[ADJOURNED DEBATE.] [THIRD NIGHT.]

HC Deb 26 February 1885 vol 294 cc1425-519

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [23rd February], That an humble Address he presented to the Queen, humbly representing to Her Majesty that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan, has involved a great sacrifice of valuable lives and a heavy expenditure without any beneficial result, and has rendered it imperatively necessary in the interests of the British Empire and of the Egyptian people that Her Majesty's Government should distinctly recognise, and take decided measures to fulfil, the special responsibility now incumbent on them to assure a good and stable Government to Egypt and to those portions of the Soudan which are necessary to its security."—(Sir Stafford Northcote.)

And which Amendment was, To leave out from the first word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House, while refraining from expressing an opinion on the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government in respect to the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan, regrets the decision of Her Majesty's Government to employ the forces of the Crown for the overthrow of the power of the Mahdi,"—(Mr. John Morley,) —instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Debate resumed.

MR. CHAPLIN

said, the debate in which the House was now engaged closed on Tuesday night with a speech, as powerful as it was searching and remarkable, from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen). Both sides of the House—and he believed he might say the country as well—were much indebted to that right hon. Gentleman for his efforts to elicit further information from the Government. They were still, however, completely in the dark as to the ultimate objects of this war. They remained at present entirely ignorant of the ultimate aims which the Government were proposing to themselves. He could not say that he absolutely agreed with every one of the opinions expressed by th9; right hon. Member for Ripon upon the great variety of topics which he raised; but he could say that, for the most part, he entirely endorsed the views which fell from the right hon. Gentleman; and it would be his endeavour also upon this occasion to induce the Government even yet to throw some fresh light upon the situation. Perhaps, however, the House would allow him, in the first place, to say a word or two upon the Motion of his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, which was more immediately before them. That Motion consisted of two parts—it censured the con-duet of the Government in the past, and it indicated, in no indefinite degree, what, in the view of the Opposition, should be the policy to be pursued in Egypt and in the Soudan in the future. It complained, in the first place, of a vast expenditure of money and of life without any adequate or beneficial result. Well, they had spent out there already, as far as he could gather, sums which might be estimated at anything between £10,000,000 and £20,000,000; and the lives which had been sacrificed already must be numbered at something between 40,000 and 50,000, at the least, during the period within which the right hon. Gentleman had held sway and authority in Egypt. They included, unhappily, the lives of many gallant countrymen of our own, and among them that of England's greatest hero, whose prowess and whose name, whose noble and heroic life, had months ago become a beacon and a household word in every home and by every fireside wherever the English tongue was spoken and where civilization ruled, and for whom a nation and an Empire were mourning as one man to-day. And what were the results? The Prime Minister told them the other night that the kourbash and the corvée were abolished. [Mr. GLADSTONE: No.] He begged pardon of the right hon. Gentleman; but he certainly believed he did say so.

MR. GLADSTONE

I hope the hon. Gentleman will be more careful in speaking upon these things. What I said was that an important step had been taken towards abolishing the kourbash and the corvée.

MR. CHAPLIN,

continuing, said, then they were evidently to understand that even that result had not been achieved.

MR. GLADSTONE

No; I did not say so.

MR. CHAPLIN

As a matter of fact they were not abolished. Their use might be diminished—he believed they were—but they were not abolished, as a study of the latest Blue Books laid upon the Table would disclose. But he was quite willing, with the utmost generosity, to make the right hon. Gentleman a present of his statement, whether they were abolished or were only diminished, if he thought that that was at all an adequate return for the expenditure of £20,000,000 and 50,000 lives. He was afraid that the condition of Egypt now for many months had been something which was little removed from bankruptcy, ruin, and general, if not complete, disorganization; while in the Soudan what they saw was chaos and anarchy and rebellion, with a whole desert up in arms against us, and in the midst of this was planted a gallant, a small, and scattered band of British heroes, who—although he did not like to take a pessimist view—were impotent, he greatly feared, to do more than to maintain themselves until fresh succour should reach them from these shores. That he believed to be a not inaccurate or exaggerated description of the position of the present, directly resulting from the policy of Ministers in the past; and they were there to-day, speaking, as they believed, the sentiment and feeling of the country, to demand a reckoning at the hands of those who had brought these things to pass. Now, why was it the Government had failed in Egypt and in the Soudan so completely as they had done? Because their policy in both had ever been a policy of inconsistency and vacillation, of indecision, of delay, and of retreat. It began in Egypt with the threatened withdrawal of the troops. "Retire and retreat as soon as possible "was their policy at that time; and that had been the tone and spirit of their actions ever since. So much for their policy in Egypt; and now he wanted the House to consider why the Government had failed so completely in the Soudan. They had failed in the Soudan because almost from the very first, after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, and after they had assumed the great responsibilities which they deliberately took upon themselves in Egypt, they adopted an attitude with regard to the Soudan by which they sought to separate and dis associate entirely the interests of Egypt from affairs in the Soudan. That was an attitude which every impartial person who was acquainted with the subject, either in Egypt or in England, could have told them, and would have told them, was impossible and ridiculous. From the first their policy was to ignore the Soudan altogether. Was that not so? He challenged the right hon. Gentleman opposite to contradict it. Like ostriches, they buried their heads in the sand, and imagined that because they declined to interfere with the affairs of the Soudan, the Soudan and its affairs would never interfere with them. They divested, or attempted to divest, themselves of all responsibility for the Soudan; and the Prime Minister repeated more than once that the affairs of the Soudan were entirely beyond the sphere of the political and military operations of his Government. He remembered being at Cairo, not long after the time when the unhappy General Hicks started on his fatal expedition, and having there a conversation with a distinguished Englishman; and he asked him this question—"Is it really possible that any English Government can sanction the departure of an English General upon an expedition so difficult and so dangerous as this is reported to be without giving him any assistance or support whatever?" His friend replied—"My dear fellow, what is the use of talking about the English Government; their policy is to ignore the Soudan altogether; they will have nothing whatever to do with it; they do not know where it is; I do not believe they have ever heard of it; they are not even aware that there is such a place in existence; and, what is more, you may be certain they never will so long as they can possibly avoid it." Now, that was an illustration of the way in which this Government had habitually attempted to evade their just responsibilities, not only in Egypt, but in all parts of the world. This attempt of the Government to avoid their legitimate and necessary responsibilities—necessary because of the position they had assumed in Egypt—was followed by prolonged indecision, and delay on their part; and indecision and delay had produced their natural and inevitable results. The very first of these was the actual necessity of the war in which we were now engaged; for the movement which might have been suppressed with ease at first had now developed into a revolution and a general uprising of the Desert, which would tax all our resources to control and subdue, and which, if not subdued, would endanger the very safety and security of Egypt, with everything which that involved in the interests of England and of Europe. That was the first, and perhaps the main result, of Ministerial indecision and delay. But another would be found in the exceptional difficulties which were presented by the war in which we were now engaged; for those difficulties were chiefly due to the delay in the despatch of the Expedition. A third result was also occasioned by delay, and was probably the most melancholy of all. The Expedition only reached its destination just in time to be too late to rescue Gordon, or to save Khartoum; and a fourth result was what he must describe as, in his opinion, the hazardous position of our Forces on the Nile to-day. He might be asked—"Why is it that the Opposition never expressed their disapproval of the policy of non-interference on the part of the Government before?" His answer to that question would be—"We did express that disapproval at the earliest opportunity after the Papers were presented to us, and after policy of the Government was officially before us; and we have declared that disapproval over and over again." The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) made a very remarkable statement last Session on this question, which really deserved the attention of the House. He referred to the celebrated Report of Lord Dufferin, and said that that Nobleman described and that the Government acknowledged, the policy of non-interference as soon as Lord Dufferin's despatch was officially laid upon the Table; and he also made this further statement—that the Opposition, because they took no hostile measures at the time, must be held to have acquiesced in the policy of the Government. But he denied that the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War stated the case rightly, and repudiated the conclusion which he drew. How did he support it? By the quotation of a single paragraph in Lord Dufferin's Report, which ran as follows:— Colonel Hicks, a distinguished retired Indian officer, has been engaged by the Egyptian Government to join the Commander-in-Chief of the Soudan as Chief of the Staff. A few retired European officers accompany him, who, perhaps, will be able to inspire the troops with confidence. Both Colonel Hicks and his companions have entered the Egyptian Service on their own responsibility, nor have either Sir Edward Malet or myself been concerned in the arrangement. That was the quotation the noble Marquess made, and upon which he based his absolutely unreasonable proposition that the Opposition had acquiesced in the policy of the Government. What were the facts of the ease? The policy of the Government was one thing, and the policy of Lord Dufferin, as indicated in the despatch, was a totally different thing. The policy of the noble Lord and of his Friends in the Soudan was first non-interference, and afterwards abandonment. The policy of Lord Dufferin pointed to an exactly opposite conclusion. The subject was so important that he would read one or two more quotations from Lord Dufferin's despatch. They were as follows:— Some persons are inclined to advise Egypt to withdraw altogether from the Soudan and her other acquisitions in that region; but she can hardly be expected to acquiesce in such a policy. Possessing the lower ranges of the Nile, she is naturally inclined to claim dominion along its entire course; and when it is remembered that the territories in question, if properly developed, are capable of producing inexhaustible supplies of sugar and cotton, we cannot be surprised at her unwillingness to abandon them. … A plan should be carefully considered for the future administration of the country. … The first step necessary is the construction of a railway from Suakin to Berber … The completion of this enterprize would at once change all the elements of the problem. Instead of being a burden on the Egyptian Exchequer, these Equatorial Provinces ought to become, with anything like good management, a source of wealth to the Government … It would be wise upon the part of Egypt to abandon Darfour, and perhaps part of Kordofan, and to be content with maintaining her jurisdiction in the Province of Khartoum and Sennaar. Did that point to a policy of non-interference? From the beginning to the end the despatch of Lord Dufferin, instead of recommending such a policy, teems with suggestions for the regeneration of the Provinces of the Soudan; and how the noble Lord could have quoted from it in support of such a policy he could not understand. He was grateful, however, to him for giving him the opportunity of referring to the despatches, because it bore directly on what was really the main question before them—namely, what should be our policy in the Soudan in the future? Now, there were three policies before us. The policy of the Opposition, the policy of the hon. Member for Newcastle, and that of the Government; and while two of them were clear and intelligible, the third was scarcely worthy of being dignified with the name of a policy. He would take the policy of the Opposition first. His right hon. Friend the Loader of the Opposition would seek to establish a stable Government in Egypt and in those parts of the Soudan which were necessary to its security. The Prime Minister said that the Opposition had not defined them. That was true; but he was not aware that it was incumbent upon them that night to define their boundaries precisely. That was a matter, possibly, for experts—at all events, for the most anxious and careful consideration hereafter. At the same time, he was not disposed to quarrel very greatly with the interpretation which the Prime Minister placed upon the Motion, that they must include Khartoum and all to the East of Khartoum. There, to some extent, he differed from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen). Now, there might be much, perhaps, to be said against that policy. It had not been said at present. The Prime Minister objected to it; and why? Because it would establish a British Government over aliens—a Christian Government over Mussulmans. The right hon. Gentleman might use exactly the same language with reference to India at this moment. Whatever might be said of the proposals of his right hon. Friend, they constituted a clear and intelligible policy, and the Conservative Party supported it for this simple reason—namely, that a stable Government in those parts of the Soudan was absolutely necessary to the well-being and to the tranquillity of Egypt, and the tranquillity of Egypt was necessary to the interests of England and of Europe. He had said that there were three policies before them. He ought to have said four, and the policy of the right hon. Member for Ripon was the fourth. The right hon. Gentleman had taken exception to the interpretation which was placed by the Prime Minister upon the Motion of his right hon. Friend with regard to the area proposed to be included in the Soudan on the ground that it was unnecessarily wide. The right hon. Member for Ripon had asked why the whole of the Eastern Soudan should be necessary to the security of Egypt? The answer, he was afraid, must be that unfortunately it was so, and that it was essential, at all events, to the peace of those parts of the Soudan which were necessary to the security of Egypt. The right hon. Member for Ripon proposed another alternative—namely, that we should get a grip upon the Nile by holding Berber and the railway from Berber to Suakin. He agreed with the right hon. Gentleman so far. That much was necessary, of course; but how were we going to get our grip upon the Nile, and to keep the railway by holding Berber, and by holding that alone? They must look upon this matter from a practical point of view. The railway would be 280 miles in length; and he had been told that it would take 30,000 men to hold Berber and to guard the line along its whole length. How were we going to protect such a length of line against hostile tribes to the North and to the South unless they were subdued, and the tribes, at all events in the South, would never be subdued unless we held Khartoum? The tribes could travel easily great distances through the Desert. Nothing could be easier for them than to cut the railroad at any point at which it might be undefended; and his strong belief was that for the safety of the railroad only it would be absolutely necessary to hold Khartoum and probably Kassala as well. Moreover, he could not conceive anything less likely to conduce to the peace of the Soudan than to have two opposing Forces—the English or Egyptian Forces at Berber, and an unbroken Force of the Mahdi at Khartoum. His own opinion was that so serious was the enter prize in which we were now engaged that no half-measures would suffice; and he could not help expressing the opinion, with all deference and respect, that the plan of the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) was not sufficiently practicable to be likely to lead to a permanent solution of the question. He now came to the policy of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), who was a thorough-going reformer; and, judging from his speech the other night, he would like to introduce a Reform Bill for the Empire without delay which would reform it out of existence altogether. The hon. Member stated that we had already undertaken responsibilities which were long past the limits within which they could be properly discharged. But how and in what quarter would the hon. Member propose to reduce them? Would he give up India? He supposed the hon. Member belonged to the "Perish India" school. Would he begin by abandoning the Colonies at a time when they were showing such noble attachment and loyalty to the Mother Country? Politicians of the hon. Member's stamp ought to give the House some idea of the ultimate objects which they had in view. But he was certain of this—that the hon. Member's views, whatever they might be, were entirely alien to the sentiments and feeling of the people of the country and the Empire of which, he supposed, with the exception of the hon. Member for Newcastle, they were all so proud to belong. As to the Soudan, there was no possibility of mistaking the hon. Member's intentions. He saw not the slightest obligation to establish, and probably no object in establishing, a stable Government in the Soudan. On the contrary, he would leave it to the people of the Soudan to work out their own deliverance for themselves. That would include, he presumed, the immediate withdrawal of our Forces on the Nile. He supposed the hon. Member would at once countermand the second Expedition. [Mr. JOHN MORLEY: AS soon as practicable.] That policy was clear and intelligible, though he need not say he entirely disapproved of it, and foresaw very considerable difficulties in its execution as well. But what were they to think of the proposals of the Government, which appeared to be absolutely purposeless and absolutely unintelligible? What was the object of the war in which we were now engaged? The House was still as much in the dark on that point as they had been when this debate commenced. That was a question which had been pressed upon the Government from all sides of the House, and it was a question which he hoped would continue to be pressed until they got the information they had a right to demand. Was it the intention of Her Majesty's Government to establish a stable Government in the Soudan? No. That was the policy of his right hon. Friend, which the Prime Minister repudiated altogether. Was it for the relief or the rescue of Lord Wolseley and his Forces? No; the Prime Minister said he took no pessimist view whatever of their position. Then, was it to be a war for prestige or revenge? He declined altogether to be a party to any such proceeding. "No," said the Prime Minister; "we must overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum." Well, and afterwards—what then? The Prime Minister was dumb; absolutely dumb. [Mr. GLADSTONE: No, no !] No; not absolutely dumb, because the right hon. Gentleman had given them the other night a shadow, a glimmering, of a half-formed purpose and intention to which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon had already referred. The sentence in which the policy of the Government was propounded was a model of ambiguity, and was characteristic of the Ministry. It ran thus— What we say is that we are not prepared at the present moment to say that there is no obligation on us to leave behind us an orderly Government, and we cannot say now at a stroke without going further that we will abandon at once and for ever the idea of doing anything for the establishment of a Government there. Quite irrespective of all Party considerations, there was no man in that House who did not feel that at this moment the Empire was in a position of very considerable danger, and that we were in the face of a national crisis of no inconsiderable dimensions; and he appealed to hon. Members on both sides of the House to say whether, under circumstances similar to these, there ever had been such a statement put forward by a Prime Minister before? It came to this. The right hon. Gentleman would not pledge himself to anything; and at a moment when the whole country was hanging on his lips to know what the policy of England really was to be, all he vouchsafed to say was that he would not absolutely pledge himself to do nothing after he had broken the power of the Mahdi. What the House wanted to know was this. Was he going to do anything at all, and what was it to be? If he repudiated the policy of establishing a stable Government in the Soudan, which was the policy of the Opposition, would lie establish any kind of Government at all, and what kind of Government was it that he proposed to leave behind him? The fact was that the right hon. Gentleman did not appear to know himself, or, if he did, he was too much afraid of his Radical supporters to say what it was. In the face of a crisis such as this, this was trifling—trifling with Parliament, trifling with the people; and he hoped that the House of Commons would at last put down its foot and mark its sense and condemnation of this never-ending weakness and irresolution which had brought us to the present terrible state of things. Whatever might be thought of the original policy of the Government in the Soudan, nothing could excuse, nothing could condone, nothing, as far as he knew, could even qualify the conduct of the Government towards General Gordon after they had sent him to Khartoum. It was difficult on Monday night even to listen with ordinary patience and courtesy to the speech of the Prime Minister on that point. It was pitiable to hear his lame excuses for an absolutely indefensible position. They were torn to shreds by his right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dublin University (Mr. Gibson), and he would not enter upon them again to-night; but he made this assertion in defiance of the statement of the Prime Minister—he affirmed that there was nothing to render impossible the despatch of Lord Wolseley's Expedition for the relief of Gordon two months at least before it started; that it could have been despatched; that it ought to have been despatched; and that no one, he believed, was more disgusted than Lord Wolseley himself at the delay of the Expedition, and that the fruits of that delay were being reaped by our Forces on the Nile at present. That was his assertion, and if there were any Member of the Cabinet who would get up in his place and dispute it, he challenged him to grant a Committee of Inquiry, and so disprove it. The Government told them that Gordon fell because he was betrayed. He replied that their long and unpardonable delay—their inaction—was the blackest and cruellest treachery towards him; and more than this—he said that on them, the English Government, must rest for ever in the first place the disgrace, the dishonour, and the guilt of the life and of the blood of that noble and heroic man. But, great as was the guilt of their conduct towards General Gordon, and although he believed that in the country it would be the last straw that would break the camel's back, it was only one among the innumerable array of their misdeeds. An hon. Member said the other night that we were menaced at this moment from almost every quarter. Unhappily, that was true to-day; but it was not true as long as Lord Beacons-field was Prime Minister of England. It was not pleasant, at a time like this, to be reminded, as day by day hon. Members walked through the Lobbies into that Assembly, that they had in their very midst at the moment he spoke the agents of revolution and disorder, the foes and the implacable enemies of all society and all civilization in the world. And what about Ireland? Ireland was part of the United Kingdom. Was Ireland a source of strength or a source of weakness to the Empire at a moment like the present? After 15 years' experience of the policy of the Prime Minister in Ireland, there could not be a doubt that Ireland was never more discontented with the English rule, or more bitterly opposed to the English connection, than she was to-day. Some of her Representatives—even Members of that House—had not scrupled quite recently to speak in public in terms of exultation over the difficulties with which the Empire was surrounded. It was impossible to deny that, in our hour of need, she was a source of weakness rather than of strength to the Empire to-day. How did we stand abroad? France alienated and cold; Germany and Prince Bismarck, whose relations with this country under the Government of Lord Beaconsfield were friendly and cordial in the extreme, and which might be so as he believed again, but for the right hon. Gentleman, were barely civil to us now—indeed, he might say positively rude. And as for Russia, he did not even like to dwell upon the position of Russia on the Frontier of India at this moment. Now, what he wished to submit—and, whatever the House might think, he was not submitting it from Party considerations—was that all these things had followed upon five years of the rule of the right hon. Gentleman. They were the outcome—the natural and inevitable outcome—of the madness of the Mid Lothian campaign. We were paying the price of that campaign today, and a heavy reckoning it was. These were some of the consequences in which he and we were foundering and floundering—perhaps the right hon. Gentleman might remember the expression—in which he and we were foundering and floundering to-day. The only bright spots which he saw in the political horizon were the heroism of our troops in Egypt on the one hand, and the significant and spontaneous outburst of loyal attachment on the part of our Colonies on the other. This incident alone, as gratifying and remarkable as it would become historic, ought in itself to give courage and determination to any English Government worthy of the name. What was to be done to recover a position which was the legacy of Lord Beaconsfield, and which had been so cruelly squandered by the present Prime Minister? Two things, in his opinion, were absolutely essential. The first was to get rid of the Prime Minister and recover the friendship of our Allies in Europe. The second, to increase, and to largely increase, without delay, the Military and Naval Forces of the country, which, if all we heard were true, were too sadly deficient at the present time. In the present position of the Empire, and as a matter for its safety, that was a question which he regarded as being an immediate and primary duty for whichever Party was to rule this country in the future. And now he must apologize to the House for the length to which he had detained them, and he had only this one more word to say. He was told that the Motion of his right hon. Friend was a weak one. Well, it contained no bad language, he admitted. He was not there to say that, if he had had the drafting of it, he might not very probably have used worse words instead. But that it was a weak one was not his opinion. It placed before the country a distinct, a great, a courageous, and an honest policy. Let there be no misunderstanding as to the meaning and the purpose of the Motion of his right hon. Friend. It meant, in his judgment, neither more nor less than this—-that the Opposition were pledged to a policy which differed little from the establishment of a Pro- tectorate in Egypt and in the Soudan for an indefinite period of time. That might be a wise or an unwise policy; in his opinion, the course of circumstances had made it an inevitable policy. But that it could be truly described as a weak policy he utterly denied. Let it not be supposed that the Opposition, representing, as they did, a great historic Party in this country, had entered lightly on this course, or pledged themselves to a policy such as this without much and anxious consideration. They were guided by motives which could not be mistaken. No man in his senses, no Party in their senses, could desire of their own accord to take Office at a moment like the present, and succeed to the desperate and appalling heritage which the right hon. Gentleman would leave behind him. But so great, in their opinion, was the peril of the Empire under the continued guidance of the right hon. Gentleman and those who sat around him, that they regarded it as their bounden duty to the nation, at whatever cost it might be to their Party and themselves, to compass the dismissal of this Government, if it were possible, and if necessary to take their places in the Councils of the Queen. In this great crisis of their country's fortunes they were neither afraid nor unprepared to do so. He knew not what might be the course which would be taken by the majority of the House on that occasion; but he did know this—that for the votes which would be given upon this question they would all of them have shortly to give an account to the great tribunal of the nation. And sure he was of this—that whatever the result of the division in this House to-morrow night, not many months—it might be not many weeks—would pass before the accumulated errors of the Government, their craven conduct and imbecile purpose with regard to Egypt—above all, their treachery to Gordon and their black betrayal of that gallant hero-would meet its righteous and its just reward in the deep and bitter execrations of an outraged people and of an indignant nation.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

