HC Deb 25 January 1886 vol 302 cc321-48
MR. HUNTER

, in rising to move, as an Amendment, to add, at the end of the 6th paragraph, the words— But this House humbly expresses to Her Majesty their regret that the Revenues of India have been applied to defray the expenses of the military operations carried on in the Kingdom of Ava, without the consent of Parliament as required by 'The Government of India Act, 1858,' said, the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India (Lord Randolph Churchill) made an appeal to the House on Thursday night to close the debate on the Address, and in the course of that appeal addressed a suggestion to him (Mr. Hunter) that he should bring on this subject at a later stage; but the noble Lord spoke under a misapprehension of the scope and terms of the Amendment. The noble Lord seemed to him to speak under the impression that the Amendment was one to challenge the policy of the Government with respect to the war of annexation in Burmah. That was not the object of the Amendment. It related to only one of the questions which arose out of the ac- tion of Her Majesty's Government in Burmah; but the question was wider than the Burmese Question, and raised an issue of the most important character with regard to the exorcise of a real and effective control by that House over the foreign policy of the Government of India. What were the circumstances under which this question came before the House? When the last Parliament was prorogued, no indication had been given to the country of any difficulties in connection with King Theebaw, which were to end with the appropriation of his Kingdom; but when the new Parliament met, it was announced that a territory, the exact limits of which it might be difficult for Her Majesty's Government to define, but which was generally supposed to cover an area nearly as large as the whole of France—that that territory had been added to the Empire. He did not discuss at that moment the policy of the annexation. He did not ask whether it was in accordance with these principles of international morality that ought to govern the conduct of every great nation; but there could be no doubt that, whether it was right or wrong, it was one that involved grave and far-reaching consequences. He believed, when a union of two distinct races under one Government was attempted to be formed, that union would meet with the most happy results if it was a union founded upon mutual consent and mutual interest; but they had this remarkable fact—that a great territory had been added to this Empire without the consent of the people of Burmah, and without the consent of the people of England; nor did he think that the transactions which had recently taken place in Burmah were calculated in any remarkable degree to win the affections and love of her people. No doubt, there were expressions in the despatches of military officers, suggesting and indicating that they had the consent of the people; but these statements were not in harmony with the principles of human nature. It might be considered by some persons to show very bad taste on the part of the Burmese people; but the Burmese people, like all other peoples, would, he submitted, rather bear the vices of their Native Rulers than the virtues of foreign officials. This annexation had been carried into effect by a Government with respect to which he would not employ any disparaging epithet; but of which it could not be denied that it did not possess, either in this or the last Parliament, that degree or kind of support which was the usual basis of a firm Administration. It was a Government that represented a minority in England, and that had met overwhelming defeat in Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. These facts alone, he thought, would justify some objection; but his specific complaint was that this action had been taken in disregard of the very statutory provisions which were intended to secure to Parliament the control over transactions that might compromise the safety and well-being of the Empire. The words of the 55th section of the Act of 1858 were— Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any Military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such Possessions by Her Majesty's Forces charged upon such Revenues. Let him remind the House of the circumstances under which that provision was introduced into law. When, in 1858, the Crown took over the direct Government of India, it was found necessary to permit a departure from Constitutional principles, and to sanction in the Indian Department a separate purse, not under the direct control of the House of Commons. That was a necessary exception, not entirely free from danger. The danger was perceived, and it was met by a proposal emanating from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. Gladstone), and accepted by the late Lord Derby upon the part of the Government of the day, and that proposal was embodied in the section which he had read. The object of the section was thus described by Lord Derby, who said— The same constitutional check, therefore, was imposed upon the Crown with regard to troops serving in India which was imposed with respect to troops serving in every other part of the globe. If the clause were not agreed to, it would be perfectly competent for any unconstitutional Sovereign "— and the right hon. Gentleman referred to, commenting on the speech, added, "or unconstitutional Minister"— to employ the whole of the Revenues and troops of India for any purpose which the Crown might direct, without the necessity of going to Parliament for the advance of a single shilling."—(3 Hansard, [151] 1697–8.) Two great interests were intended to be safeguarded by that provision. There was the interest of the people of England, and there was the interest of the people of India. It was necessary to protect the liberties of this country against what might occur under an unconstitutional Minister. If that provision were not law, there would be nothing to hinder a Minister, of his own choice, without the knowledge or sanction of Parliament, from bringing over an Army of Sepoys, and bringing them, not only to the Mediterranean, but to this country, and also as far as Dublin and Tipperary. It was necessary, also, to protect the Indian Exchequer from the predatory attacks of selfish interests. They learned from the newspapers that the Native Press of India, with almost entire unanimity, condemned the action of Her Majesty's Government in Burmah. There could be little doubt that if the consent of the Indian people were required for the expenditure of their own money, not a single shilling could have been obtained for the purpose of the Burmese War. Was that not an important consideration for the judgment of that House, if it was called upon to sanction such an expenditure? But the money had been spent without giving to that House any opportunity of estimating the justice or wisdom of the course that had been pursued; and by-and-by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India, or his Successor, would come down and ask the House to sanction that which had been done, and which could not be undone. The House might possibly, if the question were open to it, hesitate before, in the present unsatisfactory state of the finances of India, it would impose any additional burden upon the Indian people, either for the purpose of a war of annexation, or for the cost of administering a