DEPARTMENTAL STATEMENT.

HC Deb 19 March 1885 vol 295 cc1733-806

Supply—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

The MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

Sir Arthur Otway, in moving the Estimates which have been laid upon the Table, or rather in moving the first Vote for Men, and making the general Statement which is usual on these occasions, I regret that I have to say that the Estimates which we are now considering cannot be treated as final Estimates—they are rather of a provisional character. They do not represent the full demands which will have to be made upon the country for the Military Services of the year. The Estimates were in course of preparation—in fact, they were almost complete—before the catastrophe took place which we heard of in February, and, consequently, before the measures which were decided upon by Parliament, and which were subsequent to that event. The full demands which we shall have to make upon the House for the Military Services of the year cannot, therefore, be made known until a Vote of Credit is asked for after Easter. We are obtaining, as quickly as we can, the information and collecting the materials upon we hope to be able to lay before the House a full statement of what the other demands for the Military Services of the year will be; but until we have obtained that information it would be impossible, I think, and it would be inconvenient, to enter into any discussion at the present time as to what will probably be required for the Expedition in the Soudan. I will first state to the Committee the basis upon which these Estimates are framed. In addition to the ordinary Home and Colonial requirements, and for keeping 6,000 men in Lower Egypt, they also provide for an estimated expenditure of £500,000 on account of the Bechuanaland Expedition; and, as I have already stated, they provide nothing either for the Nile Expedition, or for the Suakin Expedition, or for the Suakin and Berber Railway. The original Estimate presented in the present year for the Military Services of 1884–5 was £15,930,600. In August last we obtained a Vote of Credit for £300,000 on account of the Nile Expedition; and in the course of the Autumn Session we obtained a further Supplementary Estimate of £1,000,000 for the Nile Expedition, and £675,000 for the Bechuanaland Expedition. These additions to the ordinary Estimates of the year amounted to £1,975,000. Since the Estimates we are now discussing were laid upon the Table we have had to ask for a Supplementary Estimate for £942,000, of which £672,000 were for the expenses connected with General Graham's Suakin Expedition, and £270,000 were Supplementary Estimates in respect of the ordinary Services of the year. Therefore, we have thus had £2,917,000 voted in addition to the ordinary Estimates presented last year. That brings up the total sum voted for Military Services for 1884–5 to £18,847,600, as against £17,820,700 for 1885–6, being a difference of £1,026,900. But the whole of the Supplementary Estimates to which I have just made reference, with the exception of £270,000, were for special war expenditure, these Supplementary Estimates providing a special war expenditure of £2,647,000. Therefore, the sums Parliament voted for what may be called the ordinary Military Ser- vices of the present year is £16,200,600. Of the Estimates I am now moving only £500,000 is for special, or war expenditure in connection with the Bechuanaland Expedition. We ask for £17,820,700 for the ordinary Services of the year, which is an excess over the amount voted for the ordinary Service of the previous year of £1,120,100. The occupation of Egypt accounts for £150,000—that is to say, the estimated additional cost of the Army of Occupation in Egypt is £250,000, of which only the sum of £100,000 is estimated to be borne by Egypt. Since these Estimates were laid upon the Table a slight modification has been made in the Egyptian financial arrangements, by which a larger sum than £100,000 will be paid by Egypt; £70,000 more will be paid by Egypt in aid of the Army Estimates; and the charge, therefore, in respect of Egypt, will be £70,000 less than that which is shown on the Estimates. To that extent the £150,000 required will be reduced. There has also been a considerable reduction in the military contributions to be received from the Ceylon Government, owing to a smaller part of the garrison being regarded as necessary for Colonial purposes. This, and some minor items of loss by exchanges in other Colonial military contributions, will entail an additional charge on the Estimates of £46,700. The increase of regimental and other establishments of the Army, to which I will refer by-and-bye, will cost £65,000. There is an excess in addition to the Store Vote of £680,000, and also an addition to the Works Vote of £98,300. I may state, however, that these figures do not precisely agree with the statement of the differences that was circulated to Members with the Army Estimates, because the accuracy of the statement has been affected by the circumstance to which I have referred—that since these Estimates were presented, and since the statement was made showing the difference between these and the provisional Estimates, other Supplementary Estimates have been voted containing charges for ordinary expenditure amounting to £270,000. The additional cost of the Auxiliary and Reserve Forces amounts to £79,000; and there is an increased charge for deferred pay of £30,000, and for the Clothing Vote of £17,500. The last item is, I believe, caused by the issue of additional clothing to the troops. The sum of £22,000 is required, in addition to that taken in last year's Vote, for rewards to inventors. There is also a miscellaneous increase of £7,600, causing a total increase of £1,195,700. On the other hand, it is subject to a decrease, owing to a larger estimated receipt from India and from the Non-Effective Vote of £75,000, making the total increase in ordinary expenditure of the present over the past year of £1,120,000. It is right that I should now give the Committee some explanation as to the progress of recruiting and the proposed Establishments for the year. Last year I stated, in moving the Estimates, that the large deficiency in the number of the Army which existed in 1883 made it necessary to amend, in certain respects, the term of enlistment, and steps for that purpose were being taken at the time I presented the Estimates. Up to that time the result of recruiting had been satisfactory; but the deficiency had not been materially restored. The experience of the present year has justified the anticipations which were formed as to the effect of the measures taken with regard to recruiting. The result of these measures is, that we have raised in the past year—I speak of the real, not the financial year—35,653 recruits. That addition to the number of recruits not only met the loss of the year itself, but has also given us a net gain of 7,500 men serving with the Colours. The number of effectives on January 1, 1884, including rank and file and noncommissioned officers, was 173,529 men; on January 1, 1885, it was 181,000, or an increase of about 7,500. This rate of progress in recruiting has been maintained during the portion which has elapsed of the present year. We have raised, up to March 1 in the present year, 7,442 recruits, and the number of effectives on that date was 184,209. In comparing the actual numbers with the Establishment, as voted by Parliament, I may remind the Committee that unless some such special measures had been taken as have been taken in the present year to enable us to recruit over the Establishment strength—unless this strength is exceeded at some time or other, there must be a deficiency at the time of the season for relief and for some time afterwards. The loss of the Army in India is concentrated in the months in which the reliefs are effected, hut the gain to the Army is only caused by a gradual process of recruiting, which goes on during the year; and therefore, unless arrangements are made by voting an excess of 2,000 men this year to enable our Establishment to be in excess of the number agreed to by Parliament, there must be a normal deficiency at this time of the year. In March, 1884, on the Establishment of 165,386 rank and file, there was a deficiency of 2,846 on the British Establishment, and 3,570 on the Indian Establishment, or a total deficiency of 6,416. In last year's Estimate 2,600 men were added to the Establishment. With this increased Establishment of 167,986 rank and file, we have now an excess of 1,903 men on the British Establishment, and the deficiency has been reduced to 1,459 on the Indian Establishment, leaving a total excess of 450 men. The increase in the numbers to which I have referred has been mainly, though not entirely, due to the recruiting of the year. To a certain small extent it is due to other reasons, as, for instance, to the measures which were taken in August to meet the requirements of the Expeditionary Forces. In August, under the 87th section of the Army Act, men were detained with their battalions who were actually serving in South Africa or in Egypt. We cannot at present state the exact number of those who were so detained, and who, in the ordinary course, would have been passed into the Reserves; but it is not very large. Further, in August, an order was issued enabling men who had joined the Reserve previous to August 10 of last year, and who had three years' service to give, to rejoin the Colours. Up to the 1st of January in the present year 1,455 Reserve men had so rejoined. I have already stated the measures taken in February upon the receipt of the news of the fall of Khartoum.

SIR HERBERT MAXWELL

What is the number of men who have rejoined the Colours?

The MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

Between the 10th of August, 1884, and the 1st of January this year, 1,455 men have rejoined; but I may add that our offer was to a certain extent a limited one. No man was allowed to rejoin who had not got three years still to serve. I have already stated, in moving the Supplementary Estimates, the measures that were taken in February on the receipt of the news of the fall of Khartoum in connection with the larger military operations which, in our opinion, then became necessary. I will not repeat a statement of those measures, for it would be partly a repetition and partly an anticipation of what further measures we may have to state when we make our proposal for a Vote of Credit; but on this occasion I may add that the Reserve men who have volunteered to rejoin the Colours will, on their discharge, receive deferred pay from the date of their transfer to the Reserve, and not only from the date of their rejoining the Colours. The scheme of Establishment which was laid down in 1881 by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, by which a large increase was made to the Establishment, has to a very great extent been disturbed by the exigencies of the Service, and has never had an opportunity of coming into real and normal operation. Notwithstanding the difficulties, however, under which this scheme has suffered, it has nevertheless worked, as far as it has had a chance, exceedingly well. The object of the scheme was to enable us, without delay, and without having immediate recourse to the Reserves, to send abroad a few battalions in the event of a small war, such as had frequently occurred. That object has been attained, and, I think, something more than attained. We have been able to despatch and maintain for a considerable time abroad 16 Infantry battalions of the Line in addition to three battalions of the Guards, those being the battalions which practically formed the First Army Corps spoken of by my right hon. Friend. The 1,400 Reserve men, of whom I have spoken as having joined the Colours, were not until February necessarily appointed to the battalions serving abroad. We have now, in addition to the ordinary Colonial battalions, eight battalions with Lord Wolseley on the Nile, besides two battalions on the line of communication. General Graham has three battalions of the Guards and three of the Line, and we have also four-and-a-half battalions in Egypt. In Egypt and the Soudan at present there are 20½ battalions, numbering 16,400 men, and by the last Return the efficient strength of these battalions was 15,900. We have also in South Africa 4½ battalions of 3,490 effective strength. All this force has, therefore, been despatched practically without having recourse to the calling up of the Reserves, or even the detention of the Reserve men by Her Majesty's Proclamation, but only to such measures as are provided by the Army Act. The operations, however, which are about to be undertaken amount to more than a small war, and for the operations of the year now in progress other measures will have to be resorted to; but it must be said that there never was a time before 1881 when it was possible to send out and maintain for a considerable time so large a force as has been sent on this occasion, without any delay, and without any confusion or dislocation of the Service. We have in no instance had recourse to the practice which on other occasions has been so justly deprecated of calling for volunteers from one regiment to another. I should like, without going into any details, to call the attention of the Committee to the Appendix C of the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, showing the increase and decrease of the present year, and also to the interesting and new Appendices L and M, showing the strength of the Army Reserve and Auxiliary Forces for the last 10 years, and the increase and decrease of the Army in the two periods during the last 20 years. I will not trouble the Committee by going into any details; but they will see that the waste of the Army for last year through death, invaliding, discharge, and desertion, is a little under 14,000, as the 9,784 who were transferred to the Reserve, and the 706 who were transferred to the Auxiliary Forces, cannot be considered waste. These Returns also show that the loss by death, invaliding, discharge, or misconduct last year is the smallest that there has been for 21 years. That fact is sufficient to show that there is an improvement in the health and also in the general character of the Army. With regard to the growth of the Army Reserves, of course, it has been slightly checked by the measures to which I have alluded. But notwithstanding there has been an increase last year of 4,700, and the number is now 39,244. In the course of the past year, therefore, there has been a total increase of the fighting strength of the Army with the Colours and with the Reserve by 12,134 men, and we have now more than 40,000 in excess of what we had 10 years ago. Besides the First Class Army Reserve I have referred to there is the Militia Reserve, the strength of which is 30,803 men. In addition, therefore, to the effective strength of the Array with the Colours we have 70,000 Reserve men, liable to be called out at any moment. As to recruiting, the number of recruits in 1884 exceeded those of 1883 by 2,557. The Cavalry continues to be a popular service, and it is now 519 over its Establishment. The system of three years' enlistment that was adopted in 1883 for the Guards continues to attract a very large number of recruits. In July, 1883, the brigade was 739 below its strength; it is now 326 in excess of its strength, which is more than sufficient to form the Camel Corps now serving on the Nile. The service of the Guards has become so popular under the new system that it has been possible to raise the standard of height from 5 feet 7 inches to 5 feet 8 inches.

SIR HENRY FLETCHER

Will the noble Marquess say what number is likely to leave next year under the operation of the three years' system?

