HC Deb 09 March 1885 vol 295 cc558-83

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [5th March], That, Her Majesty having directed a Military Expedition of Her Native forces charged upon the revenues of India to be despatched for service in the Soudan and Nubia, this House consents that the ordinary pay of such troops, as well as the ordinary charges of any vessels belonging to the Government of India that may be employed in the Expedition, which would have been charged upon the revenues of India if such troops or vessels had remained in that country or seas adjacent, shall continue to be so chargeable: Provided, that if it shall become necessary to replace the troops or vessels so withdrawn by other vessels or Native forces, the expense of raising, maintaining, and providing such vessels or forces shall be repaid out of any moneys which may be provided by Parliament for the purposes of the said Expedition."—(Mr. J. K. Cross.)

Question again proposed.

Debate resumed.

MR. J. K. CROSS

In rising to support the Resolution which I had the honour to move the other night, I must say that the discussions which have taken place in this House during the last few weeks, and the decision to support the policy of the Government at which the House has arrived, render it unnecessary for me to enter into the controversial question as to whether it is or is not desirable to send a Force to Suakin for the prosecution of military operations. This decision having been taken, we have to consider the means by which it may be carried out; and we ask the consent of Parliament to the despatch to the Soudan of a certain number of Her Majesty's Indian Native Troops for such time as they may be required, still keeping them on the Establishment of India. Hon. Members are, doubtless, aware that by the 55th section of the Act of 1858, for the better Government of India, it is necessary first to obtain the consent of Parliament before any portion of the Revenues of India can be even tern- porarily advanced for the purpose we have in view. Perhaps it will be as well that I should read that section to the House. It is as follows:— Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian Possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the Revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, he applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation, carried on beyond the external frontiers of such Possessions by Her Majesty's Forces charged upon such Revenues. Now, I may remind the House that upon several occasions when it has been proposed to employ Native troops beyond the Frontier, and especially beyond the sea, various opinions have been expressed as to the exact construction to be put upon this section; but everybody who wishes to look straight at the law must come to the conclusion that it is necessary to appeal at once to Parliament to sanction the proposal. Hon. Members are aware that several Expeditions have taken place in which Indian troops have been employed; but one strange thing is that the division or apportionment of charge between India and England has not been made according to any definite rule. In the first China War of 1839–40 all the ordinary charges were borne by India, and all the extraordinary charges by this country; in the China War between 1856 and 1859 all the expenses were paid by England. In the Persian War of 1856 all the ordinary charges were paid by India, while the extraordinary charges were paid half by India and half by this country. In the Abyssinian War the ordinary charges were paid by India, and the extraordinary charges by England. In the Perak Expedition of 1875 all the ordinary charges were placed upon the Indian Government, and the extraordinary charges upon the Imperial Government. In the Malta Expedition of 1878, when a number of Indian troops were brought from Bombay to Malta, the whole expenses were borne by this country. Then we have the last Expedition undertaken in 1882, the Egyptian Expedition, where all the ordinary charges were borne by India, and 60 per cent of the extraordinary charges were also borne by India, while about 40 per cent were borne by this country. Hon. Gentlemen will notice the very considerable difference between the proportion of the charge borne by India and that borne by England. Let me just explain to the House what is the difference that is to be found between the ordinary and the extraordinary charges on the various occasions I have mentioned. The ordinary expenses of the Native Forces of the Indian Army, including everything that could be charged against them, such as superannuation charges, and all charges for pensions, &c, cannot be reckoned at more than £50 per man per annum, or just over £4 per man per month; but the charges in the Abyssinian Expedition we found came to £70 per man per month, and we found that the extraordinary expenses were about £60 per man per month. It therefore seems that the extraordinary charges on that occasion came to at least 15 or 16 times as much as the ordinary charges maintained in India. The same thing is observable in the extraordinary expenses of the Indian Contingent of the Egyptian Expedition in 1882, for they amounted to about £66 per man per month on the effective strength. I may be asked what precedent we intend to follow on this occasion? We may, on the one hand, be challenged to follow the precedent of 1882, or, on the other hand, we may be challenged to follow that of 1878; and I am bound to say that, if the circumstances were similar, we might take either the one precedent or the other. But, Sir, is the present case similar, either to that of 1882 or to that of 1878? In 1882 we were afraid of the closing of the Suez Canal. Our direct road to the East was supposed to be in danger, and