§ (9.) £258,100, War Office.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. E. STANHOPE) (Lincolnshire, Horncastle)Mr. Courtney, I have asked leave to interpose this Vote, No. 16, as the first, in order that I may fulfil the promise which I have made to the House that I would take this opportunity of explaining what are our intentions with regard to the change in the organization of the War Office, in consequence of the inquiries which have been recently made. I do not think that it is necessary for me to dwell at any length upon the necessity for reform. In spite of many misrepresentations and many statements which cannot really be supported, nevertheless it must be admitted that the result of recent investigation proves the necessity of a large measure of reform. The material we have before us in this matter consists, first of all, of the Report of the Royal Commission on Warlike Stores, presided over by Sir James Fiztjames Stephen. That Commission was specially constituted for the purpose of inquiring into certain charges of corrupt- 1709 tion brought against certain officials of the Ordnance Department, and I am happy to say it resulted in showing that, as regards the officials of that Department, there remains no ground for raising a shadow of suspicion against them. Then comes the Committee presided over by Lord Morley, which was specially charged with examining into the organization and administration of the manufacturing departments and was specially constituted for that purpose. It included, as the Committee will recollect, several members possessed of a very intimate knowledge of the mode of conducting large business establishments; and they have presented a most valuable Report, in which they suggest that the main object to be attained in the reform of the present system is first of all the promotion of more intimate union between the various competing departments, greater permanence in the appointments of the heads of the factories, the introduction of a larger civilian element, and the separation of inspection from manufacture. It will be seen, when I come to explain our proposals, that we attach great weight to these recommendations. Next, there is the evidence taken by the Committee of the House of Commons upon the Army and Navy Estimates. This mainly deals with the financial position of the manufacturing and other departments of the Army; but the Committee, feeling that the extremely technical character of the questions to be investigated necessitated the employment of professional assistance, accordingly obtained the power of having an independent examination of the accounts of the Department. I hope that valuable suggestions may result from this step, and the alterations we propose in the administration of the Department will enable full advantage to be taken of the suggestions made. And, lastly, there is the inquiry now going on into the clerical establishments of the War Office by Sir Matthew Ridley's Commission. Their Report is expected very shortly, and will be before us when we work out the details of our proposed changes. Having thus explained the material before us, I come back to the recommendations that have been made. Now, the Committee presided over by Lord Morley felt itself precluded by the terms of its 1710 instructions from going into any question outside the Ordnance Department. Anyone, however, who has looked carefully into the matter knows that it is impossible to consider the position of that Department by itself, and it becomes necessary to take into review to some extent all the Departments at present under the Surveyor General of Ordnance. And here I venture to ask for special indulgence in having to grapple, after a very short experience, with schemes of re-organization of the gravest character, which naturally provoke great difference of opinion. But the House will, I am sure, learn with satisfaction that the principles of our new scheme have been accepted not only by the Heads of the Civil Department at the War Office, but also by my military advisers, who are unanimous in desiring to see them carried out. The scheme, therefore, comes before the House with a great weight of authority. The Departments now placed under the Surveyor General of the Ordnance labour at present under grave disadvantages. The holder of the Office changes with every Ministry, while almost all his principal assistants are subject to the five years rule and vacate their appointments at the end of that period. And while he himself is charged by the Royal Warrant with absolute financial responsibility for all these Departments, he has no permanent financial adviser with whose assistance he could alone exercise adequate supervision. In addition to this the changes which have taken place in recent years in armaments and fortifications have been so great that at the present moment I may fairly say that the work has altogether outgrown the system established a few years ago. We are not satisfied with this state of things. We wish for a reconstruction of this Department, and I desire to point out shortly the principles on which we think the reconstruction of the Department may fairly be attempted. First, we propose to hand over to the Military Departments, subject to the control of the Commander-in-Chief, the administration of all the executive duties of the Army at headquarters. We hope to fix upon each military head of a Department full responsibility for that branch of the Service which he controls. Secondly, we desire to separate altogether inspection of manufactured 1711 articles from the actual manufacture. And, thirdly, we desire to extend the control of the Financial Department to all the branches of the War Office. The effect of this, of course, will be to take away all the present duties of the Surveyor General of the Ordnance, and accordingly it is our intention to propose that his Office should be abolished as soon as these arrangements can take effect; and, in saying that, I hope I may be allowed in passing to express for myself the great regret with which I shall lose the invaluable assistance which I have always received from my hon. Friend the present holder of that Office (Mr. H. S. Northcote). He has rendered great service at all times, but he has in particular given close attention to the details of the proposals which I propose to make, and he has in the most loyal manner placed himself entirely at the disposal of the Government. But the position of the Surveyor General of Ordnance appears to us to be at present a false one, whether the Office is held by a military man or by a civilian, and tends to distribute a responsibility which it is one of the objects of our scheme to particularize. The effect of our proposals will be best understood by a short reference to all the Departments which are affected. The Director of Artillery and Stores has at present, subject to the Surveyor General of Ordnance, complete responsibility for supplying all stores, accoutrements, and munitions of war both to the Army and to the Navy, for their inspection and custody at home and abroad, and he is also charged with the control of all the manufacturing departments. This bare statement of his duties proves what is also abundantly clear from all the evidence recently taken on the subject—that the work for which he is at present responsible, and which has grown enormously in recent years, is absolutely beyond the power of any one man, however able and industrious, to cope with. The Office of Director of Artillery is, moreover, under the present system, frequently divorced from the observation of my military advisers and it might actually happen that even large changes might take place in the armaments of the country almost without their knowledge. We are not satisfied with this state of things, and accordingly we are 1712 prepared to sub-divide the duties of this Office, which we think can best be done by placing upon professional men the responsibility for ordering and passing into the Service all weapons and munitions of war, and by separating this duty altogether from that of manufacture. The control of the Manufacturing Departments will therefore be taken away from the Director of Artillery and will be placed under a single responsible head. This is a plan which has long been suggested, and it has now been very strongly recommended as likely to tend to the efficient, harmonious, and economical administration of these Departments. We believe that it will tend to promote all these objects. Every day that I look into the matter I am more satisfied that economies can be gained by bringing together the Departments under the control of one head, and not only that, but we are also alive to the advantage of making a single individual responsible to the House of Commons and the country for the management of all the Manufacturing Departments. We intend that these Manufacturing Departments shall be conducted so far as possible on strictly commercial principles, supplying the demands of the Army and Navy of India and the Colonies according to a programme to be settled at the beginning of each year; and I may note that this change will also take away altogether that temptation which has always existed to propose an undue extension of operations on the part of the Manufacturing Department. We are not, however, able to accept the recommendation of the Committee presided over by Lord Morley, that there should be a military head of this Department associated with a civil engineer of eminence. We think that that plan would be costly, and not only so, but that it would tend to the division of responsibility, and accordingly, following the view of the dissentient Members of the Committee, we propose that the Department shall be placed under a single head. Nor are we prepared to say that we agree altogether with the recommendation of the Committee that the Heads of Departments shall be civilians. There would no doubt be a very great advantage in the introduction of a larger civilian element; but as at present advised, I am of opinion that we should get the best man we can for this post, 1713 whether he be a military man or not. The Director of Artillery will himself be transferred to the military side, and accordingly he will be placed under the control of the Commander-in-Chief. He will retain all the duties connected with the approval of desings, and he will hold and be responsible for the inspection of all armaments and munitions of war, and in the case of those required for naval purposes he will be assisted by a representative of the Admiralty. It will be seen that if by these improvements we can accomplish this object all the warlike stores and munitions of war, after they have passed from the manufacturing establishment, will be independently inspected before they are passed into either Service. By these means we shall accomplish I hope another object in view, which has been much pressed upon me. At present, in many cases, manufacturers complain of the system of inspection to which their productions are subjected by a Department which is itself producing articles in competition with them. They ask that, so far as possible, the inspection shall be independent, and I hope that that very legitimate demand will be satisfied by the changes we are making. The Director of Artillery will, also in addition to inspection, retain the control of all warlike stores and munitions of war; but it is intended, so far at any rate as this country is concerned, to separate the stores for the Army and the Navy, the Admiralty paying the Army for the service rendered as store holders. The details of the general changes with regard to stores are not yet decided upon; but I may say that it is our intention, as far as possible, to make every military Head of Departments responsible for the stores of the particular Department over which he has control. We hope, also, in connection with this, to be able to accomplish another reform which has been very much talked about. For the future the whole charge of the Navy armaments will be; borne by the Naval Estimates; and, on the other hand, the whole charge for the transport of troops by the Navy will in future be borne by the Army Estimates. In this way the Estimates of each Department will show the true cost of the respective Services which has not been, and cannot be, possible under the 1714 existing system. The details of this arrangement, as I am sure the Committee will understand, are somewhat complicated, and not having yet been finally settled, are still under consideration. And now, Sir, I come to another Department, that of the Director of Supplies and Transport.
§ MR. WOODALL (Hanley)Is he to be responsible for inspection?
§ MR. E. STANHOPEThe Director of Artillery is to be responsible for the insepction of manufactured articles; but I think it would be better to be allowed to complete my statement before replying to questions. I need not trouble the Committee by going into the history of our Supply Department; it is, I think, sufficient to say that the purely civilian control in this Department has been in recent years in a gradual process of modification. The establishment of the Control Department in 1868, which included some military officers in its upper grades, failed to receive the confidence and support of the Army, and in 1876 it was abolished. Since that time the civilian Heads of this Department have been gradually displaced by military men, and even the civilians who remain have been given military status in the shape of honorary rank. At the present time, out of a total establishment of 321 officers and warrant officers in this Department, only 95 are civilians, and even these will very likely be largely reduced within the next few years. The time has therefore come when it is possible to transfer the charge of this very important Service altogether into military hands; and this is, in fact, the course recommended by a strong Committee which sat to consider this subject in a former year. At one time there existed a state of constant friction between the Army and the Civil Department of Supply which was attached to it. The officer of the Commissariat not being a soldier, and not being altogether in the confidence of the General Officer commanding, was frequently not consulted, and the result was sometimes a breakdown of the Commissariat such as has been spoken of in recent times. Now, the whole of the Supply and Transport Services will be placed under the Quartermaster General, who will in time of peace be able to train an efficient staff of officers thoroughly able to exercise these important 1715 functions in time of war. The office of Director of Supplies and Transport will be abolished, and the whole of the financial duties of seeing that the necessary funds are provided, advantageously administered, and properly accounted for, will be transferred to the Financial Department of the War Office; and here, Sir, I should like to say that this change is not proposed because of any complaint of the manner in which the duties of the office are at present discharged by the Director of Supplies and Transport — it is proposed in consequence of a very strong recommendation of the Committee, which, I think, is generally endorsed by officers of the Army. I can only express my opinion which I believe will be supported by my Predecessor in Office as to the admirable way in which these duties have been discharged in recent years by Sir Arthur Haliburton, the Director of Supplies and Transport. The only remaining office under the Surveyor General which need be specially mentioned is that of the Inspector General of Fortifications. This officer is technically responsible to the Surveyor General of the Ordnance in financial matters, but there is at present no adequate permanent financial control, and, accordingly, on the principle we have laid down, the Inspector General of Fortifications will be transferred to the military side under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, while the whole control of the financial arrangements of the Department will be placed under the Financial Department of the War Office. I am afraid that I have very imperfectly explained to the Committee the nature of the changes proposed, and I should be glad to be allowed to make a short recapitulation. On the military side of the War Office there willbe—first, the Adjutant General, the Deputy of the Commander-in-Chief, who will be responsible for the discipline and efficiency of the Army; and he will control all the Departments of the National Forces, including the Pay Department, which will be transferred to him and the Intelligence Department. The Quartermaster General will be charged with the whole of the supply and transport duties of the Army, and he will control and issue those stores which are necessary and peculiar to the Department over which he reigns. The functions of the Director of Artillery and of 1716 the Inspector General of Fortifications I think I have adequately described, except that the latter will also have control over the engineering and submarine mining stores peculiar to the Department. The Military Secretary will, as at present, control the promotions and appointments in the Army. These five grades will constitute the military side of the War Office, and will be made in every possible way responsible for the efficiency of the Departments under their control. The general effect of this plan will be that the primary responsibility will be placed on the heads of the Army for the whole of the land defences of the country. On the civil side of the War Office, the Financial Secretary and his principal financial assistant will have financial charge of all the Departments of the War Office, and they will also have the examination and audit of the accounts. They will have greater responsibility and greater powers, but I hope that by stopping lower down some of the details which now overweight them, they will have more time to give to larger questions of expenditure. Then there is the Director of Contracts, whose functions will be practically unchanged, except that we hope in this Department to make as much more open as we can the tenders for the Army. Then there are the Manufacturing Departments, which will be under a single head; and, lastly, the Clothing Department. The work of the latter Department is of a somewhat special character, and although there can be no doubt that in order to make our scheme complete we ought to make some change in the Clothing Department; yet as I am desirous not to overweight our proposals, I incline to the opinion that this Department should, at any rate, for the present, be left as it is. And, lastly, Sir, in order to secure joint action, and also to ensure adequate discussion of all important subjects, we propose that all the heads of the Civil and Military Departments should occasionally meet as a Council. The Secretary of State will preside, and I need scarcely say that it is not intended by the proposed establishment of a Council in any way to diminish the undivided responsibility which he has at present for all the Departments under him. I am sure that the Committee will understand that 1717 there are a great many details connected with this scheme which are not yet settled, and I hope that I may ask the Committee not to press for a further statement of them on this occasion. But the scheme which I have endeavoured to explain involves no increase of expenditure whatever; on the contrary we believe that when it is effectually carried out it will effect a reduction of charge for Establishments, and I am sure it will enable a tighter hold to be kept on the military expenditure of the country, while it places, as I believe it will, the whole administration of the War Office upon an intelligible and efficient basis. I have now to thank the Committee for allowing me to make this statement, and will conclude by expressing a hope that it will not be thought necessary to discuss at any length the Vote for the War Office, with regard to the Civil Department of which, as I have said, we are expecting shortly the Report of the Committee. There will, no doubt, be very important suggestions in the Report, and we shall have an opportunity, between this and next Session, of considering how far the recommendations of the Committee can be carried out.