Sir, the hon. Member who has just spoken claims to be a prominent Representative of patriotic principles; and, in a period confessedly of great difficulty and anxiety in this nation, what he proposes to an English House of Commons and to the English people is that they shall dismiss a Prime Minister, who is Prime Minister upon this title, and upon this title alone—that he has received the confidence of the people; and for what reason? To disarm the hostility of Foreign Governments. That is the patriotic policy of the Conservative Opposition.

MR. CHAPLIN

I said he should be dismissed in order that we may recover the Allies whom his mistaken policy has estranged.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

That comes to much the same thing. The English people are to dismiss a Prime Minister to recover their Allies. I am old enough to remember that exactly the same thing used to be said many years ago about another Prime Minister—also the head of the Liberal Party. Attacks were made year after year upon Lord Palmerston because he was unpopular with Foreign Governments, and it used to be said in those days—"Dismiss the Minister in order that you may recover the alliance of Austria, Germany, and France." But, Sir, there was pride enough in the House and in the country to reject that species of patriotic appeal. I doubt whether an appeal of that character is likely to strengthen the position of the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire. Passing from that eminently patriotic argument, which does not conduce much to the dignity of the House—[Ironical laughter]—well, I am entitled to my opinion that to dismiss the person who is Prime Minister, and who commands a majority in this House, in order to please foreign nations, is not a very dignified or patriotic course. Now, Sir, it is somewhat difficult in this debate to answer what I was going to call the triangular, but what are rather the multi-angular, arguments by which it is best. I shall have something to say later to the argument—the powerful argument—of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen). But I must say that, while differing a great deal from what the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire has said, I must thank him in one sense, as he will shorten my speech in the debate, for he has said a great deal of what I intended to say in answer to my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon. I am obliged to the hon. Member for having fired his shot into the steel armour of the right hon. Member for Ripon. I may excuse myself for taking part in the debate on the ground that I have never addressed the House on the Egyptian Question since it commenced. There is one topic which I should like to mention. I was perfectly satisfied—I think we were all perfectly satisfied—with the statements made by the Prime Minister on the subject of General Gordon. I think hardly any man who has had what I cannot help calling the misfortune of responsibility in these transactions—whatever harsh terms may be used in debate—I think no fair-judging man will think that we do not feel as strongly on this subject as you do. Therefore, I do not think it necessary to notice any harsh language which would attribute to us any intentional disregard or neglect of the interests or the life of that illustrious man. I take no notice of such a word as "treacherous," which has been employed in this debate. But one charge you are entitled to make, which we are bound to answer, and that is, that we have committed errors of judgment, and that, if we had acted sooner, we might have prevented that great catastrophe. Now, if you say, by the light of recent events, that we were wrong in sending Gordon to the Soudan, I am not prepared to deny it. Unquestionably, knowing what we know now, no power on earth would induce me to consent to that step. But before you censure us on this head, consider what the circumstances were in which we were placed. Hicks Pasha had been defeated. We had determined that the Egyptian Government should evacuate the Soudan, which they agreed to do, though not willingly at first; and they asked us to provide them with an officer—that, I think, was the phrase—to assist in the evacuation of the garrisons. Well, the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) said we did not know where the Soudan was. But there was one man who did, and it was Gordon, whom we consulted. Now, I am not endeavouring to shield ourselves from any responsibility under Gordon's name. I refer to him to show that we took what means we could to obtain information. The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire has said—"You ought not to have attempted to evacuate the Soudan;" and he has read some passages from Lord Dufferin's Report. But there is a greater authority than Lord Dufferin on the question of the Soudan. I have great respect for Lord Dufferin, but he had never been in the Soudan; but General Gordon had been there, and knew it better. Now, I am not putting the responsibility of the evacuation of the Soudan on Gordon; that responsibility is all our own. But when we instructed Gordon to evacuate the Soudan, what did he say? At the beginning of last year there was laid upon the Table of Parliament a Memorandum by General Gordon, which was received on February 1. It is Egypt, No. 7. General Gordon there says— Though it is out of my province to give any opinion as to the action of Her Majesty's Government in leaving the Soudan, still I must say it would be an iniquity to reconquer these peoples, and then hand them back to the Egyptians.

MR. CHAPLIN

Without what?

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

Without guarantees of future good government. [Opposition cheers.] "Wait till you have heard the rest. Gordon then adds— It is evident that this we cannot secure them without an inordinate expenditure of men and money. The Soudan is a useless possession?—ever was so, and ever will be so. You have our opinion, and this is the justification of our opinion— Larger than Germany, France, and Spain together, and mostly barren, it cannot be governed except by a Dictator, who may be good or bad. If bad, he will cause constant revolt. No one who has ever lived in the Soudan can escape the reflection, What a useless possession is this land? Few men, also, can stand its fearful monotony and deadly climate. Therefore, I think that Her Majesty's Government are fully justified in recommending its evacuation, inasmuch as the sacrifices necessary towards securing good government would be far too onerous to admit of such an attempt being made. Indeed, one may say it is impracticable at any cost."—(Egypt. No. 7 (1884), p. 3–4.) Therefore, if the policy of Gentlemen opposite is declared by the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire in the speech he has just made, it is a policy which is denounced in the words of General Gordon which I have just read. General Gordon adds that the Soudanese will never be oppressed by men coming from lands so remote as Circassia, Kurdistan, and Anatolia. I hope my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon will remember that passage when I come to ask him some questions. That was the opinion of General Gordon; but there was another distinguished man, alas! also dead, General Stewart, who made his observations upon this Memorandum. He said— I quite agree with General Gordon that the Soudan is an expensive and useless possession. No one who has visited it can escape the reflection, What a useless possession is this find, and what a huge encumbrance on Egypt."—[Ibid.] Well, I understand that the policy of Gentlemen opposite is, if they cannot make the Soudan a huge encumbrance on Egypt, they will make it a huge encumbrance on the English people. And that is the issue as regards the future we have to decide. General Gordon, I say, went out fully accepting the policy of the evacuation of the Soudan, and fully convinced hat it was possible to accomplish it peacefully. It may be asked now—"Why did not you send him at the head of a British Army?" Why, that never entered into our contemplation, nor into his. If that was wrong it was quite open to you to have condemned that policy, because we stated that General Gordon had gone on a distinctly peaceful mission. We may have been entirely mistaken in that. I believe we were mistaken; I now believe it was never possible to have entered the Soudan except at the head of a great British Army. These may have been errors; but they were errors not of people ignorant of the Soudan, not of people who did not know what it was, but they were errors of specialists. This is one of the great difficulties which I see in the situation with which we have to deal, that it is the men who have known the East best who have been found most mistaken in the circumstances which would arise from time to time. You cannot doubt for a moment that General Gordon, with his great knowledge of those countries, did believe it was possible to extricate those garrisons by peaceable means. He not only thought so when he left England, but he thought so when he reached Cairo, and for some weeks after he reached Khartoum. You will find from his earlier letters from Khartoum that he was still satisfied that his mission would succeed. I was rather surprised at the remark that we changed the character of General Gordon's mission after he started. Well, it was true that the character of his mission was changed, and that he had authority from the Khedive. But it was inevitable really, when you come to think of it. How could a man deal with the Egyptian garrison at Khartoum, with men who were subjects and servants of the Khedive, how could ho resettle the Soudan and make arrangements in what was regarded as an Egyptian Province, without being clothed with the authority of the Khedive? Unless we had sent him out purely as a British Agent, to deal with a country that we intended to annex, it was inevitable that he should be clothed with the authority of the Khedive. Under the Firman of the Sultan Egypt had authority over the Soudan; and, therefore, how could we do otherwise than have General Gordon clothed with the authority of the Khedive? Another charge against us was made with fervid eloquence by the right hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson), who said—"You refused everything Gordon proposed." The first criticism upon anything Gordon had proposed did not come from us. Just before he entered Khartoum he issued a Proclamation which was attacked from the other side of the House; he issued a Proclamation referring to the toleration of slavery, and the attack did not proceed from these Benches. As to the formal proposals made by Gordon to us, what were those that were refused? Are they such as you think we ought to have supported? If so, I will ask you why you do not say so? His first proposal was that we should send out Zebehr. I did not hear of any great enthusiasm for that proposal at the time it was made. Our refusal was not based upon any indication that the appointment would have been made the subject of a Vote of Want of Confidence. I would not have been a party to sending out Zebehr. We had his character from Gordon himself. Gordon said the country could not be governed except by a Dictator, who might be good or bad. What sort of a Dictator would Zebehr have been? In my opinion, he was a man, according to Gordon's own showing, whom it would not have been right for the English people to have invested with influence or control. But there were other conditions. So generous were the impulses of Gordon that he believed of men better than they deserved; and if we had sent Zebehr I do not believe Gordon would have been safe. That is the justification of my opinion on the subject; and, therefore, for no reason do I think Zebehr ought to have been sent. There was another reason to which the Prime Minister referred. If we had consented the House of Commons would not have allowed Zebehr to be sent. Therefore, it would have been an idle step and a mischievous step to have sent out Zebehr to Khartoum, for to have had our authority revoked would have made the situation much worse than it was before. At the same time, it was suggested that we should send Gordon 2,000 or 3,000 Turkish troops. Were we right, or were we wrong, in refusing to send Turkish troops to Khartoum? Again I say that if we were wrong, I am not aware that anyone endeavoured to point it out. Then, we cannot order Turkish troops about as we might the English Militia. Turkish troops could have been sent only upon terms to which the Turkish Government would have agreed. Perhaps the Turkish Government would not agree to their going to Khartoum unless they were allowed to go elsewhere if they thought fit. You could not have sent Turkish troops to Khartoum unless you intended to make the Turks masters of Egypt. Is that your policy? If so, let us understand it. It is a definite policy, and let us know whether it be one that the House and the country will adopt. For one, I am not willing to place Egypt in the hands of Turkey. I do not think the Turkish government of other countries is one which would justify England in placing further territories under Turkish control. But does anybody think that 2,000 or 3,000 Turkish troops could have settled the Soudan or destroyed the Mahdi? The hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) may think so; but when we considered the difficulties that had to be encountered by General Graham with 4,000 British troops at Suakin in dealing, not with the Mahdi, but with Osman Digna, of whom comparatively little was then known, how can in be asserted that 2,000 or 3,000 Turkish troops could have marched to Khartoum and settled matters? It was utterly impossible. What lies at the bottom of the whole of this catastrophe? Is it not that we have not realized the immense amount of military force and military resistance to be encountered, and the great difficulties to be overcome? That is true; but the responsibility is shared by those who have an intimate knowledge of the East, and of the Soudan in particular. You would not have believed it if you had been told beforehand that there was in the neighbourhood a man who would hold his own in two pitched battles with 4,000 British troops. General Gordon, before he entered Khartoum, desired to commend himself to the Soudanese by telling them that he had been sent by the British Government to avert the sending of Turkish troops. Having declared that he was there to prevent the sending of Turkish troops, could we have agreed to Turkish troops going a few weeks after? The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for the University of Dublin condemns us for having rejected these two things. I say we should not be condemned.