the maintenance of the great waterway to the East was so important to India, that Indian troops were asked for to take part in the Expedition for its preservation, because it was held that India benefited immensely by the communication with Europe—more, indeed, than almost any country in the world, because the Channel cheapened everything that India had to buy in Europe, and gave her a distinct advantage in everything she had to sell in Europe, especially when compared with the position in which she would have been placed had there been no Canal, or if the Canal had been closed. My noble Friend (the Marquess of Hartington), who at the time held the Office of Secretary of State for India, then explained this matter by showing that the proportion of the trade of India which was carried through the Suez Canal was, with England, 87£ percent; with France, 88J per cent; with Germany, 95 per cent; with Italy, 99 per cent, and so on; and that such an amount of trade could not have been carried on at all were it not for the Suez Canal. The Canal was therefore proved to be of vast importance to India—more important, indeed, to India than to almost any other country. Well, Sir, that is the precedent of 1882; but what is the precedent of 1878, when the whole charges, both ordinary and extraordinary, were borne by this country? I do not think that that is a parallel case to the one which is now to be considered, because in that case Indian troops were brought from Bombay to Europe as a demonstration against a European Power, and the charges were taken over by us, because those Indian troops were considered to be acting in English interests. The present Motion, therefore, does not stand on the same footing as that of 1878. It may be said, indeed, that the present Expedition arises out of our position in Egypt; but it does not directly come into connection with our present position in Egypt in the same way as in 1882, because India has not anything like the same financial interest in the present Expedition as she had in that of 1882. The present Expedition arises, to a considerable extent, out of the generous and philanthropic impulses of the people of this country, who could not bear to contemplate the possibility of what might happen to the Soudan garrisons, and who, therefore, determined to attempt their relief by military measures. While, Sir, on the one hand we cannot say that India has anything the same interest in the present Expedition that she had in the Expedition of 1882, yet, on the other hand, it must be allowed that she has a considerably greater interest in it than she had in the Expedition of 1878; for anything which occurs to disturb the equilibrium of the Mahommedan world, either in Eastern Africa or in Western Asia, or anything which affects the success of our arms in countries at no great distance from India, must much more affect India than anything which occurs in the Bosphorus or in the Balkan Peninsula. I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of what is going on in the Eastern Soudan, but I may put the question very plainly to any individual man of common sense, and simply ask this—will the knowledge that a barbarian military leader has baffled the efforts of Her Majesty's troops be an element of good or evil in India; and is it, in that sense, an Indian interest or not? So great an Indian interest does it appear to be, that some of the Native Princes of India—those who govern Hyderabad, Bhopal, Puttiala, and Jheend—have offered contingents to help the Forces of Her Majesty in the prosecution of this work; and I may say that I am very glad to have the opportunity of acknowledging as fully as I can on this occasion the loyal and generous offers of assistance which have been spontaneously made to us in this way. On behalf, not only of the Government, but on behalf, I hope, of Parliament, and on behalf also of the people of this country, I do wish to express the lively emotions of satisfaction which these loyal efforts have evoked. But, Sir, could we expect, unless these Native Princes of India did look upon this question to some extent as an Indian interest, that they would have sent or offered contingents in the generous manner that they have done? Well, Sir, as the Native Princes of India consider this an Indian interest, I do not think the House of Commons will refuse so to consider it. I do not wish to assess the exact monetary value to India which this Expedition ought to possess. I do not wish to say what exact proportion of advantage will accrue to India from it; but it will be clear to the House that India has at least as much interest in this Expedition as she had in that which went to the relief of the captives in Abyssinia in 1867–8, which is the precedent on which I ask the House to pass this Resolution. I notice that my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) has entered a protest against this proposition, and that he is supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh (Mr. Buchanan). They both object to any portion of the expense of this Expedition falling directly or indirectly upon the Revenues of India. But I would point out to them that the sending of these troops will not increase the Indian Budget by one single rupee, for not one penny of the expenses of these troops will be borne by India, which would not be borne by India if they stayed at home. I will say, also, that, should the operations of this war be prolonged, and should it become necessary to recruit additional men to take the places of those who are sent to Suakin, all those expenses will necessarily fall on this country, because we have arranged that they should, and a note has passed between the India Office and the Treasury in which it is specially stipulated that that shall be so.

