HC Deb 12 March 1885 vol 295 cc928-82

(2.) £14,750, Diplomatic Services.

MR. GORST

remarked, that this Vote included a sum for the West African Conference at Berlin. He did not wish to call the attention of the Committee to what he might call the abnormal proceedings at Berlin, but he desired to refer to some conversations which had taken place between Mr. Meade, Dr. Busch, and Prince Bismarck. Those conversations had appeared to Her Majesty's Government of such great importance that they had laid them before Parliament in a Blue Book, called "Memorandum of Conversations at Berlin on Colonial Matters, between Mr. Meade, Prince Bismarck, and Dr. Busch." Now, it was true that those conversations appeared, in the first instance, to have been of a friendly and confidential character; but there was no doubt that the Government had adopted and acted upon the views of the Colonial Office negotiator, and therefore he did not think they could in any way throw the responsibility for what was said and done upon the shoulders of their official, but he thought that the Government must be held responsible for the course taken. He looked upon the Blue Book as a very remarkable one, and one which deserved a great deal more public attention than he was sorry to say it had yet received. The conversations took place at the time when the German Chancellor was in no very good humour with the English Government. In the month of May last, Prince Bismarck had addressed to the German Ambassador in London a despatch which probably hon. Members would never see, but which had been read by one or two of our officials, and had been called by them a very remarkable despatch. It was a despatch which he understood that Earl Granville said he had never received, and although it had been communicated subsequently to Sir Edward Malet at Berlin and Earl Granville in Downing Street, and although it was one which he was sure the whole world would like to see, it would probably never be published. However that might be, it had been described by Sir Edward Malet as a very remarkable despatch. Sir Edward Malet said that this despatch pointed out that, in the commencement of German Colonial enterprize, England might render signal services to Germany; and it said that, for such services, Germany would use her best endeavours in England's behalf on questions affecting her interests nearer home. The despatch pressed these considerations with arguments to show the mutual results which such understanding would produce, and Prince Bismarck instructed Count Münster to say that if it could not be effected, the result would be that Germany would seek from France the assistance she had sought from England, and would draw closer to her on the same lines. That was undoubtedly a remarkable despatch, and it appeared that not only did Prince Bismarck communicate that despatch to the German Ambassador in London, but that he also sent his own son to impress these considerations on Her Majesty's Government. He failed, however, not only to obtain their assent to his proposal, but to make them even understand the inducements which were held out. The effect of that was that Prince Bismarck, to say the least of it, was out of humour with the English Government, and that in all the Colonial policy of Germany from that date forward, she contrived to keep open a sore between the two great countries in almost every quarter of the world. If he were asked to state precisely what was the character of the conversations which took place between the Colonial Office negotiator and Dr. Busch in Berlin, he should describe it as an attempt to establish a "raw" in every part of the world in which a raw could be established with this country. Now, the first subject touched upon in this conversation was the Cameroons, as to which Prince Bismarck had certainly forestalled this country. The Government had had the offer of the Sovereignty from King Bau, but not having been able to make up their minds in two years whether they would take the country or not, Prince Bismarck stepped in and hoisted the German flag. There was no doubt that our Consul and the English officials there, to use the language of the German Admiral, "had not kept quite away from a lively sympathy with rebellish negroes." That state of affairs was frankly admitted by our negotiator. Then as to Samoa With regard to this Island, it was notorious that there was a desire on the part of the Government of New Zealand to annex it, and that they had only been stopped from annexing it by the prohibition of Her Majesty's Government. On the 4th of December, the Government, through their Ambassador, made an offer to the German Government that they would give an assurance with respect to the independence of Samoa, provided that a reciprocal assurance was given by Germany. Now, that reciprocal assurance had never been received up to the present day. One of the subjects touched upon in these conversations was the complaint of Earl Granville that he had not received any reply to his letter, in which he had offered the assurance to respect the independence of Samoa if Prince Bismarck would give a reciprocal assurance. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had said, in answering a Question put to him on the subject, that there was not in existence any document which bound the German Government not to annex Samoa. [Lord EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I said no Treaty existed.] He (Mr. Gorst) said that there was no document signed by Prince Bismarck, or by any German authority, which would prevent Germany annexing Samoa to-morrow. He said that without fear of contradiction, and if the noble Lord thought he was wrong, he should be glad if he would produce such document. The noble Lord could, no doubt, produce despatches from Sir Edward Malet, showing what his own Government had said; he could produce a despatch from Count Münstor, showing what the German Government had said, but he did not suppose the German Government would be bound by that, unless there was also a document signed by some official of their own. But what he complained of chiefly was the scoffing manner in which the opinions and views of Colonial Ministers were spoken of. He was bound to say that he thought a Minister of this country, addressing a Foreign Minister on the subject of the Colonies, ought not to express to him the contempt which was expressed on this occasion in respect of Colonial opinions and Colonial views. Mr. Meade pointed out to Prince Bismarck that the Colonial Governments could not undertake annexation, and that in the case of Samoa, Her Majesty's Government were guiltless of that which, by implication, New Zealand was guilty. Then they spoke of the necessity of soothing the susceptibilities of Australia and New Zealand, and pointed out to the Prince that it was easy to set their minds at rest. In fact, the conversation was practically an invitation to Prince Bismarck to enter into a conspiracy with the Government of Great Britain to carry out Imperial policy at the expense of Colonial policy by soothing the susceptibilities of the Colonists and setting their minds at rest. Having thus dealt with the Island of Samoa, the Government proceeded to deal in the most imprudent and most reckless manner with the Islands of the New Hebrides, which lay between New Caledonia and Fiji. Those Islands actually at one time formed part of the British Dominions; they were included in the Commission of the Governors of New Zealand, and they were so continued down to the time of Governor Brown in 1859, who was the first Governor who had not the New Hebrides included in his Commission. Therefore, they were at one time part of the Dominions of Great Britain. Well, in 1879, something in the nature of a Diplomatic Convention was made with the French Government, by which both countries bound themselves to respect the independence of the New Hebrides. That arrangement, which might be more properly described as a diplomatic understanding, was made without any communication with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand; it was made behind their backs without their knowledge, and it only came to their knowledge several years afterwards. The result of that was that since that date all British purchases of land and all British settlements in the New Hebrides had come to an end; but the French had gone on year after year purchasing land and occupying a position there, and paving the way for the occupation of those Islands by France. It was notorious that the Government of France desired to get possession of the New Hebrides for the purpose of turning them into a penal settlement, because they were unable to develop their penal settlement in New Caledonia. In the face of that, he said it was a monstrous piece of imprudence on the part of the British Government for such a statement to be made to Prince Bismarck that France was to be allowed to take the New Hebrides group, which would naturally fall into the New Caledonian system. To make a statement of that kind, and then to publish it to the whole world, including the Government of France, was, he said, one of the most reckless and one of the most imprudent acts of which a Government could be guilty; and the Colonial Office, as well as the Government, seemed to have had some misgivings about the proceedings in this matter, because it appeared from the documents that an attempt was made afterwards to explain away these statements. It was admitted that the circumstance had given rise to some not unnatural expressions of opinion in the Colonies. As to why the statement was made, the only reason given was that it was intended to show Prince Bismarck that there was another Power in the Pacific Ocean besides England and Germany. He (Mr. Gorst) did not think it likely that Prince Bismarck was ignorant of the fact that there was another Power in the Pacific besides Great Britain and Germany. But in order to show that this was the case, was it necessary to make this suggestion—which was sure to be taken advantage of by the French Government, who, at some future time when their flag was hoisted in the New Hebrides, would use the words to which he had called the attention of the Committee—namely, that these Islands would naturally fall into the New Caledonian system? He did not think that anything was said at that time about soothing the susceptibilities of the Australian people, or about setting the mind of the Australian Government easy; but he could assure the noble Lord that this was a subject under which the Australasian Colonies were extremely susceptible, and unless he could give to them and to the Committee the most distinct pledge on the part of Her Majesty's Government that he would not, under any circumstances whatever, allow these Islands to be turned by France into a penal settlement, he imagined that this was not the last that he would hear of the proposal of Her Majesty's Government. He wished now to call the attention of the Committee to the case of Angra Pequena, because the gentleman who visited Prince Bismarck seemed to have had instructions to try and induce Prince Bismarck to accept some Islands lying off Angra Pequena as a sufficient reason for changing his Colonial policy and allowing great Britain to have her way in every other part of the Southern Hemisphere. Prince Bismark was rather sore about Angra Pequena, not only because we had taken these wretched little guano Islands and rocks near the coast, but because he thought we were going to cramp his energies inland. Indeed, he seemed to have been suspicious of the Bechuanaland Expedition, because he thought it might be intended for the purpose of occuping some territories on the West of Angra Pequena, and so cramp Germany in. And he complained that our maps represented as a desert some parts of the country that were unannexed by Great Britain; he said that those parts were not deserts at all, that he believed there were elephants, trees, and grass there, and that he wanted "elephants, trees, and grass." The only offer made to him by our Government was that of these wretched little guano Islands. Prince Bismarck was told that there was a waterless tract of land extending for 30 miles near Angra Pequena, and that if he crossed that desert he might annex South Africa up to the 20th degree of longitude; and the negotiator actually went on to point out the 20th meridian of longitude on Prince Bismark's map as if he could not see it himself. And that was the way we had endeavoured to cramp the action of this great man who had formed a large scheme of Colonization. It seemed that Her Majesty's Government wanted to force these Islands upon him; and their action in that respect reminded one of a money lender who forced pictures and articles of virtu on his borrower. Prince Bismarck said he did not care about the Islands; that the guano on them would soon be exhausted. Then he asked this pertinent question—"Will you give me Walfisch Bay;" and the answer was—"No, we will not give you Walfisch Bay, but you shall have the wretched little Islands we have been speaking about." After a vain endeavour to tempt this great Prince by the offer of these guano Islands at the Equator, they went on to speak of the New Guinea question, with respect to which there was, he believed, a very serious raw as to the boundaries of the British and German territories. Now there, again, was an extraordinary instance of the obliviousness of the English authorities; because it appeared, according to the statement of Prince Bismarck, that an intimation that a German Expedition was going to the North Coast of New Guinea, was given to the Foreign Office; and not only that, but an Aide Mémoire was left at the Foreign Office in order that the circumstance might not be forgotten. It was extraordinary that no one at the Foreign Office appreciated that information, and the Aide Mémoire, he believed, was nowhere to be found. The English Government were willing to give a pledge on their part that they would not go beyond the South Coast of New Guinea, which left it perfectly open to the Germans to annex such of the North Coast as they liked; and the consequence was that the German Government annexed a portion of the North Coast of New Guinea, and we annexed the rest of it. We were very anxious to get rid of the Germans by persuading them to give up their position on the mainland. Prince Bismarck, however, said humourously that he preferred a group of Islands all to himself to being mixed up with other people on the mainland; but he would not give up his tract of country on the mainland, and, speaking of the great Possessions of Great Britain, he said she grudged Germany a little Possession of this kind. He pointed out that we were asking him to give up some advantages which they had obtained, in exchange for nothing at all. Then he believed the negotiator played his last card; he took a telegram from his pocket and read it. It was a telegram which had appeared in many English newspapers respecting the irritation and soreness of the Colony of Victoria on receiving the news of the annexation of New Guinea. That telegram was produced to Prince Bismarck, and then the whole of the negotiations ended by Prince Bismarck saying— You practically offer me nothing but these wretched guano Islands; how, therefore, can I alter my Colonial policy all over the world to meet the wishes of Great Britain? That was what they were asked partly to vote this money for. The sum now under consideration was to pay, amongst other things, for this wretched, abortive attempt to mend matters with Germany, which seemed to him to have only made matters worse. He was sorry to have to detain the Committee, and should not have done so if he could have foreseen another opportunity that Session of being able to call the attention of the people of the country to the unfortunate irritation kept up apparently without any cause whatever between this country and Germany. He thought it was desirable that that matter should be brought under the attention of the people of the country; not that he was in the least afraid of anything like a war, for it was impossible that there ever could be anything like a serious quarrel between this country and Germany, the interests of the two nations being so identical. The temper of the German people and their way of looking at political affairs were like ours, and both nations were anxious for peace and the progress of commerce. As a matter of fact, he did not believe that the ingenuity of the most reckless and foolish Government on the one side or on the other could by any possibility bring the two countries into a state of collision. The two countries ought to be friends. As he had said, our interests were identical with those of Germany, and the extension of the Colonial enter-prize of that nation was really of the greatest possible advantage to us. Why we should snarl, grumble, and growl, as the British Government had been snarling and grumbling, at Germany during the last nine months, he did not know. It would have been much better to have accepted the original proposal of Prince Bismarck; and in regard to their new Colonial enterprize, Germany should not merely have had the passive good-will of England, but their active and most benevolent assistance. They ought to have given every help they possibly could give to the Colonizing schemes of that country. Even if they could not get a quid pro quo, the opportunity of securing the support of Germany in matters near at home in regard to which Her Majesty's Government stood in most need of assistance, ought to have guided them. Even if it had only been a matter of Colonial policy by itself, it was distinctly the policy of this country to have gone hand-in-hand with Germany, and to have given her every assistance in their power in the carrying out of her schemes. He was aware that, owing to speeches made "elsewhere," it was believed that a better frame of mind now existed, and that the foolish policy of the past six or nine months was not to be continued. He believed it was generally understood that an official statement to that effect had been made, that they were now good friends with Ger- many, and that it was unnecessary to make the protest which, he had ventured to make on this Vote. But if there was any root of bitterness still remaining between the Governments of the two countries with regard to Colonial policy, he ventured to say that there was hardly any sacrifice which the British Government could make for the purchase of the warm sympathy and friendship of Germany in the Colonies which it would not be prudent and judicious to make. He was certain that there was no occasion in this matter to in any way infringe upon the rights or susceptibilities of the Australian Colonies. He could not quite get rid of the idea that there was at one time on the part of the Government a disposition to enter into a conspiracy, as he had said, with Prince Bismarck for the furtherance of certain Imperial objects in the Pacific Ocean, without much respect or regard for Colonial opinion. They did not want that. What was wanted in Australia or New Zealand was that the Government should do nothing behind the backs of the Colonies. The time might come when their Colonies might demand to have a voice in our foreign policy. That point, however, had not yet been reached. Their demand at the present moment was much less. What they demanded was information—that they should know what it was intended to do before any steps were taken. If Her Majesty's Government would only at the present time give information to the Governments of the Australian Colonies and New Zealand as to the policy it was intended to pursue in the Pacific, he did not think there would be any difficulty with these Colonies; but, in his opinion, the interests of Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain would alike be served by the closest and warmest friendship being kept up with Germany in regard to the course to be pursued in the Pacific Ocean.

MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT

said, he felt bound to congratulate the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) upon his very able and interesting speech, in which he had brought before the Committee and the country matters of the highest and most vital importance to the interests of themselves and their Colonies. The Committee would not be surprised when he stated that he cordially concurred in every word of the concluding part of the hon. and learned Gentleman's speech with regard to the necessity for close and intimate friendship with the German Power. During the past four years, he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had in every possible way endeavoured to bring before the House and the Members of Her Majesty's Government, who had always shown a remarkable reluctance to realize its importance, the necessity—the absolute necessity for the interests of this country—of a friendly and close alliance with Germany. The German Power, as his hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Gorst) had said, was the natural ally of this country. Their interests were more or less identical with those of Germany, and they clashed with those of Germany less than with those of any other European State. They had common enemies in Europe, and both Powers were threatened from the same quarter; and in this matter Austria was in a similar position. They were all three not only natural allies, but their interests were menaced by common foes—by foes whom he might describe as the perpetual disturbers of European peace—in the extreme West and extreme East of the Continent of Europe. It was an unfortunate fact that the policy of Her Majesty's Government for the past five years had been based upon a directly contrary principle. They had sought to lean upon France and Russia, while they had turned the cold shoulder to Germany. They had refrained from the expression of any of those warm and kindly sentiments with which they had been overbounding towards the French Republic in regard to their foreign policy. They had a most interesting official in this country—the gentleman who had been sent to Berlin on the important mission with which the Committee was familiar. This gentleman had repudiated all direct responsibility; but it was perfectly certain that he could not have made the suggestions he had made without having had a general outline of the policy sketched out to him, at any rate in conversation, by the Foreign Secretary. There could be no doubt that Mr. Meade's action had been based upon instructions received from the Foreign Secretary. It was not difficult to imagine that, before he started, Mr. Meade had been empowered to offer Prince Bismarck concessions which turned out to be absolutely worthless, and which that Statesman rejected with that sang froid so characteristic of him. His hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Gorst) had gone into some of the important "points of the Memorandum which was in the hands of hon. Members. Mr. Meade had tried to settle some general policy, and to place their Colonial relations with Germany on a better footing; and it was obvious, from the wide character of his offers, embracing, as they did, an offer to make concessions in New Guinea, Angra Pequena, the New Hebrides, the Cameroons, and other places, that Mr. Meade was empowered to enter into negotiations of a most important character covering the whole sphere of their Imperial relations with Germany. Now, before going into the Memorandum, he should like to call the attention of the Committee to a most astonishing circumstance which took place the other day, one which illustrated better, perhaps, than any number of minor incidents, the general character of the Colonial policy of the Government, A short time ago Prince Bismarck delivered a speech upon the relations between England and Germany of the utmost European importance—a speech which had rung throughout Europe, which had been fully reported in all the London newspapers, and which he would venture to say had been read by every Member of the Committee—with one great exception—no matter how slight his interest in these questions. In that speech Prince Bismarck, whilst censuring strongly the conduct of the Foreign Office towards the German Government, expressed the warmest friendship for the English people. Prince Bismarck had really gone out of his way to express friendship for England, and to mention the valuable advice which he had throughout these matters offered to Her Majesty's Government. Well, would it be believed that five days after that speech appeared in all their public journals the Prime Minister of this country was able, in his place in the House of Commons, to state that he had never seen it? After that, what could they expect from the present Government—what could they expect from a Government, the Head of which did not take the trouble to read the speeches of the greatest master of statecraft in Europe on questions of most vital interest to this country? He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) thought hon. Members might give up the whole question of the Foreign Policy of the present Government as a hopeless case. Well, he trusted, however, that they had now reached a turning point in the unfortunate relations—he would say in the unfortunate reversal of the friendly relations with Germany established by the late Government. It had been his fortune on various occasions within the past four years to ask for information on this point, and to have been invariably met by a studied denial that the relations between Germany and England were in the slightest degree in danger or even changed. He must confess, however, that this denial on the part of the Government had been much less emphatic under the present Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs than it had been under his Predecessor. It had always been denied that there was any misunderstanding with Germany, although the documentary evidence plainly showed first a change of feeling, then a coolness, and ultimately an alienation which at one time almost amounted to a breach between the two countries. He hoped that the cycle of alienation, which began with the famous insult to Austria, and went on to the publication of the confidential Memorandum between Sir Edward Malet and Prince Bismarck, had come to an end. With regard to the publication of that confidential despatch, the point was one upon which the noble Lord (Lord Edmond Fitz-maurice) should give the Committee some information presently. He should like to know, for instance, whether Sir Edward Malet was consulted by the Foreign Office before the publication of that confidential communication of November 4, or of some date between November 4 and November 10? The Government had made an impotent and ridiculous attempt to base their policy on an alliance with France and Russia; but the attempt had, happily, been relinquished, and by the stern course of events Her Majesty's Government had been compelled to realize that their only true policy lay in a firm friendship and intmate alliance with Berlin and Vienna. That alliance effected, they might hope that the constant disasters and humiliations which had fallen upon England in regard to her foreign relations would come to an end at last. Now, he wished to tell the Committee a little episode which happened to him the other day, which showed the absolute ignorance of Her Majesty's Government with regard to these matters. He had been in conversation with a Gentleman of considerable position in Her Majesty's Government—he would not state who he was, and Her Majesty's Ministers could, therefore, take the statement he was about to make for what it was worth. Their conversation had turned upon their relations with Prince Bismarck and Germany. He (Mr. Ashmead - Bartlett) had ventured to make the suggestion he was now offering—namely, that it was of the utmost importance that cordial relations should be established between the two countries. Upon that the Gentleman with whom he was conversing, said—"What do you mean? Why should we trouble ourselves—how can Prince Bismarck hurt us?" He must confess that this reply staggered him. That was the opinion of a Gentleman who might be taken as of the general average of the intelligence of the Government and of the Liberal Party, and it had so surprised him that he hardly knew for the moment how to answer. At last, however, he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) said—"Germany cannot invade England with her legions, it is true; but suppose you alienate her to such an extent that Prince Bismarck advises Russia to advance on India, and tells Turkey to render our position intolerable in Egypt, what would our position be?" This came in the nature of a revelation to the Member of the Government to whom he was speaking. Well, the sole and only reason for the long alienation from Germany was, he was afraid, a factious desire on the part of Her Majesty's Government to reverse everything that the Earl of Beaconsfield had done. The Committee must have a vivid recollection of what the Earl of Beaconsfield had effected, particularly in regard to that greatest feat of modern statesmanship, whereby, on the strength of the German alliance he had gained in 1878, he was enabled at the Berlin Conference to deprive Russia of more than half of the spoils of her victorious Campaign against Turkey. So long as the alliances effected by the Earl of Beaconsfield had been main- tained, their position in Europe was secure, as also was the peace of Europe. Their alliance with Germany was practically a great peace union. Germany, Austria, and England were peaceful States, and contented with what they had—in Europe, at all events—and it was to their interests to maintain the peace of Europe, whereas the interests of France and Russia were constantly to break that peace. Here he might say that he had omitted to do what he ought to have done earlier—that was to call the attention of the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) to two statements which had been given in the short Memorandum in the hands of hon. Members. They showed the German feeling towards the present Government. If the noble Lord would turn to page 4 of the Memorandum, he would see that Mr. Meade stated that he had seen there was a strong feeling in Germany against England, and that only a short time before he had noticed fresh proofs of it. This came at a time when Ministers were most free in their denial of the fact that there was any coldness between Germany and England. On page 11 it would be found that Prince Bismarck was reported to have stated that up to two years ago he had done everything he could to facilitate English policy in Egypt and elsewhere, but that he had been treated in a manner which showed that the actions of the British Government did not come up to their professions. He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) took it that if it had not been for the real friendship of Germany towards England, the policy of Her Majesty's Government would long ago have led to a rupture between the two countries, because in every respect during the last four years they had either neglected or absolutely gone against the advice Germany had offered. Hon. Members, on reading the advice of the German Chancellor, would find how statesmanlike and beneficial to them it had been. Prince Bismarck had told them to increase their interest over Egypt as much as they could by friendly arrangements with its Sovereign, the Sultan of Turkey. That was what the Conservative Party had been endeavouring to impress upon Her Majesty's Government during the last four years—they had sought to impress upon them that as long as Turkey was a powerful State, and remained the Sovereign Power of Egypt, they could act in that country by the assistance of Turkish influence; and that if Turkey were broken up, they could then remain in Egypt as her residuary legatee. He was afraid that the remarkable phrase which occurred on page 10 of the Memorandum would only too probably come about. Mr. Meade had told Prince Bismarck that his hoisting of the German flag in New Guinea would have a most "deplorable effect on Australia;" and