MR. GIBSON

I said you never complied with a single request.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I will show why we did not comply with the requests I refer to. It is said that we ought to have despatched a small force of Cavalry, less than 500, after General Graham's victories, from Suakin to Berber. I say that of all things that would have been most unjustifiable. Would anyone, after the experience of the battle of Abu Klea, now say that a handful of Cavalry should have been sent across a desert more waterless than the desert between Korti and Metammeh? How do we know what the men would have met at Berber; and does any man now, in the light of recent events, believe that if a few hundred men had gone to Berber they could have marched to Khartoum? I do not think so, and I am willing to state that as my reason for not having consented to the proposal. We had then had some experience of the mighty power of the tribes of the Desert, and we had fought the battle of El Teb, and after that to send the troops across 250 miles of almost waterless desert was not justifiable. That was the ground on which we could not accept the proposal. No responsible Government would have been safe in dealing with this matter except with a very considerable force, well organized. It may be asked— "Why not have sent General Graham's Force?" But you cannot send a force without transport. Is it known how 30,000 or 40,000 camels can be got together, and what time and measures it requires? We had no military means of doing it; and I appeal to any military authority as to whether it would not have taken weeks and months to transport a force of 4,000 men from Suakin to Berber? you could do it by railway, or by a gigantic transport; but either course would have taken a considerable period. That is why we did not take any of those courses to which I have referred. Then, what could we do? We could make preparations for an Expedition in the manner I have described, which, with adequate transport, would be able to convey a considerable force to the relief of General Gordon, and that we did. [Cries of "Too late!"] I say that the course we did adopt was to organize an Expedition which alone we considered safe to send, and to equip it with the necessary means of transporting it to Khartoum. Much has been said as to whether the best route for the Expedition was from Suakin to Berber, or by the Nile. I do not profess to offer any opinion upon that subject myself. I was bound to be governed, and was governed—and I consider myself to be justified in being governed—by military opinion. It was decided by the Military Authorities that at the time the Expedition was sent the Nile was the preferable route; and that, as far as I am concerned, was the justification for settling upon that route. Now it is said that all the circumstances to which I have referred have thrown us into the hot season, in which to send any force at all was highly dangerous and almost impossible; and therefore it was that the delay took place which retarded the advance of Lord Wolseley. Then it is said we were too late. Yes, Sir, too late—unhappily too late—because General Gordon had died, I think, two days after we were in the neighbourhood of Metammeh, close to Khartoum. But does that show that we had altogether miscalculated the time? Our calculation was founded on the military relief of Khartoum and the military leader. If there had been a military leader and he had been able to make his plans as before, what proof is there that we should not have been in time? If Gordon had been able to hold out a week or 10 days longer, it is quite certain that Sir Herbert Stewart's Force would have been at Khartoum. I say we were not too late; and I am entitled to say so. It is a consolation for us to think that, had it not been for the treachery of Ferhat Pasha, Gordon would have been saved. You say that treachery was the thing which might have been expected. Yes, it might, just as much the day after Gordon arrived at Khartoum as on the day on which he died. There was no period when he was not exposed to treachery. That is what I have to say in reference to this unhappy event; and when you censure us I think you should, and I am sure the nation will, consider what were the circumstances before us in which we had to act, and the ground of the action which we took. This is a thing which wrings our hearts as much as any person's here, and whatever censure you may think we deserve that we must bear. But the question before the House now deals with much larger matters even than that. This Motion deals with the future. The question is addressed to us from the Benches below the Gangway in the able speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley). "Holding the opinions you do, and having made the declarations you have made, why do you go to Khartoum?" That question is to be answered, and answered most distinctly. I have heard complaints of vagueness and uncertainty in regard to our answers. I do not think those complaints are just. Certainly I have a clear conception in my own mind of why I have consented to the Expedition to Khartoum, and I will endeavour to state it frankly to the House. I would never have consented to go to Khartoum with the intention of annexing or occupying the Soudan, or any part of it, for Egypt or for England. I never would have consented to go to Khartoum for the mere purpose of vengeance for the death of Gordon. We should have shown very little appreciation of Gordon's character if we did—it would have been a very ill monument to his memory. The only reason, in my opinion, that justifies our going to Khartoum since the death of Gordon—the primary object was the saving of Gordon, and there were secondary objects referred to by the Prime Minister—is that that is the only manner in which the evacuation of the Soudan can be safely accomplished consistently with the safety of Egypt. [Mr. COURTNEY: Oh, oh!] I know my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard has got another plan. He thinks we may calmly and quietly retreat. I do not hold that opinion. The fact is that a retreat of the British Army before the Mahdi and his Forces is hardly likely to be either calm, or quiet. But then, I should like to ask, where are you going to stop in this retreat? When you leave Berber the Mahdi will go to Berber, and when you leave Dongola the Mahdi will go to Dongola; and I want to know where you are ultimately going to resist, because he may advance to Assouan or to Wady Haifa, and Cairo may be in danger. Therefore, for the safety of Egypt, I do think it is absolutely necessary that the military power of the Mahdi should be broken at Khartoum. That was the view of General Gordon himself before the Mahdi gained the great military position he has now acquired. For he said that if this overshadowing military power of the Mahdi is broken at Khartoum the people will have some chance of governing themselves under their own Sultans. That was his view of the matter. And what has interfered with the people governing themselves under their own Sultans? Nothing else than the overshadowing military power of the Mahdi, which Gordon told you was compelling an unwilling people to submit. I confess I arrive at the conclusion I have stated with the deepest reluctance and repugnance; and nothing but the danger to Egypt by leaving the Mahdi in military possession of Khartoum would have ever induced me to agree to such an Expedition. Therefore, inasmuch as the policy of the Government has been to get rid of these Egyptian entanglements, both in the Soudan and in Egypt Proper, at the earliest possible period consistently with the safety of Egypt, we were obliged to undertake a Military Expedition. That is the answer the Government have to make to the question raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley). And now I come to the very different point of view of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen). My right hon. Friend has dealt with us by the Socratic method of interrogation. Like a Grand Inquisitor, he says—" I have a number of questions to ask you, and you are bound to answer them." But I will ask him a question in return. Are the questions which he has put to us such as any responsible statesman has a right to ask, or any responsible Government a right to answer? I will ask, if my right hon. Friend were placed in a different position—if, instead of being one of the most distinguished Members of the House of Commons, he happened to be a candid friend and supporter of the German Chancellor in 1870, and when Prince Bismarck thought that Germany was in danger from France, and that the best method of repelling that danger was by crossing the Rhine, my right hon. Friend said to him—"Yes, you are going into France; you are going to Paris; but I will not support you unless you tell me what you are going to do when you get there. If you do not tell me whether you are going to annex Alsace and Lorraine, to proclaim the German Empire at Versailles, to ask an indemnity of many milliards, I will not support you at all, but I will give my vote to the Opposition, "what answer do you think Prince Bismarck would have given him? I am afraid not so polite an answer as we have given. Now, could any responsible Government engaged in an operation such as this pledge themselves or the country to the settlement they may make after operations which must depend largely on circumstances which they cannot control? Fancy asking Napoleon the day before Austerlitz what were the terms he was; going to make with the Austrians? These are questions which it is most unreasonable to ask, and which, in my opinion, it would be most improper to answer. You cannot tie yourselves beforehand to any definite plan of settlement of this description. It would be most wrong to bind the country to any such thing. All you can do is this—to say that if success attends your arms there are certain directions in which you will endeavour to make a settlement advantageous to the countries concerned. That is the only answer in the case I have supposed Prince Bismarck would have made. It was said that the German policy was "butcher and bolt." If Prince Bismarck was asked how much he meant to "bolt" he would answer—"I am going to secure Germany against the attacks of France. If fortune favours my arms I will make a settlement which shall best conduce to that end." And then he might be told that that was a vague and unsatisfactory answer. My right hon. Friend has given me an opportunity of testing his demands in another way. He has given hostages to fortune. He has got a plan of his own. Would my right hon. Friend forgive me if, in the highest good humour, I retort on him. He says—"Do not go to Khartoum; there is a better policy, a different plan altogether. You ought to hold Berber, not by British troops, but I hope it will be held as the outpost of Western civilization on the Nile." My right hon. Friend has a great objection to stating a policy by negatives. He objects to a statement of the Prime Minister because it had "ifs" in it and "negatives." But I observe that this plan of my right hon. Friend depends entirely for its success upon a negative proposition, because this outpost of Western civilization is not to be held by British troops. Then by what troops? Clearly not by Egyptian, after what happened to Hicks Pasha's Army, and with the Mahdi in full force at Khartoum. You would require 30,000 men to hold the railway to Berber, and if they are not to be British troops, who are they to be? You who complain of vague and indefinite proposals put forward your own proposals in terms which no man can understand. When you propound in a grave national crisis an alternative plan, why do you not propose it in terms which shall be clear to everyone? If you intend to have Berber maintained as an outpost of Western civilization with the Mahdi in full force at Khartoum, I venture to say that there are no troops in the world except British troops who can hold it. Why dons not the right hon. Gentleman accept the responsibility of saying that he is willing to extend the British Empire to Berber, and to create for us new responsibilities of enormous dimensions? My right hon. Friend does not propose to break the force of the Mahdi; he wants to have an outpost at Berber. But the best military authorities say that if you want to take an offensive and defensive position Berber is not the one to take, and that nothing justifies our going to Berber except the intention of going to Khartoum. That is fatal to the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman. But I want to understand this Berber plan of his. He catechizes us very strictly, and he refuses to give us his support unless we answer his questions. But he is going to give his support to right hon. Gentlemen opposite, and he asks them no questions. Why, that celebrated blank cheque is already drawn. My right hon. Friend's name on the back of any instrument makes it a very negotiable security; but I should like to know what assurances he has received that his plan is accepted by the Opposition? The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire has just denounced it as quite impracticable. My right hon. Friend says to us—"Answer my questions and adopt my plan, or I will vote against you, and put into Office a Government which is equally unlikely to adopt it." My right hon. Friend's plan violates two declarations made by General Gordon—namely, that there is to be no annexation of the Soudan, and that if Egypt is to be quiet the Mahdi must be smashed.

MR. GOSCHEN

I want to avoid a misunderstanding. I did not say that I was against breaking the power of the Mahdi; but I put forward my plan as a simpler plan than that of the Government. But declaring "a minimum" does not preclude one from agreeing to further measures if they can be shown to be desirable.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

My right hon. Friend said—"This is a better policy than to march forward and break the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum." Therefore, his plan, which is to remain at Berber, was an alternative plan. The right hon. Gentleman is a man of great authority in this House, and he knows very well the consequences to which his actions may lead. Of course, he contemplates, in connection with the policy which he has announced, the possibility, and even the probability, of its leading to a change of Government. I can assure my right hon. Friend that personally I shall enter no protest against such a result; but there are only two things which, in my opinion, could justify a change of Government in the present grave condition of the country. One would be a total change of policy. Now, is there to be such a change? The Prime Minister has said that we have not changed our policy. We have declared that as soon as we can do so consistently with, the safety of Egypt we intend to evacuate the Soudan and Egypt. Is a different policy from that to be adopted upon a change of Government? My right hon. Friend has not asked, and Gentlemen opposite have never defined, their policy upon this matter. I do not say that they are bound to do it as an Opposition; but on the very day when they become a Government they will have to do it. Yes; before we change the Government we must form some conception of what the change is likely to lead to. Now all that we hear is—"Why do you say you are going to leave Egypt and the Soudan? Why do you not recognize more fully your responsibility?" What does this mean? It means, I suppose, that there is to be something in the nature of a complete annexation, protectorate, or influence—I do not care what you call it—that there is to be some more intimate and protracted and permanent responsibility on the part of England over Egyptian affairs. Now, if a vote of this House should place you in Office, you know very well that the majority would not be composed of people who entertain that opinion. You may have a majority, but it will not be a majority inclined to go further in the direction of responsibility; and, therefore, from the day when you take Office, you will be in a position in which it will be impossible for you to carry on the Government. Surely my right hon. Friend does not wish, in the present condition of the country, to have a change of Government with a change of policy, and that the new Government should be crippled and paralyzed from its very commencement by the absence of the power which alone could enable it to carry out its policy? If I thought that the Opposition agreed in our policy, in the policy of terminating, at the earliest period, the responsibilities in which we are already involved in Egypt, and that the House believed that by better administration, by some more efficient Executive, they could better accomplish that purpose, there is no man who would surrender his seat to them to-morrow more gladly than I. But you talk of a definite policy, as shown in your Resolution! Why, could there be a policy more indefinite? When you talk of establishing a stable Government in Egypt, do you mean an English Government? If not, what sort of a Government do you propose to establish there? I have at least as much right to ask that question of the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote) as he has to ask the questions which he has put to us. But if we go further in the direction—I will not quarrel with words—of annexation, if you exchange English for Egyptian Government, your proposition must be that the sacrifices which England has made entitle her to claim exclusive administration and influence in Egypt. Is that your proposition? If it be, it is one of the most perilous and important propositions that this House has ever been asked to accept. I say that the policy you advocate, if it were wise, is impossible, and that, if it were possible, it would be most unwise. What are the conditions under which we find ourselves in Egypt at the present moment? We went to Egypt, having made the solemn declaration to Europe that we did not intend to do what you now ask us to do. We made that declaration in the name of the English Crown, and with the authority of the British Parliament. You have never challenged the propriety of that declaration. That declaration we have never altered, and you have never endeavoured to alter it, and you have never propounded to Parliament any protest against it. To anyone who now seeks to alter the conditions contained in that declaration, I say, "You are too late." We have bound ourselves by the obligations contained in that declaration; and how do you know that Europe would release you from them? Do you mean that you would release yourselves from them against the will of Europe by force of arms? It is not merely an Egyptian, it is a European, difficulty which faces you on that point. I could say a great deal more on this part of the subject, but it is necessary that I should be brief; and, therefore, I will pass on to another difficulty. I say that even if you attempted it you could not administer Egypt. You have referred to what you call the analogous case of India. But, even if the case of Egypt were analogous to that of India, I hold so high the responsibilities of the English administration of India that I am not willing to create another India. Do not let hon. Members opposite think that I belong to the "Perish India" school. I am like a man who has got a great and noble estate and does not want to ruin it by mortgaging it. It is, however, a mere delusion to suppose that the cases of India and Egypt are analogous. You cannot administer Egypt as you do your Indian Provinces. In India you have the field to yourself, and you have nothing to fear from European interference. But Egypt is a great deal more in Europe than in Africa for political purposes. Every European Power has its own particular interests in that country. It has its financial and its judicial rights, its International Tribunals, its Consular Tribunals, and its right to put its finger in every pie. Could you administer Bengal for a day in such circumstances? You would be met by these rights at every turn, and you could not get rid of them unless you expelled Europe from Egypt. You may depend upon it that every month that you remain in Egypt longer than you need will involve you in more and more responsibility. By adopting such a policy as that advocated by hon. Members opposite, you will find yourselves made the subject of the intrigues of politicians and of stock-jobbers. But, moreover, you will have to encounter English prejudices in your administration of Egypt. How are you going to administer a country in which slavery exists? Slavery does not exist in India, but it does exist in Egypt. Then, again, the position of the police in Egypt is one very alien to our ideas. These are a few of the great difficulties we should have to encounter in administering Egypt. But the greatest and the most insuperable difficulty that you will have to meet in carrying out your policy is the determination of the English people that what you propose to do shall not take place. I have watched their feeling upon this question, and I am sure that there is a growing determination on the part of the English people that they will not submit to the sacrifices which a permanent occupation of Egypt would entail upon them. I do not believe that this country approves the policy enunciated by the right hon. Member for Ripon that we should hold the route from Suakin to Berber and from Berber to Cairo. Depend upon it that if the existence of this Government is terminated, it will be not because we have done too little in Egypt, but because we have done too much there. And what will be the prospect of the Government which may succeed us? If it makes any change at all in our policy, it will merely be to go deeper into the Egyptian entanglement; and I venture to say that the task they will take upon themselves they will find it impossible to perform. If they should attempt to carry out such a policy, they will find that they will have to make an ever-increasing demand for men and money upon the country—a demand which will meet with an ever-increasing opposition. If the right hon. Member for Ripon will allow me to say so, his scheme for making Berber the outpost of Western civilization will be swept away like chaff before the wind by the public opinion of this country. For my own part, I adhere firmly to the declarations which the Government made when they first entered Egypt—namely, that they did not go there for the purpose of permanently occupying the country, and of maintaining an exclusively English power and influence there. If since that declaration was made the House of Commons have changed their minds upon the subject, if they are inclined to adopt another policy which means nothing less than the annexation of Egypt and the Soudan—because the subject has grown much more serious as the debate has proceeded—at least let the House of Commons and the country understand the gravity of the decision at which they are arriving. If this be the case, the House of Commons are right in changing the Government. For my own part, I shall vote against the Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman, as I do not accept the policy which I understand that Resolution enunciates; and, whether in Office or out of Office, I shall offer to such a policy my most strenuous resistance.

SIR R. ASSHETON CROSS

Two things must be perfectly clear from the speeches delivered from the Treasury Bench. The first is that the right hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down is overwhelmed with the difficulties of the situation, and that he does not see his way to disentangle himself out of those difficulties. The second point, which is equally clear, is that the observations of all the right hon. Gentlemen who have spoken from the Treasury Bench are out of touch and harmony with the feeling of the country and of this House. The feeling of the country is one of mingled shame and indignation; but the Members of the Government neither feel that shame nor share that indignation. I doubt whether those who listened to the speech just concluded ever heard a more lame and feeble defence for the long course of neglect of General Gordon. The right hon. and learned Gentleman began by saying that the Government were wrong in sending General Gordon out, and that if they had only conceived how events would turn out, nothing would have justified them in sending him out. He said that General Gordon's mission at first was a pacific one. The Government thought that by that pacific mission he could accomplish the objects he had in view, and that his earlier letters from Khartoum showed that that was likely to be the case. But the subsequent letters of General Gordon had soon afterwards made it clear, by the right hon. and learned Gentleman's own confession, that his opinion on that point had undergone a change. That indication ought at once to have put Her Majesty's Government on their guard; for they must have known, from the character of the man, how great the danger was. So great was that danger, that no one but a hero like General Gordon would have undertaken it, and a hint of danger from him ought to have been sufficient to warn the Government of its magnitude. But nothing was done. Then we come to the request of General Gordon. He dared not send Zebehr, because, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman alleged, he was afraid of the House of Commons.

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT

I said I believed that was the opinion of the House of Commons; but I did not share that opinion.

SIR R. ASSHETON CROSS

At all events, the right hon. and learned Gentleman said that we could not send Turkish troops without their coming to the conclusion that they were to be masters of Egypt. Then there was General Gordon's application for troops to go to Berber and Wady Halfa. But none of these requests were acceded to, although the Government must have known that he would not have made such demands unless he was in danger. Again, General Gordon said—"Let General Graham come on to Berber." General Graham had slaughtered thousands of the inhabitants in the districts in which he was fighting; and why was he sent there? Was it for the purpose of slaughtering these Natives, and then retiring? If that is so, the judgment of your policy has come down on your heads, for Osman Digna is as powerful an enemy to you now as he was before the sanguinary engagement at El-Teb. Well, the Government would not send General Graham to Berber, and they had not a single thing to suggest in favour of General Gordon, while they were negativing everything he proposed. At last, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Home Secretary remarked, there was nothing to be done but to send out a great Expedition; and this, he added, was done. Yes; but the charge against the Government was that the Expedition was despatched too late. The Prime Minister had stated that the House of Commons, by a large majority, affirmed what should be done. As a matter of fact the majority was only 28, though I will not now dwell on that circumstance; but I wish to remind hon. Members that the majority was gained because of the promises made during the debate in May last. As far as Gordon was concerned, they were bound to offer him every help they possibly could. This was acknowledged by the Prime Minister himself in the speech which he made. If ever there was a man who ought to have been rendered secure by the Government which sent him out, that man was General Gordon. But I undertake to say that in the history of this country there never was an agent sent out by the State to whom less support was given, and whose demands were less encouraged, or met with more opposition at the hands of the Government who sent him out, than General Gordon. In the course of that debate in May you entered into a solemn covenant with General Gordon. [Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: No.] Why, the Prime Minister himself said— On reasonable evidence of danger we shall endeavour to use the resources of this country for his protection."—(3 Hansard, [288] 73.) Unfortunately, in estimating what was danger Her Majesty's Government took into consideration the character, the genius, and the supreme power of that particular man; and what would have been danger to another they thought would be no danger to him. The Prime Minister laid down two conditions. One was that there must be a proved necessity, and the other was that the object must be attainable. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) said, during the debate in May— We must be satisfied that such an Expedition is necessary to secure the safety of General Gordon, and we must be satisfied of the practicability of that Expedition if sent."—[Ibid. 233.] The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) said it seemed to him that the necessity for an Expedition was proved even at that time; and the Government cannot get out of the responsibility which they assumed in the debate last May. The Government had been fully warned in time what would be most likely to happen at Khartoum if they did not succour Gordon. But, in spite of those warnings, they neglected the considerations of Gordon's rescue. They even allowed months to pass before they could make up their minds whether to adopt the Nile route or the route from Suakin to Berber, completely ignoring the fact that it was a very different thing to rescue a man who was thousands of miles away to a person who was only a few hundred miles off. What happened to General Gordon? He was assailed by famine, sword, and treachery. The Government had been warned of the famine over and over again. General Gordon himself announced how long his supplies would last, and those supplies were exhausted. They were warned of treachery, and Gordon fell by treachery. He fell by the sword, because there was no one there to succour him. Now, the only treachery—if treachery there was—was the treachery of Her Majesty's Government. If ever a man was betrayed, Gordon was betrayed, not by these men in Khartoum, but by the Ministers of the Crown. During all that long time every favourable rumour which came from Khartoum was made the most of; every warning and dangerous symptom was minimized to the utmost. The Government refused even to make preparations for the rescue that was requested, and the Expedition was only sent out when it was too late. Does the House remember the words of the Secretary of State for War on July 8, two months after the great debate, in which he said— We have already stated that it is not our intention to despatch an Expedition to the relief of General Gordon, unless it is clearly shown that that is the only means by which General Gordon, and those dependent on him, can be relieved. We have at present received no information which could make it desirable that we should depart from that decision."—(3 Hansard, [290] 512.) At that time, therefore, the Government had not made up their minds whether an Expedition, if it should be necessary, was to proceed by way of the Nile, or from Suakin to Berber. One of the gravest charges against them is that they ought to have been in readiness before. Thus, the words became at last applicable to them— Too late, too late; ye cannot enter now. The silver cord and the golden bowl are broken; the honour of England is stained; and the Government are responsible for all this to the country. I refer to the past, not only on account of the extraordinary circumstances of the case itself, but because I am afraid that as it has been in the psat so will it be in the future. I will refer, not to a written document, but to the statement made in writing in words which cannot lightly be altered. What was the policy of those words—"The evacuation of the Soudan by Egypt and its restoration to freedom?" but first there is to be action against Osman Digna, making a railway from Suakin to Berber, and overthrowing the Mahdi at Khartoum. But what is to be gained by that policy, which can only be carried out at an enormous expenditure of life and treasure, an expenditure which has been placed no higher by anyone than by the Prime Minister himself? The Government have undertaken to do that in the face of the country; and when it is accomplished they propose to scuttle out of the Soudan, leaving the people to what is called their natural freedom. You will have killed a great many. You are not leaving a good impression behind you; and you are not likely, therefore, to do much for the security of Egypt by simply smashing the Mahdi. The Government have spoken of the future—that slavery and the question of a good and settled Government at Khartoum were matters which involved the deep consideration of the Government. Is that so, or is it not? Are these questions put forward seriously, or simply as makeweights, in order to induce the country to accept your policy at the present moment? If the latter, they have no right to appear. If you do not mean to carry them out, you have no business to mention them. The right hon. Gentleman said the only thing is to get rid of entanglements. Are you really going to make this railway? No one has spoken more strongly of its advantages than the Earl of Dufferin himself. When you have made it, what are you going to do? Are you coming back by the first express train? If so, you are entering upon an extravagant expenditure for no purpose whatever. That is a policy which I can never support. I can perfectly understand the policy of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley). It was a great mistake ever to have gone there, and the sooner you come back the better. But first to murder and fight and spend money and blood, and then to leave all your friends, is a policy which I cannot understand, and which I will not support. How, if these men help you and bring provisions, can you leave them to the tender mercies of their enemies? A policy more stupid and purposeless it is impossible to conceive. Then we on this side are told—"But you have no policy of your own." I should have thought that the words of the Resolution itself shadowed out a policy. It is perfectly clear that none but those who have officially been cognizant of what has been going on the last two years can give the details of a policy. You have destroyed the Egyptian Army; you have destroyed the power of the Egyptian Government and made its Ministers your puppets. You know Egypt cannot stand alone. As to the policy of the hon. Member for Newcastle, it is clear that if followed to its legitimate conclusion it would invite other nations to step into our places. Thus we have been forced into this peculiar position by the policy of the Government, so that it is clear that for our own interests—and, indeed, for the interests of the world—we must stay. Then we have India to think of. I cannot help observing the deep interest which foreign nations show to add their names to the guarantee of the money which is to be borrowed. This anxiety on their part, which shows a political interest on the part of foreign countries, is a matter about which we ought to be on our guard, and watch with great care. There must be stable and good government in Egypt; and, no doubt, for a long time English influence must be large in Egypt. Surely, the policy which is shadowed out in this Resolution is as clear with respect to the Soudan as it is with respect to Egypt. The Resolution says there must be stable and good government in those portions of the Soudan which are necessary to the safety of Egypt. No one has warned you to take care what you do in the Soudan more than General Gordon himself. You are always willing to quote Gordon when he supports your views; but not in the contrary case. It is all very well for you to say—"Well, then, you mean us to conquer the Soudan." Nothing of the kind. Why should we do anything of the sort? The Prime Minister says—"At all events, you wish England to exercise power over the whole of the Eastern Soudan." Why so? The Resolution says nothing of the kind. You want a stable Government in so much of the Soudan as must necessarily have such a Government for the safety of Egypt. The right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) thought the minimum might be to make a railway to Berber and to occupy it. That is certainly a minimum which I do not think will produce the results we desire to attain. It may be necessary to go to Khartoum; but I cannot go into the details of a policy—all that is matter to be considered afterwards. The broad outline of a policy is there. That is a sufficient answer to the Home Secretary's Bismarck, a name by which the right hon. Gentleman may, perhaps, be known for some time. I cannot congratulate him upon the way in which he got out of the dilemma in which he was placed. If we wish for freedom and good government in Egypt and the Soudan, the only way to attain them is to recognize and to act up to the responsibilities which the Government have put upon our shoulders, to act as we would for ourselves until the time comes for the people of these countries to act for themselves. That will never be without our intervention. It has been said that the terms of the Resolution are weak, and that there ought to have been a much stronger expression of the indignation that is felt by the country. I believe it is according to precedent; and it will be judged by its fruits if Her Majesty's Government have to give up their Offices. There is intense shame and indignation all over the country, which, but for that, would be satisfied with a Resolution in the usual terms. No Party has the right to bring forward such a Resolution if it does not mean business; and my right hon. Friend (Sir Stafford Northcote), and those who act with him, are prepared to take the consequences if the vote is in their favour. If they were not, they would be unworthy of their position. No one could envy the cares of Office now when there are entanglements all over the world. In the last four years Government have sowed the seeds of mischief, which it will take long to remedy. But a Party must make sacrifices for the country. I believe the present Government cannot escape from their entanglements, and that if they remain in Office their acts will still be "too late," and national disaster will be the result. I believe that with a change of Government alone one-half of the difficulties that give us so much trouble will disappear. The present Government cannot get out of their difficulties with Foreign Powers, because of the acts they have done and the declarations they have made; so that whatever they do in the future they will not be able to disentangle themselves. It was for that reason that the Resolution was placed on the Paper; and I can assure hon. Members and the country that though the Resolution may appear to them to be weak, it will be strong enough for their purpose. And those are very much mistaken who think that we brought it forward without a determination to take the responsibility involved in its adoption.