Province which it was now admitted would not pay its way. The Act of 1858, and, in particular, the provision to which he (Mr. Hunter) had alluded, had been the subject of discussion in that House. In the Autumn Session of 1878 his lamented Friend the late Mr. Fawcett moved an Amendment to the Motion to sanction an expenditure from the Revenues of India upon the war in Afghanistan; and in the course of that debate several hon. Members took occasion to point out that the Government, in that war, had pursued an illegal course, and it was illegal because it was without the sanction of Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian seconded the Amendment, and stated that, in his opinion, the Government had clearly broken the Act of Parliament. That view was supported by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Bury (Sir Henry James), and by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for East Denbighshire (Mr. Osborne Morgan), and generally by the Front Opposition Bench. But they were overpowered by numbers when it came to the vote; for the Government of that day possessed a largo majority in that House. The Government were driven, in order to justify themselves, to maintain the proposition that the consent of Parliament need not be given before the expenditure was incurred, but that it was sufficient if that sanction was given afterwards. However, that contention was thoroughly pulverized in the speeches of the right hon. Gentlemen to whom he had referred. Such a construction took away from the Act all its virtue and effect. It would deprive Parliament of the power of control over the foreign policy of the Indian Government, and would leave them the barren privilege of consenting to an irrevocable act, or the equally barren privilege of dissenting from it. Moreover, the exceptions which were mentioned in the section itself clearly proved that previous consent—the only consent that had any meaning — was intended, because the section specified certain cases where the previous consent might not be required. There were exceptions provided for, such as to prevent or repel an actual invasion of Her Majesty's Dominions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity. When the Indian Empire was in danger the Government were empowered to act promptly, without waiting for the consent of Parliament. Had there been any danger in the present case? He thought not; indeed, it would be impossible to conceive any case where there was less danger to the Empire of India than from the Kingdom of Ava. It was a Kingdom separated from the sea by a British Province, and all importations of arms or ammunition must pass through British Custom Houses. The Government of India, very properly, he thought, took advantage of its position, and prevented the importation of arms and ammunition. The consequence was that, in a military sense, for years past the Kingdom of Ava had been entirely at our mercy. With regard to the other exception, had there been any sudden or urgent necessity? The annexation of Burmah was not a new idea. It had not occurred to the minds of our officials in India for the first time since Parliament was prorogued. For many years there had been an Annexation Party, not only among the merchants of Rangoon, but also in the ranks of the Government Service. So far back as 1869 there was a protest addressed to the Chief Commissioner of Burmah, warning him not to pursue such a course of conduct with respect to the King of Ava as would result in annexation. This much was gathered from a letter addressed by Lord Mayo to the Chief Commissioner of Burmah, in which he warned him against aggressive tendencies. The letter was dated the 11th of January, 1869; and in it Lord Mayo said, from certain expressions he had observed in some of the letters of the Chief Commissioner, it occurred to him that it was possible that the views of the officers of the Commission as regarded British policy in Burmah did not altogether agree with these entertained by the Government of India. Lest there should be the slightest misapprehension, Lord Mayo said— I think it my duty to inform you that I am wholly opposed to any interference in the affairs of foreign States that can be by any honourable means avoided. The future annexation of Burmah, or any of its adjacent States, is not an event which I either contemplate or desire. On the contrary, I should view with extreme regret and disapproval any course of action that would impose upon the British Government the necessity of occupation, or of assuming, even in a temporary manner, the government of any of the States lying adjacent to the Provinces now in your charge. In 1881 a more determined attempt was made by the Annexationist Party to force the band of the Indian Government in order to bring about an armed intervention. The cry then was that King Theebaw had granted monopolies that were injurious to British trade. It turned out, ultimately, that the only monopoly of any importance that was given was in the article of "cutch," and that that monopoly was in the hands of the Bombay-Burmah Trading Corporation, the very same Company which had now supplied the annexationists with that which they desired, in founding a good cry for intervention. The only other matter that was at all new in the position of Burmah was in respect to the controversy between the King of Burmah and this Bombay Corporation. He would not enter into that question, or express any opinion as to which party was right or wrong. But he would ask the House to consider that there was nothing in the transaction that could be construed into any sudden and urgent necessity for military operations. In the first place, suppose it had come to the worst, and that the decree of King Theebaw, of which the Bombay Corporation complained, had been executed, it could only have given rise to a claim for damages, which might probably have been properly pressed by the Indian Government; but that Government did not appear to have been very anxious to settle the difficulty. It was proposed by the British Government to refer this question to arbitration. But to what arbitration? The arbitrator was to be appointed by the Viceroy. That was a new idea of arbritration. He had never before heard of an arbitration in which one of the parties had the right to select the Judge. He could scarcely conceive with what object this form of arbitration was put forward, except with the certainty that it would be refused. If the manner in which King Theebaw had been treated was to be imitated, and the British Government was to act upon the principles which had been applied to Burmah in dealing with other States, they could not be surprised if the Sovereigns of other States took warning, and were chary of bestowing concessions and privileges upon British subjects. But, so far from this controversy coming within the category of a sudden and urgent necessity menacing the British Empire, it appeared that the controversy could have been settled. That was evident from a letter written by Mr. Jones, the agent or representative of the Bombay Company, to the Chief Commissioner of Burmah, dated the 21st of September last year. He said he could have settled the question, and it would have been in the interests of the Company, in a pecuniary sense, to have settled it; but, having been assisted in the way they had been by the Government, he was not going to do it.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL)

