§ (Mr. Bradlaugh, Sir John Simon, Mr. Kelly, Mr. Courtney Kenny, Mr. Burt, Mr. Coleridge, Mr. Illingworth, Mr. Richard, Colonel Eyre, Mr. Jesse Collings.)
§ COMMITTEE. [Progress 27th June.]
§ Bill considered in Committee.
§ (In the Committee.)
§ Clause 1 (Affirmation may be made instead of oath).
§
Amendment proposed,
In page 1, line 5, to leave out "upon objecting to being sworn," and insert "who shall declare that he entertains conscientious objections to the taking of an oath."—(Mr. Hunter.)
§ Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."
§ MR. FIRTH (Dundee)said, as a matter of Order he should like to ask whether the way the Question would be put would preclude the discussion on its merits of an Amendment he had on the Paper. He would suggest, in order to obviate that, that the Question should be put to leave out the words "upon objecting to being sworn." He did not object to these words being left out, but he objected to the insertion of the words in the Amendment.
§ MR. BRADLAUGH (Northampton)said, that perhaps he might be allowed to answer the appeal made by the hon. and learned Solicitor General on a former occasion, and state his attitude towards the Amendment. It would be remembered that on the second reading of the Bill, an objection was raised by the hon. and learned Solicitor General, 336 the hon. Member for Deptford and other Members of the Committee, and that an appeal was made to him (Mr. Bradlaugh) by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby (Sir William Harcourt) in consequence of which he had stated that if hon. Members voted for the second reading of the Bill, he would put upon the Paper, in the shape of an Amendment, a proposal which would appear to him to meet the object of the appeal. He had put upon the Paper an Amendment which he thought met that object, and which was as follows:—In line 5, after the word "sworn," to insert the words—
And stating, as the ground of such objection, either that he has no religious belief, or that the taking of an oath is contrary to his religious belief.With regard to the Amendment now before the Committee, he thought he was bound by the undertaking he had given, to oppose it—to ask the House to reject it. There, of course, was the difficulty that the moment they departed from the general option, and put in words limiting that option, that moment they would give opportunity for a great deal of criticism from persons who conceived that that option so limited did not meet their particular case. He should have preferred the Bill as it originally stood; but he was afraid, and he thought he rightly interpreted the feeling expressed from the Front Opposition Bench, as well as from other parts of the Committee, that he could not get the House to concur with him. Now, the Amendment proposed by the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter) had a legal difficulty connected with it, which it was his (Mr. Bradlaugh's) duty to bring out to the Committee. The hon. Gentleman had told them quite correctly that he had adopted the language of the 1 & 2 Vict. cap 77, which provided that—Persons who had been Quakers or Moravians, but who had ceased to be Quakers or Moravians,"—that was to say, in the words of the Statute, who had ceased to belong to either of these denominations of Christians—should have the right to affirm on the ground that they entertained a conscientious objection to taking the oath,and those words would perhaps be to a large number of persons less objection- 337 able than the words embodied in his own Amendment, were it not for the legal difficulty. That legal difficulty arose under the 17th & 18th Vict. cap. 125, Sec. 20, and not only under that Statute, but also under five other Statutes precisely following it. That statute used the words—"shall refuse or be unwilling from alleged conscientious motives to be sworn," and it provided a form of declaration to be made by the affirmant in each case, and that he should declare that the taking of any oath was according to his religious belief unlawful. He would not trouble the Committee by reading all these statutes, but the decisions of the Courts which interpreted them had always been that a conscientious objection made a religious objection, and did not apply to the case of a person who had no religious belief. Therefore, unless the legal meanings of those words were changed that way the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for North Aberdeen would not meet the case he (Mr. Bradlaugh) represented in his own person, and repeated by a considerable number of persons for whom he sought to get relief. There would, therefore, be considerable legal difficulty in adopting the words of the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Aberdeen unless they repealed, in the case of each one of the Acts to which he (Mr. Bradlaugh) referred, the particular section alluded to. But he would not dwell upon the matter or follow it any further. There were five English Statutes and one Irish Statute in which the form of words to which he had referred were used, and the only way of getting out of the difficulty arising out of the hon. Member's Amendment would be to expressly repeal part of each of these Acts. It was enough for him now to say that although he did it reluctantly, he was obliged to ask the Committee to reject the Amendment under discussion.
§ THE LORD ADVOCATE (Mr. J. H. A. MACDONALD) (Edinburgh and St. Andrew's Universities)said, he thought that the difficulty referred to by the hon. Member might be got over by repealing the Statutes to which he had referred.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, he had considered that point, and there were great legal difficulties in the way of its 338 adoption. It would be difficult to repeal the whole of the Statutes mentioned in the Schedule, because the members of the Society of Friends and a large number of other persons might object to being brought under this measure, being quite satisfied, so far as they were concerned, with the law as it stood.
§ MR. J. H. A. MACDONALDsaid, he thought that the technical difficulty might be got out of the way, and that precautions should be taken to prevent the anomalous and dangerous result that it might be competent for anyone giving evidence in a civil or criminal case to elect to make a declaration on the ground that he had a conscientious objection to taking the oath. Take a case of that kind, which would be very likely to be a frequent occurrence. A witness might come forward who had a religious belief, and who had a regard for the sanctity of an oath, but who, for his own benefit or because it did not suit him to tell the truth, made up his mind to state that which was not the truth. If the Amendment proposed by the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Hunter) were accepted, such a person would be able to make an affirmation, and would be saved from the necessity of violating his oath. It would be a conscientious objection on the part of such a man. There could be no more conscientious objection to a man's mind against taking an oath than the objection that he was about to tell a lie. No doubt it was true that under the Bill a person would be liable to the same penalties for making a false statement after affirming as he would if he had committed perjury; but such a man as he described would not be violating what he conceived to be the sanctity of the oath by telling a lie after an affirmation, and a man who might hesitate to tell an untruth on oath, might be willing to run the risk of any amount of punishment, for breaking an affirmation.
§ MR. HUNTER (Aberdeen, N.)asked to be allowed to say one word in regard to the technical difficulty raised by the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh). It was quite true that the object of Section 20 of the Act of 17 & 18 Vict. referred to conscientious motives; but the words of the section were to be construed by what followed; 339 because the form of affirmation which was substituted for the oath contained these words—
I solemnly and truly affirm and declare that the taking of any oath is according to my religious belief unlawful.And then the section proceeds to provide for affirmation, consequently the word "conscientious" was governed and interpreted by the form which was given. There was a form given in the Bill which the hon. Member for Northampton had introduced; but it did not contain these words, therefore the technical difficulty did not arise. Now, in regard to the Amendment, he wished to make his position perfectly clear to the Committee. He would infinitely prefer the Bill to pass precisely in the form in which it was introduced by the hon. Member for Northampton; but he was perfectly ready to admit, and he did not attach the smallest blame to the hon. Member—he was ready to admit that the hon. Gentleman yielded to pressure from the other side of the House, and partly from that, undertook to introduce some words which were not specified on the Committee stage, in order to meet the objections of hon. Gentlemen on the other side and on this. He was perfectly ready to go with his hon. Friend in meeting any objections so far as he possibly could, and the reason why he had put down that Amendment was that it was simply impossible for him to accept the Bill if the hon. Gentleman's Amendment was carried. He would far sooner prefer to wait for two or three years in the hope that another Parliament might take a view more favourable to religious liberty than the present Parliament, and he did not think there existed any urgency, any practical grievance of such a character that they should accept a Bill containing these most objectionable words. If the hon. Gentleman's Amendment were carried, he certainly should feel bound to vote against the third reading of the Bill. Consequently, in order to try and save the Bill, he had brought forward words which he thought would be admitted by all persons to be less objectionable than those it was suggested should come in always. What was the objection to any form of words such as might be suggested other than that involved in the declaration he had adopted from the 1st & 2nd Vict. cap. 340 77? In one word, he objected to the performance of a public duty being made the occasion of an inquisition into a man's religious views. The Committee knew that the question of a religious census, for example, had been often before the House of Commons, and that the House of Commons had refused to have a religious census, because it was contrary to the principles of religious liberty that, even in a document which was not public, a man should have to state to what Church he belonged. It seemed the inquisition which would be introduced by any deviation from that principle would be exceedingly awkward. So long as a man lived privately and quietly, no person had a right to inquire what his religious views were. But the moment a man was called upon in the interests of justice, not in his own interest, it might be, but in the interests of justice to assist the administration of justice, he might be at once set upon and harassed by a set of theological questions. What were those theological questions and religious difficulties? He believed there were few men who had really examined what the English oath meant. It had been the subject of judicial inquiry, and certainly they owed to the hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh), one great blessing, and that was that no Member of the House could be troubled with the religious inquiries which were threatened by the Court of Appeal, unless at the instance of the Attorney General. But the doctrine which had been laid down in the Court of Appeal was of a somewhat alarming character. Let him state what had been said on the point by the present Master of the Rolls, and the Committee would see what very great danger lurked in these inquiries into religious opinion. The question upon which the Master of the Rolls expressed an opinion was, whether a declaration by a Member of Parliament as to what his religious opinions were was binding or conclusive, or whether it was competent to go behind his declaration of his own opinions, and refer to a jury the question of what his opinions really were. The Master of the Rolls said—Although the House of Commons had no cognizance of his state of mind at all, yet, if afterwards it came to the knowledge of the At- 341 torney General, by proof upon which he thought he had a right to act that that person had sat or voted in Parliament, having gone through all the forms but having this state of mind, and if a jury should so find, I am of opinion that all these penalties would be incurred, and that the fact of the knowledge by Parliament is an immaterial fact.Now, what were the consequences of this Act? The consequences were that if they employed dangerous words as a condition to making the affirmation, it would be open at a future time to the Attorney General to institute before a jury an inquiry into the exact state of their minds upon this subject. Now, the English oath and the Scotch oath differed in one very material circumstance. The Scotch oath, he ventured to say, was hardly an oath at all in the correct scientific definition of the word. He should say that the Scotch oath rather exhibited the oath in the final stage of decay as it was passing into the form of a solemn affirmation; because the Scotch oath in its form was not so much an imprecation as simply a form of reminder to a witness that he was performing a solemn act, containing, as it did, a reference to the particular religious doctrine which generally prevailed in Scotland. He did not, however, intend to argue that question at all.
§ MR. J. H. A. MACDONALDThe Scotch form of oath is—
I swear by Almighty God, as I shall answer to God at the great Day of Judgment, that I shall tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
§ MR. HUNTERsaid, the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate forgot that a man had to answer on the Day of Judgment whether he took an oath or not. He was afraid, however, he had not been able to make clear to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the distinction he was endeavouring to impress upon him; and that was, that the doctrine of the Scotch oath was that they should answer on the great Day of Judgment for every sin, however small, utterly irrespective of taking the oath. But the point he wished to insist upon was, that in Scotland a person who did not believe in a future state, and he would also go so far as to say eternal punishment, was not competent to take an oath; but in England a man might not believe in a future state at all, but he would nevertheless be competent, under certain circumstances, to take an 342 oath. What were the negative conditions of taking the oath? In the first place, it had been decided in England that an infidel might take the oath. In the next place, it had been expressly decided by the Court of Appeal that a man need not believe in a future state in order to take the oath. An infidel might take the oath legally as the law stood at the present moment.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, he was sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but he understood the decision of the Court of Appeal to be that no person was competent to take an oath who did not believe in a deity, and who, in addition, did not believe in some future state and in punishment by that deity. He understood that to be the express decision of the Court.
§ MR. HUNTERsaid, the hon. Gentleman must have forgotten one sentence in the judgment of Lord Esher. Lord Esher said:—
Therefore there is no necessity that a person taking the oath should believe that he will be liable to be punished in a future state.Previous to that judgment it was distinctly stated by all the leading authorities, that a man need not believe in a future state in order to be entitled to take an oath. Now, what was it a man must believe in in order to be entitled to take an oath according to the existing law? In the first place, be must believe in a personal deity. Men, like Thomas Carlyle, who were Pantheists, were not capable of taking an oath; that element was clear. Now, as to the other element. He maintained there were thousands, and tens of thousands, aye, and hundreds of thousands, of Christian men in this country who were not capable of taking an oath in the legal sense as it had been defined in the Court of Appeal. What was it they must believe? They must believe that the deity would punish them, here or hereafter, in respect to a false oath. A man might believe that he would be punished for falsehood, but that was not enough. He must believe, in order that the oath might have a special obligation upon him, in a specific and distinct penalty imposed for the violation of an oath as such.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, the decision of the Court was clear—
If a man did not believe in a god, or if he believed in a god but did not think that that 343 god would either reward or punish him in this world or in the next.
