DEPARTMENTAL STATEMENT. (Hansard, 22 March 1886)

§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN) (Stirling, &c.)

In moving the first Vote it becomes my duty to make the usual Statement in explanation of the Army Estimates as a whole. The net amount of these Estimates is £18,233,200, of which £15,156,900 is for Effective and £3,076,300 for Non-Effective Services. This shows an increase over the Estimates of last year of £444,000 for Effective and £38,500 for Non-Effective Services, or £482,500 in all. But I must call the attention of the Committee to the fact that the Estimates of last year were framed and submitted subject to exceptional conditions. At this time last year we were engaged in military operations on a great scale on the Nile, the extent and cost of which it was impossible to foresee; and therefore the noble Marquess the Member for Rossendale (the Marquess of Hartington) plainly informed the Committee that the Estimates which he moved on a corresponding occasion to this last year were not final, but only provisional, and that the 1589 full demands to be made in the House for the Military Services of the year could not be made known until a Vote of Credit was asked for after Easter. A test of their provisional character may be found in the fact that whereas there was at that time in Egypt and the Soudan a force of 18,000 men, the Estimates, as the noble Marquess informed the Committee, provided only for keeping 6,000 men in Lower Egypt. Now, I would say frankly to the Committee that when a few weeks ago we were called upon to frame these Estimates, with scanty time for their full consideration, we were confronted by a difficulty of the same nature, though not quite of the same extent, as that of last year. It is the very natural desire of the Military Authorities to reduce as soon, and as much, as possible the occupying force in Egypt. This is equally the desire of the Government, and also, I feel assured, of the country. But it is impossible to say when and to what extent this can be effected. Up to quite recently we have had 17,350 men in Egypt, including 15½ battalions of Infantry, and parts of the force are stationed high up in the Nile Valley, where their maintenance is difficult and costly. We have been obliged to found our Estimate upon conjecture, and we have thought it more regular, and more convenient to the Committee, that we should fix our basis upon a moderate force, rather than that we should anticipate a greater expenditure which might not eventually be incurred. We therefore, in these Estimates, reckon upon the Army in Egypt being reduced to 8,000 men; but the Committee will of course understand that, should it be impossible to realize this result, it will be necessary to supplement the Estimates on this account. Now, Sir, before I proceed to state to the Committee the main causes of the increase of the Money Vote, it will be more convenient if I explain the reasons for the additional number of men provided for. Speaking broadly, it is due to the requirements of India and of Egypt. The Committee is aware that the Government of India have recently determined that it was necessary, in connection with the scheme for strengthening the North-West Frontier, to add to the Army in India; and in the course of the autumn the late Government decided to take immediate steps for the augmentation of the British 1590 Force in India by 10,000 men. The augmentation decided upon consists partly of an increase to the Establishment of regiments serving in India, and partly of a transfer of additional cadres to the Indian Establishment. Each battalion of Infantry is to be increased by 100 men, making the Establishment 920. This for 50 battalions makes 5,000 men. Three additional battalions sent out, 920 strong, account for 2,760 men rank and file. Two troops are to be added to each Cavalry regiment, nine in number. Eleven batteries of Artillery are to be added, five of which have already gone—six remaining still to be sent. In this way the round figure I have named is made up. The Committee will observe that not only have we to replace these men on the British Establishment, but, in order to furnish drafts for this increased force, we must provide a proportionately greater number; because you cannot produce sufficient drafts without adequate means of training and creating them. So much for the requirements of India, which are now being met according to the plan decided by the late Government. But I have said that our proposals are also affected by Egypt. Now, Sir, I do not hesitate to say that the prolonged occupation of Egypt has caused a most unusual and—if I may use the word—unfair strain upon the organization of our Army. Our Infantry is organized in units of two battalions, and the system is that every battalion on foreign service should thus have a sister battalion at home, from which the drafts to fill up its casualties should be furnished. And, as is known to those who are interested in these questions, it was laid down in the original plan that whenever, owing to some exigency of the Service, both battalions came to be abroad, the small depôt of the regiment should be immediately increased in size, so as to form, practically, a third battalion on which both the foreign battalions might rest. But during the last three or four years we have had many cases of both battalions of a regiment being abroad, and yet this step was