An hon. MEMBER

And other expenses also?

MR. J. K. CROSS

Other expenses may fall on this country; but no more expenses can fall on India. The carriage of the men from and to India will necessarily fall on this country. The principle on which we act is a very simple one. India lends us 3,200 of her troops, and the use of four of her ships. She does not—as was well said by the right hon. Baronet the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford North cote) when he proposed a similar Resolution to this for the Abyssinian Expedition in 1867—she does not wish to make money by the loan of her troops. Nor do I think India -would wish to be placed in the position in which my hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy would place her—she lends her troops to serve with their brethren in arms from distant Colonies and quarters of the Empire; but she does not lend them as mercenaries, hired out to the Mother Country, but free of charge, without any idea of benefiting financially by the loan. The reasons why Her Majesty's Government think it well to employ Indian troops are not obscure. In the first place, I may point out that Lord Wolseley has asked for these troops—for the service of three regiments of Infantry and one of Cavalry—and it is for the sending of those troops, thus asked for, that we ask the sanction of the House. I do not think there would be any difference of opinion among hon. Members as to the propriety of sending Indian troops to Suakin instead of depending entirely either on our own troops or on the Volunteers from the Colonies, much as we welcome the offer which the Colonies have made to us. When we consider the extremely trying nature of the climate of this part of the Soudan, and when we remember how difficult it is for Englishmen, accustomed to a generous diet of beef and beer, to bear up against the heat of the spring and summer sun, even when they have a plentiful supply of water, we must see how much better it is that some of our Indian fellow-subjects should be allowed to take part in these operations. They will be at home, and even at ease, on the exposed plains and in the stony defiles of the Soudan, where our men, however gallant they may be, would be absolutely prostrate. I do not for a moment mean to say that the work which these men will have to do will not be both difficult and dangerous. I do not attempt to disguise from myself, nor from the House, nor have I attempted to disguise from many people to whom I have spoken on the subject, the dangers which must necessarily be encountered by any of our troops who go to the Soudan, or the difficulties under which all these operations will have to be carried out. No one who has considered the water supply of the Soudan can fail to realize the great care which will have to be exercised to secure even a moderate supply of water for a considerable force; indeed, it is not too much to say that in these fights in which we may have to engage our hardest fight will be with nature, not with man. The duties of this Indian Force, which we hope the House will allow us to send in connection with the proposed railway, will be of no light nature. I presume that, until the military operations have been to a considerable extent concluded in the country through which the railway will have to run, all the working parties will require strong guards, both by day and by night; and the forming of these guards will be one of the most onerous duties which these troops can possibly have to perform. No more onerous work could be placed on any portion of Her Majesty's subjects. But some of these Indian troops that we propose to send now had the same duty to perform in the Pishin Valley in 1879, so that they are by no means unused to it. The country in which they will have to work, though much more desolate than any portion of India, is not altogether dissimilar; and the enemy they will have to encounter will not be unlike the mountain warriors they have met before. I do not know whether hon. Gentlemen recollect the battle which was fought under Sir Donald Stewart, when between 3,000 and 4,000 of our Indian troops were encountered by from 10,000 to 14,000 of the enemy—a fanatic enemy, much the same in character as the enemy whom our troops will have to meet in the Soudan. For two hours the attack was hurled against our troops with almost irresistible force; but the enemy was repulsed by some of those troops whom we are now sending to the Soudan—who formed rallying squares, and delivered such a destructive fire as to stop the foe when apparently about to be overcome. These troops, then, are fully equal to the task they will have to perform, and they will do it well. I do not think I need say much more on this occasion; but I will simply state that the Force has already left Bombay, and, indeed, is now at Suakin; and it has been placed under the command of General Hudson, who has been selected by the Commander-in-Chief in India to take charge of this Indian Contingent. I am well aware that it would only be presumption in me to speak of the experience and capacity of that gallant officer; but I may point out that he began the Service many years ago, that he served in the Persian Expedition of 1856; after that he went through the Mutiny, was on the Staff with Havelock and Outram at Cawnpore, was at the relief of Lucknow, and was in the subsequent operations of the Mutiny. He was in the Abyssinian Expedition, and he had command of his regiment during the whole of the Afghan Campaign. I do not think we need despair of success attending the operations of that gallant officer. May I say one word in favour of the troops he will have in charge? They have done good service, and are all men of whom we may well be proud. The 17th Bengal and 28th Bombay Regiments were through the Afghan Campaign; the Madras Sappers, of whom there are 150, have performed severe and onerous duties in times gone by; and the 15th Sikh Regiment is the one which so gallantly withstood the enemy on the occasion I have spoken of at the battle of Ahmed Khel. The Cavalry Regiment is the 9th Bengal Cavalry. It may not be known by that name to the people of this country but when I recall to mind that it was known in the Mutiny as the 1st Regiment of Hudson's Horse, it will at once be re membered how well they distinguished themselves. I do not think I need say any more. I would simply commend the Resolution to the House, and wish the men God speed in the work they have to do. I ask the House to pass the Resolution which I have already moved.

MR. E. STANHOPE

I desire to say a word with respect to the Resolution which has just been proposed by the Government; and it is simply to say that, speaking generally, I should approve of its terms as being, on the whole, and looking at all the circumstances of the case, a reasonable one. For my part, I am not going to be guided by precedents. I think if I were to argue the matter on the ground of precedents, and were to follow the hon. Gentleman through the precedents he has put forward, I could show that some of them are not altogether applicable to this case. I would rather argue the question on its own individual merits. So, also, I would not like to argne it on the ground of following the example of the Colonies. The Colonies, in my opinion, stand on a totally different footing. The Colonies have control of their own finances, and are offering us, voluntarily, the services of their troops, and voluntarily offering to pay their expenses. But in India we are the trustees of the finances. We control the finances. We decide whether or not the troops should be sent, and we ought to be most scrupulous as trustees about allowing one shilling to be spent which we do not think just, and reasonable, and beneficial to India. The question before us to night is, what is the interest of India? So far as regards Egypt, the House has already decided—and, we think, quite reasonably deeided—that the objects for which we went into Egypt are objects of interest to India. Those objects were, as I understand it, to secure a solid and permanent Government in Egypt, and also to secure our route to India. Now, we have introduced a further element—that of the Soudan. Well, the Soudan undoubtedly stands on a somewhat different footing, and I must say that the motives which the hon. Gentleman has urged for the Expedition to the Soudan appear to me to be altogether inadequate for the purposes of this Motion. For my part, I think he would find it rather difficult to reconcile the objects he put forward tonight with those recently put forward by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy (Mr. Trevelyan), who said the Expedition was based only upon military reasons. But the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cross) says it was mainly forced on the Government by philanthropic motives. All I can say is that those who desire to practise philanthropy had better pay for it; and if this country is going merely to send this Expedition on philanthropic grounds, I should say this country ought to find the money necessary for the purpose. But I do not base it on that at all. I believe you cannot altogether separate the case of the Soudan from that of Egypt; and it is proved that unless we are able to secure the objects for which we have been contending in the Soudan we cannot permanently secure peace or tranquillity in Egypt. That alone appears to me to justify our asking India, as before, to assist us in this Expedition; to assist us so far as to provide from her surplus of troops certain Forces to aid us in this Expedition, but without any extra cost being entailed on India by so doing. That being so, I should like to conclude with one word of caution. It seems to me that although we may safely agree that the proposal of Her Majesty's Government is sound at the present time, and although we may carry it, as we carried a similar Resolution two years ago, we ought to bear this in mind—that if Her Majesty's Government were suddenly to adopt the policy—and I, for my part, do not feel at all sure that they may not adopt it—of abandoning Egypt, and giving up the idea of enabling us by means of Egypt to secure our road to India, then the circumstances would be altogether changed, and I should say that India had been induced to lend troops and spend money for no purpose whatever. The purpose for which India is now lending troops is to secure the objects I have mentioned; but if we abandon Egypt without attaining those objects, India will have been led into an expense which she ought not to have been put to; and I should say with the Prime Minister that it would be a swindle and a sham to call on India to find money for purposes in which she had no interest, and we ought to refund every shilling paid, or likely to be paid, for the purposes, whether of the past or of the present Expedition.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