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

It will only be a small number. The hon. and gallant Member says, "who are likely to leave next year," but none will leave before the end of next year; and the time has not arrived when it is necessary for them to decide whether they will extend their service or will leave; but I am informed that many of them have already extended their service. In the Infantry, exclusive of the Reserves, that have rejoined the Colours, the net gain is nearly 4,000. In the Artillery the recruiting has also increased, the net gain this year being 220; but there is still a deficiency of 900. It is probable that some of the men who would have enlisted in the Guards, but who are excluded by the raising of the standard from 5 feet 7 inches to 5 feet 8 inches, may join the Artillery in consequence of being unable to join the Guards. The system of localization continues to have an increased hold on the country, and the territorial districts supply annually a large number of recruits to their own regiments. This can be shown from the figures in the Inspector General's Report, which I need not now quote. The officers commanding the depôts also say that the regiments are more closely identified with their own districts. As to the quality of the recruits, that is, of course, a matter on which there would always be room for difference of opinion; but last year there were only 371 passed by the medical recruiting officers who were objected to by the commanding officers of the regiments to which they were sent. They are now under examination. There is no doubt that a large number of the recruits are enlisted young. That, as has been explained, is almost inevitable in the case of an Army raised entirely by voluntary enlistment and with a period of short service. It would be impossible, under such circumstances, to secure the men you require at all unless they were enlisted comparatively young. There is, however, no reason to believe that these men are deficient in physique as compared with the recruits obtained on other occasions; and although some who are enlisted at an early age may at the date of their enlistment be apparently somewhat deficient in physique, yet it is found that in a great number of cases they rapidly improve after a short period of service. There is no doubt that the large number of recruits that we obtained in the course of last year has been to some extent due to the depressed condition of trade and the want of employment. But there is, I think, reason to believe that the Service is becoming more popular, and that a great many of the prejudices that formerly existed, not altogether without foundation, against the Army as a Profession are now disappearing. Every effort is being made to render the Service more popular, and also to make the condition of the Reserve men who are leaving the Army a better one. Two Registers have been established, which we suppose will be found useful in this respect. The first is a Register of Recruits belonging to each parish in the district; and the next—which is one of some importance—is a Register of Applicants for Civil employment. I am glad to say that some assistance is being given in many regimental districts by persons of great influence, with the object of securing employment for Reserve men on leaving the Service. Nothing can be of more advantage to the Army than assistance of that description, because nothing can tend more to raise the character and increase the popularity of the Army than assured prospects of obtaining employment on their discharge from the Colours by men of good character. The permission to extend service, which was applied tentatively in 1883, has been made permanent. Experience has shown that there was no risk that so large a number of men as to cause a serious burden to the country would desire to extend their service, and we now no longer apply the system tentatively, but have made it a permanent one; so that a considerable step has been made in a direction which many hon. Members desire to see taken—namely, that of giving, as far as possible, free play to recruiting and allowing the men to enlist for a short time; or, if they desire it, to make a Profession of the Military Service. It is, as I have said, premature to form any estimate yet of how far the men enlisted for short service in the Guards will desire to extend their service. As to the Establishment, the net increase in the Regimental Establishment provided in these Estimates is 1,665 men. The principal items are an increase in the Infantry Establishment of 1,015; in the Medical Staff Corps of 222; in the Royal Engineers of 144; in the Ordnance Staff Corps of 82; and for the Submarine Mining Corps, of which I spoke a short time ago, 252 men are taken. The Infantry Establishment will be so modified by the subsequent arrangements which it will be necessary to explain in connection with the operations in the Soudan that it would be useless to enter into details now of measures that were intended for the ordinary Estimates of the present year, but which will be altogether modified by subsequent arrangements. All that I need say at present on that point is that in consequence of the difficulty experienced in providing drafts for battalions for Indian and Colonial service, the lowest Battalion Establishment will be again raised, so that no battalion will have an Establishment of less than 650, including the depot. As to the Militia, during the year 1884no lessthan41,980 recruits were enlisted, including reengaged men. The number of recruits enlisted between the trainings of 1881 and 1882 was 23,432; between the trainings of 1882 and 1883 they were 32,049; and between the trainings of 1883 and 1884 they were 36,067. The Committee will see that there has been a gradual and steady improvement during the last three years. Of those 36,067, 27,000 elected to drill on enrolment. In consequence of the new system of training and the abolition of bounty, absence without leave has greatly decreased. Between the years 1876 and 1881 the percentage of recruits absent without leave from preliminary drill varied from 24 to 12. In the years 1881 to 1883, when the 10s. bounty on enlistment was partially abolished, the percentage of absentees dropped to 3.9 and 4.7. And last year, when the bounty was entirely abolished, it dropped to 1.4. I have already stated, and need not now repeat, that measures have been taken for the embodiment of a certain number of Militia regiments. All I would add is that the Returns show that the regiments selected for embodiment have responded to the call made upon them in the most creditable manner. With regard to the Yeomanry, there is nothing that I need now mention except that £3,500 has been provided to allow 3s. 6d. for two extra troop drills, the condition for the issue of this allowance being that at least two-thirds of the enrolled strength of the troop are present at the drill. As to the Volunteers, the reports are also most satisfactory. The number of efficients has increased from 199,000 in 1882 to 208,000. There is a proportionate increase in the number of officers and non-commissioned officers who have become proficient, and also of officers who have passed in tactics, the latter now numbering 627. The Force is now being armed with the Martini-Henry rifle; and, as has been stated on previous occasions, it is under consideration whether, in consequence of being supplied with a more accurate arm, some amendment might not possibly be made in the qualifications for efficiency. The change that is being made seems to offer a good opportunity for this improvement. A sum of £40,000 is provided for the camping out of Volunteers, an addition of £8,000 upon the Vote of last year. Last year the number of Volunteers applying for the privilege of going into camping training was so large that the Vote was inadequate to camp out more than 80 per cent of the applicants. Eventually, I believe the sum allotted allowed every man who attended the camp to receive an allowance. The next point to which I think I ought to call the attention of the Committee is the Vote for Military Stores. There is a large increase in the Vote upon last year, the increase being £680,000, exclusive altogether of what was granted as the sum necessary for war service. But in addition to that amount, as I have already stated, £235,000 has been voted for the ordinary service for the past year. This Vote, therefore, standing in the Estimates for next year, shows an increase of £915,000 over the original Estimates presented to Parliament for the present year. The Vote of £235,000 on a Supplementary Estimate this year was practically obtained because it was found that for many years past insufficient provision had been made for some portions of the Service. The constantly increasing demands for Naval ordnance virtually starved the provision for the Land Service. There has been a constantly increasing charge for gunpowder for the heavy guns, and there has also been an increase in small arms and ammunition in consequence of the increase of practice on the part of both the Regulars, the Militia, and the Volunteers. All these things have had the effect of reducing the amount which has been available for other purposes. The £235,000 for the present year, or the greater part of it added to the Supplementary Estimates, has been spent in making a larger addition to the provision for cocoa powder for the heaviest kind of guns. It has also been voted in part for bringing up the reserve stores which I have mentioned. It is estimated that an annual addition to this Vote of £115,000 for gunpowder and for small arms ammunition will be required; but in addition to this increase for which we ask this year it will be necessary, in my opinion, for some years to come to increase by about £150,000 the Votes for the general reserve and for necessary equipment, accoutrements, and miscellaneous articles. The subject of ordnance both for the Land and Sea Services has been sometimes dealt with in the general statement on this subject; but, in my opinion, it is at present much too large and important a question to be dealt with in a general statement. The Report of the Ordnance Select Committee to which reference has been made in a question put by the right hon. Member for Westminster (Mr. W. H. Smith), and answered by my hon. Friend the Surveyor General of Ordnance (Mr. Brand), has not yet been presented; and I think it would be well, before any statement is made on the subject of the naval guns or of heavy ordnance generally, that we should have that Report, and should have time to look into it. It would then be possible to make a fuller statement than can be made now.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

When will the Report be presented?

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

The Report itself has not been received, and it would not be convenient to say anything about laying it on the Table until the Report has been received by the Department. There will, no doubt, be opportunities for discussing it either upon the Naval Estimates or upon the Vote itself for heavy ordnance. All I need say with regard to the question now is that the increase of the Vote will provide £75,000 for additional plant at Woolwich for the manufacture of heavy guns for the Navy. It will also provide £350,000 for the manufacture of additional guns for the Naval Service, which it is expected will have to be continued for five years. It also provides £155,300 for the commencement of the armament of the Colonial coaling stations. The work at these stations was commenced last year at Aden and Hong Kong, both locally and in the provision of ordnance, and steps have been already taken which have materially increased the strength of these stations pending the completion of new works. In the Supplementary Estimates £35,000 was provided for the works which are in progress at these two stations, in addition to £9,000 which has been provided by the Colonial Government or the Government of India. Next year a commencement will be made at Trincomalee, Singapore, Simon's Bay, Sierra Leone, St. Helena, the Mauritius, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and Port Elizabeth. The sum which is provided in these Estimates for submarine work and armament stores and vessels is £198,000, in addition to £67,000 which we anticipate will be provided by the Indian and the Colonial Governments. The pressure at the present moment, as I have already stated in a previous discussion on the Engineers' Department, is very great. A large number of officers are on active service in Egypt and the Soudan, or in South Africa, and a large number are always employed in India. In consequence of the strain upon the Department there has been some greater delay than was anticipated in providing for an accurate plan and survey of these works. In addition there has been, or there may be, some delay in consequence of those everlasting changes which are brought about in the progress of Artillery science which so constantly occur. This delay has necessarily at the present time interfered with final decisions as to the best modes of mounting the heaviest guns. I may add that experiments are in progress which will finally decide the question. Until it is decided progress can only be made to such an extent as is not likely to be affected by the changes required by the advance of Artillery science. On the whole, looking at the state of pressure in the Engineers' Department, and at the uncertainty which attends the question of mounting the heaviest artillery, we are of opinion that the Votes I have already referred to, and which will have to be provided in the present Estimates, will make a sufficient provision for the year. The noble Lord the Member for West Essex (Lord Eustace Cecil) asked what progress has been made on a subject which was discussed last year—namely, the Defence of Commercial Harbours. Now the subject of the defence not only of coaling stations, but of military ports and commercial harbours, has received a great deal of attention in past years. For reasons, however, which I stated in the course of a previous discussion, we do not think it desirable to push forward these works with greater rapidity than we are doing. We believe that the energy of the Engineering and Manufacturing Department may be for the present year advantageously applied to the construction of the defences of the Colonial coaling stations, and the pressing forward of the supply of heavy guns for the Navy. What our views are with regard to the defence of commercial harbours I think will be more conveniently and fully discussed when we come to the Vote for Fortifications. There is a good deal to be said upon it, but it would be inconvenient to include it in a general statement. I believe I have now referred to most of the principal points which are contained in the Estimates. I feel very much indebted to the Committee for the attention with which they have listened to me, and I beg to move the first Vote for Men.

(1.) Motion made, and Question proposed, That a number of Land Forces, not exceeding 142,194, all ranks, be maintained for the Service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland at Home and Abroad, excluding Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1886."—(The Marquess of Hartington.)

COLONEL STANLEY

I think all the Committee must have followed with great interest the Statement of the noble Marquess; and I feel that, on the whole, so far as he has spoken of the operation of the measures which have been taken, and especially of recruiting, his Statement is one which, on the face of it, must appear very satisfactory to the Committee. I only hope that the noble Marquess is not led away entirely by the mere Reports made to him of the numbers and of the general disposition of the men who enlist, but that he will also take some means of personally acquainting himself with the general appearance and character of the recruits whom he gets in that way. I know a very striking instance in which this was done, and it shows that the difficulty existed then as now in the matter of recruiting, and that it is not a difficulty of the present day only. Some few years ago, when an unusually large number of recruits had been obtained, and it was naturally supposed that recruiting was going on satisfactorily, I remember my then Chief and Predecessor, Viscount Cranbrook, going down to one of the large camps and asking that the men who had enlisted in the current year, the year before, and the year previous, should be put into different lines. When this was done the effect was very striking, and it showed that we were getting recruits capable of a good deal of development. Each year showed a difference in the height and development of the men. Those who had only been in the Service for one year were the shortest and least developed; those who had been in two years were taller; while those who had been in three years were taller still. The inspection showed that during the whole of the three years the men had been only developing, which indicated what the real difficulty is in all these matters. I must say that the noble Marquess has very frankly recognized that difficult. In this country, I suppose, as matters now stand, considering the state of the labour market, and the conditions of the voluntary service, you must expect to get a large number of very young men; and if the authorities receive them with their eyes open, and are prepared with measures to meet the difficulty that arises in consequence, then well and good. The Service under such circumstances is, perhaps, not more at a loss now than it was in former times. I have ventured to point out the difficulty; but I do hope that the noble Marquess and the officers immediately responsible to him are not led away merely by Reports of mere numbers, but that they really look to see for themselves what kind of men they are getting. What the noble Marquess has said tends to confirm my belief that we were right in 1879, and in the case of the Army Act in 1881, in laying down the principle of free trade in recruiting. The noble Marquess has gone further in that direction, and has seen his way to allow the men to extend their service still longer. The only way that we can deal with the voluntary service of this country is to make it a free service, and to allow men to extend their time by their own free will, and not by entering into arbitrary engagements. Get the best men you can get, and when you have got them, do the best you can to keep them. If that is done with due regard to the interests of the men on the one hand, and the good of the Service on the other, I am quite sure the voluntary service may be made to succeed in this country. I join issue with a good many of my military friends who find fault with the statement in the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, which, however, the noble Marquess did not refer to, as to the number of men who take advantage of the liberty they have in the first month of their service to purchase their discharge. That number is increasing, and a good deal of inconvenience is thrown upon the Service in consequence; but I believe that more good is done by allowing men to go freely and honestly than by keeping them against their will, and tempting them almost to desert. On the other hand, the point, I think, deserves the attention of the Secretary of State for War and the Military Advisers of the Crown. Allowing for all the freaks which bring men into the Service in ignorance of the sort of life they are going to lead, it does not seem to me to be right; but, on the contrary, it seems to me that there must be something wrong when the percentage of men who get their discharge so very soon is so large, and when so large a number of men who take to a soldier's life get tired of it so very soon. It is not easy to say where the fault exactly lies; but the fact does appear to me to be something rather odd, and I think something might be done, without any undue relaxation of discipline, to make the first month of a soldier's life a little more pleasant than it now is. What with drill, school, and the variety of things which he is obliged to be taught, I think very judicious arrangements are required, and we have a good index afforded in the circumstance that so large a proportion of these young men purchase themselves out of the Service alter the first month. My hon. and gallant Friend sitting near me (Sir Robert Loyd-Lindsay) says that 1,751 men have bought themselves out within the first three months. That is, of course, a very large number; but it is very much better that they should buy themselves out than that they should go without leave or without any repayment to the public. Still, it is a circumstance which is not altogether satisfactory. Then, when we come to the noble Marquess's Statement, I find after all that it is a little difficult to do what is usual—that is, enter into criticism—because, as my noble Friend, with his customary frankness, told us, neither the Establishments nor the Estimates which we are now asked to vote are, in point of fact, really the Establishments and Estimates for the year. On both sides we are told that the real Estimates for the year and the number of men are to be dealt with on a future occasion, and I presume upon a Vote of Credit, which will form the subject of a future discussion. If it is understood that the discussion, whenever it comes on, is to be a real discussion, and one which will give all the proper opportunities for criticism, I think there is nothing more to be said upon these points now. But there are certain other questions upon which I observe the noble Marquess would also like to defer the consideration until a future occasion—questions relating to guns and works. There is no doubt a disposition to agree that as all the information is not before us, these matters should not be discussed at present, as we are hardly in a position to discuss them; but although inconvenient, it would be better to discuss them now, and would be even less inconvenient, than to be placed in the position we once found ourselves in of being called upon to discuss them upon Votes which may be brought forward and forced through under pressure of time in the month of August. If that is going to be the case, then I say, whatever the inconvenience, let us discuss them now, because otherwise the postponement of them until a future occasion would virtually be the putting off of any discussion whatever. I need not say that the noble Marquess did all in his power to bring on the discussion; but that was the result, and if we consent now to postpone the discussion, it must be with the distinct understanding that a reasonable and fair opportunity, in the full sense of that term, is given to us, and that we shall not be put off, as on a former occasion, when we made a similar request. I should like to say that I hope the attention of the noble Marquess has been directed, as I think it has been, to the double recruiting which will be necessary two years hence, when the Re-serve men of two successive years are going down from the Colours at the same time. The Reserve men who have continued with the Colours now for certainly another year will, when they claim to leave the Colours in order to go into the Reserves, produce an abnormal drain upon the Regimental Establishment, and a consequent strain upon the recruiting. There will not only be the ordinary demands of the year to meet, but the extraordinary demands occasioned by the rolling up of arrears which are being saved now by the men remaining with the Colours. That is a point which the authorities will do well to look to, if they have not already done so, in order to guard against the battalions being suddenly depleted. I am glad to hear, although I can only discuss it in the absence of positive information, that the noble Marquess is going to bring up the strength of the lowest battalions to 650. I think I am responsible for the provisions by which the lowest battalions were brought up to 450; but still I am free to admit now that that was by no means a satisfactory arrangement, for the tendency of small battalions is to throw a very undue and, in many cases, a cruel amount of hard work on the very few men left in the battalion to perform it. And everyone knows that there is a good deal of work to do, whether the battalion is large or small; and when you come to small battalions, and more than the ordinary duty has to be done from day to day, the work becomes very oppressive. The addition to the Store Vote—I have no doubt the noble Marquess will be able to defend it—but it certainly seems to have been very large and considerable. I noticed one expression? which fell from my noble Friend with regard to the Ordnance Vote. He said that the Army Vote in some years had been a good deal starved for the sake of the Navy. I am very sorry to hear that that has been the case. Of course, we know that there always has been in connection with the Ordnance Vote an increasing pressure on the part of the Navy; and it seems to me that the time is very fast approaching when it will become a question for consideration by the authorities, partly for the sake of independence, and partly for the sake of the Votes, whether the Naval Service relating to naval guns will not have to be altogether separated from the Army Service. I suppose that it is pretty generally known that the Army in all these matters, as far as I am aware, endeavours to be loyally subservient to the more pressing wants of the Navy. If there are any guns to be made, it is the Navy and not the Army that gets the best guns. It was so when the 35-ton gun was first designed. I am speaking from memory, but I think I am right when I say that the 35-ton gun was designed for the Army; but the Navy having found it a better gun than their own, the guns were handed over from the Land to the Sea Service. And so it has always been; and although I speak with great respect of the authorities, and only express my own opinion, I cannot help thinking that practically what the whole thing will come to before long is this—the Army will manufacture its own field guns and small guns specially for the Land Service, and the naval guns, with all their compli- cated fittings, will become, as they ought properly to become, part of the Naval Service, and be voted in the Naval Estimates. There always had been, and there always must be, a great deal of friction in matters of detail between two great Departments. It was so in the case of the gun carriages. When they were on four wheels there was very little difficulty; but when the carriages became part and parcel of the ships, and were worked by hydraulic machinery, it became an almost imperative necessity that the Navy should be consulted about the fittings which had to be provided, and the result was that the gun-carriages for the Navy were transferred to the Naval Votes, and ever since that arrangement has been carried out. That was so even in my time, when the arrangements were not so elaborate as they are now. It think it was a step in the right direction, and now that new problems and complicated questions have sprung up in connection with naval gunnery another move in the same direction will very likely have to be made. When that is done, I hope we shall not have the Secretary of State for War getting up in his place and saying, what I am afraid many other Secretaries of State might with truth have said before him, that the Army Votes, for some years past, have been starved on account of the Navy. There are many other questions which I might ask, but they may, perhaps, be more fitly asked when we come to the Gun Vote; for I have every confidence that the noble Marquess will give the Committee an assurance, and will fully carry it out, that there shall be a real discussion, and not a sham one, on the question of guns. I should like to know what further trials have been made with respect both to machine guns and the repeating arms of our troops in the field? I know that other Services have been making experimental trials in those things, and I should like to hear whether the War Department have got beyond experiments upon a small scale with one or two guns, and whether they are trying repeating rifles and field guns of various kinds upon a larger scale? We had an interesting discussion a short time ago upon machine guns, and I think the question is one which the country is watching with considerable interest, and one in which a general hope is expressed that Her Majesty's Government will be fully alive to the advantages and value of these guns; and, while they have their own patterns already tried and approved, that they will not entirely lose sight of the newer inventions which are springing up from day to day. The noble Marquess told us about the Votes for the coaling stations. I was especially glad to hear that at last something is going to be done for Simon's Bay. Probably there is no station which, under all conceivable circumstances, is more important to our trade. There may be circumstances in which even Aden might become of less importance than it is, and in that case Simon's Bay would, of course, become still more important than it is at present. Without going into these matters—for it would be obviously inexpedient to enter into details—I do hope that the question has been looked to from the point of view of maintaining coaling stations which will enable a main route, both in regard to commerce, and, if necessary, in connection with a military force for the protection of commerce, to be kept open under all circumstances, at all seasons, and at all times. There are a good many minor matters which I might refer to; but it is hardly expedient that I should dwell upon them now. There are two or three questions, however, which I may reserve for the discussion when the Vote of Credit is asked for; but before I pass altogether from the general question, there is one thing which I omitted just now, and that is to ask a question. There is an impression—I do not know the details, and I am not in a position to state the matter as a matter of fact—but there is a very wide impression that the Cavalry squadrons which have been sent abroad have been made up, to an undue extent, by contributions from other squadrons at the expense of the efficiency of those which have been left behind. I do not know from what causes it proceeds, whether the demands of foreign service have been of a more than usually rigid character than formerly, or that the class of horses has deteriorated, or that there are not horses enough in the ranks which are fit for the work they have to undertake. But whatever the cause, it is a matter of notoriety that the Cavalry regiments have to be made up to a far greater extent than was formerly the case, and nothing can be more painful to an officer in command than to find his men asked to volunteer from the regiment for service in another. No officer likes to see his best men going away, though it may be for the public service that they should; and when the horses have been well trained and well looked after to see them taken away at a moment's notice and drafted into another squadron or another regiment to which they do not properly belong is certainly not pleasant. If this complaint is well founded, I hope that special attention will be paid to it, and that greater care will be taken, either as regards the purchase of horses, or, in keeping up the number of the establishments, to keep up also the number of horses required, and to keep them in a state of efficiency. There are several minor questions upon which I may ask for information at some future time, but I do not think it worth while to take up the time of the Committee with them now; but I do hope that the noble Marquess, when he rises to reply to all the questions that may be put to him in the course of the discussion, will be able to assure the Committee that if this Vote is, as a matter of necessity, to be passed to-night, we shall have a real and ample opportunity of discussing the great and important questions connected not only with gunnery, but the defence of our coaling stations, and the other questions to which I have referred. I do not wish to say that there is any undue suspicion on this side of the House; but the very fact of our having been cut off from such an opportunity once before obliges us to exercise the caution which proved experience renders necessary. These are all the remarks I have to make. I think the Statement of the noble Marquess, on the whole, is highly satisfactory; but I hope that in all these matters he will not be satisfied with the mere numbers given to him, but that he will look into the figures himself.