§ COLONEL DUNCAN (Finsbury, Holborn)I am sure the Committee has listened with pleasure to the exceedingly clear statement made by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, who, I trust, will not on this occasion be subjected to too severe a questioning as to details. But there are one or two questions which as a member of Lord Morley's Committee, I must press upon his notice. It appears that the right hon. Gentleman does not approve the recommendation of that Committee that a military man should be at the head of the Manufacturing Departments.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEPerhaps the lion, and gallant Gentleman will allow me to say that it was suggested that there should be two heads of the Department—a military man and a civilian.
§ COLONEL DUNCANExactly. It stands now that a civilian is to be at the head of the Manufacturing Department.
§ MR. E. STANHOPENo, Sir; I did not say that. I objected to the double control, and said that in this case, as in every Department, I should 1718 endeavour to get the best man I possibly could, whether military or civil.
§ COLONEL DUNCANI am glad to hear that my view of the right hon. Gentleman's meaning was not correct. But with regard to the head of the Department, I invite the right hon. Gentlemen to inform me whether he thinks it would be possible for a man who did not live on the spot to give the necessary close attention to the work of the Department. I would also urge upon the right hon. Gentleman very strongly that in making his arrangement he should bear in mind that soldiers are continually undergoing instruction, and that it would, in my opinion, be far better to select a military man who could deal with difficult questions when they arise, even although a scientific man might have somewhat more technical knowledge. I think it would also be well to increase the number of military men in the War Office Department, by which means you would get a class of men well acquainted with the requirements of the Service, and at less cost. I trust the right hon. Gentleman will be able to afford us some information on these points before the Vote is taken.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR (Kincardine)I cannot allow the great changes of a revolutionary nature which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War proposes to make in the administration of the War Office, to pass without urging upon the Committee their grave nature. Among the various changes in the Army system during the last 33 years, those now proposed are far greater in extent and nature. I would remind the Committee that up to and during part of the Crimean War the Army system of the country was carried on in five or six separate and independent Offices. The Militia of the Kingdom was under the direct control of Parliament. The Commissariat in its finance and executive duties was under the direct control of the Treasury. The personnel of the Artillery and Engineers was commanded by the Master General of the Ordnance; whilst the Master General, with the Ordnance Board, controlled and directed the stores of the Army and Navy, the buildings and fortifications of the country. The Infantry and Cavalry of the Army were, in respect to their discipline and duties, under the Commander-in-Chief; 1719 and their finance efficiently and economically carried on by the Secretary at War; and, finally, in time of need, the Secretary of State for the Colonies performed the duties of Secretary of State for War. The Crimean War led to the appointment of a Secretary of State for War separate from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to whom the Commissariat, the finance, and personnel were transferred by the Treasury. The Secretary at War, with the Cavalry and Infantry, fell under the Secretary of State, as well as the Artillery and Engineers. At a later date, Lord Panmure broke up the Board of Ordnance, carrying on the detail duties in the War Office under his own immediate control; at a still later date the control of Parliament over Militia was transferred to the War Secretary. The great object of these changes was, to concentrate under the Secretary of State the whole military system of the country, with the complete and sole responsibility for the efficient and economical administration of the details of the Service; whereas the proposed organization virtually provides for the individual management of Departments, and for responsibility being fixed on separate heads. After an experience of 13 years from the Crimean War, Sir John Pakington, in 1868, found the duties and responsibilities over the entire Military Service so onerous, that on the advice of Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Henry Storks, and myself, he decided on forming an internal control over the separate branches of the War Office, so as to aid him in his supreme control. To this end Sir Henry Storks was appointed Chief Controller, and I was his Assistant. This division lasted with good financial effect until Mr. Cardwell decided, under an Act of Parliament, to divide the duties under three responsible Heads—Commander-in-Chief, Surveyor General of the Ordnance, and Financial Secretary — and this formation is the one which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State proposes to re-organize, and to still further individualize the duties and responsibilities of the War Office. With the experience we have now had of War Office administration, it cannot but be regretted that the economical and efficient administration by the Board of Ordnance and Secretary for War had not been maintained. No doubt, 1720 many difficulties, large expenditure, and inefficient management would have been avoided if the Secretary of State for War had assumed the general control of Departments, instead of taking the duties in detail under his sole and personal care. At all events, as far as I can judge, from merely listening to the speech explaining the details, the Secretary of State for War will now perform the duties of general control instead of personal management of details. It appears to me that the transfer of the duties connected with the armaments and warlike stores to the Adjutant General of the Army is not one worthy of being commended. The armaments as well as the equipments of the Army have always, in this country as well as in India, been subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief and of General Officers in command, the Ordnance Department and the Artillery Officers being mainly responsible for the fixed armaments mounted and the reserves in charge of the Ordnance Department, as also the warlike stores not required to be in immediate use. The present arrangement for the Adjutant General to have these armaments and stores under his control, is open to the grave objection of adding to his already sufficient duties. It is true that a Director of Artillery is also transferred to the Adjutant General, but in subordination to him, becoming thereby a purely executive officer. The marked and novel feature of the scheme is, in the transfer of the Commissariat Department to the Quartermaster General, on whom will rest the sole responsibility of the Commissariat in all the many duties connected with the transport and provisions of the Army. In addition to these, the Intelligence Department, hitherto under the Quartermaster General, and apparently properly so, is handed over to the Adjutant General. There is also added the Pay Department to that officer's duties. It may be, therefore, truly said that the two highest officers of the military portion of the Army must have had insufficient military duties to perform, or else that the largo addition of the new duties now imposed upon them cannot possibly be well performed. This, however, we may assume—that the many complaints which we have hitherto had against the defects in the stores and armaments of 1721 the nation, and in regard to the shortcomings of Supply and Transport, will either be silenced by much larger expenditure than has hitherto been incurred, or else that the cries about defects will not be heard against the powerful heads of the military side of the War Office. I do not wish to urge more objections against the proposed scheme, because I admit that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State was under the necessity, from the loud cries which we have heard against the efficiency and financial management of the War Office, to re-organize the whole system. I may, however, be excused for saying that if I live long enough I do not expect to see the advantageous results which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State anticipates, I approve of the Financial Secretary including the Accountant General's Department exercising complete and efficient control over all monies of every kind entrusted by Parliament to the Secretary of State. Indeed, I am at a loss to understand how this control has not been exercised. It formed a prominent feature in the control arrangements made by Sir John Pakington; whereas, under Mr. Cardwell's scheme, this important principle of financial control must have been given up. The change in the Manufacturing Departments I have long advocated. These departments will be found exceedingly useful to the Army and Navy in manufacturing stores, and in keeping in check the prices charged by contractors. The finance of these Departments should be entirely distinct from the War Office Estimates, and made solely dependent for funds on the great branches of the Service, such as the Navy, Army, India, Colonies, and other Departments. The orders for manufacture given in time before the beginning of each year should be accompanied with an undertaking to pay by instalments the cost of the work as carried on. I, however, doubt the policy of placing all these Manufacturing Departments under the immediate management of one head. I do not believe it possible to find any one individual with the qualifications necessary for the direction of all manufactures so varied in quality, kind, and nature. All that I would wish done is the appointment of a Head with the powers of general supervision of financial control, but 1722 with fit Heads for each Department, qualified for the executive duties in detail. Of this I am confident—that the Government will never secure the services of Heads for these Departments on such economical salaries as at present. I am well pleased to hear that the Director of Contracts will carry on his duties as hitherto; but lam altogether at a loss as to how his relations to the various Departments which require his aid will be maintained as hitherto, seeing that they are in a great degree not under the immediate control of the Secretary of State. The financial control of the War Office is still retained by the Secretary of State; but, seeing that the Departments over whom that control will be exercised are separate from his immediate supervision, I am very confident that the new system will not work harmoniously, and certainly far from economically. One great and important improvement consists in the entire separation of the Naval stores from those of the Army. Whilst in the War Office I urged this separation, and for the 15 years I have been in Parliament, year by year I have advised the separation, and that the charges for the naval stores should be estimated for in the Navy Estimates. The cost of sea transport for Army men and stores, instead of being paid for out of Naval Estimates, in future will be borne—as I understand from the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord George Hamilton)—on the Army Estimates. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State mentions, in addition, that the cost to the Army of store-keeping for the Navy will be repaid by the Admiralty. I earnestly hope that the Navy will be allowed to provide for their own storekeeping; they have far better means than the Army. Their warrant officers and petty officers are peculiarly well trained for the charge of stores; the knowledge which can thereby be acquired by officers of the Navy and of the Marines will be singularly valuable in a professional point of view. I wish I could close my remarks by saying that the new system of organizing will be more efficient or economical than the present one; but time alone can prove whether my fears are well founded.
§ GENERAL GOLDSWORTHY (Hammersmith)I rise to express my satisfaction at the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for 1723 War. We have for a long time suffered from failures due to divided responsibility, and we have never been in a position to bring home to any individual the blame for what has occurred; in the future, however, owing to the changes which the right hon. Gentleman has to-night laid before us we shall be enabled to trace the defects which may exist to those who are responsible for them. With reference to the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that the Adjutant General will be Head under the Commander-in-Chief, I consider the arrangement might be carried a little further, so that the officer of the Adjutant General's Department may practically be the Head of all the staff in the various districts throughout the country. I think it is right, generally speaking, that the Commander-in-Chief, assisted by his Military Secretary, should have the making of all appointments and promotions; but when I see an hon. and gallant Officer like the Member for Birkenhead (Sir Edward Hamley) left out in the cold for a number of years, I cannot but think that there is something wrong in the system, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War will be able to give his attention to the matter. No doubt, confidential reports of officers are sent to the Military Secretary, who lays them before the Commander in-Chief; but the Adjutant General is responsible for the discipline of the Army, and I certainly do not see the necessity for keeping a Military Secretary of the high position we have now attached to the Commander-in-Chief, while the Adjutant General, who knows all about the discipline of the regiments, can bring specially to the notice of His Royal Highness the case of any officer considered to be inefficient. As the matter stands now, you have a double report sent in; and although it is a matter of detail, I think the practice is objectionable. There is no doubt that it will be a matter of much trouble to make these proposed Departments work satisfactorily; but if the plan of the right hon. Gentleman is carried out, and if close attention is given to the subject, I am of opinion the Army will be much better looked after in the future than it has been in the past. There has been no failure of the Commissariat in India, whereas in England it has failed on many occasions. The position of general officers at present 1724 does not admit of their becoming practised in matters of economy; they have, in fact, nothing to do with it, whereas, I think it admits of no question that in the same way as the Commander-in-Chief looks after the Army, the general officer in a similar way should look after his district and be responsible for everything that occurs in it. Of course, there might be some failures at first, for even Secretaries of State are not expected to succeed in their work the moment they are appointed to Office; and so it will be with some general officers. But by all means let them have an opportunity to try and get their hands in, so that when you send, them on field service they may be efficient in all particulars, and be able to keep that grasp on every branch of the Service which, in a general officer, is so essential, but for which an officer now has to wait until he goes on active service to commence.