he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) ventured to think that there was something else which would have a deplorable effect on Australia—a more deplorable effect than the hoisting of the German flag in New Guinea—that was to say, the effeteness of the defence of the interests of the Colonies by Her Majesty's Ministers. It was impossible to exaggerate the utter absurdity and impotence of the conduct of negotiations by Her Majesty's Government, as illustrated by their own Memoranda. A telegram had been received which contained a protest, in the name of Australia, against the British Government for not saving her from danger and disgrace, so far as New Guinea was concerned, and declaring that the bitterness of feeling which had been engendered would not die out for generations. The Committee knew also that Resolutions had been carried in Australia, urging the retirement of the present Colonial Minister from his position, and he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) was strongly of opinion that such a course was most desirable. Hon. Members heard a great deal about Tory legacies; but it seemed to him that the only Tory legacy the Government or the Liberal Party had a right to complain of was the present Head of the Colonial Office (the Earl of Derby). Hon. Members would probably agree with him in that view. When they remembered how easy it would have been for Her Majesty's Government to have forestalled Germany in the matter of New Guinea, and that without raising the slightest ill-feeling in Germany, because Germany was a Power which always recognized faits accompli. If Her Majesty's Government had taken possession of unoccupied land two years ago, and if the Earl of Derby had not deliberately quashed the annexation by Australia, without any apparent reason, the whole difficulty with regard to New Guinea would have fallen to the ground. The Australian Colonies would have got what they wanted, and we should not have been placed in our present position. He found the strongest evidence in the Papers that Her Majesty's Government had only to raise their little finger to secure the possession of New Guinea for Australia, and that it would have been as easy to have obtained it as it would have been by a simple telegraphic message to have saved the life of Hicks Pasha. Mr. Meade, in one of his despatches, stated that Her Majesty's Government, if they had cared to, could have accomplished the thing in a few hours. It was evident that Her Majesty's Government had incurred the danger of falling between two stools—namely, Prince Bismarck and the Colonies. As to the interpretation put upon Mr. Scott's despatch, the document was clearly a very important one. Her Majesty's Government had declared their policy with regard to New Guinea—a subject which was of vital interest to the Australian Colonies; but it was clear that that despatch was so indistinctly written that Her Majesty's Government and Prince Bismarck found themselves able to place perfectly contrary interpretations upon it. What could the Committee think of a Government which wrote such despatches as that? That the Government were practised in writing despatches they knew from the statement of Prince Bismarck the other day. He had said that within the past six or eight months he had received from the British Foreign Office no fewer than 128 despatches. He had said that owing to some fault, not his own, Her Majesty's Ministers had, since July last year, written him 128 despatches, which was more than he had received from all the other Powers put together in six years. That showed the way in which the business of this country was conducted. The greatest distinctness was necessary in despatches. Yet it was to be feared that many others of these documents were as indistinct in their meaning as the one referred to. Prince Bismarck had gone further than charging our Ministry with indistinctness, and had said that we had full warning of what was coming. If Prince Bismarck's statement was correct, it placed Her Majesty's Go- vernment in a very awkward position indeed, because it made them responsible for statements which were directly in the face of the facts as viewed by the German Government. Prince Bismarck said that Count Münster had been ordered to tell them that this German Expedition to New Guinea was about to be sent. He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had not come down prepared for this debate that night, otherwise he should have had with him all the replies of Ministers during the Autumn Session, which, he thought, were in contradiction to the statement of Prince Bismarck that they had full warning of the German Expedition. That was a point upon which there could be very little doubt indeed. Either Count Mü;nster did tell them that this Expedition was going to New Guinea in July, or he did not. As to the apology which had been offered to Germany in "another place," he desired to say this—that he did not wish to criticize it in an unfavourable spirit, because, in view of their policy all over the world, and in view of the necessity of their making friends, that statement had a good deal of statesmanship in it. His respect for Earl Granville had been increased by the frankness with which he had made the apology. But he did not believe that Earl Granville was as responsible for the state of things which had rendered that apology necessary as the Prime Minister. He believed it had been hopeless perversity on the part of the Prime Minister which had driven them further and further away from Germany, and had prevented their Foreign Office from carrying out any manly policy, and had put the unfortunate Foreign Minister in the position of offering himself up as a scapegoat on the altar of the Prime Minister's remarkable blundering in connection with all their foreign relations. Though he regretted that an English Foreign Minister should be obliged to apologize to any Foreign Power, yet, as he had said, he could not criticize Earl Granville's apology in any unfriendly spirit. He would call attention to only two points in connection with their relations with Germany on this Colonial question. As to Angra Pequena, the whole case might be put into a nutshell. The despatches extended over more than two years. They began with a proposition from Germany that we should be responsible for the protection of German subjects in a certain portion of South-West Africa; they went on to a repudiation on the part of Her Majesty's Government of Her Majesty's Sovereignty over that district, or the right of interference there; they went on to a statement that if Germany ventured to interfere to protect her own subjects in a place where we had repudiated responsibility, it would be an unfriendly act on the part of Germany; and had concluded with the humiliating finale that England, who had refused to protect German subjects in Angra Pequena, begged Germany to protect British subjects there. So with regard to Fiji. They repudiated and refused to recognize the German claims in the first place, and in the end finished by accepting them—by doing the very thing which at the outset they refused to do. The case of New Guinea was equally bad. They had an opportunity, two years ago, of endorsing the statesmanlike action of the Colonies. They neglected to do it, and not only that, but squashed the annexation, and they now found themselves obliged to make an apology to retain the friendship of Germany, which was perfectly secure when the present Government came into power and which Her Majesty's Government might have retained with ease, but had lost by a series of unparalleled blunders. That was the position. He shared the opinion of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) that the great concessions which he understood were being made to Germany, in order to undo the long course of blundering which Her Majesty's Government had gone through, were not excessive in view of the critical position in which they now stood in Europe and Asia. To maintain the vital interests of this country in preserving the German alliance they were sacrificing a certain strip of territory on the Western Coast of Africa. He hoped those sacrifices would be as small as possible. He was not estimating them at a large amount in order to complain of them, so much as to enumerate what they were, and to show that the friendship of Germany was really worth something. They were making these concessions on the West Coast of Africa and in New Guinea, and the latter would raise a bitter feeling in their Australian Colonies. It should ever be remembered that they owed their Australian Colonies the deepest debt of gratitude for the patriotic and noble way in which they had come forward to support the interests of the Empire in a great crisis. The recent offers of military aid on the part of the Australian and North American Colonies was in striking contrast with the cold, neglectful, snubbing, and disintegrating policy which had been pursued by the Liberal Party during the last 20 years and longer, and especially by the present Government. The action of the Colonies had struck a warm and grateful chord in the hearts of Englishmen; and it was very hard, when all felt how close the bonds of the union between the Home Country and the Colonies were being drawn, and when everyone wished that those bonds should be drawn more close and intimate and permanent, that owing to the impotence of the present Government, the Colonies should be obliged to recall the fact that considerable interests of theirs were injuriously affected by the irritation between Her Majesty's Government and Germany. But he sincerely trusted that Colonial feeling on this matter would be as moderate as possible, and would be directed not against Germany and the Home Country, but against Her Majesty's Ministers, who were responsible for the difficulties of the present position. He hoped that the Colonies would be satisfied with making a protest against Her Majesty's Ministers in this respect, and not allow these misfortunes, which were deeply deplored, which the Conservative Party conceived to be wholly unnecessary, and which could have been easily avoided by foresight and courage, to alienate Colonial good feeling from them. It would be far better to sacrifice a Secretary of State for the Colonies, or half-a-dozen Ministers for the Colonies, than that Colonial feeling should have cause to be permanently irritated against the Home Country. He thanked the Committee for the indulgence it had shown him in allowing him to make these remarks. He had frequently endeavoured to impress upon Her Majesty's Government the great importance of preserving not merely an external appearance of cordiality with Germany—beoause it might be easy to smooth over the wrinkles produced in this matter in course of time—but of going at this question in a root-and-branch spirit. He agreed that they must establish more cordial relations with Germany if they wished to succeed in Egypt or anywhere else. They must sacrifice the rooted ideas of the Prime Minister and other Members of the Cabinet as to Russia and France, and make up their minds that Germany was their ally, and that their policy must be based upon an alliance with Germany. They must give up from the bottom to the top all this hopeless attempt to purchase a worthless alliance with the unstable Republic of France by concession after concession, for which no compensation or return whatever was obtained. Such folly only alienated from them the stable Monarchies of Austria and Germany, and threatened the interests of England in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. If he were assured that Her Majesty's Government realized the vital importance of the German alliance, and were determined to base their policy for the future upon that alliance, he should not be dissatisfied with the concessions which had been made to Germany. If it should turn out in the result that there was still no settled policy on the part of this Government to bring about a union and alliance with Germany, but merely a temporary attempt to buy off German hostility in certain parts of the world, then they would have to complain that Her Majesty's Government had sacrificed in vain not only the interests of the Colonies, but also of their own country.

