RESOLUTION. (Hansard, 23 March 1886)

§ MR. CARBUTT (&c.) Monmouth,
, in rising to call attention to the administration 1710 of the Ordnance Department; and to move— That a Committee be appointed to inquire into the whole question of guns, and the working of the Factories at Woolwich, Enfield, and Birmingham, said: I do not propose to detain the House for any length of time, nor do I imagine that the question to which I propose to call the attention of the House will occupy the time of hon. Members for anything like the length to which the debate on the incidence of taxation has run. But the subject is a very important one. Attention has repeatedly been called to the want of guns, and I have on more than one occasion stated that I should move for the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the whole subject. I made that statement last Session; but it was a moribund Parliament, and I did not think that any useful purpose would be served by appointing a Committee. I therefore gave Notice that if I was a Member on the reassembling of the new Parliament I would move for a Committee of Inquiry into the subject. The House will be aware that it is very difficult for a private Member to arrive at all the facts of this Gun Question. Hitherto we have never had a statement, except in regard to the question of expense; and even last night, although the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) entered fully into matters of detail in connection with the Army Estimates, he refrained from making anything like a full statement upon this question. Therefore, many of the facts to which I desire to call the attention of the House I have obtained, not on the authority of the Government, but from other sources. It is stated that, at the present moment, we have no single large breech-loading gun, and, so far as I am aware, no denial of this statement has been made by the Government; on the contrary, it is admitted that some of the ships are waiting for guns. The Ordnance Department propose to spend £1,500,000, and, on the average, £1,000,000 has been spent every year. Since rifle guns were adopted—at any rate, during the last five years—£1,000,000 per annum has been expended, and we have nothing to show for it. Nearly all the money has been wasted, and the guns we have are very 1711 little more than obsolete; it is, therefore, only right that we should appoint a Committee to inquire into the whole subject. The French were in as bad, or in a worse position, when the Franco-German War taught them a severe lesson. God forbid, that such a trial should fall on our country; but I firmly believe that had we gone to war a year or two ago it would have taken all our native pluck to have prevented such a catastrophe. Rifle cannon were adopted to obtain better precision—that is, the old round cannon-ball; but it was superseded by an elongated shot, which was made to rotate, with a view of obtaining an accurate run of flight—on the same principle as the spinning of a top keeps it upright. I shall not enter into the question of priority of invention, or of the credit due to Sir William Armstrong or Sir Joseph Whitworth, or many others who have laboured in this field; but I may mention that in 1854 Lord Hardinge applied to Sir Joseph Whitworth to make a series of experiments. He built a shooting gallery, and made exhaustive experiments, which showed conclusively what was the best system of rifling, what was the best method or form of rifling, what was the best length of projectile, what shape of projectile afforded the greatest power of penetration, and a variety of similar matters. All these things were removed from the region of speculation, and were determined as much as the laws which regulate gravitation have been determined; so that, although the facts may be ignored, they cannot be altered. The experiments proved, moreover, that what was true of small arms was equally true, mutatis mutandis, of cannon. Had this data been utilized, all our blunders for years would have been avoided. Mechanically shaped shot and steel shot have cost the country millions of money. It was necessary to ascertain the requisite length of shot—too short shot turn over; too long shot strain the gun. After years of blunders we have come to the right length of shot, and the right length of gun also. Other questions have still to be settled. The nation has spent millions since we began to make rifle cannon, all of which, I think, has been wasted; and I consider that the House of Commons has a right to ask—first, have we the best gun in the world; second, have we a proper supply 1712 of guns, or are we likely to get it; third, what is our system of control over the supply of guns; fourth, who is responsible for the design, the supply, and length, and who is responsible for the deplorable waste of money which has occurred; and, lastly, what ought we to do at Woolwich? In regard to the first point, have we the best gun? I believe not; or, at any rate, no thorough trial has been made to prove it. If the mechanical data had once been definitely