§ MR. WOODALL (Hanley)I think that no one can have listened to the address in which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) has expounded his scheme without being impressed with the plainness of his statement; at the same time, most of us must feel that the question is so wide in its bearings and so necessarily intricate, that it is impossible at once to recognize the effect of some of the changes suggested. I cannot but regret that we have not been aided on this occasion by the excellent new method of supplying a printed Memorandum before being called on to discuss these proposals. But the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War has, at any rate, had the advantage of a multitude of counsellors. He has been aided, as he has told us, by a number of Committees of Inquiry, and perhaps he has felt what has been felt by most of us, that there was some inconvenience in the several bodies entrusted with these inquiries overlapping each other in respect of their investigations. In regard to Lord Morley's Committee, on which I had the honour and advantage of serving with my hon. and gallant Friend opposite, we were entrusted, as the right hon. Gentleman has stated, with inquiries sufficiently wide and important in themselves, but which did not, as we interpreted them, extend to the general administration of the Ordnance Department itself. As I had some responsibility in connection with the right hon. 1725 Gentleman the then Secretary of State for War in appointing that Committee, it may not be uninteresting to say that the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Campbell Bannerman) thought that our best way of dealing with the question would have been to address ourselves, in the first instance, to an investigation of the Manufacturing Department, and then have a reconstituted Committee in order to address itself to the larger question of how far the Ordnance Department was satisfactory for supplying the ordinary wants of the Army. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House (Mr. W. H. Smith) will not have forgotten the agitation in the country 12 months ago, and the circumstances which rendered it imperative that there should be an inquiry into the very grave charges that were made not only with regard to the efficiency, but the integrity of those who were actually employed in the Department. We cannot allow this opportunity to pass without joining in the general congratulations that the charges have been so completely disproved. Let it be remembered how loudly, how confidently, these public servants were charged with corruption, corrupt favouritism, conspiracy, and incompetence—the Ordnance Department was said to be "a seething mass of corruption." These were the reasons which, in the minds of some, alone could explain how it was that guns of Colonel Hope and others had not been adopted into the Service; these reasons alone could justify the fact that certain Gentlemen were not placed on a specially constituted Committee to inquire into certain allegations; and it will be remembered that not only the public mind was possessed of these notions, but that they received the endorsement of The Times newspaper and several responsible Members of this House. But here we have found that a Royal Commission, after what has been admitted to be one of the most searching and thorough investigations by which these charges could be examined, has declared that they have no foundation; and Mr. Justice Stephen sums up by saying that—
The result of our whole inquiry into the charges of corruption brought before us is that we think they have utterly failed, and there was no evidence brought before us to justify even the suspicion that there has been any corruption at all among the superior officers of the Ordnance Department.1726 We cannot allow this occasion to pass without calling attention to the fact that this was the view strongly expressed by the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury and those who had had experience of the War Department; but it is only fair to say that after dismissing the question of the integrity of the officers of the Department, the Royal Commission held that there was evidence of a considerable amount of inefficiency. I have followed as closely as I can the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) with regard to the changes which he proposes to make, and I observe that he does not refer to the particular reflections made by the Royal Commission upon the Office which he holds with so much advantage to the State, and with so much ability, especially bearing in mind that the Secretary of State for War is therein said to be charged with duties which it is morally and physically impossible that any one man can discharge in a satisfactory manner. The Report of the Commission says—No one can possess the strength or knowledge which would be indispensable for the purpose; but even if such a physical and intellectual prodigy were found he would have to do hi s duty under disadvantages which would reduce him practically to impotency.Now, the important question which I think underlies the whole of this inquiry is as to the particular relationship which exists between the Parliamentary and the technical and professional sides of the War Department, and I think that the Royal Commission, with all respect, does not seem to have completely realized that matter. Here and there are, for instance, statements which are obviously inaccurate—the statement for instance that there is no continuity in the administration of the Department, and no security that particular principles of manufacture will be adhered to or that particular systems for making guns and rifles will be developed; that each Secretary of State takes his own view, and each is advised by persons with whom he happens to work. I hope I shall convey a strong contradiction of that statement when I say that whatever may have been the faults of the Department, there has been a steady continuity of policy under the guidance of able professional men who, happily, have not 1727 been affected by changes of Government, I desire to make one reference at this particular point to my right hon. Friend (Mr. Childers) who, at one time, filled with so much distinction the position of Secretary of State for War, who is associated in the Report with a responsibility not only administrative but technical with regard to the inquiry into the proposed new rifle. There is the statement, for instance, that the inquiry as to the new rifle wag embarrassed somewhat by the exclusion from it of the consideration of the breach, and that that was done, to the regret of the Committee, by the action of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Edinburgh (Mr. Childers). The words are—They learnt that the decision to retain this action was made, by Mr. Childers personally. They remonstrated with him upon the matter; he, however, refused to alter his decision, and retained the rifle that they were constructing.It is very extraordinary that such a statement as that should be made. I know it was made before; it was made and contradicted in this House, and it is contradicted in the evidence submitted to the Commission. The Director of Artillery, for instance, gives evidence in precise and definite terms that the decision was arrived at by His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, by and with the consent of his military advisers. I mention that only as going to show that the Secretary of State for War has been all along served by perfectly competent advisers, and that his decisions have been usually made in complete harmony with those by whom the military chiefs are guided. With regard to the position of the Surveyor General of Ordnance, we may all at any rate agree that it has been an anomalous Office, and that it has been considerably prejudiced by a rather extravagant and absurd title. It has also been exposed to the very great inconvenience of being the only important Office of State of which there was no permanent equivalent. The Surveyor General has been responsible for the Department to the House of Commons as its Parliamentary exponent, but I should suppose that for every other similar post in the State there has always been some head who is the permanent executive, and therefore a very important guide and aid to the Department. And I observe that although considerable reflections have 1728 been made upon the folly of entrusting such important duties to civilians who have no military or professional training, it does not appear that there has been much greater satisfaction given when the Office has been discharged by very distinguished military men— such as Sir Henry Storks and Sir John Adye. We have listened tonight to a most important and, as I think my hon. Friend near me correctly describes it, revolutionary proposal, and I trust that the hopes of the right hon. Gentleman in making these changes will be fully realized. My first feeling is one of very great relief that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War has not adopted the recommendations of Mr. Justice Stephen in the main to reconstruct the Ordnance Department under a Master of Ordnance, who should be a Member either of this House or of the other House, who should be an important political figure, but independent of Ministerial changes and Party vicissitudes. No one can look at the manner in which that recommendation is stated in the Report without feeling that the recommendation carries with it its own contradiction. The Commission has, indeed, frankly stated that it might easily happen, or it might generally happen, that if the Master of the Ordnance held Office for seven years he would take an important part in the Government of the country after the retirement of the political Party by whom he was appointed. That is sufficient, I think, to show how utterly impracticable is this suggestion. But there is a suggestion in the Report of the Royal Commission which I think I find embodied in the scheme of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and that is the constitution of a Council to the Master General of Ordnance. Now, the general motive of the Royal Commission, and especially in regard to this suggestion, is one which I am perfectly certain has seriously occupied the attention of the right hon. Gentleman. The Royal Commission desired to find some sufficiently authoritative body or office which would be independent of the necessity of adapting itself to the polities of the hour, and which would put on authoritative record the necessities, the requirements, and deficiencies of the Service. I observe the right hon. Gen- 1729 tleman stated with great force and authority that in any proposals which he submitted to the House there is not the slightest intention of weakening the full responsibility of the Secretary of State to Parliament; but I gather that in the various heads of the different Departments he thinks he will have a council which will be able to advise him with judgment and with authority upon all the matters which come within the responsible administration of the War Department. I want to press him for an answer upon the point, if he does not think it inexpedient to give one, as to how far he accepts the evidence of a desire on the part of the Royal Commission that there should be some authoritative body whose reports should be published, and which should, to a certain extent, be independent of the Secretary of State, or of the Government of the day, with regard to the responsibility and accuracy of the statements they might make. I know that strong evidence was given in favour of this by Lord Wolesley. Now, Sir, we come to that portion of the inquiry which was entrusted to Lord Morley. I was glad to hear the right hon. Gentleman speak of the value of the inquiry which was conducted by the Committee which had the good fortune to be presided over by Lord Morley. I do not think any reasonable complaint can be made that the right hon. Gentleman has not adopted in its entirety the Report of Lord Morley's Committee; because, although that Committee did address itself to the task entrusted to it with a very single-minded desire to arrive at a proper conclusion, and was in fact substantially in accord upon all the main points, the Committee felt quite conscious that there were many points on which there was still room for considerable difference of opinion. We did feel, and I am glad to see that feeling recognized by the right hon. Gentleman, that with regard to the Factories there was a great want of continuity and harmoniousness of management. It was obvious to us that the general control of all these immense establishments by the Director of Artillery was impossible. General Alderson—than whom the State could hardly have a more efficient servant—himself admitted that the many claims upon his time rendered it impossible for him to give that direct and continual control which was certainly 1730 required. For that reason we have recommended that the five great manufactories should be, as far as practicable, treated as different branches of one arsenal, and that, with that view, there should be placed over these establishments one General Superintendent, who we recommended should be called the Superintendent of the Ordnance Factories. I find that the right hon. Gentleman does not quite go with the Committee in the recommendation that the Superintendent of the Ordnance Factories should be aided by a Chief Mechanical Engineer, and I am frank enough to say that was a recommendation arrived at after much deliberation, some difficulty, and even some hesitation; and no one will find fault with the right hon. Gentleman if he thinks he can find one man sufficiently capable to take up the whole of the duties. At any rate, such a plan as that suggested would secure that which is felt to be greatly needed—namely, unity of administration. The right hon. Gentleman did not say where the responsibility of design was to rest.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEI said that the approval of the design would rest with the Director of Artillery.
§ MR. WOODALLI gather that while you relieve the Director of Artillery of all responsibility for manufacture, upon him would devolve the responsibility of design.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEI used the words "approval of design."
