RESOLUTION. [ADJOURNED DEBATE.]

HC Deb 21 May 1885 vol 298 cc1077-125

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question proposed [20th May], "That this House at its rising on Friday, do adjourn till Thursday the 4th of June."

Question again proposed.

Debate resumed.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

said, that they had never, in the recollection of any hon. Member of the House, or under any circumstances, adjourned for the Whitsuntide holidays, when matters were more depressing or adverse, as regarded the interests of the country, than they were now. Never before had there been a Government who had so managed the affairs of this country, that, if he mentioned one solitary instance, and he was not quite sure at that moment how we absolutely stood in regard to that Power—he meant Italy—we had not one single friend among European nations on whom we could rely, even in the meanest and smallest sense of the word. Notwithstanding the assiduous efforts of the Government to conciliate them, the insults which had been heaped upon this country by Powers which ought to have been our friends were now more than we had hitherto been called on to bear. Everything had been sacrificed to Russia and France, and what was the position we now occupied in regard to those two Powers. By every means in their power they were thwarting the best interests of this country. Though he would give the Prime Minister credit for having done all in his power to maintain peace, yet, unhappily, that peace had not been secured; and he would venture to say he never remembered a time when the House and the country had been kept in such absolute ignorance of the intentions, the views, and the opinions of the Government as they were at the present moment. If the right hon. Gentleman would look back to what had passed, he would be the first to recognize that that which had been his expressed grand and primary principle—that the House of Commons should be taken into the confidence of the Government, and should know what they were aiming at in regard to the policy which they wore pursuing in foreign affairs—had been violated. Even in the Papers which had been presented to the House respecting Russia and Afghanistan, the most critical part of the correspondence and negotiations had been omitted. Consequently the House was not in a position to say whether the Government had dealt honestly, uprightly, and straightforwardly with this country, or whether they had been pandering to Russia; whether we had come to the lowest degradation, or whether we had yet a further step to take in that unhappy direction. He would defy anyone—he would even venture to defy the Prime Minister—to get up in his place, and say that we were in the same position as a nation as we were when he came into Office five years ago. He defied the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) to say in regard to his foreign and Colonial policy that he had done that which would best maintain the honour, the dignity, and the integrity of this country. When they saw that Russia never intended to comply with that which the Prime Minister not only desired, but demanded; when they saw that this country had been led, step by step, into that mire, into that quagmire, from which the Government would not be able to extricate themselves or the country, he was justified in saying there was a point beyond which this country would not go—a point at which they would rise against that Government and turn them out of power and place, relegating them to that position which they were so eminently fitted to occupy. No language was too strong, if it would only induce the Prime Minister to put aside all views in regard to Party,—to put aside playing and trifling with the country merely to secure votes. In that case, he would receive a far more general support than he now had. This country had, by the Government's policy, been placed in an inferior position, both in regard to Russia and France. What had taken place in regard to that "Financial Convention" of which we had heard so much? The Prime Minister said that, unless the House agreed to that Convention at once, Egypt would be bankrupt. Was Egypt bankrupt? No. And yet none of the other Powers had jet agreed to that Convention. The other Powers were keeping that Convention to play on the Prime Minister, and to force him to internationalize the Suez Canal, the prevention of which was one of the main causes of our going to Egypt at first. The right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the President of the Board of Trade came down to the House, and told them that, although they had sacrificed everything they last year held to be most dear, and that they believed no financial arrangement could be made with success, except that which they propounded, yet because France would not agree with them they gave way upon every point, and only succeeded in gaining one miserable concession, which was that 5 per cent should be taxed on the coupons. And now they had it that even those coupons were not to be taxed. Not a single shred had been left of the proposal made by the Prime Minister. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade told the House that other nations had their feelings, and that they had a right to have them considered. And the result of all that was, that the Government had shown they were prepared to sacrifice our feelings and all our best interests in order to maintain peace at any price, no matter what humiliation might be placed on England. These were strong points of indictment, and he might go into others. He might mention The Bosphore Egyptienincident. Never, in the history of this country, had a greater insult been offered to this country than by the manner in which France had dealt with us in this matter. True, in some slight particular, the law as it was in Egypt might have been broken; but his belief was that if the affair had been properly managed, if the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had held his head as high as a Prime Minister of this country should, when he associated this country with Egypt in the suppression of that newspaper, we should not have heard so in much about this most scurrilous publication; denouncing in violent language both the Egyptian Government and our own, writing in every way against the British occupation, and in promotion of a French occupation. He did not suppose even hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway would approve of that. That, however, was the aim of The Bosphore Egyptien,and now it seemed that paper was again going to run its scurrilous course. In fact, it had been republished, and he presumed there was no reason to believe that it would not repeat those abominable acts which led to its suppression. He did not like to trouble the House with extracts; but he had a letter in reference to the closing of the office of the paper from one on the spot, and on whom he could thoroughly depend, a letter he was quite willing to show to the right hon. Gentleman. His correspondent's account, he might also say, agreed with one published in a London paper that morning. Everything, said the writer, was done in the most regular way: and when the French Consul appeared, and said he would only yield to force, Mr. Fenwick placed his hand on the Consul's shoulders, and said—"Will that be sufficient for you?" That was all the force used to show authority in closing the office. The French Consul smiled, and said, "Yes." The two gentlemen then shook hands, and separated. That was the whole business which France magnified into a great breach of the law, and for which she did all she could to place us in a ridiculous, invidious position he fore the other nations of the world. Knowing our position in regard to Russia she pressed all her claims upon us, because she believed she was dealing with a Government she could squeeze. The outlook in Egypt was very serious indeed, and before the close of the debate he looked for some authoritative declaration of the Government's intention from the Prime Minister. Lightly, some time ago, the right hon. Gentleman told the House the Soudan was to be abandoned; the order went forth, and all the unfortunate garrisons were left to their fate. A prudent Minister, who had considered the question and knew his own intentions, would never have made such a statement, and at such a time; but the Prime Minister, he was sorry to say, was one of those who, in regard to Egyptian affairs, never looked beyond the action he was taking at the moment; he never looked to the consequences, or what necessarily ought to follow, only how he would be able to evade those consequences, or to the means of discontinuing or finishing the work commenced. It was now stated that Suakin was to be abandoned, and this after the formal statement made some time ago by the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Hartington) that no other Power would be allowed to hold Suakin. To-day, however, they heard of the possibility of the poor bag-and-baggage Turk occupying Suakin. The Prime Minister had done everything to debase, degrade, and estrange that country; and now, in his troubles and his difficulties, he was obliged to go to the unspeakable Turk to help him in the Soudan. It was to be hoped the country would never agree to Suakin being held by any other Power but ourselves. Our great object, it was always understood in Egypt, was to protect our highway to India and our great Australian Colonies; but if any other Power held Suakin, especially a European Power, and if that Power succeeded in occupying Khartoum and other points in the Soudan, that Power would have entire command over the Valley of the Nile, which would give it absolute power over Egypt. The most unwise step the Government had yet taken was the absolute and unconditional evacuation of the Soudan after the enormous sacrifice of human life we had incurred there. The power of the Mahdi was broken, Osman Digna had no following, and would not have, unless we withdrew; and with the Suakin-Berber Railway and very little effort the country might be civilized. When the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War made his statement in reference to the Soudan, he ignored entirely one fact of which the country was proud—that the Army, under the most dispiriting and adverse circumstances, performed duties as arduous as an Army could be called on to perform. They toiled up the Nile, they laboured, they fought, they endured; they showed what a British Army could do. Except by one slight allusion the noble Marquess said nothing of this gallant work. Last year at Tamai and El Teb, and again this year at Abu Klea, Metammeh, Gubat, Baker's Ze-reba, and elsewhere. No body of men in our military history deserved better of their country. Of the Staff he would say nothing. There were good and able men upon it, under the distinguished Leader whose ability was acknowledged. Though some things less pleasant might be said, he would forbear; but the regimental officers of the Army, the Marines, and the officers of the Navy—they, with the men under their command, had shown we still had a regimental system—tho backbone and foundation of our Army. But for the way in which the men rallied round the officers, and formed a square in emergencies, there would have been a very different tale to tell. But nothing of this came from the noble Marquess, and he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) took the opportunity of publicly saying that these men deserved well of their country. To the Staff rewards and promotion were always given; they were always taken care of; but the officers who toiled