§ Order for Committee read.
MR. GLADSTONEI rise to move, Mr. Speaker, that you do leave the Chair, and in so doing I need not detain the House for an unreasonable time. I wish to say that if I am to understand the present opposition to the Bill mainly to have reference to the question of the Suez Canal, the ground of dispute between us is so narrow that my eyes practically fail either to define 1875 or even to discern it. I will say a few words with regard to the merits of this Bill, and I will close by stating' what is the view of the Government with respect to the proceedings now going on at Paris in relation to the Suez Canal. I think with regard to the Bill so much notice has been taken of the transactions which took place in 1855 that it would not be respectful on my part were I not now to make some short reference to that transaction. I did not deem it necessary to do so on the former occasion, because, in my mind, the two subjects are as different as it is possible for any two subjects to be that involve the same particular word. The particular word "Guarantee" is involved in both—"Joint Guarantee," I should say—and that, in my own opinion, is the only resemblance that I know between the two subjects. It is only right that I should express what I take to be the nature of these matters. I am one of those who think that even in private life it is dangerous to make a gift under the name of a loan; and most certainly, in my opinion, it is dangerous and objectionable for a State to make a gift under the name either of a loan or of a Guarantee. I myself was a party, at the time of the Crimean War, to advancing a sum of £2,000,000 to the Sardinian Government. That was even a step beyond a Guarantee. We raised the money and handed it over, and made an arrangement for its repayment. To my mind the essential condition of justification of that measure was our full and absolute conviction that the Sardinian Government would fulfil as punctually and accurately as we ourselves could have fulfilled the engagement to pay the money. Thirty years have elapsed, and I do not think all the money is repaid yet under the arrangement then made; but my recollection is that the great bulk of it has been repaid, and the remainder will be repaid. The foundation of the objection taken in 1855 to the proposal to guarantee the loan to the Turkish Government was a belief that the Turkish Government would probably be unable to fulfil the conditions of the Guarantee. That was the belief that I and many others entertained; and I am bound to say the belief was not altogether unjustified by facts. I do not mean to say that the money is not now secure, because I think 1876 that by the arrangement which it has been found practicable to make upon what I may call the collateral funds, not coming under the description of ordinary Turkish resources, sufficient provision has been made. But if we had been dependent upon the ordinary Exchequer payments of the Turkish Government there would have been great difficulty. But that is not all. What were we doing? We were at that time engaged in a great war, which had been brought about by an attempt of one or two Great Powers to interfere with the internal arrangements of Turkey. We knew quite well, if we guaranteed the loan, that if the condition of the loan were not fulfilled, that title to interference would again arise. That is the point of distinction to which I wish to direct attention. Unless hon. Gentlemen are conscientiously and intelligently of opinion that Egypt is likely to fulfil the pecuniary conditions of the Guarantee and exempt the Powers from liability in respect of it, I am not prepared to defend the Guarantee. I have the firmest conviction to the opposite effect; I believe that 19 out of 20 hon. Members of this House entertain the opinion with me that Egypt is able to fulfil its obligations. As long as there is any Revenue at all in Egypt—and there must always be some Revenue—the first charge upon it will be that of this Guarantee. That is the broad and fundamental distinction which I draw between it and other Guarantees where a doubt arises as to the fulfilment of the engagement. That is not a mere pecuniary question; but it is also a political question of the utmost importance, because it cannot be denied for a moment that when a State which has taken the benefit of a Guarantee is unable to fulfil its pecuniary covenants, then claims of the most indefinite character to interference may be urged with a view to procure, by whatever means, the fulfilment of those engagements. But, of course, a demand of that kind may be made a cover for almost any amount of interference that may be conceived. I hope right hon. Gentlemen opposite will not think I speak disrespectfully when I say that I am under the impression that they are not really aware with what edged tools they are playing in opposing this Bill. Have they considered the consequences which 1877 would follow if they could succeed in persuading the House—but I have no