said, he thought that he personally had been rather hardly treated. The Under Secretary of State for India had induced him to give up an opposition to this Motion on the understanding that the discussion should be brought on at a convenient hour, and the subject fully debated. He (Sir George Campbell) did not think that a Motion made at 20 minutes past 12 o'clock was convenient. He objected to the Vote—though he admitted it was only a little one. Still, he objected on principle to the Vote; and as to the precedents which had been quoted, all he could say was that two blacks did not make a white. He was not altogether averse to a mutual support between the English and Indian Armies, provided it was upon equal terms; but what he did object to was that the terms upon which this mutual support was given were not equal. The Under Secretary of State for India had spoken in sarcastic terms of the possibility of India wishing to lend her troops in a mercenary way for pay; but this country had never hesitated to lend her troops to India for payment. In the very direst necessities of India this country had not scrupled to take the ordinary pay of her troops from India. In the terrible crisis of the Mutiny every regiment sent out to India had the whole of its ordinary pay transferred to India. It was not, then, acting on equal principles of mutual support if the Indian troops lent for Egyptian purposes were still to be paid for by India, while English troops lent to India had also to be paid for by India. In proposing this Motion Her Majesty's Government were not putting India and England upon equal terms. He would have viewed this matter in another light if the troops were only to be lent to assist in the retirement of the Forces from the Soudan; but he strongly objected to their being used in an aggressive war. Whenever a Jingo cry was raised in this country, and they had serious difficulties to meet, he was very much afraid that there was too great a disposition to say—"Oh, let us send for Indian troops; they will take us through all our difficulties." It seemed to him that the strength of their Indian Army was very much ex- aggerated. It was not a large Army, and there was only a portion of it which was fit for foreign service. He doubted whether, under the present circumstances, they could spare any troops or camels, and other means of transport from India—it was quite possible they might soon be needed in another direction. He somewhat doubted the policy of employing Indian troops in the Soudan. It was all very well to parade Indian troops on great occasions and in times of prosperity; but the Soudan Campaign was beset with very great dangers. They were bound to take very great care how they employed Indian troops. Then he objected altogether on principle to applying any part of the Revenues of India to the expenses of this war, because he maintained that India had nothing whatever to do with it. He understood his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. Cross) to trot out again their old friend the Suez Canal; but, really, the Expedition to the Soudan had no connection whatever with the police of that waterway. No reason at all had been given why the expenses of the Expedition should be charged on the Revenues of India. He was alarmed by words which had been used by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington), and which were somewhat amplified by the Home Secretary (Sir William Harcourt), with regard to the interest India had in this war. The noble Marquess spoke of the war as if it were a religious war, and said they owed something to their Indian Empire; and asked what would be the consequences if the British Forces had to retire before hordes of Mahommedan fanatics? He (Sir George Campbell) protested against the introduction of the religious element. He believed that if the Mahommedans of India sympathized with the Mahdi there was no danger to the Indian Empire. But he did not believe the Mahommedans of India sympathized with the Mahdi. The great majority of the Mahommedans in India were the quietest and most peaceful of their subjects in India. Possibly a very small minority of that race would be found to sympathize with the Mahdi; but they would be so few in number that it was impossible they could give them any trouble. The Under Secretary (Mr. Cross) had referred to the sponta- neous offers of assistance. Some of those offers came from States with which he (Sir George Campbell) had had a good deal to do; and he could testify to the loyalty of those States during the Mutiny, and to the assistance they had at all times rendered. But if the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary knew Indian habits and manners as well as he (Sir George Campbell) did, he would not for a moment believe that the offers to send troops to the Soudan were in the least degree prompted by any interest the States had in the war in the Soudan. The offers showed that the people were loyal and obedient subjects; but they did not show that the people took the slightest interest in the Soudan. He maintained that, as a matter of fact, they took no interest in the affairs of the Soudan. The vast majority of the Indian people did not know whether the Soudanese were Mahommedans or Pagans; and they would not have heard of the name of the Mahdi if they had not heard of it from us, through the English newspapers; it was only in that way that they had any knowledge at all of the Mahdi. He altogether denied the possibility of the operations of the Mahdi affecting the allegiance or disturbing the peace and quiet of the Natives of India, be they Mahommedans or anything else. It seemed to those who had been connected with India absurd to talk of the affairs of the Soudan affecting very much the minds of the Indian people, especially when it was borne in mind that much greater events had happened much nearer to them than the Soudan without affecting them. We had suffered great disasters at Cabul, and still the people of India were little affected. Even when a great part of India was given up to anarchy and our power in some districts was effaced, little effect was produced upon the people in the Provinces which were not subjected to the Mutiny; their allegiance was not in the least shaken. He thought that the Mutiny served to teach them an important lesson. The mutineers set up a Mahommedan King as the Representative of the Great Mogul; and who were their great allies in putting down the Mutiny? Why, the two Provinces in which Mahommedans were most numerous—namely, the Punjaub, where half the population were Mahommedans, and Bengal, where a very large proportion of the people were Mahommedans. He read with great interest the article from the pen of Sir Richard Temple which was lately published in one of the Reviews. He was anxious to see whether the writer would say anything alarming; but, as a matter of fact, he had nothing alarming to tell them; and he went out to curse, and he blessed altogether. Sir Richard Temple made some allusion to the disaster at Cabul; but he (Sir George Campbell) failed to see what connection there was between that disaster and the Mutiny. Now, the House knew that the object of the Expedition to Suakin was to smash Osman Digna. He (Sir George Campbell) protested against the policy of smashing Osman Digna. Indeed, he cordially agreed with some of the remarks on that matter which were made by the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst). He (Sir George Campbell) was one of those who by his vote expressed the opinion that the last Expedition under General Graham was one of the most unjustifiable acts of unreasonable slaughter which had ever been committed in the history of this country; and when the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) told the House that they had not committed themselves to go to Khartoum, then he asked—"Why were they going to smash Osman Digna?" He did not see any reason whatever for it. If the House and the country had decided to go to and hold Khartoum, he could, understand that it might be necessary to smash Osman Digna on the way; but when the House were told in so many words by the noble Marquess that in passing the Votes asked for that night they were not committing themselves to go to Khartoum, it seemed they were liable to the imputation of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) that in smashing Osman Digna they were doing an unjustifiable act, causing, as they would do, the death of many thousands of innocent people without rhyme or reason. What possible justification could there be for the slaughter which would unquestionably take place if it so happened, as he believed it would, that this country would determine not to go to Khartoum? He said a little while ago something about the terrible effect of the Soudan climate upon European troops. He confessed he thought his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. Cross) had spoken with somewhat too light a heart of the Indian troops. The hon. Gentleman said the Indian troops would be entirely at their ease in the Soudan. It must be remembered that Indian troops were, after all, human beings, and that they could not exist without water. When it happened, as sometimes it did, that disease broke out amongst the troops, the Indians suffered even more than the Europeans. Ho could testify to the excellence of the Indian troops who had been sent to the Soudan. They were regiments for whom he had a great affection, and therefore he was very unwilling to see them exposed to the terrible climate of the Soudan unless there was sufficient cause and justification for the exposure. Indian troops would willingly shed their blood and expose themselves in a tough fight in the interest of the British Empire; but he did not think they ought to be called upon to do so in order that Her Majesty's Government might get at the Mahdi by first of all smashing Osman Digna. He would not detain the House longer. It was not his fault that this Motion had come on at so late an hour—at an hour when hon. Members wore exhausted by a previous debate, and when the subject could not be sufficiently discussed. He was decidedly opposed to the Vote, and would vote against it.