MR. ONSLOW

said, he thought the Committee must have been satisfied and pleased with the two speeches which had been made on this subject from this side of the Committee, and the more so because both of the speeches were very moderate indeed in their tone. He hoped that whatever he might have to say on this subject would be characterized, at all events for the present, by the same moderation which was observable in the remarks of his hon. Friends. His hon. Friend the Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had ever since 1880 been persistently bringing before the notice of the House this question of the friendly alliance between this country and Germany. Nearly every time that the hon. Gentleman had had an opportunity of bringing forward the question he had been met by jeers from hon. Gentlemen occupying seats below the Gangway on the Ministerial side of the House; but he thought that, judging from what had transpired in the past, and from what was transpiring now, the Committee and the country would agree that his hon. Friend had been persistently right in that portion of his foreign policy. ["Oh, oh!"] The hon. Member who cried "Oh, oh!" had been one of the most persistent jeerers of the hon. Member for Eye ever since that hon. Gentleman had occupied a seat in the House. He (Mr. Onslow) was sure of this—that his hon. Friend's desire to obtain a friendly and stronger alliance with Germany bad been perfectly consistent throughout, and had been justified by the facts which were now before them. Well, now, what were they to say about the Papers which were now the subject of discussion by the Committee? The hon. Gentlemen (Mr. Gorst and Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had so thoroughly exhausted the subject dealt with by those Papers that he need not make any quotations from them; but what he would say was this—that there was no man who had ever been at the head of affairs in any European country who had, judging from his despatches, both public and quasi- private, so persistently endeavoured to be friendly with England as Prince Bismarck. Every despatch contained in the Blue Book just issued showed that Prince Bismarck's primary wish had been to be on the most friendly terms with this country; and it had only been by the persistent stubbornness of Her Majesty's Government that the friendly relations between the two countries had been at all estranged—stubbornness, the one result of which was the great fiasco displayed in the apologies of Earl Granville in the other House, a fiasco which, in his (Mr. Onslow's) opinion, did not redound to the credit and honour of this country. He hoped things were now changed; he hoped that bygones would be bygones, and that nothing had been done that would permanently estrange Prince Bismarck or the German people from this country, because if they were to hold their own in Europe, and maintain their Empire intact, it was utter madness for them to think they could do so without the assistance, or at least the cordial friendship, of Germany. As to the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) who was now the Head of the Colonial Office, he (Mr. Onslow) was sure there were many who would like to use strong words. He did not think the noble Earl, when he was Foreign Secretary under a previous Government, did the country much good, and he did not think that the noble Earl had done this Liberal Government much good as Colonial Secretary. All he (Mr. Onslow) could say was, reading history as he did, and knowing a little of the Colonial and Foreign policy of this country, that if they had had such men in the past as in the present, they never could have made the Empire what it was. ["Oh, oh!"] Of course, he was not speaking of the Earl of Derby privately, but concerning his political character, and he maintained that if they were to have many more of such men, be they Liberal or Conservative, they would never be able to hold or maintain their Empire. He could not understand how the noble Earl could retain Office after the snubbing he had received on all sides from Australia——

THE CHAIRMAN

Does the hon. Gentleman mean to connect his observations with the West African Conference, because I must remind him that that is the subject before the Committee?

MR. ONSLOW

said, he did propose to connect his observations with the subject before the Committee—namely, the German annexations in New Guinea, and he thought he was perfectly within Order in doing so. He would not say more about the policy of the Earl of Derby than this—that it seemed to be utterly inconsistent that one who had been so treated by Germany and by our own Colonies could possibly remain a moment longer in any Government. But that, however, was a matter for the Earl of Derby himself. He was sure no one who loved the Empire—as he hoped all hon. Members did—would wish the Colonial Office henceforth to be filled by a noble Earl or a right hon. Gentleman of the calibre of the Earl of Derby. There was an item in the Vote to which he wished to call the attention of Her Majesty's Government. It was the item of £2,500 set down for the Earl of Northbrook's Mission to Egypt. Now, he was one of those who did not care how much they spent on missions of that kind, if such missions were only successful; but when they came to think that all this money had been spent on a mission that was utterly abortive, which had led to no good result whatever, he thought they should have some explanation from the Government, especially as the Report of the Earl of Northbrook was not before the House or the country; he thought they had a right to some explanation from the Government how it was so large a sum was spent by the Earl of Northbrook in so short a time, and, as it appeared, to no advantage. It might be said that the Earl of Northbrook's was a very difficult mission. He recollected that, at the time it was announced that the Earl of Northbrook was to be sent to Egypt, the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister said he was to be sent with the full authority of the Cabinet; that they could send no one better, as the Earl of Northbrook was a Cabinet Minister, and thoroughly understood the views of his Colleagues. It was a very remarkable thing that, if the noble Earl did understand the views of the Cabinet, the Report he drew up upon his return had not yet been brought to light; even at the present time it was not certain whether the Government intended to publish the Report or not; they had given no definite assurance that they would do so. It was only due to the country that one or other of Her Majesty's Ministers should tell Parliament whether they had got a quid pro quo for the expenditure of the sum now asked for. The Earl of Northbrook was away for a very short time—two months or three at the outside; even if he were away for the outside period mentioned, he (Mr. Onslow) would like to know how it was that so large a sum as £2,500 was expended? They knew, of course, that the Earl of Northbrook travelled a great deal; they knew that he had Private Secretaries with him, and that, of course, there would sure to be many incidental expenses, and he was certain that no one would grudge a halfpenny of the money—in fact, that they would not have grudged £5,000, or even £10,000—if the Earl of Northbrook's visit had led to a successful solution of the Egyptian difficulty; but, in his opinion, the effect of the Earl of Northbrook going to Egypt had only tended to embitter the feeling of the Egyptians against us; it had only tended to alienate still further the common people of Egypt from the ruling power, which was prac- tically this country. Now, he wished to address a few words to the Committee upon what had become, he must admit, a very delicate subject. He had taken, as, no doubt, many hon. Gentlemen knew, the deepest interest in Sir Peter Lumsden's mission to Afghanistan. He put last Session several Questions which he thought to the point on the subject—first to his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. J. K. Cross), and then when he, in common with others, thought the replies of the hon. Gentleman were not very satisfactory, or did not elucidate matters, he thought it desirable to put Questions to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister admitted, in answer, that the matter was of great importance. It had turned out, everyone would admit, a matter of the gravest importance, and he (Mr. Onslow) did not intend to go into the minutiæ of the mission of Sir Peter Lumsden; he did not wish to discuss what was the present policy of Her Majesty's Government; but he hoped the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister would not think he was going too far when he asked how it was that Sir Peter Lumsden undertook so important a mission without all the details being arranged beforehand; how it was that when he arrived upon the Afghan Frontier, the Russian Commissioner was not there to meet him, but was somewhere, it was believed, in Russia? The country had a right to know how it was that it was not arranged that the Russian Commissioner should meet General Lumsden, not exactly on the very day he arrived on the Frontier, but, at all events, within a reasonable time of his arrival. He assured the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister that there were many people in England who considered the conduct of Russia to amount to a gross insult to this country; not only that, but he assured the Prime Minister that the conduct of Russia had been considered by the people of India to be a great insult. He did not wish to go into the policy of masterly inactivity with regard to Afghan affairs which had been adopted by Liberal Governments; but he did wish to point out to the Government that there were many of them sitting on the Conservative Benches who looked with the gravest suspicion on the mission of General Lumsden. He did not wish at all to embarrass the Govern- ment in any way; but he asserted that the Committee ought to know somewhat definitely what were the instructions given to General Lumsden, and how it was that the Russians, who they were told had promised to meet General Lumsden on the borders of Afghanistan, were now Heaven knew where. It was of very serious moment indeed to the people of England that General Lumsden should have been sent on a fool's errand. The question of the advance of Russia and of General Lumsden's mission was now the talk of every bazaar throughout the length and breadth of India, and the Natives of India were asking themselves why the Queen's Government, at the present time, were allowing General Lumsden and his Mission to eat their heads off, as it were, on the borders of Afghanistan, and the Russians had not come out to meet them according to arrangement? It had been said that this question might be settled by a Conference of the Powers. He had seen that hinted; but he hoped that that was not to be the policy of Her Majesty's Government. This question had nothing whatever to do with the other European Powers; it was a question entirely between England and India and Russia. For the moment he would put India aside, and say that it was a matter entirely between England and Russia; it was a matter on which they had no right to ask Germany, or Prance, or Italy to interfere; they ought to undertake the responsibility—the very grave responsibility—upon their own shoulders; and he trusted Her Majesty's Government did not intend to relegate their duties to any other Foreign Potentate, or to a Conference of the European Powers. He was the last person in the world to endeavour to embarrass Her Majesty's Government in a difficult matter of this kind, and the Questions he had put on the Paper he had simply asked with the intention of getting some information from Her Majesty's Government. His simple wish was that the Government should take the Committee and the country into their confidence. He, in common with others in the House and in the country, was pleased when he heard the Prime Minister say that this was a National policy; he only hoped and trusted that the Prime Minister's idea of a National policy, as regarded Russia and India, was the same as his (Mr. Onslow's) own. He trusted that the Government of this country would put its foot down at the present time as firmly as possible, because it was of paramount importance to the interests of England and of India that they should do so. He trusted also that when the time came for a settlement of these grave questions, Her Majesty's Government would, as far as laid in their power, see that the settlement was a permanent one. It was no use patching up a matter for a time, by some means or other, and he thought it was quite possible that those means could be found. The Russian Government should be led to understand that whatever Treaty was made, if there was to be a Treaty, it should be final and definite. He hoped he would not be considered as travelling beyond the limits of the question at issue when he said that the people of this country rejoiced to hear that the Ameer of Afghanistan was to meet the Viceroy in India. He thought that that might be—he hoped it would be—an augury of peace for the future. At the same time, he was not quite sure that it was safe for the Ameer to leave his country at the present state of affairs. He sincerely hoped there would be some definite, some final conclusion of this unhappy state of things, which had been worrying India for many years past, and which had been worrying successive English Governments for many years past. He, for one, had always been opposed to what was called a policy of masterly inactivity. For such a policy the day had long gone by; and he hoped that for the future they would show the people of India and the people of Russia that they would not allow Russia to invade one atom of Afghan territory. While upon this subject, he would like to renew a Question he put to the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) not long ago. It was whether India was to pay the whole cost of Sir Peter Lumsden's mission? He had understood from the noble Lord that India was so to do; but in this Vote he noticed an item of £1,650 was set down for the Afghan Boundary Commission. He would like to know how such a sum came into this Vote? He was not at all sure that it was politic to allow India to pay anything at all towards the expenses of this mission; but, of course, there were things to be said on both sides of the question. In conclusion, he could only once more say most emphatically that, notwithstanding the Votes the Committee were now asked to pass were somewhat high, he would not grudge one halfpenny of them if there was to be any success; if the payment of this money was to insure their rights in India, and to insure their rule over Egypt. The Government ought not to ask the country to fritter away its money upon missions which, up to date, had turned out purely abortive.