§ MR. HUNTERIn this world or the next. Special punishment for perjury in this world had for the last 2,000 years been a doctrine which had held a very small place in the mind of anyone. The doctrine of future reward and punishment was very generally entertained; but the idea of special punishment in this world was one which was entertained by very few persons. Under those circumstances, he would like to know whether it was the intention of Parliament to leave a large number of persons outside the law altogether. They included in the Bill persons who could take the oath, and included persons who could make an affirmation; but he contended that, unless some large and broad and general words, such as those he had adopted, were inserted in the Bill, there would remain a considerable class of persons who could neither take the oath nor make the affirmation. Now, let him take one class of persons; it was a very small class, but it consisted of men of very high intelligence and position. He referred to the Comtists. The Comtists claimed that they had a religious belief; they emphatically denied the suggestion that they had no religious belief, and they denied also that they ought to take an oath, not because it was unlawful according to their religious belief or inconsistent with their religious belief, but because it was inconsistent with their common sense. He had been told by some members of that small but rather distinguished and intellectual body that, unless some words such as those he suggested were adopted, a person who was a Comtist would not be able to take an oath, would not be able to affirm, and, therefore, would be entirely excluded from the benefits of this Act. Under those circumstances, he hoped all those Members who advocated the principles of civil and religious liberty would save the Bill by accepting the Amendment he had proposed.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, the Amendment he had put on the Paper provided for persons who had no religious belief, or to whom the taking of an oath was contrary to their religious belief. If the Comtists had religious belief, an oath must be either in accordance with it or in discord with it.
§ MR. HENEAGE (Great Grimsby)said, he disputed the assumption of the hon. Gentleman that an oath must be in accordance or contrary to a religious belief. People might have a conscientious objection to taking what they believed to be an useless oath, because they believed that an useless oath amounted to profanity. He would not detain the Committee for many minutes, but, as the Bill was originally brought in by his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dewsbury (Sir John Simon) and himself, he wished to say that if he had had any idea that the Bill would be altered as was now proposed, he would have had nothing whatever in the world to do with it. His objection to the taking of the oath was founded upon what he had seen as a magistrate during the last 20 years, both at Petty and at Quarter Sessions, and what he had seen in that House—the want of solemnity in the taking of the Oath in the House. At the beginning of a Parliament Members came to the Table to take the Oath; they were all huddled together, half of them were unable to hear the Oath when it was read out to them, and there was joking and talking going on all around them. In the same way there was a want of solemnity when a new Member advanced to the Table to take the Oath after a bye-election. He did so amidst the cheers and counter-cheers of rival Parties; he probably was trembling, and did not know what was going on, and hardly heard the words which were read over to him. He (Mr. Heneage) therefore looked upon the taking of the Oath in that House as an absolute farce. The right hon. and learned Lord Advocate (Mr. J. H. A. Macdonald) had spoken of a witness going into the witness-box with the intention of telling lies, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman professed to think that people wore deterred from telling lies because they were sworn. Now, he (Mr. Heneage) had had a great deal of experience with witnesses, and he had very little doubt that many witnesses whom he had come across had gone into the witness-box intending to tell lies. He certainly had never seen one of them deterred from telling lies because they had taken the oath. As a matter of fact, they either did not care a bit for the oath, or they endeavoured to evade responsibility by 345 kissing their thumbs. What they were afraid of was the punishment for not telling the truth, and if that punishment were made available for all instances in which people gave false evidence, that would have exactly the same effect on witnesses as if they were required to take the oath. An hon. Member had declared that the great value of the oath was that counsel in cross-examining a witness was enabled to remind him that he had taken the oath; but no Chairman of Quarter Sessions who was worth anything at all, and certainly no Judge in the land, would allow counsel to browbeat a witness by reminding him of his oath; and where he had seen it done by some Members of the Bar, it had generally been with a view to diverting the attention of the jury from mistakes which the learned counsel had themselves made. He asked the Committee to consider for one moment the anomalous condition in which Christian men would be placed if the Bill were passed without the Amendment of the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter). Why, they would practically assert in an Act of Parliament that the only people who were not to be believed when they spoke on their word of honour—when they spoke with a view to punishment hereafter—were Christian men and women. Anyone who had no religious belief whatsoever, anyone who could say he had a legal objection to take the oath, might refuse to take it, and he would be allowed to affirm. Therefore, if they did not accept the Amendment of the hon. Member for North Aberdeen, they would assert in an Act of Parliament that, though every other class of people might be believed on their word of honour, there was a certain class who were not to believed, and they were those who belonged to the Church of England, or who were Nonconformists, or who belonged to the Roman Catholic persuasion. He earnestly hoped that they would pass the Bill in its present form, which he should much prefer, or accept the Amendment of the hon. Member for North Aberdeen, and thus avoid casting an unwarrantable slur on Christian men and women.
§ MR. J. H. A. MACDONALDsaid, the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Heneage) had attempted to answer him by saying that anybody who could tell a lie on 346 what he called his word of honour, which was a phrase which might have a meaning, or might have none—
§ MR. HENEAGEUnder liability of punishment.
§ MR. J. H. A. MACDONALDwas certain that if the right hon. Gentleman meant that there were not large numbers of people who would tell lies in ordinary conversation but who would not tell lies when on oath, he had a very mistaken opinion. It was perfectly monstrous to say that an oath had no effect upon the consciences of individuals. Surely, the right hon. Gentleman's experience, sitting as a magistrate, was that many counsel and solicitors could not elicit from witnesses when under oath the information which they had given privately. The right hon. Gentleman must be perfectly well aware that professional men were often disappointed at the evidence given on oath, because when a witness had taken the oath, he could not be brought to say the rash and foolish and false things he had stated, possibly in his own interest, before he went into the box. The right hon. Gentleman said he objected to the Oath taken by Members at the Table of this House, because of the want of the solemnity in the taking of it. What did the right hon. Gentleman propose to substitute for it? He proposed that hon. Members should come up to the Table under exactly similar circumstances, and solemnly declare so and so, while there would be no solemnity about the proceedings. What was the logic or sense of that argument? The cure for the present state of things was not to alter the Oath, but to have more decency in their proceedings. In English and Irish Courts of Law the slovenly manner in which the Oath was administered and taken had a great deal to do with the amount of perjury. In the Scotch mode people could not kiss their thumb. Besides, if people cared nothing for an oath, why should they try to salve their consciences by kissing, not the book, but their thumb. Let them observe what happened in the House. When an hon. Member came up to the Table to make an affirmation he made an affirmation, and the presumption was that he made it solemnly, notwithstanding the fact that he was surrounded with all the talk and difficulties to which the right hon. Gentle- 347 man had referred. Did Members of the House who were members of the Society of Friends, when they came to the Table, really make a solemn affirmation? They would not cure that evil the right hon. Gentleman thought was a very great evil—namely, the slovenly way in which the Oath was taken, by turning the Oath into a solemn affirmation, which the right hon. Gentleman himself thought, if taken in the way he had described, would be a solemn farce. Most people, coming with a solemn feeling in their minds to take the oath, would not be disturbed if the surroundings were not satisfactory; but, as he had said, the cure was to alter the surroundings, and not to alter the oath. The right hon. Gentleman had also said, that the only people who would suffer were people who were Christians; but, if only such people were concerned, they would never have had the question raised in the House, and fought with the pertinacity which had been exhibited, for the simple reason that it had been competent for any person who was a Christian to compass the difficulties by making an affirmation. The object and intention of the Bill was to get rid of other difficulties not connected with Christians at all. The hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter) said, that they were making inquisitorial inquiries into the religious belief of particular persons. The Amendment which was on the Paper further down did no such thing whatever. It did distinguish between people who had no religious belief and people who had religious belief; but it did not distinguish between religious beliefs at all. A person coming up to be sworn, either in the House or a Court of Justice, would not, if this Bill passed into law, have any inquisitorial question put to him. A man who was so disposed would be entitled to say—"According to my religious belief, I object to take the oath," and to insist upon an affirmation. What inquiry was that into religious belief?
§ MR. FIRTH (Dundee)said, he had put down an Amendment which, in his humble judgment, would make the Bill perfect, and it was that the words, "Upon objecting to be sworn," should be left out. He objected entirely to the words proposed by the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter) being put in. He also entirely objected to the 348 words proposed by the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh), or any other words, being put in. He thought the time had come when they might allow men simply to make an affirmation, without taking an oath at all. With respect to the observations of the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate upon that point, he would simply ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman if they had not had some experience of men of various classes being permitted by Statute to make an affirmation instead of taking the oath. There never had been, in the whole history of legal procedure since the passing of those Statutes, a single case of assignment of perjury upon an affirmation, at least, so far as he knew. Many persons had enjoyed the advantage of making an affirmation, and he really could not understand why Gentlemen holding strong views upon this subject should not be willing to make an affirmation instead of an oath. He believed at once—of course, he could not possibly state anything else—that the word of any hon. Gentleman opposite was as good as his. Why, then, were hon. Gentlemen opposite to be bound by an oath? His (Mr. Firth's) word was accepted in every Court of Law. In the High Court of Parliament, his word was as good as hon. Gentlemen's oaths. Why, then, should hon. Gentlemen not be permitted to make a simple affirmation? As far as that House was concerned, the oath—he would not call it a farce—was the most absolutely useless thing which could possibly be conceived. They knew perfectly well that the oath which had to be taken by Members in the Parliament of King James II. was of the strongest type. In the Parliament of William III., the word "allegiance" was introduced into the oath. The men who introduced that word were the very men who had taken a very strong oath in respect of James II. Why did they introduce the word "allegiance?" Because, as they were told by Archdeacon Paley, it was a word of undeterminate and vague insignificance. If anyone did not carry out his allegiance he was not punished for perjury but for treason. He (Mr. Firth) suggested to the Committee that surely the time had come when every man who chose should make an affirmation without any sort of stigma being cast upon him. The hon. 349 and learned Member for Preston (Mr. Tomlinson) proposed that they should provide, that if anyone objected to be sworn and stated falsely as the ground of such objection that an oath had no binding effect upon his conscience, or that the taking of an oath was, according to his religious belief, unlawful, they should fix upon him the stigma of being a misdemeanant. He (Mr. Firth) suggested that everyone ought to have the same right. He entirely disagreed with some of the legal conclusions at which the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate had arrived from his experiences. He held that if bad men spoke the truth, it was because of their fear of the penalties of perjury, and that if good men spoke the truth, it was because of their regard for the truth itself. As long as they maintained both an oath and an affirmation, they maintained a double standard of truth. He certainly thought that all men should be allowed to have the same rights and privileges which he and others enjoyed, and which he thought might safely be given to them. Very rapid progress had been made with respect to the question of oaths. History showed that oaths formed no greater security than the Declaration of Allegiance itself. It had been stated that the great Treaty ratified with the Indians of Pennsylvania was the only Treaty ever ratified without an oath, and the only Treaty which was never broken. The object of the State being to obtain the truth, and experience having shown that the truth might be equally well obtained by an affirmation as by an oath, every citizen of the country ought to have the advantage, if he chose, of relying on what, to him, was probably as binding as his oath—that was his word—and ought not to be compelled by the law of the country to invoke the name of the Supreme Being for the transactions of the ordinary affairs of daily life.
THE CHAIRMANPerhaps it is as well that I should point out to the Committee that the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter) has moved the omission of certain words for the purpose of inserting certain other words. The question now before the Committee is the omission of certain words.