fixed, the trial of one gun, even to destruction, would settle all sizes; but we go on making all sizes, without finally settling the design. We go entirely on calculated results. No actual results can be given. I want to see more exhaustive experiments with regard to these guns with a view to testing their capabilities. Then, there are many other descriptions of guns which might be tried. There is the Longridge wire gun, which can be made for one-third of the cost and in one-quarter of the time. I know that we shall be told that at Woolwich we are now manufacturing two of these wire guns; but I am given to understand that it is being done without consulting the original inventor, either upon the question of design or process of manufacture. Again, there remain two questions to be settled with reference to the Woolwich gun, which only a definite trial can determine. I fancy if we were to spend a little more money in exhaustive experiment that we should find ourselves in a better position than we are at the present time; and to show the House that there is need of this I will read from The Times of the 23rd January, 1885— When we come to cannon, the Woolwich guns are nearly as dangerous all round to those who fire them as they ever would become to those who were fired at. Now, that, of course, is a strong statement for the leading journal to make; and I think the Government would act wisely in doing what is necessary to satisfy the country that the manufacture of guns at Woolwich will be placed on a better footing than it was at that time. But let me refer to some failures which have taken place within the last few years. We know there was the case of the Thunderer, which was inquired into and a Report made, although we may not all agree with the decision arrived at. We know that H.M.S. Daring received 1713 orders that her guns should not be fired except with reduced charges; and I should like to know how many guns we have issued to our ships that are perfectly reliable, and how many doubtful and unserviceable. Of the guns of H.M.S. Dryad eight out of nine are unserviceable. Then we find that an 80-ton gun at Gibraltar in 1884 was sent home to be repaired. Again, there was a 9-inch 18-ton gun which burst at Woolwich. It had a calibre of 9.2 inch, and the gun was being used for proving gunpowder, and not testing the gun itself. Lastly, I should like to refer to a gun on board H.M.S. Active, a 6-inch breech-loading gun, which burst in 1884, five feet of it being blown away. An inquiry took place upon the subject; but I have never been able to see the Report, and I make the following statement with regard to it. I believe it was one of the guns originally passed by the Ordnance Committee in 1881; it was arranged that it should be fired with 35 lbs. of powder and a projectile of 80 lbs., and was said to give under those circumstances a muzzle velocity of 1,930 feet per second; this gun was called Mark I. In September, 1881, the new Ordnance Committee, who had been experimenting with the Elswick gun Mark I., were instructed to demand a drawing of the gun-factory design, to be sealed as Mark II.; and although they did so, and sealed the drawing, they stated that as yet they had had no opportunity of considering the design. Here we find out how it is that our guns are so unfortunate in design. We depend entirely on the Ordnance Committee; and yet they say they have had no opportunity of considering the design. Well, Sir, they went on making these guns. There were 25 made at Elswick, and at the Royal Gun Factory 53, and there were in progress at the Royal Gun Factory 57, giving a total of 135, at a cost of over £100,000. It was found out before long that this was a defective type, because in June, 1882, several of these guns which were made at Elswick arrived here, and five of them, besides two of those made at the Royal Gun Factory, burst, after we had expended the £100,000 I have mentioned. But the strangest part of the story of these guns is this—they were designed originally to fire a charge of 50 lbs. of powder, and with a projectile of 100 lbs. were to 1714 give a muzzle velocity of 2,090 feet per second, the charge afterwards reduced to 42 lbs.; but after the failure I have referred to it was recommended that the charge of powder should be further reduced to 38 lbs., the muzzle velocity being lessened to 1,811 feet per second. Well, Sir, I think it an extraordinary thing that the Ordnance Committee should have spent the £100,000 without making an efficient experiment. The next thing I wish to refer to are the guns of H.M.S. Collingwood. These were two breech-loading steel guns, 27 feet 4 inches in length; 12-inch bore; shot 3 feet 1 inch in length; and were constructed with a 16-inch powder chamber 6 feet 3 inches in length. The objection to them is that they were designed originally to fire 400 lbs of powder, and that having been put on board the Collingwood, it was ordered that the charge of powder should be reduced to 295 lbs. Well, Sir, is it not an extraordinary thing that having designed a gun to