and went all over the world had but few friends; they were never rewarded as they should be—men who had done such arduous work, with disease and death around them. He had many relations with the Army, but never a complaint had he heard from any officer or man—they were too well disciplined—but it was because he was in favour of doing justice to such men, who not only did honour to, but maintained the honour of their country, that he ventured to call the attention of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War to the manner in which they had done their duty undermost difficult, trying, and dangerous circumstances. Into the question of our position in Afghanistan he would not now enter, except for the purpose of asking a few questions which ho thought might be answered without touching upon those diplomatic proprieties so dear to the right hon. Gentleman. Were we going to assist the Afghans in the defence of Herat? What was to be the boundary of Afghanistan that we were going to maintain; and how were we going to defend the country for the Ameer? They could not forget that the Prime Minister some time ago said, with the full consent of the House, that there could be but one opinion with regard to our policy in Afghanistan, and that was that we should maintain the Dominions of the Ameer intact. That was the view which was taken by the House and ratified by the country; and he should like to know what view the Prime Minister took of the matter at the present moment? The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, in summing up the debate on the evacuation of Candahar in 1881, said— Russia knows perfectly well that any interference, militarily or diplomatically, in Afghanistan means the rupture of friendly relations with this country, and she knows that we hold ourselves justified in resisting such interference by any means in our power, by any means that may he most convenient and most suitable at the time. It is not necessary to say beforehand whether those means would be war in Europe or Asia—war by our own troops, or war by the assistance of Afghan levies."—(3 Mansard,[259] 2022.) What was the position now? Were the Government going to make further concessions, and had we any agreement with the Ameer? We were giving the Ameer large quantities of arms and ammunition, and a large sum of money every month; and the House ought to be informed whether he was under the control of the British Government, and what security we had that he would remain faithful to us, and not go over to Russia? Had we any assurance that those arms and money would not be used against ourselves? Few would deny the difficulties that must perplex the Government; but the Government had the interests of the country in their keeping, and he believed that, up to this moment, the Government had sacrificed those interests. Before the House separated for the Whitsuntide holidays he should like to know what was the exact position of the country with regard to Russia? It was not asking too much to ask for an explanation. The Government were trustees for the honour, dignity, and interests of the country; and unless the House knew the Government's intention, it was helpless to check or advise the Government.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, that, on these occasions, it was very easy to speak de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis,and the hon. and gallant Baronet opposite (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) had certainly done so. He should really like to know how long they were to be told by hon. Gentlemen opposite that the whole of this country was disgraced and degraded'? He could tell them that they were going on the wrong tack. Hon. Gentlemen opposite did not know, and would not endeavour to understand, what was the feeling of the country as regarded the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government. The Conservatives might rage and the Colonels imagine a vain thing; but he contended that, on the whole, the foreign policy of the Government of late had been a very sound one. It was said of the Predecessor of the present Prime Minister that he brought home "peace with honour." Well, the right hon. Gentleman at the head of Her Majesty's Government had now given them peace with honour. [Mr. WARTON: Dishonour.] He had secured to them, he might say, peace with honour; for, had it not been for his exertions in this most difficult question connected with Afghanistan and Russia, he (Mr. Labouchere) was perfectly sure that the howls of the Jingoes in this country and in Russia would have precipitated us into a war which would have cost us a vast number of millions of money, and would have simply secured a miserable strip of steppe which, he gathered, they should learn, when the Blue Books were presented, the Ameer himself did not want. The hon. and gallant Gentleman who spoke last had told them that Ministers were wrong for not staying in the Soudan, and that it was their duty to civilize that country. He (Mr. Labouchere) contended that they had no such duty, either with regard to the Soudan or with regard to any other country on the whole habitable globe. Many hon. Gentlemen on the Ministerial side of the House were somewhat at variance with the Government so long as the Soudan War continued, and they were glad when it was announced that the occupation of the country was to be speedily brought to a close. They hoped nothing would interfere with that intention of the Government, and that, if Suakin could not be handed over to some other Power, at least we should not remain there ourselves, but leave it to the Soudanese, because it happened to belong to them, and not to this country. Then, it had been stated that there had been a disgraceful surrender on the part of this country in the case of The Bosphore Egyptien. He admitted that Lord Granville was wrong at the commencement of that matter; but the noble Earl (Earl Granville) had recognized that he had made a mistake, and he (Mr. Labouchere) did not know what else could be expected of a Minister when he made a mistake but that he should recognize and acknowledge it. It seemed to him that Earl Granville was an exceedingly able diplomatist, and it was remarkable how clever he was in getting out of difficulties, and also how he occasionally got into them. It was pretty clear from the Blue Books that The Bosphore Egyptien was a very objectionable journal. Sir Evelyn Baring had written to Her Majesty's Government to complain of The Bosphore Egyptien, stating that it ought to be suppressed, and Her Majesty's Government had entered into a discussion on the matter with the Government of France, who appeared to have taken up a very reasonable attitude. But, on April 1st, Lord Granville had written to Sir Evelyn Baring stating that, as there would be an opportunity of trying the question by law, he should inform Nubar Pasha that Her Majesty's Government saw no reason for interfering. On the same day a telegram was sent to Sir Evelyn Baring, saying that instructions would be sent to Lord Lyons on the matter, and on the 2nd a despatch to that effect had been sent to Lord Lyons at Paris, who had spoken to M. de Freycinet. But, in the meanwhile, before he got a reply from Lord Lyons as to the consent of Prance, Sir Evelyn Baring had caused this newspaper to be suppressed, and M. de Freycinet had naturally inquired why we had asked him to agree to its suppression, when we had actually suppressed it. Lord Granville should have telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring to tell him to wait before taking action, until he had received a reply from the French Government on the subject. That was an. error of procedure, and one which had arisen merely from Lord Granville not understanding precisely the rights of Frenchmen under the Capitulations. The difference between the Conservatives and the Liberals was this—the Conservatives were habitually seizing every chance they possibly could to get us into trouble, and to promote war with Foreign Powers; whereas the Liberals, when they considered that a mistake had been made, frankly said so, and endeavoured to avoid giving cause for a quarrel. There was one point upon which he would appeal to the Prime Minister, and that was that he would fairly and seriously consider the state of the affairs of Ireland during the Recess, and, if he possibly could, act in the most generous spirit to that country, and not do that which was contrary to the feelings and desire of a very large number of his supporters in the House. Since 1856 exceptional legislation had been passed for Ireland, and, three years ago, the Government had brought into the House the most stringent of all the Coercive Acts, which was passed for a period of three years—a longer time than any Crimes Bill before. The three years were over. The plea in favour of that Crimes Bill was that there were numerous agrarian outrages in Ireland—there were no agrarian outrages at present. Ireland was the most tranquil of Her Majesty's Dominions. Let hon. Gentlemen look at the Returns, and they would find that, with the exception of threatening letters, there were, to all intents and purposes, no agrarian crimes in Ireland. It was perfectly monstrous that the Irish people were to be told that if there were agrarian outrages, that was a reason for a Crimes Act; and that if there were no crimes, that was the effect of the Crimes Act. Whether there were crimes or not, they were wrong to apply this legislation to Ireland. Ministers had done much of a remedial character for Ireland; but they had destroyed the effect of their remedial measures by their perpetual attempts to pass Crimes Bills, and to govern Ireland in this exceptional manner from year to year. So far as he could gather from the speech of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill), which he had read that morning, and which was delivered at some Conservative Club in the neighbourhood, the noble Lord, who occupied a considerable position in the Conservative Party, and who probably would be followed by a considerable number of Conservatives, intended to oppose the Crimes Act tooth and nail. They had heard that there was a strong feeling in the Cabinet against the renewal of the Act; and, taking that feeling with the feeling amongst the Conservatives, it did seem a little ridiculous that they should perpetuate ill-feeling between Ireland and England by endeavouring to pass a few of the clauses of the Act. They were told that owing to the Crimes Act there was no time for other legislation. The Prime Minister replied to his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stockport (Mr. Hopwood) that he could not give him a day for an Affirmation Bill. He (Mr. Labouchere) thought it would be much better that the Crimes Bill should be set aside, and that they should have an Affirmation Bill, so that, at least, in the next Parliament all religious tests should be set aside, and that anyone duly elected by the country should be allowed to take his seat in that House. There was the strongest feeling against the Crimes Bill, certainly in Ireland, and a very strong feeling in England, that there should be an Affirmation Bill, and that the House had acted with considerable injustice towards his Colleague (Mr. Bradlaugh). He would again express the hope that the Prime Minister would, during the Recess, fairly consider the case of Ireland, and that he would, if he possibly could, act in the most generous spirit towards that country, and not do what was contrary to the desire of a very large number of his supporters in this House by renew- ing any single one of the clauses of the Crimes Act.