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE

Sir, the discussion which has been raised has travelled over a very great number of points. I, of course, make no complaint against the hon. Gentlemen who have raised this discussion, although, no doubt, they felt that a discussion of a particular Vote in Committee of Supply was hardly the most convenient opportunity for raising some of the questions which they wished to bring forward. They stated they would not have done so if they had had any other opportunity. At the same time, Sir, the discussion, because we are in Committee of Supply, has been, to a great extent, one of detail. The hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), who opened the debate, mentioned a great number of points connected with various questions common to both the Colonial and Foreign Offices which have for the last few months attracted a considerable amount of attention. The hon. Member (Mr. Onslow) who has just sat down devoted most of his speech to the subject of Afghanistan; while the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) touched very nearly upon every conceivable subject which it is possible to mention in a speech relating to Foreign or Colonial affairs. He commenced his speech by an account of a discussion which he had with a Gentleman outside this House, who, he said, was a distinguished Member of the Liberal Party, and he treated us to such an alarming and lamentable picture of the condition to which that Gentleman was reduced after the discussion with him, that I really feel myself in a state of trepidation in following the hon. Gentleman. Notwithstanding, I shall attempt to touch upon some of the points which the hon. Gentleman raised. Now, with regard to nearly all of those points, there was one common and general proposition. The whole of the points brought forward by the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) and the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) were all urged with the view of showing that there had been, according to them, a lamentable indifference on the part of Her Majesty's Government to securing the friendship and goodwill of Germany. Now, on many occasions last year I had to contend in this House against these assertions of the hon. Member for Eye and other hon. Members with regard to our relations with Germany. They have asserted, over and over again, that Her Majesty's Government has shown, not merely indifference to the friendship of Germany, but almost a positive desire to incur the enmity of that great country. I have denied that on previous occasions, and I deny it again; and I assert that no proof has ever been adduced, either on previous occasions or on this occasion, that Her Majesty's Government has shown itself insensible of the importance of the friendship of that country. There would, no doubt, be a certain temptation to follow out the various lines of argument which were indicated by the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) and the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), and to show, with regard to these different questions—the questions of Angra Pequena and New Guinea—that the allegations of the hon. Gentlemen were not justified by facts. But it seems to me, that at a moment when, to the great satisfaction of all parties—to the House and to the country in general—an announcement was made to-day in Parliament, showing that whatever slight misunderstanding may have arisen between the two countries in the past, that misunderstanding has now been happily settled, would not be the most favourable to go back upon these questions, and to open up the discussions which have now been brought to a happy and successful termination, and thereby accomplish what, it occurred to me, was the object of the speech of the hon. Member for Eye—namely, to widen again whatever unfortunate difference may have existed between the two countries. On certain points the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), I think, gave a very remarkable proof of how entirely animated he is on these questions by Party; because, having devoted nearly the whole of his speech, to an elaborate argument to show the importance of the friendship and goodwill of Germany, he, towards the end of his speech, alluded to the statements that have recently been made to Parliament with regard to the removal of this unfortunate misunderstanding, and in connection with that he alluded to the question of the Cameroons and the settlement which has been reported in certain newspapers on the authority of a telegram from Berlin. When he came to the question of the Cameroons, and the reported settlement, he turned round and began to accuse the Government of a surrender of valuable British interests to the Germans, although he had immediately before been telling us that we had committed the very greatest folly on the Coast of Africa in not doing everything we could to welcome German extension and German Colonization. What struck me also as inconsistent in the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) was, that he said that anybody reading these Papers would be led to suppose we had almost entered into a conspiracy with Prince Bismarck, he having previously been showing how lamentably indifferent we had been to the friendship and goodwill of Prince Bismarck. I do not understand how, at one and the same time, you can enter into a conspiracy with Prince Bismarck, directed, as the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Gorst) thought, against our own Colonies, and also show complete indifference to the friendship and goodwill with the person with whom you are entering into a conspiracy. That appeared to me to be a great inconsistency on the part of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chatham. Then, again, he touched upon the question of the despatch of the 5th of May, and also of the Memorandum which was said to have been delivered to Earl Granville at an early date last year; and he really appeared to me to trench rather closely upon what may be called the courtesies of debate which exist, not only among Members of this House, but between Members of this House and those who sit in "another place;" because I may remind the Committee that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville) has quite recently made a very clear statement in regard to these questions, which has been accepted by persons of all Parties in this country and in foreign lands. The hon. and learned Member (Mr. Gorst) appeared to me, by the manner in which he chose his words, rather to impute, or cast some doubt upon, the accuracy of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs' statement.

MR. GORST

I am sure the noble Lord will allow me to say that, whatever my manner may have been, it was very far indeed from my intention to cast any doubt upon a statement of Earl Granville.

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE

I, of course, accept the hon. and learned Gentleman's disclaimer; but my hon. and learned Friend was certainly understood by many in the House to be aiming his argument to the statement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and if he was not, I really do not understand what the point of his observations was, because, if he accepted the statement recorded in this Blue Book, and repeated in "another place" by the Secretary of State for Foreigh Affairs, and by myself in this House, he must know that the despatoh of the 5th of May was never received at the Foreign Office, and that the Memorandum was never given to Earl Granville by Count Münster. If he accepts that statement, I do not understand what the aim of the exordium of his speech was. The hon. and learned Member also alluded to the question of Angra Pequena, and the question of the Cameroons. I really do not understand whether he desires to re-open the question of Angra Pequena; at one moment I thought he did. He alluded to an assertion, an entirely unfounded one, that we had desired to shut up the Germans within a narrow strip of land along the coast; and then he proceeded from that to point to the Cameroons, and he said we had proceeded there on an ungenerous policy with regard to the Germans; that we had desired to hem them in; and in that manner had excited the ill will of the German Government. I may state that such an idea, if it exists in the mind of my hon. and learned Friend, is an en- tirely mistaken one. The Government have had no wish whatever to shut the Germans in to a narrow strip of land along the coast; on the contrary, the Government were perfectly willing that, in the future, the German Colonists should be free to penetrate into the interior, and no doubt, as time goes on, they will do so; and if in those regions, which no doubt are inhospitable, German Colonization developes a thriving civilization, as it has in other parts of the world, no one will rejoice more than Her Majesty's Government. I repeat the words of the Prime Minister in Scotland—I quote from memory—"There is plenty of room in this great world for English Colonists and German Colonists." It is a matter of fact known to everybody who has given any attention to the history of Colonization, almost everywhere in the world, and especially in America, where English and German Colonists have found themselves neighbours, that they have been on the most friendly terms. But, Sir, with regard to the Cameroons. I was astonished that the hon. and learned Gentleman, considering the many minute points he raised in the course of his speech, did not notice, in the Blue Book presented in regard to the Cameroons, that there was a despatch that clearly showed the goodwill of Her Majesty's Government to the German Colonists in that part of the world. It is the Despatch, No. 57, of the 23rd of October, in which it is recorded that Her Majesty's Government would be glad to see an extension of the German Settlement in the South until they touched the Northern limits of the French Settlements in the direction of the Gaboon. If Her Majesty's Government had been so anxious to hem in the Germans, certainly that despatch would never have been sent; that despatch is in itself a proof of the goodwill of Her Majesty's Government to the German Colonists; and if since then we have found it advisable, and I may say, speaking generally, we have found it advisable, to carry that principle further, and to recognize that the Germans are quite within their rights in extending themselves, I assert that in this case we are simply giving further proof of what is already on record in this Blue Book. Then, Sir, the hon. and learned Member alluded to the question of Samoa, and he returned to a charge in regard to a matter which he asked me some Questions about the other day, and as to which I had hoped to find I had satisfied him. I referred him then to the Colonial Office Blue Books on the subject, Blue Books which were issued some time ago, and which contained many Foreign Office despatches as well as Colonial Office despatches. Notwithstanding the explanation which I then gave him, the hon. and learned Gentleman again asserted to-night that there was nothing binding on the German Government in regard to the pledges given, or asserted by me to have been given, in reference to the respect to be shown by both Governments—the English and German Governments—as to the independence of Samoa. [Mr. GORST: I said there was no document.] I explained the other day there was no Treaty or Convention; I used both words advisedly, because I was quite aware there was no Treaty or Convention. There are two Treaties in existence, one between Great Britain and Samoa, and the other between Germany and Samoa; but there is no Treaty or Convention drawn up between England and Germany with respect to Samoa. There is, however, in the Blue Book, on page 145, a note of Count Munster to Earl Granville, and the reply, which is to be found on page 163, under date February 16th. There are on record, therefore, these two Papers, and in the deepatch of Count Munster, on page 145, there is a clear recognition by the Germans of the independence of Samoa. Referring to the Treaty which was reported to have been concluded by a certain German official with the King of Samoa, Count Munster speaks as follows:— This Treaty will not be ratified so far as the stipulations do not harmonize with the explanations previously exchanged between Germany and England with regard to the maintenance of the independence of Samoa. And then Count Münster goes on to say— While the undersigned has the honour of inclosing for the information of Her Majesty's Government the annexed Gorman translation of the agreement, he expresses the hope of his Government that the Royal British Government will be convinced that the points agreed upon are within the limits of the German Treaty with Samoa, and encroach neither on the independence of this group of Islands nor on the rights acquired there by other nations. When the Ambassador of a friendly country speaks, as Count Minister in his note does, of the maintenance of the independence of Samoa as being recognized by both Governments no one can say, although there is no Treaty or Convention, that there is no document between the two Governments in which the independence of the Islands was recognized. I am persuaded that the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Gorst) has not observed that despatch in the Blue Book. The hon. Member who addressed the Committee a few minutes ago—the hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Onslow)—touched briefly upon Colonial questions also, and I may say, in reply to him and to the other hon. Members who wanted to know why we had published the conversations of Mr. Meade, it is well known to the House that the German White Book gave an account of the conversation. I am not going to make any attack upon the German White Book; but it contained a certain account of the conversations, and we thought it was desirable, and I am sure the Committee will feel we were right, that this country should have our record of the conversation also; that Mr. Meade should be allowed to tell his own story; and that hon. Members should have an opportunity of judging, from an account in his own language, of what was said and done, and not merely in the shape in which it appeared in the German White Book. But, Sir, the hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Onslow) only touched very briefly upon Colonial questions; he rose to dwell upon those topics with which he is specially familiar, and on which his Indian experience naturally gives him a right to address the House. He again appealed to us to say something about the question of Afghanistan. Well, I am very sorry indeed to have to refuse information; it is always a very disagreeable thing to have to do so; but it is very often a melancholy duty. There are moments when we cannot make statements; and the Prime Minister has stated—and I think the country has fully endorsed his view—that this moment is not a proper one for making any declaration with regard to what is going on on the Afghan Frontier.

MR. ONSLOW

What I asked the noble Lord was, how it was that Sir Peter Lumsden's Mission had been sent to Afghanistan, and that no Russian Commissioner was there to meet him; how it was that all the details of the matter were not arranged before our Commissioners went out?