apprehension that they will—to reject or refuse to pass this Bill? I will just point out two of the consequences which would certainly follow. Had this Convention not been made. Egypt would have become bankrupt on the 6th of April by its failure to pay the dividend of tribute money, which on that day became due to Turkey. Now, the object of opposing this Bill, as I understand it, is to prevent foreign interference in the affairs of Egypt. Have right hon. Gentlemen considered that, independently of the other consequences of bankruptcy, the very first effect of the inability of Egypt to pay the tribute money would have been to establish an absolute right on the part of the Ottoman Porte to interference in Egypt? So that, in addition to the internal consequences of bankruptey—a discredit and disgrace involving discredit to this country, we being in military occupation of Egypt—there would be created that very right of interference which right hon. Gentlemen wish to avoid. Moreover, the Sultan might be backed by the other Powers, to what extent I do not know, but that he would have an absolute title to interfere in Egypt for the fulfilment of the primary engagements of that country to the Turkish Empire is beyond all question and doubt. Well, Sir, I should have thought that was rather a serious consideration of the consequences that would have followed the failure of the British Government to conclude the Convention which we have been enabled to form. I will refer to another question which I can find no sign from their speeches that right hon. Gentlemen opposite have taken into view. I want to know what, but for this Convention, would have become of the suit that was raised by the Caisse in the last autumn against the Egyptian Government? Have they considered what would have become of that suit? I will give, Sir, the particulars as far as they are essentially necessary. The sum which was diverted by the Egyptian Government from its legal application under the Law of Liquidation was £524,000. I say from its legal application under the Law of Liquidation. I have had the satisfaction of reading today an article in The Quarterly Review, in which the reviewer appears coolly to 1878 contend that from change of circumstances the Law of Liquidation is now I entirely placed at the arbitrament of the British Government, and that it is for the British Government to say how far that International engagement is in force. If that ancient periodical expresses the views of Her Majesty's Opposition on this subject, it is well that we should understand it, because I perfectly grant that if that be so—if we are to assert that International Law has no longer any existence in Egypt, that we have become masters of it, and, consequently, can deal with Egyptian Revenue as we please—then I admit that that is a ground broad enough to carry with it all the consequences which you may desire. But I have great doubt whether any Gentleman in his senses will say that he is prepared to adopt that ground, or to deny that the provisions of the International Law of Liquidation form a covenant absolutely binding upon us, and upon everyone a party to it; and I must say that they formed that covenant with the Powers of Europe! at its back to enforce the doctrine that the law is in force, and to enforce the provisions in respect to it. That appears, at all events, to be the opinion of most of the Powers of Europe; because although the Conference last summer had agreed that if an arrangement had been made the Sinking Fund should be suspended, yet, as is well known, no arrangement was made; and it was in a desperate necessity, and for the purpose of avoiding the confusion that would have followed upon bankruptcy—it was upon that ground that the Egyptian Government diverted these moneys, and was supported by the British Government in so diverting them. Notwithstanding that anything but satisfaction was given to the Powers, the diversion took place between the 18th of September and the 23rd of October in last year. It was followed by the immediate protest of the Commissioners of the Caisse, and subsequently by protests from, I believe, the whole of the foreign Consuls General. Therefore, by that protest, those gentlemen, acting, without doubt, under the instructions of their Governments, laid the ground for ulterior measures. Now, what, was to take place in Egypt? On the 5th of October, 1884, while the diversion of the Funds was going on, but long before 1879 it was completed, action was initiated by the Caisse against Nubar Pasha, the head of the Executive Government of Egypt; Mustapha Pasha Fehmy, the Minister of Finance; the Mudirs of the assigned Provinces, and the heads of the assigned administrations—namely, the Customs and the Railways. That action was initiated on the 5th of October. On the 9th of December judgment was given by the Court of First Instance, and they condemned the whole of these functionaries, except Nubar Pasha, and held them personally responsible under sentences for replacing