MR. CHAPLIN

said, that the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Labouchere) had, while accusing his (Mr. Chaplin's) hon. and gallant Friend (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) of discursiveness in his remarks, been somewhat guilty of the same thing himself. The hon. Gentleman had eulogized the peaceful tendencies of a Liberal Government, and condemned the warlike proclivities of a Tory one, accusing them with being guilty of seeking every opportunity to create war. If the hon. Member had studied the history of the wars in which this country had. been engaged during the last 50 years, he would find that out of 29 or 30, 23 or 24 had been made by the Liberal Party, and only about six by the Conservatives. If, when the hon. Member again taunted the Conservatives with rushing into wars, he would bear this fact in mind, it might have some influence upon the accuracy of his statements. With regard to Ireland, it was a rather curious commentary on the policy of the Prime Minister that at the end of 15 years legislation for Ireland he was compelled again to ask Parliament to renew Coercion Acts. They had been told, over and over again, that if Parliament would accede to all the remedial measures which had been proposed for Ireland, all the ills of that country would vanish, and that they would see a totally different state of affairs; but instead of the country becoming more tranquil and more pacified, each Coercion Act seemed to surpass all others in severity; and the truth was that the Prime Minister's Irish policy, like his policy elsewhere, had turned out to be one ghastly and disastrous failure. Many Members of the Tory Party regretted the necessity for these Coercion Acts as much as the hon. Member for Northampton himself, and with him desired most earnestly to see that necessity pass away; but before they could join with the hon. Member in declaring that they intended, under all circumstances, to oppose the Coercion Act tooth and nail, as the hon. Member had said the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) intended to do, they required to hear from Her Majesty's Government, who were responsible for the state of affairs there, what was the precise condition of that country at the present time, and what alarming state of affairs existed that compelled them to renew those Coercion Acts, the necessity for which they all viewed with so much regret. The present state of affairs in Ireland was brought about entirely by the action of the Government, and he hoped that the right hon. Gentleman before the close of the debate would inform the House of the precise condition of the country now, and what were the grave and even terrible reasons, for some such there must have been, which induced them to come again, and at the last moment, to Parliament, with the intimation that it was absolutely necessary in the best interests of the country that exceptional legislation should again take place. What was to be the character of the measure, and when would be the precise time of its introduction? The hon. Member for Northampton said that Ireland was perfectly tranquil at this moment; but, he (Mr. Chaplin) asked, how much of the tranquillity now apparent on the surface was owing to any real or permanent amelioration of the state of that country, and how much of it was owing to the exercise of those very measures the renewal of which the hon. Member denounced? The hon. Member also told them, in regard to the frontier affairs of India, that the Government had definitely secured for the country "peace with honour." He (Mr. Chaplin) said nothing of the honour which was likely to devolve upon the country from these transactions; but he was not aware, nor was the country, or the House, yet aware, that even peace had been secured, whether with honour or dishonour. On the 12th of this month, upon the eve of the division on the last Vote of Censure, the Prime Minister informed the House, in reference to the proceedings between Lord Granville and Lord Kimberley on the one side and the Russian Ambassador on the other, that the effect of those proceedings had been that they had arrived at an agreement which was satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, and satisfactory also to Lord Dufferin and the Council of India. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say, with intense satisfaction, that there had been no time to receive the final ratification of those proceedings on the part of the Prussian Government, but that it was expected certainly from day to day. The House heard that announcement with the greatest gratification, and no doubt it had a very marked effect on the debate which took place on the same night; indeed, he was not at all sure that it did not secure the majority which the Prime Minister had upon that occasion. At all events, it was exactly the announcement which the right hon. Gentleman would have the most satisfaction in making on the eve of a critical division. But what happened? The division over, the majority secured, the right hon. Gentleman came down to the House the next day and said that he had made a mistake—that he had received a communication from the Russian Ambassador in this country, to the effect that the right hon. Gentleman was not at all warranted in having made that statement. Time went on, no answer was received from Russia, and that agreement, which they were told was so satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, to Lord Dufferin, and to Russia, had never yet been ratified. He (Mr. Chaplin) himself, on the 14th inst., asked the right hon. Gentleman whether any answer had been received from the Russian Government as to the proposed agreement; and whether the agreement met with the approval of that Government? The Prime Minister replied that he had no authentic information to give, that communications were proceeding; but he was not aware that they had reached such a result as could be communicated to the House of Commons. The right hon. Baronet the Leader of the Opposition also put some Questions, the answers to which were so unsatisfactory that, on the 16th, he himself asked the right hon. Gentleman when the House would receive the Papers relating to the Penjdeh incident, and reminded him that the House had been previously told that the final ratification of the agreement was expected from day to day. The right hon. Gentleman then replied that he had never stated that he could name a day, within two or three days, when the negotiations would be concluded; but that what he certainly had said was that it would be desirable that the House should have the whole case before them. They would all agree in that. But the right hon. Gentleman had really told the House that the ratification was expected from day to day; and that had undoubtedly warranted the hon. Member for Northampton in his belief that peace had been secured. It was only another mistake of the right hon. Gentleman. But the agreement had not even now—a fortnight later—been ratified; and they had a right, before the adjournment, to know whether the Prime Minister since he made the statement had received so much as a reply from the Russian Government. If the Government had received a reply, what was the nature of it? He asked the Prime Minister to take the House, for once, into his confidence, and to state exactly how the position stood as to this agreement. Was that agreement accepted by the Russian Government or was it not? Had the right hon. Gentleman any hope that it would be accepted; or was it only another of those arrangements which were unconfirmed, and which were not likely to be confirmed, though they waited until the day of doom? He entreated the Prime Minister to tell them what were the prosspects of that arrangement, which about a fortnight ago he spoke of with such confidence, being ratified by the Russian Government, and peace being finally secured. They now learned that the Guards had been stopped by the orders of Her Majesty's Government at Alexandria; and the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, when questioned in the House on the subject, said that it was not desirable to give any information as to the reasons for that step. When the Conservative Government were in power, they were taunted day by day with the concealment of their policy, and withholding information on every occasion. It was therefore rather a strong thing for one of the authors of those taunts now to get up in his place and, when asked the Question in such critical circumstances, to say—"It is true the Guards have been stopped at Alexandria, and that for a very important reason; but we decline altogether to tell you anything further about it." The fact was, the authors of those taunts were themselves adopting the course they accused their opponents of following. Turning to the subject of the suppression of The Bosphore Egyptien, Her Majesty's Government, after due deliberation, either suppressed or agreed to the suppression of that newspaper. Within the last few hours, however, they had learnt that, either with or without their consent, that newspaper had been reissued, and re-issued under circumstances not very different from those under which it was published before. When asked a Question on that point not long ago, the right hon. Gentleman said that although the proceedings had to some extent been illegal, and although he was willing to make some apology and some reparation to the French Government, yet that, as far as the re-issuing of the paper was concerned, nothing of the kind would occur. The hon. Member for Northampton said that Lord Granville had probably made a mistake, and it was right to acknowledge it. Lord Granville appeared always to be doing nothing but making mistakes. If Her Majesty's Government was right in suppressing The Bosphore Egyptien they were plainly wrong in allowing it to be re-issued. That was only another of those instances, unhappily so numerous of late, in which the Government had placed the country in a position in which it had to undergo nothing but unnecessary humiliation, and it was also one upon which the House and the country desired further information. Although they might be able to keep their mechanical majority in that House probably till the end of that Session, they might be sure that the blunders and humiliations which were following each other so rapidly day by day would entail upon them, he hoped at no distant day, the severe and bitter condemnation of the country.

MR. GLADSTONE

Various appeals have been made to me, in successive speeches, ranging over a very wide field, and I ought to take some note of those appeals, although they are, in some cases, of a character to which it is impossible to render a full reply. I observe the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down taunts the "mechanical majority" on this side of the House. He has borrowed that epithet, and uses it in the way of tu quoque, having obtained it, not from the wealth of his own resources, but from the history of a former Parliament. In that—the former—Parliament the epithet was applied to a majority which never saw fit to abandon the Government, or place it in a minority. Is that the case with the majority in the present Parliament? ["Yes!"] It is nothing of the kind, Why, Sir. the hon. Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce), who contradicts me, was himself the triumphant Mover of a Motion of great importance, leading to a controversy of the most serious character, in which the Government had been placed, by the defection of a large number of their independent Friends, in a minority. They have been habitually placed in such minorities; and yet the hon. Member is surprised that I should say the application of the epithet "mechanical majority" to a majority the Members of which exercise their independent judgment, to the great inconvenience, unquestionably, of the Government which in general they so generously support, is not a proper application. That is not a mechanical majority; that is a majority which considers the grounds on which it stands, a majority which endeavours to weigh questions according to their merits. I must hero observe upon the great disadvantage of the inequality upon which discussions of this kind are carried on. The hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) made a speech of the wildest declamation. Every opinion of the hon. and gallant Gentleman was received with silence and respect on this side of the House; but the moment an hon. Gentleman on this side of the House rises and begins to utter, in much more guarded language, opposite opinions, he is met with jeers, laughter, and cries and interruptions of one description and another. Mark me, that this state of things is too likely to grow habitual. I shall probably never refer to it again. I think I have noticed it sufficiently already, and you may rely upon it that the references which I have made to it will be themselves referred to in future years. Both the hon. Gentlemen who last spoke have made appeals to me in reference to Ireland. The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down says that the policy of the Government for the last 15 years has been a perfect failure. I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman at all. I will not now refer to a matter which he says ought to be produced in the debate to-night, but which, I think, ought not to be produced in the debate—I mean the matter of proposing legislation with respect to the present state of Ireland with regard to crimes and outrage, and with regard to the confidence felt by society at large in the maintenance of order and the prosecution of the common pursuits of life.

MR. CHAPLIN

I beg pardon; what I said ought to be produced were the reasons of the Government for the necessity of re-introducing coercion measures.

MR. GLADSTONE

No doubt; but this is not the time, in my opinion, for producing the reasons which the Government may have even for proposing any legislation at all with respect to Ireland, or for proposing that legislation in the form in which they will bring it forward. We do not admit the failure of the legislation which has been attempted. It is not for me to say how long it may be before the woes and evils of Ireland, due to so many generations and to so many? centuries of misgovernment and oppression, may be removed; but it is for me to say that progress has been made, and progress of a most important kind. The poison of religious ascendancy, the bitterest and the most virulent of all poisons, has been expelled from Irish life. In my opinion, that is a great achievement and a great advantage gained, and never, I hope, to be lost and surrendered. But I have another opinion, which may seem strange to the hon. Gentleman. In my opinion, the happiness of the masses of the people, the faculty they possess of insuring by their industry some decent return, sufficient to keep body and soul together, sufficient to lift them above the lowest level of human misery, is a consideration of the greatest and most vital importance. I firmly say that, so far as depends on law, never in any country within the same time has greater progress been made than has been made by legislation of this House with respect to Ireland during the last four years. I am not in the slightest degree afraid of the taunts of the hon. Gentleman; I am far from denying that there is much to desire, and much to cure; but I meet his taunts with courage and with confidence. The hon. Gentleman says that it is a dreadful thing that we should renew the Coercion Act. I am not sure what the hon. Member means by the Coercion Act. He is speaking of a Bill of which he knows nothing; and I have not described this Bill as a Coercion Act.

MR. CHAPLIN

I beg pardon. The right hon. Gentleman has announced his intention of renewing whatever may be valuable and equitable in the Prevention of Crime Act; and he would not say that there is anything in it that is not valuable or that is inequitable.