MR. P. H. MUNTZ

said, it was not often of latter years that he obtruded himself upon the House; but if ever he had had any doubt about the danger of meddling in Egyptian affairs, that doubt had been removed by the Home Secretary. Little did hon. Members think of the entanglements they had got into since they approved of the present action of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt. They had now 25,000 men, or shortly would have that number, in the Desert, and were spending several millions a month. It was very easy to go to war; but what had been done in Egypt had not been called war. The Government had discovered some new-fangled name for it. It had begun by the Dual Control, a very innocent but stupid attempt to meet the wants of the bondholders. The Dual Control resulted in extortion and mismanagement, which led to a military mutiny, because the officers were defrauded of their pay. It was, no doubt, a bondholders' question, and for their sake all the blood and treasure had been expended. And now Great Britain was going to war for the sake of persons who went in for large interest—7 per cent on £100, for which they paid only £50. He did not blame the bondholders; but if they went in for high interest, which the Duke of Wellington said meant bad security, they ought to be allowed to take their chance. In 1877 our Consul General in Egypt informed the Marquess of Salisbury that Ismail Pasha told him that it was impossible to pay the interest upon the bonds; that the pay of the Army was in arrear for 12 months, and that of the Civil servants for 18 months; and that there would be an insurrection unless he was allowed to use the interest on the bonds for the service of the State. The Chancellor of the Duchy (Mr. Trevelyan) said the day before yesterday that the Dual Control was the beginning of the imbroglio. But Arabi's rebellion broke up the Dual Control, and then was the time that we might have got rid of it. Some Members of the Government had said that we were obliged to interfere to protect the Suez Canal, though Lord Wolseley said, in the House of Lords, there was no fear of that, because it would not have been interfered with by Arabi so long as it was not used for warlike purposes. We began with the bombardment of Alexandria, and wound up the first campaign with the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. Now we had another Army in Egypt in great difficulty, and in considerable danger, and it would have to remain six months before it could do anything. The Motion before the House was meant to turn out the Government. He was not prepared to advocate that at all; but he thought they had a right to demand that Her Majesty's Government should give the House what they had not yet given—some reasonable outline, not of their military, but of their general policy— something clearer than the House had hitherto had from them. Knowing the country as he did, he was sure the people would not be content to go on spending millions of money and sacrificing a large number of valuable lives unless they knew what they were looking for. They must have something definite and clear before their minds. His vote would depend upon what further explanation the Government might make; and it was with a view to obtaining further information that he had made those few remarks.

SIR FREDERICK MILNER

Sir, in common with many others, I have been disappointed with the Motion before the House; but from what I know now I am perfectly satisfied with the proposals of the Conservative Party. It is not necessary to use strong language in order to bring Members of the House face to face with the enormous blunders committed by Her Majesty's Government during the past few months. It has been said that we were riding to be beaten; and the hon. Member for the City of Cork (Mr. Parnell), during the unfortunate and disgraceful episode of the other evening, said that it was useless discussing the. Motion, because the Conservative Party did not wish to carry the Vote. I can, however, tell the hon. Member that we are perfectly in earnest about it, and that the Conservative Party are prepared to take Office if the Government sustains defeat and is condemned, as it deserves to be. True, the Conservative Leaders recognize the grave disadvantage of such a position, and the awful legacy they would inherit; but we are accustomed to think of the welfare of the country before the interests of Party, and our Leaders are prepared to adopt the only manly and honourable course in such a crisis. If Her Majesty sees fit to call upon them they will accept the cares of Office, and do their best to redeem the terrible past. I trust that, before the conclusion of the debate, one prominent man will declare the policy of the Conservative Party. I believe that policy will be a firm and vigorous one, such as is recommended by the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen). It is rumoured that a few Conservatives will absent themselves from the division on account of a private grievance; but I believe they will do nothing of the sort. I will say this—that if any Member of the Conservative Party allows any private grievance, however great it may be, to interfere with his plain duty to his country he deserves to be execrated by every loyal patriot in the land. But some say—"What is the use of debate? The result is a foregone conclusion." I dispute that altogether. I contend that if the servile majority, who have directly assisted Her Majesty's Ministers to bring about the appalling events of the past few months, continue their fatuous allegiance, they may, indeed, be described as mere pawns, humbly willing to be moved about the political chess board, as a few distinguished players think fit; but I will not believe so badly of them. The Prime Minister complained in his speech on Monday that the debate was a mere repetition of the discussion of last year. He said— There is not an act which the right hon. Gentleman has alleged against Her Majesty's Government, but what was in full cognizance of the House when it debated this question last year. That may be true. We are dealing with the same actions, the same insane policy; but there was this material difference—then we could only warn, entreat, and prophesy; now we can point to the results of neglected entreaties, to prophecies literally fulfilled. Then at that time the Franchise Question was the all-absorbing topic. Ministers believed that the distribution of votes to the urban population would serve as a cloak to cover a multitude of sins. Their servile followers said—"Perish, Egypt; perish, Gordon. Nothing must imperil the franchise." I will do the urban population the justice to believe that they would gladly have gone without votes for two—aye five—years to have saved the gallant Gordon, to have saved all those noble men the victims of Ministerial incompetency. Now, I must congratulate the Prime Minister on one thing—the marvellous sang froid with which he defended a perfectly indefensible policy. As far as I can make out, the sum and substance of his speech was, he repented him not one jot of his former sins, and was determined not to lead a new life for the future. I cannot help thinking that the Prime Minister made a serious mistake in not promptly accepting the mild terms of the Resolution—especially after the gentle, almost caressing, way in which he was treated by the respected Leader of the Opposition. He would have done better had he bent his back beneath the blow, and even offered the other cheek to the smiter. Now, Sir, it will be my object to show that the death of Gordon, and of the brave men who made such heroic efforts to save him, was directly attributable to the wilful perversity of Her Majesty's Ministers in refusing to look plain facts in the face. That these noble men have been sacrificed, and all this ruin and misery caused by what the Marquess of Salisbury has called the squabbles of a Cabinet and the necessities of keeping a Party in power, cannot be doubted by anyone who looks at the facts. While I am aware that it would not become me to detain the House beyond reasonable limits, I will try and concentrate my remarks on what I conceive to be two very important points in this grave question. My contention is that Gordon's mission was spoilt, and all the lamentable consequences have occurred, from the unwarrantable interference of the wiseacres of Downing Street, who thought they knew more than the man on whom they had cast all the burden and responsibility. Now, let me ask first, what was the opinion of the Government of the man whom they sent out to extricate them from difficulties of their own creation? On February 12 of last year the Prime Minister stated that General Gordon was selected because, to use his own words— He is a man whom I look upon as by far the highest authority on the subject."—(3 Hansard, [284] 715.) The Lord Chancellor, on February 12, declared that General Gordon— Because of his vast knowledge of the country and great influence over the Tribes and Chiefs was better able than any other man to say by what means a policy of conciliation and pacification might succeed."—[Ibid. 615.) The President of the Local Government Board, on February 14, said— He was better able to form a judgment than anybody else. He will have, I make no doubt, any support which he can need in the prosecution of his mission."—(Ibid. 967.) On February 19, Earl Granville said the Government took upon themselves— Responsibility for anything General Gordon does."—(Ibid. 1291.) Now, what were Gordon's instructions? I have summarized his duties from official despatches. Briefly, they may be taken as follows:—1st, to withdraw the troops, Civil employés, and Europeans from the Soudan; 2, to report on the best means of securing the safety and good administration of the Red Sea Ports; 3, to advise how best to counteract the stimulus given to the Slave Trade by evacuation; 4, to establish an organized Government in the different Provinces of the Soudan for the maintenance of order and the cessation of all disasters and incitement to revolt; 5, to restore public tranquillity on a sure basis; 6, to establish justice and order; 7, to maintain the security of the roads open to commerce. With these instructions, Gordon received a despatch from Sir Evelyn Baring. After describing the object of his mission, Sir Evelyn Baring concluded— But the Egyptian Government has the fullest confidence in your judgment, your knowledge of the country, and of your comprehension of the general line of policy to be pursued. And again— In undertaking the difficult task which now lies before you, you may feel assured that no effort will be wanting on the part of the Cairo authorities, whether English or Egyptians, to afford you all the co-operation and support in their power."—[Egypt, No. 6 (1884), p. 2.] Now, how was this support and cooperation given? By refusing every single request which General Gordon made. Those requests may be briefly summed up as follows:—In the first place, he asked that he might negotiate personally with the Mahdi. The Prime Minister failed the other night to make out that the Government were not responsible for the refusal of this request; and we have it on record that Sir Evelyn Baring distinctly refused to allow the negotiations in question, and that in this he was encouraged by the Ministers at homo. In the next place, he asked for Zebehr; but the Government refused this request, notwithstanding his earnest desire. In the next place, the Government refused to send troops to Wady Halfa, although General Gordon's request that this might be done was backed by Sir Evelyn Baring, Nubar Pasha, General Stephenson, and Mr. Clifford Lloyd. Then the Government refused to send troops to Berber to open out that route; and, lastly, the Government refused to allow General Gordon to escape with the employés and the garrison from Khartoum. I am prepared to prove all these assertions from official sources. I will now take two of these refusals upon which I will dwell for a moment, because of their vital importance to the question. First, refusal to send Zebehr, whereby the Government deprived General Gordon of the possibility of executing his mission pacifically; secondly, the refusal of the Government to secure Berber, whereby they compassed the ruin and death of General Gordon. When Gordon realized how huge, how overwhelming was the task he had undertaken, aggravated as it was by the insane policy of the Government in declaring their intention to abandon the Soudan, he saw that he could not accomplish his task alone. Therefore, after deep and anxious thought, he declared that Zebehr was the one man who could help him out of the difficulty. Now, remember that Colonel Stewart strongly supported this request. Sir Evelyn Baring thrice impressed on the Government the absolute necessity of granting that request, and further suggested that Zebehr Pasha should have an allowance of £50,000 a-year for a certain time. He said— I believe that General Gordon is quite right when he says that Zebehr Pasha is the only possible man. I can suggest none other, and Nubar Pasha is strongly in favour of him. Thus Gordon, Stewart, Baring, and Nubar Pasha—all the ablest men on the spot—were unanimous as to the absolute necessity for sending Zebehr; but Downing Street was inexorable, and this is the way in which the Prime Minister carried out the resolution which he expressed on February 12, that they would do nothing to interfere with Gordon's schemes, which alone promised a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. It is true that many persons disapproved of Gordon's wish that Zebehr Pasha might be sent to him. Undoubtedly many Members of the Conservative Party were opposed to it; but why? Because the Government, with their usual love of concealment, never fairly explained the situation, or the reasons why Gordon urged the appointment of Zebehr. Had the Government put this House in possession of the facts of the case, the appointment of Zebehr Pasha would, I believe, have been approved. I believe there is, indeed, little doubt that the Prime Minister was at first inclined to grant General Gordon's request. What, then, was the reason the request was refused? The Prime Minister let out the reason on Monday, when he said— Then came the recommendation to send Zebehr; but it is well known that if, when that recommendation was made, we had complied with it, an Address from this House to the Crown would, before 24 hours were over, have paralyzed our action. This is, indeed, the secret of most of the blunders of the Government—their continual fear of being turned out. Now, it has been charged against the Conservatives that they would have endeavoured to turn the Government out on this question; but had General Gordon's despatches been produced, I am convinced that they would have given the Government their support. Let me remind you of an incident that shows the temper of the House at this time. I refer to the now celebrated Manifesto of Gordon as to the non-interference with slave-owners. On the 25th of February the hon. Member for Greenwich (Baron Henry de Worms) asked Questions as to this; thereupon the hon. Baronet the Member for Harwich (Sir Henry Tyler) interposed, and, amidst the cheers of hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House, asked if it would not be better to let Gordon carry out his dangerous mission in the way that seemed best to him? The Prime Minister said that he strongly concurred in the general sentiment expressed in the truncated Question of the hon. Member for Harwich, and added— I understand that likewise to be the decided feeling of the House."—(3 Hansard, [284] 1873.) I am perfectly well aware that, on the face of it, the appointment of Zebehr appeared to be objectionable. He had, no doubt, been a man of bad character, and a great slave hunter; but we might have known that Gordon would not have recommended his appointment without good reason. When Gordon said that the appointment of that man was a necessity, he ought to have been sent, even if that statement had stood alone. But General Gordon also gave reasons for thinking that Zebehr Pasha was improved. He pointed out that Zebehr was much civilized by his residence in Cairo, that it could be made worth his while to keep his contract, and that his slave-hunting proclivities would be effectually stopped by the evacuation of Bahr-Gazelle and the Equatorial Provinces. As to putting an end to slave-holding, that was necessarily a work of time; for just as in England, in 1883, immediate emancipation was denounced as confiscation—a view supported by the Prime Minister—so it would have been there. But be that as it may, the Government, backed by Earl Granville, were inexorable; and I contend that by refusing to allow Zebehr to go, they prevented Gordon, once for all, from carrying out his pacific mission. I have dwelt at some length on this matter, because I think it is one of the crucial points of the whole case. I contend, secondly, that the Government are directly responsible for Gordon's death by refusing to open the road to Berber and to secure the place. On February 27 Gordon implored that this road might be opened to Berber by Indian Moslem troops. At first, I admit, Sir Evelyn Baring was opposed to this; but afterwards he saw the necessity for it, and stated that Sir Evelyn Wood and General Stephenson said it was possible. On March 24, Sir Evelyn Baring wrote— General Gordon is evidently expecting help from Suakin, and he has ordered messengers to be sent along the road from Berber to ascertain whether any English force is advancing. Under present circumstances, I think an effort should be made to help General Gordon from Suakin … General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood … are of opinion that the undertaking is possible."—[Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 186.] So that at this time the Government knew that Gordon was in urgent need, and would not help him. But now they pretend that they thought he was in no immediate need; and because the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) chose to formulate a new meaning for the verb to "hem," Gordon was left to perish. If he had been "surrounded," I suppose help would have been sent; but because, according to the right hon. Gentleman, he was only hemmed in, therefore he was left to die. I have looked out the word to "hem" in an original copy I have of Johnson's Dictionary. I find it means "to cross the edge of cloth by a double hem, to enclose, environ." Therefore, it strikes me that "hemmed in" is even a more confining expression than "surrounded." It is impossible for the Government to say that they were not warned as to the importance of keeping Berber. Over and over again, both in this House and in the Press, they were urged and entreated to take advantage of our victories over Osman Digna, and to secure Berber; but, forsooth! the Government would not submit to Press dictation. When Berber fell, and his communications were cut, there was no hope for Gordon; and what makes the matter worse is that the reason the Government gave for not keeping the road open after El Teb and Tamasi was that it was too hot for troops. But if it was then too hot for the troops already there, and in some degree acclimatized, what is to become of the young unacclimatized fellows sent there now? I will not attempt to go further into this melancholy history; but I cannot help contrasting the way in which the Prime Minister spent his autumn, and the way in which Gordon spent his. The Government went scouring about the country, delivering orations at every railway station, hamlet, and town, haranguing mobs about their benevolent intentions with regard to the rural householders, while General Gordon was struggling day after day against starvation and ruin within, and savage foes without, and waiting in vain for the relief that never came. God grant that he may now know that thousands of English hearts were burning with indignation, thousands of strong English arms were longing to brave all the terrors of the Desert if only they might save him, and were restrained only by a Ministry that valued their own political position before the life of that noble hero. Nothing in the Prime Minister's speech was more weak than his reasons for not sending the Relief Expedition earlier. We were told that the choice of route required the most careful and prolonged consideration; but surely the Government might have found out, without much investigation, that the Nile route was more practicable at high Nile than after it began to fall. At any rate, they might have commenced their preparations earlier. What was it that happened on August 5 that they did not know before? Why, they found their Party had become exasperated, and that they must take steps to relieve Gordon or quit Office. The re- sult was that, having put off action to the very last moment, this step, like every other taken by them, came too late. Now, in conclusion, let me ask the Home Secretary, who has enlightened us to-night with a speech that would make us think he knew every square inch of the Soudan—let me ask him, is it not a fact that Her Majesty's Government are now committed to undertake every single thing which they declared no human power should make them undertake? Are they not committed, so far as this Government can be committed, to anything? Is it not a fact that they are committed to take Khartoum? Is it not a fact that they are committed to smash the Mahdi, who is heading a people struggling to be free—and rightly struggling for freedom—according to the Prime Minister? Is it not a fact that they are committed to smash Osman Digna for the third time? Is it not a fact that they are about to storm Berber, when a year ago General Gordon stated that 200 Hussars were all he required to secure him there? Is it not a fact that they are about to make a railway to Berber, which they think will take six months to complete, but which Lord Wolseley tells us will be nearer 12 months? Is it not a fact that we entreated them over and over again last year to make this railway; and that as late as November I put a Question to the Secretary of State for War urging him to make it as a means of retreat for our Army when the Nile had fallen? Is it not a fact that they are about to send 5,000 Indian troops from India to Egypt, when last year General Gordon implored that 200 or 300 might be sent? Is it or is not a fact that the difficulties now are ten times greater than they were last year; that the Mahdi's Forces, flushed with success, are ten times as numerous; that a doubting belief in the Mahdi has turned now to a firm belief in his divinity; that religious fanaticism threatens Egypt with destruction, and threatens trouble throughout the whole Mahommedan world, if not promptly checked? Is it not a fact that only a year ago General Gordon said the rebellion was only a trumpery affair, which he could put down with 500 Turkish troops, or any other troops sent him? It may be true that 2,000 Turkish troops would not have been enough; it may be true that the Home Secretary, in his over-weening self-esteem, thinks he knows more about the Soudan than General Gordon, who spent years there, and knew the tribes intimately; but I am justified in thinking—and I know many here will agree with me when I assert—that in the estimation of the people of England General Gordon's opinion will be taken before that of the Home Secretary. I ask, can any right hon. Gentleman on the Front Bench opposite contravene these facts I have put forward? I ask hon. Members who sit opposite whether, in the face of these facts, which cannot be controverted, they will still pin their faith and give support to a Government which has brought about this state of things? I earnestly trust—I earnestly believe—that the result of this division will be very different, indeed, to that in the division after these same facts had been debated last year.