not taken. The truth is that the nature of our military position in Egypt is peculiar. Our organization is calculated to enable us satisfactorily to meet the demands of a small Colonial war, and also, by the help of our Reserves, to take part in great mili- 1591 tary operations for the defence of our shores or our national interests. But in Egypt we have not been engaged in either a small war or a great war, but in a prolonged military occupation of a foreign country. It is this, which was never contemplated in the organization of the Army, that has strained our resources. And if the step which I have described of raising at home a special depôt for every pair of battalions on foreign service has not been taken earlier, it is because during all this time the hypothesis has been that our occupation of Egypt was temporary. Sir, it has been temporary in feeling and intention, but it has been continuous in fact; and, although this hypothesis may be most salutary and consolatory, there is one thing which no hypothesis can do, and that is to furnish drafts for an army in the field. It was therefore resolved last summer, under the power given by the Vote of Credit to raise 35,000 men, that in each case in which both battalions of a regiment are abroad the depôt should be raised to 600 men; and this plan, so necessary, as all will admit, will be continued, and is provided for in the numbers now proposed to be voted. The number—9,673—which is proposed to be added to the Army is thus mainly accounted for, partly by these increased depôts, and partly by a larger Establishment being given to the Infantry battalions at home, in order to meet the strain of the larger drafts. No battalion will be under 750 rank and file, which number does not seem excessive considering the diverse, and in some sense incongruous, duties which a large part of our Home Army has to discharge. Coming back now to the money to be voted, if hon. Members will turn to page 2 of the Paper giving an explanation of differences, and circulated with the Estimates, they will see that the increased charge due to these additional numbers, as I have described them, is £246,000. But against this is to be set a sum of £200,000, which the Indian Government will contribute during this year as an advance to meet the charge for supplying India with the increased force I have described. The steady development of deferred pay accounts for £30,000. An increased sum of £10,000 is taken for additional horses. The Auxiliary Forces require an additional sum of £50,100, and the Army 1592 Reserve of £38,500. The Store Vote is increased by £361,200 for Land and Sea Armaments, and the Works Vote by £72,000; of these I shall say something more in detail. The direct expenditure in Egypt causes an increase of £474,000; but against this, in the comparison with last year, may be set the amount of £500,000 taken for Bechuanaland which drops out this year. Lastly, we have a falling-off of £38,600 in the contribution from India towards the share of non-effective charges, which, according to the arrangement now in force, happens to tell to our disadvantage on this occasion. On the other side of the account we calculate upon a saving of £120,000, owing to a reduction in prices of supplies. These are the chief items which go to make up the excess over last year, resulting, as I have said, in the net increase of £482,500. Now, Sir, I have a few words to say on the subject of the recruiting for the Army during the past year; but I cannot refer to this subject without expressing my regret, which I am sure will be shared by many who hear me, that this is the last time we shall have a Report on the subject from the pen of General Bulwer. The extraordinary success of recruiting during the last few years has been largely due to the energy, tact, and intelligence with which that gallant officer discharged his duties; and I venture to say that he has left a permanent mark on this part of the administration of the Army. I daresay there are in this Committee hon. Members who are warm advocates either of long or short service. I am not about to say anything which will tend infandum renovare dolorem—to provoke a fresh outburst of an interminable controversy. Personally, I am not a fanatical supporter of either extreme. I am a follower in the school of which General Bulwer has been, if not the most eminent, certainly the most practical and effective exponent. We trust to voluntary enlistment in this country. In my opinion the terms of service ought to be as varied, as free, and as elastic as is consistent with discipline and with the strict requirements of the public interest. The old conception of the relation between the Crown and its soldiers was widely different. I hardly overstate it when I say that there were two principles of action—in the first place, you 1593 were to contrive, by any manœuvre, to entrap an unwary recruit; and, in the second place, when once he had placed himself in your power, it was your business, whatever the disposition of his mind might be, to stick to him at all hazards to the end. I believe this to be entirely wrong. It deters good recruits; it makes the Service unpopular; and I cannot believe that an unwilling and discontented soldier can be a good soldier. On the other hand, when a good man is interested in, and satisfied with, his career, it is most unfortunate that any regulation should debar him from continuing