The date of that letter, please?

MR. HUNTER

The 21st September.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

Is it in the Blue Book?

MR. HUNTER

said, it was a letter published in The Times. It was a letter addressed to the Chief Commissioner of Burmah, and was an official communication. He ventured to say that if an illustration had been desired to point a moral, and to show the necessity for the Constitutional safeguards that were provided by the Act of 1858, a better illustration could not have been found than this annexation. To make a military promenade up to Mandalay was an easy thing. To issue a Proclamation of Annexation was easier still. But that step, once taken, was very hard to retrace. If Parliament was to exercise its judgment on the important and grave issues that were submitted to it, it ought to be able to preserve that judgment unfettered by acts that could not be recalled. There could be no doubt that the presence of an English Administration in Mandalay closed some questions. But it opened other questions, which might, in the long run, prove more serious than these which were closed. No one could study the history of the conquest of Burmah by this country without being forced to this conclusion—that the same influence and forces which had driven the Government to Mandalay would not permit it to rest there; but these same influences and forces would sooner or later bring us into collision with the Chinese Empire. He said nothing with respect to the complications looming in the not distant future with European Powers. Surely a great question, so vitally affecting the interests of this country, ought not to be withdrawn from the consideration of Parliament. It was to secure this that Section 55 of the Act of 1858 was passed. It was a section of great value to the English people; and to the Indian people it was of the greatest importance that that House should exercise a jealous guardianship over their rights and interests. The Act of 1858, and the gracious Proclamation of Her Majesty in the same year, were regarded by the people of India as their Magna Charta. The provisions of that Act had been violated. He, therefore, asked the House to adopt the Amendment he now moved, in order to maintain the law and to vindicate its own statutory rights and Constitutional powers.

MR. CONYBEARE

seconded the Amendment.

Amendment proposed, At the end of the 6th paragraph, to add the words—"But this House humbly expresses to tier Majesty their regret that the Revenues of India have been applied to defray the expenses of the military operations carried on in the Kingdom of Ava, without the consent of Parliament as required by 'The Government of India Act, 1858.'"—(Mr. Hunter.)

Question proposed, "That these words be there added."

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER)