§ MR. ADDISON (Ashton-under-Lyne)said, he should not like to give a silent vote upon this subject. While he had 350 every desire to maintain the great reverence for the oath, he very much regretted that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) had thought it wise to depart from the original drafting of the Bill, and to adopt Amendments which seemed to him, from his point of view at least, to work very serious mischief, and to be productive of no particular good. First of all, they were told that the advantage of amending the clause would be that they would know which the principles might be of witnesses who gave evidence and of jurymen who had to try cases. The Amendment, however, would secure nothing of the kind; 99 out of every 100 of the people who had no religious belief at all never said so; they came forward and took the oath as a matter of course, and consequently the supposed security by which they were to know whether a witness or a juryman was or was not a person bound by religious belief would not exist in practice. The right hon. and learned Lord Advocate had said that the proposed Amendment would enable them to distinguish between those who had and those who had not religious belief; but that statement was quite fallacious, because no Amendment would enable them to do anything of the kind. If there was any advantage in knowing these things, it could only be secured by making some sort of examination of the persons who came up, in the endeavour to find out whether they were what they professed to be. No one, however, would assert that such a thing was practicable; on the contrary, if they attempted such a thing, they would be landed in an absurd position. A person coming forward might say—"I have no religious belief." Thereupon, it might be said to him—"Oh! yes, you have;" and he would reply—"No; I have not." Then it would be said—"Oh! if you have no religious belief at all, you are a conscientious person, and need not take an oath." The contrary would be—"We do not believe you; we think you have a conscientious belief; we think you would be bound by the oath, and we make you swear, although you say you have no religion at all." There could be no possible security given by this proposed Amendment. Then it was said the Amendment guarded against perjury, because it would prevent a man endeavouring to avoid taking the 351 oath because he did not like to speak falsely when he had taken the oath. Just consider what that meant. A person who came up and felt himself bound by the sacredness of the oath was a person who had some regard, one would suppose, for religion. If he were, one would think he would not commit perjury; but if he came forward, and in order to commit perjury was willing to deny his religion, why then he would do that which, from a religious point of view, was a great deal worse than any other offence he could commit. It was impossible to see what advantage could be gained by those who desired, as far as they could, to promote the cause of religion in this country by extracting from either jurymen or witnesses statements which in 999 cases out of 1,000 would be untrue. Then he saw a very great objection from another point of view, and that was in reference to the one person in the thousand who took advantage of the clause. This person would be allowed to come forward and get a sort of privilege by saying he had no religious opinion at all. Thus, for the first time, they would allow by law a class of people who would be very desirous to come forward sometimes and say, "I object to take an oath, because I have no religious belief."
§ MR. BRADLAUGHWill the hon. and learned Member allow me to explain? By two Statutes that class of persons are now permitted to give evidence in England and Wales.
§ MR. ADDISONsaid, that that was so, and he did not like it. What he maintained was that those Statutes were not used. They were not used by 99 out of 100 of the people who either shared such opinions or were indifferent on the subject, but were used by the one-hundredth person who every now and again came forward before a Judge and jury and made himself, to a certain degree, odious, and who was rather proud of the odium and the advertisement which was given him. In that way, they ticketed a certain class of unbelievers; and he did not like to see that existing in this country at all, because their experience was that, after all, the greatest saints had been made of the worst sinners. He did not see why they should glorify ardent unbelievers by making them get up and say they do not believe in God. He, there- 352 fore, preferred the Bill as it was originally drawn; because under it, all a person who wished to affirm would have to do would be to get up and say, "I object to take the oath." His experience certainly did not confirm that of some of his hon. and learned Friends as to the value and solemnity of the oath in Courts of Justice. He had heard counsel over and over again remind witnesses that they were upon their oath; but he never knew, or rarely knew, a counsel of experience to do anything of the kind. Such a thing was generally done by very young and inexperienced counsel at Sessions; it always sounded offensive to the learned Chairman or Judge; they did not like it. No doubt, hon. Members recollected the story that a late serjeant not accustomed to the practice of the House, who went before a Committee upstairs, and reminded an eminent engineer that he was upon his oath. The witness declined to go on giving his evidence until an apology was made to him by the learned serjeant. It was needless to say the apology was made. It was sometimes said that people kissed their thumbs rather than the book. That was a practice undoubtedly common with some witnesses who came from the other side of the water. [Cries of "No, no!"] Well, he would withdraw; but the kissing of the thumb was not done because people did not like to risk the salvation of their souls, but it was done so that if they were charged with perjury they might have a technical defence, and say they never kissed the book. It was also said that people sometimes gave evidence in lawyer's offices that counsel had the greatest difficulty in getting from them in Court; that they would not swear to what they had said to the attorney's clerk. But it was well known that in lawyer's offices leading questions were put to witnesses, and that they were really credited with a great deal they were disinclined to say. When they came into Court, however, and were face to face with a Judge and jury, the solemnity and importance of the thing came upon them, and they were a great deal more guarded in their expressions. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Great Grimsby (Mr. Heneage) had referred to the meaning of an oath; that would be a very difficult matter to go 353 into. He (Mr. Addison) remembered that when, some years ago, a very experienced Chairman of Quarter Sessions in Lancashire heard counsel ask a witness if he knew the nature of the oath, he said—
If he does, I wish he would tell me, for I have never been able to find that out during the last 50 years.Now, the real objection he (Mr. Addison) had to this Amendment was that it did not secure to them any of the advantages promised. There was no distinction between believers and unbelievers, and if any such distinction were attempted, it would be found impossible. It did not apply, and could not apply, to the enormous majority of people, whether religious or irreligious, who took the oath as a matter of form and of course, but it would only apply to a very small minority, so small a minority that it was hardly worth talking about, who were proud that they belonged to no religion. These Amendments would have the effect of enabling people belonging to that small minority to come forward in Courts of Justice and make the displays they were so fond of. He hoped that that class of persons would not be encouraged. He certainly believed that these Amendments to the Bill would encourage professional Atheists in the manner he had indicated.
§ MR. GRAY (Essex, Malden)said, he thought the Bill required some amendment, because, as it ran, the only reason for refusing to take the oath would have to be an objection to be sworn. He certainly thought that if men refused to take the oath they should give some reason for their refusal. He presumed he would be in Order in referring to the Amendments upon the Paper, because reference had already been made to them. The hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) suggested that the grounds stated should be religious belief or no religious belief. He (Mr. Gray) did not wish the refusal to be based on such grounds. Then there was an Amendment on the Paper in the name of the hon. and learned Solicitor General (Sir Edward Clarke) which would make it a test whether the oath had any binding effect upon the conscience or not. He thought that a man might conscientiously object to take the oath, and yet if he did take it he would 354 consider that it had some binding effect upon him. He understood that the proposed legislation was based upon a feeling that, if a man really had a conscientious objection to taking an oath, it was contrary to religious liberty to make him take an oath. If they were going to have regard to conscience in the alteration of the law, let them be practical and say so in the Bill. Taking all things into account, he certainly preferred the Amendment of the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter).
§ MR. NORRIS (Tower Hamlets, Limehouse)said, he wished to offer every objection to the passing of this Bill. He had been much exercised in his mind as to the course he should take with the numerous Amendments upon the Paper. He should support that which would best effect his purpose, which was to whittle down or weaken the Bill as much as possible. He had said upon every occasion that he was in favour of upholding the ancient usages of the House; and he was quite prepared to say that he had no objection to the word "conscientious" as it had been explained in the debate that day by many Members. He thought it probable he should support the Amendment of the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter), because he believed it would much weaken the Bill. He waited to hear what the learned Solicitor General had to say upon the subject, but he gave supporters of the Bill notice that, when the third reading was moved, he should oppose it.
§ MR. ILLINGWORTH (Bradford, W.)said, that as his name appeared on the back of the Bill, the Committee would perhaps allow him to make a few observations. He confessed that if he had known his hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) would have fallen into the trap—for he regarded it as nothing else—and compromised the principle of the Bill, he should have hesitated before he put his name upon the Bill. It was doubtless the case there was a considerable difference of opinion upon the question of oaths; but it must be gratifying to his hon. and learned Friend near him (Sir John Simon) that there had been a great advance made upon the question of the value of oaths. There was only one Amendment which he (Mr. Illingworth) could accept. As the Chairman 355 had put it to the Committee, it would be an improvement of the Bill; and he thought that his hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) would himself regard it as an improvement. It was, that no man should be even asked to express his objection; but where there was a choice, that choice should be freely given, leaving it to the individual taker of the oath or the affirmation to decide for himself in which form he would accept the obligation. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Lord Advocate (Mr. J. H. A. Macdonald) had expressed the opinion that though a man might ordinarily talk loosely, when the oath was administered to him he was careful as to what he said. He (Mr. Illingworth) did not think that the solemnity of the oath, or any thought of future reward or punishment, would prevent a man who was inclined to commit perjury from doing it.
§ MR. J. H. A. MACDONALDOur oath refers to a future state.
§ MR. ILLINGWORTHsaid, he did not think that made the oath any more binding upon a man.
§ MR. ESSLEMONT (Aberdeen, E.)said, he thought the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate would not deny that in very many cases in Scotland, the reference to "the great Day of Judgment" was left out of the oath.
§ MR. J. H. A. MACDONALDsaid, he most distinctly did deny it. It was utterly contrary to law to leave that reference out.
§ MR. ILLINGWORTHsaid, that what had just been said showed the chaotic condition of things in regard to the oath. He spoke as a layman; but he had a profound regard for that religious liberty which, he believed, was involved in the course taken by his hon. Friend (Mr. Hunter). He was strongly of opinion that they would secure the truth in every relationship of life more generally and more extensively if they showed more respect for conscientious objections than they were wont to do. At present, we forced oaths upon people upon whom they were in no sense binding; and he thoroughly agreed with the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate, that the oath as presented in a Court of Law was taken by hundreds and thousands of people who outside the Court would declare they had no religious belief. He could only say that if the Amend- 356 ment of the hon. and learned Solicitor General (Sir Edward Clarke), or of the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh), carrying out the supposed agreement between the Gentlemen on the two Front Benches, were carried, he would infinitely prefer that the Bill should be postponed for a time. It would not be postponed for any long time, because public opinion was steadily advancing. For the credit of the House he would wish a postponement of the question, rather than a tinkering with it, which would leave it in a state which, he did not hesitate to say, the more it was examined the more confusion it would create and the more unsatisfactory it would be to the great majority of the people affected.
§ THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir EDWARD CLARKE) (Plymouth)said, he was sorry he was occupied elsewhere, and could not be present at the beginning of the discussion. He had, however, heard one or two of the later speeches, and, therefore, he was anxious to make his position perfectly clear to the Committee. He did not quite understand the grounds of the objection which had been taken by the hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bradford (Mr. Illingworth). The hon. Gentleman said that the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) had surrendered the principle of the Bill in putting upon the Paper an Amendment in his own words, which corresponded very closely with an Amendment which he (Sir Edward Clarke) had put down on the Paper shortly before. The hon. Gentleman told the Committee that the principles of religious liberty were involved in the course which he (Sir Edward Clarke) desired to take. Let him remind the Committee of what took place on the second reading. There was certainly very considerable doubt that the Bill would be read a second time, whether it would be accepted in principle by the House at all; and in the course of that debate, speaking not on behalf of the Government, but on his own behalf, he (Sir Edward Clarke) expressed his own anxiety that the subject should be dealt with when they were able to consider the complexities and the difficulties of the question without reference to the personal questions and conflicts which had been forced upon them in previous times. He was anxious 357 for a fair and just administration of the law, and for the remedying of grievances which might be felt by any class of persons. He pointed out that the Bill, as framed, would allow persons to come forward and say—"I prefer not to take the oath," and that that would enable them thereby to escape that which he believed to be the most valuable sanction to truth that they had for the purpose of the administration of justice, and for any other purposes. He did not propose to argue that question now; they argued it on the second reading when the principle of the Bill was being discussed in the House. It would, however, be remembered that on that occasion he said—
At all events, if you are going to allow an affirmation to be made instead of an oath to be taken, a person who claims to be exempted from the obligation of taking an oath should state some reasons to justify that exemption, and should not be allowed to do it at his mere caprice.If they allowed him to do it at his mere caprice they would open the door to those who were bound by the sanction of the oath, and they were very many, to avoid that fear which imposed upon them the obligation to a careful adherence to the truth in the witness-box. If they did that, then they would make it always a matter, when a man refused to take the oath and chose to affirm, which would be subject to question. It might be subject to discussion whether he had declined to take the oath because of religious conviction on his part, or the absence of religious belief, or whether it was simply because he had chosen to take another course; and, if no stipulation was made as to the statement of a witness as to the ground on which he claimed to affirm, counsel would be perfectly justified in certain cases in asking a witness, in course of cross-examination—"Why did you decline to take the oath just now?" It would introduce a practice which would remove the sanction of the oath, which he thought a valuable one, and which would open the door for a flood of unseemly questions which no one would challenge the right of counsel to introduce. He was summarizing the matter, and dealing with the questions which arose upon the second reading. The hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) got up and said he recognized the force of what 358 he (Sir Edward Clarke) had put before the House, and he was prepared, if the second reading of the Bill were carried, to accept words—he (Sir Edward Clarke) did not think the hon. Member pledged himself to propose them—to accept words which would carry out—and the Members who were present on that occasion would remember there was a double interposition by the hon. Member in the course of his (Sir Edward Clarke's) speech—which would carry out not only the object of making persons who, on religious grounds, claimed to affirm, state their grounds, but also—and this was specifically mentioned—to require persons who claimed to affirm because they had no religious belief to say so as the ground of their claim. It was in expectation that, at all events, some such clause would be inserted in the Bill that the second reading was accepted by the House of Commons; and, undoubtedly, unless that pledge were kept, and such words were accepted, the matter would be absolutely free for the consideration of the Committee, and he, for one, would become extremely anxious to use every means in his power to defeat the Bill, for he should think it simply a mischievous Bill. If those who proposed the Bill to the House of Commons were of opinion that, with the words inserted, it would be a worthless Bill, their straightforward course would be to abandon the Bill that Session, and bring it in next Session, and let the House decide then upon the second reading, after notice and warning that the promoters of the measure intended to insist upon that as an important part of the question. Let him point out to the Committee how the matter stood now. He was very much afraid that the votes in the Division they were about to take might be governed by the consideration of what would ultimately happen to the Bill. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Addison), who spoke a little while ago, made undoubtedly an interesting speech; but he did not gather from the hon. and learned Gentleman whether he opposed the Bill or not, and he really did not know now whether, if the Bill were proposed in its original form, the hon. and learned Gentleman would vote for it or against it. His impression, however, was that the hon. and learned 359 Gentleman would vote against it. He did not want to suggest that his hon. and learned Friend was a wily and circuitous person in his actions, but he was afraid that the sympathy the hon. and learned Member had endeavoured to persuade himself to feel for this Amendment was a little strengthened by the thought that, if this Amendment was accepted, the Bill was absolutely lost, and that there was no chance of its passing into law that Session. If so, it was desirable they should not expend too much time upon the consideration of the Bill. The hon. Member for West Bradford (Mr. Illingworth) said that the principle of the Bill was abandoned by the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) in accepting the suggestion he had embodied in the words which he had placed on the Notice Paper. What principle was abandoned?