§ MR. WOODALLHe is not to be called upon to design, but will be the judge of the merits of designs, whether the designs are made in Government factories or by independent contractors. Well, the conspicuous and all important change which is involved in the new scheme is the transfer on a very large scale to the military side of the War Department. That transfer will probably involve some diminution of friction, but no one can express an opinion upon it until we see the actual details of the proposal itself. It is very satisfactory to learn that the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman have been approved by his advisers on the civilian as well as on the military side. I have spoken so far merely with reference to the Manufacturing Departments, and I gather that the Chief Superintendent of the Ordnance Factories will have control 1731 of all the manufacturing factories, the powder and small arms factories. Then comes the disappearance of another very important Department, and that is the Department of Supply and Transport. The right hon. Gentleman justly paid a sort of parting tribute to the very able man who has been entrusted with that Department. Sir Arthur Haliburton is not only a man of the greatest ability and courtesy, but he may challenge the severest criticism of his administration of the Supply and Transport Department under the trying circumstances of the recent wars, and be able to come out of the ordeal with flying colours. The Department was admirably managed during the Egyptian Campaign. I believe it was established as true that of the supplies sent to Egypt during the several campaigns, less than 5 per cent were unaccounted for, and that the actual losses from any preventible cause fell something below 1½ per cent. I speak in the presence of hon. Members who have personal knowledge of the facts. Although supplies were transported from the base to the front, sometimes as often as 40 times by road, boat, train, and camels' backs, the result comes out that Lord Wolseley testifies that there never was an Army in the field more efficiently served. It is only just to say so much for a very able and devoted public servant, especially after what has been commonly supposed to have been the disclosures of the Committee which sat upstairs in connection with supplies. Then the Department of the Inspector General of Fortifications goes over to the military side, and with it, I suppose, everything in the nature of provisions for buildings, roads, and all other matters which have hitherto been discharged by that Department. I do not quite understand what will happen to the Clothing Factory and to the Department of the Director of Contracts. I know the right hon. Gentleman mentioned them, and I understood him to say that they were to remain as at present. [Mr. E. STANHOPE: They will be placed under the Financial Secretary.] Then practically we shall come to the disappearance as a military administrative figure of the Surveyor General of Ordnance, and such of his duties as are now transferred to the military side will devolve upon the Finan- 1732 cial Secretary to the War Office. That is the conclusion which was anticipated, and which, in effect, would have been recommended by my right hon. Friend the late Secretary of State, and one which I hope will be found to work on the whole very satisfactorily. It will obviously increase very considerably the importance of the Department of the Financial Secretary to the War Office. But I believe it is allowed that that Office has not hitherto been overworked, and I have no doubt at all that provision will be made by some means to increase the dignity as well as the importance of the Office. On the whole, I think that we may take it that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State has addressed himself, as we know he would, to this important task with great earnestness, and a desire to arrive at a thorough and efficient reform. Let us hope that the reform will be lasting, that it will command the co-operation of all persons concerned, and that it will realize the expectations the right hon. Gentleman has formed with regard to it. At the same time, it is perfectly impossible to speak with confidence with respect to it, and I suppose it will be necessary for him to come to Parliament for legislative sanction. The condition of things established in 1870 was brought about under the authority of an Act of Parliament. One of the points I should like to put to the right hon. Gentleman is how far the change contemplated will necessitate the repeal or the amendment of that Act? I am sure we have all listened with the greatest pleasure and attention to the right hon. Gentleman, and I congratulate him upon the general tenour of his scheme.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEI think I may fairly follow the hon. Gentleman, and I thank him very much for the tone of the speech he has delivered. Although, of course, the hon. Gentleman reserves his judgment upon some of the suggestions I have made, I am bound to say that, on the whole, he is favourably disposed to my proposals. I should like to say, in the first place, that so far as I know no legislation will be necessary. The legislation under which the Surveyor General of Ordnance was appointed gave power to the Secretary of State to appoint the Surveyor General or not, and enabled him to lay down by Royal Warrant the duties of the Sur- 1733 veyor General. With regard to the transfer of the Supply and Transport Department from the civil to the military side, about which the hon. Gentleman spoke, I should like to say that it is a change strongly recommended by a powerful Committee, which examined carefully into the matter, and that it is also recommended by Sir Arthur Haliburton himself. I think that at once commends the change to the House. The hon. Gentleman also asks me with regard to the Council which it is proposed to set up. I am afraid that the Council I proposed is not the sort of Council which he sketched out, and which was recommended by the Royal Commission. I have no intention of proposing any such Council; I do not believe that it would be possible for the administration of the War Office to be carried on in this House if there were a Council empowered to make its Reports public independent of the Secretary of State. It is difficult in these days to carry on the administration of the War Office; but I think that to have the Head of the Ordnance Department independent, or to have a Council to Report to Parliament independently, would make the task of the Secretary of State almost impossible. The hon. Gentleman seems to be labouring under a misapprehension in respect to another point. He seems to think that it is intended that the responsibility of the Secretary of State should be diminished, and the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief increased. Now, the effect of the proposal is this. At the present time responsibility in regard to warlike stores is practically divided between the Director of Artillery and the Surveyor General of Ordnance. The effect of my proposal will be that the whole responsibility for the warlike stores of the Army will be placed upon the Director of Artillery, who will be subject to exactly the same control, as at present, of the Secretary of State, and subject in addition to the financial control of the Financial Secretary, so that the guarantees the House will have in regard to the administration of this important Department will be more ample than they have been up to the present time. The Commander-in-Chief will be the head of the military side, but the control of the Secretary of State will be as absolute as it is at the present 1734 moment. With regard to the control as to warlike armaments, it is obvious it all depends upon finance. These things cannot be ordered unless money is provided for them, and, that being so, there is the double control of the Secretary of State, because he controls the Commander-in-Chief on the one hand and the Financial Secretary on the other. Now, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Holborn Division of Finsbury (Colonel Duncan) spoke of the desirability of the Establishments at Walham and Enfield being under the control of the Head of the Manufacturing Department. They will be under such control, and no inconvenience will be found to arise therefrom. Then my hon. and gallant Friend also asked me with regard to the introduction of a larger military element into the clerical establishment of the War Office. That is a question which has often been raised in this House, and which has been raised upstairs in Committee. I should be very glad to see a larger military element at the War Office if it could be introduced; but I am not able to make any proposal to the House on the subject now, because I am waiting the Report of the Royal Commission presided over by Sir Matthew White Ridley, and which is examining into the Civil Departments of the War Office. I must see exactly what the Commission proposes before I can make any suggestion. I think I have now referred to all the points which have been raised in the course of the discussion.
§ COLONEL DUNCANWill the right hon. Gentleman say who will be the Head of the Inspecting Department?
§ MR. E. STANHOPEHe will be the Director of Artillery. He will be responsible for the inspection of all articles which come to the Army, whether manufactured by Government or by private contract.
§ CAPTAIN COLOMB (Tower Hamlets, Bow, &c.)I think the Committee is indebted to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) for the very clear statement he has made. I think that so far as principle is concerned the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman are necessary. I should like to ask the right hon. Gentleman at what date is it proposed that the change should commence; and I should also like to ask him whether the 1735 question of the five years' appointments has been considered, because there is a great deal to be said on both sides of the question? There is no doubt about it that in any Civil Department, in any great private manufacturing business, or in any establishment requiring knowledge and supervision, it would be regarded as madness to change heads of Departments absolutely every five years. Another matter I should like information upon is the separation of the naval and military charges. I think the Committee will have heard with the greatest possible satisfaction that all charges on the Army Votes under this system will be really for Army purposes, and that all charges on the Navy Votes for Naval purposes. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War stated, for example, that the transport services for the Army will be transferred to the Army Vote. I should like to know whether the net cost or the detailed charges will be transferred? With regard to military clerks I will not say a word except to say that I agree with my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Holborn Division of Finsbury (Colonel Duncan), and that there should be a greater infusion of military officers of experience into the War Office. There is one more point I wish to refer to, but it is one on which I cannot expect the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State to give me an answer now. I must, however, take the opportunity of bringing it under his notice for fear that it might escape his attention. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of Colonial support. Now, let me point out that since all the various re-organizations have taken place in the War Office, a new state of things has arisen very much out of our sight, and that is the growth of the Colonial Military and Naval Forces. Of course, these forces must be supplied with stores. Now, because the War Office was in no way in touch under former systems with the military element of our Colonies, it so happens that some of our Colonies have adopted armaments of a pattern which we are not prepared to supply. The War Office may not know it, but demands will come home on the outbreak of war, and we shall not be able to meet them, unless we are in some way in touch at the War Office with the Colonial Military Authorities. I beg that the right hon. Gentleman the 1736 Secretary of State for War will make inquiry of those who held Office, or will have the Correspondence of 1878 examined with regard to the supply of stores for armaments in the Colonies. I think he will find that when the Colonies thought and expected that they would have to defend themselves, there came tumbling in from all parts of the Empire demands for all sorts of stores, which we were not in a position to supply. I therefore hope that, as the War Office is being re-organized upon principles which I believe will endure, this matter will receive the attention of the right hon. Gentleman. I am sure, knowing the interest the right hon. Gentleman takes in the Colonies, it is only necessary to bring this matter to his attention to secure its being considered and dealt with by him.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEI am much obliged to the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Captain Colomb) for his kindly reference to myself. Of course, the last point raised is one which I cannot be expected to reply to at once. He asks, first of all, as to the date when these changes will come into operation. I do not want to pin myself to any one date, but I want to bring them into operation as best I can; of course, they cannot all be brought into actual effect until the 1st of April next. So far as I can, I wish to bring them into operation at the earliest possible moment. Then he asks with regard to the five years appointments. I recognize the value of what he has said upon this point. It is not our intention to limit the appointments to the Headships of the Manufacturing Departments to five years. I think we should be able to keep a good man when we have got him. Then, with regard to the actual charge of transports thrown on the Army Estimates, I should prefer to postpone my answer to that question until a subsequent date.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL (Kirkcaldy, &c.)The main feature of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War is the very large transfer of War Office control to the Commander-in-Chief. Notwithstanding the theory that the Secretary for War represents the popular element in this country, I have very great doubt as to whether, so long as the Commander-in-Chief is a great Officer of State, and in direct relation to 1737 the Crown, the control over such a great Office by the War Office will be, and can be, so complete as it is sometimes asserted to be. That is the only doubt I feel I ought to express with regard to the statement which has just been made.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (10.) £76,000, Yeomanry Cavalry.
§ MAJOR RASCH (Essex, S.E.)I should like, for one moment only, as an old Cavalry soldier, to say a word about this Vote. No one doubts that we want an irregular body of Cavalry to support our regular body of Cavalry—that we want a good and efficient body of irregular Cavalry; but that is what I would suggest we have not got. The Government are asking for £76,000 for Yeomanry, and for that sum we support 10,000 men—that is to say, give them three dismounted drill and eight days mounted drill in the course of the year. I submit that it is utterly impossible to imagine that we can get a good and efficient body of irregular Cavalry with the amount of drill and with this amount of money spent upon it. Of course, there are regiments of Yeomanry which are more or less efficient, but they have a great deal more money spent upon them than the Government are asking for now. For my own part, I should like to see the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War either reduce the Yeomanry to a quarter of its present strength and ask for the same Vote, or else see the Vote now asked for quadrupled in amount, keeping the Yeomanry at its present strength. In either case we should get an amount of drill such as would make the men thoroughly efficient; or, at any rate, more efficient than they are at the present time.
§ Vote agreed to,
§ (11.) £655,000, Volunteer Corps.
§ (12.) £448,000, Army Reserve Force.