MR. BUCHANAN

said, the real question at issue was, were they, or were they not, endeavouring to relieve themselves at the expense of the Indian people of a charge which could fairly be held to devolve upon us? He had put an Amendment on the Paper—which, however, he should not be able to move—in which that issue was directly raised in those very words. He regretted particularly that he could not move it, for the words used were not his own words, but those of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for War, in a despatch which he wrote on the 5th of October, 1882, as Indian Secretary to Lord Ripon's Government, on the subject of the expenses of the Indian Contingent sent to Egypt in that year. He did not wish, especially at that hour of the night—12.45—to go into details respecting the Expedition to the Soudan. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. Gross) had given up any attempt to make out that this was an Indian Expedition, or that it was an Expedition in any way connected with the interests of India. Therefore, he (Mr. Buchanan) took it that the Expedition was undertaken for Imperial purposes; that the objects in view were exclusively Imperial. If for the purpose of bringing the Expedition to a speedy termination it was thought advisable to make use of Indian troops, they were justified in using them; but they ought certainly to pay the Indian Government for the aid so rendered. His remarks upon the Motion now before the House ho should confine to one or two points which were raised by his hon. Friend (Mr. Cross). He should endeavour to point out that the Motion brought forward by the Government on that occasion was contrary to the spirit of the Act of 1858; then he should say a word or two with regard to the precedents relied upon, particularly those of the Abyssinian War and of the Perak Expedition. Now, with regard to the Act of 1858, his hon. Friend the Under Secretary (Mr. Cross) had read to the House Clause 55, in conformity with which the Motion had been brought forward by the Government. The origin of that clause being inserted in the Act was well known. It was due to the initiative of the Prime Minister. The original clause as inserted by Mr. Gladstone was withdrawn in the Upper House; and the Earl of Derby, the Prime Minister of the time, substituted for it the present clause. In his speech of the 19th of July, 1858, the object of the clause was thus distinctly laid down. The noble Earl said— The effect of the clause would be, that Indian troops, except for the purpose of preventing anticipated invasion, or of repelling actual invasion, should not quit their own territory; or if they did, the expense should be defrayed out of the revenues of this country, and not out of the revenues of India. If the troops were employed out of India, it would be for Parliament to decide whether they were employed on Indian or Imperial objects. The clause did not prevent the Crown from making use of the Indian troops, subject only to this—that as a general rule the expense of these troops must be defrayed by Parliament."—(3 Hansard, [151] 1697.) The Earl of Derby laid down the general rule that if the Home Government wished to employ Indian troops out of India it should defray the expenses of such employment out of Imperial funds; and therefore the House ought to ask themselves whether there was anything in the circumstances of the present case to justify a departure from this general rule? The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cross) alluded to the Expeditions to China, all of which took place, and were practically carried out, anterior to the Act of 1858 coming into force. In two of the three Expeditions to China the Imperial Government bore all the expenses, ordinary as well as extraordinary; in one the ordinary expenses were thrown on India. In fact, on no occasion on which Indian troops were employed outside of India after the passing of the Act had the Imperial Government given such good terms as they gave before the passing of the Act, except in the case of the conveyance of the Indian troops to Malta. Reference had been made by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cross) to the course pursued in the precedent of the Abyssinian War. It was, however, probably within the knowledge of hon. Members that the conclusion arrived at by the Government of the day to throw the ordinary expenses incurred during that war by the employment of Indian Forces upon the Indian Exchequer was not allowed to pass without grave question. The Motion proposed by the late Mr. Fawcett, whose loss, on an occasion like the present, was painfully realized, was supported by very distinguished Members of the House—by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. John Bright), by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), and by the present Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan); and outside of the House it was supported by very high Indian authorities—by, for instance, Sir John Lawrence, who was then Governor-General of India, and Sir William Muir. The Minutes that were recorded by these two distinguished civilians, together with the despatch of the Government of India of February 3, 1868, had unfortunately never been published. But Sir John Lawrence's opinion was also on record in a letter which he addressed to the right hon. Baronet the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote), at that time Secretary of State for India, and which had since been published in Lord Lawrence's life. He (Mr. Buchanan) desired to read an extract from that letter, because he believed the words of Sir John Lawrence, with regard to the Abyssinian Expedition, were applicable to the present Expedition to Suakin. Sir John Lawrence, on the 2nd of January, 1868, wrote— I hope you will forgive me when I say that I cannot go with you in what you advanced in the debate regarding the Abyssinian Expedition. I am sure that the general feeling in India, especially among the Natives, will be that it is unjust to charge India with the cost of the ordinary expenses of the troops. It seems to me that Lord Cranbourn effectively disposed of all the arguments in support of the measure. Then Sir John Lawrence went on— I cannot admit that India has the slightest interest in the question at issue between England and King Theodore. "We shall be neither stronger nor weaker out here if he is duly punished for his misdeeds. Abyssinia is too distant from India; the communications between the two countries are too slight for the people of India to take any interest in what goes on in the former part of the world. Now, he (Mr. Buchanan) submitted to the House that if for King Theodore they substituted the Mahdi, and for Abyssinia they substituted the Soudan, Sir John Lawrence's words in 1868 were almost exactly applicable to the present occasion. In the Correspondence regarding the Abyssinian War Sir John Lawrence pointed out that if the proposal of the Home Government to place any of the expenses upon the Indian Government were accepted, it might set a very dangerous precedent for Indian finance hereafter. Sir John Lawrence's foresight had been amply justified. The precedent of the Abyssinian War was cited to justify what was done in the case of the Perak Expedition, and the two precedents were now brought