it. Our present system seems to me to avoid these evils. From the first moment when a village youth reads a notice setting forth the conditions of service in the Army, down to the day of his discharge, he has from stage to stage in his career a free opportunity, if he is a well-conducted man, of determining his career for himself, of electing whether he shall go on in the profession of arms, or whether he shall return to civil life. I believe that the more this is known and experienced the more popular will the Service become, and the greater will be the influx of young men anxious to have a trial, at least, of a soldier's life. The number of recruits during last year was 39,971, thus far exceeding the number in any recent year. These are the men passed into the Service; but even more surprising is the number of men who offered themselves, amounting to 69,401, or more than 23,000 in excess of those who offered themselves only five years ago. No doubt depression in trade goes far to account for these large figures; but I would invite the attention of the Committee to the remarks on this subject of the Inspector General— Recruiting has been always more or less affected by the state of the labour market; but never to the extent shown by the Returns of the last three years. It must be admitted that the existence of bad trade is a great element of consideration when seeking for recruits; but I do not think that the great jumps made during the last three years are to be attributed solely to this cause; on the contrary, I am of opinion that the changes which have been made in the localization and organization of the Army, in the administration and development of the recruiting districts, in the freer and fuller advertisement of the Service, have all contributed very largely to the popularity and knowledge of the Army among the people at large. He also attributes part of this result to 1594 the fact that the standard has not been altered, and that it is such as to admit of our taking all men who offer themselves, and who are likely to make efficient soldiers. The results of localization are most satisfactory, inasmuch as the Army is yearly brought into closer connection with the Auxiliary Forces, and the number of men serving in regiments belonging to the locality in which they were born is constantly increasing. In 1883 there were 24,247; in 1884, 32,376; in 1885, 34,654; in 1886, 40,265. The recruits obtained from the Militia were 14,821; and even the Volunteers furnished 1,964, instead of the very small number who formerly entered from this source. So much as to the quantity of recruits; the Reports show that their quality also is, on the whole, satisfactory. I believe that it is sometimes asserted that our physical standard is low, especially as regards the height of recruits; and this is a subject upon which, perhaps, the Committee will allow me to make a few observations, especially in view of a comparison with other Armies. With voluntary service we are obliged to take our recruits at an early age; and our experience is that if they are healthy and sufficiently well grown for their years, a few months of steady life and regular food develop and fill them out greatly. What we require in those young men, whose precise age may be in some doubt, is that they should have the physical equivalents of 18—that is, the degree of development which an ordinary healthy young man of 18 should have reached. In height the standard is 5 feet 4 inches; but men under 20 may be specially enlisted for the Infantry who are over 5 feet 3 inches. Can anyone say, or has it ever been asserted, that a short man, if otherwise properly developed, cannot do the work of a soldier? What are the heights in Foreign Armies? Be it remembered that in those countries the age of enlistment is 20, with the exception of Russia, where it is 21. In France the minimum height is 5 feet ½ inch; Austria, 5 feet 1⅕ inches; Germany, 5 feet 1 8/10 inches; Russia, 5 feet ¼ inch; Italy, 5 feet 1.45 inches. Again, we require a minimum chest measurement of 33 inches. In France it is 30.867; Austria, 30.06; Germany, there is no limit; Russia, no rules; Italy (for active service) 31.5. Further, we prescribe a minimum 1595 weight of 115 lbs., regarding which the other countries issue no instructions at all. I think that these facts show that our Military Authorities are not neglectful in laying down such rules as may insure a fair physical development in the soldiers. The rule to be followed appears to be this—that as under a conscription the standard is regulated so as to insure that no man escapes his liability, so in a voluntary service the standard should be fixed to secure, as far as the requirements go, the enlistment of all willing men who are likely to make efficient soldiers. The waste from the Army continues high; but there is nothing abnormal to notice in it. The net loss by desertions in the year was 2,975. Recruiting for the Militia has also been most successful, and the Reports on the Militia regiments are highly favourable. I am glad to say that, although there are great difficulties, owing to the shortness of the training, and, in some cases, want of range accommodation, there is shown to be a decided improvement in shooting under the new Musketry Regulations Two regiments of Artillery Militia and six of Infantry Militia were embodied last year for six months, and the General Officers