§ COLONEL NOLAN (Galway, N.)I should like to ask the Representatives of the War Department on the Treasury Bench a question with regard to this Vote. I should like to know what becomes of the Army Reserve man when he has put in his 12 years' service. We will suppose that the men are of the average age of 18 when they join, and that they stay in the Army six years— they may only spend three, but it is 1738 open to them to spend another three or six —say they spend six years in the ranks, and at the age of 24 go into the Reserve, receiving a certain amount of pay, I think it is 6d. a-day. When the man arrives at the age of 30—that is to say, after six years in the Reserve, I should like to know what becomes of him. I should like to know what the Government have to say about it, because I have a good idea on the subject myself. My idea is that you turn him away altogether, and that appears to me to be a very bad thing for the country. All the training that you have given to him is useless. I think he might with considerable advantage go on even to the age of 40, if you keep him in a sort of garrison reserve. I certainly do not see why men in the Reserve should be put out of it at the end of six years' service. Probably the hon. Gentleman the Financial Secretary (Mr. Brodrick), who has been more in attendance on the Army and Navy Estimates, than perhaps any other Menber, and who appears to have taken a deep interest in all these matters, will be able to give me some answer to my question. The matter is one of great interest to myself, because there are many of these Reserve men up and down my own constituency.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL (Kircaldy, &c)I do not object to having a Reserve Force, on the contrary, I should like to see it retained, and I should like to see the number larger than it is at present; but I am of opinion, that if we are to extend the Reserve Force, the present description of Reserves which we possess are not of the right kind. I cannot help thinking that the efficiency of the Army has been too much sacrificed in favour of the half-and-half system we have adopted. We have a sort of Regular Reserve under which system men are liable to be called out for foreign service, and we know that, situated as this country is, it very often happens that we are under the necessity of sending men on foreign service. Well, Sir, the country has been able to absorb a certain number of men who are ready at the call of the country when they are wanted, but my own belief is—and it is not altogether my own belief alone, because I am fortified in my opinion by that of Friends of much greater experience than myself—that if 1739 you extend this system at all, and the Reserve becomes too large, the country will not be able to absorb them without great difficulty—you will not find a sufficient number of employers of labour who are willing to take the men— and the result will be to cause great discontent amongst the men. The country can absorb a number of men in this way no doubt, but if you go beyond a certain point, I do not think the country will be able to do so. I think you have already got to the number the country is capable of absorbing under present conditions. I think that you ought not only to have as largo a Reserve as you have, but one ten times as large. I am strongly of opinion that we should divide the Army into two parts, and that we should have one Army for service abroad, and one for Home defence, like the Militia, which I should like to see ten times as great as it is now. This it appears to me can only be managed by a material alteration of the conditions under which the Reserves are formed. I think you should allow men to enlist in the Army, merely to qualify them for military service without being liable to go on foreign service or to India. You could, by a system of that kind, make your citizens capable of defending their country in the Reserve in connection with the Militia. In this way you would have a great defensive force, which I am sure, under present modern conditions, would render our position much more secure than it is. This is a country of great wealth, and it behoves us to make a great effort for its defence, but it will never be secure until it has such a system of defence as I propose. I think we can only secure the end which I hold to be so desirable by passing your men more quickly through the Army than you do now. You ought rather to do that than send all your soldiers to India making your Army professional soldiers. This view that I am expressing is one that I have long held. It is a view which has been growing, and which Secretaries of State have been inclined to. I think the noble Marquess the Member for Rossendale (the Marquess of Hartington) when Secretary of State for War, inclined to it, for he made an experiment in the matter. He tried it in the Guards, and I must say that I should not have thought that the best experi- 1740 ment would be in that quarter. However, the experiment was made, and it proved successful. I should like to know if the experiment has been extended, and whether the Government do not think that it should be largely tried in other directions. Do they not think it would be advisable to extend the Reserve very considerably? Should we not have a Reserve which is not liable to foreign service, but which would only be liable to be called out when the country is in grave danger? You ought to be able to keep your Reserve up to a certain number by putting the men discharged from the Army in connection with the Militia, and giving them a retaining fee. I would ask whether the Government have under consideration the extension of the three years' service system or a shorter service system, and whether we may not hope in that way to have a greater Reserve than we have at present.
§ THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY, WAR DEPARTMENT (Mr. BRODRICK) (Surrey, Guildford)I cannot follow the lion. Member into his observations on the short-service system; but the question as to what becomes of the Reserve men when they are discharged is one which has occupied the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. After the expiration of 12 years, Reserve men can retire into civil life if they desire to do so; but if they so wish, they can be retained in the Reserve for four years longer.
§ COLONEL NOLANAre they retained?
§ MR. BRODRICKMostly they are; but the difficulty which has arisen is in making sure that they can obtain employment. An earnest attempt has been made by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State to get all classes of employment for them in the Government service. The condition of the Reserve is most satisfactory. It is found that very few cases of fraudulent enlistment take place, and I think hon. Members may rest assured that the present system is working satisfactorily.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR (Kincardine)The objections raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) against the Army Reserve of 52,000 men are worthy of consideration, because the abolition of this force would result in important 1741 changes if his views were adopted; because this change could not be carried out without the country being provided with another force to serve as a Reserve for the Army. This probably would end in a large increase to the numbers of the standing Army, or else a kind of conscription would follow, so as to provide this country with the extensive Reserves which the Continental Armies have. At all events, considerable expenditure would be incurred in providing additional recruits for the Army. In fact, Mr. Cardwell, who largely extended the system of Army Reserve, did so in imitation of the Continent; he fully expected that the passing of men through the Army and entering them in the Reserve would have produced a much stronger force than has yet been provided. My own leaning is to a different mode of providing Reserves for the country. I am of opinion that the Militia, as re-constituted in 1756, would have formed the nucleus for a much more extensive and less expensive force than we at present obtain by means of the Militia and Army Reserve, as these forces are now formed. As I see the hon. Gentleman the Financial Secretary paying attention to my remarks, I suggest to him to read up the papers which have been written about supplying the country with Reserve Forces. I refer to the speech of that able man, Mr. Windham, on the training of men for the defence of the country. This practically provided for military training being given throughout the country to the young men willing to receive it. I believe that military instructors might be told off for each county to train the young men, who might be paid provided they attended a sufficient number of drills to ensure some degree of military fitness. Then there are most excellent papers in Cobbett's Register, written by that remarkable man between 1809 and 1813. Indeed, so good are these suggestions, that if the several papers, referring to the Army with reference to recruits, were reprinted so as to omit the parts which give a clue to the authorship the suggestions would be received as suitable to the present day. One part I would mention was a weekly payment, small in amount, to be paid to the parents of men who join the Army. I cannot but think that it would be well for the Government to resort to this 1742 means for securing services of men. In Ireland it could not fail to have a most beneficial and useful effect. With regard to the Vote, may I ask the Financial Secretary to sub-divide the charge of £440,500 under the different heads now lumped together. I have several times been put to great inconvenience by not having the amount of the several items.
§ COLONEL NOLANThis is a very important question, and I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman the Financial Secretary for the observations he has made. In the few words he has spoken he has given us a great deal of information. I did not, myself, know of this four years' extension of service; but I certainly think the Reserve men, after the expiration of their period of service, ought to be kept longer if they desired it—in my opinion, they ought to be kept in the Reserve up to the age of 40; at any rate, in the Artillery and Cavalry, as it takes a much longer period to qualify a man in these branches than in any other. If they could not be conveniently utilized in any other way, the large additional strength you would gain by adopting this system would enable you to have a greater force on garrison duty, provided, of course, that the men agreed to it. In the case of strong, healthy men, there is no reason why they should not be kept on such duty up to the age of 50. I am rather surprised at what has fallen from the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), because he is a person who always looks upon matters from a common-sense point of view'—and, of course, we all know that upon Indian matters he is almost the first authority in the House. When he said that this country could not absorb more than the present Reserve, I could not help thinking of the two greatest military countries of Europe—namely, France and Germany—I could not help thinking that these countries manage to absorb 2,500,000 men.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLMy point was that the country could not absorb them whilst they are liable to be called out for foreign service.
§ COLONEL NOLANI am rather of opinion that, in this country, the Reserve men have been called out unnecessarily. There have been instances in history where men have been called up unnecessarily from time to time until they have 1743 become dissatisfied, and when cities have been really in danger, and a call has been made upon them, they have refused to obey it. I think the Reserves ought never to be called out unless the country is really in imminent danger; and I also think that where you have a good soldier you should never force him into early retirement. Let it be a free service; but, of course, in the case of all soldiers I would not keep them for a long period in the Reserve, unless they were good shots, and, whilst in the case of the Infantry I would not keep them unless they were good walkers, in the case of the Cavalry I would not keep them unless they were good riders. I would not be, however, very strict with regard to character, and I would not reject a man on that score, unless, of course, he happened to be an unusually bad man. By accepting men in the way I propose you would have a good and effective Army ready to serve you abroad and at home, and at the same time you would have a good and effective Army at home. Of course, you would never be able to compete with Continental Armies, because the conditions are not the same. At any rate, what I suggest appears to me to be a solution of the present difficulty, and I think everything has been pointing to this solution lately.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (13.) £542,700, Commissariat, Transport, and Ordnance Store Establishments.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL (Kirkcaldy, &c.)I have given Notice of my intention to move the reduction of this Vote and one or two other Votes; but I may at once say that I am not going to raise the questions mooted, as they have already been dealt with by the Committee. I am going to restrict myself to a hard matter of account, except with regard to one subject dealt with in a Paper delivered this morning, which raises another reason why we should remove our Army from Egypt, and save the money that it costs. On this occasion I will go into this matter of account. I think it will be admitted that in regard to our Army in Egypt there has been a great saving, therefore we may expect that Her Majesty's Government will agree to another reduction. The reduction of expenditure, so far as I can make out, is a reduction which is not to the 1744 relief of the British taxpayer, but to the benefit of the bondholder. The Egyptian Government was bound to pay £4 per head per month, that makes£48 per annum for each English soldier. That bargain was quoted by the Auditor General in his last Report, and as it is known to the Committee I need not waste time by quoting it. There was superadded to that bargain an understanding that, in no event, should the expense exceed £200,000. I find that the present Army Estimates, the amount to be received for the Army in Egypt, is £185,000, and £15,000 in the Navy. I do not go back on the original bargain, provided that bargain, such as it was, is kept. It is not kept if this £200,000 is not paid, and if the bondholders have their way it will never be paid. I want to know if the Government are to get the contribution from Egypt that stands on the Estimate, or if they are going to allow the Egyptian bondholders to get out of it as they have before? It is a question whether the British taxpayer should—
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. E. STANHOPE) Linconshire, Horncastle)I think the hon. Member is probably under a misapprehension. The real fact is that the expenditure in the Estimates is the excess expended over the amount which these troops would cost in the ordinary way in Europe. It is true we put in the Estimates the amount we expected to pay; but if the troops do not cost us that full amount, the hon. Member cannot expect that the Egyptian Government should pay us a bigger sum.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLI agree that if under your bargain of £48 per head the charge comes under £200,000, then the sum should be reduced; but we have some 4,500 troops in Egypt—and we have had during part of the year a great deal more—if the right hon. Gentleman will reckon that amount, he will find that at £48 a-head it comes to more than £200,000. The bondholders in Egypt, and those who represent the Government of Egypt, have made a great outcry on various pretexts and have managed to cut off the payment of the full amount. I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Goschen) is not present, because—
THE CHAIRMANI feel a delicacy in interfering with the argument of the 1745 hon. Gentleman, but the £185,000 in respect of the Army in Egypt is an Appropriation in Aid, which comes on under Vote 1. I do not see bow the hon. Member is entitled to raise the question of the reduction of the Appropriation in Aid under this Vote.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLMy impression was that I could move the reduction of this Vote.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLOn the ground that the money is not received in Appropriation—that the Appropriation is not received in Vote 1. If, Sir, you rule me out of Order, I must proceed upon another ground. I would move to reduce this amount on account of the relations between our Army and Egypt, as shown in the Papers published this morning. I refer to the attack made upon an English officer and the military execution that followed.
§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELLI would venture to submit, Sir, that if the Army were, removed from Egypt, as I would have it removed, this money would be saved.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEI would appeal the hon. Gentleman not to discuss the matter to which he refers in detail.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (14.) £830,000, Clothing Establishments, Services, and Supplies.
§ (15.) £2,943,500, Supply, Manufacture, and Repair of Warlike Stores.