MR. CARTWRIGHT

said, he hoped the Government would, in regard to certain points, give some information which might relieve the difficulties of mind under which he and many other hon. Members who sat on that side of the House were labouring as to the vote they were called upon to give. The Resolution submitted to the House fell under two heads. First there was the retrospective portion, but he would say nothing about that. The point of importance was the second head of the Resolution that dealt with the question of the hour. In the course of the debate he had heard some remarks which seemed to show certain misapprehensions of what he considered to be the character of the struggle in which we were engaged, and of the policy to be adopted. He had heard it called a struggle against a people who were fighting for their liberties. He ventured to say that this was not a struggle of nationalities. It was a struggle on one side for Western civilization against a wave of very militant Islamism; and the issue would not only touch England closely, but also, at many points, the interests of the Western communities and of the Western world at large. The question we had to consider was how we were to solve that problem? He heard to-night, what he must consider so far, an authoritative statement from the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir William Harcourt) that we were about to be engaged in a struggle that would involve us in this—that we were to go and, to use a phrase which had become current, try to "smash up" the Mahdi at Khartoum. He (Mr. Cartwright) was bound to say that that would be a task of no ordinary magnitude. If it were to be entered upon, he hoped that all it involved and all it was likely to bring upon this country would be distinctly laid before the constituencies. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister said that we were to go to Khartoum for the purpose of putting down the Mahdi; but he did not inform the House what we were to do with Khartoum after the Mahdi went out of it. The Mahdi well knew what his interests were, and if he chose to retire to Obeid, were we to follow him thither; and if he escaped us, was this country prepared to go beyond there into the Equatorial regions? They had been authoritatively told by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan) that the railway from Suakin to Berber was being constructed for military purposes only, but also was to be a broad-gauge line, so that its construction would have the character of an abiding and a permanent line. The proposal to build such a line he looked upon as being perfectly ridiculous, if the line was to be abandoned after the campaign. When they made, in a region like the Soudan, a monument of Western civilization like this railway, was it wise, was it proper, was it expedient, on the termination of the war, to allow it afterwards to be handed over to the use of savage barbarians? He called attention to this, because, in the last few years, we had had instances of action that were somewhat spasmodic and emotional. The Expedition of General Graham to Suakin resulted in feats of arms which were glorious for our military renown, but which were attended the next day by a retreat; so that the enemy was stronger a few days after than they were a few days before. Were we to have the same thing at Berber? He hoped the Government would have a clear and distinct answer to this question. He could not forget that, though they had heard to-night that there was to be no annexation of the Soudan either by England or by Egypt, Parliamentary Papers had just been issued, which showed that there had been an idea of making an Egyptian Prince the Ruler of that country. There was much difficulty in ascertaining what was to be the real scope and limit of this great enterprize, the goal of which was Khartoum at present, but which might soon become Obeid. Therefore, anxious as he was to give his vote in support of Her Majesty's Government, he hoped they would condescend, through some responsible Minister, to give the House assurances that they were not pledged to an Expedition the magnitude of which was illimitable, and the results of which it was absolutely impossible to forecast. Above all, he hoped there would be a guarantee that we were not about to engage in Expeditions only attended by feats of arms and by slaughter and butchery, and which might prove as fruitless as the Expedition of General Graham to Suakin and the battle of El Teb. The House ought to know whether we were going to introduce into that country some form of orderly government. He would again express his respectful hope that the Government would take into consideration the difficulty in which some of their supporters were placed with regard to the vote which they were about to give. He was far from desiring to support the Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote); but, as at present advised, he would say that if he were not provided with better light as to the intentions of the Government, and as to the scope and end of their action, he should be prepared to vote for the Amendment of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley).

SIR ROBERT PEEL

said, he deeply sympathized with the hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright) in the difficulty in which he was placed. The humble appeals which the hon. Member had made to the Government would, he hoped, induce them to relieve the anxiety of the House and the country. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir William Harcourt) had ridiculed the suggestions of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), which he considered impertinent and declined to answer. Then the right hon. Gentleman sneered at India; but was good enough to admit that the Government had experienced failures and made some mistakes. Made some mistakes—why, good God! their hands were deep in blood. They were ankle deep in it. The request of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon was a very legitimate and reasonable one—namely, that he was not prepared to support a policy, which pledged us to breaking the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum, without receiving some more definite declaration of the policy of Her Majesty's Government than had yet been obtained. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, in referring to the speech of the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin), actually had the audacity to compare the present Government in regard to foreign affairs with that of Lord Palmerston. The idea of comparing the policy of Lord Palmerston's Government, which secured us peace and the respect of Europe, with the present Administration, which had plunged us into war broadcast, and had made us contemptible in the eyes of other countries, was too absurd. Then the right hon. Gentleman had smothered the House with long extracts from Gordon's despatches, tending to prove how wrong the Government had been in the past. But that was not what the House required. The House wanted information with respect to the new departure of the Government which had been announced by the Prime Minister. What hon. Members wanted to know was, whether this new departure would strengthen, not the hands of the Government—for neither himself, nor, he supposed, anybody else, cared a row of pins about the Government—but the hands of the country in the eyes of the world. Do not let us be loft any longer in ambiguity about this matter; but let the country be frankly told what the Government really intended to do. Let them enlighten the House as to their new departure. There was no doubt of the character of the indictment of the policy of the Government after the speeches of his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson), and the right hon. Member for Ripon. But there had been some remarkable speeches also from the Benches opposite below the Gangway. The hon. Member for East Cornwall (Mr. Borlase) was so thorough a supporter of the Government that he said the Prime Minister was entitled to the honours of a Roman triumph. The hon. Member had forgotten the words of Gibbon, who said that many of those to whom a Roman triumph had been decreed were "condemned to everlasting infamy." Then the hon. Member for Leicester (Mr. Picton) announced himself as speaking on behalf of the "democracy of organized industry." That was a beautiful phrase. No doubt, the hon. Member knew where it came from. It came from Tom Paine's Age of Reason. The hon. Member for Leicester ridiculed the policy of the Government, but then went on to say that he intended to support the policy which he had just ridiculed. The junior Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), whose Colleague's speech the other day he (Sir Robert Peel) read with admiration, proposed an Amendment which reminded him of one described by Sheridan as being like a mealy potato with pickled onion, because it at once condemned and shielded the Government. What would the country think of hon. Members who could denounce and yet support the Government? It was pleasant to think that there were Members of an advanced Party, who could maintain an air of independent Radicalism by speaking one way, and an air of independent respectability by voting another. It was clear from the speeches delivered by the right hon. Gentlemen the Member for Ripon and the Secretary of State for the Home Department, that the Government were miserably drifting into a hopelessly defenceless position. It seemed so difficult to arouse them to a sense of their situation, that it was natural the Opposition should try their hands at something better, and should declare a policy which this direct Vote of Censure manifestly though tacitly implied. ["Oh, oh!"] It was constantly asked of the Opposition—"Why do not you declare your policy; let us know what you mean, and we will shape our course accordingly? "This was said by the miserably weak Government of 1839–40; and the late Sir Robert Peel replied—"When I am called in I will prescribe, but not till then." The consequence was—to use an expression not unfamiliar to the House —out they went. The Leader of the Opposition had done quite right in not waiting for Papers, and in pressing manfully to the front, for the country was in a state of dismay and agitation. It was impossible for any honest politician not to be surprised at the enthusiasm which the most moderate attacks against the Government engendered outside the walls of Parliament. Wait for Papers, indeed! Did not we know enough? In the opinion of the country, General Gordon had been done to death; the "Christian hero" of the Prime Minister had been the scapegoat of political exigencies, the victim of political indecision; and he, for one, in common with other hon. Members, had seen, what he was ashamed to allude to—the humiliating spectacle, on Monday night last, of the Prime Minister and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department attempting to ride off from responsibility on the back of the traitor who betrayed Gordon. To make the case worse, the affidavits of the two anonymous Egyptian Colonels, to which the Prime Minister had referred, to the effect that no human power could have saved Gordon, reminded him of the affidavits quoted by the President of the Board of Trade in regard to the Aston Riots. By the irony of fortune there had just come to hand a letter of Gordon's, dated the 14th of December, in which he said— All is now up; I expect a catastrophe in ten days' time. It would not have been so if your people had kept me better informed as to their intentions. This clearly proved that the Colonels' affidavits were worth no more than those of the President of the Board of Trade. Was this a moment for joy and congratulation, as the Marquess of Ripon said it was at Liverpool? In the view of a vast number of people there had been most defective strategy in all these proceedings of the Government. The situation was this. Instead of relieving Gordon, all their efforts were directed in relieving Wilson, who had gone to relieve Gordon, and now in relieving Buller, who had gone to relieve poor Stewart. Yet the Marquess of Ripon, fresh from honours won in India, could speak of this as a moment for joy and congratulation. ["No, no!"] He would quote the report of the speech from The Times. Lord Ripon's words were— There are circumstances in the troubles of the Soudan upon which we must all congratulate ourselves. He contended that there were no such circumstances. The Prime Minister said his policy now was to smash the Mahdi, and then make a friend of him. Smash the Mahdi, indeed! He should say the Mahdi was much more likely to smash Her Majesty's Government. But while all this was going on, it was something pitiful to hear the appeals ad misericordiam to the Opposition not to venture to censure the Government at the present moment. If ever there was a time when they should censure the Government it was the present. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. J. K. Cross), the other day, said that— This is not a time to criticize and censure the action of the Government; we can only hope for the best. That was exactly the hand-to-mouth policy which the Government had been pursuing. They had been hoping for the best, and always getting the worst of it. But there was one Member of the Government who had come to the rescue, and there was such a mawkish sentimentality about his speech that it was impossible not to refer to it. The hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General (Sir Farrer Herschell), speaking at South Shields immediately after he heard of the fall of Khartoum, of the death of Gordon, and of the retirement of the British, said— He was not for one moment going to say that Her Majesty's Government had not made mistakes;"— the Home Secretary had said as much that night, so that the statement had been confirmed— this was an erring world, where everybody made mistakes; and to suppose that they had got infallible Ministers was to suppose that they were not going to get human beings whom they could understand. That was the speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Solicitor General; and he would defy anyone to understand the human beings, as the hon. and learned Member called them, who were now Ministers. There was one omission which struck him in the speech of his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition (Sir Stafford Northcote). He (Sir Robert Peel) thought it was hardly fair to omit stating that, in all the blunders and butcheries in which the Government had been mixed up in Egypt, they had really many other things to look to. They had been studying, for instance, the political philosophy of one of their Colleagues, with whom they had been in correspondence, and they had been engaged upon the greatest Constitutional change since 1688, undertaken with the view of strengthening the influence of the Radical Party. But, putting on one side those matters, there could be no doubt whatever that the situation of affair's at the present moment was deplorable. There was a universal spirit of distrust and dissatisfaction prevailing in almost every part of the Empire; and what was much worse, there was a total loss of respect on the part of the other Powers of Europe towards England. Never, since the time of the First Napoleon, were the relations between France and this country more strained than now. He was one of those who complained of the treatment of Turkey in this matter. His opinion was that it would have been in the interests of Europe if the Prime Minister, instead of constantly attacking Turkey, had followed the policy of Lord Palmerston and had really taken that country into his confidence. ["No, no!"] That, of course, was a matter of opinion; but he (Sir Robert Peel) had followed the policy of Lord Palmerston for many years, and believed it to be, upon the whole, a right policy. He wished to refer to the position of Italy in this matter. Three Expeditions had left Italy for Massowah; and, in the Italian Chambers, Signor Mancini had stated distinctly—"We are not going to Massowah by Treaty, but by understanding with England." He considered that this was a serious matter, for who could say that such an invasion of Turkish territory by Italian troops might not lead to a European war? What had the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) said in that House upon the subject? The noble Lord had been questioned upon the matter more than once, and he had stated that there was no Treaty or arrangement between the two countries with respect to the occupation of Massowah; that Her Majesty's Government had no information as to the intentions of the Italian Government, but that they had reason to believe that the Sultan had not assented to the occupation of Massowah. He could not conceive any situation more unfortunate than for a Minister to make a statement in the House of Commons upon this matter directly contrary to that of the Prime Minister of Italy. It was impossible to reconcile the two statements. The Italians had more than once attempted to take Massowah; and, in 1880, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs wrote a despatch to Sir Augustus Paget at Rome, and that despatch showed that, since the year in question, the policy of the Government Upon this point had changed, because Her Majesty's Government in 1880 considered that the Egyptian Government held Sovereignty over Massowah and that part of the country, and protested against the exercise of any right of Sovereignty on the part of Italy.

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE

Is it Assab or Massowah?

SIR ROBERT PEEL

Assab.

LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE

You said Massowah.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

said, that what he had said was the Sovereignty of the country of which the bay formed a part. Lord Granville, in 1880, protested against the occupation of a part of the coast which belonged to Egypt. Now, he (Sir Robert Peel) believed that that occupation was likely to lead to fanatical outbreak among the Mussulman tribes in that part of the world; and he maintained that, unless the Government took very great care, serious danger would result from the occupation of Massowah by the Italians with 10,000 men. Were they going to assist the Government, or to assert a Sovereignty over the country? He asserted that the Italian Government never went there with 10,000 men unless there was a Treaty, or, if not a Treaty, some arrangement with Her Majesty's Government. There was one remark which the Prime Minister contested to-night, and which was made by his hon. Friend (Mr. Chaplin). The Motion of his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition stated that the policy of Her Majesty's Government had involved great sacrifice of valuable lives and heavy expenditure without any beneficial result. Well, on Monday night the Prime Minister turned to the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), and said— I deny altogether the assertion of the hon. Gentleman, that the expenditure of blood, and treasure has produced no beneficial result. Have we not abolished the kourbash and corvée? Have we not improved the irrigation of Egypt? That was the policy of the Government—spending millions of money, and sacrificing hundreds and thousands of valuable lives, for the purpose of abolishing the kourbash and corvée, and improving irrigation. But even that was not true. He (Sir Robert Peel) spoke on the authority of Mr. Clifford Lloyd, who wrote to The Times, and said that he had abolished the corvée; but, when he left Egypt, it had been re-established. Therefore, the result was that Her Majesty's Government had abolished the kourbash and re-established the corvée, and improved the irrigation of the land. Now, in addition to this Italian policy to which he had referred, we had in London at present a special Ambassador from Turkey—Hassan Fehmy Pasha. What had he come here for? He (Sir Robert Peel) had tried to find out what was the object of his mission. In fact, he had asked Fehmy Pasha himself, and he failed to obtain from him the precise object of his mission. But if he had failed to learn from Hassan Fehmy what was the precise object of his mission, at all events he had been able to ascertain what Lord Granville had said to him. Fehmy Pasha asked whether Her Majesty's Government were inclined to evacuate Egypt, and Lord Granville told him they were for political reasons. Fehmy Pasha asked when, and Lord Granville said— The British Government, being a Constitutional one, is dependent upon public opinion, which compelled the Cabinet to send an Expedition to the Soudan, and would not permit the evacuation of Egypt without some return for the sacrifices England has incurred.

MR. GLADSTONE

Who said that?

SIR ROBERT PEEL

That was Lord Granville to Fehmy Pasha. But, on the 19th of February, the first day of the re-assembling of Parliament, the Prime Minister said—and he (Sir Robert Peel) deeply regretted it— I need only remind the House that the policy declared by Her Majesty's Government has always been, with respect to the Soudan, the evacuation of the Soudan by Egypt and its restoration.

MR. GLADSTONE

To freedom.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

That was not in the first speech.

