasty in coming to a decision as to the course to be adopted when peace and order had been restored. He entirely agreed with him. It was very desirable that they should be put in full possession of information showing what had taken place, and that they should reserve their judgment on all the questions to be settled until that information was obtained and placed before them. The Government had been asked whether it was true that there was any substantial friction between the Governor and the General Officer commanding in Zululand. He was very glad to say that there was not. The steps to be taken for the purpose of restoring peace and order in Zululand must, of course, be concerted between the Governor and the General Officer commanding; but as soon as those steps were settled the General Officer became invested with full military authority, and was free from the control of the Governor until they were carried, as it was hoped they would be, to a successful conclusion.

MR. A. M'ARTHUR (Leicester)

said, he thought the conduct of England with reference to South Africa in general for many years past had been anything but creditable to them, and in regard to their treatment of the Zulus in particular he considered it was unjust and ungenerous. Many years ago the Boers swarmed into Zululand and took some of their best land from the Zulus, who endeavoured to expel the intruders and attacked the Transvaal. We interfered and advised the Zulus as to the course which they should follow. They accepted our advice, and Commissioners were appointed to investigate the matter. The Commissioners practically decided in favour of the Zulus; but those Boers who had taken possession of land were not to be disturbed, but compensation was to be given to the dispossessed Zulus. The Zulus were naturally discontented, and in consequence of that discontent became involved in war with this country. We conquered them and made Cetewayo prisoner. The late Mr. Forster, who took a great interest in South African affairs, commented in severe terms on the gross breach of faith of which we had been guilty with reference to the Zulus. We had, he feared, lost the confidence of the Natives by our past policy, and he earnestly hoped we should avoid the mistakes which we had committed in the past. If we were to maintain our hold in South Africa, it must be by a different policy from that which we had carried on in the past.

SIR JOHN SWINBURNE (Staffordshire, Lichfield)

said, he should like to ask whether it was intended to arm Natives, as was done in the Transvaal under Lord Wolseley, when the employment of one section of Natives to fight another section led to the most frightfula trocities.

DR. CLARK

said, with the consent of the House he begged to withdraw his opposition, because the matter could be further debated on another Vote. As he had been misunderstood, he wished to explain that he did not desire a Commission for Zululand, where he thought the General in command, having full control, would be able to settle the matter; but when he suggested a Commission he was speaking generally of South Africa, and not of Zululand in particular.

Question put, and agreed to.