the money—for a sum of £500,000 taken from necessity by the Egyptian Government out of the Caisse to meet necessary charges of administration. The Court of First Instance gave judgment, declaring that the agents of that Government who had been directly or indirectly concerned, with the exception of Nubar Pasha, were personally responsible for that money. Had it been at once communicated to the Egyptian Authorities the execution would have followed immediately, unless delayed by appeal; and had it been confirmed on an appeal made at that date, execution might have been enforced as early as the 23rd of January, 1885. But, Sir, of course, every fair measure was taken to procure postponements, and postponements were procured, so that the judgment, although published, was not notified officially to the Egyptian Government until the 29th of December, 1884. So much time was gathered by the intervention of Diplomatic Representatives. When it was notified, the Egyptian Government immediately appealed; and on the 7th of January, 1885, negotiations were opened by France for delaying the hearing of the appeal. In consequence of the friendly progress of these negotiations, we were enabled to exercise influence with the Commissioners of the Caisse to interfere to prevent the execution. Postponements took place on the 14th of January to the 18th of February, on the 18th of February to the 4th of March for a fortnight, and before the expiration of the fortnight the Convention of the 19th of March was signed. Now, Sir, what would have been the effect if that Convention had not been signed and the negotiations had been broken off? The appeal would have been judged, beyond all doubt, in the 1880 sense of sustaining the sentence of the Court of First Instance. It would have been confirmed without any question whatever; and in the regular course of these proceedings the judgment would, by the regular machinery of Egyptian law, have immediately followed. Well, have Gentlemen realized to themselves what that means? What would have been the position of this country with regard to this sum of money—£500,000—diverted from its legal application under necessity, but declared by the International Tribunals to be exigible personally from the agents of the Egyptian Government? I ask you in what position would Parliament have been placed if such a result had been allowed to come about? Would you have asked this House to give this money? Egypt had no power to borrow it, and we had no power to lend it. Were we to come down and ask this House for it? How much more was to be given, and were you prepared to incur all these liabilities? If the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir R. Assheton Cross), who is going to move, I suppose, an Amendment to-night—should succeed in stopping the progress of this Convention, and if he himself, in consequence of his so succeeding, were to be one of those who had to deal with the Caisse, he would be compelled, whether he liked it or not, to sign and agree to this Convention, or perhaps one much worse. I have not heard a word from the opponents of the Convention which shows to me that they have ever thought it worthy to be taken into consideration; but they have played with the subject in discussing the advantages of this International Guarantee. Now, Sir, it may be said, and I hope it is true, that this is not an opposition to the principle of the Bill that is now before the House. I think the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire said the other evening that the Bill of 1855 was carried by a small majority of 40. Whether that was a small majority or not, the Convention of 1855 was carried by a majority of three or four; and yet, notwithstanding that it was so carried, our sense of the delicate nature of the matters involved operated with that very large minority to prevent any challenge of the measure upon a division, and it was allowed to pass. It appears there is to be a further division taken upon the 1881 present occasion; but it is to be taken upon an Amendment rather than upon the principle of the Bill. Well, Sir, what are we going to fight about with respect to the Amendment? When there is a battle it is surely requisite that there should be a cause. Well, what is the cause. The right hon. Gentleman asks the House to affirm that it will not proceed with this Bill until the Convention relating to the Suez Canal is concluded. But what connection is there between these two subjects? I contend that the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman is in the nature of attack. In the old days of Constitutional dispute it was occasionally attempted by this House to enforce its just claims by associating them with measures that in themselves were unobjectionable, but which they were disposed to stop for the purpose of insuring the recognition of those just claims. So it is that the right hon. Gentleman now wants to stop this Bill until he has got before him the Convention on the Suez Canal. Now, Sir, there