MR. CAUSTON

said, he was sorry that the noble Marquess, in the course of his very interesting Statement, had made no reference to the Staff Clerks, to the question of whose position he had kindly said, on a former occasion, he would give his consideration; but he took that to have been an unintentional omission, and hoped that in the course of the evening either he or the Financial Secretary (Sir Arthur Hayter) would make some reference to that deserving body of men. When he put their case before the House last year, he took the opportunity of paying? what he considered a just tribute of gratitude to the noble Marquess, when he said that the Quartermasters highly appreciated what he had done for them. But unfortunately he had since then received several communications from Quartermasters intimating that he was under a delusion, and that all the benefits, which he was under the impression that they had received, were nothing but myths; and, rightly or wrongly, the Quartermasters thought that they were the most friendless body of officers in the Army. They considered that they were slighted at Head Quarters, and that their services were hardly appreciated. He was glad to hear that evening, from the noble Marquess, that every effort was being made to render the Army more popular. He was sure that the noble Marquess had every desire to include in that statement a body of men who had always been regarded as a useful body, and who had now the feeling he had described; and he hoped that something would be done to redress the grievances of which they complained. The few remarks he should make on their behalf that night he proposed to divide into two parts; he should refer to their financial grievances, and to their grievances of a more sentimental character. His remarks applied not only to the Regimental Quartermasters, but to those of the Commissariat, Ordnance, and Medical Departments. They considered that during the past 40 years their duties had considerably increased, and that they were considerably more important—in other words, that their duties had really doubled; and they considered that during that time, instead of having gone forward in the way of promotion or money, they were in a worse position now than they were 40 years ago. One of their grievances was that, by the re-organization of the Militia, Quartermasters were deprived of their chance of serving with the Militia and of receiving what they had been in the habit of doing before—namely, their pensions from the Army and pay from the Militia. They also alleged another grievance to be that they were the only soldiers who could not get any paid promotion for services in the field; and—although they performed many important field duties, and had recently shown this in the Soudan, where they ran the risk of losing their lives, and where they had lost a greater proportion of men than any other class of officers, comparing numbers—they said they were treated not as combatant officers but—he did not want to say with contempt—in such a way that their claims and services had been quite overlooked. Another grievance which they put forward was, that whereas before the establishment of the Army Clothing Department Quartermasters had been in receipt, in connection with the clothing arrangements of regiments, of an annual sum of something like £150, and whereas the Colonels of regiments had been compensated for the loss they had sustained by the establishment of that Department to the extent of £500 per annum, the loss of the Quartermasters had been recognized to the extent of £30 per annum only, by Royal Warrant dated 28th of January, 1875, in place of the amount which they had generally received. He knew that he might be told by his hon. and gallant Friend (Sir Arthur Hayter) that this £150 had never been paid direct from the War Office, but that it had been received direct from the Colonels of regiments; but the case of the Quartermasters remained substantially the same. Again, by the formation of the Army Pay Department they had been deprived of their chance of becoming Paymasters, with the very great and largely increased advantages attaching to that position. Those advantages had been considerably increased since the Quartermasters had been refused admission. The Regimental Quartermasters could formerly succeed to Paymasterships, and the Commissariat and Ordnance Quartermasters used to be assistant and sub-assistant Commissaries, and could rise to the highest grade of Commissaries. In January, 1876, before the Army Pay Department came into operation, there were no less than 24 ex-Quartermasters fulfilling the duties of Paymasters, and their grievance on this point was that the remaining and future Quartermasters were made ineligible for the Pay Department, and that the full pension which they could now obtain was £200 instead of £450 granted to Paymasters. Therefore, a great grievance had to his mind been inflicted on the Quartermasters, especially those who were serving at the time when the Army Pay Department came into operation. He would say no more in regard to the financial side of that question, on which he thought he had dwelt at sufficient length, than that he hoped his hon. and gallant Friend would consider that the Quartermasters had a substantial financial grievance. He would now touch on the sentimental grievance.

THE CHAIRMAN

said, that without saying the hon. Gentleman was out of Order, he thought he was pursuing a course exceedingly inconvenient in Committee. The hon. Gentleman was going into details on that Vote, which would come under discussion hereafter. It would be impossible to say when the Vote would be got through if the hon. Gentleman pursued that course with regard to it.

MR. CAUSTON

said, he was, of course, desirous of falling in with any suggestion that might come from the Chairman, and he was taking the present course with the object of putting the Committee to as little inconvenience as possible; because otherwise he should have placed a Motion on the Paper with regard to the grievances in question which would have come forward on the Motion "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair." Therefore, unless the Chairman desired him to abstain from further remarks upon that subject, he should prefer to continue.

THE CHAIRMAN

said, that he was not prepared to say that the hon. Gentleman was out of Order, but that the course he had been pursuing, of entering into all the details of the question now, was inconvenient to the Committee.

MR. CAUSTON

said, that, under the circumstances, perhaps, of having gone so far, he should save the time of the Committee by proceeding. With regard to the sentimental grievances, he might remark, as apart from the financial grievances, that they would, if redressed, benefit the Quartermasters' position much, and cost the country nothing. In the first place, the title of Quartermaster was originally intended to indicate the individual who carried out particular duties; but the Quartermasters were under the impression that the title was now used as a brand upon those officers who by merit and experience had risen from the ranks. ["No, no!"] He did not profess to have any great technical knowledge on this point, but he was in a position to state that the opinion was that the title of Quartermaster was a brand; and those officers said that those who rose from the ranks by merit should have the rank of Lieutenant or Captain, as other officers had, and that the title of Quartermaster should follow as a matter of course. The honorary and relative rank of Captain given to Quartermasters after 10 years' commissioned service did not raise them from the lowest rank amongst officers in their regiment or Department, and their names appeared at the end of The Army List. Therefore, it appeared that promotion from the ranks, instead of being what he was sure all desired it should be—a reality—amounted to what might be called a sham; and the Quartermasters objected that, having risen from the ranks, they, as officers, were unfairly branded by that fact. The noble Marquess a short time ago had been good enough to grant him a Return of all the officers commissioned from the ranks of the Regular Army since 31 at January 1880, exclusive of Riding Masters, Quartermasters, officers of the Coast Brigade of the Royal Artillery, officers of the Army Hospital Corps, Sub-Inspectors of Army Schools, and those who were commissioned for bravery in the field. Now, he was not going to say one word disrespectful of those men who had been promoted from the ranks; but he wished to point out that of the total number of 58 men so promoted 44 were promoted after a service of less than 10 years. One had been promoted after from two to three years' service; 10 after from three to four; 12 after from four to five; eight after from five to six; six after from six to seven; two after from seven to eight; three after from eight to nine, and two after from nine to 10 years' service: the total number of men promoted after between two and ten years' service being, as he had stated, 44, out of a total of 58. He was not going to ask why they were promoted, or make any observation upon their promotion at all, because he was delighted to see men rise from the ranks; but the Quartermasters did feel it a great hardship that, having obtained their commissions after long, good, and faithful service, they should remain stationary with regard to rank. He would point out to the Committee that, in respect of the last 100 Quartermasters appointed, the average service in the ranks had been 18 years and nine months. He said it was—and the Quartermasters thought so—a great hardship that others should, after such short periods of service as he had mentioned, take precedence of Quartermasters in the matter of promotion. For whereas the 58 men included in the Return quoted had promotion and pay open to them to the fullest extent, the Quartermasters were blocked at the honorary rank of Captain, and, as he said, after longer and probably more important service. He thought after those remarks it was unnecessary for him to detain the Committee at greater length; but he might express the hope that he had made out a case for the Quartermasters by showing that they had both a financial and a sentimental grievance. The noble Marquess had told the Committee that evening that every effort was being made to render the Army Service more popular; and he thought he had brought before the Committee the case of a body of officers which, in the interest of making the Service more popular, was deserving of favourable consideration.