§ MR. ILLINGWORTHsaid, the hon. and learned Gentleman was not in the House when objection was taken more in detail by the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter). He (Mr. Illingworth) agreed with that hon. Member that any inquisitorial provision by which a man was asked to declare his religious belief was, in his judgment a violation of religious liberty.
§ SIR EDWARD CLARKEsaid, the hon. Gentleman said, and he (Sir Edward Clarke) would forgive him if he resented the observation—the hon. Member said he had led the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) into a trap, and induced him to accept words which were inconsistent with the principle of the Bill? He wanted to know what was the principle of the Bill? The principle of the Bill was that they should make such rules in regard to the administration of oaths that those who, for a sound reason, claimed not to be obliged to take the oath should be excused from doing so. There were two sound reasons which might be alleged. One sound reason was, that a person whom it was proposed to swear, had a religious belief which made him think it was unlawful for him to take an oath, that it was contrary to his religious belief to take an oath. That was a perfectly reasonable objection. There was another reason for which a man might claim to be exempted from taking the oath, and that was not because his religious 360 belief told him it was wrong, but because he had no religious belief to appeal to at all, and that, if he repeated words which in their nature were an appeal to Almighty God to look upon the act he was doing, and to judge him without reference to his honesty in doing that act, he repeated words which to him had no force and which conveyed no real meaning. That was a serious and important objection. He did not like to see the law in such an uncertain condition, that a man who made that objection might yet give evidence as a witness, but could not be allowed to pass into the jury box. He maintained that if any such subject came into a Court of Justice or into the House of Commons, where oaths were required, and had for centuries been required, and claimed exemption from the obligation of taking the oath, there was no inquisitorial examination into his opinions. A man claimed to be exempted from the ordinary practice of the law, and the administrators of the law said—"State your grounds of objection." It could not be said that was an inquisitorial practice, or inconsistent with religious liberty. Why, religious liberty was liberty to practice and profess any opinion that a man might honestly hold. It had been said, he did not see with what truth as far as the mere verbal considerations were concerned, that the liberty of profession was in itself religious liberty. Let it be so, but it was liberty to declare that, and not to be prevented from performing the duties of citizenship, because they had declared it. So far from there being anything inconsistent with religious liberty in requiring a man to state the grounds of exemption from the ordinary rules, it was an assertion of religious liberty. He (Sir Edward Clarke) asked the Committee to consider that there were a great many people who attached very great importance to oaths. They believed, he was of opinion, that oaths were a most valuable guarantee of truth, and while he was desirous to deal with this subject, and to do it on an intelligible footing, he would strongly resist any attempt either to abolish the oath altogether, or to make it possible for any person, without stating the grounds of his objection, to be exempted from the obligation of the 361 oath. He did not think that it could be said, in any sense, that he had led anyone into a trap. He was perfectly frank and straightforward with the House in this matter. He stated on the second reading, and he stated now, that he resisted the principle of the Amendment of the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter), which was now under consideration, because he was anxious to see the Bill pass. He was anxious to see the law put upon an intelligible and just footing, and he objected to and resisted the Amendment, because, if it were carried, he would consider the Bill so serious an interference with public interest that he should feel bound to endeavour to prevent its passing into law. He reminded hon. Members that, in the case of a Bill like this, it was only, especially at that period of the Session, by some acquiescence of both sides in regard to the terms of the Bill that there was the slightest possibility of its passing into law. If, as he said, those in charge of the Bill thought they would do better by postponing the Bill till next Session, and taking the judgment of the House upon the second reading in regard to the principle they were now contending for, that was a totally different matter. He trusted the Committee, if they divided, would save the Bill by rejecting the Amendment of the hon. Member for North Aberdeen.
§ MR. JOHN MORLEY (Newcastle-upon-Tyne)said, he only interposed for the purpose of correcting the account the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General (Sir Edward Clarke) gave of the transactions of the 14th of March. So far as his memory went, and so far as the report of their debates went, what happened on that occasion was in reality the ground for the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter). The hon. and learned Member for Deptford (Mr. Darling) made, on that occasion, a very earnest and temperate speech, and in the course of it said he would be satisfied that a man should be relieved of the necessity of taking an oath if he said that he had a conscientious objection to take it. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby (Sir William Harcourt) put into the mouth of the hon. Member for Deptford the very words that he would be satisfied that a man should be relieved from taking the oath 362 on the ground of conscientious objection. So clear was it that the repudiation of religious belief, or the declaration of an oath was contrary to a man's religious belief, was not in the mind of the House at the moment, that that compromise, if it might be so called, was arrived at, and on which the second reading of the Bill was agreed to, that the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) said—
That the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Deptford had suggested a form of words providing that 'no person should be allowed to make such solemn affirmation except he alleged, as his ground for objecting to be sworn, a conscientious objection to taking an oath.'"—(3 Hansard, [323] 1228.)That was what his hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, at the time, understood to be the position of hon. Gentlemen opposite.
§ SIR EDWARD CLARKEsaid, that if the right hon. Gentleman would refer to the interposition of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Northampton while he (Sir Edward Clarke) was speaking, he would see that the matter was perfectly clear.
§ MR. JOHN MORLEYsaid, that the first of the two interpositions of the hon. Member for Northampton was that he should not object—
To any words which were found by the majority to fairly embody the feelings expressed on both sides of the House."—(Ibid., 1228–9.)That was a very noncommittal interposition. In the second place, the hon. Member for Northampton interposed that—He appreciated the distinction and would accept any words that were not absolutely offensive that would cover the cases of both classes of persons."—(Ibid., 1229.)But the words his hon. Friend the Member for Northampton now agreed to put in were words which went entirely beyond the ground covered. He (Mr. John Morley) regretted extremely that his hon. Friend had proposed this Amendment and had assented to the compromise. For his own part, he thought the Amendment of the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter) far more truly expressed the mind of the House at the time the agreement was come to on the 14th of March. Certainly, he thought it was better calculated to meet the real difficulties of the case, because the course 363 proposed by his hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, supported by the hon. and learned Solicitor General, was, after all, a course which was inconsistent with real religious liberty. In that respect he entirely agreed with the hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bradford (Mr. Illingworth), because what did they do? If a man came before a Court, they were going to make him say "I have no religious belief."
§ SIR EDWARD CLARKEIf he has none.
§ MR. JOHN MORLEYsaid, they were practically going to make a man assert before a Judge and jury that he had no religious belief. That assertion might, and in many cases probably would, damage his evidence. He (Mr. John Morley) remembered that in the discussion of the 14th of March the hon. Member for Stockport (Mr. Sydney Gedge) gave that as a reason why a witness should refuse to be sworn. He believed the hon. Gentleman used such language as this—that the Judge and jury, knowing the state of mind of the unbeliever, would estimate the value of his evidence and take it for what it was worth. He (Mr. John Morley) maintained that that was a course that was entirely inconsistent with religious liberty, They were making a man's state of mind with reference to religion damage him and prejudice him in a Court of Justice. He thought someone said in the course of the debate, perhaps it was also by the hon. Member for Stockport, that the jury would have no means of ascertaining the value of a man's evidence unless he was compelled to state he had no religious belief. [Mr. SYDNEY GEDGE (Stockport): If he had none.] If he had none. That would put a man in a position in which he ought not to be placed, because the whole principle of the Bill to which they had assented was that a man's religious opinions ought not, because they chance to confirm to the opinions of the majority of the jury, to give any extra value or weight to his evidence. He did not say whether that was sound or not, but that was the principle of the Bill. [Cries of "No!"] To put it in another way, the principle of the Bill was that the absence of the ordinary religious belief or the non-conformity with the religious belief of the majority of the community ought not to take away by one jot or tittle 364 from the value of the evidence he gave.
§ SIR EDWARD CLARKENot from the value of the evidence; from the right to give evidence.
§ MR. JOHN MORLEYsaid, he was now answering the contention of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Sydney Gedge), that it would and ought to detract from the value of the evidence. He maintained that that principle, carried out to its logical and fair conclusion, was a justification for any kind of intolerance whatever. On that ground, he granted the Amendment of his hon. Friend (Mr. Hunter) was a more fair way of putting persons of all kinds of religious belief or non-belief upon the same footing. He should certainly support that Amendment. The hon. Member for North Aberdeen had cited the case of the Comtists, about whom he (Mr. John Morley) knew a good deal. A Comtist would object to say he had no religious belief; he would assert that he had a religion of his own. A Comtist could not say his religious belief forbade him to take the oath, because it did not, but he would refuse to take the oath, because the taking of the oath was contrary to his common sense; it would add no weight to his testimony, and, therefore, he would refuse to go through what to him was a mockery. Here was the case of a class of men whose evidence might be of the highest value, and who, at all events, had a right to give evidence on their own terms. Here they had the case of a class of citizens who would be deprived of a civil right on account of their religious belief. The position of the hon. and learned Solicitor General was an intolerant position, and one incompatible with the principles of the Bill.
§ SIR EDWARD CLARKEasked permission to remind the Committee what took place on the second reading of the Bill. He said upon that occasion—
Although it would not be convenient to discuss the Amendment which had been suggested and was accepted by the hon. Member for Northampton, the words did not wholly meet the objections that had been made. They only referred to those who alleged a conscientious objection to take an oath."—(3 Hansard, [323] 1228.)The hon. Member for Northampton interposed, saying that—In Committee he should not object to any words which were found by the majority to 365 fairly embody the feelings expressed on both sides of the House."—(Ibid., 1228–9.)Then he (Sir Edward Clarke) went on to say—He was glad that that larger statement had been made. He thought, however, it was essential, in order to meet objections that had been made from both sides of the House, not only that those who objected on religious grounds, but also that those who, from want of religious belief altogether, would not hold themselves bound by an oath, should be required to state the fact before they were permitted to affirm. Certainly, unless that concession was made—although he should vote for the second reading of the Bill, believing that it gave Parliament an opportunity of dealing with a difficult subject on which legislation was necessary—unless the proviso were inserted as to both classes of cases, he should resist the third reading of the Bill.The hon. Member for Northampton again interposed, and said—He appreciated the distinction, and would accept any words that were not absolutely offensive that would cover the cases of both classes of persons,"—And then he (Sir Edward Clarke) said—He was glad to have got that further assurance."—(Ibid.)
§ MR. JOHN MORLEYsaid, the hon. and learned Solicitor General had no doubt given a true account of the spirit in which he accepted the second reading. All he (Mr. John Morley) wanted to point out was that when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Derby (Sir William Harcourt) advised the hon. Member for Northampton to assent to the view of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Deptford (Mr. Darling), he meant the hon. Gentleman to do so upon the terms of the Amendment of the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter).