is no connection between the two subjects. The necessity of this Bill is extreme. To shake the confidence of the other Governments with respect to it would entail those consequences to which I have briefly referred. There are a great many consequences. I may say that we have before us an assurance that the French Chamber—of course the change of Government in Prance has somewhat interfered with the progress of affairs—will apply itself to it at once on its assembling, and it is not expected that there will be any opposition. But anything like hesitation on the part of this House would, of course, at once alter the position of other countries in regard to this Convention. The right hon. Gentleman thinks we are going to behave very badly about the Suez Canal—that we have got some secret plot or plan, and that we are going behind the back of this House to agree to some dreadful provision about the Suez Canal which we do not wish to disclose. Assume that to be true. Is that any reason why Egypt should be allowed to become bankrupt—that we should give the Powers a title to intervene at once by force in Egypt, and expose the Ministers of Egypt to the indignity of personal liability and to personal confinement for having laid their hands on moneys which we encouraged them to apply? Why 1882 should our misconduct about the Suez Canal be visited on Egypt? There is no connection between these two things. If I can give satisfaction to the right hon. Gentleman, I think he ought not to resort to this ancient practice of tacking, which was deemed to be extremely objectionable unless under the pressure of absolute necessity. He says he wants to see the Convention. Why, Sir, his Motion is perfectly inefficient. By his Motion he would punish Egypt, but he would not insure any satisfaction to this House respecting the Convention. Supposing he carried his Motion and stopped the Financial Agreement, I have shown what would happen in the regular course of law in Egypt. And what would happen here? Presuming we were engaged in a foreign plot, which the right hon. Gentleman is endeavouring to prove, we should make a Convention at the back of the House. We should come down to the House and say—"Now you have got the Convention; that is all you asked; you did not ask what is in it beforehand, and did not make any conditions as to its terms; now you have got it, go on with your Financial Agreement. "It appears to me that that would not be sufficient for the purposes of the right hon. Gentleman. But I want to know what is demanded? I think what the right hon. Gentleman really means, though I cannot say, as his Amendment is not happy in the mode of expressing it, is that he desires that the Government should not in this matter act behind the back of the House. Well, Sir, there is no concession that a reasonable man can ask in the way of Ministerial declaration on that subject that we are not perfectly willing to make. We have done what we could thus far, because the House is cognizant of the principles upon which Her Majesty's Government have proposed to the Powers to act. What I have heard from the other side of the House gives me reason to believe that our objects are recognized as good. The freedom and the security of the Canal are generally acknowledged to be the ends at which we should aim. The Commission have met at Paris; of course they have arrived at no conclusive results, but they have commenced the discussion of the subject; and I am bound to say, without entering into details, that as yet we have no reason to complain, but, on the contrary, we have 1883 reason to be satisfied with the progress that they have made and the course that apparently things have taken. But you will say that when you come to compare notes and go into details, you will very likely find that you will have to allow this or that deviation, willingly or unwillingly, from the basis you have made, and you may either purposely or unawares be led into some conclusion which the House will disapprove. Well, Sir, the House cannot conduct this business itself. If it could, I do not know that there is any great reason why we should grudge it the pleasure. But it appears to me to be an instrument of Executive Government or of diplomatic negotiation. That being so, all we can say is that our desire is to throw our mind into common stock with the mind of the House, and to be assured upon very material and substantial points involving British views and British interests. It is not a concession I am reluctantly making to the right hon. Gentleman under threat of intimidation—it is an expression of our own spontaneous and real desire that we shall on every point be in the fullest possession of the opinion of the House; that we shall take the very best means in our power to satisfy ourselves that in anything that is proposed we should not deviate from what the interests and convictions of this country require; and, finally, that we anticipate no practical difficulty in acting upon that principle and conducting