MR. GLADSTONEIn laying this Vote of Credit on the Table, Her Majesty's Government have engaged that it should be accompanied by a brief explanation, which will contain nothing in the way of apology, argument, or controversy, but the whole object of which is to give to the House of Commons a clear idea of the course we are now taking and the meaning of the Vote proposed. The House of Commons was apprised soon after its meeting in February that it would be necessary to make provision for military charges in the Soudan, not only during the unexpired portion of the year 1884–5, but also during the financial year 1885–6. At that period we had in view the expenditure in the Soudan, and expenditure in the Soudan alone; but circumstances which have since occurred, with the greater portion of which the House is acquainted, have obliged us to widen our investigations and greatly to enlarge our demand for funds. We have found it necessary to review our military position, not with reference to the Soudan only, but with reference to the general condition of public affairs and to all the possible demands upon the military resources of the Empire. We feel that it is necessary at the present moment, in our judgment, to hold all these resources as far as possible, and including the Forces in the Soudan, available for service wherever they may be required. In these circumstances, the Vote for which we are now asking does not include any provision of money for further offensive operations in the Soudan, or for military preparations with a view to an early 318 advance upon Khartoum. It does, however, include items having reference—as will be readily understood—to such contracts or undertakings as, being already considerably advanced, could not be stopped with any appreciable advantage, and which, at the same time, do not involve any necessity for hostile action. For example, we provide for the river steamboats which have already been contracted for, and for the completion of what is known as the Wady Halfa Railway—the railway beginning at Wady Halfa—towards which extensive preparations have already been made, and which will have advantages altogether apart from military necessities. As to the ulterior steps beyond what I have stated, we reserve our entire liberty of action, subject to the discretion and control of Parliament. Perhaps I ought to add—though it is hardly necessary—that what I have now stated with respect to the Soudan does not imply any change of view or intention as to the defence of Egypt and its frontier. There are many considerations of importance—moral, military, political, and physical—which bear upon the question of the operations in the Soudan. I refer to them now merely to say that the whole of them are entirely beyond my present purpose, that purpose being merely to explain the basis of the Vote; and I may repeat for the convenience of the House the most important words I just now used—words in which I declared that we do not in the Vote now laid on the Table ask for any provision of funds for further offensive operations in the Soudan, or for any military preparations with view to an early advance on Khartoum; but that we solicit Parliament to hold the military resources of the Empire, including the Force in the Soudan, available for service wherever they may be required. I think it may be convenient that I should add an explanation of one or two details which fall within the scope of what I have already said. The Suakin Railway was projected and commenced as a military work in support of the Nile Army; but with the cessation of active operations on the Nile any considerable extension of the railway will be suspended. But until some other permanent arrangement can be made, it will be necessary to hold the Port of Suakin with British or Indian troops. The experience of last summer 319 has proved to us that in order to hold Suakin for any useful purpose—indeed, in order to hold it without undue exposure and risk to the garrison, particularly including their health—it may be necessary to occupy one or more positions in the neighbourhood of that place. The Military Authorities will be consulted as to the positions which it may be considered necessary to occupy with that view; and as to the point up to which it will be necessary, on the grounds I have already stated, that the construction of the railway should now be carried. It is proposed to complete the Suakin Railway up to the point which may be determined as best for the garrison; and while that is being done—for it must take some little time—we shall consider our future course as to any prosecution of this railway beyond that point. We consider, Sir, that if the Nile Railway be, as we think it is, an advantageous work for general purposes, the prosecution of it need not be discontinued, as it does not involve any question of hostility. The addition to our resources which will be effected by holding the Soudan Force available for service elsewhere is an addition quite independent of the demands which have been recently made upon Her Majesty's Government by the Government of India for large reinforcements. These demands will be entirely met by provision at home, leaving the Force released in Egypt and the Soudan as an additional reserve for employment in India or elsewhere. I may perhaps say—my noble Friend the Secretary of State for War has furnished me with the information—that in the total Vote it is proposed to provide, first, for the Government of India, as already stated; and, secondly, for the mobilization at home of a Force which, with that released in Egypt and the Soudan, will constitute a complete Army Corps; thirdly, for guns, submarine mines, and defences in addition to, and in aid of, naval preparations. I will now state in outline the particulars of the Vote. Perhaps I may first explain to the House the change which has taken place in our views as to the order of Business, which was suggested—although I will not say it was asked for—by the short statement or question of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devon (Sir Stafford Northcote). When we first had to contemplate asking the House for a Vote 320 of Credit it had reference to the Soudan alone, and as it was to be asked for with reference to the Soudan alone, besides that the amount was not so large, it was one with regard to which the question of time was not in our view of very great importance; and, consequently, we intended to propose that Vote to the House after the Budget; but, considering the important change that has taken place—the change in the proposition which the Government now make to the House, and the great change of their having to introduce other and larger items of great consequence into the Vote—and with reference to what I shall term special preparations, we think now that