MR. GLADSTONE

If the hon. Member refers to my words, let him quote them with accuracy. My words were that there were various provisions of the Prevention of Crime Act which, in our opinion, were valuable and were equitable; that we had embodied them in a Bill, and that we intended to propose them to Parliament. I did not say they were coercive provisions; nor shall I now say anything on the subject whether they are coercive provisions or not. The time for us to explain them, and the time for the House to appreciate them, will appear very soon—I hope shortly after the Whitsuntide Recess. The hon. Gentleman asked at what time such a measure will be introduced, and that is the best satisfaction I can give him. He will then be able to form his own judgment, like all other Members of this House. The hon. Gentleman makes an appeal to history, and says that in the last 50 years only six or seven wars have been made by the Conservative Party. The hon. Gentleman appears entirely to forget that until within the last 20 or 25 years, or something like that period, the Conservative Party were the Peace Party in this country. Has he seen no change in the tone of the Conservative Party of late years, as compared with what it was? Does he think that the tone of his own Party at this moment, or at any time during the last 10 or 15 years, is the same tone as that of Sir Robert Peel, the tone of the Earl of Aberdeen, or the tone of the Duke of Wellington? The tone of his Party has undergone a complete and fundamental revolution; and it appears to be the object of too many Gentlemen on that side of the House to make the principal part of their political pursuits to stir up passions between nations, and not to allay them. The hon. Gentleman, perhaps, recollects the attitude of the present Conservative Party—but I decline to identify the present Conservative Party—on the subject of Denmark. Were the speeches then made speeches of a character to promote peace between the two countries? The hon. Gentleman, perhaps, recollects the attitude of the Party during the time of the American Civil War. Was that an attitude which tended to peace? He cannot form any just estimate of the question how far it is possible to distribute praise and blame in respect of the war between the one Party and the other; and especially he cannot appropriate to himself the character and the proceeds of the policy for the last 50 years without taking into view the enormous change that has taken place in the policy, conduct, and attitude of his Party. The hon. Gentleman refers to the last 10 years. In my opinion that is a matter too large for discussion at this moment; but I am ready to maintain the same argument. There is not a difficulty in which we have been involved during the last five years—I agree there have been many; I will not claim that we have always been right in judgment in dealing with them; I think the strong probability is that we have made various and serious errors—but not one of those difficulties was of our own creation. In our policy we have never made claim to an ambitious foreign policy; we have endeavoured to cope, as we could, with the circumstances which we found. I rejoice to say in many cases we have succeeded; but I admit there are other cases in which success is either far distant or incomplete. [A laugh.] I see no matter for laughing; and yet no person can be blamed, no creature of the Almighty can be blamed, either for utterance or action which is most congenial to him, and I cannot blame the application of laughter—which may appear to me most unsuitable—in those who find it most congenial to their own character. Reference has been made by the hon. Gentleman, and by my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) to The Bosphore Egyptien, and it appears to me that my hon. Friend is not quite accurate in his reference to that newspaper. Our desire has been, while we are in Egypt, to afford to the Egyptian Government to the best of our power all the advice which was sought by them, but in no case to interfere with their action, unless we found that it was an imperative necessity of their requirements. Under that imperative necessity it was that we made a very strong interference indeed with Egyptian action in regard to the Soudan, and which led to the resignation of Cherif Pasha and a change of Government. Our rule has been to avoid such interference, and especially to avoid anything like pressure or compulsory interference; because we desired to leave Egypt as far as possible, and even now, to govern itself. With respect to The Bosphore Egyptien, the case is this. The Egyptian Government believed that a certain publication in The Bosphore Egyptien was incompatible with peace and order in Egypt. They asked Sir Evelyn Baring's advice; lie could not object to that opinion of theirs; he referred them to us, and we could not refuse to approve of it. We could not undertake the responsibility of saying to the Egyptian Government—"You ought to tolerate this offence and do nothing." That is the extent of Earl Granville's responsibility, and the extent of the responsibility of the present Government; but, still, the legality of the proceedings was not a question brought before us at that time, and it was not a question as to whether it was our duty, or in our power, to institute a minute investigation. It is said—"But you associated yourselves with the regret which you invited the Egyptian Government to express when it was found that the proceedings had been illegal." The hon. Gentleman calls it "a slight illegality." "A slight illegality," indeed! Let me tell the hon. Gentleman that in matters when the law happens to be international it is not so easy to define what is "slight illegality" and what is not "slight illegality." The proceedings were illegal; and, under the circumstances, we advised the expression of regret, and we associated ourselves with that expression, for we were unwilling to bring upon the Egyptian Government too great pressure, and to place it in a position of such disadvantage as it would have been in if it had had to make that expression alone. Our object was not to measure minutely, not to argue jealously, to show the limited nature of our own interference. Our object was to reduce to a minimum the evil which we felt must result from the error that had been committed. That is the state of the case.

MR. CHAPLIN

What about the reissue of the paper?

MR. GLADSTONE

I am coming to that, if you will allow me. We can only entertain one thing at a time. With respect to the re-issue, I must postpone any definite declaration beyond that which I made to-day to the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote)—I am not quite certain whether the words ascribed to me with regard to the reissue were exactly those I used; but, undoubtedly, I think that as they paid attention to the declaration of the Government the House would have been justified in expecting that the re-issue of the paper should not have been arrived at at so early a period as appears to have been the case. Upon that question there may arise a case for further explanation at a future time. I stated across the Table to-day that it was now itself a subject of inquiry; but it was quite a proper subject to press, and it is one which may be of importance. I will not attempt to define it now. I certainly will not say anything now which can in any way aggravate the difficulties that exist. I quite admit that at the proper time—and that proper time will be when we meet again after the Recess—an account must be rendered by us as to the position in which we stand with regard to the re-issue of The Bosphore Egyptian. This I must, however, say in justice to the French Government—that at the commencement of the correspondence the French Government entirely declined to associate themselves with any resistance to the legal action of the Egyptian Government in putting down The Bosphore Egyptien, and disclaimed all fellowship with the tone which it was supposed to have adopted. The hon. Gentleman who commenced this debate defied me to state a great many things. If the time of the House allowed I should be perfectly ready to state every one of those things which he defied me, to state. He said he had never known a time when so little information was given, and so slowly, as recently. I have never known a time when so much information was given, and so rapidly. Looking back at the last few weeks, and at the pressure which has been brought to bear upon us to produce some part of the Russian Correspondence, my impression is that perhaps the public interest might have been better served if we had maintained greater reserve. [Laughter, and "Hear, hear!"] That is my deliberate opinion. There is one appeal of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) on which I think he is entitled to an answer, and I give myself the pleasure of speaking with cordial sympathy and approval of one portion of his speech.—I wish there were more—as I know my noble Friend the Secretary of State for War would if he were now addressing the House. I allude to his references to the British. Army; and I am also very glad that in comparing one class of British officers with another, he should have made it his special duty to bring to notice the great and honourable claims on the score of services which belong to the regimental officers and those less in the way than Staff officers of the notice of persons in Office. I thank the hon. and gallant Gentleman for that; and I can assure him that the Government are not sluggish in recognizing the merits of the Army, which have never been more conspicuous than at present. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said we spent three months in choosing between the Nile route and the Suakin-Berber route. That is true; but he did not mention that the months which we thus spent were months when we could not send an Expedition, when we had not the evidence on which to decide, and when the season would not have justified any Expedition being then sent. But the hon. and gallant Gentleman is chiefly anxious to know how matters stand between ourselves and Russia. The hon. Gentleman who last sat down refers to expressions of mine in which I stated in certain terms, which I cannot precisely repeat—but, no doubt, he gave the substance of thorn—that an agreement had boon substantially arrived at—that, I believe, was the phrase used—between the Representatives of Russia on one side, and Earl Granville and the Earl of Kimberley upon the other; and the hon. Gentleman charitably says—in the spirit of that charity which believeth all things, only, unhappily, it happens to believe them on the wrong side in cases of this kind—the hon. Gentleman charitably says that that was stated in order to obtain votes in a division. But, Sir, it was exactly the wrong way to obtain votes. Setting out the activity of our exertions to secure peace may have been a way to obtain votes of which we could have believed ourselves to be already sure; because I believe that the Party on this side of the House knew that we had done our best. But certainly it did not appear to be the right way to obtain votes on the other side of the House; for, unless I am very much mistaken, it was on that night that the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) rose and delivered a most deplorable jeremiad upon the degradation to which the Government had submitted in consequence of the concessions it had made to Russia. I must leave the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock and the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire to settle that matter between them. Butthen, says the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire—"You had to come down next day and say that all you had said was wrong, and to give the Russian version of the proceedings, which was entirely different from yours."

MR. CHAPLIN

I did not say that. What I attributed to you was that you had said that there had been no time to receive a final ratification of this agreement on the part of the Russian Government, but that it was certainly expected from day to day, and then I complained that we had heard nothing further of that ratification from that day to this.