negotiations in that sense. I do not know, Sir, that the right hon. Gentleman can ask anything more. He cannot now have the Convention before him. He cannot wish to tie us up in regard to every matter of form or procedure. There will be a multitude of matters connected with the Convention with respect to it which the final form of them must evidently be reserved to those who are to be the instruments of the respective Governments. But, distinguishing between these things and the substantial matters which relate to the views and interests of this country, I believe there is no reason why I should impose any practical limitation whatever upon the desire and intention of the British Government that we should only proceed after giving the fullest confidence to Parliament, and making Parliament aware of what we are doing, and being assured that we shall have Parliament 1884 with us. Now, Sir, if there is any addition to be made to that declaration I am not aware what it is. If there be any addition, we are quite ready to listen to it, and to see what we can do. I do not know that I could carry it any further. I do not think that any of my Colleagues are disposed to restrict it within the wide and liberal limits that I have been enabled to lay down. I must say, Sir, I hope that the spirit in which I have spoken will be recognized as not being a spirit of contention, but, on the contrary, as exhibiting a desire to avoid contention. If there be a question of principle at issue between the two Parties, if the conduct of the Government is to be censured, if some broad sentence of condemnation is to be passed, I am very far indeed from saying that the position in which the Empire is at this moment is a reason for waiving or avoiding that condemnation. I do not hold that opinion at all; but I must say this—that if there is a point at issue between us which is narrow, unreal, almost invisible, it is not a moment when it is desirable to come to an issue on such a matter. We had better recollect that England requires to present herself in the view of the world as united. Apart, as I have said, from discussions on matters of broad principle, upon matters that are not of broad principle—and here, as far as I know, we are perfectly agreed in principle—surely it would not be well if a great semblance of difference, a great stir and tumult of Party contention, should be raised. I feel that the House has shown for the last fortnight—I think we owe much of it to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition—a great deal of self-restraint, a great deal of temperance in relation to the critical matters of Imperial policy and interests that are now at issue. I only hope that the House will continue to exhibit that feeling, and we shall endeavour to do all in our power to promote it, especially when we think that some issue is being presented which possibly conciliatory language and declaration may avoid. We shall go as far as we can for the purpose of meeting any demand that may be made upon us, being anxious that the Parliament of this country should exhibit, along with its determination to maintain freedom of opinion and difference of opinion so far as conscience and 1885 principle may require, a cordial and hearty union in what relates to the fundamental conditions of the honour and existence of the Empire; and, therefore, that we should avoid the needless semblance of differences which have no substantial basis.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(Mr. Gladstone.)
SIR E. ASSHETON CROSS, in rising to move the following Amendment:—
That this House, taking into consideration the terms of the Declarations of the Great Powers of the 17th March, declines to proceed to the discussion of the details of this Bill until it shall have before it the Convention which is to be concluded with regard to the Suez Canal,said: I must throw myself upon the indulgence of the House, as I am suffering from a very severe cold. I am quite willing to accept the friendly spirit in which the Prime Minister has just spoken, and to assure him that nothing is further from my mind at the present moment, considering the state of foreign affairs, than to ask the House to do any act, or myself to utter any word, which would give the impression that, so far as foreign relations are concerned, we are not a united people. It is only as a matter of duty that I bring this question forward. The Prime Minister has gathered quite rightly from the Amendment that it is not my intention at the present moment to object to, or divide again upon, the principle of the Convention itself. My object is of an entirely different character; but I am bound to say, in the interests of this great commercial community, that I do not believe a more important document was ever laid upon the Table than that one which contains the Declarations of the Great Powers of Europe of the 17th of March. The Prime Minister has asked that this question of the Suez Canal should be treated as perfectly distinct from