commanding speak highly of their discipline, zeal, and efficiency. Hon. Members are aware that for some time there has been a considerable lack of officers for the Militia Force, a Return last year showing no fewer than 773 vacancies. It is so far satisfactory to know that this deficiency has been reduced to 603 at the present moment; notwithstanding the fact that during the year the Militia gave 223 subaltern officers to the Line. The Committee will observe that there is a small increase in the Yeomanry Vote, which is due to greater efficiency. I may mention that we expect that during this spring the Martini-Henry carbine will be issued to the whole of the Yeomanry. With regard to the Volunteers, the facts laid before me appear to show a steady and decided improvement in almost every respect. This Vote is increased by £18,500, which is nearly all due to Capitation Grant. Not only have we close upon 10,000 more efficients in 1885 than in 1884, but nearly the same additional number were actually present at inspection. This shows that the patriotic spirit is not dwindling, but was rather 1596 stimulated in such a year as last, when active military operations were in progress; and it is also the effect of the extraordinary interest which officers take in the efficiency of their corps. The increased attention given to shooting since the issue of the Martini-Henry rifle, the great interest taken in Camps of Instruction, which so powerfully contribute to the improved discipline of the Force, and the desire on the part of officers to perfect themselves in their knowledge of military duties, are all most creditable and satisfactory as proofs of the essential vitality and spirit of the Volunteers. The Army Reserve is estimated to number 51,000 men; showing a steady though not a very rapid growth. The Votes upon which I have hitherto dwelt have this characteristic in common—that there is but little elasticity in them; and, from an administrative point of view, little room for discretion. The larger sums required for the different branches of the Auxiliary Forces represent no new development of their establishment, but simply and solely greater efficiency and better work done; and we can only grudge or refuse such increases on grounds which would involve the rejection of the entire Votes. Again, the great Pay Vote, and Votes 9, 10, and 11, for Transport, Clothing, and Food, which follow in its train, depend immediately upon the number of men you maintain; and the number of men you maintain depends on the military policy and requirements of the country. If you find it necessary to reinforce your Army in India, or if you resolve to continue the military occupation of Egypt, you must provide the means of doing it; and it is my belief that this necessity is adequately met in these Estimates, but met on a scale which is reasonable and modest. But now we approach a Vote of a different order, the great Vote for Warlike Stores; a Vote which is much more directly under our control, and which, in fact, supplies in itself the subject of a great branch of military policy. The amount which it is right to ask Parliament to devote to the supply of arms and munitions of war does not depend solely or mainly on the immediate requirements of the Army; it must be settled upon a careful review, in the first place, of the present condition of our armaments; in the second 1597 place, of the changes which the rapid and increasing developments of modern science may be creating in the art of war; and, lastly, of the financial position of the country. No one of these questions can be left out of sight if the Minister is properly to discharge his duty. I believe another conception of his duty is sometimes formed; and pictures are sometimes drawn and held up to our admiration, on the one hand of a stubborn War Minister, grasping at every shilling he can compel the reluctant Treasury to grant, and on the other hand of an imperious Chancellor of the Exchequer, ready to sacrifice the safety of his country to the necessities of the Budget. Why, Sir, if either of these pictures were true, whatever the result of the struggle, there would be an end of true economy and of true efficiency. I can assure the Committee, at any rate, that such pictures do not represent the relations between my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and myself. I believe quite as strongly as he does that it would not be reasonable, or even possible, in the circumstances of the year, to propose a larger Vote than this. Let me call the attention of the Committee to the recent history of this Vote. The net total now to be voted is £2,569,000, which is a net increase of £341,200 over the amount taken in the Estimates of last year. But the amount of last year's Vote exceeded, that of 1884–5 by no less a sum than £965,300, so that this great Vote has been raised in two years by more than 100 per cent over what is still considered its normal amount—namely, £1,250,000, which was voted in 1884–5. But this is not all, because £2,500,000 were allotted to this Vote out of the Vote of Credit, of which upwards of £1,500,000 was devoted to the very purposes to which the abnormal increase over the ordinary and average Vote is being annually dedicated — namely, naval and land armaments, submarine mining defences, gunpowder, small arms, field guns, and reserve stores. How, I would ask, in the face of these facts, could the