MR. GLADSTONE

The hon. Gentleman said more than that. He said I had to read or state an account of the matter given by the Russian Ambassador, which was at variance with the account I had given. There was no variance whatever. It did not contain everything that was in my account; but it stated still more strongly than either Earl Granville or I had done that the agreement had been arrived at. I quite agree that there was a confident expectation that what I had carelessly called a ratification, and what I next day called the approval of the Russian Government, would be received almost from day to day. I think that I was justified in using those words at that time. That they have been borne out completely by what has happened I will not say. The proceedings have not been so rapid as we could have desired; but I suppose that there are in Russia—as we sometimes suppose there are in this country—powerful, influential persons and classes who do not make it their object to promote the harmony of nations. I fear that a great struggle has been going on in Russia between those parties and the more prudent and, as I think, the more patriotic members of society and Representatives of Office in Russia, who, I suppose, are liable to exactly the same battery of accusations as certain persons are exposed to here. We are constantly being told that we are sacrificing the interests of the country, and are truckling to Foreign States. That is what I believe is also going on in Russia; and I do hope the hon. Member and those among whom he sits will consider a little in the speeches they make and in the Questions they put, and will be put upon their guard against the danger of strengthening the hands of that party in Russia, whom I may regard, and which possibly the world at large may regard, as least likely of all the subjects of Russia, either to promote its honour or to maintain its interests. I cannot tell the hon. Gentleman when that agreement will be accepted. I expect it from day to day. But I can say that we are pursuing, I think with steadiness, a policy which I have described as a national policy, agreed upon by a long tradition of statesmen, and, as I think, sanctioned by the general concurrence of all parties. The hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) asks whether we can trust the Ameer? I presume the hon. and gallant Member does not attribute to those whom he thinks incompetent to manage the affairs of the country the gift of omniscience, or that by some Apostolic prerogative we can read the interior of the heart of the Ameer, or anybody else. We must trust to external sources and to such rational means as are at our command. Using such rational means to the best of our power, we must not strain them beyond what they will reasonably bear; and, acting on that view, in our judgment the action of the Ameer has been such as is not likely to add to the difficulties now before the House. The hon. and gallant Gentleman, no doubt, well knows that there are other things to be considered in Afghanistan besides the Ameer. The Throne of the Ameer is not always very firmly founded. I do not want to refer to the past; but under happier circumstances, in recent times, it might have been more firmly founded than it is. I believe that the sentiments of the people of that country are a most important element in the case; and we shall do all that we can to produce harmony and friendship in their sentiments towards us, and all that belongs to us. That is all that it is in our power to do; but I do not think justice will permit us to cast the smallest taint of suspicion on the words or acts of the Ameer at this important and difficult juncture. The hon. and gallant Gentleman asks about the boundary that is to be, and when the negotiations will conclude. I am not able to tell him. I cannot predict what the exact course of Russia may be with respect to one point or another. But if it will give some satisfaction to the hon. and gallant Gentleman, I. will refer to the passage he read, and which my noble Friend the Secretary of State for War laid down as a sound doctrine of policy for the management of this question. I am not aware that my noble Friend or any Member of the Government has exhibited any disposition to recede from those doctrines. Beyond that I cannot undertake to say at what precise date these negotiations will come to a close. But I do not wish to spread alarm in the country. We are so accustomed to telegraphic machinery and to the astounding and incredible rapidity with which transactions are made known that we suppose the brains of men have quickened their movements in the same proportion. That is not the ease. Unfortunately, the brains of men are not stronger—I sometimes fear they are rather weaker—in proportion to the hurry and confusion that now attend the transaction of business, and the incessant multiplication of reports and rumours which distract the mind of the public. But it must be considered that, after all, the time occupied in the transmission of information is small, though the time occupied in deliberation may have been great, and I trust that hon. Gentlemen will have some patience I will not in the least degree blame the Russian Government for the time they are now taking. I believe that that country really labours at times under the same disadvantage, from want of adequate information and good maps, that we have done; but I will say that when the House comes to compare the dates of the different transactions and the different communications, they will see reason to believe that we have not been deficient in promptitude in the answers which we sent, because our views and the bases of our action have been clear. The objects we hold up before us are simple, honourable, and well known; and as our principles of action are principles easily defended and difficult indeed to renounce, so the application of these principles does not involve a great many questions of difficulty. One word more. The hon. and gallant Member says that this Government is so liable to be squeezed, and that this is well known abroad. Well, the hon. and gallant Member had only to go one step further in order to come up fully to the level of the argument that I saw a few days ago in a daily paper of great influence and ability, which I will not name, because I think that it is very seldom that it writes such folly and nonsense. But that article, deliberately founded on this principle, illustrated and dilated and expanded this proposition—that the Government of this country was so weak that the Russian Government had only to persevere—[Mr. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT: Hear, hear!"]—aye, there goes the hon. Member for Eye—that they had only to persevere, they had only to hold out, and they will get everything they want. That sentiment is cheered by the hon. Member for Eye. I am not sure that the influence of the hon. Member on the action of the Russian Government will be very great; but if I did think so, then I would endeavour to answer his cheer, and say—"What in the world can be less agreeable to the dictates of wise patriotism than to tell a foreign country, with which your own Government is wrestling in a great conflict, that that Foreign Government has only to be strong, only to persevere, only to hold fast to its purpose, to gain everything it wants?" Such language, we are told, forsooth! is a form of patriotism. I know very well it is a great temptation to stir up lively and emphatic cheers. We may all have fallen into it on occasions; but let us remember that there is something else. You may be tempted to arouse those cheers. You may be tempted to say things because they wound your adversary and give pain. I do not think your adversary has any reason to complain; but do take care in these speeches that you do not wound your country and weaken its position in the assertion of its honour and the maintenance of its interests.