forward as a justification of the present Motion. This was a matter which was of great importance to the future of Indian finance. The power of resistance possessed by the House of Commons was diminished on every occasion Motions of this kind were made; and there was a distinct danger that with frequent repetitions of precedents they would establish a principle which, once accepted, would operate unfairly to India, and prejudicially to England. It would operate unfairly to India, be- cause of the many calls which might be made upon that country; and it would operate prejudicially to England, because India would come to be looked upon, as the Marquess of Salisbury, speaking on the 28th of November, 1867, in the debate on the subject of the Abyssinian War, feared it might be, as a Barrack in Oriental seas, from which we may draw any number of troops without paying for them. It was alleged that, after all, this was a very small matter. It was said that they were only putting the ordinary expenses of the Expedition on the Indian Government, and it was asked—"What does it matter whether the Indian troops are paid in cantonments in India, or in huts in the Soudan? "In point of fact, there was an important principle at stake; and if they were to go on making precedents of this sort, they might do permanent damage to the interests of India in the House. He was delighted to hear from his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. Cross) the assurance that no extraordinary expenses whatever would be thrown upon the Indian Government. He noticed that in the case of the Abyssinian Expedition the India Office, when it was demanded that all the ordinary expenses of the Indian Contingent should be put on the Indian Government, entered into an arrangement that all extra allowances, pensions, or gratuities to officers or soldiers, and pensions to the families of killed or disabled men, should come out of the Imperial Exchequer. He should like to know whether similar terms had been made with the Indian Government on the present occasion? There was still another point on which he was somewhat doubtful—namely, as to India being surcharged under the present arrangement. He put a Question the other day to his hon. Friend (Mr. Cross) with regard to the purchase of some camels to be used for transport purposes in the Soudan. The hon. Gentleman replied that camels were being bought in India, and all the expenses of purchase, shipment, &c. would ultimately fall on the Imperial Exchequer. Knowing what the experience of India in the past was, the use of the word "ultimately" caused him some anxiety. In the cases of the Abyssinian and Perak Expeditions India was to pay only ordinary expenses; but she had to advance the money for all the expenses of the Expeditions, and in the repayment there was a delay which would be incredible if it were not recorded by the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary (Mr. Cross) himself. In a letter which he wrote to the Secretary to the Treasury in March, 1883, the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cross) said— In the instance of the Perak Expedition which occurred in 1875–6, no repayment of the sums advanced by the Government of India was made until May, 1881, and the account was not formally adjusted until June, 1882. In the case of the Afghan War, the sum granted by the British Government towards the expenses of the Expedition is being spread over six years, and in that of the Abyssinian Expedition, where in order to make the necessary advances the Government of India were themselves obliged to borrow, the accounts were not formally closed for more than 12 years after the operations were undertaken. It did seem to him that if payments from this country to the Indian Exchequer were delayed for so long a period there was a decided loss to India. The Indian people must indeed be surprised to see the difference between the treatment served out by England to India and that which England demanded from India to her. It was not creditable to us that when there was a debt due to England it was exacted with promptitude, and even interest was demanded; but that when there was a debt from England to India payment was long deferred, and not one half-penny of interest was ever paid. Under the circumstances he thought that a Parliamentary Inquiry would be useful into the way in which Indian finance and administration were affected by the delays and difficulties caused by the Offices at home, particularly of the Treasury and War Office. He trusted that the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Cross) would provide, by getting advances from the Treasury or otherwise, that India should not be out of pocket by the obligation laid upon her of defraying in advance the whole of the expenses connected with the despatch of her Contingent. They heard mention made from time to time of the duty of the House of Commons to India. What that duty was it was often difficult to define; but in this case the duty was laid upon them by Act of Parliament, and the question they had to ask themselves was this—" Are we to discharge that duty fearlessly and unselfishly?" Naturally they had to look first for the due discharge of that duty to hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the two Front Benches. Their hands had, however, been weakened by what they themselves had done; the hands of those on the Front Opposition Bench by what the late Conservative Government had proposed with regard to the Afghan War; the hands of the Front Bench on that side by their original proposals with regard to the Indian Contingent sent to Egypt in 1882, which were so unfair and so unwarrantable that they had ultimately to recede from them. It devolved, therefore, on independent Members of the House on both sides to do what they could to protect the interests of the unrepresented millions of India. Even though they could do no more than make a protest, it was right that without the strongest protest no new precedent should be established. If this Motion were carried, it would be almost impossible in the future to resist any proposal for the employment of Indian troops in countries East of the Suez Canal, and of throwing at least all the ordinary expenses on the Indian Exchequer. In that event, the object of those who inserted Clause 55 in the Act of 1858 would have failed. The House would be forced to the humiliating confession that the Indian taxpayer was better protected when he had to look to the selfish interests of the shareholders in the East India Company, than when he depended upon the guarantee of an Act of Parliament, the responsibility for the due execution of which rested with the House of Commons. In conclusion, putting the matter shortly and on other grounds, what the Imperial Government had done was this. They had called upon their Indian troops to help them, and to do them a service at Suakin; and right well, he doubted not, they would perform it. In private life, if a man did to another a service at his request, the least the person benefited could do was to relieve his ally of all expense entailed upon him. What, therefore, would be mean in an individual could not be honourable in a nation, and they ought not to make a demand from a subject race that they would not dare to make from one that was free.