the first and second parts of the Declaration. I am bound to say that I think that these Declarations were practically one. They were so considered by the Great Powers, and were put in the same Declarations because the Great Powers thought they were united. If anything is wanted to prove the assertion I have just made, I will quote the language of one of the Powers which was used before the Declaration was finally con- 1886 cluded. M. Waddington, in the Papers which have been laid on the Table, says—The Government of the Republic, trusting to the sentiments of justice and of friendly feeling which have always animated the Queen's Government, count upon their consent to enter upon the examination of these questions at the earliest possible moment. Amongst them, and of primary importance, is the establishment of a definitive arrangement to guarantee the free passage of the Suez Canal at all times to all the Powers. The examination of this great European problem might be undertaken at once, by means of a Conference or otherwise, without awaiting the issue of the proposed inquiry into the financial situation."—[Egypt. No. 4 (1885), p. 101.]The French Ambassador goes on to say—An agreement upon this subject would be a fair compensation for the financial sacrifices which the Powers are ready to impose upon their subjects."—[Ibid.]It was quite clear that, in the opinion of the French Ambassador, the two subjects could not be separated, and we are perfectly entitled to consider them at one and the same time. If that was his opinion, the other Powers had practically come to the same conclusion. It was perfectly understood at the time the Convention was signed that the several Parliaments of the Powers that have Parliaments were to be consulted, and that the freedom of every Parliament was absolutely unfettered; and if this Parliament had chosen to resist that Convention, and to reject it, that would not affect our friendly relations with the other Powers. But although theoretically this Parliament was free, practically, when we came to consider the question, we were not so unfettered. I should like to ask, of those who formed the majority of 48, how many really approved the Convention that was made? It is quite true that when they came to balance one advantage with another, they thought it better, on the whole, to support the Convention; but it must have been evident, from the speeches they made, that there were many serious matters in the Convention which they disapproved as much as we did. Of course, the question naturally arises, supposing the Convention had been upset or rejected, could the respective Powers have come to any other conclusion, after what had been said by Her Majesty's Government? That may be a difficult question to answer. The finan- 1887 cial difficulties which were pressed upon the House at the time by the Prime Minister had, no doubt, very great weight and effect on the votes of many Members on that occasion. Now, however, all this is passed. The particular liability on which Egypt was to become bankrupt has been got over, whether through the action of the House or of the Convention is immaterial; Egypt has overcome her immediate difficulty, and we are in a state of calm peace. I am bound to say that I believe my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Mr. T. C. Bruce) was probably right when he said that even if the Convention had not been passed by this House Egypt would have found many ways of getting the money she required, and bankers would have been quite willing to lend to her on terms she would have been able to offer. But this question of the Suez Canal is one which we can deal with irrespective of all the financial difficulties of which the Prime Minister has spoken. It is one which most seriously affects this country. I know no question in which the commercial community is more interested, and any mistake made now may be fatal to our commercial interests for a long time to come. The Prime Minister says—"Why do you oppose our going into Committee on this Bill because you want to force upon us some views you entertain about the Suez Canal?" The answer is, it is our only chance of holding Parliamentary control over your proceedings with regard to the Suez Canal. The junior Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) asked the Prime Minister whether the Convention would be submitted to Parliament before it was signed, and whether the ratification of Parliament would be required? The answer of the Prime Minister was that at that time he could not say what course would be pursued. Mr. Gladstone stated what the terms of his answer were. Then I do not misconstrue the answer of the Prime Minister, who, at the present moment, is not able to tell us whether the Convention will require the ratification of Parliament or not.
MR. GLADSTONENo; not the ratification of Parliament. I used the word "ratification" in its diplomatic sense. There is no question of its being strictly within the jurisdiction of the Government.