GENERAL ALEXANDER

said, he had certainly expected that the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Causton) would have brought forward this question on the Motion for going into Committee of Supply, which he thought would have been the more convenient course. However, as the hon. Gentleman had raised the question in Committee, and as he (General Alexander) took a great interest in the subject, the Committee would perhaps allow him to refer briefly to one or two points which the hon. Gentleman had not alluded to. It was true that by a process of giving a little here and taking away a little there in 1881, the magnificent result had been achieved of giving Quartermasters an extra 4d. per day. There was also a slight pension increase; for whereas up to that time they had pensions of £182 10s., in 1881 they obtained £200 a-year. At the same time, the rank of Captain was given to Quartermasters who had served 10 years as such, and the rank of Major on retirement. He believed that this advance in rank was appreciated very much, and he would remind the Committee that it was a boon which cost the country nothing. But the Quartermasters would prefer to be made Captains after seven years, instead of after 10 years, as arranged in 1881. He would like the Committee to hear what was the position of a noncommissioned officer accepting the position of combatant officer, and what was that of a non-commissioned officer accepting the position of Quartermaster. While the combatant officer might, and of ten did, rise to the highest ranks in the Service, of Quartermasters it might be said—"Once a Quartermaster, always a Quartermaster." He had himself known some non-commissioned officers who had risen to the very highest positions in the Service. After 10 years' service Quartermasters attained the rank of Captain, with 12s. a-day. Then, comparing the position of Quartermasters with that of Paymasters, he pointed out that, whereas the Paymaster received on appointment 15s. a-day, the Quartermaster only received 9s. a-day, and whereas the Paymaster, after 10 years' service, received £1 a-day, the Quartermaster only received 12s. a-day. Again, on retirement, the Quartermaster received a pension of £200 a-year, while the Paymaster received no less than £350 a-year. And there was another grievance of which the Quartermasters oomplained—namely, that only one-half of their service in the ranks was allowed to reckon for pensions. Then, whereas the duties of Paymasters were light and intermittent, and were often performed by clerks, those of Quartermasters were extremely laborious and constant. It might be said that the Paymaster had more responsibility. But that he (General Alexander) entirely denied. The Quartermaster had in his possession a greater value in the shape of stores than the amount which the Paymaster could hold at any particular time. Then, as the hon. Member for Colchester had said, they felt very much their exclusion from the Paymastership in 1877. That was the work of Viscount Cranbrook, then Mr. Gathorne Hardy, who was at the time at his wit's end to obtain promotion for officers, in consequence of the unsatisfactory abolition of purchase, and who induced combatant officers to leave the ranks for the position of Paymasters. The Quartermasters were then excluded from becoming Paymasters. In 1882 the noble Marquess was kind enough, at his request, to move the Government of India to give Quartermasters serving with the rank of Captain in India the allowance of Captains; and he would now appeal to the noble Marquess not to allow a well-founded and well-ascertained grievance on the part of those most meritorious officers to remain unnoticed at this particular period. He would like to make one or two remarks with respect to the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, and he could not help expressing his regret that this was the last Report they would receive from that excellent officer (Major General Bulwer). Whatever differences of opinion might exist, and whatever views they might take of long and short service, they could not fail to acknowledge the distinguished ability and impartiality which had always characterized his Reports. There was one portion of the Report in which he was happy to say all could agree—namely, that in which the Inspector General especially condemned the system of attenuated battalions, of which there were no fewer than 35 last year. He would not refer to this subject minutely, because the noble Marquess had said, that these battalions were to be got rid of, and that battalions of 650 rank and file were to be established in their place. [The Marquess of HARTINGTON: Including depôts.] The Inspector, General of Recruiting, in condemning those attenuated battalions, spoke of the way in which they were hampered in the performance of garrison duties; and those garrison duties were very important at the present time, for they could not, in these days of dynamite outrages, dispense, as they had hoped to do, with a certain number of sentries, and trust entirely to the police. He found, in the Report, that not only did the Inspector General condemn attenuated battalions, but he condemned also the frequent change in the establishment of battalions; he wished that the establishment of battalions at home should be of more uniform, strength, as in that case a supply of recruits would in time become annually more equal, and thus a certain proportion of the battalion would be composed of men fully trained and available for duty. In other words, the Inspector General thought, as he (General Alexander) did also, that there should not be a great variety of battalions, and that their present system was too complicated. He (General Alexander) thought, if they had one peace establishment and one war establishment, it would be sufficient. Why should they not content themselves with a peace establishment of 750 rank and file, and a war establishment of 950 rank and file? The battalion of Grenadier Guards sent out the other day was a fine battalion, because it contained the pick of three battalions. Therefore, he would take that opportunity of asking the noble Marquess to consider whether it would not be advisable to add at the present time another battalion to the Coldstream Guards, and another battalion to the Scots Guards, because he was satisfied that by doing so their efficiency would be greatly increased. He did not see why the battalions of the Guards, which, as an hon. Gentleman pointed, out the other day, went so frequently abroad, should not be increased in number, and why those three regiments should be of unequal strength. He would also like to say a few words with regard to the new system of recruiting adopted in the Guards—that was to say, the three years' system established in June, 1883, and for which the Inspector General claimed that it had been a great success. But it must be remembered that this experiment was tried under exceptional circumstances. They were told by the Inspector General that all the agencies of recruiting were set to work in every district, in order to obtain recruits for the Guards, and to make known throughout the country the great advantages of that service. But it appeared to him to be a little premature to say whether the system had or had not been a success, for they must remember that there still existed in the battalions of the Guards a considerable number of old soldiers, and a good deal would depend on the circumstance as to whether a considerable number of men enlisted under the three years' system were induced to prolong their service with the Colours. He might inform the Committee that up to the 28th of February, 1,163 men had enlisted in the Grenadier Guards under the system of short service, and that out of that number exactly 173 men, or 14-84 per cent, had consented to prolong their service with the Colours. That, the Committee would admit, was not a very large number, and he was afraid that unless they obtained a greater number there would be some difficulty in obtaining a supply of good non-commissioned officers. With respect to the men, the numbers obtained were considered by the Inspector General to be exceedingly satisfactory. But what about the quality of the men; what did the General Officers of the district say in their Reports with respect to the quality of the recruits? There were 13 of these Reports, and only three of them were distinctly favourable, and they came from the Home District, from Scotland, and from Jersey. Jersey, he thought, they might leave altogether out of account, as coming from a not very important recruiting district. The general tenour of all the other Reports was that the recruits were a great deal too young, and that their appearance ought to show those who enlisted them that they were too young. The Inspector General (Major General Bulwer), when quoting the Reports, urged, with perfect truth, that provided time was given young men would ultimately become the best soldiers. But the question was would time be given? Time, no doubt, was a very important factor in the case. For instance, they heard a great deal the other day about the 3rd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade, that went out to Gibraltar with half its battalion consisting of boys, and more than 200 of them had not gone through any course of musketry. If time were given—if the Mahdi or the Russians would give them time—no doubt, that battalion would prove a very efficient battalion. He was glad to see that the Military Authorities were at last becoming alive to the circumstance that it was necessary to institute, at any rate, a partial return to the system of long service, because, instead of, as formerly, doing their very best to induce soldiers to enter the Reserve, they were now doing all they could to induce men to prolong their service to 12 years; nay, more, he was informed upon the very best authority that a man having served 12 years and wishing to prolong his service to 21 years, and thus get his pension, was scarcely ever refused. That was a very important point, and it was a most valuable testimony on the part of the Authorities to the advantages of long service.

SIR ARTHUR HAYTER

said, he thought it might be convenient to the Committee that he should state what the views of the Department were with regard to the two classes of men the hon. Gentleman the Member for Colchester (Mr. Causton) had alluded to. First of all, as to Military Staff Clerks. He had made a very careful analysis of their pay, and he found that they received on appointment 3s. 6d. a-day, and they ranked with sergeants, who received only 2s. 8d. a-day. They then rose 6d. a-day every three years to 5s. a-day, and at each step they received a very considerably higher rate of pay than the sergeants with whom they ranked. For instance, the Colour Sergeants with whom they ranked after three years' service received 3s. a-day, and they received 4s. When they rose to the highest grade they were paid 5s. a-day, as against 4s. paid to Quartermaster Sergeants; therefore, with regard to pay, they received in all the ranks in which they served considerably more than the regimental men. Now as to pensions. They received 3s. 6d. a-day pension after 12 years' service, and 4s. 6d. a-day after 21 years' service, whilst the maximum amount of pension paid to a non-commissioned officer was 2s. 9d. It had been said that there was no opportunity for these men to rise in the Service; but he found that posts open to regimental sergeants were open to them, and that if they obtained Quarter-masterships they received a Quartermaster's pay. The Department were, however, making some changes this year, which it was hoped would even improve the position of the men. Well, then, with regard to the Quartermasters. He was obliged to trouble the Committee with a few figures, because he had had to compare the present position of the Quartermasters with their position before the Warrant was issued in 1881. Now, the advantages they had received were these. Before the Warrant was issued a Quartermaster of Infantry received 8s. 2d. a-day, rising to a maximum after 32 years' service of 13s. 2d.; after the Warrant the Quartermaster received on appointment 9s. a-day, and after 20 years' service (commissioned) 15s., rising by successive increments after five, 10, and 15 years' service. With regard to his pension. Before the Warrant a Quartermaster received 5s. 6d. a-day after 15 years' service, and 10s. a-day after 30 years' service; he now received after 15 years' service £150 a-year, after 25 years £180 a-year, and after 30 years £200 a-year. As regarded pay and pension, therefore, the Quartermaster's position had been improved by the Warrant. He was also given by the Warrant after 10 years' service the honorary and relative rank of Captain, while formerly he did not obtain that rank until retirement—and the rank carried with it widow's pension and increased allowances. Something was said by his hon. Friend (Mr. Causton) with respect to promotion. Article 60 of the Warrant provided— A Quartermaster or Ridingmaster who may be recommended for promotion by our Commander-in-Chief, and who shall have passed such a professional examination as may be fixed from time to time by our Commander-in-Chief, with the approval of our Secretary of State, may be granted a commission as a lieutenant in our Cavalry or Infantry, provided he shall not exceed the age of 32 years.

And Article 7 provided— A Lieutenant shall be eligible for promotion to the rank of Captain after two years' service in our Army. Of course, it might be said that very few accepted this promotion, or would be likely to. The reason, probably, was a financial one. The pay of a Lieutenant was only 5s. 3d. a-day, while that of a Quartermaster was 9s. a-day; and in addition to that, a Lieutenant, even if he rose to the rank of Captain, had to leave the Service at 40 years of age, but a Quartermaster was able to stay on full pay until he was 55 years of age. Well, then, something was said about the rank service. Rank service was reckoned for combatant officers, and for all officers appointed to Departments of the Army at half the service in the ranks (Article 425). Thus Paymasters had no advantage over Quartermasters. He heard that one of the grievances of the Quartermasters was that they received no increase beyond the maximum after 30 years' service; but neither did Lieutenant Colonels, Commissariat or Ordnance Store officers, or Surgeon Majors, or, he believed, any rank. If half the claims of the Quartermasters were granted, £40,000 a-year would be the charge—£80,000 for the whole. No doubt, Quartermasters did not now so frequently obtain Paymasterships; but that was in consequence of the change which, after very full consideration, was adopted by Mr. Secretary Hardy. He (Sir Arthur Hayter) thought it would be a very bad step for them to raise the age for promotion, because in all probability they would fill the higher ranks of the Army with old men. Considering the immense expense which it would involve, and considering that the men whose case his hon. Friend (Mr. Causton) had taken up were in all respects better off than they were before the Warrant of 1881, it was not possible for his noble Friend the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) to entertain the request which had been made.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