MR. GLADSTONE

I have referred to the reports, and in consequence of a considerable movement at the time in the House when I used the words "restoration to freedom" the words "to freedom" were not heard by the reporters.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

said, it did not appear in the report; but, of course, he accepted the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. The hon. Gentleman the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Caine), speaking at Brixton on the same day—for it was well to compare the different utterances of Ministers—said that the results which had followed in the Soudan were only the consequences of Mr. Gladstone's earnest desire to evacuate the Soudan as quickly as possible. But they had heard the Prime Minister say that the intention of the Government was not the abandonment of the Soudan, but the evacuation of the Soudan by Egypt; and the intention of the Government, as shown by the construction of the Berber-Suakin railway, is one of occupation. Immediately on the confirmation of General Gordon's death, this official notice was sent round to all the newspapers in the country— It is now decided, in accordance with the wishes of Lord Wolseley, to open the Berber-Suakin route. He wanted to know, what every person in the country was anxious to learn, why the Government did not adopt that plan when there was an opportunity of doing so last spring? The Conservative Party and the country were in favour of the establishment of the Berber-Suakin route. Why was not this course adopted, instead of the immense cost which had been entailed in men and money now thrown away on the Nile Expedition? But then the Government had apparently entered upon another plan. Now they had again, apparently, changed their mind. A vast Expedition was leaving for Suakin, evidently for a new purpose, and he had no doubt it would be too late. All these Expeditions had arrived too late. They reminded him of some lines as to the position of this country some years ago—lines which were written by a very cele- brated statesman, and were very happy and applicable— In planning expeditions 'gainst the foe, Our Ministers are ever sure, but slow; Each expedition shares a common fate, Slow to depart, and sure to be too late. It appeared to him that the Government were now adopting a policy of revenge. They were going to avenge Gordon's death. Was that right or wise? Poor Gordon was dead, a scapegoat to the political exigencies of the Government, a victim to their vacillation. But was a war to avenge Gordon a right or judicious thing for this country to undertake? Among others who had said that Gordon was to be avenged was his hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to the War Office (Sir Arthur Hayter). That hon. Gentleman had said— Gordon is to be avenged. No Government would be worthy of the name who did not come to that decision. To withdraw would entail a loss of prestige; but it was not intended to rescue the garrisons in the South of the Soudan. A resolution was, of course, at once passed expressing confidence in the Government. The other evening the Prime Minister used an expression which, he hoped, would never again be adopted by a Prime Minister of this country. The right hon. Gentleman, on February 19, asked—"Can we escape by accommodation?" He could not understand how such an expression could be used at a time when the Government had spent millions of money on a reckless war, and sent many brave men to their graves. The House, he hoped, would decline to support the policy of the Government without further pledges and stricter declarations as to the nature of that policy. He was prepared to give his support to this Motion before the House, because he believed every day proved that the policy of the Government was injurious to the public interest, and was working incalculable mischief to the welfare of the Empire.

Sir CHARLES W. DILKE and Mr. COURTNEY rose together. Mr. SPEAKER called upon.

SIR CHARES W. DILKE,

who said: Sir, I am sorry to stand between my hon. Friend the Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney) and the House; and as I am certain that my hon. Friend will have an opportunity of addressing the House before the close of the debate, I have thought it right that some Member of the Government should rise to reply to the speeches which have been addressed to us by distinguished Members of this House since the speech of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. As to the fine comedy of the right hon. Gentleman who has just spoken—["Oh!"]—I do not use the word in an offensive sense; but I desire to point out that the roars of laughter in which we have all of us been kept for the last hour, by the right hon. Gentleman, are hardly in keeping with, and hardly suited to, the dignity and gravity of the subject before the House. I shall not follow the right hon. Gentleman into the consideration of Lord Wolseley's strategy. I am not a military man, and the right hon. Baronet is not a military man, and is probably no higher an authority on matters of strategy than a layman like myself. Nor shall I follow him in some of the other comments he has made. But I must take exception to the course pursued by the right hon Baronet in giving to the House as quotations from speeches, delivered on various occasions, words which are not quotations at all, but long summaries with his own opinions upon them. One most remarkable example of this practice is to be found in the allusion made by the right hon. Baronet to a recent speech of the Marquess of Ripon. He went very much out of his way to bring the name of the Marquess of Ripon into the matter; and he charged the Marquess of Ripon with having, on a certain occasion, made some undesirable remarks, and with having congratulated the country upon the present unfortunate state of affairs. Now, the passage in the Marquess of Ripon's speech had reference only to the heroism displayed by the British troops. The House will, perhaps, allow me to read what it was that the Marquess of Ripon really did say. What he said was this— There were circumstances connected with the present state of affairs upon which they might undoubtedly and fairly congratulate themselves. What could have been more magnificent than the conduct of the British Army in the Soudan? The lesson that foreign countries would learn was that we were the same people who fought in the Crimea and the Indian Mutiny. Another cause for congratulation was the offer of assistance made to England by her Colonies. Surely no comment of any kind is necessary in reference to these observations, and it is only necessary to put before the House the actual words of the Marquess of Ripon for hon. Members to see how unfair is the attack which has been made upon my noble Friend. The right hon. Baronet also misquoted, if the House will allow me to use the expression—but I will put it in any other words if the right hon. Baronet objects to that term—the right hon. Gentleman gave his own version of the words of Mr. Clifford Lloyd's letter to The Times with regard to the corvée, and he entirely misrepresented the words used by the Prime Minister in the course of last week.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

What did Mr. Clifford Lloyd say?

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

I read the letter in The Times very carefully, and, although I do not agree with it, I did not understand Mr. Clifford Lloyd to say that he had abolished the corvée, and that it had been re-established.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

Since he left.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

I do not pretend to use Mr. Clifford Lloyd's exact words. I am quoting from memory the language of his letter which appeared in The Times, not having the passage at hand.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

Perhaps the right hon. Baronet will pardon me if I interrupt him. It is not very fair for the right hon. Baronet, when he is charging me with wilful misrepresentation—for that is his meaning—to speak from memory, without referring to the actual words of Mr. Clifford Lloyd's letter.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

I can assure the House that I have no desire to hurt the feelings of the right hon. Baronet; but I read Mr. Clifford Lloyd's letter, and I gathered from it an entirely different impression from that which has been conveyed by the right hon. Baronet. With regard to other points, there can be no doubt that the right hon. Baronet has misrepresented what the Marquess of Ripon said, and that, on three occasions, when he professed to quote the words of the Prime Minister, as a matter of fact he misquoted them.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

I really must interrupt the right hon. Baronet, who has now repeated his charge against me. The right hon. Baronet has distinctly charged me with wilful misrepresentation, and I am entitled to defend myself against that charge, and to explain to the House that I used the very words of the Marquess of Ripon. I deny that I, in any way, misquoted him. I quoted his very words. I am in the hands of the House. If I have in any way said anything that was not fair to the Marquess of Ripon, I am perfectly ready to apologize. The words I quoted were to the effect that, in reference to the Soudan, there were circumstances upon which we might undoubtedly and fairly congratulate ourselves.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

I am in the recollection of the House. I maintain that the right hon. Baronet made an attack upon the Marquess of Ripon; and I desire to show that, so far from the noble Marquess having made an unpatriotic speech, he did just the reverse.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

I never said that the noble Marquess had made an unpatriotic speech.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

That appeared to be the impression which the right hon. Baronet wished to convoy to the House. The right hon. Baronet is fond of making rather sweeping and strong statements. The right hon. Baronet said that he knew from the highest possible authority that our relations with France at the present time were more critical than they had ever been since the battle of Waterloo.

SIR ROBERT PEEL

I said that they were more strained than they had ever been since that time.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

I was not at all aware that we were on the brink of a war with France, or on anything but the most excellent terms with that country. I do not know how the right hon. Baronet can suppose that our relations with France are more strained than they were at the time of the Pritchard incident in reference to Tahiti, or at the time of the Spanish Marriages, when we undoubtedly were on the brink of war. I do not know whether the right hon. Baronet means by "the highest authority" the French Ambassador, the Prime Minister, or the President of the French Republic. It ought to be one of those three persons to justify the language used by the right hon. Gentle- man; but I greatly doubt whether the right hon. Baronet got his information on the subject from cither of them. I shall have occasion presently to refer again to the misrepresentations of the right hon. Baronet on other matters; but I will now, in the first place, deal with the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire (Sir R. Assheton Cross). The right hon. Gentleman, in his speech to-night, took us back a very long way, and he spoke of the danger to the country which had arisen from the seeds sown by the present Government in Egypt during the last four years. The right hon. Gentleman seemed to imagine that the Egyptian Question had been raised entirely by the present Government since they came into Office, and that hon. Members opposite are not in the smallest degree responsible for any part or share in these transactions. The right hon. Gentleman appears to have forgotten all about the meeting at Willis's Rooms, and the action of another Government which had rendered it necessary to send the British Fleet to Alexandria. He is quite ignorant of anything like pressure on the part of the Party opposite, and certain circumstances which preceded the transactions of four years ago. The country, however, will never forget that the present Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and several of their Colleagues were in Office for many years without mixing this country up in the affairs of Egypt, and that it was the late Government who upset the late Khedive and set up the present Khedive.

MR. BOURKE

Not at all. Never.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

The despatches are before the House, especially the despatches relating to the bringing of France into the control of the affairs of Egypt, and including Austria against the desire of Austria, and I ask the House if that did not bring this country into the position of direct responsibility which it now occupies in regard to Egypt? I ask the House also to remember that it was the action of the Marquess of Salisbury when he came into Office which changed the Dual Control, which had formerly been merely a financial one, into a political and international one. The right hon. Gentleman taunted us with not having sent out Cavalry to Suakin and Berber; while the hon. Member for York (Sir Frederick Milner), who spoke shortly after the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire, made a vigorous attack upon us on this ground alone. He also said that the blood of Gordon rested upon us. That is the nature of the accusation of the hon. Baronet, which he endeavoured to substantiate in a speech of great length, because we had not allowed General Gordon to avail himself of the assistance of Zebehr Pasha. The request of General Gordon to have Cavalry sent to him was dependent upon his obtaining the assistance of Zebehr Pasha; and when the Government decided that he should not have that assistance his request for Cavalry fell through. Do hon. Members recollect that speech which the Marquess of Salisbury made with regard to Zebehr Pasha? And, in the face of that speech on the part of their Leader, how could hon. Members opposite now maintain that Zebehr Pasha should have been employed? Do hon. Members opposite mean to endorse the statement that the death of General Gordon and the fall of Khartoum were owing to the not sending out of Zebehr Pasha?

SIR R. ASSHETON CROSS

What I said was that General Gordon requested us to do certain things—five in all; that we refused every one of them, and substituted nothing in their place.

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

I was not referring to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman at the moment, but to that of the hon. Baronet the Member for York (Sir Frederick Milner). The right hon. Gentleman carefully guarded himself against giving a distinct support to the request for sending out Zebehr Pasha. We must remember that all of the military authorities in this country were distinctly opposed to the sending of a small force to Berber at that time. We are told that we should probably be doing no good, and that we should be running a risk which no Government were justified in running. That was the opinion of the military authorities. Now comes the question whether the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire is right in saying that at a later period than that we were too late in the action which we took. The whole stress of the argument against us, with the exception of that of the one hon. Gentleman I have mentioned, who attacked us for not having sent out Zebehr Pasha—the whole stress of the argument against us is that we were too late in the action which we took on the Nile, and that we must have been prepared to be too late—that we acted, in fact, at a later moment than the best moment at which we should have acted; but those who make that accusation against us have not attempted to justify it by any facts or dates at all. They seem to think that we let pass the moment of the highest Nile, and that we let slip the best opportunity for taking action upon the Nile. That is not the case. The first action for advancing up the Nile was taken previous to the highest Nile. The steamers for the transport of an Expedition were passed up the Nile as soon as it was possible to pass them up; and, as a matter of precaution, the orders were given even before the Expedition was decided upon. This was about the middle of July—a considerable time before the actual necessity for an Expedition had been demonstrated. ["Oh!"] I do not know what there is in that statement that can be considered objectionable.

An hon. MEMBER: The words "Before the actual necessity for an Expedition had been demonstrated."