§ SIR R. ASSHETON CROSSThen that makes my case all the stronger. It is quite clear that in no circumstances can we have any Parliamentary control over this question of the Suez Canal if we do not use this opportunity. I was in hopes the Prime Minister would have held out some promise that we should be consulted upon the actual terms of this Convention about the Suez Canal before we bound ourselves to the other Powers, or that, at all events, Parliament would have an opportunity of seeing the text of it before this country was bound. That, however, I understand is not to be. All that the right hon. Gentleman says is that we shall be kept acquainted with the principles laid down. It is quite impossible that he can keep us au fait as to the principles the other Powers may choose to press upon the Commissioners. Hence, if we are dissatisfied with the Convention, we shall have no means of putting any pressure on the Government if we allow this opportunity to slip. Therefore, until we have seen the Convention and are satisfied it is one which the country will approve, we must hold our hands and say that we will stop this Bill. We may ask ourselves—Are we so well pleased with the action of the Government and with their negotiations as to be satisfied that they will carry on further negotiations in a way to meet with our approval? Are we satisfied there can be no International interference? Are we satisfied they have taken all proper precautions against future complications with Foreign Powers? Or are we satisfied with the way in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer dealt with this matter of the Suez Canal in a former year? Is there anything in the Agreement with M. de Lesseps which shows that the Government was aware of the importance of the subject and appreciated all the intricate questions connected with it? Have they satisfied us before that we may safely leave these important matters in their hands, and allow them to make a Convention behind our backs without the smallest Parliamentary control to keep them in check? My answer to that question is in the negative. It is for that reason—and for that reason only—that I bring this Motion forward. I do not propose to take a division as against the Agreement itself; the object of the 1889 division I propose to take is simply to delay these proceedings until we can be satisfied, in some way, either that the proposals in the Convention as to the Suez Canal are satisfactory to us, or that we shall have an ample opportunity of considering them in this House before the nation is bound to them. The Prime Minister urges two objections to delay—the bankruptcy of Egypt, and the action against those who took the money out of the Caisse. As far as the bankruptcy of Egypt is concerned, practically the danger is over; and as regards the £500,000, the taking it out of one pocket and putting it into another was the action, not of the Egyptian Government, but of the British Government itself. The noble Earl (the Earl of Northbrook) was responsible for it. It is all very well to say that the action, although it was necessary, has left us in a strait, and we must get out of it. They are responsible for all the mischief, and it is for them to see how they can get out of it. If we are to take the bankruptcy of Egypt and this liability for £500,000 as reasons why this particular stage of this particular Bill should be passed at once, it is obvious that the same reasons would apply with equal force if the Convention had been much worse than it is, for the difficulties would have been just as great. This is a question of International interference, one about which we are jealous, although we do not propose to stop the Bill on that ground alone. When the London Conference was held there was great alarm about International interference and International complications, and there was a feeling of relief when the Blue Book came out and it was found that, when the proposal was made by the French Representative that there should be a Joint Guarantee of all the Powers, the Chancellor of the Exchequer said they could neither expect nor ask Parliament to give its assent to that. No doubt, with the publication of that Blue Book, the Government got credit with the country for having been firm on that particular point; and, therefore, we were much surprised when the proceedings of 1885 were made known, and when it was found that on the French Commissioner making the same proposal the Chancellor of the Exchequer, instead of holding the language he held before, immediately stated that, while we had 1890 no desire to ask Foreign Governments to join us, if they desired to do so we should make no objection. We naturally thought there was a great discrepancy between those two modes of dealing with the matter in 1884 and 1885, and I think that anyone who would put the two proceedings in parallel columns would come to the conclusion that there was a great discrepancy in the action of both years. The proposal of 1884 was that—"In order to facilitate the task of the English Government the Powers are to be asked to join in a guarantee of the proposed loan." But in the next year it was this—"It is far preferable and more simple to increase at once the loan to £9,000,000 attaching thereto the collective guarantee of the Powers." What were the answers to these proposals? In 1884 the answer was—"We could not accept or ask Parliament to agree to a Joint Guarantee, nor have we reason to believe that all the Powers would agree to it. "In the next year the answer was—"We have no desire to ask the Powers to share with us the liability which such a guarantee would involve; still if it is the desire of the Powers to join us in the guarantee we are willing that they should." If anyone would look at the Protocols and the action of the Italian Government and the statement of the French Minister, he would find that the explanation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer is not practically borne out by those documents, but if the present contention of the Government is that there is no discrepancy between their action in 1884 and their action in 1885, then it is quite clear that the Government enjoyed in 1884 a popularity which they did not deserve, and gained a credit to which they were not entitled. When the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced on that Wednesday afternoon the conclusion of the Agreement with the Foreign Powers we still had some ray of hope that, although they had not resisted the Joint Guarantee, they had taken some precautions to prevent interference on the part of other Powers—because the words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer were apparently explicit on the subject. But the speech of the Prime Minister to-night showed that it was the Turkish Convention of 1855 which, in his opinion, gave to England and France the right of interference with Turkey.