MR. E. N. FOWLER

said, although he did not agree with the arguments of hon. Members on the other side of the House, he quite agreed with the conclusion they had arrived at with regard to this question. He had always looked at any attempt to tax the people of India with great jealousy. They were a poor people and were not represented in that House, and the House ought, therefore, to be very careful in putting any taxation upon them. He agreed with the action of Her Majesty's Government in sending Indian troops to the Soudan, because, if the war was to go on, a sufficient number of troops should be sent there. He should have been glad if they had sent 10,000 men instead of 3,000. But it seemed to him that when they employed Indian troops it was doing no more than their duty to pay for them. Certainly, in this case, they ought to look to the interests of the people of India, and if the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) went to a division he should vote with him.

COLONEL NOLAN

said, he thought the taxpayers of this country ought also to be considered, and that it was only just that the people of India should pay some portion of the money for several reasons. First, because the military operations were not without benefit to the Indian Force, because they got military training in the field which was extremely useful to the Indian Army; secondly, because the money paid to the troops and for their equipment would fructify in India; and the third reason was that the cost of these troops would be very great, because the Home Government would not be able to control the Indian expenditure upon them. These troops would land at Suakin under entirely different conditions as compared with English troops. They would land with bheesties to carry water and other followers—five or six times as many as there would be in the case of English troops. He would not deal with the argument that it was mainly on account of India that they were in Egypt and the Soudan, but would rest his contention on the reasons he had given, which, he said, ought to be taken into account in deciding this question. The camp followers when in India could be paid for cheaply enough; but when once these requirements had to be provided for Indian troops across the sea, they became most expensive. The Paymasters and Controllers would have no means of checking the accounts, and, that being so, the expenditure would be on an extravagant scale. But if some of the expenses were charged on India, the accounts would be properly checked and the cost kept down. For these reasons, he thought this proposed charge on the Revenues of India was perfectly fair.

GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR

reminded the House that although the Government of this country, prior to the first War in China, made it a condition that the entire cost of the troops sent from India should be paid for by England, the matter ended, after a discussion which lasted many years, by the English people not paying a fraction of the ordinary pay of the troops, though money paid by China under the Treaty of Nankin more covered the war expenditure of the first China Expedition. He thought that whatever expense might be incurred with regard to sending Indian troops to Egypt and the Soudan, it should not be paid for by the Indian Government. The example of the Abyssinian War, as well as that of the first China War, should be borne in mind—the first China War was carried on during the first Afghan War. For that war about 90,000 Native troops were added to the Indian Army, and the European Force was also increased, yet England employed 12 Native regiments and 4 European regiments, besides a large force of Artillery and Sappers, without payment of the pay and allowances, which India paid. In the Abyssinian War, though India raised 10,000 European and Native troops, to replace the 10,000 European and Native troops sent to Abyssinia, yet no portion of the pay of the extra troops was made good to India. This treatment was in great contrast with that of India to England. In the last Afghan War five battalions of Infantry extra to the 50 permanently stationed in India were sent out, and immediately on embarking all charge was borne by India.