said, he thought the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Causton) had done good service by bringing the case of the Quartermasters before the Committee, and he also thought that the clear way in which his hon. and gallant Friend (General Alexander) had stated the case of these men deserved somewhat more consideration at the hands of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) than it had received at the hands of the Financial Secretary to the War Office (Sir Arthur Hayter). He also agreed with his hon. and gallant Friend (General Alexander) that they were deeply indebted to General Bulwer for the Annual Statement he had made since he had occupied his present position; that Statement was clear and explicit, and gave them every detail and every information; and they would indeed be sorry to lose the services of General Bulwer, which had been of great advantage to the public. He (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) desired at that moment to call the attention of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) to the peculiar position in which they were now placed. They had had already presented the Supplementary Estimates for the Army, and they had now received the Army Estimates themselves; but these Army Estimates were not the Army Estimates which they would have to deal with presently. A very large increase was to be made in the Army, and the noble Marquess considered that the proper time to discuss this increase would be when the Vote of Credit was brought on. He (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) ventured to say that no fair or proper discussion could be raised when they came to the Vote of Credit, because that Vote of Credit would be taken more upon political issues than upon military issues. The Vote of Credit would be debated, and debated most keenly, no doubt, from both sides of the House, and, in his opinion, very little of the real question—that was the increase of the Army—would enter into view, because all the many considerations connected with the occupation of Egypt would chiefly occupy the attention of hon. Members. He asked them, was it not fitter that some opportunity should be afforded for discussing the Estimates proper, because it would be quite impossible to discuss the Vote of Credit upon its merits? He also desired to remind the noble Marquess that when they came to discuss the Vote of Credit, it would not be the ordinary Members who usually took part in military discussions who would speak; it would not be those alone who, perhaps rightly or wrongly, thought they knew something about military matters; but the discussion would be carried on chiefly by all those hon. Members who were interested, on one side or the other, in the occupation of Egypt by an English Army; therefore, he thought he and his hon. Friends had some right, before the Vote was passed that night, to demand that they should have a proper opportunity of discussing in detail the proposals which the noble Marquess had to make. Now, there was one remark which the noble Marquess made which he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was exceedingly sorry to hear. The noble Marquess said they were only going to increase the Army simply on account of the present war in the Soudan. Now, there was no man who had had such an opportunity as the noble Marquess of knowing the exact position and condition of their Army; and, therefore, if the noble Marquess were to get up in his place and say that the position of their Army was satisfactory, or had been satisfactory during the time he had been in Office, ha (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) would be very much astonished. The noble Marquess knew perfectly well that there was a great want of men to do duty in the Home Army. If there was one thing more patent than another it was the want of men of sufficient age to send out to the Army abroad, and that whenever they were occupied in any war, however small, they were completely put upon their beam ends, and were obliged to go to the utmost of their resources to fill up the Army abroad. He knew it would be said that they had a Reserve which they could always fall back upon; but he thought the Reserve had been very much damaged of late by being called upon to serve at times when it never expected to be called upon. The men had been taken away from Civil employment at home so frequently that those who willingly employed them at the outset, believing that they were not going to be employed abroad again, were often bound to refuse to re-engage them when the necessity for their employment was over. It was because he had felt so strongly on this point, and because he had always felt that the depletion of the regiments at home to send out efficient men to the regiments abroad had made their Army at home so inefficient, that he had always urged a considerable increase of the Army. That was a question which was raised when short service was introduced. It was never supposed for a moment that the Army was to remain as it was, but it was always understood there was to be an increase in the number of men. But they had a Government pledged to retrenchment, and the bottom of the whole mischief, both in regard to the Navy and the Army, and their foreign coaling stations, and their home defences, was that it was very difficult to get the money. It was because the Government did not like to raise the money that the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War was obliged to resort to the expedient of saying, with regard to the two latter questions, that when a proper and mature plan was presented the Government would be ready to take it into consideration. But, supposing they were attacked in the meantime, where would they be with their great Arsenals undefended, where would they be when their Fleet was engaged elsewhere? Their preparation at home was to be delayed until some maturity was arrived at. Of course, half a defence was better than no defence at all, and he hoped the noble Marquess was entertaining the matter more seriously than he had shown in his speech that night when he said the Government could not consider the question until there was something more definite upon which they could act. Now, he would like for one moment to turn to what was an old Army Return, but, after all, the newest with the exception of the monthly. In the Army Return for last year very valuable information was given with regard to the waste that took place amongst the recruits. The waste was still great; it had not stopped, though at some times it was considerably less than at others. In the years 1881–2–3, he found there were no less than 83,156 recruits enlisted, and that the total falling off or waste in those years was 15,579, leaving only 67,577; therefore, that confirmed what his right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley) said—that they had not yet found any means of stopping the waste in the Army. He was glad to find that this year 35,653 recruits had joined the Service; but he would like to know how many of those men were still in the Service; how many had left? He remembered very well the occasion on which the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Wolseley), who was now commanding so well out in the Soudan, boasted that they had enlisted upwards of 33,000 men in the year; but it must be borne in mind that at the very moment the noble Lord was speaking between 3,000 and 4,000 of those recruits had wasted away and were not to be found. There was no doubt that this year there had simply been a repetition of the past, and it would be for the noble Marquess to see if he could not find out some means by which men might be prevented from leaving the Service. Surely there ought to be some means of preventing the great waste which now went on. As a general rule, if recruits got over the first six or eight months they continued in the Service, and made most excellent soldiers; it was the first six or eight months of service that broke them down and cooled their zeal for Her Majesty's Army. In regard to stoppages, there was great room for improvement; free rations, too, might be given. Of course, with regard to the kit, it was impossible to give everything that was asked; but more might be done in that direction than had been done hitherto, and at no very great cost. When they took a recruit and worked him as he was now worked, when they forced him into a position for which he was unfit, when they put him on sentry and to do duty before he was really half-drilled, the man found he was in a position he did not expect to be in. Men were forced on at an unreasonable rate because there was a scarcity of men in the regiments; and, therefore, it was a satisfaction to hear what the noble Marquess said the other day—though he was rather inclined to go back from his statement to-day—that there was to be a considerable increase in the depots. How was it that the Guards and Rifles and Marines were in such a good position? It was because the men, at the outset, were properly drilled, and were not sent away to go upon duty until they were fit to be put in the ranks. Was that so with Line regiments? Could it be expected that the discipline of a regiment would be perfect if men were sent to join them before they were properly drilled? He noticed that the desertions had been 4,478—rather more than they were last year; but into that question he did not propose at that moment to go. There was, however, one question which he was in hopes might have been touched upon that night—namely, the increase of the regiments serving abroad and those first for duty at home, and the depots of those regiments which had both the battalions abroad. Into that question, too, he would not go further, except to say that he did hope that a substantial increase in the Army would be made, because it was impossible, without such an increase, for the duty of the Army in their garrison towns and elsewhere to be carried on, except under great privations to the men who had to perform it. An increase of the Army was not alone required for warlike purposes, but simply to insure the proper protection of the nation. With all their interests, not only at home but abroad, and considering the vast amount of money which the country was called upon to expend, no reasonable man could admit that their Army was in a proper and fit condition. He had a few words to say about the Cavalry, because he could only compare the proposed increase in that branch of the Service to a drop in the ocean. He was speaking in the presence of a most distinguished Cavalry General (Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Fitz-Wygram), and if he therefore said anything which was not absolutely correct, that hon. and gallant Gentleman would, he was sure, correct him. He knew that he and his hon. and gallant Friend did not agree on all military questions; but as to the necessity of keeping up the most efficient Cavalry Force they certainly were agreed. There was a most remarkable statement made the other day in the papers by an hon. and gallant Gentleman of 30 years' service. He did not know whether the attention of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) had been directed to that statement. Looking at the use of Cavalry in the present day, looking at the number of Cavalry they had at home, if there was one thing they ought to be more particular about than another it was that their Cavalry regiments should be efficient. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War could not possibly say that it was a wise or prudent thing to pick all the best men out of the Cavalry regiments and send them, as they had been sent recently, to the Soudan to form Lord Wolseley's Camel Corps; such a thing could not possibly contribute to the efficiency of the Cavalry regiments left behind. Whenever it suited the convenience of right hoc. Gentlemen sitting on the Treasury Bench, they were apt to say they liked to imitate what was done abroad. Let them, however, follow the foreign Armies with regard to their Cavalry and with regard to their Artillery. The Cavalry regiments in foreign Armies were always kept up to war strength, and our regiments ought always to be kept up to that strength. They were constantly reading in the papers of some new organization being required for the Cavalry. Now, if there was one thing more mischievous than another it would be to make the organization of the Infantry applicable to the Cavalry; for this country a Cavalry regiment must be complete in itself. It ought to be of such a strength that it could easily be increased when sent abroad, and it ought always to be 600 strong. Let them see how the regiments stood at that moment. He noticed that there were 10 regiments stationed in Great Britain from October 15, 1883, to October 14, 1884, and their establishments, if complete, were eight regiments of 469, and two regiments of 600, making an aggregate of 4,952. Now, in this one year, looking to the various losses from all causes, without particularizing such losses, they amounted to the very large number of 1,745. He admitted that 430 were sent out to form the Camel Corps in the Soudan; but they were lost to the establishments at home, and could not be considered to add to the efficiency of the Home regiments. When it was borne in mind what heavy work that of a Cavalry regiment was, what fatigue duties the men had to perform, what guards the men had to do, it was unwise that the regiments should be burdened with young and untrained soldiers. It would be well if the noble Marquess were to inspect the Cavalry regiments, for then he would see in what an inefficient state they were. Why, there was one Cavalry regiment of 469 men who, within the past 18 months, had received 255 recruits: another regiment within the same period had received 244 recruits, and a third 252 recruits. He would take two regiments with regard to which the noble Marquess had spoken as having sent two squadrons of each with the Force sent to Suakin under Sir Gerald Graham. The Hussar regiment which was first for duty, which consisted of 600 men, had sent two squadrons to the Soudan, and yet it had received 310 recruits during the past 18 months. The 5th Lancers, which were on a lower establishment, had received 254 recruits during the past 18 months, and had sent two squadrons to the Soudan. Now, he would put it to the noble Marquess whether it was possible that recruits could do their duty under such circumstances as those? He saw his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of Ordnance (Mr. Brand) smile at that statement. He should like to see the hon. Gentleman himself do the duty of one of those men—just for a week. If the hon. Gentleman knew anything of the circumstances, he would know what hard work those men had to do. He (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) would go the length of saying that at the present time if there was one arm of the Service which ought not to be neglected it was the Cavalry. There was one other matter which the noble Marquess had said little or nothing about—that was the question of Mounted Infantry. He (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was glad that the Mounted Infantry had not been turned into Cavalry regiments. He was convinced that the best men they could find in the Infantry regiments, given proper opportunities for instruction, and whose officers were encouraged to learn their duties, were the best men who could be found for a certain class of service. They ought to have every opportunity for becoming proficient, and facilities ought to be given at Alderehot and elsewhere. He would ask the noble Marquess whether he had turned his attention in that direction, and whether he had done anything to help, establish, and foster the idea that that branch of the Service was one which required development? The point was one which would commend itself to everyone interested in the Service. And now just one word with regard to the Reserves. He admitted, and admitted freely, that the Reserve stood far better than it had ever done—that was to say, they had 39,244 men in the First Class Army Reserve, and he supposed they had something like 30,813 in the Militia Reserve, making a total of 70,057. The noble Marquess had kept in the Army a certain number of men who should have passed into the Reserve, and he had also asked for volunteers from the Reserve. He thought that was a wise course to take in both those cases; but he should like to know how many men had volunteered from the Reserve to serve again in the Army? When the noble Marquess replied, perhaps he would be able to tell them, because it would be interesting to know how many men had volunteered since the order was first given.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

I have told the hon. and gallant Member how many men there were up to the 1st of January.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

The noble Marquess gave us so many figures that I could not understand from his speech how many men there were. No doubt, he gave as a figure——

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

I said that 1,400 men had volunteered up to the 1st of January.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

The noble Marquess said 1,400. Well, he was very glad to think that that number had volunteered; but he would like to ask the noble Marquess whether he considered 1,400 volunteers, out of 39,000 men, was satisfactory—whether he thought it satisfactory that only 1,400 men should volunteer from the Reserve at such a time of emergency as the present? The country asked the Reserves to volunteer, and only 1,400 responded to the call!

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

I say up to the 1st of January; I do not know how many have volunteered since.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

said, that if the noble Marquess declared that he did not know how many volunteered since the 1st of January, he would say nothing further about it except to continue in this way, that why he had urged so strongly an increase to the Army itself, and why he should always continue to do so, was because he thought that when emergencies arose, unless they were very great ones, they had no right to trench upon the Reserves. The Reserves were all they would have to depend upon in the case of the greatest emergency, and if they used them up on the first blush in all these small wars, where would they be when they had to face some great European complication? Why, they would then have nothing to fall back upon; and he ventured to say that by relying upon the Reserves as they were now doing a great mischief was done to that arm of the Service itself. When the Reserves were taken out for occasions that were not of the first magnitude, civilians would cease employing them in proportion as they knew their services were not to be relied upon for any length of time. Ordinary employers of labour would have nothing to do with these men when they knew they were liable to be taken for service in the Army on the smallest provocation, and when it was known also that there were plenty of means of increasing the Army in other ways. The men themselves must be dissatisfied, seeing that when they enlisted it was on the understanding that they should not be called out as Reserves except in case of a great National emergency. No doubt, it might be argued that a great emergency now existed; but the other wars into which they had entered were not cases of such emergency; therefore he urged, and urged most strongly, that the case of the Reserves was a peculiar one, and one that did deserve far more consideration than what had yet been given to it. Look at the cost of increasing the Army. The cost to this country of the Army itself was not to be measured by the number of pounds, shillings, and pence that was paid for it. Their Army was a voluntary one—look at the class of men they got into it. It was the making of many of them taking them into the Army. A very large proportion of them would have done nothing else if they had not enlisted; and yet even many of those who had been the very worst, when they got into civil life after their service in the Army, proved to be most valuable servants to those who engaged them. If they looked abroad they would see that the men in the Army were taken from various occupations—many of them were skilled artizans who earned large sums of money for their country. Many of the men serving in Continental Armies had been capable, before enrolment, of earning eight or 10 francs a-day, whereas their pay when in the Army was only one franc a-day. Could they compare the case of those countries with that of England? Certainly England was in the best position she possibly could be in in that respect. They were giving employment to men who probably would not otherwise be employed, and at the same time saving the nation from using higher skilled labour which could be turned to better account than employing it in the Army. He had only one word more to say, and that was with regard to a Force with which he had had a great deal to do—namely, the Volunteers. He was sorry to hear that the noble Marquess, though he was going to do something, was not going to do as much as he thought the circumstances of the case required. They might depend upon it, it was a most desirable thing to encourage the Volunteers to go into camp; and to his mind it would be most advantageous to set aside a certain amount of camp equipment for the men. All the expense that it cost the battalions when they got into camp should be paid for them. If they wanted that Force to be efficient and well-disciplined, that was the way to bring that desirable state of things about. The Volunteers were becoming a highly valuable Force to the country, and the more the Authorities tried to instil into them the principles of discipline, so much the more would they be of use to the nation. He would, in conclusion, say they would have an opportunity later on of talking about the two Army Corps, which he hoped the noble Marquess would tell them were to have all their transport and commissariat, and all that which was so essential in warfare, attached to them. Up to the present the arrangement of those Army Corps in that respect—namely, with regard to commissariat and transport, had entirely failed. He hoped the noble Marquess would be able to say that those Army Corps were to be completed in every sense and in every way. One more word. He, for one, was rejoiced to find that their Colonies had shown such a determination to come to the succour of the Mother Country. He only hoped that the Mother Country would extend to them that good feeling, and that friendly hand which at first he was afraid they had given grudgingly, because he believed the safety and security of the Empire depended upon their being a united people.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

said, that that was the time to discuss questions connected with the financial part of these Estimates, because the future occasion for the discussion of Army matters promised by the noble Marquess would be occupied, by very different matter. If the Committee was to have any control whatever over these large Estimates, now was the time to go into them. He must thank the noble Marquess for having framed the Estimates this year with the addition he had asked for last Session, by separating the Supplementary Estimates from the original Estimates of the year. In that way the Committee was able to see at a glance the increase which they made in the normal Estimate of the year. But there was one thing he had suggested which had not been done. He had asked that the estimated increase and decrease should be made on the current Estimate each year, with the original Estimate of the past year; not on the original Estimate of one year, with total Estimate, original and supplementary, of the past year, because it was impossible to form a fair Estimate in that way. He would like to give an illustration of what he meant. In this year's Estimate they had an increase on the Establishment of £722,000, and parallel to it were the decreases upon last year's Estimates amounting to £732,000. Those amounts nearly balanced themselves, and no great damage appeared to be done; but if the Estimates were prepared in the way he asked, showing the real increase of the Estimate now asked for, and the real Estimate asked for that time last year, a very different state of things would be found to exist. He did not understand why the Committee should not have placed before it, in clear figures, the increase they were asked to vote, that they might know year by year the increase that was made in the Estimates. As the Estimates were now framed they saw in large figures a net decrease of £84,900, whereas in reality there was an increase of £1,890,100. He was aware that the matter was explained at the end below the big figures; but it did not catch the eye, and they were flattering themselves that they were voting a decreased sum this year, when really they were voting an increase, and in that way the Army Estimates mounted up year by year to a very large sum; the Estimates of the country were increasing £1,000,000 a-year steadily. During the last 10 years they had increased at that rate, the increase having been for that period £10,000,000 by this system of preparing the Estimates. His contention was that they did not know what they were doing, and, therefore, as the noble Marquess had complied with half his request, he would strongly urge him now to comply with the other half. The plan he proposed would make the plan very simple, and would not cause any official inconvenience. Beyond that he wished to draw attention to one point, and to one point only. It was a mattter to which he had drawn attention last year on these Estimates. It was with regard to the great falling off of the Militia of the country. He forgot the exact case he quoted last year, but the falling off had been very large, especially in regard to the officers; but he would draw attention to the matter as it stood this year. There were of officers enrolled now 2,777, whereas in 1883, or two years ago, there were 3,290 enrolled. That was to say, the country had 513 Militia officers fewer this year than she had two years ago. Then, if they took the number of officers in training they would find that though the number of the Establishment was 3,579, there were only 2,347 at training, or a difference of 1,232. Out of the number enrolled, small as it was compared with what it was two years ago, no less than 395 were absent on leave. He could not think there was any energy in the Service and any real desire on the part of officers to do their duty when they saw such a large number of officers on leave of absence and away from training. Then, with regard to privates, he found the Establishment was 121,000 odd privates—the figures were so small in the Estimates that it was almost impossible to read them, and he was not sure, therefore, that he was quoting correctly. Last year the number was 122,629, showing a difference of nearly 1,000 less this year on the Establishment than last. How it was that the Militia had been reduced in that way he did not know; but, as a matter of fact, the number required to complete the Establishment were 2,000 more this year than they were last. The noble Marquess told him last year that he had taken steps to deal with this matter, and hoped that the Militia would rally, and that they would find that the difficulty under which they were suffering would be removed, and that additional Militia would be added to the Establishment. He (Sir Alexander Gordon) was sorry to say, however, that if these figures were correct—and he had no reason to doubt them—the depletion of the Militia was going on very rapidly. With regard to the Adjutant General's Return, dealing with recruiting in the Army, he was struck by the reference to the large number of men who obtained their discharge by purchase before the expiration of three months' service. Some hon. Members would remember that the clause bearing upon this matter was inserted in the Act of 1881 for the first time. Instead of a recruit being able to pay £1, he thought it was, of "smart money" within 24 or 48 hours of enlistment, that privilege was taken away, and it was enacted that a man had first to be enlisted, was to be attested immediately on the same day, and to have no chance of escape unless be paid £10. According to communications received from officers in the recruiting service, it was clear that large numbers of men tried to get off, but were unable to obtain the money. On page 22 of the Report it would be found that no less than £76,490 had been paid into the Exchequer by poor lads who had enlisted in order to get out of the Service, into which they had been inveigled, within three months of their taking the shilling. That seemed to him to be a great hardship. Another point was with regard to recruiting officers being allowed to act as magistrates and swearing in the recruits. That system had been forbidden up to 1881, and it was only then that these officers were allowed to act in the capacity of Justices of the Peace for the purpose of administering the oath. The recruit was made in the street and taken into the barracks; the commanding officer swore him in at once, and the man was fixed, and unable to get off without paying £10. He had protested against that system when the clause was put into the Act, and he was sure that all officers who had ever had anything to do with the recruiting service knew how unjust it was. In 1880, 1,400 men purchased their discharge; in 1881, 1,400; in 1883, 1,500; and last year, 1,751. The number of young men who acted in this way seemed to be increasing, and that, as hon. Members would see, did not tend to make the Service more popular. For the Service to be popular young men should enter it and remain in it willingly. At present it was evident that a great number of men were unwilling. He thought this matter was worthy the attention of the noble Marquess. The system seemed to be one of forcing young lads to take the shilling, and them compelling them, by the alternative of this £10 fine, to remain in the Service.