§ SIR EDWARD REED (Cardiff)I listened with great attention to the statement of the hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and I was satisfied with it. I also could not take exception—although I feel very strongly on the point—to his proposal to keep open the question whether the managers at the head of the Manufacturing Departments of the Army should be military men or civilians. I noticed that as soon as he had completed his speech an hon. and gallant Gentleman below the Gangway on his own side of the House (Colonel Duncan) put in an appeal on behalf of the appointment of military officers at the head of the Manufacturing Departments. Now, I really trust the right hon. Gentleman will not yield too readily to that proposal. The 1746 reason assigned for it by the hon. and gallant Gentleman was one of a very familiar kind, but singularly weak in my opinion. He states that there are many non-commissioned officers and other military men of an inferior position employed in the Royal Arsenal and other manufacturing establishments, and forsooth, it would interfere with their comfort and satisfaction to have a civilian placed over them ! Now, Sir, notwithstanding the authority of the hon. and gallant Gentleman, I must say that the reason he has given for his proposal is most unsatisfactory. The idea of placing at the head of the Establishment, which the right hon. Gentleman opposite very properly promised us should be conducted on commercial principles, a military officer, whose training is certainly not of a technical character, and for no better reason than that the Department gives employment to some soldiers, I think would be reducing the reform of a great Department to the lowest possible point. One of the great grievances and one of the great grounds of dissatisfaction on the part of the Army, for very many years past, has been the absorption of mechanical duties and mechanical control by military officers. Now I can quite understand the desire, and quite sympathize with the desire, on the part of naval and military men as far as possible to employ military and naval men; but when a great scheme has been proposed for the reform of a great Department, and one branch of it, which is to separate the Manufacturing Departments from purely military control, and to establish these Departments upon a commercial and manufacturing basis, surely it is to threaten the breakdown of the whole reform to insist upon placing at the head military managers. I thought the statement of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War on that question very satisfactory, because what he said was that he would not pledge himself or the Government to the appointment of either military officers or civilians as Heads of these Departments, but that they would appoint the best men whether military or civilian. I do not think it would be fair to ask more than that; but I would express a hope that in deciding such appointments the right, hon. Gentleman will bear in mind that outside the Military Services, there is a great distrust of 1747 manufacturing departments managed by military officers, and there is a general feeling that such departments ought to be governed and controlled by men who understand manufacturing, and have been trained to it—by men who have given their lives to such duties.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR (Kincardine)It was my intention to have spoken very fully on this Vote, but this is now unnecessary because of the announcement made by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War of his intention to separate the stores, hitherto kept under the War Office, for Navy, as well as for Army, and to arrange for the Navy paying to the Army the cost of the services rendered, as well as for the Army paying the Navy for the transport of troops, hitherto borne by the Navy Estimates. There is one change which I would urge in regard to the intention of the War Office to continue to be storeholders for the Navy. I earnestly advise that the Navy should be allowed to be their own holders of stores. In the naval officers, especially Warrant officers and potty officers and seamen, the Navy has a personnel admirably adapted for the charge of stores—with daily training in the custody and care of stores — and, therefore, for the charge of the magazines, armaments, and stores they would have duties to perform which they are hourly in the habit of exercising. I speak from experience when I say that I wish the Army had classes of men as efficient and as well qualified for the charge of stores as are the seamen, marines, and officers of the Navy. In addition thereto the Admiralty possesses a Marine Artillery, as fine a force as England has.
§ Vote agreed to.
§
(16.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £862,300, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for superintending Establishment of, and Expenditure for, Engineering Works, Buildings, and Repairs, at Home and Abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1888.
§ MR. SHAW LEFEVRE (Bradford, Central)Mr. Courtney, this Vote contains two items, one of £1,500 for the commencement of a new factory for the manufacturing of Brennan torpedoes, and the other of £4,500 for the installa- 1748 tion of those torpedoes; and it is stated in a footnote that the latter sum is merely of a provisional character, and that no determination has yet been arrived at as to the number to be installed. Then, Vote 15 contains the further sum of £16,000, part of the enormous sum of £110,000 which it has been agreed to give to the inventor of the torpedo. It is quite clear that this means the commencement of what will probably be a very large expenditure on this new weapon of defence; and therefore I feel it my duty to raise a protest against it, and to urge the Government not to proceed further without more inquiry into the matter. I can assure the Committee I should have been very glad to have postponed this discussion until next Session; but in the meantime all these works will be commenced, and next year I should be told that the House had already agreed to the matter and I was too late.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. E. STANHOPE) (Lincolnshire, Horncastle)It has already.
§ MR. SHAW LEFEVREThe Committee will recollect that the subject of this torpedo was somewhat sprung upon the House in a Supplementary Vote early in the Session, when we were asked to Vote £30,000 out of the £110,000 to the inventor. I think that at that time no single Member of the House, with the exception perhaps of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth (Sir William Crossman), knew anything about the matter. [Cries of "No, no!"] Well, very few Members had heard anything about the matter. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth, who is a man of great scientific attainments, certainly knew something about it, and he raised his voice again it. When I heard the details it seemed to me that the proposal was novel, and of such doubtful expediency, that I suggested a Committee should be appointed, not to consider so much the details of the particular invention, but to inquire into the expediency of entering upon such a policy as that of purchasing the secrets of inventions of this kind. The Government, however, refused, and the money was voted. In consequence, I presume, of the part I had taken in this matter, I received many communications on the subject of this torpedo from naval 1749 officers and others, and I was induced to make further inquiries. The result of my inquiries is to raise in my mind the gravest doubts as to the value of the weapon for defensive purposes, or as to the secrecy of the invention, for which we have agreed to give this enormous sum. I can undertake to say that the opinion of nearly all competent naval officers on the subject is that the weapon is of little or no value for defensive purposes, and they have all expressed the most unbounded astonishment that the Government should have given this large sum to the inventor, which is quite unprecedented. Beyond this, there appeared in Engineering a short time ago a series of articles purporting to give a full description and drawing of the torpedo. I have ascertained that the writer is a gentleman of great practical knowledge of torpedoes and of high character. That gentleman's statement is that, so far from the torpedo being any secret, all its main features were the subject of a patent which was taken out by its inventor in the name of another person five or six years ago, and his contention is that any practical engineer taking this patent and applying to it the knowledge and experience derived from the Whitehead torpedo, which is now no longer a secret, would have no difficulty whatever in constructing, if not exactly a Brennan torpedo, at least one capable of performing everything claimed for the weapon. Before going further, I will shortly describe the Brennan torpedo. It is a very ingenious device. The torpedo communicates with a fixed engine on shore by two wires. These wires unwind from rollers in the interior of the torpedo, which are connected with the two propellers; the pulling in from shore of these wires gives motion to the rollers and sets the screws in motion, and thus the harder the wires are pulled the faster the torpedo goes ahead to sea. The direction is given by pulling at one or other of the wires. All this is minutely described in the patent which I have in my hand, in which I am informed that any competent engineer can construct it. The only possible secret is in the method employed in keeping the torpedo at a uniform depth below the water, but that has been achieved in the Whitehead torpedo and others of the same class by a hydrostatic valve acting upon rudders, and it is probable that the Brennan has some 1750 analogous arrangement. In order to steer the Brennan it is necessary that its course should be clearly seen from the shore, and that is effected by a staff showing a flag above water. This, however, constitutes its main defect, for the flag can be equally seen by a ship against which it is directed, and which can then easily avoid it. The torpedo also clearly requires a fixed engine ashore, which requires the protection of a battery, and its whereabouts will always be known. There are also defects in its range, and in the fact that it cannot be brought back when discharged. As I have said, naval officers who are competent to form an opinion, are almost unanimously of opinion that it is of little value as a means of defence, on the ground that it can be so easily avoided. One naval officer of great repute has told me that if any officer under him were to lose a vessel through such a torpedo he would have him tried by court martial, and shot for negligence. I can quote any number of opinions on the subject, but I will content myself with one, that of Admiral Sir Cooper Key, who is a very high authority on such matters, and who states that in his opinion, and in that of all naval officers who have seen the weapon, it is of little value as a defence against ships, on the ground that it can be so easily avoided; that it can only be of use in very narrow channels, and that there fixed and sunk torpedoes will be far more efficacious. This I believe to be the opinion of nearly all naval officers; and I challenge the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford) to say whether this is not his opinion and that of his naval colleagues. On the point of the secrecy of the invention the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) and the First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. W. H. Smith) made a very great point of this when recommending the Vote at the beginning of the Session. The right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury said that the Government considered it to be so important to keep the secret from the knowledge of other Powers that, if this could be done for five years only, it would be worth the money it was proposed to give for the invention. I cannot think the right hon. Gentleman can have known when he said this that all the main 1751 features were fully described in a patent which, is open to any foreign Goverment. I feel certain that the House would not have voted the money if it had known that the main features were the subject of a patent. For my own part, I thoroughly disbelieve in the possibility of keeping anything of this kind secret. There is an immense amount of engineering talent devoted to the subject of torpedoes, and there are already in the field at least six other torpedoes of the same class communicating with the shore by wires, and differing only in the method. Some of them are directed by electricity, some have their engines in their interior, two at least of them which are American inventions appear to have at least equal speed, and to have superior qualities to the Brennan. I should like to know whether any investigations were made as to these rival weapons before giving £110,000 for the Brennan? I allude to this for the purpose of showing that, although these particular torpedoes may not be identical with the Brennan, yet there are evidences that the engineering mind is especially directed in the direction of torpedoes, and that if others have not arrived exactly at the same solution of the thing they are very much on the same path. In the opinion of many competent men, and of Foreign Governments, many of these torpedoes are as valuable, if not more valuable than the Brennan. I have consulted on this point a member of one of the most eminent engineering firms in the country, and he said that, in the first place, it is impossible to keep a thing of this kind secret. There are so many minds directed to the manufacture of torpedoes at this moment that depend upon it whatever course you may adopt other people will be close upon your heels and will arrive pretty much at the same result. My friend said to me that if, instead of giving £110,000 to the maker of this particular torpedo, the Government had offered a reward, say of £10,000 for the best controllable torpedo an efficient weapon would have been forthcoming. He had not the smallest doubt that within a few weeks a dozen valuable inventions would have been sent in all of them very closely approaching, and perhaps many of them exceeding in value, the Brennan torpedo. I think that the facts that I have brought under the notice of the Com- 1752 mittee and of the Government at least show that there are some grounds for hesitation in this matter. I cannot help thinking that the Government have been somewhat hastily led into adopting this Brennan torpedo. My own impression is, that it would have been wise before going further in the matter to, at all events, have instituted further inquiry. I do not go further at this moment. My belief is, that it would be expedient and wise on the part of the Government to undertake an independent inquiry into this matter, putting upon the Committee of Inquiry—I do not mean a Committee of this House, but a Committee outside this House—some of the most eminent scientific and practical men, with a view of inquiring not merely into the value of the Brennan torpedo, but into the weapons of the same kind which are in the possession of other countries or which have been laid before the public by other inventors, and also with the view of inquiring into the question as to whether the invention of the Brennan torpedo is really a secret, whether the main features of the Brennan are really a secret, and of that value which they are represented to be. To my mind it seems clear that, if the facts I have stated are to be relied upon, it will be found eventually that we have spent a very large sum of money without any great result, and that it may also be found that other Powers are in possession, if not the Brennan torpedo, possibly of a torpedo of greater value. I beg to move the reduction of the Vote by £6,400 merely for the purpose of raising the Question.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £855,900, be granted for the said Services."—(Mr. Shaw Lefevre.)
§ MR. E. STANHOPEIt is somewhat unusual, at any rate according to old fashion notions, to raise a discussion on precisely the same subject twice in the course of the same year. We discussed this matter very fully at a time when there was a large attendance. Many hon. Members spoke, and at that time the House, without any hesitation, arrived at the conclusion that this was a very good expenditure of public money. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Central Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) now asks, why do not the Government, 1753 instead of spending tins large sum of money, offer a reward of £10,000 for the purpose of obtaining the best torpedo which anyone can produce. Well, I am bound to say that the Government with which, the right hon. Gentleman was connected had ample opportunity of doing what the right hon. Gentleman speaks of, but they did not do it. What, however, they did do was to spend many thousands of pounds in encouraging Mr. Brennan to perfect his invention although they had no claim whatever to the torpedo. First of all the right hon. Gentleman raises the question of secrecy in respect to this torpedo, and he actually suggests that my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. W. H. Smith) could have known that the details of this torpedo or some of them had been published. Of course my right hon. Friend knew all about that, but I can say that, so far as I am informed, there is not a single statement which has appeared in Engineering from which the secret details of the torpedo could be ascertained. Nor is there the smallest suggestion at the present moment that the real secret—the secret for which we have paid this sum of money—has been in any way discovered or made known to anyone outside the people actually concerned in the manufacture. The right hon. Gentleman says we cannot keep secrets. That may be so, it may be that the secret of the invention will leak out; but I hope that before it does we shall have made a larger number of them. We have at present made 30 or 40 of these torpedos, and we shall be in a position to place them in situations where they will be of service before other nations know anything about them. I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman has seen the torpedo at work, although he has described it in great detail. Those who are specially qualified to advise me at the War Office, and who have investigated this torpedo in all its bearings, are of opinion that it will be a weapon of the greatest possible value in time of war. I noticed the right hon. Gentleman studiously avoided quoting military authorities. He says that naval men whom he has consulted do not think it will be a very useful weapon. I fully admit that many naval men say that this torpedo cannot be fired from a ship; but, on the other hand, those who have a great opinion of this 1754 torpedo say it could. I will not express an opinion upon the point; but I have in my hand a written opinion of one of the most eminent naval men in this country, a gentleman whom I asked particularly to be good enough to go down and inspect this torpedo, because he had expressed an opinion in private against the advantages to be derived from it in time of war. This gallant Admiral went to see a trial of the torpedo the other day, and he has reported to me his opinion that this torpedo will be a most formidable weapon for the defence of channels through which vessels must pass within 2,000 yards of the shore. This is most powerful testimony, because it comes from a gallant Admiral who was at first prejudiced against the weapon. All I can say is that, from the best opinions we can obtain, we believe we have got a weapon of great value and importance, and one which can be applied usefully in the defence of many of our rivers, which will not require any other defence than the Brennan. The weapon is one which I believe will be of the greatest advantage in the defence of the coast of this country.