§ MR. LABOUCHERE (Northampton)said, the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General seemed to be under the impression that the principle of the Bill could not be carried out unless the words suggested by his hon. Friend and Colleague (Mr. Bradlaugh) were inserted. Now, as he (Mr. Labouchere) understood it, the principle of the Bill was an optional one that everyone had a perfect right either to affirm or swear without any inquisition into the reasons why he did so. He simply had to say that he had an objection, whereas with these words there would be an inquisition, and no one would be allowed to affirm unless he were prepared to say 366 that he had more than a conscientious objection, and that he did not believe in the efficacy of an oath. That was the very widest difference; and while he did not blame his hon. Friend and Colleague for accepting the suggestion made by the hon. and learned Solicitor General and for moving the Amendment which he placed upon the Paper, yet, for his own part, he (Mr. Labouchere) must say he should feel it his duty to vote for the hon. Gentleman the Member for North Aberdeen. They had had most extraordinary arguments used by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Lord Advocate for Scotland and by the hon. and learned Solicitor General. The right hon. and learned Lord Advocate seemed to have a very poor opinion of his fellow-countrymen in Scotland. He seemed to tell them, as well as he (Mr. Labouchere) could understand the right hon. and learned Gentleman, that the majority of the great mass of Scotchmen were such utter liars that it would be impossible to believe them unless they swore. He seemed to think that if they were not made to swear, it was their nature to speak contrary to the truth in a Court of Justice. He (Mr. Labouchere) was sure that other Scotch Members would hardly agree with the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate in his estimate of their countrymen. The right hon. and learned Lord Advocate seemed to think that on the mass of people an oath had a very great effect. Well, but there were many persons in the country upon whom an oath had absolutely no effect whatever. He (Mr. Labouchere) was one of them. He would just as soon perjure himself as not.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, he was not a Scotchman, but so far he went with the Scotch. He would just as soon perjure himself as not in this sense, that he would not speak the truth one atom more for being put upon his oath. He would speak the truth without it. He did not require those terrorisms which seemed to affect the minds of the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate and his countrymen as to what would happen in the next world to induce him to speak the truth. It was sufficient for him that it was wrong in itself not 367 to speak the truth, and also that he might, perhaps, get seven years' penal servitude if he did not speak the truth in a Court of Justice. He very strongly suspected that that dread of seven years' penal servitude had a great deal more effect even upon Scotchmen than anything vague and indefinite as to what might happen them in the next world. The hon. and learned Solicitor General had descended to the very lowest point of special pleading in his argument. He had said that if a witness were to refuse to take the oath without giving his reasons that counsel would create a prejudice against him in the minds of the jury by saying—"Why did you decline to take the oath?" He (Mr. Labouchere) was sure that the hon. and learned Solicitor General himself would not condescend to do such a thing as that as an advocate; and he (Mr. Labouchere) had a higher opinion of English lawyers than the hon. and learned Gentleman seemed to entertain. He did not believe that an advocate would take this course, and, moreover, if he did, it would not create a prejudice against the witness, but a prejudice against himself and his case. The right hon. and learned Lord Advocate had told them that no one had a right to object to taking the oath because it happened to be the law of the land that he should take the oath. Why, did the the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate remember what happened in the early ages of Christianity? Did he remember that in those days prisoners were dragged up before the Roman magisgrates, and called upon to swear by their fidelity to the Emperor, and that they refused to do so? In vain the magistrates told them that it was in accordance with the law; their consciences would not allow them to do so; and it seemed to him (Mr. Labouchere) that a man ought not to be called upon to choose between obeying the law of his own conscience and the law of the land in a matter so very little affecting the well-being of the community at large. He (Mr. Labouchere) looked upon an oath as a relic of a debasing superstition, and as debasing in itself, because there could be no two measures of truth. Did the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate know what was the origin of oaths? The origin of oaths was in Pagan times. In those times 368 persons were accustomed to pour out a libation before making a declaration, and they used to call upon a particular god, whose business it was to punish those who told untruths, to appear and bear witness to what they said. Since that time they had had one long series of superstitions connected with these oaths. Why, the Chinese were in the habit of swearing by a salmon—sometimes by a salmon and sometimes by a saucer—but if they wished specially to be believed, they asked for a salmon and swore on the head of a salmon. Did the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Lord Advocate remember Quentin Durward? He must have read the book, and must remember the incident where the freebooters were called upon to swear by the three men of Cologne—where they were told that if they did not speak the truth they would be haunted for three days by these men, who on the fourth day would come and cut their throats. He mentioned these cases simply as superstitions connected with the taking of oaths. He should like the right hon. and learned Lord Advocate to tell him what on earth an oath was? He never yet had been able to discover it. Was the oath an incantation, an invocation, or an imprecation? In the former case it was calling upon the Deity to witness some act done, which was clearly an absurdity, as the Deity was omnipresent, whether invoked or not. If it were an imprecation, it was the calling down of some punishment on the heads of the false witnesses in the next world if the truth were not told. But in that case it was an absurdity, as the punishment would follow whether the oath was taken or not. The Commandment against telling an untruth was genera], and no one could contract himself out of it as though it was a matter of employers' liability. The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Lord Advocate seemed to argue in this way—he told them what would happen on the Day of Judgment, and he seemed to think—the right hon. and learned Gentlemen would not do it, but, at any rate, he seemed to think—that he might tell as many untruths as he liked, and if, on the Day of Judgment, when challenged with it, he could say—"Well, I did not swear to those untruths," that he would not be punished. He (Mr. Laubouchere) could assure the right 369 hon. and learned Lord Advocate that the punishment would be just the same to him whether he swore the untruths or merely told them on his word without swearing. What he wished to impress upon the Committee was that by adopting the proposal of his hon. Friend and Colleague they would only be giving an advantage to Atheists, and what he (Mr. Labouchere) wanted was equality between Atheists and Christians in all matters of this kind.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, that if this clause were adopted they would shut out Atheists.
§ MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, that if his hon. Friend could show that they would shut out the Atheists, undoubtedly it would be a strong reason against the clause. They, no doubt, required some sort of clause to give security in this matter equally as between Atheists and Christians. His hon. Friends only objected to Atheists being shut out, but he (Mr. Labouchere) objected to the shutting out of Christians. His hon. Friend seemed to think that to shut out the clause altogether would endanger the Bill, but he (Mr. Labouchere) did not think so. There would be concensus of opinion in favour of passing it, and that being so, after the long discussion which had taken place upon it, he did not believe that through any alteration such as was proposed, hon. Gentlemen, by a recollection of their constituents before them, would venture to throw out the Bill on the third reading, because they established a quality between all men, and enabled them, without distinction, either to take the oath or to affirm. Unless under the circumstances it could be brought home to him, that by doing so they would be shutting out Atheists, he should support the Amendment.
§ MR. SYDNEY GEDGErose to address the Committee.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHI claim to move "That the Question be now put."
§ Question put, "That the Question be now put."
§ The Committee divided:—Ayes 226; Noes 72: Majority 154.—(Div. List, No. 190.)
§ Question put accordingly, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause."
370§ The Committee divided:—Ayes 174; Noes 148: Majority 26.
372| AYES. | |
| Acland, A. H. D. | Fowler, Sir R. N. |
| Acland, C. T. D. | Fry, L. |
| Agg-Gardner, J. T. | Fry, T. |
| Ainslie, W. G. | Gathorne-Hardy, hon. A. E. |
| Allison, R. A. | |
| Amherst, W. A. T. | Gathorne-Hardy, hon. J. S. |
| Ashmead-Bartlett, E. | |
| Baden-Powell, Sir G. S. | Gedge, S. |
| Gilliat, J. S. | |
| Baird, J. G. A. | Goldsmid, Sir J. |
| Baring, T. C. | Goldsworthy, Major-General W. T. |
| Barran, J. | |
| Bartley, G. C. T. | Gorst, Sir J. E. |
| Barttelot, Sir W. B. | Gourley, E. T. |
| Bates, Sir E. | Greenall, Sir G. |
| Beach, right hon. Sir M. E. Hicks- | Greene, E. |
| Grey, Sir E. | |
| Bethell, Commander G. R. | Grimston, Viscount |
| Hamilton, right hon. Lord G. F. | |
| Birkbeck, Sir E. | |
| Blundell, Colonel H. B. H. | Hamilton, Lord C. J. |
| Hamilton, Col. C. E. | |
| Bolitho, T. B. | Hanbury, R. W. |
| Bridgeman, Col. hon. F. C. | Hanbury-Tracy, hon. F. S. A. |
| Bristowe, T. L. | Hardcastle, E. |
| Brodrick, hon. W. St. J. F. | Hastings, G. W. |
| Healy, M. | |
| Brooks, Sir W. C. | Heathcote, Capt. J. H. Edwards- |
| Bruce, Lord H. | |
| Burghley, Lord | Herbert, hon. S. |
| Caine, W. S. | Hill, right hon. Lord A. W. |
| Chamberlain, R. | |
| Charrington, S. | Hill, Colonel E. S. |
| Clarke, Sir E. G. | Hoare, E. B. |
| Cochrane-Baillie, hon. C. W. A. N. | Hobhouse, H |
| Holden, I. | |
| Coddington, W. | Houldsworth, Sir W. H. |
| Colomb, Sir J. C. R. | Howell, G. |
| Compton, F. | Hunter, Sir G. |
| Cooke, C. W. R. | Jackson, W. L. |
| Corbett, A. C. | Jacoby, J. A. |
| Cossham, H. | Kay-Shuttleworth, rt. hon. Sir U. J. |
| Cranborne, Viscount | |
| Crawford, W. | Kennaway, Sir J. H. |
| Cross, H. S. | Kenny, C. S. |
| Crossley, Sir S. B. | Kenny, M. J. |
| Crossman, Gen. Sir W. | Kenrick, W. |
| Curzon, Viscount | King, H. S. |
| Dalrymple, Sir C. | Lafone, A. |
| Dixon-Hartland, F. D. | Lalor, R. |
| Donkin, R. S. | Lawson, Sir W. |
| Douglas, A. Akers- | Lea, T. |
| Duncombe, A. | Leighton, S. |
| Dyke, rt. hn. Sir W. H. | Lowther, hon. W. |
| Ebrington, Viscount | Macdonald, right hon. J. H. A. |
| Elliot, hon. H. F. H. | |
| Elton, C. I. | Macdonald, W. A. |
| Ewing, Sir A. O. | Mackintosh, C. F. |
| Farquharson, Dr. R. | Maclean, J. M. |
| Fielden, T. | Maclure, J. W. |
| Finch, G. H. | M'Arthur, W. A. |
| Fisher, W. H. | M'Calmont, Captain |
| Fitzgerald, R. U. P. | M'Kenna, Sir J. N. |
| Fletcher, Sir H. | M'Laren, W. S. B. |
| Flynn, J. C. | Madden, D. H. |
| Foljambe, C. G. S. | Mahony, P. |
| Forster, Sir C. | Mallock, R. |
| Maxwell, Sir H. E. | Russell, T. W. |
| Mayne, T. | Seton-Karr, H. |
| More, R. J. | Shaw, T. |
| Morgan, O. V. | Sidebotham, J. W. |
| Morrison, W. | Sidebottom, T. H. |
| Mowbray, R. G. C | Sidebottom, W. |
| Mulholland, H. L. | Sinclair, W. P. |
| Muncaster, Lord | Stanley, E. J |
| O'Hea, P. | Sullivan, D. |
| O'Neill, hon. R. T. | Talbot, J. G. |
| Pearce, Sir W. | Temple, Sir R. |
| Penton, Captain F. T. | Theobald, J. |
| Picton, J. A. | Tomlinson, W. E. M. |
| Powell, F. S. | Vernon, hon. G. R. |
| Rankin, J. | Vincent, C. E. H. |
| Rasch, Major F. C. | Walrond, Col. W. H. |
| Redmond, W. H. K. | Watson, J. |
| Reed, Sir E. J. | Wayman, T. |
| Reed, H. B. | West, Colonel W. C. |
| Richardson, T. | Whitbread, S. |
| Roberts, J. | Whitley, E. |
| Robertson, J. P. B. | Wiggin, H. |
| Robertson, Sir W. T. | Wodehouse, E. R. |
| Robinson, B. | Wood, N. |
| Ross, A. H. | Woodhead, J. |
| Rothschild, Baron F. J. de | Wortley, C. B. Stuart- |
| Round, J. | TELLERS. |
| Rowlands, W. B. | Bradlaugh, C. |
| Rowntree, J. | Kelly, J. R. |
| NOES. | |
| Abraham, W. (Glam.) | Elliot, hon. A. R. D. |
| Abraham, W. (Limerick, W.) | Ellis, J. |
| Ellis, J. E. | |
| Addison, J. E. W. | Ellis, T. E. |
| Anderson, C. H. | Esmonde, Sir T. H. G. |
| Austin, J. | Esslemont, P. |
| Balfour, Sir G. | Fenwick, C. |
| Barbour, W. B. | Ferguson, R. C. Munro- |
| Bentinck, W. G. C. | Fergusson, right hon. Sir J. |
| Biggar, J. G. | |
| Bolton, T. D. | Finucane, J. |
| Bright, Jacob | Firth, J. F. B. |
| Broadhurst, H. | Flower, C. |
| Brookfield, A. M. | Foley, P. J. |
| Brown, A. H. | Fuller, G. P. |
| Bruce, hon. R. P. | Gilhooly, J |
| Brunner, J. T. | Gill, T. P. |
| Buchanan, T. R. | Gray, C. W. |
| Burt, T. | Halsey, T. F. |
| Buxton, S. C. | Harrington, E. |
| Byrne, G. M. | Harris, M. |
| Caldwell, J. | Hayden, L. P. |
| Campbell-Bannerman, right hon. H. | Hayne, C. Seale- |
| Heneage, right hon. E. | |
| Causton, R. K. | Hervey, Lord F. |
| Channing, F. A. | Hooper, J. |
| Clancy, J. J. | Hoyle, I. |