fire 400 lbs. of powder you should tell those who have to use it that the maximum, charge is to be 105 lbs. less? But the most extraordinary part of this story is that when the gun came to be tried the shot stuck on the 17th, 18th, and last round, so that even this, the reduced charge, could not be fired. This is another instance of a largo expenditure having been incurred before experiment had conclusively shown that we were right in making them. Then I come to instances of failure. At the bombardment of Alexandria several guns burst. One 11-inch gun showed a crack in the muzzle; and it is currently believed that there was so small a supply of ammunition that the bombardment could not have continued much longer. And then, Sir, there is the very remarkable circumstance that our troops during the war in Egypt had only 7-lbs. muzzle-loading guns. One objection to muzzle-loading guns is that the men have to stand in front for the purpose of ramming home the powder. In that way they are, of course, greatly exposed to the enemy in front, and have not the protection which is afforded by the breech-loading gun. We found there were no muzzle - loading gun in the Egyptian Army; they were Krupp's breech-loading guns. Well, I believe we have very few. And it seems to me very strange that we who ought to be 1715 the largest manufacturing nation in the world should not have come to the same conclusion on this point as all civilized people have done. Other nations have breech-loading guns. If we were to go to war with a country like Germany we should find that they did not use muzzle-loading guns. One of the chief objections to using these guns is that you cannot see through their bore, whereas you can see through the bore of a breech-loading gun after it has been fired. I contend that it was a great mistake on our part to supply the troops in Egypt with a weapon inferior to that which the Egyptians had. The next question I will ask is this—"Have we anything approaching to a proper supply of guns; or are we likely to have them?" I believe we have very few guns indeed. Continental nations adopted steel for guns 10 or 12 years before we did; and it is 17 years since France adopted breech-loading; whereas it was only adopted by us seven or eight years ago; and I may mention that at one time Sir Joseph Whitworth offered to lend the Government two breech-loading guns which he had made for the Brazilian Government, and that the offer was declined. Now with regard to the three 110-ton guns ordered at a cost of £19,500 each. The first of these was promised to be ready in October, 1885; the second in January, 1886; and the third in April, 1886. There is one of these guns, I am told, ready; but I should like to ask whether that one has been tried? Do we know exactly what that gun will do; what charge it will stand; and whether it is right that we should have a large number of them? Then with regard to the 43-ton steel guns. I ask if any of these are being tested to the full extent; and, if so, what thickness of plate did they pierce? On the 5th of March, 1886, the Earl of Northbrook, in "another place," said there was no doubt that there had been a most regrettable difficulty in supplying breech-loading guns for the Navy; that when Mr. Smith left the Admiralty in 1880 he expressed his regret on this point; that it was unnecessary to say whose fault it was, and that certainly we were behind other nations in this respect, but were then remedying the defect. I should like to ask what is our system of control—under what system are our guns supplied? 1716 We have the Surveyor General of Ordnance, who is responsible to this House for the supply of guns. No doubt, the House has great respect for the present Surveyor General of Ordnance (Mr. Woodall); but he is a political and not a military agent, and he is not responsible for the design and manufacture of guns. Then we have the Director General of Ordnance, who is a military man. I believe he is technically responsible for the manufacture of the guns; but what I want to know is—whom would the Government or the nation have hanged, so to speak, if this country had gone to war three years ago when we were so lamentably deficient? The Director General of Ordnance, I understand, is a very clever man; but he is only appointed for a few years, and I believe that the last appointment was junior to all the other Manufactory Directors at the Ordnance Department. I do not want to find fault with any man, Sir; but I find fault with the system, and I ask how long the present system is to continue? Well, next comes the Superintendent of Factories. He is a military man, and knows nothing whatever of the manufacture of guns; his appointment is for five years in the Arsenal or Laboratory at Woolwich. At the end of five years, if he has managed his business well, he generally contrives to get reappointed. I believe it is the practice to appoint men who know absolutely nothing of a great Manufacturing Department, which makes them dependent upon any information they can get from others. There is another evil