SIR CHARLES W. DILKE

I quite understand the feeling of hon. Gentlemen opposite, and which they expressed in the debate in August, that the necessity was demonstrated before we thought it was. But although that may be the feeling of hon. Gentlemen opposite, we did, in point of fact, act in advance of our own views on the subject, because, as we thought it might become necessary to despatch an Expedition at the earliest date, we passed the steamers up the Nile, and as soon as the river became sufficiently high we took steps which would have to be taken if the Expedition were afterwards decided upon. These orders were given in July, and the steamers passed up the river some time before the Expedition was decided upon in August. Some hon. Gentlemen opposite say that at that date we had no intention of aiding or rescuing General Gordon. Before we decided to send British troops up the Nile, on this very dangerous Expedition, it was our bounden duty to try whether there were other means in exist- ence by which Khartoum could be relieved. These means were tried in July, when active steps were taken to get the Kabbabish Tribes, who were opposed to the Mahdi, to go to Khartoum. Major Kitchener was sent to them, and spent a considerable sum of money in order to negotiate for the relief of Khartoum. This was in July, at the time when the boats were being prepared. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire has quoted to-night a letter from General Gordon, dated 19th of September, in which he complains of receiving no answer to his applications. The right hon. Gentleman has quoted it as if he thought that the receipt of no answer by General Gordon was in some degree our fault. Now, at the moment when that letter was written by General Gordon, Lord Wolseley was actually at Cairo; and every possible step had been taken, two months in advance of that date, to send news to General Gordon at Khartoum. Every conceivable step had been taken, two months before that date, to send news into Khartoum. Messengers had been sent by the Nile, through Suakin and Berber, by Massowah, and even through Tripoli and the Barbary States. Indeed, every possible and conceivable step had been taken for sending an answer to General Gordon; and although, unfortunately, he was without news from us at that date, it cannot be said that it was our fault that General Gordon was so situated. The right hon. Gentleman and other speakers have lately spoken of our being too late, as though we were too late in the ordinary sense of the word, and as though the danger could have been foreseen and prevented with greater speed. Some hon. Members have persuaded themselves that Khartoum actually fell from want of provisions; but, in the opinion of the great majority of this House, that was not the case. There is every possible reason to suppose that Khartoum fell through treachery, and there is absolutely no evidence the other way. There is evidence to show that there was plenty of food to enable the garrison to hold out until Lord Wolseley's Forces reached the city in the ordinary course of events. General Gordon informed us, over and over again, that he had food to last up to December, or, at the least, up to the end of September. On the 18th of September he stated that he had money and food enough in Khartoum for four months, after which time he said he should be embarrassed; but he used no stronger word than "embarrassed." He assumed that no troops had been sent at that time to relieve him; whereas, as a matter of fact, Lord Wolseley had sent troops up the Nile in boats, and a great number were on their way. General Gordon said that if troops were sent, the rebellion would cease as soon as they reached Berber. That fact shows how misinformed even General Gordon was as to the military situation. Now, although General Gordon then expected to have provisions only to the end of the year, as a matter of fact, there can be no doubt that he made sortie after sortie in the late months of the year, in which he captured provisions. The right hon. Gentleman opposite smiles; but there is a great mass of evidence to that effect, and we have the distinct statement of the last messengers who left Khartoum, that General Gordon was in perfect health, that his steamers were going down the river, and that he was constantly capturing grain and taking it up the river. Some hon. Members opposite have blamed the Prime Minister for quoting the anonymous Colonels of General Gordon; but what better evidence can you have than that of General Gordon's two Colonels, and of his Admiral, and of the 250 men who came down from Khartoum? They were Gordon's most trusted men; they acted as his body-guard during the siege; they were constantly going up and down the Nile; and their testimony to Lord Wolseley was that Gordon was not in great straits for want of provisions. Then there was the fact of the four steamers, which were well provisioned, and not by any means steamers that would be sent down by a starving town. It seems, therefore, to be as certain as anything can be that the statements of the messengers are true, and that Gordon was brought to his death by treachery within the town alone. If the danger was treachery, it was one which could not have been avoided by a more speedy military action than Lord Wolseley actually took. Now, I turn to some of the later questions, which are by far the most important raised in this debate, but which it is impossible to consider with- out previous reference to those military questions which have been made the ground of attack upon the Government. There are some hon. Members on this side of the House who think that after the fall of Khartoum became known we ought immediately to have withdrawn from the Soudan. I think it is unnecessary to discuss that question from the political or general point of view, when you remember how overwhelmingly strong against it are the purely military arguments. We had from Lord Wolseley a statement which, judging from subsequent events, appears to have been too sanguine as to the possibility of either of two courses being taken—either concentration at Korti, or advance. But Lord Wolseley asked for and expected an Expedition from Suakin; and, therefore, farther and considerable military operations were regarded by Lord Wolseley as an essential portion of our plans. The hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright) asked a distinct question with regard to military operations. He put one of those questions which it is generally unwise to put and unwise to answer. I am able to say that, because I am not going to make that appeal with regard to this particular question. But speculative questions as to what is to happen in six months' time, at the end of our military operations, are questions which it would be unwise for any Government to pledge themselves to definitely. I cannot think that has been done in any previous military operations in this country, and it would be unwise on our part to do it now. But the hon. Member has put so extreme a case that it is possible to answer it. He asked, if the Mahdi were to retire to the Equatorial sands, whether we should follow him? I answer that no English Minister would be sufficiently mad or foolish to follow the Mahdi in that way. With regard to the future of the Soudan, the hon. Member for York (Sir Frederick Milner) made a somewhat humorous statement to the House, though I think it was somewhat unconscious humour. He expressed a fervent hope that before the close of the debate one of the prominent Members of the Opposition would enlighten him by expressing a firm and enlightened policy. I do not think he is likely to be successful. He seems to have spoken without any regard to the speeches which his Leaders have made up to the present time. He does not seem to have paid any attention to the speeches of his Leaders, either in this House or in the other House, to-night, or to the speeches of the right hon. and learned Member for the University of Dublin (Mr. Gibson), or of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire (Sir R. Assheton Cross), or of the Duke of Richmond to-night in "another place." None of those speeches seem to have made any effect upon him, and I think his Leaders will not be much flattered when they read that statement to-morrow; and certainly the anxiety of the hon. Member is likely to be increased by the statements which have since been made in the course of the debate. I sympathize with right hon. Gentlemen opposite when they refuse to give form to declarations of policy. My contention is that no Government and no Opposition ought ever to be asked, six months in advance, to pledge themselves in detail as to the j results of military operations. Those results must depend upon circumstances and the nature of the operations themselves. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire made certain general declarations with which I should be prepared myself to agree. He quoted the words of the Resolution, and he said that we ought to do our best to insure a good and stable Government succeeding us. Quite so; and then the right hon. Gentleman said that a good and stable Government in the Soudan meant our staying in Egypt. But this seemed to imply our staying in such portions of the Soudan as were necessary to our security in Egypt; and, no doubt, a large portion of the Party opposite appear to be desirous of pledging us to the policy of staying there. The right hon. Gentleman then read the words of the Resolution, and said the portion of the Soudan in which we must stay must be that portion which was necessary for the security of Egypt. All the highest military authorities of this country have agreed previously in fixing the frontier of Egypt so as to exclude these portions of the Soudan. If you looked merely to military considerations, you would not find it necessary to keep these portions of the Soudan, including Berber and Khartoum. The right hon. Baronet the Mem- ber for Huntingdon (Sir Robert Peel) told us that there was no ambiguity in the Resolution of the Leader of the Opposition. Those who have followed the explanations of that Resolution would be disposed to think there was an immense amount of ambiguity covered by its terms. For instance, the right hon. Gentleman says we are to stay in Egypt and those portions of the Soudan which are necessary for military security, and that the minimum of the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) was not enough. But he did not say what line be would fix, but put it entirely on the ground of military security. He did not assume any necessity for staying in the Soudan for the purpose of securing good government in the Soudan, or those parts of it which were necessary for the security of Egypt. Some hon. Members have gone so far as to speak of our staying in the Soudan for the sake of trade, and for the benefit of those of the inhabitants of that country to whom we are under obligations. Therefore, I am justified in saying that the speeches on the other side make the Resolution that is moved ambiguous in the highest degree. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire (Sir R. Assheton Cross) got into a little difficulty, for he said we must establish a safe, and firm, and settled Government in Egypt. That certainly means our staying there ourselves, and yet that we must keep faith with Europe; and I do not know how the two purposes are to be reconciled without breaking faith in some way. The right hon. Gentleman said he would not go into detail, but would only lay down the broad outlines of a scheme; and I am bound to say that his outline is very broad indeed. He refused altogether to commit himself to any frontier line, or to a frontier line within 200 or 300 miles outside Khartoum. He certainly said that Berber was not enough. I will now turn to the questions which have been addressed to Her Majesty's Government with regard to our policy, and the questions put by my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) which have already been dealt with by my right hon. Friend the Homo Secretary. I also propose to deal, at the same time, with the questions which have been put by the right hon. Baronet who has just spoken. My right hon. Friend the Mem- ber for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) asked for a great deal of further information; and I was struck by the difference between the speech of my right hon. Friend on this occasion and the speeches which on former occasions he has addressed to this House on foreign subjects. My right hon. Friend was Ambassador to Constantinople while I was Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, and we had much conversation about foreign affairs. I may, therefore, confuse what he said in private with what he has said in public speeches, and if I do I hope he will forgive me. But he has always tried to guard Governments—all Governments—from over-pressure of detail in regard to questions relating to foreign affairs, because of the difficulty and inconvenience of suddenly pressing a Government in this House for details about matters which are the subject of pending negotiations. That is my right hon. Friend's general view; but on this occasion, if he will allow me with all respect to say so, I think my right hon. Friend has violated his own principle in asking questions upon many points of great delicacy, which are the subject of pending negotiations at the present time; and with his knowledge of public, and especially Oriental affairs, I would ask him to pardon me if I answer his questions less completely than I might otherwise do, although I will answer them to the best of my ability consistently with the interests of the public. My right hon. Friend put questions to us in reference to the occupation of the Red Sea ports by Italy; and the right hon. Baronet the Member for Huntingdon (Sir Robert Peel) made an attack upon us in regard to the occupation of Massowah. I am sorry that the right hon. Baronet is not at this moment in his place, because I was about to refer to his remarks, and in his absence I am unable to speak in so much detail as I would have done if he had been in the House. The right hon. Baronet quoted a great deal of the despatches as to Assouan, and dragged in Massowah, although that place was not in question in the least degree. The right hon. Baronet asked for information in reference to pending matters between this country and Italy, and the negotiations now going on with Hassan Fehmy Pasha in this country; and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) also asked questions as to Hassan Fehmy's object in being here, the position of Germany and Russia, and the autonomous or international position of Germany in Egypt. With regard to some of these questions, I would the less try to satisfy my right hon. Friend than to argue with him, and try and convince him that on his own principle he ought not to be satisfied. Hassan Fehmy Pasha, who is here at the present moment, is actually carrying on negotiations at this time. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Huntingdon (Sir Robert Peel) has pretended to give the House some sort of account of those negotiations, and has said that Hassan Fehmy Pasha himself give him an account of what passed with Earl Granville. Now, Hassan Fehmy Pasha is a man of great ability, uprightness, and integrity, and is in the highest degree a statesman, and one of the two very best men in the service of the Turkish Government at this time. He is an admirable example of a Turkish barrister of great eminence in the law, but he is not highly skilled in the languages of Western Europe; and possibly the right hon. Baronet has failed in understanding from him what it was that Earl Granville said. I will, however, confidently assert that Earl Granville never made the extraordinary statement which, passing through two mouths, has been ascribed to him by the right hon. Baronet. I speak with certainty on the subject, because the conversation has been formally recorded, and Fehmy Pasha has attested the accuracy of the record. I can only say that Earl Granville never said anything of the kind. My right hon. Friend the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) has asked me a question in reference to these negotiations. I can only, in the face of the fact that negotiations are now pending, tell him that it will be found from the Blue Books before the House that we have not only recognized the rights of the Porte in the Red Sea, but that, over and over again, we have pressed the Porte to take over those parts of the coast which the Egyptian Government has been unable or too poor to manage. For one reason or another the Turkish Government delayed doing so, and have never acted upon the policy we have pressed upon them. We have no reason to believe that now there is any desire on their part to take a more active part on the shores of the Red Sea than they have taken during the many months we have been pressing them to occupy the places the Egyptian Government has evacuated. Prince Hassan has been sent into the Soudan under circumstances which are absolutely and entirely known to the House. Nothing has passed with regard to his mission which is not contained within the four pages of the Paper in the possession of the House. Therefore, there is no mystery or secrecy in this transaction. Lord Wolseley desires that he should be sent to him, because Lord Wolseley feels keenly his position as a Christian Commander in a Mahommedan country, and wishes to have a Mahommedan with him to increase his influence over local officers. The statement which was made to-night, that we have sent him as the Governor of the Soudan, is not a true statement; because, as will be seen from the last Papers, we prevented any such rank being given to him. Then, as to the position of Germany and Russia in Egypt, we have been asked why those Powers take a more active part in the affairs of that country than they formerly took, and what is behind this activity? The greater activity of Germany and Russia was shown at the time of the Conference by a request then made that there should be German and Russian Representatives on the Caisse. My right hon. Friend must admit that, if the Caisse exists at all, it is desirable that all the Great Powers should be represented upon it. Whenever any changes in the Law of Liquidation are required it is necessary to appeal to the Powers; and it is much more easy to obtain the consent of the Powers to the recommendations of a body on which they are largely represented than to the recommendations of a body on which only a few are represented. Then, again, as to foreign control, there is not the danger of active foreign intervention in the case of a body on which four or five of the Powers are represented upon it. I cannot think that the mere admission of the Representatives of Germany and Russia can be a subject of blame on the part of my right hon. Friend. It has really been done at the desire of all the Powers, who wish to prevent any financial pressure and increase of charges upon Egypt. Then, my right hon. Friend asks a more important question, and one much less easy to answer. He inquired of us as to the internationality or autonomy of Egypt—whether it is to be international or autonomous? One of the difficulties of using long words is to know always what they mean. "Internationality" is a word which never means the same thing in two cases, and "autonomy" may also be used in different senses. For instance, I find it difficult to know whether Belgium and Switzerland are international or autonomous in the opinion of my right hon. Friend. [Mr. GOSCHEN: Autonomous.] Then, my right hon. Friend wishes to know whether Egypt is to be governed by an International Control, and to cease to have any power of self-government at all. I hope we shall not do anything which is likely to make Egypt international, in the sense of losing the power to govern her own affairs. Her Majesty's Government, in the unfortunate position of things in the Soudan, have not received any considerable amount of local support. I know hon. Members opposite are under the impression that that is in consequence of the declaration that it was our intention to leave the country. But I believe that that absence of local support preceded any declaration of the kind, and any of the consequences to which they allude, and that it is founded upon the fact that we are dealing with a considerable amount of fanaticism. The Mudir of Dongola, who has been specially mentioned in the course of this debate, is a person whom it is undoubtedly impossible for us to abandon to his enemies after the services he has rendered to us. But he is not an inhabitant of the Soudan; he is an Egyptian Turk. He was formerly employed in the Delta, and wishes very much to be employed there again. His chief desire is that when he ceases to be of use in the Soudan he should be employed in the Delta. There can be no doubt that one of the objects we ought to have in view in the course of our operations in the Soudan is the protection of the interests of those who have assisted us. The most difficult, perhaps, of all the questions put by my right hon. Friend, to which it is possible to give an answer at all, is a question he addressed to us with regard to Italy. The question is one on which I think I can throw some little light, although I fear that I shall not be able to satisfy my right hon. Friend. The right hon. Baronet who attacked us just now with reference to the position of Italy in the Red Sea told us that the Prime Minister of Italy made a statement upon this subject which was entirely at variance with the statement of the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice). Now, the statement of Signor Mancini is entirely at variance with that of the right hon. Baronet, because he said in the Italian Chamber exactly what was said in the House of Commons by my noble Friend. The right hon. Baronet said that we have changed our policy in regard to Massowah. I have already said that Massowah is not mentioned in these despatches, and that it is not a subject of negotiation in any way. But if we have changed our policy on this point with regard to the occupation of a particular town on the Red Sea in the course of four years, surely the change is not one at which the right hon. Baronet need wonder or be astonished, or accuse us of flagrant inconsistency, because, four years ago, it was thought that a particular town should remain Egyptian, and because Egypt is now too poor to keep it, and, therefore, the care of it ought to be transferred to somebody else. I do not think that the circumstances lay us open to any charge of inconsistency. The late Government stated in this House that they were prepared to hand over Herat, which is called the key of India, to Persia; but I imagine that if we did so now, the Opposition would not think it inconsistent to challenge that policy, and propose a Vote of Censure. Therefore, it is very probable that in the course of a period of four years a change in our policy with regard to the occupation of a not very important seaport may have come over "the spirit of our dream;" and I would remind the right hon. Gentleman of the extreme delicacy of the position of Italy with regard to Turkey, similar as it is to the delicacy of our position towards Turkey in regard to the occupation of Cyprus. Italy is in possession of certain territory which she admits to be under the Sovereignty of Turkey, as we admit Cyprus to be. I should like to know, if anybody in the Italian Chamber was to go into the question of our occupation of Cy- prus, where the position is somewhat similar, what would have been thought by us? My right hon. Friend, who was Ambassador at Constantinople, will appreciate the value of the remark. There is, at this moment, not only friendship and amity between this country and Italy, but there is the closest possible friendship and amity in the relations between the two countries. We disclaim all responsibility for the proceedings of the Italian Government in their operations at Massowah. We are not responsible for them in any way; we did not suggest them originally, although we acquiesced in them; and we do not consider, under the circumstances of the case, that we are called upon to express any opinion with regard to that Expedition. But, in general terms, we cannot refrain from expressing our earnest desire that the extremely amicable relations now existing between the two countries should not only continue, but even be strengthened. It should be remembered that Italy has a large number of its people in Egypt; the language of Italy is greatly used there in commercial transactions; that it has a considerable trade passing through the Suez Canal; and that the most valuable results are anticipated from the friendly relations between Egypt and Italy. It is a country, too, whose remarkable revival in recent years has excited the sympathy of all Englishmen. We had, before there was any question of an Italian Expedition to Massowah, or to any of the ports on this coast, pointed out to the Sultan that Egypt was not able to maintain them, and that it had better take steps with regard to them. But time passed; no steps were taken; and I think that, under these circumstances, we should not be the first persons to protest against the action of Italy. My right hon. Friend pressed us very much upon the subject of the Suakin and Berber railway—a subject much more difficult to answer. Surely my right hon. Friend must admit that it is impossible to give an absolutely binding pledge upon the subject at present. Suppose he were in power and were asked to give a pledge as to his own policy, that he would in all circumstances keep Berber, maintain the trade route, put down the Slave Trade, and open up the country to civilization. Would he give that pledge? Suppose that the Mahdi was at Khartoum with unbroken power, with an immense force of religious fanaticism behind him, would my right hon. Friend give the same answer as to the immunity of the railway and the trade route, and the opening up of the country to civilization, as he would if the Mahdi were dead, without any fanatical successor? You must remember that in an Oriental country it is quite within the bounds of possibility that this whole movement may suddenly break down; that the country may be restored to its former position; and that the people may return to their old allegiance. Take the possibility of the death of the Mahdi. These prophets, as a general rule, do not leave successors behind them. The inutility of a railway line under certain circumstances in such a country could be easily shown. A comparatively small force of the enemy could prevent its working. Although military reasons have made us make the line, I hope that it may remain, I hope that the Soudan may return to such a state of tranquillity and peace that the railway line, after a few years, will be regarded as a commercial undertaking, and may be utilized for purposes of trade. I would never be a party to the protection of the line by an enormous military force, or at an enormous expenditure of money. But it would be the height of folly to give an absolute pledge. That seems to me to transcend the ordinary conditions under which pledges may be asked for and given. There can be no doubt that the railway, if it were maintained, would be a blessing to Africa; but, on the other hand, no one in this country would consent to keep for years a large British garrison in Berber at an immense expense for the purpose of protecting a railway which, if it had to be protected, would be absolutely useless for purposes of commerce and civilization. Therefore, I think my right hon. Friend will admit that it is impossible for any Government whatever to give an absolute and binding pledge in reference to the Suakin and Berber railway. The utility of a railway, if our Forces are to be kept in the Soudan for 12 months, must be evident. The House will remember the difficulty that was experienced in moving troops out of Alexandria four years ago. Then, in general terms, my right hon. Friend asks the Government for pledges with regard to the future government of the Soudan. It is not, in my opinion, possible, to give more explicit pledges than those already given. My own impression is that no pledge as to the ultimate future of the Soudan, or of Khartoum, is possible under present circumstances. It is undesirable to give pledges which in the nature of things cannot be carried out. There is no general agreement in this House or in the country as to what that future should be; but if there were such an agreement, it would be foolish to attempt to put it in the form of a pledge. Our intention is to use all reasonable care to leave behind us in the Soudan a lasting state of tranquillity. We will not and cannot go beyond the statement that we will use all reasonable efforts. We decline to convert that statement into a binding pledge. We should be merely deluding the House if we were to say more than that. My right hon. Friend seems to contemplate the possibility of our keeping a grip on the Nile at Berber. I would ask him whether in the course of the debate he has heard from the Party opposite anything in the nature of a binding pledge that would dispose him to entertain the idea that they would accede to his wishes in this respect? I do not complain of the vagueness of the statements of the right hon. Gentlemen opposite; but I contend that it would be hostile to the interests of the country if binding pledges on such a subject were made at the present time. Hon. Members opposite have spoken tonight of a policy of "bloodshed and bolt;" but it is difficult not to cast our eyes back a few years and to remember what was the policy of the late Government in Afghanistan. If ever there was a policy of "bloodshed and bolt," it was in Afghanistan. ["Oh!"] I mean in the abandonment of Cabul, the capital of Afghanistan, without leaving behind any settled Government. [Cheers, and ironical cries of "Hear, hear!"] Hon. Members cheer ironically; but the expression "bloodshed and bolt" does not apply to the policy of the present Government in Candahar, which was contemplated by themselves, and has been approved by Sir Donald Stewart himself. I would ask hon. Members who cheer ironically to read that statement. When we left Candahar we left behind us a settled Government, and such a condition of things as resulted in the formation of an independent and united Afghanistan, which was what we demanded. If that should be possible, of course we should like to pursue in Africa a policy such as that which we followed with so much success in Afghanistan. We have not forgotten the success of that policy; and although some hon. Members seem to think that we shrink from giving a pledge that we will carry out in the Soudan the policy we have so successfully pursued in Afghanistan, I am quite sure that I have now shown that the conditions of the present situation are such that it would be merely imposing upon the good sense of the House and the country if we were to attempt to carry our pledges further than we have carried them already.