| Clark, Dr. G. B. | Illingworth, A. |
| Cobb, H. P. | Joicey, J. |
| Coghill, D. H. | Kilbride, D. |
| Condon, T. J. | Knightley, Sir R. |
| Conway, M. | Labouchere, H. |
| Conybeare, C. A. V. | Lawson, H. L. W. |
| Corbet, W. J. | Leahy, J. |
| Corry, Sir J. P. | Lefevre, rt. hn. G. J. S. |
| Craig, J. | Lethbridge, Sir R. |
| Cremer, W. R. | Lubbock, Sir J. |
| De Cobain, E. S. W. | Lyell, L. |
| Dillwyn, L. L. | MacInnes, M. |
| Dimsdale, Baron R. | Maclean, F. W. |
| Duff, R. W. | M'Arthur, A. |
| M'Cartan, M. | Sheehan, J. D. |
| M'Ewan, W. | Sheehy, D. |
| Maitland, W. F. | Simon, Sir J. |
| Mappin, Sir F. T. | Sinclair, J. |
| Morgan, rt. hn. G. O. | Smith, S. |
| Morley, right hon. J. | Spencer, hon. C. R. |
| Morley, A. | Stack, J. |
| Mundella, rt. hon. A. J. | Stanhope, hon. P. J. |
| Stevenson, F. S. | |
| Nolan, J. | Stewart, H. |
| O'Brien, J. F. X. | Stewart, M. J. |
| O'Connor, J. | Sullivan, T. D. |
| O'Gorman Mahon, The | Summers, W. |
| O'Keeffe, F. A. | Tanner, C. K. |
| O'Kelly, J. | Thomas, A. |
| Philipps, J. W. | Thorburn, W. |
| Pickard, B. | Trevelyan, right hon. Sir G. O. |
| Pickersgill, E. H. | |
| Playfair, rt. hon. Sir L. | Tuite, J. |
| Villiers, rt. hon. C. P. | |
| Plowden, Sir W. C. | Wallace, R. |
| Potter, T. B. | Warmington, C. M. |
| Powell, W. R. H. | Will, J. S. |
| Power, R. | Williams, A. J. |
| Price, T. P. | Williamson, J. |
| Priestley, B. | Williamson, S. |
| Puleston, Sir J. H. | Wilson, C. H. |
| Quinn, T. | Wilson, H. J. |
| Randell, D. | Wilson, I. |
| Rathbone, W. | Winterbotham, A. B. |
| Richard, H. | Woodall, W. |
| Roberts, J. B. | Wright, C. |
| Robertson, E. | Wroughton, P. |
| Roe, T. | Young, C. E. B. |
| Roscoe, Sir H. E. | |
| Rowlands, J. | TELLERS. |
| Samuelson, G. B. | Hunter, W. A. |
| Schwann, C. E. | Kerans, F. H. |
§ MR. BRADLAUGH, in moving to insert after the words "sworn," the words,
And stating, as the ground of such objection, either that he has no religious belief, or that the taking of an oath is contrary to his religious belief,said he need not trouble the House with any words on that Amendment, which had practically been considered in the discussion which had taken place. He thought it would be right in interpreting the words which had fallen from the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General (Sir Edward Clarke) to say, that judging between the two Amendments, while he preferred his own he was willing to assent to his (Mr. Bradlaugh's). That being the case, he (Mr. Bradlaugh) would simply move this Amendment.
§
Amendment proposed,
In page 1, line 5, after the word "sworn," to insert the words "and stating, as the ground of such objection, either that he has no religious belief, or that the taking of an oath is contrary to his religious belief."—(Mr. Bradlaugh.)
§ Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."
373§ MR. JOHN MORLEYsaid, he thought they had fully carried out the understanding—at least from that Bench—which was arrived at when this Bill was read a second time in March last. He considered the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) entirely deprived the Bill of its value. It took away from the measure the intention with which the Bill was moved and supported, and, for his part, he should vote against it.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, that it was absolutely necessary after what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman on the Front Opposition Bench that he (Mr. Bradlaugh) should say one or two words. He, at any rate, had some means of judging of what value this Bill would be. The effect of this Amendment, amongst other enablements, would be to enable a large number of persons in Scotland, who were at present shut out from the witness box, to come into it. It was stated by a Scotch Judge the other day that if a murder were committed in Scotland, in the presence of only one person, and if that person could not take an oath he would be incapable of giving evidence, and the murderer would escape punishment. It was a misconception to state that with this Amendment the Bill would be without value. What were they doing? They were doing for a class of persons, of whom he was one, precisely what Parliament had already done for Quakers, Moravians, and Separatists and numerous other religious Bodies. They were relieving them from a disability on their stating the grounds on which they claimed to be relieved. That, at any rate, was a great progress in the law. He should certainly have preferred that everyone would have been relieved without any declaration, but he must say he did not think hon. Members could have read the Amendments on the paper, especially the one in the name of the hon. Member for the Ripon Division, which he had agreed to accept, and which would take away from everybody the right to inquire into the character of a witness's religious objection—he did not think hon. Members could have read these Amendments before taking up a position of hostility to the present proposal. For those persons who were without religion he could claim as good a right to speak as anyone in this 374 House. To protest against the Bill because you do not get in it your own form of words, in spite of the fact that the measure contained a good deal of the highest value, was not a philosophical kind of opposition, and was an example which ought not to be followed.
§ MR. SYDNEY GEDGE (Stockport)said, he desired to say a few words upon this clause, because he had been alluded to a short time ago. One point which was clear was that through all ages, in all civilized and half-civilized nations, hitherto there had been practical unanimity in regard to requiring witnesses to take oaths in giving evidence, and he hoped that in that House unanimity would still triumph over the want of unanimity which seemed to prevail among the opponents of this system. One hon. Member said that the Bill as now amended was a great deal too good, and another hon. Member said that it would be simply valueless. The supporters of the Bill did not agree with one another. He thought they might have been spared all those allusions they had heard as to what had occurred during the time of the second reading of the Bill, for it seemed to him they could have no better judge of the understanding which was originally arrived at than the hon. Member for Northampton himself; and from him they had a very clear and explicit statement. The effect of the understanding arrived at, and which the hon. Member referred to, were the words of the Amendment now before the Committee, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Mr. John Morley) should be satisfied that they were the outcome of the original understanding. He (Mr. Sydney Gedge), in dealing with this matter, wished to confine himself to oaths administered in Courts of Justice. He had been unable to move an Instruction upon going into Committee at this stage, but it was his intention on considering the Bill on Report, to move that the Bill be recommitted, and that a similar Instruction be given to the Committee in order that as promissory oaths taken, not in Courts of Justice, nor in connection with legal proceedings, were to be no longer obligatory, these promissory oaths and affirmations would be done away with in future; and, confining himself merely to oaths administered in Courts of Justice, he wished to 375 say, most distinctly, that universal experience had shown that, rightly or wrongly, oaths were very greatly abused. That was not the point in this Amendment, but the point was—should a witness, who claimed to dispense with an oath, be obliged to give a reason why he did so or why he did not? Now, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle was of opinion that those who advocated that a witness should be bound to say, in the terms of the Amendment, either that he had no religious belief or that his religious belief prevented his taking an oath, were guilty of religious intolerance; but to his (Mr. Sydney Gedge's) mind there was nothing inconsistent with the fullest religious liberty in requiring this statement to be made. It seemed to the right hon. Gentleman that there was great objection in requiring this statement; but there could be no objection to it, because they went to Courts of Justice simply for the purpose of arriving at the truth, and in order that they might arrive at the truth.
§ SIR JOHN SIMON (Dewsbury)As we have discussed all this, Mr. Chairman, ad nauseam, I now claim to move "That the Question be now put."
§ Debate resumed.
§ MR. SYDNEY GEDGEsaid, that a witness either held or did not hold a religious belief, and religious belief or non-belief was a part of that man's character, and was a fact which ought to be known to the jury in addition to every other fact bearing upon his character which was brought out by cross-examination. The jury should know whether or not the witness held religious belief in order that they might have adequate material before them in judging of the weight to be given to the man's evidence. It was a Roman Catholic poet who, in the last century, wrote—
Religion vails Her sacred fires,And unawares morality expires.Standing here as a Christian man—and he was happy to say that this was still a Christian country, although a false religious liberty was allowed to those who were not Christians—he distinctly stated that he considered belief a part 376 of character. Religious belief had a very large bearing upon character, and the same principle adopted in Courts of Justice which allowed counsel to cross-examine as to personal character in order that the jury might have sufficient material to test the worth of his evidence, rendered it most important that when a man refused to take an oath the jury should know whether or not he did so on the ground of religious belief. There seemed to him no intolerance whatever in that. A man should come forward to give evidence in the interests of justice and nothing else, and there was no reason why a man's desire to be privileged in a matter of this kind should interfere with that grand result which was required in the interests of justice. It had been said that no one in a Court of Justice ever ventured to suggest to a witness that he was on his oath, and it had been said that such a suggestion would be an insult; but he (Mr. Sydney Gedge) had only quite recently heard a learned counsel, who usually sat on the Opposition Bench, in cross-examining an eminent Doctor of Divinity of the Established Church, say to him—"On your oath, do you say so and so, and so and so?" The effect of this was very frequently to insure greater attention to the words that were being uttered and greater accuracy of statement. It was said that to remind a man that he was "on his oath" was equivalent to saying to him—"Now, remember you are sworn, and the fact of telling an untruth will be perjury, and to commit perjury will render you liable to seven years' penal servitude." But no counsel of experience would dream of putting such a statement to a witness. It was a very different thing to say simply—"You are on your oath," as a kind of reminder to greater accuracy than might otherwise characterize the witness's evidence; it was a reminder to the witness that he was giving his evidence in the immediate presence of the Creator, and, therefore, had a marked influence in assuring accuracy. He (Mr. Sydney Gedge) would certainly vote for the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton, and he wished, at the same time, to point out that the hon. Member, if this Amendment were withdrawn, would be in honour bound—and, no doubt, he would do so—to withdraw the Bill.
§ SIR EDWARD CLARKEsaid, that, in view of what had taken place in the second reading debate, he, after consideration with the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh), had framed words which he thought would carry out the understanding arrived at. He had put down these words on the Notice Paper, and they occurred after those which appeared there in the name of the hon. Member for Northampton. His (Sir Edward Clarke's) proposal was, in line 5, after "sworn," to insert—
And stating as the ground of such objection, either that an oath has no binding effect on his conscience, or that the taking of an oath is, according to his religious belief, unlawful.The Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton was substantially identical with this; in fact, he thought the words the hon. Member for Northampton had put down would perhaps better carry out the view the Government had adopted. He should certainly support the hon. Gentleman's Amendment.
§ MR. MUNDELLA (Sheffield, Brightside)said, that neither the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) nor the hon. and learn0ed Gentleman the Solicitor General were the keepers of the consciences of hon. Members on that (the Opposition) side of the House, and he (Mr. Mundella), for one, just wished to express the reason why he should vote against the Amendment. He had all his life had the greatest repugnance to the taking of oaths, and he had been frequently shocked at the flippancy with which they were administered and taken. He himself had been asked to take 20 oaths at once in a matter of some accounts before a notary, and he could therefore say, from experience, that the flippancy with which this proceeding was carried out was most shocking. Further than this, holding a religious opinion upon the matter, he would say that so shocking did the system of taking oaths in this country appear to him, that he thought every man ought to have the right of choosing an alternative between taking an oath and making an affirmation without any reference whatever being made to his religious belief. No one had a right to ask a witness in the witness-box what his religious belief was.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, that under the law as it stood a witness with religious belief could affirm. There was no addition in the present Bill in that respect to the existing law.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHThat is not so.