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE

I enter no complaint to the question; it is perfectly natural for an hon. Gentleman who desires information on the point to put such a question; but the reply I would have to give would relate to the whole transaction; and I must, therefore, ask the Committee to curb their impatience, and allow us, when we make our statement, to make a full statement of the transactions from the very beginning. I believe that, from a British point of view, our statement with regard to the point raised by the hon. Member will be considered satisfactory. I must decline, however, at present to go into details. The hon. Gentleman raised a point with regard to the expenses of Sir Peter Lumsden's Mission. He asked me how the expenses are going to be borne. I have only to reply that this is an Indian charge, but that Mr. Stephen and his Secretary are in the employ of the Foreign Office, and therefore their expenses are put down as part of this Vote. That is the exception to my answer which proves the rule—namely, as I said the other day, that the expenses of this Commission are to be borne by India. Then the hon. Member also made a point with regard to the Earl of Northbrook's Mission, and wanted to know what quid pro quo there was for the expenses of the noble Earl's Mission. All I can say is that when the documents are published with reference to the Egyptian financial proposals, it will be found that they contain large extracts, as I informed the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) the other day, from the Report of the Earl of Northbrook, and it will also be found that many of the financial proposals made to the European Powers were made partly in consequence of his recommendations. At the same time, I may add that the Earl of Northbrook's inquiries, and his subsequent advice and counsel to the Government, were most valuable; and we believe that the expenses which were incurred by the noble Earl during his Mission have been fully met by the advantage of that advice and that counsel. These are the principal considerations which I have to lay before the Committee upon this Vote. My hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) no doubt will enter more fully into those parts of the questions relating to Angra Pequena and the South Sea Islands, and the relations between the Mother Country and the Colonies which are involved. I can only say that in my opinion these Blue Books and Parliamentary Papers show that Her Majesty's Government have been actuated by an earnest desire to consult the wishes of the Colonies. It is in every sense one of the most gratifying experiences of the age in which we live that there is a good feeling between the Mother Country and the Colonies; and Her Majesty's Government are fully sensible of the importance of strengthening in every direction the ties which spring from that good feeling. I deny that the Blue Books show that there has been any neglect on the part of Her Majesty's Government. I may remind the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) that, in proof of what I am just now saying, it was the desire of the Colonial Office to consult the Cape Colony which to a great extent led to the unfortunate misunderstanding which arose with Germany about Angra Pequena. The charge made by the German Government against our Government was based upon the delay which occurred. The reply of Her Majesty's Government was and is that that delay simply represented the time during which the Colonial Office and the Cape Government were communicating with one another. If we had hurried the Cape Government in the matter it is very probable we would have been exposed to the opposite attack; we should no doubt have been told that we had been trying to force the hand of the Colonial Government, and that we had not given them proper time in which to reply. The Colony at that time was undergoing a change of Ministry, and there was an unavoidable delay. Her Majesty's Government were fully sensible that it would have ill become them to have attempted to compel the Colonial Government to give a reply before it was in a position to do so. I am fully justified, I think, in quoting that to show that in all these matters Her Majesty's Government have been most anxious to consult the Colonies. Sir, I have simply, with these observations, to recommend this Vote to the Committee, and to assure them once more that there is on the part of Her Majesty's Government a full knowledge of the great importance of the friendship of Germany to this country, and that we believe that whatever misunderstanding may have arisen during the past few months it was a misunderstanding only. On the part of Her Majesty's Government there is nothing except an anxious desire to meet the views of the German Government, and we fully believe that our good feeling is reciprocated by the Government of that great Empire.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

said, the reply of the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) was scanty and unsatisfactory. The noble Lord had said that it was not a convenient opportunity to bring up questions of this kind on a Vote of Supply; but when the Committee recollected that the private Member's nights had been entirely appropriated by the Government he was persuaded the Committee would feel that hon. Members were justified in seizing any opportunity which presented itself of bringing forward questions upon which they took a deep interest. The noble Lord was very severe upon the hon. Gentleman the Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett). The noble Lord's sarcasm, however, was not of a high order; and he was persuaded that if the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had been present he would not have suffered much pain from the comments of the noble Lord. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) was happy to find that the noble Lord denied all indifference to the good feeling of Germany. The dissensions he said between this country and Germany had entirely passed away, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) was actuated by Party feeling in bringing them up again. There were, however, one or two points upon which the noble Lord had been very deficient in his explanations. He, of course, accepted implicitly everything that was stated by the noble Lord, or by his Chief in "another place" (Lord Granville); but, at the same time, although Lord Granville disavowed having received the Memorandum or despatch of the 5th of May there was no doubt that Prince Bismarck was under the impression that the contents of those documents had been communicated to Earl Granville. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) could not help thinking that if the documents were communicated to Lord Granville the noble Earl had failed to appreciate their language. The noble Lord said that no Memorandum or despatch was communicated to Lord Granville; but Prince Bismarck said that they were communicated to him.

MR. GLADSTONE

That has nothing to do with the question.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFE

The right hon. Gentleman was very impatient of interruption himself, and he thought he might have some little consideration when others were speaking. It had a great deal to do with the question, because a great deal of the difference between Germany and this country was owing to that circumstance. He thought it could not be denied that the despatches were communicated to Lord Granville; but the noble Earl seemed to have shown a great deal of obtuseness in this matter, which was not usual in him. The noble Lord (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) said that nothing was communicated; but did he deny that Lord Granville had communications with the diplomatists at Berlin? What did Sir Edward Malet write? On the 24th of January, 1885, writing to Earl Granville, he said that Prince Bismarck had shown him a despatch of the 5th of May last, which he had addressed to Count Münster, and which was a very remarkable one. It stated the great importance which the Prince attached to the Colonial question, and also to the friendship of Germany and England. Sir Edward Malet stated that the despatch was a long one, and that the Prince read it to him in German. It contained a passage to the effect that Prince Bismarck had instructed Count Münster to say that if the arrangement could not be effected the result would be that Germany would seek from France what she failed to get from England. And Prince Bismarck went on to say that not being satisfied with the result, and attributing it in part to the Ambassador not having stated the points with precision, he had sent his son, Count Herbert Bismarck, to England, in the hope that he might succeed where Count Münster had failed, but that he only succeeded in obtaining general friendly assurances of goodwill, which were of little value in the face of subsequent occurrences. It appeared, therefore, that it was distinctly stated by Prince Bismarck that Count Münster had given the gist of the despatch to Lord Granville. That was a distinct statement on the part of Prince Bismarck. [Lord EDMOND FITZMAURICE: No, no!] If the noble Lord wanted him to read it again he would do so; he would read the whole despatch if he liked. The hon. Member again read from the despatch of Sir Edward Malet, and said that the Prime Minister, after hearing it, had the face to contradict him.

MR. GLADSTONE

It is rather a strong measure to say that I have the face to contradict in a matter where I did not contradict or interfere in the slightest degree.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

said, he, of course, accepted the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, and regretted that he had used the expression to which he had taken exception. He desired now to refer to another question. It appeared to him that the whole communication between Mr. Meade and Prince Bismarck was of a most extraordinary character, and perfectly unprecedented in diplomatic history. This country had a Minister at Berlin, and there was a German Ambassador in England. Mr. Meade, a gentleman of whom he could only speak in the highest terms, had gone to Berlin as a delegate on the Congo Conference. As hon. Members were all aware, Mr. Meade had been for a long time in intimate communication with Lord Granville and with the Colonial Office; and Mr. Meade, on his own hook, so to speak, went to the German Foreign Office and made a distribution of the countries of the world. Mr. Meade, overlooking the Ambassadors, without, as he said, instructions from the Foreign Office, went first to Dr. Busch, and from him to Prince Bismark, and others, and of his own initiative presented to Prince Bismarck a project under which England, France, and Germany were to divide amongst themselves the unoccupied territories of the Pacific. This was a most extraordinary proceeding on the part of Mr. Meade, because he offered not only territory to Germany, but to France, territories which England had entered into an ar- rangement should not be given to France. Mr. Meade showed the greatest inconsistencies in his statements. Writing from the Hotel Royal, Berlin, on the 10th of February, he said— There seems to be some not unnatural misapprehension in England, and consequently, I fear, in the Colonies, as to my observations in regard to the New Hebrides; and I should like to explain that my reference to those Islands was solely intended to show that Germany and England are not the only Powers interested in the South Seas. The questions between England and France respecting this particular group were our own concern; and I, therefore, merely mentioned the subject, without going into the details of what we should require from Franco as an equivalent for the withdrawal of the understanding as to the independence of the New Hebrides. Now, what was it Mr. Meade really said? In order to carry out his explanation he gave his original words. Mr. Meade, in a letter to Lord Granville, dated December 13, wrote— I pointed out that this would give Germany perfect freedom to develop their commercial enterprize in Samoa should the German Parliament make the necessary appropriation. France to be allowed to take the New Hebrides group, which lie away from the others, and would naturally fall into the New Caledonian system. The New Caledonian system! What was that system? It was a system of penal servitude; it was a system of depredation by convicts in those parts which had given rise to angry Correspondence between this country and France. Entirely ignoring the horror which the British Colonies had of any penal settlement being near them, Mr. Meade had actually proposed that, on certain conditions, the New Hebrides group should be handed over to France, by whom they would be made into a penal Colony. He should like the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies to give an explanation of this matter; because what was the meaning of the phrase, "falling naturally into the New Caledonian system," if the New Hebrides were not to be supplementary to New Caledonia? The noble Lord (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had in a very innocent way disposed of the allegations of the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) and the hon. Member for Guilford (Mr. Onslow). But was there no public document with regard to the partitioning of these unoccupied Islands? There was no despatch to Mr. Meade; there was no com- munication either with him or with Prince Bismarck with regard to the offer to the German Government; and, instead of disavowing the proposal of Mr. Meade, all that the Government did was to decorate him. By decorating him at that moment, the only result would be that, both in the Colonies and Germany, the act would be taken in this sense—that the Government had not repudiated the proposals, and that, although they had not sanctioned them, they did not consider them impossible. There was another point upon which the noble Lord had laboured a great deal, but without success, and that was with regard to Samoa. His hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) had asked the Government on several occasions whether they had any assurance in writing from the German Government that they did not intend to interfere with the independence of Samoa. The only answer which had hitherto been given by the noble Lord had been references to despatches written by Lord Granville to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin referring to reports of conversations; and now the noble Lord came forward with a document. The noble Lord since he had occupied the position which he then filled had obtained a considerable amount of self-complacency; and he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) did not think there was any more signal instance of that than in the quotation of this particular document. The noble Lord said there were Conventions between Germany, and England, and Samoa, but that there was no direct Convention between England and Germany. He did not want to convict the noble Lord of an inaccuracy; but there was nothing about explanations having been previously exchanged in the despatch from Count Münster to Lord Granville, in which he talked about the maintenance of the independence of Samoa. The sentence in the letter written by Count Münster was as follows:— The note which the Royal British Ambassador at Berlin addressed on the 17th instant to the Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with regard to New Guinea concludes with the information that the British Government has recently received Reports concerning the conclusion of a Treaty between the Representatives of Germany and the Chief of Samoa, and pre-supposes that this Treaty will not be ratified so far as the stipulations do not harmo- nize with the explanations previously exchanged between Germany and England with regard to the maintenance of the independence of Samoa. Where did they see anything about explanations previously exchanged? There was not one word about them from Germany; the only explanations were furnished by our own officials. The only paragraph in which the word "independence" occurred was in a German despatch from Count Münster to Lord Granville, which said— While the undersigned has the honour of inclosing for the information of Her Majesty's Government the annexed German translation of this agreement, he expresses the hope of his Government that the Royal British Government will he convinced that the points agreed upon are within the limits of the German Treaty with Samoa, and encroach neither on the independence of this group of Islands nor on the rights acquired there by other nations. There was not one word about encroaching on Samoa, and when Lord Granville answered Count Münster he said— He did not take that as any guarantee of the independence of Samoa; but he went on to say in the despatch to Count Münster of the 16th of February— It will not be possible for Her Majesty's Government to accept a position of less influence and consideration than is given to Germany by the agreement under discussion. If, therefore, it should be ratified by the Imperial Government in all its essential points, it may become necessary for Her Majesty's Government to call on the Samoa Government to enter into a precisely similar agreement for the benefit of British subjects, in order to secure the most favoured nation treatment, guaranteed to this country by Article 2 of the British Treaty with Samoa of August 29, 1879. There was, therefore, no guarantee of the independence of Samoa. All they had got from Germany was a copy of an agreement which gave Germany certain powers; and so little did they look upon that as any guarantee of the independence of Samoa from Germany that they said they must obtain from Samoa the same guarantee for themselves. He challenged the noble Lord to produce any document in which the independence of Samoa was guaranteed by the German Government. Having touched on these points he was quite ready to go to a division; and if the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Buchanan) would tell him on what they were to divide he should be very much obliged to him. He merely wished to point out that Mr. Meade's communications with the German Government were of the most unheard of and dangerous character, and they seemed to have sprung altogether from that spirit of concealment and reticence which the Government had on all occasions shown in the House. In the case of Egypt, it was that concealment and reticence which had drifted them into the terrible position in which they were at that moment, and which he hoped might not drift the country into similar complications with Russia. But, at the same time, he protested against an official being allowed to go to Berlin, and without authority, in the most liberal spirit, to dispose of territory in different parts of the world to Germany or any other Power; and he trusted the Committee would receive from a Member of the Government some repudiation of the proposals made by Mr. Meade, and especially with regard to the point of the occupation by France of the New Hebrides as a penal settlement.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