LORD ALGERNON PERCY

said, that after listening to the speech of the noble Marquess, it was impossible not to lament that the Statement made by the Minister for War differed very materially from the opinion of all officers who were at present serving in the Army, and from all those who had any knowledge on the subject. Indeed, he believed that it also differed very much from the real opinion of Her Majesty's Ministers themselves. They were invariably told that the Army was in a most efficient condition, and that they were capable of despatching a large Force at a moment's notice to any part of the Empire, and were able to meet any emergency that might arise; whereas it was perfectly well known that the real facts of the case were very different. The noble Marquess had prided himself a good deal upon the fact of the despatch of a Force to Egypt the other day without any delay, and he thought the noble Marquess said without any dislocation of the Service. Well, he (Lord Algernon Percy) would deal with that subject in a few minutes. He believed that, although there was no delay, the dislocation in the Service was very considerable, and he could not help feeling that it was rather a pity that Ministers for the time being did not meet the case boldly and state what they really knew to be the fact—namely, that the Service required a great deal to be done to it in order to render it efficient, because he was convinced that the House and the country would be willing to vote any sum that was absolutely required to bring about that efficiency. As it was, the country was paying a large sum of money for the Army, and was not really getting the article it ought to possess. They were told that a certain number of regiments were to be so many strong—were to be increased to 650 strong, and certainly the officers in the Army had thought that that would be a great improvement; but their joy was at once damped when they learned that the number was to include the depots. That made a great difference, and made the increase to the regiments very small indeed. People who knew very little about these matters—probably the House generally—would think, when they heard of a regiment being 650 strong, that it implied that the regiment contained that number of fighting men; but such was not the fact. He would undertake to say that if the noble Marquess were to take the trouble to go down and attend a parade unexpectedly—because if his coming were known an effort would be made to get together a large number of men, and a great many who under other circumstances would be employed in other duties would be brought to parade—he would find a regiment of, perhaps, 600 strong, parading 100, or not 150 men. He would find that at least half the men were recruits, who had lately learnt their drill, and not one of whom had ever fired a shot out of a rifle, and the remainder would be composed of men on garrison fatigue, on duty as orderlies or cooks, or in the other casual duty that had to be performed in every regiment. The few men left on duty would be old soldiers who were feeling extremely dissatisfied with the amount of extra work thrown upon them. The recruits of which such a large number would be found, would be men incapable of doing a great many things that old soldiers had to do, such as guard duty. A letter which had been written by General Fraser to The Morning Post on the 10th of this month, had been referred to. That officer had pointed out that many of the Cavalry regiments had had half their number recruited within the last 18 months. That was the case also with regard to Line regiments. It was impossible to describe regiments so incomplete and so unfinished as efficient. They were not efficient at all, and certainly were not prepared for any service that might be required of them. With regard to the question of fatigues, he must submit it would be a good thing if a system could be arrived at by which fatigue duty could be lightened. At all quarters and camps throughout the Kingdom, the amount of Government fatigues, as they were called, was very large indeed. All the work of the different stores was performed by privates who were taken out of the camp when they ought to be employed in drill. The period of service was short enough, Heaven knew, and it ought not to be wasted in this manner, but should be employed in teaching the men their duty as soldiers; it should not be frittered away by this fatigue duty, gymnastics, and every sort of work except that of learning the duty of a soldier. On this matter he was not speaking from his own experience solely, but he was fortified in the opinion he was expressing by such an eminent and distinguished officer as General Eraser. The fact was, that the more the present system was tried the more it was proved to have failed. The noble Marquess had expressed the opinion that the Guards' system of enlistment had worked admirably. The noble Marquess prided himself upon its success; but the fact was that that system tended rather towards long service than anything else, and certainly not towards short service, for the idea was that a man would reengage for nine years. Their system was copied from Germany; but the reformers of the Army, when they adopted it, seemed to have entirely forgotten two very important circumstances, one being that the German Army never left its native shores, and the other being that in Germany they had compulsory ser- vice, whereas in England they had to find troops to serve in every quarter of the globe, and their service was voluntary. He thought there could be no greater proof of the failure of their system than the circumstances attaching to the despatch of troops to Egypt and South Africa this year. In order to equip Lord Wolseley's Force every single Cavalry regiment in the Service had been injured, irremediably injured. From every Cavalry regiment a great number of the best men had been taken to make up the number required, and everybody knew that to take a large number of well-trained soldiers out of a Cavalry regiment damaged that regiment for a very considerable space of time. Then the noble Marquess had said that no volunteering had been necessary to fill up the regiments that had been sent out. No doubt, that was perfectly true; but then they must not lose sight of the fact that there had been considerable drafting, and that in order to send out the Guards battalions, other regiments had been obliged to give a number of their best men. When it became necessary for them to put a large Force in the field, as in the case of the campaign in the Soudan—and after all a little over 20,000 men was not a very large Force for the English Army to put in the field—they had the pleasure of knowing that the Army at home was in an utterly disorganized condition. With regard to the Forces in South Africa, they were actually employing civilians to take part in the war, and he regarded it as a most extraordinary circumstance that a country like England with a large standing Army should be compelled to have recourse to civilians for the purpose of placing so small a Force in the field. He was not going on his own judgment alone as to the failure of the present system, because he found that at the anniversary meeting of the Royal United Service Institution on February 28, the subject of the essay for the prize was—"Can the European Army in India remain as at present constituted, or should it be in whole or in part a local force?" There were 16 essays submitted, and every one of them expressed a decided opinion that short service as enforced in their Army was inapplicable to the Forces in India, and that it was impossible to maintain in India an Army that could take the field under the present system. If there were two things which militated against the efficiency and popularity of the Service at the present moment, it was the constant changes among the men in the battalions and the constant stoppages, to which allusion had been made. General Fraser, speaking of the great unrest there was in the Service, had pointed out that of 278 men discharged by purchase 175 had less than three months' service, and that in the case of one regiment, out of 169 men, enlisted from November, 1883, to November, 1884, 75 men had in that time left the regiment. It was impossible that a regiment could have any solidarity about it under these circumstances of change. Again, with regard to stoppages, there was no doubt that a recruit from the moment of engagement to the moment of leaving the Service considered himself to be fraudulently treated in this respect. He was promised that he should have a free kit. Well, he had a free kit, but he was told that it was to last him longer than it was possible for a kit to last any man; he had to replace the articles when worn out, and the whole of the articles had to be kept in order at his expense. And, again, although his clothing was worn out in the performance of his duties, he was made to put it in order at his own expense. He (Lord Algernon Percy) thought it would be well that a certain number of canvass working suits should be kept in barracks and served out to the men, and that the repairs in these suits should be made good and paid for by the regiment in the same way as other barrack damages were paid. He believed that such an arrangement would be exceedingly popular with the men. Then with regard to orderly duties, which took so many men out of the ranks, he thought it would be a popular thing if the men after serving with the Colours could join some orderly corps to perform the duties of orderlies in garrison towns, and also do the orderly work at the Public Offices. The hon. and gallant Member (Sir Alexander Gordon) had made some remarks with regard to the absence of officers from the Militia training. He (Lord Algernon Percy) took objection to the remark of the hon. and gallant Member that those officers did not take a keen interest in their duties. The fact was that the time of training often clashed with the time of examinations, so that if an officer wanted to read up for an examination he could not do so and train with the Militia as well. He thought the officers might be allowed to train with other regiments, or that some relief might be given to them under the circumstances he had mentioned. There was no doubt the Militia was going down in a certain sense; but that was due to the fact of its being made the means of feeding the Army. He would not detain the Committee at any greater length than to say that these matters might be treated and remedied by Her Majesty's Government without expense to the country.

COLONEL COLTHURST

said, that remedies had been attempted for some of the evils which existed in the Service by enabling a certain number of soldiers to be re-engaged. But those remedies had not been successful, and it was the duty of that House to find out and remove the cause. He believed the cause was mainly to be found in the system of deferred pay. Under the existing system the deferred pay was given to the man when he left the Army, but if he re-engaged it was not given to him before the final termination of his service; and he (Colonel Colthurst) was therefore of opinion that the £10 under such circumstances was too great an inducement for him to leave the Service. He thought that if the system of deferred pay was to be retained, the money should be given to the man whether he re-engaged or not. But, in his opinion, the far better way would be to do away with the stoppages of 3½d. a-day for groceries. The men were told that they were to have free rations; but the ration was not sufficient, and they had to pay from 3d. to 3½d. a-day to make it so. He thought the noble Marquess should consider whether it would not be a good thing to do away with the stoppages and give a man 1s. a-day with his food and no deferred pay at all. It was an extraordinary thing that with the inducements given of late to re-engage, and with the privilege which the noble Marquess had also given to Reserve men of coming back, so few of them should return to the ranks; 1,400 was a very small proportion of those who might have been expected to return. He was unable to understand that except on the ground of the constant changes made during the last few years, under which the minds of the men had become quite puzzled and disheartened; when the privilege of re-engagement was taken away the men regretted it, but when it was given back to them they would not take advantage of it. There seemed to be some discontent at the bottom of this; and he thought that the facts mentioned by the noble Lord (Lord Algernon Percy), and the fact that the older men in the regiment did more work than they were accustomed to formerly, on account of the recruits, were the cause of it. With regard to orderlies, he thought it would be well if those employed in Public Offices and in garrison towns were taken out of an orderly corps. There was at the present time a great need of soldiers, and he thought the soldiers they had might be left to do their duties as soldiers without engaging them in other occupations. He hoped the noble Marquess would take those points into consideration, which, although they might appear small in themselves, were of very great importance in connection with the popularity of the Service.

SIR HENRY FLETCHER

said, he agreed with much that had fallen from his hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Colonel Colthurst), and with regard to deferred pay on which he had remarked, he was entirely in accord with him. The deferred pay had been, in his opinion, and in the opinion of old soldiers, a very great mistake. He would like to bring before the notice of the Committee another matter which he knew would be met with some opposition from the Benches opposite. He referred to the Order from the Horse Guards, dated 24th January, 1885, to the effect that after the 30th of June next gratuities given in connection with medals for long service and good service would cease. He had given Notice to his hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the War Office (Sir Arthur Hayter) that he would bring forward this question. The present was a time when they must not play fast-and-loose with good and gallant soldiers. Their Army was a volunteer Army, and they wanted to get men to re-engage. He sincerely thanked the noble Marquess for what he had done in the matter of allowing soldiers to reengage; but was that a time for the issue of an Order such as that to which he had referred, which could not but operate in a very opposite direction—that was to say, against the re-engagement of soldiers? For his own part, he regarded it as a breach of faith with the men that soldiers who had enlisted on previous conditions should now be told that after the 30th of June next they should not have the £5 gratuity given to them at the end of their period of service. He knew the feeling of the old soldiers in the Army, and their views of the Service; he worked for them as much as he could, and he could not but believe that it was detrimental to the interests of the Service that that Order should have been issued which deprived them of their gratuity. He had taken the trouble to work out the number of medals distributed last year, and he found from the 1st of April, 1884, to the 1st of January, 1885, there were 880 medals distributed amongst the old soldiers in Her Majesty's Service, and that with those 880 medals was granted altogether the sum of £4,880 by way of gratuity. He asked whether it was wise, with the Army in a transition state, for the sake of £4,880 to create discontent amongst old soldiers who had enlisted on the understanding that they should have this gratuity with their medal? He would not, on that occasion, dwell longer on that point; but he hoped the noble Marquess would take the matter into consideration with a view, if possible, to the withdrawal of the Order in question. While thanking the noble Marquess for what he had done, he was obliged to take exception to one or two remarks which fell from him with regard to the state of the Guards regiment sent to Egypt. The noble Marquess said they had not been obliged to call for volunteers. But, although that was the case, he (Sir Henry Fletcher) pointed out that in consequence they had decimated the regiments at home. He thought it right that the whole system should be clearly understood at the present time. He was informed that one of the battalions of Guards which went out the other day to Egypt—the Scots Guards—had to be provided with 10 sergeants and 350 men from the battalion left at home to make up its complement on proceeding to Egypt. The conse- quence was that the one battalion left at home, and which was at that moment in London, was almost exhausted owing to the duties it had to perform. Those were matters which he thought the Military Authorities should look into. He was opposed to, and should always be opposed to, the territorial system, which he believed to be entirely wrong. He had read the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting, and from his own knowledge of the state of affairs throughout the country he was unable to agree with that Report. However, he would impress most forcibly upon the Military Authorities that they should consider very carefully how the regiments which had two battalions abroad should be best provided for. There were 15 regiments abroad of two battalions, and that was a point of great importance. He thought that before the Committee voted this large sum of money they ought carefully to consider whether the territorial system was a success, and whether they would be able to keep up the supply of men to the regiments which were abroad.