MR. MARRIOTT

said, that with regard to the rebuke with which the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down thought fit to commence his speech in reference to the right hon. Baronet the Member for Huntingdon (Sir Robert Peel), and the laughter and spirit of levity he had provoked being out of place, he (Mr. Marriott) thought the House would agree with him that such a rebuke came with a very bad grace from a Member of Her Majesty's Government. He did not want to go into details, which were now well known all over the country, as to how some of the Ministers acted on the receipt of the intelligence of the fall of Khartoum; but, considering how they acted, he thought the rebuke which the right hon. Baronet had administered to the Opposition was singularly ill-timed. He could not help admiring the audacity of the right hon. Baronet. He only wished the Government had displayed the same audacity in their policy as the right hon. Gentleman had in his arguments. When he told them of "bloodshed and bolt" in Afghanistan, he (Mr. Marriott) should like to ask who bolted there? Why the present Government, who left Candahar and bolted, after the successful march of Sir Frederick Roberts. Who bolted from the Transvaal? Why, the whole policy of the Government had been to make a successful war, and then bolt; and what he wanted to know was, whether we were going to have another bloody war, and then another bolt, with- out any tangible good resulting to civilization? The right hon. Baronet tried to make out that the Government were not responsible for the death of General Gordon, because General Gordon was betrayed by treachery. That was not the first time this excuse had been made. It had been made by the Prime Minister in one of those airy phrases he was fond of using, such as that of "a people struggling to be free." He would ask the right hon. Gentleman for one moment to consider the dates, and then say what foundation there was for the assertion that Gordon was sacrificed by treachery, and not by the neglect of the Government. General Gordon's last letter was dated December 14, and in that letter he said he expected the catastrophe in 10 days. He himself well knew that the catastrophe was going to happen; but if relief had come in December, that which did not happen till January 26 would not have happened at all. He wondered whether the right hon. Member for Ripon was satisfied with the answer he had received to his question? He wondered if he was satisfied that the Government was pursuing the right course? The Ministry, the right hon. Baronet stated, had all along said that their intention was to leave in Egypt a stable and lasting Government; but the fault which hon. Members found with them, and which the country found with them, was that they had never realized what a stable and lasting Government meant, or the process or period of time that it would take to establish it. Having destroyed the Army and upset the existing Government of Egypt, they considered that they would be able to set up another Government in the course of two or three years. The House and the country ought to bear in mind this fact—that, considering they had overthrown in Egypt the very foundations of authority, and that there was no Egyptian Army, the establishment of a stable Government in that country could not be accomplished in less than a generation; and, therefore, if that was the intention, they must remain there for 25 or 30 years. Before a stable Government could be established, Her Majesty's Government would have much to do; they would have to restore order—no easy matter; they would then have to produce an equilibrium of the finances, and that also was no easy matter, as Her Majesty's Government had already found out; and then they would have to give the Egyptians equality of laws and equality of taxation, which things, as he had already said, would take a generation for their accomplishment. The country asked why, if Her Majesty's Government intended to do all this, and to remain in Egypt until it was done, they had not said so plainly at the outset, instead of beating about the bush, at one time speaking of six months, at another of a year, as the duration of their stay there, and now giving no definite reply on the subject at all? The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, in replying to the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Leader of the Opposition, put forward this defence. He said that the matter was res judicata; that all these matters had been brought up before; that they had been made the subject of Votes of Censure; that the country was satisfied; and that, therefore, the House ought not to go over the ground again. But the right hon. Gentleman forgot that, although the Votes of Censure were not carried, the conduct of Her Majesty's Government was only condoned. [Ministerial dissent.] He was using the language of the Home Secretary. He and hon. Members on those Benches said, not that the Government had committed three, four, or five errors of judgment, but that they had committed a series of errors of judgment, and that at different periods those errors had been condoned. But were they, having committed another error of judgment, again to be condoned? Why, the Prime Minister had never yet realized the initial mistake made in bombarding the forts of Alexandria without having troops ready to land there. The historian of our times would have to record that the English Fleet entered the harbour of Alexandria in the month of May, 1882; that upon the 30th of that month the English Consul sent home a telegram, not only in his own name, but in the name of the European inhabitants of Alexandria, which stated that, so long as the Fleet remained, their lives and their property were in danger unless troops were in readiness to land; that, on the 11th of June a riot took place, during which several lives were sacrificed, and the English Consul (Mr. Cookson) insulted and wounded; and that when, notwithstanding these warnings, the Fleet bombarded the forts, the lives and property of the Europeans in the city were left at the mercy of the rabble. He said that, were the Government a Corporation or a Railway Company, and were they brought before a Judge and jury in this country, not only would they be held liable for the amount of the damage resulting from the bombardment at Alexandria, which his hon. Friend the Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) stated at £4,000,000 sterling, but a verdict of manslaughter would be returned against them for the lives that were lost. But Her Majesty's Government had never realized that fact. Why had this been condoned? Because the telegram of Mr. Cookson was not published until after the war had begun, when everything else was forgotten, and the victory of Tel-el-Kebir put out of sight the fault of the Government in not providing for the protection of life and property at Alexandria. On the 5th of October, 1882, Earl Granville addressed a despatch to the Earl of Dufferin, in which the Earl of Dufferin was asked, in the most polite manner, to show to the Porte that England wished for her co-operation, while all the time England had imposed impossible conditions on her Army and impossible conditions on her Fleet. The House knew that the Porte was deceived, and that there existed a great soreness in consequence. But in that despatch there was one line which might have given hope as to the future. Earl Granville said that, while the sacrifices they had made had given England power, that power had thrown upon her great responsibilities. He would ask hon. Members to take their minds from the 5th of October, 1882, the date of the despatch, to the 8th of August, 1883. At that time Colonel Stewart had been sent to Khartoum, and it would be found that 30 or 40 despatches suggesting reforms were sent by him to Sir Edward Malet and passed on to Cherif Pasha. Then General Hicks sent despatches, all of which were received. But about the 8th of August Earl Granville began to be alarmed, and for the first time showed the white feather, for he wrote out to Sir Edward Malet, reminding him that Her Majesty's Government assumed no responsibility whatever in regard to the condition of affairs in the Soudan. Now, at that time, let it be borne in mind, the Soudan was as much a part of Egypt as Jersey was of England; and yet Sir Edward Malet was instructed to point out that he was debarred from giving advice with reference to affairs in the Soudan. Then followed the sacrifice of General Hicks and his Army, and the defeat of Baker Pasha, after which, in the month of February last year, a Vote of Censure was moved in that House. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen) and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), both of whom he regretted not to see in their places, took part in the debate on the Motion. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford rejoiced that Her Majesty's Government had at last discovered and acknowledged their duties, and added that, bearing in mind the difficulties of their task, he should vote with them. He wondered whether the right hon. Gentleman rejoiced now, whether he felt sorry that he rejoiced then, and whether he thought it would have been better had he voted against the Government? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon also said that the policy of the Government must be different from their past policy; and he added that he believed the Government would stand by their pledges, and he would stand by them. What did the right hon. Gentleman think of the Government pledges now? They had given pledges which might be as easily broken as those of last year. Hon. Members knew what had taken place between February and May last; they knew the Government policy was never to act themselves, but only when public opinion guided them. It was not until that article appeared in The Pall Mall Gazette that they sent out General Gordon; they sent him out first on account of public opinion, and, secondly, because it was a cheap thing to do. After that El Teb and a series of battles took place; General Gordon was believed to be in danger, and accordingly hon. Members on that side of the House did the duty of an Opposition by again proposing a Vote of Censure. Upon that occasion the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford was silent; but the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon delivered a speech, in which he said that Her Majesty's Government had not recognized the danger of the situation, and impressed on the House that not only the Government, but every individual Member, incurred great responsibility by the vote he was about to give. He (Mr. Marriott) agreed with that; but what vote was given by the right hon. Gentleman? Why, none at all. Having told the House of their responsibility he went away, as did also the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford, without voting. Hon. Members knew that on that occasion the conduct of the Government was condoned; that they pledged themselves to be responsible for the safety of General Gordon; and they knew that on the 8th of August the Government had not made up their minds. The right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down said they were preparing to act months before; but if that were so, why did they not take the House into their confidence? The Government came down to the House in August and asked for £300,000 on account of the Expedition which it was known in November would cost £7,000,000, and when they must have known that the Expedition was undertaken too late. On the 13th of September they had not expressed their intention of giving field allowance to the officers of the Staff; and he said, without fear of contradiction, that on the 13th of September it was the opinion of military men in Cairo, the opinion of their own Staff officers, and the opinion of Mr. Cookson, that they were six weeks or two months too late; and if there were a Royal Commission to inquire into the circumstances, he was confident that Lord Wolseley, were his opinion asked, would say—"I knew at the time—nay, I expressed the opinion in Cairo—that we were six weeks too late." Well, then, who was to blame? Was it not the unanimous opinion of hon. Gentlemen on those Benches, and of many hon. Gentlemen opposite, that the Government ought to have begun to act sooner? They said—"We do not want the Government to send soldiers into the climate of the Soudan in June and July, but we want them to begin their preparations for doing so; to get their boats ready, if boats are to be used, so that the Expedition may start at the earliest fitting moment." And had it started in September, instead of in No- vember, there could be no doubt that Khartoum would not have fallen, that General Gordon would have been saved, and that the English Flag would have now been floating over the city. Who, then, was to blame for what had happened but the Government? He observed on the Benches below the Gangway the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney), who sacrificed himself when he left the Government, and who in an interesting speech, which he (Mr. Marriott) had read, took his constituents into his confidence, and told them that, like him, the Prime Minister disapproved of the Egyptian War and the Expedition to Khartoum. But if that were so, how came it that the war and the Expedition were carried out under the auspices of the Prime Minister? [Mr. COURTNEY dissented.] The hon. Member shook his head, but he said in his speech that it was a policy of which the Prime Minister disapproved. He was so reported in the newspaper in which he had read the hon. Member's speech. The hon. Member was deserving of respect for having sacrificed his place in the Government to his opinions as to proportional representation; but although he left the Government on that question, he (Mr. Marriott) thought that the question of the Egyptian War was of more importance still, and he would remind the hon. Gentleman of the saying, "Straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel." Again, the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) had applied to the Government language which hon. Members on those Benches would be called to Order for using; he said they were "cowardly, and not honest." If that were the opinion of hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway opposite, he would ask if they were going to vote for a Government whom they declared to be dishonest and cowardly? If so, he hoped their constituents would know it, because he was convinced that the great body of the working classes would then support the policy of the Opposition. He knew that many were taken with the phrases that had been used in reference to this question—such, for instance, as that of "scuttling out of Egypt; but the establishment of a civilized and stable Government would not only be a great blessing to Egypt and the Soudan, but it would also be the means of opening up an enormous trade with Liverpool, Manchester, and the manufacturing districts; if a railway were made between Berber and Suakin, there could be no possible doubt that those in the North would gain enormously. But for that one thing was necessary—there must be a civilized and stable Government. Now, a civilized and stable Government was impossible at the present moment without the help of England, and that was impossible so long as Her Majesty's Ministers remained in Office. He quite admitted that some of Her Majesty's present Ministers might carry out a proper policy for Egypt and the Soudan; but the problem would never be solved until this country had a good understanding with Germany, Austria, and Turkey. He quite reciprocated what had been said about Italy. They all wished to be on the best terms with that rising nation, which had their good wishes; but an alliance with Italy alone was a danger both to her and to ourselves. The only alliance should be with Germany, Austria, and Turkey, which would be the best alliance possible; but how could such an alliance be brought about whilst they had such a Prime Minister as Mr. Gladstone, and such a Foreign Secretary as Earl Granville? The Turks had not forgotten the despatch of Earl Granville of the 5th of October, 1882. It was easy to deceive a person once, but it was very hard to do it twice; and it was not astonishing if the person deceived felt a little sore, as they knew the Turk did in regard to the treatment he received from Earl Granville. The Turk had not forgotten those splendid harangues in Mid Lothian, and those splendid pamphlets written by the Prime Minister about a "bag-and-baggage" policy. If Gentlemen opposite were so opposed to the shedding of blood—and nobody was more opposed to it than Gordon had been—the only way to prevent the shedding of blood was to go to the Soudan on a good understanding with the Turk. The Sultan of Turkey had, they knew, immense authority over all Mahommedans. He was their head—their Pope. The Mahdi was a false Pope and a false Prophet. A good understanding with the Turk was almost the first requisite to acting peacefully in the Soudan, because in the Soudan they were fighting people who did not wish to fight with us, and whom we did not wish to fight with. All this had been brought about by the almost unheard-of bungling of Her Majesty's Government. The Soudanese were a peaceful people who loved work, who made the most beautiful articles in silver and gold, and sold them to Egyptian and Arab tyrants and slave dealers. These were the people they were now fighting, and who were led away by a few whom the Prime Minister had described as "struggling rightly to be free." The Soudanese themselves, the original inhabitants of the Soudan, were an industrious people, who wished to be at peace with this country; yet what could they think when they saw our soldiers at their doors? Why, that we were invading their country as their enemies. He believed that if we went to them in an amicable spirit, and offered them money and goods in a peaceable way, we might be friends with them, though, of course, we must have force to appeal to as a last resort. But with the present Prime Minister and Earl Granville in Office, he maintained that it was almost impossible for any real solution to be found for the Egyptian Question. Even the present debate was not the most serious one that would have to be taken, because, after all, they had to find the financial solution of the question; and he never could conceive the people of this country agreeing to a Multiple Control. That Control would be condemned not only by that House, but by the country at large. The country would never stand the spending of £20,000,000 or £30,000,000, and then the putting of the Control under a variety of nations, each acting against the other, and each having different interests to serve. He knew the moderate Members on the other side of the House were waiting for the declaration of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington). That was rather a happy trait of the Prime Minister. He got up and made a rabid speech, which pleased the extreme Party, the Radicals calling "Excellent!" but the moderate men, disliking it, declared that they would not vote in support of the Government; and then the Whips went whispering about, and got the Secretary of State for War to finish the debate; and he would give some kind of sooth- ing syrup which, would satisfy the moderate Party. The result was that the Prime Minister satisfied one Party and the noble Marquess satisfied the other, while no promise was kept and no pledge redeemed. He (Mr. Marriott) did not make the charges against the Government which had been made by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley). He did not repeat the charge made by the right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen), that they made promises they did not keep; but he did say that their want of action and the disproportion between their promises and their fulfilment of promises had been such as to earn for them a character for hypocrisy all over Europe. Promises were made and carried out in a half-hearted manner, and pledges were put forward with which the country did not agree. Was that to continue? The decision rested with the Moderate Liberals, who in heart and feeling were much more with the Opposition in this matter than with the Prime Minister. They agreed almost entirely with the policy the Conservatives were advocating, and yet they—or some of them, at any rate—would vote against the Motion censuring the Government. There was only a narrow passage—the Gangway—dividing the Moderate Liberals from the Radicals, whilst from the Conservatives the former were divided by the wide floor of the House; and yet, in feeling, in regard to the Egyptian policy of the Government, the Liberal Members were much nearer to the Conservatives than to the Radicals. But, however near the Opposition they might be, for Party purposes they would not vote against the Government. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade had told them that that would be a very serious occasion in the House; but, in his (Mr. Marriott's) opinion, there never was a more serious time for the country, and he did not believe that the feeling in the House was half as serious, nor the indignation against the Government half as bitter and pronounced, as it was throughout the country. That House did not represent the real feeling of the country; but to-morrow and on Saturday, when they read the papers, they would find that the speeches which had been made, and the vote which had been taken in "another place," were a much truer representation of the opinions of the country than the speeches made or vote taken in this effete and moribund, so-called "popular" House. The House of Commons did not represent the feeling of the people of the country; and he would only refer on this point to one remark made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen). On a recent occasion the right hon. Gentleman told them that he would not vote for a Motion of Censure, because he did not wish to give a blank cheque to the Marquess of Salisbury. The right hon. Gentleman had never had great confidence in the people of this country. He had always been opposed to household suffrage and its extension to the counties; but could the right hon. Gentleman have used any phrase more clearly showing his distrust of the people than that now quoted? What did it mean? Why, "You may pass a Vote of Censure; but if you do we shall have to go to the people, and they will return the Marquess of Salisbury, and I am not prepared to trust the Marquess of Salisbury." But the Marquess of Salisbury had never asked for a blank cheque. The Conservatives were of opinion that, of late years, far too many blank cheques had been given to Ministers sitting on the Treasury Bench. What were wanted were Ministers with a firm and decided policy, and power was wanted in the House to check the Government if necessary. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) had acknowledged the evils of the present Administration; and he (Mr. Marriott) asked the House whether, in the face of the evil courses which this Government had pursued throughout the whole of these Egyptian affairs, they were going to give them another Vote of Credit? The words of the Resolution might be considered by some open to criticism; but its plain meaning was that the past deeds of the Government did not entitle them to confidence—that Her Majesty's Ministers were no longer fitted to be entrusted with the management of the affairs of the country, and that others could be found who could be depended upon to carry out a policy in accordance with national sentiment; therefore he hoped that many, even on the Ministerial side of the House, would be found to support it.

MR. BRYCE

said, that at that late hour of the evening:—12.50 P.M.—he would confine himself to a very few observations, and would not follow the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down into his attack upon the Mid Lothian speeches, nor into his references to the probability of Party voting on the Ministerial side of the House, to which the hon. Member had, perhaps, felt himself at liberty to allude through being himself so exceptionally free from the possibility of being charged with giving a Party vote. One part of the hon. and learned Member's indictment consisted of the bombardment of the forts of Alexandria, which event took place whilst the hon. and learned Member sat on the Liberal side of the House, and to which event the hon. and learned Gentleman, at the time, took no objection. What was the critical point to the Members sitting below the Gangway in the triangular duel which the House was witnessing?—and he called it such because it seemed to him that those of them on the Liberal Benches who were not altogether satisfied with the declarations of the Government conceived that the Government and the Opposition were mutually answering one another, but had failed to answer the objections which were made to any further aggressive operations in the Soudan. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir William Harcourt), in one of the most powerful speeches which even he ever delivered in the House, had answered with singular effect the arguments of the Opposition, who pleaded in favour of establishing a stable Government in the Soudan. He had shown the difficulties which would have to be encountered in an undertaking of that kind—how little there was to gain by it, and how much to lose. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire (Sir R. Assheton Cross), who followed the Home Secretary, on the other hand, had shown how inadequate would be the destruction of the power of the Mahdi unless it were accompanied with something more. He (Mr. Bryce) did not think the answer given by the right hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) completely removed the objection which many of them felt to the policy announced by the Government. For him- self, he wished to draw a marked distinction between the political and military features of the situation. He admitted the plea put forward by the President of the Local Government Board, and previously by the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Trevelyan). He agreed that the movements of Her Majesty's troops would have to be guided very materially by the exigencies of the case, and did not think the House was the proper place in which to express opinions as to the military features of the case. The Government must have given to them a large discretion in the matter. But he did believe that the House and the country were entitled to a clearer statement as to the political objects at which the Government were aiming. In spite of all they had heard from four Cabinet Ministers, they wore still in the dark as to those objects. The Prime Minister had said that Egypt was to evacuate the Soudan, but carefully abstained from giving his pledge that England should do so. The right hon. Gentleman the Home Secretary had dwelt on the importance of breaking the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum; but he had omitted to say why it was so necessary to break his power at Khartoum, and what was to be done in case he withdrew South or West of Khartoum and established himself at Kordofan. An hon. Member had asked what course would be followed if the Mahdi retired in the direction of the Equator; and the right hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board had rather evaded the question by saying that no one would think of following the Mahdi to the Equator. But suppose he withdrew to where he was before he attacked General Gordon, to those very regions in which his power had grown to its present formidable dimensions, what security was there that the Government, in their operations against him, would not consider it necessary to remain for a long period at Khartoum, to pursue him and engage in campaign after campaign beyond Khartoum? They could not find much comfort in the hopes expressed by the President of the Local Government Board, that the power of the Mahdi would expire of itself, and would not survive a single defeat. It was true that these outbreaks of fanaticism sometimes died away as rapidly as they had arisen; but there were cases in Mahommedan history in which the originator of some religious movement had found a successor, under whom it had continued and grown more potent. The present movement had risen so fast, and had consolidated itself so much, that they must not base their policy upon any hope that the Mahdi's power would disappear of itself. It seemed to him (Mr. Bryce) that the Government ought now to be prepared with a distinct declaration as to what they would do in case they found the campaign lengthening itself out. The House ought not to pass any Amendment which would forbid a forward movement if the military exigencies of the case required it; but ought to require an assurance that a movement of that kind would not turn into a long campaign, and, above all, that no step should be taken which should bind them to permanent occupation. Therefore it was that he looked with great apprehension to the making of the Suakin-Berber railway. It was impossible to suppose that when a railway of that kind was once made, public opinion in England would consent to abandon it. If any proposal for such abandonment was made, they knew how many arguments would be raised against it. They knew how strongly the absurdity of abandoning a trade opening such as that to the tribes of the Desert, after having spent large sums of money on it, would be urged. The question was, therefore, could they give a simple Vote of Confidence in the Government, or were they bound in some other way to express their sense that a more specific statement of policy was wanted? It would seem as though an opportunity were afforded them for expressing that opinion in the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley); but that Amendment was defective in two important respects. It protested too much, and prescribed too little. It indicated no policy for the Government to follow—it forbade an act of military exigency, and not of administrative policy—an act which, indeed, he personally believed not to be necessary, and in support of which, he submitted, no sufficient evidence had been tendered by Her Majesty's Government. Not even the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, in the speeches they had made on the military question, had given any sufficient grounds for believing that it was necessary to go forward against Khartoum; and he wished to call the attention of the House to the ignominious position in which they might be found if intentions of the kind announced by the Government, under the sudden impulse of the feeling caused by the news of General Gordon's death, should be apparently maintained between now and December next, and then, when December came, abandoned. It would be far better, now that alarm had subsided, to look calmly at the situation, and make up their minds that such a forward movement was not necessary, than to hold themselves out as intending to undertake it, and then to sneak away in December next, because public opinion would not support them. He ventured to say that public opinion was already opposed to the plan which the Government had announced. The people of this country were opposed to the making of a railway from Suakin to Berber, because they believed that it would ultimately involve a permanent occupation. He would like to ask the Government whether they thought it wise to endeavour to commit the country to a forward policy of this kind at a moment when they were so uncertain as to the views of the great mass of the new electors put on the electoral roll by the Franchise Bill? An hon. Friend of his (Mr. Picton) had denied, the other night, that the Democracy were eager for war. His own opinion was that the new electors, and the whole body of the working classes of the country, were somewhat too indifferent to our Imperial interests. He wished they were more interested in these matters, and more alive to the sacrifices they might be called upon to make in regard to them. It was because he was afraid that the Government, who were on the point of embarking in a forward policy, which would lead to the retention of British troops in Equatorial Africa for a long time to come, would find, before many months, that they were not supported by the public opinion of the country, and would therefore have to pull up I half way, that he begged them to pause before they committed themselves. They saw their Possessions in India threatened—they were threatened on the East in Burmah, and on the West in Afghanistan; and was that a time to engage in new liabilities? Was it not rather a time when they ought to reserve all their strength for the calls that might soon be made upon it? The Amendment of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley) he could not support, as it did not suggest any aims or principles of general policy, but merely sought to condemn one particular military operation; and he had therefore placed on the Paper an Amendment of his own, which he should move if an opportunity arose for him to do so. It expressed a definite line of policy; and he could not help thinking that if the Government were more free than they were to express their real opinion, they would say that his Amendment did not fall very far short of their views. There was another Amendment given Notice of by the hon. Member for the University of London (Sir John Lubbock). He (Mr. Bryce), while naturally preferring his own, was willing to vote for that Amendment, should there be a disposition to think it more seasonable. He would only say, in conclusion, that hon. Gentlemen opposite must not complain of them because, while thinking that the Government should be more explicit in their declarations, they, at the same time, were not prepared to support the policy of the Opposition, which they deemed far worse than that of the Government. The Government, it was true, were not sufficiently anxious to withdraw from these complications, but the Opposition wished to increase them; the Government kept them in a mist, but the Opposition would plunge them into a night whose darkness might at last be relieved by a flash of lightning, which would only serve to show them that they were on the brink of a precipice.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(Sir Michael Hicks-Beach.)

Motion agreed to.

Debate further adjourned till To-morrow.