said, that in all that had fallen from hon. Members opposite on this Vote he thought there were only two points which concerned the Colonial Office on which he was bound to speak. The first was the last question raised by the hon. Member who had just sat down, with regard to Mr. Meade's communications, and the publication of the Correspondence, with regard to which he must say that these Papers were laid upon the Table of the House simply because of the publication in a German White Book of some portion of the Correspondence. Mr. Meade went to Berlin to attend the Conference there, and being a gentleman of very large acquaintance with Colonial matters—geographical and political—and having made the acquaintance of Dr. Busch, came into communication with him on those questions in an unofficial manner. What was their astonishment to see the bulk of that conversation published in a German White Book. Upon this it became necessary to publish the whole story as an antidote for what had been so published. The hon. Gentleman laid hold of the passage in which Mr. Meade proposed in certain contingencies that the New Hebrides should fall to France, and in which he said they would naturally come into the New Caledonian system. He could hardly believe his hon. Friend had really misunderstood the meaning of that term; he rather thought he intended to make a pun on the words. As a matter of fact, the words were used in the same sense as one would use them when he spoke of the planetary, railway, or any other system. Of course, what was meant was that geographically the New Hebrides belonged to the system of Islands of which New Caledonia was the principal, and stood in the same relation to them as Tahiti did to the Society Islands. And when Mr. Meade spoke in that way of the New Hebrides, he knew perfectly well that no such proposition as that which the hon. Member had supposed would be entertained, without consultation with the Australian Colonies, and without conditions absolutely satisfactory to their Governments were secured. Without dwelling on freedom of trade, and matters of that kind, he need not say that this country would never be a party to the handing over of the New Hebrides to Trance, unless there was absolute security against their being made into a penal settlement. This also was the answer of the Government to the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Chatham. (Mr. Gorst) upon the same subject. And that brought him to the only other point upon which he had to speak—namely, the observation which fell from the hon. and learned Member for Chatham that Her Majesty's Government withheld information from the Colonies. If he were to allow that to pass without notice, it might be supposed that the Government had been guilty of withholding information from them. During the whole time he had been at the Colonial Office, and during the whole course of the transactions about New Guinea, the Government had never kept back any information from the Colonies. The Agents General of the Colonies were in constant communication with the Secretary of State. The Government could not always do what they were asked to do; but they certainly gave them all the information they possessed. Last October, when he was asked whether there was any arrangement that Germany should take possession of the Northern part of New Guinea, he answered "No," and that was the result of the whole information possessed by the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office at the time. Finally, he wished to repeat his assertion most positively that they assisted the Colonies by giving them all the information they possessed—there was no system of keeping back from them the terms of any arrangement they proposed to make or any information whatever.

MR. TOMLINSON

said, there was a point which he thought properly arose on this Vote. He did not propose to go into the question of the Congo Treaty itself, but only to refer to some points in the negotiations which had taken place at Berlin. It was not the time then to go into the general question, because the whole of the Papers had not yet been laid on the Table of the House. The question he desired to raise was this—"How far had Her Majesty's Government kept the promises made to the House before these negotiations commenced?" It would be in the memory of most hon. Members that on the 3rd of April, 1883, the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Jacob Bright) called attention to the apprehension he entertained that negotiations might be entered upon by Her Majesty's Government detrimental to the interests of this country, and that the discussion was closed by the Prime Minister, who said— I am quite ready, under the circumstances of the case, to engage.…that if we should make a Treaty that Treaty should be made known to Parliament before ratification in such a way, and with the intervention of such an interval, that Parliament shall be enabled to exercise an independent judgment upon it."—(3 Hansard, [277] 1325.) And then he said further on— I need not explain what the effect is of an intervention of a deliberative Chamber upon an unratified Treaty. We have experienced it in very important cases ourselves from other States, the effect of which is to prevent the instrument ever taking legal effect as a portion of International Law."—[Ibid. 1326.] Upon that statement of the right hon. Gentleman the hon. Member for Manchester withdrew his Resolution, as he said, relying on the promise that the Treaty would not be ratified until the House had ample opportunity for discussion. Some further discussion took place on this; and his hon. Friend the Member for Guildford, not deeming the assurance on that point quite sufficient, drew a further statement from the Prime Minister, who said that the pledge he had given was well understood; and that if the Government availed themselves of the crowded state of Business for the purpose of escaping discussion they would be guilty of violating that pledge. Well, the Treaty was signed on the 26th of February, 1884. He wished to observe in passing that the Treaty did not contain anything in itself about the consent of the Parliament, either of this country or of Portugal, being required before its ratification. [Lord EDMOND FITZMAURICE: It was to be ratified.] He was perfectly aware of that. He thought the noble Lord would see the cogency of his point when he came to it, which he would do as quickly as he could. The Treaty in terms required no confirmation by Parliament, or by the Cortes of Portugal, before it was ratified. But it concluded with a clause that it should be submitted for ratification as soon as possible. Time after time Questions had been asked in that House as to when it was to be submitted to the House; and it was not an unfair observation to say that if the Government had wished to have the Treaty discussed, they might have availed themselves of an opportunity afforded by a Motion put down by one of their constant supporters, because if it had been carried it would have supported the Government in the contentions they raised in the negotiations. But in answer to these Questions they only reiterated the promise made by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister during the previous Session. He came now to the point to which he wished to draw the attention of the Committee. Notwithstanding their avoidance of a discussion of the Treaty in Parliament, the Government, in their negotiations with the other Powers in Europe, endeavoured to obtain their consent to the views they had embodied in this Treaty. And in the despatch of Earl Granville to Baron Ampthill, dated the 26th of May (Africa, No. 7, 1884), the necessity for the approval of the Portuguese Cortes was put forward, while the rights of the British Parliament were ignored. This was shown by the following passage:— Your Excellency is aware that the Treaty with Portugal, which was signed on the 26th of February last, has not yet been ratified, and that the election of a new Cortes is now necessary, before which the Treaty will have to be placed for ratification. And Earl Granville, in the despatch of the 30th of June to Baron Ampthill, argued in favour of extending the territorial jurisdiction of Portugal in the manner proposed by the Treaty. He said— I have to point out to His Highness that, but for the persistent opposition of the British Government unsupported by any other Power, Portugal would, in all probability, have long since established herself in the Congo district. The despatch went on to endeavour to induce the German Government to adopt the Treaty made between Portugal and this country. And the negotiations were further continued on this footing. In the instructions given by Earl Granville to Sir Edward Malet (Africa, No. 8, 1884), he found the following— As Portugal, after having obtained the conditional assent of Great Britain to the recognition of her claims to the Coast from Ambri to the 5° 12'S. latitude. He had therefore the fullest justification for saying that the Government, having promised to bring this Treaty for discussion before the House, sent their Representatives to the Conference at Berlin with their hands tied by the statement that Great Britain had given "conditional assent" to this Treaty. It was true that the House did not yet know what the results of the Conference at Berlin were; but it was clear from the Papers from which he had quoted that, but for the intervention of Prince Bismarck, this country would have been saddled with this Treaty with Portugal, which had never received the sanction of the House. It was hardly possible to acquit the Government of having committed a breach of faith with the House. The Government were in the dilemma of either having entered into negotiations with Foreign Powers, and of having tried to induce them to enter into a Treaty which they had promised to submit to the House, but had not so submitted, or of having concealed from foreign countries the fact that they had given that pledge to the House of Commons.