CAPTAIN MAXWELL-HERON

said, that although at the present moment, as military men, they had reason to criticize the Army system, they were none the less able to appreciate and express admiration of the great deeds and valour of their men in Egypt. No doubt, the great question at issue was as to recruiting; and he thought that while the pay of the soldier was only 1s. a-day, they could not expect to get the same article, so to speak, as they did 30 years ago, when the price of labour was cheaper. But he was glad to see, by the Report of the Inspector General, that recruiting had improved; and not only that, but that desertion was less than it was four years ago. During the Crimean War the 10 years' system came into operation. In 1854 he had the honour of commanding a company when some troops had to take their discharge. Speaking to the soldiers, whom he found to be very reasonable men, as a friend, he asked them whether they thought that in the next 10 or 11 years, by leaving the Army, they would be able, out of the wages earned by the practice of their calling, to save enough of money to give them a pension of 1s. or 1s. 2d. a-day. He believed that on that occasion, with the exception of three, not a single man took his discharge—a fact which he thought very creditable to the men. But the real question was the difficulty of providing troops for India. He had always held that they should revert to the local system in India, because he was sure that the time occupied in crossing the seas and bringing home invalided men was the cause of a great deal of loss in respect of soldier labour. He was sure it would come to it in time, and that was a question which he believed operated in the mind of the present Chancellor of the Exchequer when on a former occasion he mentioned the subject of pensions to him. They had discussed that evening the whole system of military administration, and the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) had brought some important points under their consideration. He had always considered it their duty, as military men, to place military matters outside politics. Therefore he said he did not consider that the administration of affairs in the Army was as good as it might be, although he did not attribute that to anything which the noble Marquess had done. On the contrary, he had certainly made the system of extended service with the Colours more elastic; and if hon. Members wished to ascertain how that system had worked they had only to refer to the Inspector General's Report. They would find that when the system was made more elastic, and the noble Marquess offered £10 to men serving in India to re-engage with the Colours, not one single man re-engaged of under three years' service, a fact which proved that for the first three years a soldier's life was irksome and tedious to him, because he was made a soldier only after three years' service, and in the meantime he was, in a manner of speaking, bullied and kicked about, and was therefore, at the end of the short-service period, only too ready to take his discharge. Again, as the number of years of service increased, so the number of discharges decreased; and therefore he thought that if they could engage men to serve 21 years, they would confer a great boon both upon the Service and the country in general. The great difficulty now was to have a good line of attack and a good Reserve; but he trusted that they would never have to resort as they did during the Crimean War to the humiliating and miserable expedient of paying mercenaries to fight the battles of the country. He was convinced that the present state of things abroad had been good for the Service, inasmuch as it had awakened many to the fact that neither the Army nor the Navy was in that state of efficiency in which they would like to see it. He hoped before another year had passed the Service would be improved, and that a considerable improvement would take place before their soldiers were again called upon to exhibit their courage and valour in the field.

COLONEL MILNE-HOME

said, he should not have addressed the Committee but for one point raised by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horsham (Sir Henry Fletcher) with reference to the proposed abolition of the gratuities accompanying medals for long service and good conduct. As a matter of fact, in the Household Cavalry, in which he had the honour of serving a long time, long service still prevailed. The consequence was that a large number of those medals had to be given away in the corps; and he knew of no prouder or pleasanter moment than when commanding officers had to call from the ranks men who had served during 18 years with uninterrupted good character for the purpose of bestowing upon them the medals in question. It was a very easy thing to lose character in a regiment, where temptations were so rife, and he repeated that it was a pleasant thing to award medals to men who had withstood those temptations and retained their character. Therefore, he felt it his duty to protest against the abolition of the gratuities which accompanied the long-service medals; and, in speaking on that subject, he would like the Committee to consider the kind of Circular which abolished them. It said— Until the 30th of June, 1885, a gratuity shall be paid to each soldier awarded a medal, and so on. Why, anyone would infer from the ingenious and ingenuous way in which the Circular was worded that something was to be granted to the soldiers until that date, whereas, as a matter of fact, something was to be taken away from them. It so happened that for the last nine years gratuities had been granted with good service medals, and that previous to that time there were only four such medals given away in each regiment. He repeated that this Article, instead of giving the soldier anything, absolutely deprived him of what he was entitled to. An hon. and gallant Friend of his had said it was a breach of faith. Surely common sense showed it was a breach of faith to all the men who joined the Service before the Circular was issued. The Circular was issued in 1881; it was repeated in 1882; and repeated again in January last; so that all the men who joined the Service before 1881 felt they would receive a gratuity of £5. Now, however, they were to be done out of it. Why were they to be done out of it? Was it because on Vote 17 it was hoped to save something like £3,000? In his opinion, £3,000 would be very well spent in the shape of these gratuities, because the very best recruiting agency they could have in the country were the men who left the Army, and who went back to their homes, and told their friends and companions how well they had been treated. Now, if men were sent down to the country who had been done out of this £5—he used the phrase advisably—recruiting would be very much checked, because they would tell their friends how, when they entered the Service, they were promised £5 one day, and how it was taken away from them the next. He had intended to say a word or two with reference to the condition of the Cavalry of the country; but the subject had been so thoroughly well dealt with by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), that he would not detain the Committee more than a single moment on the subject. General Fraser's letter had been referred to. That letter was, in his opinion, a most valuable production, because it put the facts of the case in the briefest and tersest manner, and it ought to be added to the Annals of the House. Every Member of the House of Commons ought to make it a part of his duty to ascertain what the real facts were with regard to the Cavalry Force of the country. There was one point to which his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) did not allude, and that was with reference to an Hussar regiment which had been sent abroad. The hon. and gallant Member said that the regiment had something like 300 recruits in 18 months; but there was one other cause for its depletion or exhaustion, and that was the passing last autumn of 82 men to the Reserve. Practically speaking, 82 efficient men, after five years' service, were lost to the country. It was true they went to the Reserve; but what, after all, was the Cavalry Reserve? With all submission, he ventured to say it was a useless Force. It was well known that as men grew older they did not become better horsemen unless they continued their riding; and, therefore, when they passed a Cavalry man to the Reserve, unless they sent his horse with him he would not be of much use if he were called upon a few years hence. Therefore, if the country wished to have efficient Cavalry ready to take the field at any moment, regiments must be kept up to war strength, and not be dependent upon any phantom Reserve such as they had in this country. It was all very well to state, as had been stated by the Inspector General of Recruiting, that not only in the case of the Cavalry, but in the case of the Infantry, there were a great number of excellent recruits, young men who were calculated to become good soldiers. They did not want men who were calculated to become good soldiers, but they wanted men who were now good soldiers. The first number of men calculated to become good soldiers who were sent out would only fill the hospitals or create scares. He did hope that the Committee would insist upon the men who were to go and fight their battles being thoroughly efficient.

SIR FREDERICK FITZ-WYGRAM

said, he would not detain the Committee long; but he did not wish that opportunity to pass without making some remarks in respect to the Cavalry. He did not propose to enter into the question of the value of the Cavalry as compared with the other branches of the Service—he did not wish to enter into the question that had been discussed at length with regard to the number of men; but he wished simply and solely to point out in what way he thought it would be possible so to organize the Cavalry as to make them an efficient body. He thought it was the duty of the Committee to take care that every regiment in the Military Service should be made thoroughly efficient. Now, he believed he was justified in Saying that at the present moment the War Department had not got a single regiment of Cavalry which they could send out complete in men and horses. That he believed to be an absolute fact; indeed, it was pretty well established the other day, when the War Department wanted to send out 400 men to Egypt, and they were obliged to take 200 men from one regiment, and 200 from another regiment. He was aware of the ingenious answer made by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) to a Question put to him on the subject. The noble Marquess said that he desired to send out a certain number of Hussars and Lancers; but if he had tried to take 400 men from either of the two regiments, he would have found it quite impossible to do so. Supposing they were to send out a full Cavalry regiment at its present strength, they would have no reserve to replenish it, and no means of maintaining it during the progress of the campaign; and men and horses during a campaign—horses especially—perished very quickly. According to the establishment of their Cavalry at the present time, the War Department appeared to imagine that Cavalry would have no casualties. The facts of the case, however, were just the contrary, because there was no branch of the Service which was so exposed to casualties as Cavalry. The very nature of the occupation of the men led to it, as Cavalry in war time were always pushed forward to the front; they were always nearest to the enemy; if any reverse occurred, the Cavalry had to guard the rear, while in actual battle they were always thrown in the front of the fight. Now, if their Cavalry regiments were to be made efficient, he believed it was absolutely necessary to add a fifth squadron to every regiment. If the money could not be found to add that squadron, he should infinitely prefer the number of Cavalry regiments to be reduced, and the remaining regiments made really efficient for purposes of war, rather than maintain a number of regiments which were inefficient, and unable to do the good service required of Cavalry in the time of war. Under the present organization he considered that the officers commanding the Cavalry regiments, and the officers generally, deserved the greatest credit for the struggles they had made under the difficulties of their service. Very much fewer complaints had been heard from Cavalry officers of Cavalry regiments against the short-service system than from Infantry regiments; yet it was much more difficult to train a Cavalry soldier than an Infantry soldier, in addition to which there was the training of the horses to be taken into consideration. Notwithstanding all that, he ventured to say that for the purposes of war, however good their Cavalry regiments might be, they were not really efficient. The Establishment of Cavalry regiments at home were six regiments of 600 men and 400 horses, and 13 regiments of 450 and 300 horses. What he would like to see done was an extra squadron added to each of those regiments, and that that squadron should consist of 150 men, but of 50 horses only. They would then have regiments of 750 men and 450 horses in the higher standard, and regiments of 600 men and 350 horses in the lower standard. He knew he should be asked why he made that proposal. There were a great many hon. Gentlemen who considered that the force of the Cavalry regiment consisted in its horses; but that was quite a fallacy; the real valuable part of a Cavalry regiment was its trained men. The horses were, comparatively speaking, immaterial; and for two reasons. Horses could be bought in this country from private trade of suitable age, used to saddle and to harness. The trade of the country would supply them with whatever trained horses they required; but the private trade of the country would not supply them with trained Cavalry soldiers; and, therefore, he urged most strongly the necessity of keeping up the number of men very largely in excess of the horses. His idea of the proper and relative strength of the two was, that in Cavalry regiments they should keep the fewest number of horses on which the riding practice of the largest number of men could be kept up. There was another point connected with the horses on which he wished to make a few remarks. It was settled at the time of the Egyptian War that no horses over 14 years of age were to be sent out; yet the allowance to the Cavalry for remounting was so small that many horses were obliged to be retained up to 18 years of age. It was true that some change had been made in respect of the first six regiments on the list; but the observation was true as to the remainder of the Cavalry regiments. He could not conceive what was the good of keeping horses which were useless for war. When the 4th Dragoon Guards were ordered to Egypt in 1882 they had no less than 100 horses over 14 years of age, and that was one of the reasons why the second line of Cavalry was so broken up, in order to replace these overage horses. They did not keep noncommissioned officers and men when they were unfit for service; and, therefore, he could not really understand why they should keep horses which were not fit to be used in time of war. Old soldiers might be of some use for the training of recruits; but old horses could certainly not be used for the training of young horses. With regard to the strength of Cavalry regiments, it had been said that it could be very largely made up from the Reserve. His hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Milne-Home) had explained that that was not possible, because when men left a Cavalry regiment, though they were, generally speaking, employed in stables, yet it very frequently happened that they never got outside a horse for years after. The Germans had fully recognized this fact, and therefore they had done away with a reserve of Cavalry as regarded their first line. A good deal was said in the earlier part of the evening as to the stoppages for rations. He wished, on behalf of the Cavalry regiments, to remind the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) of the promise made two years ago that Cavalry soldiers should receive extra clothing. The promise was to the effect that as soon as a man was dismissed his drill—that was, about eight or nine months after he joined the Service, he should be given a new suit of clothes. That promise had not been fulfilled. Perhaps he was not strictly correct in saying that such a promise was made; but it was as good as made, and he certainly understood it was made. There was another point with respect to the Cavalry on which he desired to say a word or two. He thought it was very desirable that every Cavalry regiment should be camped out once a-year. Indeed, it would be well if a strict rule were made on that point. It was not necessary to send the regiments a long distance; but they might be camped out even in the barrack yard. Every soldier, he thought, should be camped out once a-year, whether he belonged to Cavalry or Infantry, because it was well that he should acquire a certain knowledge of what would have to be done in actual warfare. Now, as to Commissariats and Transports. It ought to be borne in mind that the Committee of which he was President, after the Egyptian War, had declared very strongly in favour of training a certain number of Infantry soldiers to Transport duties. The measure was not a very large one; it would not be a very expensive one. At present, when any campaigning was to be done, they were obliged to trust the mules and camels in a measure to untrained Infantry soldiers. In the present war Mounted Infantry had been sent out with comparatively little or no knowledge of the duties they had to perform. He had seen it stated, in connection with the Soudan Campaign, that the loss of camels and horses, and animals generally, had been something terrible. He believed that in General Stewart's Brigade alone the loss amounted to 1,600 out of 1,750. It was a well-known fact that soldiers not knowing how to treat animals, or how to saddle them, added enormously to the expense of war. Ho did not know what the expense of keeping up a Camel Corps was; but he was confident that the losses in the Soudan must have entailed great expense. Of course, they could not have camels in this country; their hard roads would not suit them; but he thought it would be a wise step always to keep a certain number of mules here for the Commissariat and Transport Services, and to keep their soldiers well trained in their treatment. It was well that their soldiers should be trained to the care of mules, because they were very peculiar animals, and they were excessively vicious and nasty unless they were properly attended to. Then, again, it was very necessary to encourage all soldiers, particularly in Infantry regiments, in military trades—such, for instance, as shoeing horses. The first want which displayed itself in a campaign was the want of farriers; there always had been such a want, and he presumed there always would be, on the principle that when men were most wanted they were never forthcoming. He thought that every endeavour should be made to make every regiment as complete as it could possibly be in itself. Much had been said about special corps. Now, he had the strongest objection to all special corps. Indeed, he should like to abolish every special corps in the Service, and make the regiment furnish everything that was necessary for the service of the regiment. Take the case of hospital orderlies. Of old, every regiment possessed its own hospital orderlies; and wherever the regiment went the hospital orderlies went. It was quite possible to keep men in a regiment trained to hospital duties, and the same thing might be done with regard to Transport and other duties needed on a campaign.