MR. ONSLOW

said, he did not think the Government had taken a proper course in bringing forward the Resolution so late in the evening. The question was one in which many hon. Gentlemen in that House, and very many persons outside it, took a great interest, and, if he remembered rightly, the Government had pledged themselves to bring it forward at 11 o'clock, at the commencement of Business; but it was 12 o'clock before it was reached. The hon. Gentleman who brought forward the Motion had said that there was some analogy between the sending of troops to Suakin and sending them to Abyssinia; but he would remind the hon. Gentleman that the war in Abyssinia was a very popular war, and on both sides of the House it was agreed that something should be done to rescue their fellow-subjects in that country. But there was a great difference of opinion in the House and out of it as to whether this war was necessary or not, and therefore be thought there was very little analogy in the two cases. He had not voted for the payment of £500,000 by India for the troops employed at Tel-el-Kebir, because be held that India had nothing to do with that war; but he should support the present Resolution, as India was only asked to pay the ordinary pay of the troops. The House should recollect that the Indian troops which were now being sent were not for the relief of General Gordon, but because they had had a great reverse in the death of General Gordon. If these troops which were to be sent to Suakin were merely for the purpose of guarding the railway, he did not think they would go back to India very well contented. They had the belief that they were to fight for the prestige of the Empire, and for the purpose of the "smashing up" of the Mahdi; but if they were to be sent on a sort of picnic only, he did not think they would care very much to come forward again to fight the battles of the British Empire. The hon. Gentleman had laid some stress on the loyalty of the Chiefs in India, and he (Mr. Onslow) thought it ought to be a matter for great congratulation amongst the English people that those Chiefs had come forward to lend their troops as they had done in the Afghan War. The Native troops who were going to Suakin did not really think much of the Mahdi. It had been stated that it was a dangerous thing to send Mahommedan troops to fight Mahommedans in the Soudan; but he did not believe there was any ground for apprehension in that respect. He believed the Native troops were thoroughly loyal to the Empress of India, and that they were ready to show their loyalty in the same manner as they had done before. In his opinion, if they were called upon to fight in the interest of the Empire, they would not care against what foe they fought. He hoped they would not be sent to Suakin merely for the protection of the railway. The hon. Gentleman had remarked that the troops would be somewhat in their element at Suakin; but he seemed to have forgotten that the accommodation they would have there would be very different from that which they were accustomed to in India. He would not speak on this subject any further than to say that he should give a consistent vote on this question in supporting Her Majesty's Government.

MR. SLAGG

said, he rose to express regret that, according to unhappy precedent, Indian questions of great importance to that country should be pushed off to an hour when it was absolutely impossible that they could be adequately discussed. He desired to make a strong protest against and to express his distinct aversion not only to the terms of the Motion, but to the payment by India of any sum towards this service. The hon. and gallant Member for Galway (Colonel Nolan) based his approval of the payment by India of a proportion of the cost of the troops on the ground of the field practice which the Indian troops would get in the Soudan. That might be so; but he (Mr. Slagg) altogether objected to their employment. The Contingent would not return to India in the same condition as they were in when they left. A great many of them would leave their bones on the sands of the Soudan; and to take men to be shot in a country and for a cause in which they had no interest in the world was an arrangement which he could not approve. He thought it would constitute a dangerous precedent, one which would be fraught with danger both to India and this country. He believed it could be shown that the Indian Mutiny arose in a great measure from Indian troops serving beyond India; and he would like to know who had guaged Native opinion on this subject, because experience showed that it was dangerous to employ their fellow-subjects in India in this way?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)

said, he had been asked a question as to the meaning of the words "ultimate charge" which his hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State had used. The first incidence would be a local charge, and the word "ultimate," in this case, meant that the Indian Government would be repaid by us. Then he had been asked as to the time of payment. He was told that, although the accounts between the two Governments were not finally settled for sometime, as a rule the balance outstanding was exceedingly small. The Government was asked whether they intended to tax the people of India in connection with this transaction. The Government intended to do nothing of the sort. Their intention was that India should neither gain nor lose one penny in this matter, and therefore no tax whatever would fall upon the people of India, who would stand in exactly the same position as now.

MR. CHEETHAM

said, that when Indian troops were proposed to be employed a little more than two years ago out of India, there were strong protests on the part of the Indian Government and the Indian people. He should like to know whether, on the present occasion, any assurance could be given that the employment of Indian troops, on the terms proposed, had met with the entire concurrence of the authorities in India?

MR. J. K. CROSS

said, Her Majesty's Government had received no protests whatever, and he thought that if any objections had been entertained in India to the proposed employment of Indian troops, Her Majesty's Government would have heard of them.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 88; Noes 23: Majority 65.—(Div. List, No. 45.) Resolved, That, Her Majesty having directed a Military Expedition of Her Native forces I charged upon the revenues of India to be despatched for service in the Soudan and Nubia, this House consents that the ordinary pay of such troops, as well as the ordinary charges of any vessels belonging to the Government of India that may be employed in the Expedition, which would have been charged upon the revenues of India if such troops or vessels had remained in that country or seas adjacent, shall continue to be so chargeable: Provided, That if it shall become necessary to replace the troops or vessels so withdrawn by other vessels or Native forces, the expense of raising, maintaining, and [providing such vessels or forces shall be repaid out of any moneys which may be provided by Parliament for the purposes of the said Expedition.—(Mr. J. K. Cross.)