said, he was sure that hon. Members would be glad to welcome the hon. and learned Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Hunter) as a participator in their debates. There were many subjects on which the great experience and learning of the hon. and learned Member would be able to assist the House; but he (the Attorney General) must confess he was sorry that it should have fallen to the lot of the hon. and learned Member, as a new Member, to move the present Amendment; because he (the Attorney General) would venture to submit that the hon. and learned Member had somewhat misunderstood the restrictions imposed by the Act of 1858, and that, under existing circumstances, there could not be any substantial ground for the Amendment. He therefore proposed, with the permission of the House, to deal with the legal argument which the hon. and learned Gentleman had advanced, and then to say a word or two upon some of the general considerations by which he had supported his Amendment. The hon. and learned Member for North Aberdeen had been arguing before the House as though, by the action of Her Majesty's Government, it had already been decided that the expenses of the operations, the responsibility of which Her Majesty's Government fully recognized, were to be defrayed out of the Revenues of India. He (the Attorney General) begged to point out that nothing of the kind had been decided. The question, no doubt, might be raised, as a similar question was raised in 1878 by the Motion of Mr. Fawcett, against charging the Revenues of India with the expenses of the operations in Afghanistan. He thought a few minutes' consideration would show hon. Members, oven if they had not the advantage of the legal training of the hon. and learned Member for North Aberdeen, that the section to which the hon. and learned Member had referred imposed certain restrictions, not one of which had been in any way neglected by Her Majesty's Government. The hon. and learned Member had argued as though it were unjustifiable in the Government to go to war without the previous consent of Parliament. The same question was raised indirectly in 1878, and the then Attorney General (Sir John Holker) showed that that was by no means a correct construction of the Act of Parliament. The question was involved in the terms of the 54th section of the Act, that section providing that, when an order was sent to India directing the actual commencement of hostilities, the fact of such order being sent should be communicated to both Houses of Parliament within three months, if they were sitting, and, if they were not, within one month after the next meeting of Parliament. He thought he need scarcely point out that two alternatives were contemplated by the section— the commencement of war at a time when the House was sitting, and at a time when the House was not sitting. In the latter contingency, which applied to the present case, the responsibility of these who undertook the operations was to communicate the fact to Parliament one month after the meeting of Parliament. He submitted, therefore, that to anyone who was capable of appreciating the plain language of the section, it could not have been passed without it being in the contemplation of these who were responsible for the enactment that war might be declared without the consent of Parliament, otherwise there would have been no object in saying the fact should be communicated to Parliament within a month after its next meeting. Passing on to Section 55, he submitted that it provided for a state of things not within the purview of the hon. and learned Member's Amend- ment. It enacted that, except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of our Indian Possessions, the Revenues of India should not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expense of any military operations carried on beyond the frontiers of such Possessions. The state of circumstances contemplated by the section was the preventing or the repelling of invasion; but what was the case which was to depend on this state of circumstances? It was whether the Revenues of India should or should not be applicable to defray the expense of military operations. The House would see, therefore, that it was not a question of whether war should be undertaken or not. The hon. and learned Member, no doubt, honestly wished to raise a great question; but he (the Attorney General) should like to point out that the question whether war should be, or should not be, commenced, and whether military operations should be undertaken, rested with the Advisers of Her Majesty at the time, and it was not a question of previously obtaining the sanction of Parliament. The hon. and learned Member, in his Amendment, which expressed the regret of the House that the Revenues of India were to be employed in the operations in Burmah, assumed that that question had already been determined which must be submitted to the House; and if he chose, when the debate arose on the question as to how the expenses were to be defrayed, he had the opportunity of raising any objection he thought proper as to the course of action pursued by Her Majesty's Government. But he (the Attorney General) trusted that he had shown the House that the responsibility of beginning the military operations was to be determined by Her Majesty's Advisers, subject to the condition that certain communications were to be made to the Houses of Parliament, with the addition that the question as to how such expenses should be borne should be governed by the decision of Parliament. When he remembered that this question practically formed the subject of a solemn debate in 1878, in which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. Gladstone) took part, and when he remembered that the action of Her Majesty's Government on that occasion was supported by a majority of 110, and that it did not please the Party opposite to alter the law during the five years they had been in Office, he ventured to think that Her Majesty's present Advisers would have been shirking responsibility if they had hesitated to act under the circumstances, because they were afraid that some such Motion as this would be brought forward. While the hon. and learned Member disclaimed, at the beginning of his speech, any intention to call in question the general policy of the Government, he had thought fit to make certain statements which, if they remained unanswered, might seem to lead to the conclusion that the Government had acted indiscreetly or improperly. It was no part of his (the Attorney General's) duty to argue whether or not there was a sudden or urgent necessity in this case; but no one who would candidly read the contents of the Blue Book, instead of referring to letters in The Times, and other newspapers, which did not appear in it, could doubt that there was a sudden and urgent necessity which justified the action of the Government. The hon. and learned Member had spoken of the Bombay and Burmah Corporation as though it was a body which merely had some claim against the Burmese Government which might be made the subject of arbitration. For 20 years the Bombay and Burmah Corporation had been in intimate relations with the Burmese Authorities. The dispute began by suggestions being made that the Bombay and Burmah Corporation had bribed the present Governor of the Province of Ninghyan, with a very large bribe—namely, six lacs of rupees, in order to cover their frauds. Upon that suggestion being at once challenged the Burmese officials shifted their ground, and alleged that the Bombay and Burmah Corporation had not paid a sufficient amount under the leases of 1880, and that they had defrauded the foresters who had been in their employ. He would undertake to demonstrate to any hon. Member that there was no foundation for either of these charges. When the charges were made, they were only supported by the testimony of a few discharged servants, or of persons acting under the compulsion of the Burmese Government. The Bombay and Burmah Corporation courted, from the be- ginning, a thorough investigation of the charges made against them; but they were unable to secure either the substantiation of the charges, or an investigation. But the matter did not, by any means, stop there. The hon. and learned Member had referred to the question as a mere money demand, which might be made the subject of arbitration, or an action for damages; but there were other considerations. In the end of 1882 and the beginning of 1883, a now lease having been arranged, the Corporation paid clown in advance for the right of cutting wood in the forests no loss than four and a half lacs of rupees. He wanted the House to understand that this, which was called by the hon. and learned Member a money claim, was something which was alleged by the Burmese Government as having happened with reference to timber in 1882. Having paid that large amount in advance, this Corporation had other considerations which ought to have influenced, and he trusted did influence, their minds. They had in their employ several thousand persons, of whom no less than 2,000 were British subjects; and instead of the Government of Burmah simply declining to accept the proposals for arbitration, or saying that some other tribunal must be devised, whereby the questions in dispute could be determined, on the 24th September, four days after the hon. and learned Member had told the House the dispute might have been amicably settled, they demanded payment of 23 lacs of rupees from the Corporation in respect of these alleged breaches, On the 24th of September this was the condition of matters, as stated in a telegram from the Bombay and Burmah Corporation— Burmese soldiers insist on stopping the rafts, notwithstanding the orders of the Governor of Ninghyan. He has no power to enforce his orders. Soldiers have fired on several of our rafts. Raftsmen are frightened, have been arrested, and put in the stocks by soldiers. There were various degrees of opinion as to the extent to which Governments ought to forbear; but it seemed to him (the Attorney General) that Her Majesty's Government had some duty to perform towards the 2,000 British subjects who wore in the employ of the Bombay and Burmah Corporation. The hon. and learned Member would have a further oppor- tunity of criticizing the conduct of the Government; but he (the Attorney General) submitted that that conduct was not to be criticized by a side wind, on a Motion made by way of suggestion that some condition in an Act of Parliament had not been fulfilled before the operations began. He only desired to add that, having given his careful consideration to the matter, and looking at it not only as a lawyer, but also with the object of finding out which side was in the right, so far as he had been able to form an opinion, he had come to the distinct conclusion that there was no foundation whatever for the charges made against the Company, and that these who represented Burmah, knowing they were in the wrong, were at once proceeding to enforce their unrighteous and improper demands by force, which Her Majesty's Government could not allow to pass unnoticed. The general policy of the Government in matters of this kind rested in far wiser hands than his; but it was well known that prompt action in these matters did not, as a rule, lead to prejudicial results. They knew perfectly well that the expenditure of a few hundreds might pro-vent the ultimate loss of thousands, and that the expenditure of a few thousands might prevent the ultimate loss of tens of thousands; and when it was suggested that Her Majesty's Government ought to have stayed their hands before they undertook the responsibility of these operations, he ventured to point out that they were inviting criticism, because the question of how this expenditure was to be met was still open; and, in his opinion, Her Majesty's Government would have been entirely wanting in their duty to the country and the first principles of government if, having made up their minds that there was a case for prompt and energetic action, and in view of the interpretation of the law for which they contended, they had delayed to undertake these operations.