in appointing a military man to the office of Superintendent of Factories, and that is that after he is appointed he does not look to the Factory Authorities, but to the Horse Guards, for promotion. I think this divided responsibility is a great mistake. I know that we shall be reminded of the new Ordnance Select Committee. A new Ordnance Select Committee was appointed in 1881; but that, I believe, was not a very strong Committee. It consisted of two civil engineers and several military half-pay officers. There was no naval man upon it until last year, or the year before, so that the Admiralty never had a chance of stating what sort of guns the Navy wanted. Last year, during the war panic, there was great dissatisfaction, and another Committee was 1717 actually appointed to supersede the Select Committee on Ordnance. Upon that Committee there was a member of the Whitworth firm and two members of the Armstrong firm, as well as military men, who, I believe, were in this position—that they knew nothing whatever about the manufacture of guns. Sir, I think we were perfectly right in appointing the three gentlemen, who were members of the firms mentioned, to consider the question of the manufacture of our guns; but does it not seem a strange anomaly that those gentlemen should in this matter stand, in the position both of buyers and sellers? I regret that it has fallen to me to trouble the House at this late hour with the statement I have made; but the earnest wish I have is to see a permanent Head placed over these Manufacturing Departments. I will not discuss whether he should be a military or a civil officer; but let him be the best man the country can produce, and let him be paid as highly or even higher than a Cabinet Minister, if need be, in view of the immense responsibility which would rest upon him. I believe the Surveyor General of Ordnance exercised a sound judgment last year, and that the Government were perfectly justified in not making steel forgings themselves. I beg to move the Resolution standing in my name.

§ MR. RUSTON (Lincoln)
I will not occupy the time of the House at longth; but I hope the House will allow me to make a few observations upon the Motion of my hon. Friend. I think that this question of the manufacture of guns is one of very great importance on account of its magnitude—with respect to the large sums of money involved, and the great national interests involved. Last year the sum of £1,452,232 was voted for wages and materials, of which £910,192 was on account of Woolwich, and £542,040 on account of Enfield.
Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,

§ MR. RUSTON
I will not detain the House at length. As soon as I have stated these figures, the Minister will probably reply, and the discussion be at an end. I therefore ask hon. Gentlemen kindly to be patient. I was saying 1718 that last year the House granted £1,452,232 for expenditure at these Factories. Well, Sir, we have for 1886, on account of Woolwich, a Vote for £1,127,150, for Wages and Materials, which comprises £230,600 for the Carriage Department, £256,050 for the Gun Factory, and £640,500 for the Royal Laboratory. We have also for wages and materials at Enfield, £198,000, and for the Gunpowder Manufactory at Birmingham, £40,450. Sir, I think we have a claim to ask what are the results obtained from the expenditure of so large a sum of money. I wish it to be perfectly understood that I do not wish to enter for a moment into the question of what kind of guns should be manufactured at these Factories—whether they should be 40 or 80-ton guns, breech-loading or muzzle-loading—I merely deal with the question as to whether they are practically economical. There is a Return made as to the working of the Government Factories—a large volume, containing an immense mass of figures, none of which, however, give the information which we desire. We want to know whether the money is spent in the best possible way for securing the end we have in view. There are many Members of this House who are familiar with the conduct of large manufacturing and mercantile establishments, and who, in dealing with questions of this kind, would have no more difficulty than they would have in dealing with their own regular business. The peculiarity of this Return lies in the manner in which it is made up. There is one column for cost of materials, one for material, and another for indirect expenditure; these three are added together and called Balance 1; then comes a column in which is given the amount which would have to be added for wear and tear, and those together are called Balance 2; and so careful are those who make up the figures, that to a sum of £56,000 they add the 19s. 9¾d. The country does not grudge the money expended on the Manufacturing Establishments; but it does want to know that it receives for it a fair economical return; it does want to know that the money which is provided by the taxpayers is spent in their interest. Sir, I beg to second the Resolution of the hon. Member for Monmouth.

§ COLONEL NOLAN (Galway, N.)