§ SIR EDWARD REED (Cardiff)The speech the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War has just delivered is exactly the speech he could have delivered in respect to any other torpedo. Opinions such as he has quoted can be obtained in regard to all kinds of weapons. Now, I have not seen any of the operations connected with this torpedo; but I have conversed with a gentleman who has seen the torpedo, and who has thoroughly studied the subject, and the opinion of that gentleman—a military officer—is that he could not see how the Naval Authorities could attach any value at all to the torpedo. Now I feel very strongly on the matter on the ground that the grant now asked for is a misappropriation of public money. We are called upon year after year to vote a large sum of money for this torpedo. I hold that this is wrong in principle, because it is perfectly possible that long before we have discharged our obligations to Mr. Brennan in these annual payments another torpedo of greater value may be placed at our disposal. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. E. Stanhope) said with great emphasis —he always speaks with emphasis—that the Brennan torpedo would be valuable 1755 for an attack from shore against a ship within a range of what?—2,000 yards— a little over a mile. I confess I am at a loss to understand the national value of a system of defence which only has a range of a little over a mile. I did not catch the exact purport of the interruption of the hon. Gentleman the Civil Lord (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett); if the hon. Gentleman will make himself a little more clear I shall be grateful to him. This is an example of voting public money under conditions which are unjustifiable when judged by the standard which all gentlemen apply when voting money for matters of this kind. I remember that I once had the greatest possible difficulty in getting the Government of this country to recompense me for my own personal expenses in the production of a design of a ship which cost £106,000 less than its predecessor, and which was pronounced by Naval Authorities to be a great deal better than its predecessor, as it certainly was cheaper. Yet, because I was not a stranger or an adventurer in any sense, or a person coming from a distance, I had the greatest difficulty in being reimbursed my own outlay on that design. I have known many other cases in which men have contributed beyond all question to the advantage and the economy of the Public Service; but in those cases no Minister ever thought of coming down to the House to ask for many thousands as remuneration for the men who had so acted.
THE CHAIRMANOrder, order! The question of remuneration of Mr. Brennan is not in this Vote. We are dealing with the cost of torpedoes.
§ SIR EDWARD REEDI quite understand that; and although my remarks may seem outside the Vote, they really apply to it, for the reason that we are not only to pay money under Vote 15, but we are to erect establishments under Vote 13, which is now before the Committee. Now, with regard to the unknown character of this torpedo my right hon. Friend the Member for Central Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) stated very truly that matters of this kind are very rarely kept secret for any length of time at all, for whenever there is any real value in an invention other inventions of a similar kind are brought out. These things are not the product of one man's brain; the 1756 principle of the invention may be said to be "in the air," and it generally emanates from a number of quarters at once. In the case of the Whitehead torpedoes, it will be remembered how the Government put themselves in relation with Mr. Whitehead. What was the consequence? We went on building inferior Whitehead torpedoes at a high price after superior torpedoes had been produced and supplied to the whole world at a lower cost. That is a fact which is within my own knowledge. My right hon. Friend (Mr. Shaw Lefevre) has limited his Motion. Formally it takes the shape of a reduction of the Vote; but in reality it amounts to a request that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War will make further inquiry into this matter. Now, I, for one, will object year after year to be told that because the Vote has been granted in the previous year we are to be debarred from resisting the Vote in the year upon us. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War has rather reflected on my right hon. Friend because he has ventured to discuss this matter twice in one year. I do not think that was a fair cause for a reflection. If the proceeding of my right hon. Friend is unusual, surely it is an unusual proceeding to give a private inventor £110,000 for his secret, and then to ask for public funds for a factory in which to carry out the invention, the whole proceeding is of an unusual character. If we do not oppose demands of this kind at a very early stage we shall lay ourselves open to reproach. Although I feel very strongly on this subject, I do not think, looking at the late period of the Session, it would be right to prolong this discussion. I can only say I entirely sympathize with the position taken up by my right hon. Friend with regard to this part of the Vote. I regard it as a wasteful expenditure of the public money; and I think it is essentially in the nature of a transaction which will not bear the scrutiny of Parliament, and for that reason it is most objectionable.
§ MR. SHAW LEFEVREI do not wish to prolong the debate, but merely to say a word in reply to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. The right hon. Gentleman took exception to my bringing up the subject a second time this Session; but I justify 1757 my action on two grounds. In the first place, since I last brought the question forward communications have been made to me by Naval men, of whose opinions I had no knowledge before, all tending to show there was the gravest doubt on the part of the Naval Profession as to the value of this invention, and asking that strong representations should be made on the subject. I have challenged the noble and gallant Lord the Member for East Marylebone (Lord Charles Beresford) to express his opinion on the subject; but he is discreetly silent. I ask him to say whether he is or is not adverse to this invention. I am satisfied that the great majority of naval men will agree with me in the opinions I have ventured to express. The second ground on which I justify my action to-night is that a statement was made in Engineering to the effect that the main features of this torpedo had been the subject of a patent, and that there is no secret worth any large sum. I said I could hardly think that the right hon. Gentlemen the First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. W. H. Smith) and the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) knew that fact when they advocated the giving of £110,000 for this alleged secret. The hon. Gentleman the Surveyor General of Ordnance (Mr. H. S. Northcote) has described the main features of the torpedo as those of a controllable weapon; but the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War says that there is another secret, the nature of which I understand he does not know himself. The whole thing is a matter of uncertainty. From all I have read and heard about the matter, my view is that that other secret, whatever it may be, is of a very subordinate character as compared with the main features, and not worth anything like £110,000. The future will show that I have done my duty, as a public man, in bringing the facts within my knowledge before the Government; and they must bear the responsibility of the action they have taken in the matter. I have great confidence that it will turn out I am right in this matter—that this is not a real invention, and that the torpedo is of no value.
THE SURVEYOR GENERAL OF ORDNANCE (Mr. H. S. NOBTHCOTE) (Exeter)I should like to correct a statement made by the right hon. Gen- 1758 tleman the Member for Central Bradford (Mr. Shaw Lefevre). He says I described the main features of the torpedo as being those of a controllable weapon. That was not at all my statement. I said it differed from other torpedoes in being controllable; but the main feature is a secret, with which neither my right hon. Friend (Mr. E. Stanhope) nor myself is acquainted. A competent Committee consisting of the most distinguished Artillery and Naval officers and the Director of Ordnance were unanimous in recommending the purchase by the Government of this invention. When the right hon. Gentleman speaks of the House having been misled into purchasing this invention, it must be borne in mind that a very full discussion took place, and that Gentlemen who differ as widely from the Government as the hon. Member for Gal way and the hon. Member for King's County very cordially supported the proposal to purchase this invention. With regard to what the hon. Gentleman the Member for Cardiff (Sir Edward Reed) has said, I may remind him that the money is borne entirely on the Army Votes, and that the torpedo is undoubtedly purchased on the responsibility of the Army, rather as a land defence than to be used by the Navy, although, I think it is possible and probable it will be useful for the Navy.
§ SIR EDWARD REEDIt does seem to me extraordinary, that after we have heard to-night of a redistribution of responsibility in the War Department under which the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War and his Successors are to be responsible for all the offices, we should be asked to vote a large sum of public money for a thing the right hon. Gentleman has never seen and knows nothing about.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEDoes the hon. Gentleman really suppose my opinion on a matter of engineering like the construction of a torpedo would be worth anything whatever?
§ SIR EDWARD REEDI think the right hon. Gentleman's opinion as to whether an article is worth £110,000 would be in the highest degree valuable.
§ MR. J. ROWLANDS (Finsbury, E.)The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War seems to attach little importance to the opposition to the Brennan torpedo. When last we went 1759 to a Division on this question, we had one of the strongest supporters of the right hon. Gentleman, and also a great military authority—namely, the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Holborn (Colonel Duncan) with us. I think that is a little set off to some of the authorities quoted by the right hon. Gentleman this evening. I hope my right hon. Friend the Member for Central Bradford will take us again through the Division Lobby against this expenditure. I do not profess to be an authority upon the subject, yet I do confess that upon the evidence there is nothing to justify the enormous expenditure which it is proposed to incur in respect to this torpedo.
§ Question put, and negatived.
§ Original Question put, and agreed to.
§
(17.) Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £130,600, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for Establishments for Military Education, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1888.
§ MR. SEXTON (Belfast, W.)I wish to call attention to the position of the head master and second master of the Royal Hibernian Military School in Dublin, under the Royal Warrant of 1884. The case rests upon paragraph 489 of the Royal Warrant, and this paragraph was devised on the report of Lord Morley's Committee, in order to meet admitted grievances of the officers who served in this establishment. The paragraph provides that the head master of the Royal Hibernian Military School shall be paid £250 a-year, increasing by £25 every five years to £350; that is a quinquennial increment. But the head master has been treated under the Warrant as if he were a new comer and not a gentleman of 39 years' service. I maintain, that under this Warrant the past services of this gentleman ought to be taken into account. The second master was intended by this Warrant to receive a salary of £150, rising gradually to £180. This gentleman had 13 years' service, and therefore was entitled to the maximum salary. He has been treated exactly as if he entered the service upon the day the Warrant was issued. This, of course, nullified the object of the paragraph. Now, the 1760 civilian masters at Chelsea have received the value of the Warrant. Lord Sandhurst visited the Royal Hibernian Military School last year, and he stated, that in his opinion the masters I have referred to had just claim to the reform they desired. The Board of Governors of the school have admitted the justice of the claim of these men. The second master in the Dublin School is placed in an absurd position, as well as a damaging one to himself. While he is the second master the third and fourth masters receive higher salaries than he does, simply because their full service is reckoned under the paragraph and his is ignored. I ask that the first and second masters be given the increments to which they are entitled on their service, and that the arrears be paid to them. I beg to move the reduction of the Vote by £250, being the arrears of pay to which these masters are entitled.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £130,350, be granted for the said Services."— (Mr. Sexton.)
§ THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY, WAR DEPARTMENT (Mr. BRODRICK) (Surrey, Guildford)(who was indistinctly heard) was understood to say that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War would undertake to see that no injustice was done in the case of the masters of the Royal Hibernian Military School, but that the same rule would be applied to this case as was applied to other cases. The hon. Gentleman the Member for West Belfast (Mr. Sexton) ought to bear in mind that the masters at Chelsea, and those at the Royal Hibernian School, were appointed under totally different circumstances.
§ MR. SEXTONThe object of the Royal Warrant of 1884 was to remedy grievances which existed. If the Warrant is not to be a nullity, so far as the masters of the Hibernian Military School are concerned, the service they have actually given must be recognized. The Head Master at Chelsea has served eight years, and he has received two increments. He has received every penny of value. The Head Master at the Dublin School has served five times as long as the Chelsea Head Master, and yet he has only received one increment. Is that justice or common sense? Surely the Head Master at Dublin ought to be 1761 placed at the maximum of his class? The three or four subordinate masters to the second masters receive higher salaries than he does, because every day of their services has been recognized. I really think a conclusive case is made out by these gentlemen. If the hon. Gentleman the Financial Secretary (Mr. Brodrick) will assure me that the Government will approach the case in the spirit in which Lord Sandhurst approached it—with a desire to do strict justice to these men—I will not press the matter further.