MR. GLADSTONE

Like the hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down, I do not feel it necessary to enter at any very great length into the question that has been raised by the hon. and learned Mover of this Amendment. But I must say, in passing, that this being the first opportunity we have had of hearing the hon. and learned Mover, I have listened, in two respects, with great pleasure to his speech. I thought the general principles he propounded were eminently sound; and otherwise he appeared to be a Gentleman who, in the course of his speech, proved to us, in the most satisfactory manner, his power to bear a very useful and distinguished part in the discussions of this House. But the hon. and learned Member the Mover of the Amendment is, in this respect, I think, unfortunate—that the Amendment he has moved does not cover the whole breadth of the ground he undoubtedly occupied in his speech. The Amendment only raises the question—one of grave importance, no doubt, but still the comparatively narrow question—of who is to meet the expenses that have been incurred? But a considerable portion of his speech undoubtedly touched what is a deeper matter—namely, the merits of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in this very important matter. I would keep these two questions entirely distinct. The Attorney General, I am bound to say, has kept them entirely distinct. But, before referring to either of them, I must undertake to point out to the Attorney General that there is a palpable error in the proposition with which he concluded his speech, because he contended that the Parliament of 1878 passed a direct judgment upon this question. I, without hesitation, say that this is an entire mistake. I quite agree that the argument was made, and made with great decision, certainly by myself, with regard to the construction of the Act. I quite admit that the whole tone and temper of that Parliament was entirely the opposite to our contentions on that and on other matters which have been since dealt with in a somewhat different way. The issue was not raised on the Motion, and no decision was given by the Parliament, directly or indirectly, upon the construction of the Act. With regard to the second part of the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman, and which touched the same subject-matter as the second portion of the hon. and learned Mover's speech, I agree undoubtedly with the hon. and learned Gentleman to this extent—and it is a very important agreement—that I do not think the House is at this moment in a condition—even if the question had been raised by the Amendment, and it has not been—to pronounce that there was no sudden or urgent necessity in the condition of things in Burmah which led to the action of Her Majesty's Government. If there was a sudden and emergent necessity, then, by the confession of all parties, it was open to Her Majesty's Government to proceed without obtaining the prior assent of Parliament to the employment of Indian Forces, or to creating a charge upon Indian Revenues. In other times it has been in this condition—that questions of the most vital importance— questions of war, of conquest, far larger in their character even than this—were decided without the smallest hope or possibility that Parliament would exercise any control over them whatever. In this instance, I think I need only say that, as regards the merits of the question, I keep my mind entirely open. I noticed on a former night a sentence in the Speech from the Throne, not because I thought it conveyed a doctrine in distinct and intelligible terms, but because I thought it somewhat more savoured of a doctrine that this House ought to watch with considerable jealousy and reserve—namely, the doctrine that a civil wrong inflicted on British subjects constitutes a case on account of which we are to go to war. It is a very large and a very grave question. I am far from denying that the right of going to war may arise upon it; but the general proposition that warlike measures ought to be undertaken upon that ground is a proposition which we ought to hesitate, I think, to inscribe among our political axioms. The speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman, I may say, on this part of the question, I thought, was open to some exception; because he argued this war as though it had grown entirely out of the relations of the trading Company and the Burmese Government. There is no doubt that much more was involved than the question between the Company and the Burmese Government; and though I do not deny that there is force in the plea that the conditions and interests of the 2,000 persons employed by the Company were matters for consideration, yet I think if there is to be an ultimate defence and justification of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with respect to making war and the annexation of Burmah—and at present I do not say whether there will or will not be such a justification—that it certainly must be drawn from broader and deeper considerations than the mere relations of a Company with the Burmese Government. I do not know the hon. and learned Member's intention; but I doubt whether the House will approach this question satisfactorily by any division on the Amendment now before us. In asking the House to assent to this outlay, the Government will have to make a Motion, which will afford ample and legitimate opportunity for considering the question of the liability of the Indian Revenues; and with respect to the matter which constituted so great a part of the speech of the Mover of the Amendment, and which was not touched by the Amendment itself. I venture to hope that the House will not be called to decide anything by voting upon the Amendment. I must say a few words upon the more legal and professional portion of the speech of the Attorney General. He has stated his views tonight, as he has done during his short experience in this House, with great clearness and force; and he has referred to the argument made use of by the late Sir John Holker when he so honourably tilled the position now occupied by the lion, and learned Gentleman. Though I differed much from Sir John Holker in politics, this I will say—that I appreciated and admired his legal knowledge. I never heard a legal argument from Sir John Holker, whether I agreed with him or not, without great pleasure and admiration for the masterly way in which he handled his subject. Therefore, I do not approach this subject under prejudice. But I must give fair notice to the hon. and learned Gentleman that I am prepared to contest to the uttermost his legal doctrine as to the construction of the Act of Parliament. The doctrine was advanced—I do not like to use the word extravagant—but in the most advanced form it was capable of assuming by the Earl of Iddesleigh; and, if I remember his contention, he argued thus:—He said there is nothing in the Act of Parliament to prevent the advance of the money from the Indian Treasury; and if Parliament subsequently determines that these advances shall be repaid, and the charge shall be finally borne by the Consolidated Fund, then the Act of Parliament has been satisfied. That I also understand to be the contention of the hon. and learned Gentleman. If the hon. and learned Gentleman had sat as long as I have sat in this House during a multitude of Indian wars—during the first Afghan War, during the Scinde War, during the Persian War—[General Sir GEOROE BALFOUR: And the Chinese Wars.] Well, the Chinese wars are a very painful subject. As far as my recollection goes, I do not know that these wars raised this particular question. My recollection rather is that in the case of the greater of these conflicts, in the Chinese War of 1839, we had a perfectly free hand, and were able to pass judgment upon the question, irrespective of any financial embarrassment. But in these eases to which I have referred—and, perhaps, the list of them could be enlarged — what Parliament, and what successive Parliaments, felt was that they wore reduced to a state of absolute impotence. The question came before them simply as a question of censure upon the Government, and in no other practical shape. The clause of the Indian Government Act of 1858 was intended to provide an effectual remedy for that mischief. Not in every case. That clause was much considered—I do not say it was much debated in this House. It was intended to provide a remedy; but not in every case. It was generally felt that where there was actual or meditated invasion, there you must be content to take the risks of compromising the authority of Parliament, and leaving the Indian subject practically without remedy. It was felt that the exception of invasion was not wide enough, but that another exception should be introduced, and that was the case of sudden and urgent necessity. These were words which, in the hands of the Government, might be elastic words; but, nevertheless, it was necessary, undoubtedly, to have a provision of that kind in the Act of Parliament; and so far I admit that it is not possible for us to exercise any previous control. But I affirm, in the boldest and most confident manner, that the purpose of Parliament was, setting aside the case of invasion, and the case of sudden and urgent necessity, to provide a prior control for Parliament in questions of this kind. What is the contention of the hon. and learned Gentleman? His contention is that the whole object of the clause was to reserve the question, who is to pay? Then, I can only say, most deplorable is the position, not only of the Indian taxpayers, but of the British taxpayers also. Because, according to the lion, and learned Gentleman, how stand the British taxpayers? In respect of wars and like operations conducted in all other parts of the globe, we have a tolerably effective control. I will not go now into the technical question; but, on the whole, it is well known that, although the prerogative of making peace or war is in the hands of Her Majesty, yet the wars made by this country are generally, through the privileges and rights of this House, practically under an effective prior control. But how stand we under the doctrine of the hon. and learned Gentleman in regard to these wars that can be made by the Indian Army? Under that doctrine we have no control whatever in regard to these wars.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sir RICHARD WEBSTER)