I do not think we can go into the whole question of guns; but I think we may very well inquire into the working of the Manufacturing Establishments of the country. I do not say the Factories would not come out well; but I think the time has arrived when we ought to go into the question, and that a case has been made out for inquiry as to how the Manufactories are carried on. There are now many officers of both Services who are Members of this House; and I think we are now in a good position to enter upon an inquiry. I quite agree that there is a good deal of doubt about these balance sheets, and that they require looking into, and that they ought to be as clear in the case of Government Manufactories as in the case of private individuals, who, if they did not keep their books clear, would soon get their business into confusion. Take, for instance, the guns. The extras the trade cannot compete with, because there is continual change in regard to them. Instead of placing the extras on the articles with regard to which there is competition, the Gun Factories put them on various small articles with which private firms cannot compete. We want an inquiry into this question; but we should not go into the whole matter. That would involve our going down to Shoeburyness and making extensive experiments. I should be inclined to alter the Motion so as to make it apply merely to the supply of guns and small arms, and to the working of the Factories at Woolwich, Enfield, and Birmingham. I used to bring this question before the House at one time. It certainly deserves careful inquiry; and I think also we are deficient in knowledge as to Krupp's Manufactory. However, as the Front Benches are not anxious to go into these subjects, I will cut short my remarks.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN) (&c.) Stirling,
Perhaps the House will allow me to make one or two observations in answer to the remarks of my hon. Friend. Though I cannot agree in all points with what my hon. Friend said in bringing forward the Motion, or in 1720 what fell from my hon. Friend behind me (Mr. Ruston) in seconding the Motion, I admit at once the importance of the subject, and that the object they have in view is well deserving the attention of the House. But my hon. Friend (Mr. Carbutt) proposed that a Committee should be appointed to inquire into the subject of guns and the designs for guns. I should deprecate such an inquiry in the strongest possible manner, because we have had delay enough owing to inquiries as to the construction of guns. Up to 1880, when the former Liberal Government entered into power, nothing had been done as to the armament of the Army and Navy; and the present Home Secretary (Mr. Childers) then appointed an Ordnance Select Committee of skilled officers of the Army and Navy, with the assistance of two of the best civil engineers in the country—Sir F. Bram well and Mr. Barlow. This Committee sat since that time, and I am glad to say that now the designs for these guns are settled. To show the desire they had not to proceed in any hole-and-corner way, I hold in my hand a special Report presented to the House with regard to the construction of ordnance, and it seems that in making the investigation they associated with themselves a member from each of the two firms of Sir William Armstrong & Co., and Sir Joseph Whitworth & Co. That shows there was no desire to keep the matter in the hands of what was called the Woolwich "ring." That being the case, I should, as I say, deprecate any inquiry into the question of the construction of ordnance; but the question of administration is another matter; and though I do not commit myself to any promise, I believe that it would be a most advantageous thing to have an inquiry of this kind into Government Establishments. I cannot speak too highly of the Artillery officers who have been Superintendents of these Factories. I believe they have not only been men of great eminence in their Profession, but have developed extraordinary business habits and capabilities in the management of the men and the ordinary business-work of the Factories. Colonel Maitland, I may select as one—a man of the highest distinction and fully deserving the confidence of the country. It would not involve the slightest derogation from the position of these Superintendents, 1721 if an investigation were to be made by a Committee, who would be able to collect valuable information as to the administration of the Departments. But there, again, I differ from what I imagine to be the intention of my hon. Friend. I do not think a Committee of the House of Commons is a proper Body for that purpose. We all know how Select Committees are formed; and for a purpose of this sort I should rather prefer a small Committee, carefully chosen, consisting of skilled men and men of business taken from the outside world, so that we should have a fair, impartial, and careful inquiry. I can speak with some sort of good conscience in this respect, because when I was Secretary to the Admiralty I was the means of procuring a Committee of shipbuilders and shipowners to inquire into the management of the Dockyards. One or two Members of this House were on that Committee, and I must say that the greatest benefits have resulted from its appointment. If I may use a somewhat homely expression, it stirred things up, and was able to make suggestions that have been of the greatest use. Without committing myself at all, I think it is possible that the Surveyor General of the Ordnance and myself, after looking into these matters to which we are now practically new, may find that an inquiry of that sort may be advantageous to the public interest. If so, I can assure my hon. Friend that we shall not be slow to appoint such a Committee as I have described.

§ MR. CARBUTT
I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.