MR. TOMLINSON

said, he wished, before this Vote was passed, to refer to a matter which came under his own observation during the Recess. He happened to be at Gibraltar, and he there saw a regiment of the Line, part of whom were clothed in brown uniforms, and the other in red. The regiment certainly did not present a very creditable appearance. The explanation given to him was—he did not know whether it was a correct one—that reinforcements had come out a short time ago, and when they left England there were no brown uniforms in store, and they were obliged to go out in their red uniforms and parade with the men at Gibraltar, who had only the brown uniform. He only hoped that what he witnessed at Gibraltar was not an instance of the state of preparation in which the Service was generally in. It appeared too probable that the stores generally had been allowed to run down to an undue extent. He did not think they ought to allow this opportunity to pass without expressing, on behalf of the Volunteer Service, his thanks to the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) for having considered the recommendations made last year with respect to the necessity of dealing more liberally with the Volunteers regarding camping. It was generally admitted by military authorities that camping out was the best mode of training for the Volunteer Service; but, notwithstanding the allowance made this year, it was still the fact that the allowances were not sufficient to maintain Volunteer Corps in camp, and that the officers were obliged to put their hands in their own pockets to meet the expenses. He did not think the Government were yet doing their duty in this respect to the Volunteer Service. He wished to make one observation with reference to the number of Volunteers. It was satisfactory to note that the number was increasing, and that there was also a steady advance in efficiency. He was sorry, however, to find that the advance in numbers did not extend to the Artillery Volunteers, for they had been reduced during the year from 38,889 to 38,236—a decrease of something like 500. This circumstance was very much to be regretted, because, in the opinion of competent men, the Artillery Volunteers were, perhaps, the most useful element in the Volunteer Service. They were trained in managing heavy guns, and would, therefore, if required, prove themselves most valuable. He suggested that it might be worth the while of the noble Marquess to inquire into the cause of the diminution. In his (Mr. Tomlinson's) opinion, the Artillery was a force which ought to be encouraged in every possible way. It was very well to congratulate themselves on the condition of the Volunteer Service; but they ought never to forget—and no one who had had anything to do with the Volunteer Service could forget—that after all that was said and done the Service was in a very incomplete condition, considered as an effective part of the defensive forces of this country. Until the Volunteers possessed every equipment, including transport, necessary to make them an effective body, it could not be said they were in a condition to perform the work which might be required of them. Whilst speaking of the Artillery Corps, he should like to mention a circumstance which struck him very much. He was not connected himself with the Artillery Service, but he was told of a certain corps in Lancashire that would, in case its services were required, be marched to Portsmouth or some part of the South Coast. He could not help thinking that that disclosed a defective system of organization. The primary object of a Volunteer Corps ought to be to defend the particular county or part of the country in which it was raised. If the Volunteers were called out their recognized post of duty should be the military district to which they belonged.

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, he hoped the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) would be able to see his way to take seriously into consideration the case of that deserving class of officers, the Quartermasters. It might be said that when once a man became a Quartermaster he always remained a Quartermaster. If an ordinary soldier raised from the ranks remained in the Service he might rise to any rank, even to that of a General Officer or of Field Marshal; and, as a matter of fact, there were one or two amongst the higher officers in the Army who had risen from the ranks. The Quartermasters did not receive the money they used to receive as Paymasters. A Paymaster was a much less important officer in a regiment than a Quartermaster, and had not so much intrusted to his care, because the stores under the control of the Quartermaster were frequently of far greater value than the amount of money intrusted to the Paymaster; and yet, while the Paymaster was allowed 15s. a-day, the Quartermaster received only 9s. That they felt very strongly, and it seemed to him that in this matter the grievance they felt was very just. They had over and over again applied to the various Heads of the War Department for relief; but, like most individuals who had not the great advantage of aristocratic or other influences to bring to bear upon the authorities, their prayers had hitherto been very much neglected. In 1881 the Government offered the old officers an increase of 4d. per day, and he had no doubt that he should be only expressing the sense of the Committee and the opinion of everybody who had paid any attention at all to this subject, when he said that their offer of 4d. per day was little short of insult added to the injury under which that deserving body of men had long suffered. He thought the minimum pension ought to be raised to £130 a-year. Another point which he thought ought to be considered was this—He understood that at present only a certain portion of the service of Quartermasters, whilst they were non-commissioned officers, was taken into account in fixing their pensions. He failed to see any ground in reason or justice for this regulation. Surely the time a man served in the Army as a private soldier was just as valuable to the Service as the time he spent in it with a commission; in fact, he (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) thought it grossly unfair that these men who, by rising to the position of Quartermasters, had given ample proof of their ability and efficiency, should not have the whole of the time they had spent in the Army in any capacity taken into account. He thought every year those men had spent in the Service, whether as private soldiers, non-commissioned officers, or commissioned officers, should be taken into account by the authorities when the question of pensions came before them. He had promised the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) that he would not deal with this subject at any considerable length, and he was anxious not to break his promise. There was just this other point he would bring to the notice of the noble Marquess—namely, that he thought Quartermasters should be allowed to reach the rank of Major, and that when they retired they should be allowed to reach the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

So many points have been touched on in the course of this discussion that I am afraid it will be absolutely impossible for me to make a reply to more than a very few of them. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Stanley) expressed great anxiety as to when an opportunity would be given for a full discussion upon the proposals of the Government with regard to the Army. It is not possible to predict that the opportunity will occur on the Vote of Credit, on which a political issue may be raised, which may therefore render a discussion upon points of detail inconvenient. If such a discussion cannot then be held, an opportunity will arise on the Reserves Vote, or some other Vote, when the Vote of Credit for the Establishment is within full knowledge of the Committee. We will undertake that such an opportunity will be given within a reasonable time. I trust, however, that that opportunity may be made use of really for the purpose of discussing the actual proposals of the Government, for I think the discussion we have had tonight has been, to a great extent, a repetition of discussions we have had previously, and that it would be well to avoid, as much as possible, a repetition of to-night's debate. It is reasonable that an opportunity should be given for full discussion on the question of ordnance, and we shall make the best arrangement in our power for such a discussion to take place. It may be that the most convenient opportunity will be when the Navy Estimates are under consideration. If, however, such an opportunity should not arise, we will endeavour to bring in the Army Estimates again at a time when such a discussion on the subject may be taken. Well, the right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Stanley) also asked me whether the administrative authorities had anticipated and provided for the double drain that will take place whenever the campaign is at an end and the men detained in the Reserve are released? Of course, that has been present to our minds. With reference to this point, I stated, I think, the other day that measures are already being taken to largely increase the depots of certain regiments which have battalions abroad; and in the other cases, when the transfer of men from the Reserve is suspended, it will possibly be necessary to make a corresponding increase in the Home battalions. A great deal has been said in the course of the discussion as to the organization of the Cavalry. That is a part of the organization of the Army which I admit has not come so much under my attention as the recruiting of the Infantry. It is perfectly true, no doubt, as has been stated by the hon. and gallant Member for South Hants (Sir Frederick Fitz-Wygram), that although, no doubt, the short-service system has given more trouble and labour to Cavalry officers than to Infantry officers, yet we have heard less complaint of this system from those Cavalry officers than from the others. So far as I am aware, no alteration in Cavalry organization has been made; and I am under the impression that the present organization, which has been in force for some years, has given general satisfaction to Cavalry officers. I understand that one of the complaints of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was that, in the present establishment of horses, a Cavalry regiment could not embark for foreign service without obtaining a large number of animals from other sources. That always has been the case, I think, and is the result of the system that has been deliberately adopted. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for South Hampshire, who is acknowledged to be a high authority on Cavalry organization generally, and especially on Cavalry horses, says he does not object to the establishment of horses being considerably less than the establishment of men. The remaining complaint appears to be that a considerable number of the men in Cavalry regiments are very young soldiers, and not fit to embark on foreign service. I do not know in what way that can be avoided. It has always been contemplated that a Cavalry regiment embarking for foreign service should leave a certain number of its recruits behind it for the purpose of forming a depot. The only question is, what is to be the strength of the establishment of a Cavalry regiment? It may be, though it is a question upon which I do not speak with much confidence—speaking upon it, as I do, after only a moment's notice—it may be that it would be better, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for South Hampshire suggests, that we should have fewer Cavalry regiments with a larger complement than to be satisfied with the present organization. I have never, however, heard of any such motive as that alleged for the arrangement. It has been suggested to me that the most convenient way of bringing about what is desired would be to send out two squadrons of Cavalry regiments. That appears to me to be a very practicable arrangement, as it would enable two thoroughly efficient squadrons to be sent out, and the younger men, or less efficient, could be left at home. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) says that I ought to have taken the opportunity to have proposed a large permanent increase to the Army. The hon. and gallant Member has said that the battalions at home are, and always have been, deficient, and that the wants of the battalions abroad cannot be supplied. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has repeated that statement tonight, having made it before. I have never contended that the battalions at home are efficient for immediate service; but the hon. and gallant Gentleman did not bring forward any proof of the accuracy of his assertion that the battalions at home are unable to supply the bat- talions abroad. I have told the Committee what the organization has been able to do in sending a force to the Soudan and another to South Africa, and the manner in which those Forces have been disposed of. I contend that that number of men could not have been sent out with the rapidity with which it has been sent out, and with as little confusion and disturbance of the system, at any previous period in our military history. My hon. and gallant Friend has failed to give proof that the regiments that have been sent out for service in Africa during the past summer and autumn have been sent out in an inefficient condition, or that they have not been perfectly capable of performing the duties they have been sent out to perform. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir Alexander Gordon) has again complained of the form of the Estimates. I think upon this subject we have given all the information it is possible to give. The hon. and gallant Gentleman wants a comparison drawn between the different items in the normal Estimates, and put with the Estimates of last year, including the Supplementary grant. It is impossible to comply with that request, because the comparison that he requires would be one altogether contrary to the fact. The provision that is asked for this year can only be put in comparison with the provision that was granted last year. Then the hon. and gallant Gentleman complained of the gradual decrease of the Militia. He was not in the House when I made my Statement, and I do not know from what figures he has quoted; but certainly he cannot have referred to the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting. Appended to General Bul-wer's Report was a Return showing the increase and decrease in the Militia since 1884. From that Return it seems that, as a matter of fact, there has been an increase. On the 1st of January, 1884, the number of Militia was 99,440, whereas on the 1st of January, 1885, it was 104,340. I do not know, Sir, from what information the hon. and gallant Gentleman arrives at the conclusion that the Militia is wasting away, when it has increased in the manner I point out.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

I quoted from a Militia Return dated 31st December last. That Return and that from which the noble Marquess is quoting do not agree; and if he will refer to the Return I speak of he will find that what I have stated is accurate.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

My Return is probably the right one. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will tell me what figures he refers to I will explain them. I have here a Return for the year 1884, and according to that it appears there has not been a decrease, but an increase, in the total strength of the Militia. As to Militia officers, it is well known that the great inducement to gentlemen to enter the Militia is the prospect of obtaining commissions in the Line. The chances of obtaining these commissions in the Army, through the Militia, are greater now than they were in former years. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the County of Cork (Colonel Colthurst) said that the measures that have been taken to induce the men to extend their service have been a failure. I think, however, my hon. and gallant Friend has not quite accurately apprehended what has been said. In the numbers I quoted I gave the numbers of men who had rejoined the Colours from the Reserve. They were 1,400—the number who rejoined the ranks between the 10th of August and the 1st of January of this year. But no great effort has been made to induce men to return; and, as I have already stated, the men were only permitted to rejoin under certain conditions—that is to say, they had two years' additional service to give. Under these circumstances 1,400 men joined, and, looking at the circumstances of the case, I think that is quite as many as we could have anticipated would have joined. Then my hon. and gallant Friend mixed up with that question of volunteering from the Reserve the question of extension of service. Now, Sir, I stated that the system which was established in 1882–3 had been permanently adopted. We are not able to state yet how many men will avail themselves of the permission to extend their service abroad; the Return has not yet been received. Last year 1,500 men did so. The hon. Member for Galway (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) has just referred again to the complaints of the Quartermasters. He was not in the House when this was brought on by the hon. Member for Colchester (Mr. Causton), and when the Financial Secretary to the War Office (Sir Arthur Hayter) replied. I do not think it is possible for me to add anything to what has been said on this matter. It appears to me that the position of these officers has been fully considered both by the present and by the late Government, and I fail to see that there is any sufficient ground for incurring so large an expenditure of public money as the hon. Member has shown would be involved by agreeing to the demand made. The hon. Gentleman complains that they are not permitted to count the whole of their service while in the ranks in reckoning the time they have been in the Army for pensions. Well, my hon. and gallant Friend (Sir Arthur Hayter) has already pointed out that that is a rule that does not apply to Quartermasters only, but to commissioned officers of all grades who have risen from the ranks, and that it is no grievance attaching only to Quartermasters. Seeing that that is the case, and that this is no grievance attaching to Quartermasters alone, I cannot see why an exception should be made in their favour. I think I have referred to a few, but I am afraid to only a very few, of the questions that have been put to mo to-night. I am afraid I have passed by many of them; but many of the hon. Gentlemen who have addressed questions to me evidently do not attach much importance to the answers, as they have not thought it necessary to be present.

SIR HENRY FLETCHER

said, he wished to remind the noble Marquess that he had said nothing with regard to the abolition of the £5 gratuity paid to men with the long-service medal. He thought for the sake of the Service, and particularly for the sake of those who felt themselves aggrieved in this matter, that an answer should be given.

SIR ARTHUR HAYTER

said, that the hon. Baronet referred to the question of the taking away the gratuity of £5 granted with the medals to the men who had served 18 years. The gratuity would cease on the 30th of June. The reason it had been decided to abolish it was because when deferred pay was granted for a second period of service it was thought that the gratuity should cease. There was a difference between non-commissioned officers and men, because the former were granted deferred pay during the first period in 1876, and in 1881 it was conceded to them that they should have deferred pay for the second period of service also, which boon was not conceded to the men. Retiring non-commissioned officers, therefore, would get £63 instead of the smaller sum. The men who enlisted before 1881, and who went on for 18 years' service, having understood they came into the Army on a definite understanding, and enlisted expecting to receive the gratuity, were, of course, an exception to the general rule, and he should be happy to consider their case again.

SIR HENRY FLETCHER

said, he was much obliged to the hon. and gallant Gentleman for the statement he had just made. He would point out that in the Estimates there were only £1,200 put down for this item as against £4,000 granted last year, so that all the soldiers could not be deprived of their rights.

MR. TOMLINSON

asked whether the noble Marquess had any explanation to offer with regard to the regiment he had referred to?

LORD BURGHLEY

wished to know whether the noble Marquess could give him an answer to the question which he had addressed to him with reference to the Militia?

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

Perhaps it will be more convenient to discuss the details of the Militia on the Militia Vote. It is impossible in a general discussion to give details. With regard to the question put by the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Tomlinson), the Committee will agree that I can hardly be expected to know the circumstances of the uniforming of a certain regiment at Malta; but I can promise that inquiries shall be made into the subject.

Question put, and agreed to.

(2.) £4,543,000, Pay and Allowances.

MR. LABOUCHERE

I wish to say, Sir, with regard to this Vote——

THE CHAIRMAN

I have taken the voices.

MR. LABOUCHERE

I will ask—I appeal to the Committee——

THE CHAIRMAN

I state that I had taken the voices before the hon. Gentleman rose. I had not said who had it; but I called both for the Ayes and Noes—therefore the hon. Gentleman is too late. I say the Ayes have it.

MR. LABOUCHERE

I wish, Sir, to say that I rose——

THE CHAIRMAN

I cannot allow the hon. Member to contest my ruling.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

I beg, Sir, to move, "That you report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

The Government, Sir, agree to that Motion.

Motion agreed to.

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.

Committee to sit again To-morrow.