MR. GIBSON

The Prime Minister has stated that the policy of the Government and the principles upon which that policy is conducted are simple, and honourable, and well known. That is one of the most remarkable descriptions ever yet given of the Government policy. It is not the description given by any one of the supporters of the Government, by any Ministerial organ, or by the Continental Press. The Prime Minister reproved those who say that other countries have only to "be strong, persevere, and hold fast," in order to obtain all that they want. What right has the right hon. Gentleman to be ironical in using those phrases? I will ask when have the Government of this country proved that they are "strong," that they have "perseverance," and that they know how to "hold fast?" What right or title has the right hon. Gentleman to irony in this connection? Why, from hour to hour and week to week the Government change their policy? We heard yesterday that the Guards had been stopped at Alexandria. To-day we expected to be told that they have been allowed to go on, and tomorrow we may expect to be told that they have been allowed to go back again. Only this morning, Papers were published which shed a lurid light on the infinite power of change and the instability of purpose of the Government. Those Papers contain a despatch from Lord Wolseley commenting on the good deeds of the men who came to render us service from Canada, and expressing the hope that they would prove themselves useful, before the year should come to an end, in an Expedition down the Nile. Well, the contents of these Papers, only distributed this morning, have now become ancient history in consequence of the change of policy of the Government. Consider what the Prime Minister now says with regard to Russia. A moment ago the hon. Gentleman the Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) pointed out how a few days ago the Prime Minister intimated that we had a right to expect the completion of the agreement with Russia from day to day, it was so imminent. To-day, however, the right hon. Gentleman did not venture to tell us how soon we may expect the ratification or conclusion of the agreement. Will any occupant of the Treasury Bench repeat to-day, after an interval of 10 days, the words which the Prime Minister used so readily when he last spoke upon this subject? Have we yet got any clear indication from the speech of the right hon. Gentleman just now of what is to be submitted to the arbitrator who has not yet been found? What is the agreement between this country and Russia? I do not know. The Prime Minister embarked to-day upon a now question at Question time. Formerly, he stated that it was the interpretation of the sacred contract that was to be submitted to the arbitrator. To-day, he states that it is not a question of the grammatical construction of the terms of the agreement, but something outside, and I am waiting with great curiosity to read what it is in to-morrow's papers. I should like to have it put into something like definite, plain English what is the point that is to be, in the present opinion of the Government, submitted as the duty of a capable and independent arbitrator. In a sentence endeavouring to convey a heavy charge against some parties in this House, the Prime Minister said—"There is a struggle in Russia, to which there is an analogy in this country, between those who are favourable to peace and those who are not favourable to it, and there are people in Russia who charge their Government with trucking to Foreign States." I do not believe anyone in Russia makes a charge so patently absurd. What sane man would at this time of clay, make the statement that the Russian Government have for one solitary second, in any despatch with which we are at the present moment conversant, done anything or said anything which could be tortured by anyone into a readiness to truckle—to England, at all events? The right hon. Gentleman objects to our saying that his Government has been "squeezed." Well, I do not believe in harsh language, but I believe in fair language. How on earth are we otherwise to describe the action of the Government? Was there ever a Government that dismissed a House of Commons for the Whitsuntide Recess in circumstances of greater doubt, greater anxiety, and uncertainty? The only thing we know absolutely is that ill almost every episode of their policy in which they could be squeezed they have exhibited an almost infinite capacity of squeezability. The Prime Minister in his speech dwelt on other topics, though I will not go into them in detail. He referred to the first origin of the phrase "mechanical majority." I will not go into that, but will merely pass on with this general statement, which no independent Liberal in this House will deny, that but for the "mechanical action" of the Government majority voting in silence, and often with heads be wed, the Government would have been out half-a-dozen times during the last two years. I shall not follow the Prime Minister, even in his guarded statement with respect to Ireland. I have ever taken, on that subject, as far as possible, a non-Party view, or what I conceive to be such. I have considered, for myself, what the best interests of the country required, and I have acted on my own conscientious views of what those interests were. The Prime Minister says that the conclusions of the Government have been embodied in a Bill. Those are his words, not mine. I have only to say that when the conclusions of the Government have advanced to that final stage that they are embodied in a Bill it is to be regretted that they are not submitted to the House in a way which would put an end to the cavil which has surrounded the Notice of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), which is suggested to have been put forward to strengthen one side of the Cabinet against the other in the controversy that is taking place. The Prime Minister went back on a point unworthy of him—I mean unworthy of a man of his ability. He went back on the stupid, foolish, old point, now worn threadbare, that not one of these difficulties were of their own creation. Surely, at this time of day it is silly childishness to talk to us in that way. What is the policy in the Soudan—reckless, wild, criminal as it has been—been guided by? What is answerable for what was done in the Soudan but your own miserable infirmity of purpose? You sent your Forces to the Soudan to slaughter madly, recklessly, criminally, unless you had a policy worthy of being accomplished by such unworthy ends; and then you withdrew without having accomplished anything except the loss of thousands of human lives and the expenditure of millions of money. Why, every week that you remained undecided you were answerable for the bloodshed and appalling sufferings of the unfortunate Soudanese. The last attack made by General Graham, about which the Secretary of State for War sent a telegram of congratulation, was an appalling episode if it was not a part of a campaign, and would have been prevented if you had made up your minds the day before instead of the day after. The Prime Minister said, with reference to the Soudan, that the Government were not too late, because they were making up their minds for three months. I dealt with that subject on a former occasion, and I will not go into it again; but I leave it now with this open statement—which is notorious—that Lord Wolseley pressed you again and again to act, months and weeks before you took his advice, and the consequence of your culpable incapacity and inability to make up your minds was the death of General Gordon, and all the deplorable events which followed. I make that statement in the presence of the Secretary of State for War, because it is notorious that the Government were not supported by the authority of any of their capable military advisers. Against advice and warning they deliberately held back; and thus they are answerable for the weeks and months of delay which cannot possibly be thrown on the shoulders of other persons, and but for which Sir Charles Wilson might not have arrived a few hours too late at Khartoum. I will not go into the suggestion as to the non-responsibility of the Government for their action as to Afghanistan. What is the use of putting the right hon. Gentleman and his able Colleagues into Office and giving them full power for five years if they go now through the country crying, like children—"We are not answerable for our own actions; we are unable, after five years of Office, to assume the responsibility of reasonable men?" The Prime Minister made the remarkable statement that at no time in the history of the country was information given so much and so quickly. No one has a greater respect for the Prime Minister than I have. We know him; but one may venture to say, with great respect, that when he speaks in that way he pre- sumes a little on his own position and on our credulity. We have been endeavouring, helplessly, anxiously, after sleepless nights, to wrest some information from the Government, and we have always been baffled by the Prime Minister giving us information not quickly, and certainly not much. The Prime Minister passed on to The Bosphore Egyptien,and he dealt with the subject in a curious way. I have read the Papers, and read them with much attention. They are extremely easy to understand—it is almost impossible to misrepresent the facts or misconceive them. Sir Evelyn Baring, our own officer, an able man, the real Governor of Egypt—for there is no good at this time of day in dealing with shams, and saying that we are only to make suggestions and give advice—Sir Evelyn Baring said, in clear and unmistakable language, that this was a paper which could not be tolerated, as it habitually published false news about the Soudan. On March 29th, after asking whether Nubar Pasha could count on the diplomatic support of Her Majesty's Government, he wrote— I am of opinion that Nubar Pasha should be supported, for I do not think that in the present state of public feeling the misrepresentations of the French Press can be tolerated any longer without danger to the public tranquillity. These are the words used by our own Agent. On April 11, Lord Lyons, writing to Earl Granville, used even stronger words. He stated that the cause of the suppression of The Bosphore Egyptien was the appearance in it of an incendiary Proclamation from the Mahdi, and that the publication of such matter as the paper contained could not be tolerated. Nothing could be stronger or plainer than that; in fact, the advice of both Sir Evelyn Baring and Lord Lyons was that the newspaper should be suppressed. That suppression received the deliberate sanction of the Government. [Interruption.]That interruption conveys with greater clearness what I want to bring out in naked simplicity, that the Government and the country is distinctly responsible for what was done in Cairo, and that it is a perfect sham to try and throw the responsibility upon Nubar Pasha and the Egyptian Government. On the 5th of May it was distinctly stated by our Ambassador at Paris that the newspaper was suppressed by lawful decree of the Egyptian Government, and that the British Government gave its distinct sanction to the act on the grounds laid before it. There can be no doubt about that. The Prime Minister has argued that the British Government were bound to give their advice when it was asked for, and were bound to answer the question submitted to them at the time, and in that manner he has endeavoured to evade the responsibility. That is not the true position of the case. Our Agent in Egypt, Sir Evelyn Baring, gave the grounds on which we acted, and our Ambassador at Paris stated that no civilized Government could sanction the continuance of the newspaper, and that the Egyptian Government was proceeding in the matter with the distinct sanction of Her Majesty's Government. There is no going back from that. It is absolutely clear and distinct. Under the circumstances, I have a right to ask Her Majesty's Government this—Why did they not take advice before giving their distinct sanction to the suppression of this newspaper? Surely they must have known perfectly well that the state of the law in Egypt was very involved in such a state of facts, and that it required an examination of Egyptian and, possibly, of Ottoman law and of the Capitulations, to decide whether or not the suppression was legal. We know that the Government afterwards took legal advice; but it was then too late. Why did they not take legal advice in time, so that there might be no illegality about what the Egyptian Government was doing? I think that is an observation I have a right to make. The consequence of what they have done has been to involve the Egyptian Government in a position not calculated to give it strength. It is also calculated to put our Government in a degrading position in Egypt. By sanctioning what the Egyptian Government did we have associated ourselves in the submission of the Egyptian Government to the demand of a Foreign Power which did its best, under the circumstances, to humiliate the Egyptian Government and the English Government that sanctioned its proceedings. In answer to a Question of the Leader of the Opposition on the 5th of May, the Prime Minister stated that the paper was not to be re-issued. He said— A question may arise as to the method of suppressing the newspaper, but the re-issue of the paper is not included in the arrangement. Nothing can be more absolutely clear than that statement. Well, what is the present position? We know that that statement has not been carried out. The "agreement," if the Prime Minister chooses to use the word, the arrangement, the assurance, or the sacred covenant of the French Government, or whatever it was, has not been carried out. It has been distinctly broken, and the paper was reissued last night. The noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has said that the paper was to be watched and looked after on the part of the Government, and, if necessary, again suppressed. It was stated that, notwithstanding its suppression, it might, if necessary, be re-issued. Surely that is not a necessary state of things. The paper has not erred once, or twice, or three times, but many times; and now, contrary to the statement of the Prime Minister, it has been re-issued without one solitary guarantee as to its future good conduct. Suppose this paper is again suppressed on some question of political criticism, and the French Government differ with Her Majesty's Government on the question, there is then an issue between two Great Powers. We have an issue now between England and Russia, and this paper may, at any time, cause one to arise between France and England. Would that be another subject to be submitted to another independent arbitrator? There is another point, as to which we have no information. We know from the newspapers that the Representatives of Germany, France, Austria, and Russia have waited upon Nubar Pasha, and have informed him that they have received orders from their Governments to protest against the illegality of the Decree of the 14th of April, imposing a reduction of 5 per cent on the coupons. What steps are going to be taken in that matter? We are now on the eve of adjourning for the Whitsuntide Recess, and we do not know what steps are to be taken on that subject. The English Government sanctioned the Decree of the Khedive of the 11th of April, putting the tax on the coupons. England again will be put in the humiliatting position of recalling the Decree, and reversing that state of facts. Have Her Majesty's Government yet considered and decided what they will do in consequence of the difficulties which have arisen? Before the Easter Recess we were coerced into giving a Vote on finance with reference to Egypt by being told that bankruptcy was a question of hours and days. On the strength of that the British House of Commons was coerced into doing what no European Power has yet been called upon to consider; and under the pressure of the English Government and the debates in this Parliament the Khedive, poor man was called upon to issue the Decree of the 14th of April, and to put into operation the Government view of the financial agreement. Now, the poor Khedive—this independent man—who has only a right to ask for advice and take it or not as he pleases, will be bound tomorrow, or the day after, to reverse the Decree, and upset the entire arrangement, so far as we know. I want to know have Her Majesty's Government decided how they will cope with this difficulty? Do they intend to retire altogether from the financial proposal? I daresay they might do so without any loss to Egypt or to England. There is one point of good argury in this frightful mass of confusion in which the present Government have involved the country. The Government will be compelled to make up their mind very soon as to whether they will assume the responsibility that lies upon them in Egypt, or whether they will submit and surrender all their rights in Egypt to be dealt with by all the European nations. That is a very serious question, and a question they might very rapidly decide; and I do hope that to-night, before this debate closes, we shall hear from some Minister something like a statement as to the conditions on which The Bosphore Egyptienis to be allowed to appear in future; whether those conditions are to be found in any document; what that document is; why it has not been included in the Papers laid on the Table; and whether it can now be stated and submitted to the judgment of Parliament; and, with reference to this Decree to which I have referred, and the protest of the four Great European Powers whose names I have given, what steps the Government have taken, or intend to take; or whether, indeed, they have yet considered what decision they are likely to arrive at?

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

I really do not wish to detain the House; but I think it is somewhat remarkable, after the direct and fair appeal of my right hon. and learned Friend, that there is no word of reply from the Treasury Bench. My right hon. and learned Friend has raised in the course of the latter part of his speech two questions of very great and pressing importance. He has alluded to circumstances which are fresh in all our minds. He has alluded to the position of affairs in Egypt, and he has asked questions of Her Majesty's Government as to the position of those affairs, and as to the way, so far as they are able to announce it to the House, in which they intend to deal with them. Let me take the last point raised by my right hon. and learned Friend. Sir, on the question of the International Guarantee of the Egyptian Loan, no one can deny the accuracy of the statement of my right hon. and learned Friend that we were practically coerced by Her Majesty's Government in April last into voting our share of the International Guarantee on their statement of imminent bankruptcy in Egypt and the terrible circumstances that would arise unless we acceded to that request. We know, for it is a matter of notoriety, that in not one single Parliament of Europe except our own has this question yet been considered, and that, so far as we can tell, no European Government has taken any active steps to carry out that arrangement. Indeed, so far from taking any active steps to carry out the arrangement, they have actually appealed to the Khedive of Egypt to revoke that part of it which was all that we received in return for that International Guarantee. What, then, do Her Majesty's Government intend to do in that state of affairs? Have they any hope that this arrangement will be carried into effect'? What advice have they given the Khedive on the subject, or have they given him any advice at all? Is this Decree to be revoked with the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, or without it; and what is the position of affairs in this important matter? Sir, I trust that before this Motion is finally agreed to, we may have such an answer as I think this House is entitled to have from the Government to the questions of my right hon. and learned Friend. We are adjourning for a fortnight, and surely it is reasonable that we should ask Her Majesty's Government, without wishing them to tell us anything which may be injurious to the Public Service, to assure us, if they can, that their policy in this matter will be carried into effect, and that this undertaking will not be thrown aside as mere waste-paper.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I should have risen before to reply to the questions of the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Gibson) if I had not conceived that they had been practically answered, in anticipation, by my right hon. Friend at the head of the Government. The right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) stated that the Opposition was coerced into supporting the arrangement made with regard to the International Guarantee.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

No; I said the House was coerced.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

The House was coerced! That is a very different thing. Eight hon. Gentlemen opposite have no right to say they were coerced. They voted against the arrangement; and, therefore, I think they can hardly now complain of being coerced into supporting it when they did all they could to resist it, and endeavoured to overthrow it and the Government at the same time. Now, as to the questions of the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite. I think he a little misapprehended the position of the Government with reference to The Bosphore Egyptien.He stated that the English Government had been a party to the determination of the Egyptian Government to suppress The Bosphore Egyptien.Well, that is perfectly true; and he says that the suppression was illegal, and asks why the Government did not take advice before they became parties to the transaction, which would have shown that it was illegal?