Yes; we have.

MR. GLADSTONE

What control have we, then? Parliament usually prorogues at the end of July, and meets again six months after. The Indian Forces may be operating to any extent during the whole of that period; and then there is nothing for the House of Commons to do but to say in the subsequent Session whether they will or will not pay the bill. Under these circumstances, I say that we have no Parliamentary control whatever over these wars. We have no power remaining, except to condemn the Government. The hon. and learned Member may say that I have not been complimentary in my remarks to the Parliament of 1878; but he, in his observations, has been most uncomplimentary to the Parliament of 1858, and the Government of 1858, and, I may say, to a series of Parliaments which have groaned under the state of things that previously existed with regard to wars made from India, and by means of the Indian Army. Well, Sir, I would remind the hon. and learned Gentleman of what were the sensations in this country produced by the first Afghan War. He may remember that such was the belief in the responsibility, in the error, and perhaps almost in the crime, of that war—such was the universal sentiment of public opinion in respect to it, and, at the same time, the sentiment of the perfect helplessness of this House and this Government in preventing a repetition of such things, that Mr. Roebuck, in 1843, under the Government of Sir Robert Peel, made a Motion to inflict retrospectively the severe censure of this House upon a Government that had been out of Office for two or three years; and it was only with difficulty that Sir Robert Peel, exercising all the skill and influence he possessed, could restrain the House of Commons, and the large majority that confided in him at that period, from pronouncing that censure. I do not wish to go further at this moment; or to enter into the details of the Act of Parliament; but I think the hon. and learned Gentleman himself will do me the justice to say that if his construction of this Act is right our position is this—Dividing the word geographically into these regions which are accessible to the Indian Army and these regions which are not, Parliament can control the military action of the Advisers of the Crown in the regions which are not accessible to the Indian Army. But with respect to these which are accessible, the Government are under no necessity or occasion whatever to come to this House for prior sanction—they can operate through the Indian Army, and then content themselves with presenting to us the bill after the whole matter is at an end. The hon. and learned Gentleman proposes, by his construction of the Act of Parliament, to convict the Parliament of 1858, and all these who had to do with it then, of the crime of what I should call political idiotcy. ["Hear, hear!" and laughter.] I was obliged to say as much as this; because the general question involved is one of extreme importance. It is not now legitimately before us in connection with the present state of things. What is the present state of things? The noble Lord (Lord Randolph Churchill) may undoubtedly, three or four weeks hence, if he thinks fit, raise the doctrine of 1878 in its full breadth—namely, that the Act of Parliament does not touch a case in which India pays, provided that she is subsequently repaid. That is the high doctrine on the subject. But whenever that high doctrine is broached, we on this side of the House shall be bound to meet and contest it. Then the noble Lord may have it open to him—and I hope he will take that course—to pass by that high doctrine altogether. If there were a sudden urgent necessity, then he would not require that doctrine at all. I know not which plea will be raised; but when the proper time comes undoubtedly we shall see. I leave my mind entirely open and unprejudiced with respect to this case, which involves many considerations of great difficulty and importance. I hold the construction of the Act of Parliament to be not only clear, but to be of vital moment to the preservation of the Privileges of this House. I hope that on the merits of the question we may not be driven to a division at present, especially on a Motion which would but imperfectly express its own purpose, and on which we should vote with very imperfect knowledge.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL)