§ MR. BYRON REED (Bradford, E.)said, he had no love for the Bill as it stood as a whole, but he thought that the clause they were discussing could be greatly improved by amendment. He should like to suggest a verbal alteration in the Amendment under discussion, which he thought would meet the objection of many hon. Members on that (the Ministerial) side of the House, and would be a sort of compromise between the hon. Member for Northampton and the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General. At the end of the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton were the words "contrary to his religious belief." Well, he would suggest that the Committee should expunge those words, and add in their place the concluding words of the hon. and learned Solicitor General's Amendment—namely, "according to his religious belief, unlawful." He (Mr. Byron Reed) did not wish to complicate the issue before the Committee, but if the hon. Member for Northampton and the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General would accept this modification, or, he might say, combination, of their proposals, he thought it would lead to a more speedy settlement of the question under discussion. If he were in Order, he begged to move to leave out the words he had indicated from the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton, in order to add the words "according to his religious belief, unlawful."
§
Amendment proposed to the said proposed Amendment—
To leave out the words "contrary to his religious belief," in order to add the words 'according to his religious belief, unlawful."—(Mr. Byron Reed.)
§ Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the proposed Amendment."
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, he could not possibly accept this Amendment, and the reason was very simple—namely, that if the Amendment were 379 adopted only persons who found in their religion some law against taking an oath would be permitted to affirm. There were many people who held the view that it was contrary to their religious belief to take an oath, although their religion had no specific law forbidding them to do it. There was a large number of such cases, and it was for that reason that he did not accept the words of the hon. and learned Solicitor General. They were unnecessary words. Another reason why he could not accept the Amendment was, that at present witnesses and jurymen in England, Wales, and Ireland could affirm, if they made a declaration that according to their religious belief the taking of an oath was unlawful. The original proposal before the Committee was to relieve persons outside these classes.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL (Kirkcaldy, &c.)said, he was sorry to hear the hon. and learned Solicitor General say that he accepted the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton in preference to his own. The words moved by the hon. Member for Northampton, to which he (Sir George Campbell) very much objected, required a statement to be made by a witness who did not wish to take the oath of the grounds of his refusal, and, it might be, to require him to state that he had no religious belief. He very much objected to any man being forced to come forward and say that he had no religious belief. He would rather not have an Amendment of this kind at all, but if they must have an Amendment, he should prefer that of the hon. and learned Solicitor General. The words in that Amendment seemed to him to be the best, because they would enable a man to say that he objected to taking the oath because it had no binding effect on his conscience. He should vote against the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton, and, if that were defeated, he should be prepared to vote for that of the hon. and learned Solicitor General.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, that, unfortunately, he knew, to the tune of many thousands of pounds in costs, that the Court of Appeal had held that the words "taking an oath has no binding effect on the conscience," meant that the man using them had no religious belief. In 380 regard to matters of this kind, one had to deal with words as they were interpreted by the Courts of Law.
§ MR. A. R. D. ELLIOT (Roxburgh)said, he would trouble the Committee with but very few words. He could not, however, remain quiet after the expressions of opinion that they had heard on this matter. Hon. Members did not seem to be aware of the extreme importance of the Amendment they were now dealing with. As a matter of fact, upon the manner in which they dealt with this Amendment depended whether or not they would settle the question dealt with by the Bill. If the Committee accepted the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton, they would infallibly leave the matter open, and fresh Bills would have to be brought in to settle it on future occasions. It had been pointed out that the Amendment, if adopted, would not carry out any object of the measure, and certainly there were a large number of people belonging to the Positivist and other persuasions who would not derive any benefit if the Amendment proposed by the hon Member for Northampton were accepted. He would ask hon. Members who were in favour of the principle of the Bill to vote against the Amendment.
THE CHAIRMANI must point out to the Committee that there has been an Amendment moved to the proposed Amendment. That Amendment should be settled before the Committee proceeds to discuss the original proposal.
§ Question put, and agreed to.
§
Question,
That the words 'and stating, as the grounds of such objection, either that he has no religious belief, or that the taking of an oath is contrary to his religious belief,' stand part of the Clause,
again proposed.
§ MR. E. ROBERTSON (Dundee)said, he wished to express in a single sentence his entire concurrence with the position taken up by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Mr. John Morley) on this question, and he would invite the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Bradlaugh) to reflect for a moment on the reasons which had been advanced on the other side of the House for the Amendment which he had accepted. What were these reasons? They came 381 to this, that a jury ought to know in the case of a man who was called as a witness whether or not he had a religious belief. That hon. Members opposite had asserted time after time, and what did it mean? It came to this, that this House was prepared to assert that the evidence of a witness without religious belief was of less value than the evidence of a man who had religious belief. That, he maintained, was the meaning of the Amendment proposed—that or more—and that was the direction which the House was invited to give to every jury in the three Kingdoms in every case that came before them. It seemed to him that this proposal touched the very core of religious liberty, and rather than accept the Bill with such an objectionable clause he would be prepared to do his utmost to defeat the whole measure.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, he wished hon. Gentlemen who professed to be in favour of religious liberty would consider well what they were doing, and would leave those who had no religious belief to fight their own battles. At the present, in Scotland, those who had no religious belief could give no evidence at all.
§ MR. A. R. D. ELLIOTThe Bill corrects that without this Amendment.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, that if the hon. and learned Member had waited until he had finished his sentence, he would have seen the application of what he (Mr. Bradlaugh) was saying. He had been saying that though in Scotland no person without religious belief could give evidence in England, Ireland, and Wales; he could only give it after he had been subjected to a lengthened cross-examination as to whether he had any religious belief or whether the oath was binding on his conscience. For his own part he had been subjected to such a cross-examination before Mr. Baron Huddleston in a case where his religious opinions were not involved, and the matter was forced to such an extent that the entire jury was firmly impressed with the fact that he had no religious belief. He did not complain of this, because, if he held certain opinions, he expected to be required to take the consequences for good or ill of those opinions, and he had never hesitated to do it. This was, and it ought to be, regarded as an enabling Bill applicable 382 to the cases of those who had no religious belief; and those who held a religious belief of any kind would not come within its provisions. Under those circumstances, those who held a religious belief could trust those who did not to take care of their own interests, and to say that the Amendment would put those persons who did not hold a religious belielf under some sort of taint from which they were now free was not correct.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLsaid, he did not think that a person who held no religious belief should be called upon to declare the fact in a Court of Justice, thereby, in the eyes of very many persons, putting a stigma upon himself.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHsaid, they had to declare that now.
§ MR. TOMLINSON (Preston)said, he thought that hon. Members opposite who had spoken upon this Amendment had forgotten one side of the question which was always remembered by hon. Members on that (the Ministerial) side of the House. The Bill without the Amendment would destroy the value of the oath altogether, and they believed the oath to be a most valuable instrument in eliciting the truth in Courts of Justice. Unless the affirmation were made the exception and the oath the rule, the value of the oath would fall to pieces. He had heard the hon. Member for West Bradford (Mr. Illingworth) state that it was his intention, and the intention of those who agreed with him, to make the affirmation of equal value with the oath. He (Mr. Tomlinson) and his Friends were not of that opinion, and they supported the Amendment because by it they supported the primary importance of the oath.
§ MR. JACOB BRIGHT (Manchester, S.W.)said, he rose to express regret that this Amendment should be placed in the Bill from that (the Opposition) side of the House. He should not be surprised if the Committee were obliged to accept the proposal, but he should have preferred to have it forced upon them from the other side of the House. It expressed the views of hon. Gentlemen opposite, but it was altogether against the views of hon. Gentlemen on that (the Opposition) side.
§ SIR EDWARD CLARKEsaid, that the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had an odd complaint to make, 383 He said that it would have been pleasanter to have had this Amendment forced upon him from that (the Ministerial) side of the House. Well, he (Sir Edward Clarke) hoped that no Amendment of any kind was going to be forced upon the Committee from any quarter of the House. For reasons that he had explained more than once, he was anxious that the House of Commons should not now throw away the time it had spent on the Bill this Session, but that it should accept it in a form in which it would be a fair, just, and reasonable settlement of a difficult controversy, and as such acceptable to the whole Body of Members. Well, he believed that by this Amendment, a fair, just, and reasonable settlement would be brought about. Some hon. Members opposite said that it would be a great hardship that he should be obliged to declare in Court that he had no religious belief before he was allowed to affirm instead of taking the oath; but, surely, that was better than that persons should be prevented from giving evidence at all, as was the case in Scotland. To exclude a man from the witness-box because he could not take an oath, having no religious belief, was to treat a witness as if he was not fit to give evidence.
§ MR. A. R. D. ELLIOTsaid, the Bill would admit such persons to give evidence in Scotland.
§ SIR EDWARD CLARKEsaid, on the one hand, there was great objection to oaths—that had been expressed over and over again—but, on the other hand, on that (the Ministerial) side of the House, there was a strong feeling that oaths were valuable. It was impossible that the question could be dealt with this Session on the assumption that the oath could be abolished altogether. The rule must be that the oath must be taken. Well, if oaths were not to be abolished altogether, how were they to deal with them? He had said before, in the course of the afternoon, and he submitted to the Committee now, that the fair thing to say was that those who claimed to be exempted from the necessity of taking an oath, should state the grounds on which they claimed that exemption. At the present moment as to one class of persons, they were excused from the obligation of taking the oath by declaring that they had a reli- 384 gious objection to it. Well, that might be very difficult to do in the case of the other classes of persons which it was thought desirable to include. There might be no express law in a man's religion against the taking of on oath, and yet that man might have a strong antipathy to the taking of an oath. On the other hand, a man had to satisfy the mind of a Judge that he was a person who was entitled to affirm. The Judge had a right to the means of forming an opinion as to the binding effect the oath would have on a man's conscience. He desired to remove all those differences, and to make it a rule that the oath should be taken, and that, if a person said he desired to affirm instead of taking the oath, he should frankly set forth the grounds upon which he based his application.
§ SIR GEORGE TREVELYAN (Glasgow, Bridgeton)said, that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General, in his very temperate and courteous speech, had not got to the bottom of the objections of hon. Gentlemen on that (the Opposition) side of the House. The hon. and learned Gentleman said that many on that (the Opposition side) of the House had an objection to the taking of oaths in themselves, but the question was whether a man ought to be bound to make a declaration of his religious opinions before being allowed to discharge his duty as a citizen. The Liberal Party had attacked and carried one entrenchment after another on this question. In olden times it was a question of holding offices. In times gone by it was the rule that no officer, no town councillor, no magistrate, unless he professed his religious belief, could hold an appointment, and now it was a question of discharging his duty as a citizen by giving evidence in a Court of Justice. Their objection was on this general ground, and the speeches of hon. Gentlemen opposite had not removed that objection. ["Hear, hoar?"] Those speeches plainly showed, as this cheering also showed, that this Amendment was supposed in the minds of those hon. Gentlemen to largely prejudice a person who would make a statement before giving evidence that he had no religious belief. He (Sir George Trevelyan) did not think that such a person ought to be prejudiced, and in the name of the principles of the 385 Liberal Party they objected to this Amendment; and they objected to it with a greater strength of feeling than any feeling they had in favour of the Bill.
§ Question put.
§ The Committee divided:—Ayes 172; Noes 166: Majority 6.—(Div. List, No. 192.)
§ Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause, as amended, agreed to.
§ Clause 2 (Form of Affirmation) agreed to.
§ Clause 3 (Short Title).
§ On the Motion of Mr. TOMLINSON, the following Amendment made:—Page 1, line 19, leave out "Affirmation" and insert "Oaths."
§ Clause, as amended, agreed to.
§ MR. BRADLAUGH (Northampton)said, he had to move a new clause, intended to carry out an arrangement made with the hon. and learned Solicitor General, the object of which was to maintain the validity of an oath once taken, and to meet the judgment in the case of "The Attorney General v. Bradlaugh" in the Court of Appeal, in the event of the case being re-opened long after, even within 20 years.
§ New Clause, to be inserted after Clause 2—
§ (Validity of oath not to be questioned.)
§ "Where an oath has been duly administered and taken, the fact that the person to whom the same was administered had, at the time of taking such oath, no religious belief, shall not for any purpose affect the validity of such oath,"—(Mr. Bradlaugh,)
§ —brought up, and read the first time.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."
§ THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir EDWARD CLARKE) (Plymouth)said, he had himself put a Notice of Amendment on the Paper in the same terms, because it was desirable to prevent Courts of Law investigating the state of mind of a person who had taken the oath.
§ MR. HENRY H. FOWLER (Wolverhampton, E.)said, he would point out that the wording of the Amendment did not agree with the marginal note. The oath was already invalid, and the object was to say that there should be no dis- 386 ability, and that no proceedings should be taken in connection with it. The validity of the oath depended on the fact that the person who took it believed in the Deity, and the clause stated that what was invalid should be made valid.
§ SIR EDWARD CLARKEsaid, that the Bill, if it passed into law, would provide that in certain cases a person should be excused from the obligation of taking the oath. Until he stated the reason for being excused the oath was valid. The clause stated, in terms adequate for the purpose, that there should be no questioning after the oath had been taken.
§ Question put, and agreed to.
§ Clause added to the Bill.
§ New Clause—
§ (Form of affirmation in writing.)
§ In page 1, after Clause 2, insert the following Clause:—"Every affirmation in writing shall commence "I,—, of—, do solemnly and sincerely affirm," and the form in lieu of jurat shall be "Affirmed at—, this—day of—, 18—. Before me,"—(Mr. Bradlaugh,)
§ —brought up, read a first and second time, and added to the Bill.
§ MR. TOMLINSON (Preston)said, they had succeeded in restoring the oath to the position from which it had been deposed, by requiring that the person who escaped taking the oath should state some valid ground for his objection. That was done in the interest of justice, and he now proposed to move the adoption of a clause to impose a penalty for improperly objecting to take the oath.
§ New Clause—
§ (Penalty for improperly objecting to take an oath.)
§ "Any person objecting to be sworn and falsely stating as the ground of such objection that an oath has no binding effect upon his conscience, or that the taking of an oath is according to his religious belief unlawful, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and on conviction shall be liable at the discretion of the Court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding six months,"—(Mr. Tomlinson,)
§ —brought up, and read the first time.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."
§ MR. BRADLAUGH (Northampton)said, it was quite impossible to agree to 387 this Amendment. There was no case in which a declaration had been required to be made, and there were no Statutes in which any penalty of the kind had been enacted.
§ THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir EDWARD CLARKE) (Plymouth)said, he hoped his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Tomlinson) would not press the clause. If it were accepted, the consequence would be that it would be necessary to call evidence to show that at a time when a man had no religious belief he was in truth a good Christian.
§ Question put, and negatived.
§ MR. TOMLINSON (Preston)said, he took it to be the immemorial right of British subjects to be tried by jury. [Cheers and Laughter.] On that side, at any rate, they considered it one of their highest functions to see that this right was not impaired. A juryman was a man sworn to do right in the matter on which he was called to give a verdict; and every person who was a party to an action had the right to be tried not only by a jury, but by a sworn jury. If a man thought he would be less fairly tried by a man who avowed that he had no religious belief, he held that he had a right to object to such person as juror. He had embodied that principle in the clause standing in his name.
§ New Clause—
§ (Peremptory right of challenge in respect of juryman of no religious belief.)
§ "Upon any trial by jury any party to the action in the case of a civil proceeding, or any accused person in the case of a criminal trial, shall have a peremptory right of challenge in the case of any juryman who objects to be sworn on the ground that he has no religious belief,"—(Mr. Tomlinson,)
§ —brought up, and read the first time.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."
§ MR. BRADLAUGH (Northampton)said, he had a similar objection to that as he had expressed to the last new clause proposed. There was a time when Quakers were shut out of the jury-box; but the proposition of the hon. and learned Member was so monstrous that he should not waste the time of the Committee in arguing against it.
§ VISCOUNT CRANBORNE (Lancashire, N.E., Darwen)said, the privilege of 388 trial by jury was not the privilege of the person sitting on the jury, but of the prisoner. The prisoner then had a right to object when he considered that there was no proper sanction to the proceedings of the jury, and if he was not sure that they would decide according to their consciences. There was no doubt that in the minds of an enormous number of people an oath added greatly to the security, and, after all, they were not so wise in the 19th century that they should set themselves against the opinion of mankind. The oath had been admitted in every age, by every race of men, of whatever religion, to be the highest sanction; and he held that a person about to be tried for his life had every right to insist that those who tried him should swear to do their duty in the sight of Almighty God. And, although he could not believe that a man would be so abandoned, even if he did not take the oath, to condemn another unrighteously, he adhered to the principle set forth in the clause of his hon. and learned Friend that the accused person should have the right of challenge in the case of any juryman who objected to be sworn on the ground that he had no religious belief. This right might be almost regarded as doubly necessary in a civil action, where it might be supposed by some that the matter was not of such importance, or that it would be less disgusting if they decided contrary to justice. His hon. and learned Friend had been met by a considerable amount of laughter when he said that everyone had the right to be tried by jury. But, whether a man was now condemned by a jury or by a magistrate, he was condemned under the sanction of the oath by which both were bound to do justice; and if this Bill were passed it would be only fair that a magistrate should not be compelled to take an oath that he would judge rightly according to law before he sat upon the Bench. But, apart from that, he earnestly hoped that hon. Members would look at this matter seriously. The particular matter in a trial was, of course, to have justice done, and it was more likely that this would be secured under the Amendment of his hon. and learned Friend than without it. The next important object was to secure that the public conscience should approve the verdict given. He said there was great 389 danger, considering the deep religious sentiment prevailing in the country, that certain verdicts might be called in question if they were not given under the sanction of the oath. He did not see what the hon. Member for Northampton would lose by accepting the Amendment, or why he should object to a prisoner, or a plaintiff or defendant, objecting to be judged by a person who had no belief in a Supreme Being; and, therefore, he hoped the hon. Member would agree to the proposed clause.
§ THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Sir EDWARD CLARKE) (Plymouth)said, his noble Friend had, of course, the right to have the question discussed seriously.
§ MR. TOMLINSONsaid, he should be very sorry to be supposed to introduce any Amendment that he did not intend to be discussed seriously.
§ SIR EDWARD CLARKEsaid, he apologized to the hon. and learned Gentleman for unintentionally omitting to draw a distinction. He was quite ready to admit the claim of the noble Viscount to have this question seriously discussed; but he hoped his hon. and learned Friend would not press his Amendment, because it would be an outrageous thing to introduce into our law a provision which would declare that all those who had the honesty to call themselves Atheists should be marked as a class to be excluded from the jury-box. There was no ground for putting such a slur on the man who said—"I am incapable of taking the oath." The religious belief of a juryman, except in cases involving religious questions, was a matter of no importance. In 99 cases out of 100, the fact of a man being a Roman Catholic, a Quaker, or an Infidel had no relation whatever to the subjects he had to decide upon. The Committee were asked to say that, although they allowed a man to go into the witness-box who had no belief, and on whose evidence a life might be taken they would exclude him from the jury box, where the fact that he had no belief would not matter at all. He hoped his hon. and learned Friend would not insist on dividing the Committee on what was undoubtedly a retrograde proposal.
§ MR. TOMLINSONsaid, it might be a retrograde proposal, but it was one which he should press to a Division if only one man followed him into the 390 Lobby. There was a broad distinction between a witness and a juryman. He repeated that it was the privilege of the accused to have a sworn jury to try him, and he and his hon. Friends had a right to preserve to such persons all the sanctions which had come down to them—one of which was that the jury should decide on oath. There were many grounds on which a man had the right to challenge jurymen, and he (Mr. Tomlinson) insisted that a person accused ought to have the privilege of saying—"I will not be tried by a man who will not take the oath."
§ MR. SYDNEY GEDGE (Stockport)said, this appeared to him to be a very important matter. The point had not yet been discussed, and surely, in making a change of this kind, the case of jurymen deserved a little consideration at the hands of the House of Commons even in 1888. He pointed out that whereas in the case of a witness there was the sanction of the legal penalty which applied to a man who gave false evidence, no such penalty attached to a man who gave a verdict contrary to his conscience—no such legal sanction could be brought to bear upon him, because it was impossible to prove that he had done so. There was the man's general sense of right and wrong to trust to and the oath. The hon. and learned Solicitor General would say that because they could not have a knowledge of what was passing in a man's heart the best steps ought not to be taken to get from him a statement with regard to his belief. If the argument of the hon. and learned Gentleman was worth anything, it went against affirmation quite as much as against the oath. Why, on the hon. and learned Gentleman's principle, should they require an affirmation from a man who went into the witness-box on summons, and whose doing so might be taken as a sufficient guarantee that he would do his duty there? Knowing, as they did, that people do consider themselves bound by an oath, he hoped the Amendment of the hon. and learned Member for Preston would be accepted.
§ SIR ROPER LETHBRIDGE (Kensington, N.)said, this was not a case of creating a disability; the privilege lay not with jurymen, but with the accused. He maintained that it would not be denied by any hon. Member that there 391 was a large number of people in this country who would believe that they had not been fairly and rightly tried if they had been tried by persons who refused to take the oath; and on that ground it seemed to him essential that at that time there should be no proposal to diminish the securities of those who were accused of crime. Therefore, he hoped his hon. and learned Friend would press the Amendment before the Committee to a Division, and that it would be agreed to.
§ MR. SWETENHAM (Carnarvon, &c.)said, he thought the hon. Member for Northampton was mistaken in the view which he took of the Amendment. The clause was divided into two parts, the first of which related to civil actions, and gave to the plaintiff or defendant the right to challenge jurymen upon the ground of having no religious belief. It did not say that a juryman should be unable to serve, and that was the point of difference—all it said was that either party to the action should have the right, if he chose, to challenge the jury. Now, as regarded criminals, their case was different. The Amendment did not give to the Crown the right of challenging, but only to the party accused. If a person thought he ought to be tried by jurymen who were bound by a religious belief, no harm was done to the jury by his challenging those who objected to take the oath. But it was a great hardship on the criminal to say—"No; you shall not have the opportunity of challenging this man, although he professes that he will be guided by no religious belief." The Amendment did not say that the juryman should not be at liberty to try the case, but that the accused person should have the right only to say—"I object to this being done." If that view were taken, he thought it entirely did away with the objections urged by the hon. and learned Solicitor General, and he ventured to hope that the hon. Member for Northampton would see the force of what he had pointed out.
§ Question put.
§ The Committee divided:—Ayes 97; Noes 191: Majority 94.—(Div. List, No. 193.)
§ New Clause—In page 1, after Clause 2, insert the following Clause:—
392§ (Statement of religious denomination not necessary in case of affirmation.)
§ "After the passing of this Act it shall not be necessary for anyone claiming to affirm, on the ground of religious objection to an oath, to state that he does so as belonging to any particular religious denomination,"—(Mr. Bradlaugh,)
§ —brought up, and read the first time.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."
§ MR. HUNTER (Aberdeen, N.)said, he wished the hon. Member for Northampton to consider what would be the effect of the clause. The clause provided that a person who said the taking of the oath was not consistent with his convictions should not be asked what denomination he belonged to. Did not that suggest that he might be asked minute questions as to what his religious opinions really were? If a man could be asked to what religious denomination he belonged, then the clause was not necessary. If it was necessary, it could only be because, under the Bill, a person could be subjected by the Judge to an inquisitorial examination as to his religious convictions.
§ MR. BRADLAUGHYes; but under Statutes already in force.
An hon. MEMBERsaid, as a member of the Society of Quakers, he wished to point out that they never objected to be described as belonging to that Body.
§ Motion and Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
§ New Clause—
§ (Swearing with uplifted hand.)
§ "If any person to whom an oath is administered desires to swear with uplifted hand, in the form and manner in which an oath is usually administered in Scotland, he shall be permitted so to do, and the oath shall be administered to him in such form and manner without further question,"—(Mr. Solicitor General for Ireland,)
§ —brought up, and read the first time.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause be read a second time."
§ MR. W. P. SINCLAIR (Falkirk, &c.)said, he hoped the clause would be agreed to, because it removed a long-standing and serious grievance in the North of Ireland.
§ Question put, and agreed to.
§ Clause added to the Bill.
§ On the Motion of Mr. TOMLINSON, Schedule (Acts repealed) agreed to.
393§ MR. KELLY (Camberwell, N.)said, he had a clause to move to the effect that where a person was excused from taking the oath under the Act, the fact should not be the subject of comment on the part of either the Court or of counsel.
§ MR. BRADLAUGH (Northampton)said, it would be better to bring this up upon Report.
§ Bill reported; as amended, to be considered upon Wednesday next, and to be printed. [Bill 319.]
§ House adjourned at twenty minutes before Six o'clock.