MR. GIBSON

I said the method in which the suppression was carried out was illegal.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

We could not take advice beforehand as to the manner in which the suppression would be carried out, because we did pot know what method would be adopted. We were never asked about the closing of the Press. That was the illegal part of the transaction, and we could not take advice on it, because we had no knowledge whatever that that particular method would be adopted. That illegal method of carrying out a proceeding legal in itself was the unfortunate circumstance which has led to all the present embarrassments. Then the right hon. and learned Gentleman will also see that, if an illegal act has been done, it is impossible to make conditions with reference to an act illegal in itself. The right hon. and learned Gentleman says—"Have you reason to believe that The Bosphore Egyptienwill not re-appear in its former shape?" Well, my right hon. Friend has already stated that on the subject of its re-appearance we are in communication with the French Government. That was what I referred to when I said the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite had been answered by anticipation. Is it reasonable upon a transaction of this character, which is not 24 hours old, to demand an answer from the Government whilst they are still in communication with a Foreign Power with regard to it? Unless the right hon. and learned Gentleman desires—which I am sure he does not—to force on a hostile attitude between the Government of England and the Government of France, it is surely unreasonable to insist upon a categorical public statement upon this subject. That is my answer to the right hon. and learned Gentleman's first question. The Prime Minister has indicated to him how it is impossible to give an answer to that point. My answer on the second point is precisely the same. What is this event with reference to the revocation of the Khediveal Decree? Why, it is not 24 hours old yet! It is a question which involves the Government of Egypt and the Government of England and the Great Powers of Europe, and yet the right hon. and learned Gentleman comes down and says—"We demand that you shall give us an answer before the face of the House as to the course you intend to take in reference to all these Great Powers, and we shall consider you have done us a great wrong if you do not give an answer to that question, although the matter is only 24 hours old." It would be unstatesmanlike to give an answer. A course of that kind could only lead to great International embarrassment, and possibly to grave International consequences. I say that it is not fair on the part of men occupying the responsible position which the Gentlemen sitting upon the opposite Bench do to seize upon every difficulty which arises for this country instantly, and to say, "Give us an answer," when they know that an answer cannot be given without leading to grave International complications. I say that is not fair conduct on the part of any Opposition, and it is not conduct in which any responsible Government can consent to acquiesce.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

We are accustomed to lectures from the right hon. Gentleman (Sir William Harcourt); but there are one or two considerations which the House ought to bear in mind. With regard to the first of the two points to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred, and which were touched on by my right hon. Friend the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) and by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for the University of Dublin (Mr Gibson), as to the course of the Government in supporting and advising, and prompting, I may almost say, the Egyptian Government in this matter, and inducing—which they distinctly did—the Government of Egypt to put itself in a false position, from which it had to withdraw with an apology, with which Her Majesty's Government very necessarily, I think, but very painful to the country, had to associate themselves, what we say is this—"You may be right in finding at the end that it was necessary that an apology should be offered for the manner in which The Bosphore Egyptienwas suppressed, but you ought to have known that before; and it is no excuse to give the sort of answer which the Home Secretary gave, 'that we did not advise with regard to the mode in which this thing was to be done.'" We knew beforehand that the Government of Egypt thought it necessary to take steps against this newspaper on account of its language. The Government of this country assented, and encouraged the Egyptian Government to go on and suppress the newspaper. They must have known that in a matter of that kind everything turned—the main question upon which most things turn—on the manner in which this was to be executed; and it is absurd, and it is more than absurd, for them to withdraw themselves, and to think they get out of the responsibility by saying—"Oh, we never went into the question of how this particular thing was to be done." Well, that is what we say has characterized your conduct with regard to Egypt all through. You have always been getting Egypt into a difficulty, and then withdrawing yourself from responsibility by saying—"Oh, that was a question of the manner in which the thing was to have been done, and we were not responsible for that." Take that serious question we have so often referred to—the abandonment of the Soudan. There was a question as to which, it being one of the highest importance, Her Majesty's Government said—"This is to be done; but we need not say how it has to be done." And then they would keep themselves out of the responsibility, and would not give any advice as to the manner in which it was to be done, and their failing to do so led to the great misfortunes which have happened since. The same has been the case, on a different scale, with this newspaper. You were responsible for the act of the Egyptian Government. You failed to point out to them what you might have pointed out—the difficulties and dangers to be avoided in the manner of executing the Decree—and then, when the thing comes to the last, you have to humiliate yourselves in the eyes of the world and in the eyes of the Egyptian Government themselves by having to confess—" We did not give sufficiently good advice; we had not considered the matter sufficiently; when we came to look into the matter and take the opinion of our Law Officers, we found that the way this was done was illegal, and therefore we have to associate ourselves with an expression of regret." Sir, that is not the position which we think Her Majesty's Government should take up, and I do not think that the country will be satisfied with the explanation which has been tendered by the Home Secretary. But, Sir, we have the other point, which is the re-appearance of The Bosphore Egyptien.When we had that not particularly agreeable statement made to us of the terms to which Her Majesty's Government had agreed, and the apology with which they were to asso- ciate themselves, they were distinctly asked—I myself asked the Prime Minister—whether, as a part of the arrangement, the paper was to be suppressed, or whether it was again to appear? The Prime Minister gave me, in a most distinct manner, the assurance that it was not to appear. I see now—and I put a Question on the subject at the beginning of the evening—that in the very last of Earl Granville's despatches on this subject he tells Nubar Pasha, or desires Sir Evelyn Baring to tell Nubar Pasha, in the most distinct terms, that although the opening of the printing office should be unconditional, Her Majesty's Government have reason to be convinced that The Bosphore Egyptienwill not appear for a certain time, and that, meanwhile, the French Government will be ready to exchange views on the question of the application of the Press Laws to newspapers published by French citizens in Egypt. Well, I asked whether any communication had taken place, whether any exchange of views had taken place, in conformity with that which we were told Her Majesty's Government expected as far back as the 28th of April? The answer we get is—"Oh, this matter of The Bosphore Egyptienis only 24 hours old, and how can you expect that we should answer in 24 hours upon this matter? Communications are going on, and views are being exchanged upon this subject." But we want to know what has been going on between the 28th of April and the 20th of May? We were told, as part of this arrangement, that there were to be negotiations and an exchange of views, and we want to know has there been such exchange of views—has the matter been touched since the 28th of April, or has it been left until now, when we have had it forced upon us? I think the House has every reason to complain of the manner in which they have been dealt with with regard to this incident. It may, in itself, be considered as a comparatively small incident—but it is not so when we consider all the points raised by it—the responsibility of the Government both with respect to the Government of Egypt, which they have misled, and the credit of this country, which they have, I think, so deeply involved. We ought, therefore, to have explanations on this matter. As to the other important question of the proceedings as to the Guaranteed Loan, I do most distinctly say that the House was coerced by the majority, who in their turn were coerced—the minority was coerced by the majority, who were in their turn coerced by the Prime Minister and his Colleagues by the statement which we believed, and by which we were strongly impressed with all the authority of the Government, but which we now look upon in a somewhat different light. We were led by the statement of the Prime Minister as to the urgent necessity for our passing at once this Resolution forming the financial arrangement, without which we were told that foreign nations would not proceed with the business, and we were given to understand that if we did so proceed and did give the guarantee further difficulties were not to be expected, and the Foreign Governments would proceed with the matter. Well, they have not proceeded with it, and we see the difficulties which have now come upon us. We want some advice and information from the Government on these matters. We are told it is unreasonable to ask it. I think we are closing the Session for the present adjournment in a very unsatisfactory manner. I think the House and the country have every reason to complain of the position in which, as it now appears, we are placed with regard to this particular question of the newspaper and the fair settlement of the financial arrangement; and we are placed, let me add also, in an unsatisfactory position with regard to a very important question which I do not think has been mentioned to-night—I mean the arrangement with regard to the Suez Canal. Upon that question we ought to have more assurances than we have yet received; and I am bound to say that I do not think that the Government have a right to use to us the language of rebuke in which both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary have so freely indulged.