Government have consented to, or could I have urged, a greater increase to the Vote than I now propose? Nay, I will at once change my front, and ask how, in the face of these facts, can I justify our present proposal? I will endeavour to show to 1598 the Committee how it is that I do so. Hon. Gentlemen who were not Members of the last Parliament may not be aware of the tremendous revolution that has taken place within the last few years in the designs of guns, both great and small. The change from muzzle-loading to breech-loading has been due not so much to any caprice or ingenuity of gun inventors, as to the discovery of the great results attained by slow-burning powder, which require for their development a long gun, and thus necessitate breech-loading. Again, the gun is now made of a new material, steel, which has been perfected for the purpose. The new gunpowder also, of which I have spoken, is greatly more costly, and requires special appliances for its manufacture. Then there are machine guns and torpedoes, and all the paraphernalia connected with them. Now, in all these matters we in this country have been slower than our neighbours to adopt the new systems, and we may at least hope that we thus gain the advantage of benefiting by the latest improvements; but the result is that, the whole of this costly expenditure falls upon us now. This is the cause of the startling increase to the Vote of recent years. Let me take for example the amount of the Naval Gun Estimate, which is borne on Army Estimates, and included in this Vote. In 1880 1 it was £303,000. In the following years it was £369,000, £616,000, £500,000, and £500,000. This brings us to last year, when it rose to £850,000, while this year it will be £1,000,000. The fact is that the types are now settled, the designs are completed, the ships are being pushed on, and the guns must be ready; and so with all the other kinds of warlike machinery. I assure hon. Members that it has been no easy task, though it was a necessary one, to restrict the Vote within its present limits. Many excellent, ambitious, and praiseworthy efforts have had to be checked and delayed, or sacrificed; and I must bear testimony to the reasonable spirit in which the officers of the Department accepted the restrictions, which I frankly admit that I have felt it my duty to impose upon their most creditable desire to extend and accelerate its work. Now, as to particulars, as I have referred to naval guns I may state the condition of things in this respect. Of the 110-ton 1599 gun there will be three completed by March 31, and there remain four under orders. Of the 68-ton there are one completed and 28 under orders; of the 45-ton there are 14 completed and eight under orders; of the 10-inch there is one under orders; of the 9.2-inch there are 22 completed and 19 under orders; of the 8-inch there are 35 completed and two under orders; of the 5-inch there are 334 completed and 136 under orders; and of the 4-inch there are 113 completed and 37 under orders. There have also been made or provided for 315 6-pounder and 298 3-pounder quick-firing guns; 1,366 Nordenfelt and 491 Gardner machine guns, and 1,262 Whitehead torpedoes. I may add that experiments of the most interesting kind are being made at Aldershot with different sorts of machine guns, for use with Cavalry and Infantry. Of the new 12-pounder breech-loading field gun we expect that 19 service batteries, in all, will be provided by the end of the year. With regard to small arms, the Committee is aware that during last summer the pattern of the new .4 bore rifle—also, I believe, called the Enfield-Martini—was settled; and, owing to great exertions in the Department, 1,000 will have been turned out by the end of this financial year. Preparations had been made for great activity in production during next year. This is, however, one of the services in which it has appeared to us that, with the smallest detriment to the public interest, the rate of manufacture may be slackened, and we provide for turning out only 55,000 of the new rifle for Imperial service in the coming year. We, however, proceed with the increase to the plant at the factories, which will add to the power of the Department to manufacture a large quantity of those weapons at a rapid rate in case of urgency. I need not say that the lowering of the rate of production, both at Enfield and at Woolwich, from that which was maintained under the Vote of Credit, will involve some reduction in the numbers employed, although, as I have already stated in the House, we trust that the reduction will be so arranged as to cause the smallest degree of hardship. But the Committee will not think some reduction unreasonable in the light of the figures which I have quoted, and of the fact that out of a total number of workpeople of 13,213 no fewer than 4,569 1600 were entered since April last. Now, Sir, the progress that we intend to make with the fortification of coaling stations has been already stated this evening, and also some information has been given as to submarine work. I am not aware that I need detain the Committee at greater length, or that there is any other question of magnitude which requires explanation. I admit that these Estimates involve a heavy charge on the taxation of the country; but I believe that the expenditure proposed in them is wise and reasonable, and I submit them with confidence to the Committee.