§ MR. BRODRICKI will undertake to look into the matter; and if I can satisfy the hon. Gentleman I will certainly do so.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR (Donegal, E.)I should like to point out that the second master of the Royal Military Asylum actually gets more pay than the Head Master in the Royal Hibernian Military School. There must be a mistake somewhere.
§ COLONEL NOLAN (Galway, N.)It is quite obvious that the gentlemen connected with establishments near the seat of Government have greater opportunities of pressing their claims upon the Secretary of State for War than those connected with distant establishments. The Government ought to seriously consider the case of the masters of the Hibernian School. Certainly, the Irish Members must persist in bringing it to the notice of the authorities. I trust we shall receive an assurance that the masters of the Hibernian School will be treated equally with those of the Chelsea Establishment.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. E. STANHOPE) (Lincolnshire, Horncastle)I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we desire, as far as possible, that there should be no distinction in this matter. I will look into the subject, and if I see substantial reasons I will take the course suggested by the hon. Member.
§ MR. SEXTONCan the right hon. Gentleman ascertain how it is that the third master gets a higher salary than the second master?
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Original Question again proposed.
SIR FREDERICK FITZ-WYGRAM (Hants, Fareham)I wish to call the attention of the Committee and the 1762 right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to the Vote for the Staff College. I have no intention to object to the Vote, because I think it may be useful, and, in some cases, necessary, to educate officers at the expense of the State. But I do object most strongly, and I think many others object, to the preference given to officers of the Staff College, in the matter of employment, over regimental officers, who might, perhaps, be equally, or much better, qualified. I am sure it is the wish of the Army that the best and ablest men should be employed; but, as I have said, I object to the preference given to officers because they are educated at the expense of the State. I say let there be fair play in this matter—make no difference as between the two classes of officers; and when there is a vacancy, by all means let it be filled by the man who is best qualified, whether he is from the Staff College or not.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORI have to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War if the case has been brought under his notice of the claim of the riding master at the Royal Military College in respect of his military rank? The ridingmaster at Canterbury has been allowed his majority; but the ridingmaster at the Royal Military College, who is a man at least as competent, and of longer service, and, I believe, with higher pay, has been refused his majority. Now, I do not know on what ground that refusal is based, but the fact is so; and, as I am credibly informed, it is a matter of comment and some surprise throughout the Service.
§ MR. E. STANHOPEThis is a matter which, I think, ought not to be brought under the consideration of the Committee. I am sorry to say that I have been attacked by one or two men on this ground. One of them has done me the favour to make attacks upon me in my constituency, because I will not promote him to the rank of major. I shall be glad to deal with this matter when the time arrives; but I am bound to say that I cannot give any consideration to unfair pressure put upon me in connection with it in this House.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORI certainly do not desire to put any unfair pressure upon the right hon. Gentleman in this House. I am not altogether in the same position as I should occupy if I belonged to the Party opposite, or to the Party of the late Government. There is a very good reason indeed why a Member of the Irish Party should not have any direct personal dealings with any Member of Her Majesty's Government. However high may be the personal esteem of hon. Gentlemen on these Benches for Her Majesty's present Advisers, there is good reason why we should shrink from having personal intercourse with Ministers.
§ CAPTAIN COLOMB (Tower Hamlets, Bow, &c.)I rise to Order, Sir. I wish to know whether the hon. Gentleman is in Order in discussing on this Vote the relations of the Irish Party with Her Majesty's Government?
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORI was saying that there was a reason why I should abstain from making a private and personal communication, which, coming from any other Members than those of the Party to which I belong, would be quite right. I desire that all my communications with Her Majesty's Government should be across the floor of the House. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that I am not making this reference in the interest of the person concerned, who to me is only a name. I have made a note with respect to this particular Vote of what appears to me to be an anomaly. The persons I refer to are both doing precisely the same work; and, as a matter of fact, the ridingmaster at the Royal Military College has more important and more difficult work to do than the riding-master at Canterbury. I think, under the circumstances, that the strictures of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War were a little uncalled for; and I protest that in making my observations, and calling attention to the facts, I was not going beyond my plain duty.
SIR FREDERICK FITZ-WYGRAMHaving held the office of Inspector General of Cavalry, and being in some way responsible for the ridingmasters in the Army, I may explain that all young ridingmasters are trained at 1764 Canterbury, which has always been recognized as the head place for riding instruction. It was always the custom to give the position of major to the riding-master at Canterbury. But when, some years ago, the second commandant was reduced, the ridingmaster, being a major, became second commandant. This was thought undesirable; and, on the appointment of ridingmaster becoming vacant, the rank of major was not given. Subsequently a second commandant was appointed, and then it was decided to restore the ridingmaster at Canterbury to the position of major. At Canterbury the whole training of riding-masters is carried out, and combined with that is the training of all Indian recruits. The present number of men at Canterbury in training is over 1,750, while the number taught at Sandhurst is 100 cadets and 25 Staff officers. The appointment of the officer at Sandhurst, who is an old and gallant soldier, was recommended by me.
§ COLONEL NOLANI am rather inclined to protest against the doctrine lad down by the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. There seems to be here a tendency to mix two things which are entirely distinct. It is, no doubt, an improper thing for an officer personally to attack the Secretary of State for War, and circulate statements in his constituency; but for an officer to have his grievance righted in this House is a totally different thing, and otherwise we should lose control over the Army altogether. The position as between the House and the Army has not been defined for the last 200 years; but to say that an officer cannot have his grievances righted here, and that he is liable to be reprimanded by his commanding officer, is, as I have said, subversive of all control on the part of the House over the Army. There are, no doubt, some officers in the Army who think they can and ought to be allowed to manage the whole of the Service by themselves; but that, I contend, is a most mischievous doctrine. To say that any Minister or other person, no matter how high may be his position in the Army, should have this power, would be totally opposed to the spirit of the Constitution, and I must say that the argument of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War decidedly leads in that direction. The effect of preventing 1765 aggrieved officers stating their cases in this House will be very likely to bring about a more objectionable result—that is to say, they will bring forward their grievances in the public Press. From my own experience, I can say that the grievances of officers and others are, as a rule, stated in this House in a very temperate manner; and the Secretary of State for War has plenty of means of voting down the cases that are not properly stated. I must say that, having regard to these considerations, I protest against the doctrine laid down by the right hon. Gentleman that an officer of the Army is not to bring his grievance before the House of Commons.
§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR (Kincardine)In this Vote there is an item of £4,000, to be used as rewards to officers for acquiring proficiency in languages. I believe this is the fourth year in which a grant has been taken for this purpose in the Army Estimates. In the two first years only £2,000 was voted, and then only as a reward for passing in the Russian language; but, if I err not, none was spent. I spoke to the late Secretary of State about enlarging the number of languages, and wrote to the War Office suggesting the extension of the rewards. I am glad to find that the sum has been raised to £4,000, and that it can now be spent as rewards to officers for acquiring proficiency in all modern languages. I trust that the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish languages may be included. I also urge that the grant should be extended, and that non-commissioned officers and soldiers should be entitled to rewards for proficiency. In India all ranks of the Army are entitled to claim rewards for knowledge, and the money yearly expended is four or five times the sum now voted—upwards of £20,000; and, looking to the necessity which England may have of employing men of other nations as soldiers, it is good policy to train officers and men in acquiring knowledge of languages. Let me suggest that our Military Attaché at Berlin should report upon the arrangements lately made for encouraging the acquisition of languages by the military as well as by the civil community.
§ Original Question put, and agreed to.
§ (18.) £48,200, Miscellaneous Effective Services,
1766§ LORD HENRY BRUCE (Wilts. Chippenham)I wish to make a few remarks to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War with reference to the arms of the Service. We are told that we have two complete Army Corps ready to take the field. I positively deny that, Sir. We have at the present time three different kinds of rifles and three different kinds of ammunition. I contend that to have three different kinds of ammunition is like running two or three different omnibuses through Temple Bar—
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. E. STANHOPE) (Lincolnshire, Horncastle)I rise to Order, Sir. The subject on which the noble Lord is speaking has no connection with this Vote in any sense whatever.
THE CHAIRMANThere is nothing in this Vote which concerns the supply of rifles; and the observations of the noble Lord are, therefore, not relevant.
§ LORD HENRY BRUCEI regret that my reference to the rifles and ammunition is out of Order. I desire to point out that the Surveyor General of Stores under successive Governments has allowed the supply of stores to fall greatly too low. I think the Ordnance Committee are responsible for stores.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR (Donegal, E.)On a point of Order, Sir, I ask whether there is not on this Vote a charge of £500 for officers engaged in special experimental services; and whether that does not cover the question of arms introduced into the Service?
§ MR. E. STANHOPENo, Sir. It is not the case at all. This is solely for experimental purposes.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (19.) £16,800, Rewards for Distinguished Services.
§ (20.) £76,000, Half Pay.
§ (21.) £127,600, Widows' Pensions, &c.
§ (22.) £15,200, Pensions for Wounds.
§ (23.) £81,400, Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR (Donegal, E.)I wish to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. E. Stanhope) whether the scheme for the re-organization of the War 1767 Office involves an alteration of the administration of Chelsea Hospital; and whether it is proposed to remove it to Pall Mall?
§ MR. E. STANHOPENo, Sir.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (24.) £1,358,300, Out-Pensions.
§ COLONEL NOLAN (Galway, N.)I brought before a former Secretary of State for War the cases of some men who were discharged on account of ill-health without a pension, after 18 or 19 years' service. I was told at the time that the authorities had no power to deal with these cases, but that they were drafting a Bill to enable them to do so; since which, time, now four years ago, I have heard nothing about the matter. I wish to draw the attention of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War to the position of these men, which I consider is a very hard one. When a man serves for 21 years he gets a pension of 1s. a-day; but here we have men discharged with 18 or 19 years' service who get no permanent pension at all. It is true, they get an allowance for a short time; but I do not know any worse principle than to give a man a pension for four or five years only. I have met with many cases of this kind where men have been left without the means of subsistence, in my capacity as Member of Parliament, and particularly in respect of being Chairman of a Poor Law Union. These cases occur all over the Kingdom and in every constituency, and I have in my mind one of a particularly distressing character. I believe the Secretary of State for War has no power to grant permanent pensions to men discharged after this long service, if the full period of 21 years has not been served. I think it is a great shame that the Secretary of State for War should not have this power. There are, no doubt, many of these men who think they have been defrauded in this respect, and I think so too. They expect to get pensions after long service, and there is no doubt that when they find that they are not to have them a great deal of discontent arises. I hope the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War will tell us what the present state of the law is with regard to this—whether he can give a pension after 17 or 18 years' service, when he discharges men against their will; and, if not, I 1768 think he ought to tell us that he is going to take powers for the purpose.
§ THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY, WAR DEPARTMENT (Mr. BRODRICK) (Surrey, Guildford)In reply to the hon. and gallant Gentleman, I confess that I do not quite understand how such cases as he has referred to can have arisen, because I certainly think it is in the power of the Secretary of State for War to give pensions to soldiers discharged for ill-health after 17 or 18 years' service. I am not quite certain that we have power to give permanent pensions straight off; but, presumably, if a man is discharged for ill-health, he ultimately gets his pension. I must say that commanding officers, as a rule, are most kind and considerate in allowing men, as far as they are able, to complete their full period of service.
§ COLONEL NOLAN:Is the limit 17 or 18 years, or am I to understand that after 15 or 16 years' service there is power to give these men pensions? Of course, we know that soldiers are nearly always protected by their commanding officers in the way the hon. Gentleman speaks of; but we have to remember that the men whose cases we are considering do not belong to the regiments in which they served.
§ MR. BRODRICKThere is power first of all to give a temporary pension, and I believe that there are cases in which a permanent pension after 15 years' service has been given.
§ MR. SEXTON (Belfast, W.)There are, within my knowledge, several cases of men in the North of Ireland who have been retired from the Army, and which I should wish to lay before the right hon. Gentleman. Not being an expert in these matters, I would ask whether, if I submit the particulars of a case in writing, after proper investigation, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War will look into it and give the result at his convenience?
§ MR. E. STANHOPEYes, Sir.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (25.) £183,300, Superannuation Allowances,
§ (26.) £47,100, Retired Allowances, &c. to Officers of the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteer Forces.
§ Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.