MR. O'KELLY

said, the Government asserted that they had no means of informing themselves as to the mode which would be adopted of suppressing The Bosphore Egyptien;but, as a matter of fact, the suppression of the paper, as it had taken place, was merely a second edition of a former suppression that was attempted in February, 1884. On that occasion the Egyptian Government sup- pressed the paper by Decree; but that Government was informed by its Legal Adviser that the action they had taken was illegal. When they went to the office of the paper they were told that if they attempted to put their Decree into force they would be met by armed resistance. The French Consular authorities had not been notified. Information was sent to them, and they despatched an agent to the newspaper office, upon whose representation the Egyptian Government withdrew. That was the history of the first effort to suppress the newspaper, and that, so far as he was aware, was the only authority for the later suppression. Those facts were notorious in Egypt—in fact, all over Cairo—and they must have been pretty well known to Sir Evelyn Baring and those who acted on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. Therefore, the Government had no right whatever to come to the House and say that they were not aware of the illegality of the course they were pursuing in connection with this paper. Now, with regard to the character of The Bosphore Egyptien,he must say that he had felt very much astonished at the statements made both in that House and by the Press of this country on the subject. He had been a very constant reader—almost a daily reader—of the journal, and he thought that if there was any real ground of objection to it, or any sufficient ground for its suppression, it would be the invariable support it had given to Her Majesty's Government in their conduct of the affairs of Egypt. With regard to the statement that what was done was done by the action of the Egyptian Government, and that Her Majesty's Government were not responsible, that was a mere play upon words. It was perfectly well known that there was no real Egyptian Government—that the Egyptian Government was a mere marionette; we pulled the strings and it jumped. As to Nubar Pasha, he was not an Egyptian but a Christian Armenian officer, who was kept at the head of affairs in Egypt by our bayonets, and who would not be allowed to remain 24 hours in Egypt after those bayonets disappeared from it. And that was the man whose action Her Majesty's Government called the action of the Egyptian Government. If there was anything that was absolutely plain to any- one who was not a thick-and-thin supporter of the English clique in Cairo, it was that The Bosphore Egyptienrepresented the opinion not only of the Egyptian Government and the French Colonists, but of all other Colonists with regard to the British Government and their acts towards the officials in Egypt. Therefore, the action which had been taken in the case of this newspaper was not the action of any real Egyptian Government, but was an action for which Her Majesty's Government were primarily responsible. It was an act done by an Agent of theirs who called himself a Minister of the Khedive, and it was upon that ground that France had demanded from them, and had compelled them to join in, the expression of regret which had been made for this act of invading the domicile of a Frenchman in Cairo. With regard to the question as to the legality or illegality of this act, it did not require any very extensive knowledge of the laws under which Englishmen lived in Egypt to know that any violation of the domicile of a foreigner in that country would be a breach of International Law. That must have been patent to the British authorities and to those who advised this action in Egypt, and he supposed that it was something that was not unknown to the gentlemen who ruled over the destinies of the foreigner. He supposed they knew enough about foreign affairs to know that the laws under which foreigners lived in Egypt were different from those under which they lived in any European country. And now he meant to pass from that point. He just wished to say one word with regard to a phrase the Prime Minister used as he (Mr. O'Kelly) came into the House with respect to the Soudan Expedition. There were plenty of books concerning Egypt which would supply the right hon. Gentleman with all the information about that country which he could possibly desire to have. If the British Government had it in contemplation to send an Expedition up the Nile, it was evident that the only time at which such an Expedition could have been properly sent was the time when the Nile was at the flood. That time the Government deliberately let pass. They said they had no notice of it. Perhaps it might appear a little egotistical; but he, in some letters he had the honour to write, called attention as early as May to the necessity of sending the Expedition up the Nile not later than the 1st of July. His letters, no doubt, escaped the attention of Her Majesty's Ministers; but still Her Majesty's Ministers must have had agents who were able and clever all throughout Egypt. They had the officers of their Intelligence Department scattered throughout Egypt at that time; and, therefore, how could the Government have been ignorant as to what was the proper time to send an Expedition up the Nile? If they were ignorant it was because they did not take the trouble to inform themselves on a matter of vital importance to the safety of the garrison of Khartoum. The excuses they attempted to make to the House were lame and ineffective, and if the country were satisfied with them they were very easily satisfied.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

said, that the matter of The Bosphore Egyptienwas not important in itself, but it was important as showing the want of benevolence on the part of the French. It really seemed that there was a combination of European Powers against us, in spite of the continual assertion of Her Majesty's Government that they did not seek any special privileges in Egypt, but that they wished to get out of Egypt as soon as they could, and that they wished to make the Suez Canal a channel of commerce open to all nations. This country spoke before Egypt with two voices—one the voice of Her Majesty's Government, and the other the voice of an irresponsible Press, a voice which was mistaken for that of the public opinion of the country. The Press was continually hounding on the Government to take in Egypt a position superior to that which other Powers had. He did not think the Government had any grounds for doing so. It was argued by the Press of this country that they had, in the exercise of their discretion, gone to Egypt; that they had several times spilt their blood and treasure there; and that, therefore, they were entitled to remain there. The Government must decide either that they would remain in Egypt, or tell the European Governments that they need not be jealous. Personally, he thought the Canal ought to be subjected to International control.

MR. WARTON

said, the time spent upon this Vote had not been wasted, because the discussion had elicited from the First Lord of the Treasury his approbation of the language which the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquees of Hartington) used in 1881 in the Candahar debate, and which had been quoted that night by the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for West Sussex (Sir 'Walter B. Barttelot). It was not, however, his (Mr. Warton's) province to interfere in matters of high policy. He had tried to do what he could to improve in a small degree the procedure of the House. In the matter of the introduction of Bills brought down from the other House he had already succeeded. In consequence of his humble efforts, it was now the practice of the Speaker to announce from the Chair when the first reading of a Bill brought from the other House was to be taken: formerly such Bills used to be introduced in the House of Commons without anyone being aware of the fact. There was another little matter which still awaited settlement—? namely the appointment of casual Chairmen. At present, when the Chairman (Sir Arthur Otway) was not in the House, and the Committee on a Bill was reached, some hon. Gentleman on the Treasury Bench, or it might possibly be someone on the Front Opposition Bench, quietly slipped into the Chair. The consent of the House was in no way asked with regard to the hon. Gentleman who should fill the Chair. He maintained that that was a state of things which ought not to be. That was not his view only, but of the First Lord of the Treasury, because, in 1882, that right hon. Gentleman said he intended to bring forward some Rules with regard to that important question. At a later period the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) asked the Prime Minister when he would be able to put on the Paper the proposed Regulation regulating the appointment of casual Chairmen. The answer the right hon. Gentleman returned was that the Government had no intention at present to make any proposal on the subject. A hint was thrown out from the Government Bench that it would be a good thing if there was a panel of Gentlemen capable of sitting in the Chair. If that suggestion were acted upon, they would not see what positively happened on some occasions—a kind of scramble for the Chairman's seat. He had not a word to say against any of the hon. Gentlemen who occasionally occupied the Chair; but, nevertheless, he thought there should be some Rules to regulate the appointment of Chairmen.

MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

asked the indulgence of the House for a few minutes. He should not have done so if it had not been for a remark which fell from the Prime Minister in the course of his speech that evening. He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) ventured to cheer, not immoderately, but in the ordinary way, a quotation from a newspaper, with regard to the squeezability of Her Majesty's Government, which the Prime Minister was then reading to the House. The right hon. Gentleman at once founded the enormous charge against him of want of patriotism; be said there was a great want of patriotism in cheering the statement that the Government was squeezable by foreign nations. Well, were they not squeezable? Could any intelligent man on the Ministerial side of the House say they were not squeezable? When he and his hon. Friends drew attention to the squeezability of the Government, their object was not to encourage foreign nations to squeeze the Government, but to encourage the Government to resist the squeezing. They wished, if they could, to arouse what latent sense of shame was in the Government. The squeezability of Her Majesty's Government was nothing new. The whole Continent of Europe was well acquainted with it. Every foreign organ of intelligence was at that moment writing about it. The only way which the House had of checking that fatal squeezability of the Government and averting war—for it was certainly bringing about war—was to put such pressure upon Ministers as would prevent their being squeezed. It was remarkable to listen to the Prime Minister indulging in a eulogy of peace. Did the Prime Minister or hon. Gentlemen opposite really think that the policy of Her Majesty's Government had been peaceful? Did they not know that these constant surrenders to a Power which only respected force were the certain means of leading to war? As a matter of fact, the only war in which this coun- try had been engaged with Russia was caused by a Liberal Government, of which the present Prime Minister was a Member, and was caused by the same course of feebleness and inability to speak their own mind which the present Government were now following. The more they gave up to Russia the more she would demand. The right hon. Gentleman had said that the course which he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) was following was detrimental to the public interest. He confessed he had, with very little support, tried to induce Her Majesty's Ministers to declare what their policy with regard to the Afghan Frontier was. Ho deeply grieved to be at variance with the Prime Minister on that point. He believed, however, that what he wanted was not at variance with the public interest; because, in his opinion, the only means of preventing war was to make the Government lay their hand on the Table and state how much they were prepared to defend, and see whether public opinion would support them in what they called a national and Imperial policy, but which, so far, had been nothing of the kind. He asked the Prime Minister whether he could deny that if the Russian despatch of the 16th of January had been made known to this country at the time such strength would have been given by public support to Her Majesty's Government as to make the invasion of Afghanistan and the attack on and slaughter of their allies absolutely impossible? On the 16th of January last the Russians demanded Zulfikar, Penjdeh, and other places; and, furthermore, that the Ameer should not have the right to fortify his own country. Was there a Minister on the Treasury Bench who could deny that if the despatch containing those demands bad been made known to the country at the time there would have been such a display of public feeling as would have made the Government's subsequent surrender impossible? In conclusion, he asked the Government to state what was the Frontier agreed upon last Monday or Tuesday between Earl Granville and M. de Staal, so that the country might know how much further pressure was being put upon Ministers, and where this insidious encroachment of Russia was to make its next move? The Opposition were told that they were a War Party. That they were told by a Government who had just spent £13,500,000 on war preparations; who had a Budget of £100,000,000 and a deficit of £15,000,000; a Government who had involved them in wars in the Transvaal and the Soudan, who had rendered war with Russia all but inevitable—yes, in spite of the sneers of the Home Secretary (Sir William Harcourt), he maintained that the yielding policy of the Government was making war with Russia absolutely certain. There were no possible means of preventing war with Russia but by telling her she was not to overstep a certain line. Let Russia know clearly that if she continued to encroach she would be confronted by the whole Forces of the Empire—in India, the Baltic, and the Black Sea; and by every ally we could get—in Turkey, in China, and wherever we could obtain support, would be used against her. That was the only way in which war was to be prevented. There was no Peace Party in the Russian Government; there were two Parties—one which believed that more could be gained in the future by temporary delay now, and another which thought that Herat ought to be seized at once. As to M. de Giers, of whoso peaceful intentions the House had heard so much, he asked hon. Members to read the Blue Book and see whether M. de Giers was not the most convenient stalking horse that any War Party in any country ever possessed.

Question put, and agreed to.

Resolved,That this House, at its rising on Friday, do adjourn till Thursday the 4th of June.