I imagine that the House will be inclined to follow the advice of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. Gladstone), and will forbear discussing the general policy involved in the war with Burmah, and the annexation of that territory to the Dominions of the Crown. I imagine, moreover, that that course will be agreeable to hon. Members below the Gangway, and possibly to the hon. and learned Gentleman who moved this Amendment, as he is now aware that it will be my duty under the Act of Parliament, within a month from the first day of the meeting of Parliament, to place before the House a formal Resolution sanctioning the war by authorizing the payment of the expenses caused by it out of the Revenues of India. A legitimate and a more convenient occasion for debate will then arise. And I am the more confirmed in that opinion from the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman himself; because I am convinced that if there is one quarter of information to which he has not gone, and to which he ought to go, it is the official Blue Book, and the further record which has been placed before the House by the Government. It is obvious that the hon. and learned Gentleman, for some reason or other, has not been disposed even to consult that Blue Book, or, if he has consulted it, he evidently is not disposed to place the slightest reliance upon it; but I believe that the hon. and learned Gentleman has not studied it. I am not surprised at this, because the time that has elapsed since it was laid before the House has been so short. That being so, I shall confine my remarks within a very brief compass, if the House will kindly grant me its indulgence. I wish to support, as far as I can, every word which fell from the Attorney General, and with great respect, but at the same time with perfect conviction, to contest every word which has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. I think that I shall be able to show the House that, in support of my assertion, I can call to witness acts of the right hon. Gentleman himself, and very recent acts. The right hon. Gentleman has advised me to avoid basing the action of the Government upon what he calls the high doctrine, that the proper interpretation of the Statute is the one placed upon it by the Attorney General—namely, that the Government, the Crown, and the Ministers of the Crown, have the undoubted right to declare war, to initiate hostile proceedings, without the prior sanction of Parliament, whether by the Indian Army or the Forces of the Crown. That was the doctrine of the Attorney General, and I believe it to be the Constitutional doctrine. In the case of making war by the British Forces in Europe, obviously the power of the House of Commons is very great; because, within almost a few hours of acts which lead to hostilities being done, the Government is bound to come to Parliament for a Vote of Credit, and Parliament has at once the power to arrest proceedings by refusing the credit. Therefore, there is no helplessness whatever of the House of Commons as far as hostilities in Europe by British Forces are concerned. But the right hon. Gentleman said that the House of Commons is perfectly helpless, if our contention of the interpretation of the Statute is right, in the event of war being made by Her Majesty's Indian Forces. In the first place, I venture to deny altogether that the House of Commons is helpless, even if the right hon. Gentleman is right; because the very remarkable illustration which the right hon. Gentleman gave of the action of Mr. Roebuck proves that the House of Commons is not helpless. [An hon. MEMBER: Two years after.] Well, if the House of Commons could, on the Motion of Mr. Roebuck two or three years after the occurrence, when another Government was in Office, take hostile action, that would almost have amounted to an impeachment of the servants of the Crown who were responsible for the course pursued; and if it required all the power and influence of Sir Robert Peel to restrain the House of Commons from taking that action, how can the right hon. Gentleman contend that the House of Commons is perfectly helpless with regard to the present Burmese War, either as regards censuring the Government, evacuating the country, or sanctioning the payment of the expenses of the war out of the Revenues of this country? The House of Commons can censure Her Majesty's Government, if it should be of opinion that its action in this matter has been immoral or wicked, and it can evacuate the country and replace King Theebaw on his Throne. The House of Commons can direct that the Revenue of this country should boar the charge, and not the Indian Revenue. There is only one thing which the House of Commons cannot do. It cannot go back upon the action which the Crown, in the exercise of its Prerogative on the responsibility of the Advisors of the Crown, has committed. It cannot prevent the expenditure from having been incurred. [Laughter.] Hon. Gentlemen who laugh do not understand my contention, and I do not think they will laugh so loudly when they find that the very action I am contending for is within the power of the Crown; and the action which, as I am contending, is within the power of the Crown was actually performed by the right hon. Gentleman in the late Government. The contention of the right hon. Gentleman is that it is not enough that Parliament should be able to say afterwards whether Indian Revenue should be expended or not. That, he says, is not the construction of the Statute; the construction of the Statute is, that the Government intending to spend Indian Revenue or British Revenue must obtain the consent of Parliament before a single shilling of Indian Revenue can be expended. Now, as a matter of fact, that construction has never been adopted by any Government, Conservative or Liberal. I take the case of the third China War of 1859; and I am under the impression that at that time the right hon. Gentleman had a seat in the Government. I find that the order for Indian troops to take part in that war was issued in September, 1859; and, of course, the cost of the Expedition from India was defrayed out of Indian Revenue. More than that, although certain portions of the extraordinary charge were paid out of Imperial Revenue, the ordinary charge was paid out of Indian Revenue. The expenditure began in September, 1859, when the right hon. Gentleman was a Member of the Government, and no Vote of Credit was taken from the House of Commons till March 16, 1860—five months after the commencement of the war. Now, why do not hon. Gentlemen opposite laugh? However, I am not going to rest on 1859, the evil days before the great Reform Bill, when the majesty of the people was not represented in this House. So I will take another case—that of the Abyssinian War. The order for Indian troops to take part in that war was issued from this country in August, 1867, a Conservative Government being then in Office; and the Resolution authorizing the payment of Indian Revenue towards the expenses of that war was not brought before the House of Commons till November 28, 1867—four months afterwards. Therefore, the Conservative record is a little better than the Liberal record. Then I come to the Afghan War of 1878. An order went for the commencement of hostilities on November 21, 1878, and the Resolution sanctioning the payment of the expenses out of Indian Revenue was brought forward in December,1878—the Government, if I recollect aright, summoning a special Autumn Session of Parliament to sanction that war. Now, Sir, I come to the recent Administration of the right hon. Gentleman. It was the unhappy lot of the right hon. Gentleman to conduct more than one "military operation;" and in one of these "military operations" the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues very properly decided that Indian troops should bear a useful part, and that in the security and independence of Egypt the interests of India were very closely concerned. So Indian troops were ordered to take part in the Egyptian Expedition of 1882. Orders were sent from the India Office on July 21; and here I will admit that the Government acted with immense promptitude, and only the most microscopic criticism which ingenuity could devise can be passed upon their conduct; but, nevertheless, they broke the law. [A laugh.] I am not contending that they broke the law; I am contending that the right hon. Gentleman opposite contends that they broke the law. Well, orders had been sent on the 24th of July, preparations for these orders had been going on for some days beforehand, and considerable expenditure had actually been incurred in India; but the sanction of Parliament was not taken till the 27th of July. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!] What about the contention of the right hon. Gentleman? How about the helplessness of Parliament? The money had been spent in India, and Parliament was utterly helpless to prevent its being so spent. What, then, is the contention of the right hon. Gentleman? Either it is that the prior sanction of Parliament must be obtained before a single shilling is expended—