MR. GLADSTONE

The hon. Member opposite (Mr. Tomlinson) is entirely mistaken in reference to the charge which he has thought fit to bring against the Government. It seems to be the impression of the hon. Member that Her Majesty's Government has given some unconditional pledge to lay this Congo Treaty before the House be- fore it was entered into. No such pledge was ever asked for, or has ever been given. What was asked, and what was given, was a pledge, if it was a pledge, that before the ratification of the Treaty, if the ratification were contemplated, it would be brought before this House. The progress of investigation convinced the Government that the Treaty ought not to be ratified, and, consequently, the whole matter fell to the ground; and I believe my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester (Mr. Jacob Bright) and other Gentlemen who took a great interest in the question were better pleased with the total disappearance of the Treaty from the region of existence into the region of nonentity than they would have been by a lengthened discussion in this House for no end or purpose whatever. Therefore, Sir, with regard to the supposition that the Government were induced to conceal that pledge from a Foreign Power, which is one of the horns of his dilemma, I think the hon. Member will see that as the pledge was made openly in this House, and is recorded in our Records, reported in our debates, and printed all over the world—I leave the hon. Gentleman to judge in his own mind whether there is any force whatever in that charge. Now, Sir, I can assure the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) that there was no intention on the part of my noble Friend (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) to censure him for having taken advantage of this opportunity. All my noble Friend stated was, that it was obvious that the discussion could not be entered into with perfect convenience. That, I think, is quite plain, if for no other reason, on account of the discontinuity in the attendance. I have seen the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) in his place sit out with great virtue and constancy this discussion from beginning to end; and he, with the official Gentlemen who occupy this Bench, are nearly the sole links between the beginning and the end of the debate. [Mr. WARTON: No, no!] I beg pardon. I am not going to impeach the hon. and learned Member for Bridport sedet aternumque sedebit. The hon. and learned Member is perfectly immaculate in the matter of attendance. I only spoke of those who contributed to the discussion; and I say that almost every contributor to the discussion, ex- cepting the hon. and learned Member for Chatham, having made his contribution, has made his disappearance from the House. Now, Sir, the hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Onslow) said ono or two things that I cannot entirely allow to pass. In the first place, he has discovered that the Earl of Derby is a person of the most insignificant capacity, and that no such gentleman ought to be entrusted with the management of a Department of public affairs. Well, Sir, I may say that I recollect how for 20 years in this House I heard the Earl of Derby extolled to the skies for everything he did, and everything he did not do, by the other side of the House; and when I recollect that the Earl of Derby was never adversely criticized when he was a political opponent from this side of the House, I do not think that censure of this kind, coming so late in the day, will greatly affect the high character and reputation of the noble Earl. The hon. Member referred to the Report of the Earl of Northbrook, and I think he said there was a sum of £2,500 for his mission, and that the result of it was dear at the money. Well, what I would say is, let it remain until we have had our discussion on Egyptian Finance, and then we will be better able to judge whether or not that is fair criticism. The Colleagues of the Earl of Northbrook know very well the great benefit they have derived from the authoritative judgments which the Earl of Northbrook, from his visit to Egypt, has been able to form on many points of a difficult and complicated subject. I only ask the Committee to suspend its judgment until the discussion on these matters, and I think they will find that there is no ground for such criticism. I do not dwell on the case of Mr. Meade, further than to say that it is very gratifying to us to notice the just acknowledgment which the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) paid Mr. Meade for his public services. But I may observe that, if the slight mark of honour conferred upon him had been connected specially with this particular conversation at Berlin, of course it would have been conferred at the time of that conversation. That conversation took place three months ago. It is an acknowledgment of Mr. Meade's public services, but it has no relation to any particular act, and certainly not to an act which was entirely unofficial. I need not quote the passages which mark it as unofficial. The hon. Member for Portsmouth says—"Why has it not been repudiated?" But it is not necessary to repudiate a conversation which has no official character, and which is embodied in a document which declares, both in the first paragraph and the last, that it has no official character whatever, and it appears in this book, inasmuch as it is deemed worthy of reference in a White Book published in a foreign country. Well, Sir, with regard to Germany much has been said; and there has been a good deal of censure and a good deal of controversial matter imported into the debate, which I think, upon the whole, there is no advantage in going back upon—as to how the case stands with regard to the despatch of the 5th of May. How does the case stand in regard to that despatch? There is no doubt about it—it is perfectly well known, and has been placed on official record—that Prince Bismarck was under a mistake in his belief that the despatch had been communicated to Her Majesty's Government. For my own part, I will not depend upon my own memory, for it betrays me from time to time into error; but I remember that, upon hearing of that despatch, I immediately said to Earl Granville I could, not believe my memory had so entirely and absolutely gone that I should not recollect such a despatch. Earl Granville said—"I am in the same position; I have no recollection of it." It is no wonder, because we have been in communication with the Representative of Germany on the subject, and it appears that it had never been communicated. I regret it, for at least I will say that, if it had been communicated to this country, it would have attracted all the attention, and it would have drawn all the friendly attention, which it would well have deserved. Now, Sir, with respect to the friendship with Germany, I stand behind no man in the value I attach to it. I said "no man," but I am not sure whether I ought not to make a single exception, and say that I am a little behind the hon. Gentleman the Member for Guildford (Mr. Onslow), because he laid down deliberately this doctrine—that it was vain for this country to think of maintaining its position in Europe or the world without the friend- ship of Germany. I must say that I think the generous enthusiasm of the hon. Gentleman betrayed him into an error when he laid down such a proposition as that. Perhaps the statement slipped from him inadvertently. I am not prepared to admit that the friendship of any country in the world is necessary, or ever has been necessary, to enable our country to maintain its position. I will go to the fullest length with him in the value he attached to the friendship of Germany. I would say one word as to the particular subject which has led to that variety of correspondence which, I feel convinced, never would have taken place at all if only there had been that general introduction to the question of the desire of Germany to become a Colonizing Power, which Prince Bismarck evidently thought he had secured by the sending of this despatch, for there is no doubt he did believe that that despatch had been communicated to us, although it never was. With respect to the colonizing of Germany, there are two limitations which ought to be placed on all Colonization. One of them, of course, is that it should conform to the Law of Nations, avoiding all nominal and fictitious claims, and be of a bonâ fide character; then it must have regard to the prior rights acquired by other countries. Another limitation is dictated, not by the Law of Nations, but by the law of morality and justice, and that is, that it should be conducted with a full and due regard to the interests and rights of all aboriginal inhabitants. In our case, there is, I may say, another consideration, because we are bound to see that fair justice is done to the reasonable claims of our own Colonists already established in those regions, having been there for generations, and having founded communities which, it is not too much to say, will eventually be the dominant communities in time to come. But, subject to these limitations, what I hold is this—that it is for Germany to say how far it is her interest to become a Colonizing Power. With that we have nothing whatever to do; but, so far as we are concerned, we ought to meet her in no grudging spirit. We ought not to enter into the discussion of the question of the occupation of this or that spot by Germany, as if it were to be conducted in a huckstering temper, with a disposi- tion to withhold everything that it is possible to withhold. In my opinion, it is the grossest error on our part in policy and in principle to allow any such humour to prevail. If Germany becomes a Colonizing Power, all I can say is "God speed her." She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of a great purpose of Providence for the benefit of mankind, and I hail her entrance upon that operation, and gladly shall I hope that she will become associated with us in carrying the light of civilization, and the blessings that depend thereon, among the more backward and, as yet, less significant regions of the world. Now, Sir, under all these circumstances, and in all places, that is the spirit in which, irrespective of this despatch or that, irrespective of this correspondence or that—that is the spirit in which we regard the tendency and the efforts of Germany towards establishing herself as a Colonizing Power, and towards sending forth her intelligent citizens, who have proved themselves in the United States to be among the very best emigrants in the world. In that work she will have our best and heartiest wishes, and every encouragement in our power.

MR. A. J. BALFOUR

remarked, that the concluding words of the speech of the Prime Minister would meet with the hearty concurrence of Members in every part of the House. He only wished the Colonial Office had been animated by such a generous spirit in its dealings with Germany during the past year. The Prime Minister appeared to think that this was a very inconvenient occasion on which to bring forward these matters; but this was likely to be the only opportunity that the House would have during the whole Session of adequately discussing the Colonial policy of the Government. He must congratulate the Government on having got off so cheaply that night. No one would assert that the Colonial policy of the Government during the last eight months had been a glorious one for this country. It had been marked by all the vacillation and indecision, and more than the ordinary ridicule, that had attached to the policy of the Government in other parts of the world. Many hon. Members and right hon. Gentlemen had been absent that evening; and it was certainly to be regretted, not alone in the interest of the Conservative Party, that those who might have spoken the mind of the Party with authority had not been present. He hoped it was not too late even now for some contribution from the Front Opposition Bench. This debate had been most useful in this, if in no other respeot—it had drawn from the Under Secretary an assurance that an adequate arrangement would be made to prevent the New Hebrides being turned into a penal settlement by the French.

MR. WARTON

asked for some explanation of the item of £9,000 for outfits Payable through the changes consequent on the death of Lord Ampthill, the appointment of the Earl of Dufferin as the Viceroy of India, and the re-establishment of diplomatic) relations with Mexico. A sum so large as £9,000 ought to have some explanation, and the more so that some time ago on a Diplomatic Vote the Committee received four or five different accounts from the Treasury Bench as to what had been done with regard to the Embassy House at Berlin. It was quite plain that under the lump sum paid in respect of the Berlin Embassy House there were some thousands of pounds concealed which ought to have been disclosed, and he was afraid there was something of the same sort being done in the matter of this £9,000. It was a perfect farce to have ridiculously small sums paraded while large sums were concealed. He should like to hear what sum had been spent through the changes consequent on the death of Lord Ampthill, what was spent on the appointment of the Earl of Dufferin as Viceroy, and what the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Mexico had cost?

BARON HENRY DE WORMS

said, he only wished to make one observation, and it had reference to what had fallen from his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Evelyn Ashley). The hon. Gentleman gave the Committee to understand that communications which passed between Mr. Meade and Prince Bismarck and Dr. Busch were of a strictly private and confidential nature. Particular stress was laid on the fact that they were of a private and confidential nature, and had no official character whatever. Referring to despatch No. 2, which was very properly called "Extract from a private letter from Mr. Meade to Earl Granville," he found a remarkable paragraph. The writer stated he had not had time to make a copy of a Memorandum, and asked for the loan of Earl Granville's copy. That appeared to him to be the most remarkable specimen of a private communication that had ever been laid before the House of Commons. He hoped that before this conversation ended the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies would be able to explain the very peculiar nature of this public-private-official communication.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

said, he did not understand his hon. Friend's point. Mr. Meade's communications would naturally be sent to his Colleague.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

said, there was one question he had to ask; and it was whether the Government absolutely repudiated any intention of offering the New Hebrides to France?

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE

rose to reply to the question put by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Bridport (Mr. Warton); the question was a very natural one indeed, and one which he fully expected would be asked in the course of the discussion. He had before now had occasion to explain to the Committee, on the ordinary Estimates for the Foreign Office, that the sum for outfits varied from year to year, and that, notwithstanding every effort that was made—he assured the Committee he had made every effort during the time he had been at the Foreign Office not to ask for Supplementary Votes—it was impossible, when the ordinary Estimates of the year were prepared, to foresee the exact sum which would be necessary for outfits. The present charge for outfits was almost entirely owing to the diplomatic changes consequent on the death of Lord Ampthill. The principal item was that of £2,500 for Sir Edward Malet. He did not think the Committee would wish him to read the list of items; but if the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Warton) desired to see the list, he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) would be glad to furnish him with a copy. The hon. and learned Gentleman, however, asked what part of the item was due to the re-establishment of relations with Mexico. The sum charged under that head was £340. To show how the charge for outfits varied from time to time, perhaps he might point out that, in 1881, the charge was only £290; but that, in the following year, when there were several changes in the Diplomatic Service, it was £13,261. In the ordinary Estimates of the year, which were already in the hands of hon. Members, he had taken the average; but, owing to this large sum for the present year, probably next year the amount expended would be small. He hoped his explanation would be satisfactory to the hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Warton).

Vote agreed to.

(3.) £2,050, Colonies, Grants in Aid.

(4.) £6,200, South Africa and St. Helena.