the considerable addition to the military expenditure of the year which it is our duty to ask Parliament to make should be distinctly submitted to Parliament at a very early day, and before we determine finally upon the financial proposition which will be necessary in order to enable us to meet the charge. The general principle upon which our arrangements are made is that before the Budget is submitted to the House the general scheme of expenditure is sufficiently known and sanctioned, though all its details have not been fixed. This is so considerable an addition to the annual Expenditure, that we believe it will be better that we should pursue a course founded on that basis on the present occasion; and, therefore, our proposal is to submit this Vote of Credit to the House for its sanction, if it should meet with approval from the House, on Monday next—which will, I think, give the House sufficient time for its consideration—and to postpone the Financial Statement of my right hon. Friend from Thursday to Thursday next week. Now, Sir, the total sum for which we ask the House by this Vote is £11,000,000. The sum is put in one Vote upon administrative grounds, but it is divided in that Vote between what I have termed the remaining charges relating to the Soudan, and what I have termed special preparations other than the Soudan; and I think it is a fact that, in point of law, we should be enabled to effect a transfer from one portion of this Vote to the other without any previous explanation to the House. I wish to state distinctly that we shall not effect any transfer whatever from the head which 321 relates to special preparations to the head relating to the Soudan without full previous communication to Parliament. The House will, therefore, understand that the Government entirely gives up its discretion in that respect. Of the £11,000.000 I have mentioned, the remaining charge for the Soudan stands at £4,500,000. Of this £4,000,000 would be in the technical division military charges; out of that sum £750,000 would have relation to the Suakin Railway, for which very considerable cost has already been incurred, and £400,000 would have relation to the Nile or Wady Half a Mail way, making in all £l,150,000. Taking the military charge at £4,000,000, there would be also a naval charge of £500,000 in connection with operations in the Soudan. I may say, at once, it refers to the removal of the troops from one point to another. Under the head of special preparations we ask for the sum of £6,500,000. Of this sum, again, the House will please to understand that I am not able to speak with the rigid technicality of an Estimate; but the description I give is prepared in the Departments according to the best understanding they can form of the respective sums that will be required for each purpose. Upon that basis, the expenditure of these £6,500,000 would be approximately—for military charge, £4,000,000; for naval charge, £2,500,000. Under the head of special preparations there are£4,000,000for military charges, including £1,150,000 for railways, and £500,000 for the Navy in connection with the Soudan. Thus we have £6,500,000 and £4,500,000, making together the total I have mentioned, £11,000,000. In conclusion, I can only say that we are sensible of the gravity of the proposal which we now make under a deep sense of our responsibility to the Crown and to the Empire. While we count with confidence on the liberality and patriotism of Parliament for meeting every just demand, our course, it is perhaps hardly necessary for me to say, will continue to be, in all our relations with Foreign Powers, what, as far as our intentions went, it has been already—that is to say, our aim and desire are, if it be possible by pacific means, to obtain a just and honourable settlement of every controversy in which we are, or in which we may be, involved.
322 Estimate presented,—of the Sum required to be Voted, beyond the ordinary Grants of Parliament, towards defraying the Expenses which may be incurred during the year ending the 31st March 1886—(1.) For Remaining Charges in the Soudan and Upper Egypt; (2.) For Special Naval and Military Preparations—£11,000,000.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEThe statement of the right hon. Gentleman, both in what it actually contains and what it implies, is so important that I do not propose to say much upon the subject at the first blush. I cannot, however, help noticing the change, the change in the arrangements which the Government propose in the order of Business. I regret that we should have the Budget delayed; at the same time, if it appears to the Government to be important that they should proceed rapidly with that portion of this Vote which refers to special preparations, I can quite understand that it may be necessary and desirable to lay aside or postpone other Business for a time in order to arrive at the consideration of that very important proposal. It is one the magnitude of which, and the circumstances under which it is brought forward, must at once strike the House with a sense of its gravity, and impose caution upon us in dealing with it. With regard to one part of the statement of the right hon. Gentleman—that relating to the expenses in connection with the Soudan—I am not entirely satisfied with the right hon. Gentleman's statement; and if it were not for the fact that this question is coupled with another which requires careful attention, and which I should be most sorry to damage by premature criticism, I should feel it necessary to make some observations upon the subject. I do not think the Government are dealing with the Soudan Question, if it can be regarded as a question by itself, in a manner that would be satisfactory to the House. We ought not to be asked to spend money, and especially to give Votes of Credit, for operations in the Soudan without a fuller and more complete statement of the policy of Her Majesty's Government.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEWhen the right hon. Gentleman states that he is going to ask for the large sum of £4,500,000 for expenditure in the Soudan, I think it is only reasonable that Her Majesty's Government should give us full and complete explanation of their policy. I understand, however, that we may look for that statement when the time comes for the question to be raised. With regard to the matter as a whole, I am glad to hear that the Government intend to proceed rapidly; and if it is necessary for the purpose to postpone the Budget, of course I shall make no objection to that course being taken. If the Government find it more convenient that the Budget should follow the statement, that is a course to which, I think, the House will offer no objection.
Estimate referred to the Committee of Supply, and to be printed. [No. 155.]