MR. GLADSTONE

"Before a single shilling is expended" are not my words at all. I know too well the uniform practice to which the British Votes and every other Vote is subject.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

I beg the right hon. Gentleman's pardon. I understood him to argue totidem verbis from his contention of 1878; and if he will refer to Hansard he will find that he construed the word "defray" as containing and moaning the issue of money; and for the issue of money he contended that the prior sanction of Parliament was necessary. But there I admit that only a very fine-drawn criticism can be brought to bear on the right hon. Gentleman. I should not have thought of making such a criticism had it not been for the tremendously high-flown doctrine which the right hon. Gentleman laid down. It is obvious that the period of time, small as it was—three days—was a fatal flaw in the virtue of the right hon. Gentleman. However, I come to a case far more glaring, which utterly destroys the position taken up by the right hon. Gentleman. I come to the second Egyptian War—the Suakin Expedition—and there I have been able to ascertain from the India Office exactly the amount of money which was spent before Parliament was asked to vote one shilling. Orders were sent from the India Office for Indian troops to go to Suakin on the 8th of February, 1885, and the sanction of Parliament in the form of a Resolution was not demanded until the 5th of March —a whole month nearly. What becomes of the prior sanction of Parliament now? if the right hon. Gentleman would care to know—because, of course, his attention was so taken up with the general conduct of the Government that probably he does not know the details of the expenditure connected with Egypt— £350,000 of Indian money was disbursed before the sanction of Parliament authorized the expenditure. It was expended between the 8th of February and the 5th of March. Now, see to what lengths the Expedition had gone before the sanction of Parliament was obtained. The whole force had been embarked, and was aboard the transport. They could not possibly have prevented that force from being embarked, nor the transport being engaged. A transport had been engaged; troops had been embarked; 9,000 camp followers had been engaged; 5,500 camels had been purchased between the date when the Government was first instructed to prepare for the despatch of a force—namely, the 8th of February—and the date that Parliament was informed; in addition to which large liabilities were incurred by the Government of India for contracts for transports, although the actual payment did not, perhaps, fall to be made on the instant. Now, observe, I doubt very much whether the Burmese War up to the present moment has cost£350,000, well within the margin of the right hon. Gentleman. I ask the House after such habitual practice of Liberal and Conservative Governments with regard to wars in which Indian troops took part—and there is not a single instance on record in which the prior sanction of Parliament has been asked—I ask the House how it could really now be contended that that is the meaning of the Statute, and that the Statute is absolutely worthless, and that, in the words of the right hon. Gentleman, it "must have been drawn by idiots," unless it bears that meaning? Obviously, Sir, the persons who drew the clause in question were under the wing of the right hon. Gentleman himself. I am not saying that in the least degree in a jeering way. I think it is a most valuable clause, one which does bring the Government under the control of Parliament; but which, at the same time, does not fetter the initiative of action on which the English Government, and far more the Indian Government, must depend. I contend, therefore, that the true construction of the Statute is this—that the Indian Government, acting under the instruction of the Advisers of the Crown, can undoubtedly declare war, and can use the Indian Revenue for the purpose. The declaration of war, if Indian troops are employed in such war, must be communicated to Parliament within three months, if Parliament is sitting; and if Parliament is not sitting, within a month after it meets. That is undoubtedly within the power of the Indian Government; on that interpretation of the Statute they have invariably acted, and on that they are acting now. As I said before, the object of the Statute is to prevent the Crown using the Indian Revenues without the consent of Parliament for carrying on warlike operations, and that the House of Commons can do. The House of Commons can arrest the whole of the military operations in Burmah. It can order the immediate evacuation of the country and the restoration of King Theebaw; it can order the payment of any indemnity almost that the House of Commons chooses, in case, in its philanthropy, it should determine that that benevolent Monarch has been wronged. That is the power of the House of Commons; and I cannot see how that great power can be reconciled with the expressions of the right hon. Gentleman, who threw his hands up to Heaven and talked about the utter helplessness of the House of Commons. I would not have taken part in this debate, after what has fallen from the right hon. Gentleman, if it had not been for the extraordinary contention he has raised. I do hold that I have shown to the House that by the reasonable construction of the Statute and by the invariable practice the Government have acted within their legal and just rights. I shall be prepared, when the proper time arrives, to defend the action of the Government upon that subject. But I do believe that in the position which I have the honour to fill I should be utterly false to all that is absolutely essential to the discharge of the duties of my Office, and the immense responsibility that must ultimately repose on the Indian Secretary, if I had not at once contested the doctrine of the right hon. Gentleman—a doctrine which I venture to say might, in the future, if accepted by the House of Commons, and ratified by Parliament, bring utter ruin on the Indian Government. I will not further detain the House to-night. At the first opportunity which will be most convenient to the House I will be prepared to move the formal Resolution sanctioning the Burmese War and annexation. I have no doubt whatever as to what the verdict of the House of Commons on that issue will be. If I could bring it on to-morrow I would be delighted to do so; because, I will own, I am more than proud to have had the responsibility of recommending to my Colleagues the action which has been taken in regard to Burmah; and I am proud of belonging to a Government which has added to the Dominions of the Crown, and the enterprize of British commerce, and which has added to the area of civilization and of progress so vast and so valuable a possession.

MR. HUNTER

said, that in response to the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lothian (Mr. Gladstone), and considering that the main issues on this question must come up for discussion at another time, he would ask leave of the House to withdraw his Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.