§ SIR R. ASSHETON CROSSI will come to that presently. The Prime Minister has given us a full explanation of this subject, and it really comes to this—that Turkey was financially in a very bad way, and that Egypt is in about as sound a financial condition. But that does not account for the words used in 1855, because there are two evils the Prime Minister mentions. He says—"It is not the worst of this Guarantee that if Turkey does not pay we shall have to pay for her; but the worst is that all the Guaranteeing Powers acquire a political hold upon Turkey." The Prime Minister says that is only because Turkey is financially unsound. But there is another danger which is equally great, and which he pointed out in the following words—namely—
Here is a Convention which creates and husbands the opportunity of quarrelling with foreign nations, but if there is one thing we want more than another it is an immunity from complications with foreign nations with regard to Egypt.It is quite clear from the Prime Minister's speech to-night that he has persuaded himself that there is this vast difference between the two cases, although the Chancellor of the Exchequer thought they were practically the same. The question is not about the Prime Minister's persuasions, but what the Foreign Powers think, and how far he will be able to persuade them that there is a difference between the Turkish Guarantee of 1855 and the Guarantee of 1885. There is another matter which is, I think, of the greatest possible consequence to consider, and that is the question of the Suez Canal. Anyone who considers that question will readily admit that we are the country most interested in it; nor can we well judge what evils would happen to us if our interests were not properly protected in it. There is no doubt that the interests of other nations are growing in other parts of the earth, but still we cannot forget what a paramount interest we have got. The difficulty, however, is to describe the Canal and ascertain in what category to place it, and I want to know what is meant by the Suez Canal in Lord Granville's despatch of 1883? My right hon. Friend behind me spoke of that despatch as being full of pitfalls, 1892 and so it is to a great extent. I want, first of all, to know what is meant by the Canal? Do you mean simply the actual Canal, or do you mean to include the Sweet-Water Canal also? And where is the provision in case of a belligerent Power sinking a man-of-war in the Canal simply for the purpose of stopping the traffic? Supposing there are two belligerent Powers contending as to what use is to be made of this Canal, is it for Egypt alone to preserve the Canal in its proper state, or is she to be allowed to call in any neutral Power, or what position is Egypt left in? These questions which I have mentioned give rise to considerable complications, and I only mention them in order to show that we cannot rely sufficiently on that basis, as laid down in Lord Granville's despatch, because that basis is capable of extension. A superstructure built upon this basis may be one of which we entirely disapprove, and which may be much against our interests. It is clear that the despatch of Lord Granville has gained further importance by being accepted by the Powers; but still the Powers may put their own construction upon it, and the question to consider is, are we certain that, when the Conference is at end, we shall be safe in the Convention they may make? Whatever danger may have been supposed to exist when the Conference first met, anyone who has followed the proceedings of that Conference must have become alarmed lest dangers which at that time were shadowy have become very sensible and very real. This Commission has met in Paris—I presume because it is a French Company. One would have thought that, as this was the basis accepted by the Conference, the}' would have asked the English Representative what superstructure it was proposed to build upon it. Nothing of the kind. The French came forward at once with a series of propositions of their own, quite irrespective of any communications from other nations or even from ourselves. We are told that the scheme drawn up by France contained complex rules interfering with the management of the Canal and full of puzzles and ambiguities of all kinds. When we present our counter-proposals are they to be printed in parallel columns by the side of the French proposals? And when the Conference meets again are 1893 they to discuss these several proposals? I should have thought that that would give rise to serious apprehensions as to the result of the Conference. From the general tone of the French Representatives, and from M. Ferry's speeches, it appears that the French were inclined to give a different construction to the basis laid down in this despatch. This French scheme, conjointly with the English proposal, is an instrument the value of which will depend upon the skill of those who use it. We find it said that the proposed Convention agrees with the views previously expressed informally by the Great Powers. Well, we should like to know something about those informal expressions of opinion on the part of the Great Powers, and how far the French consulted them, and whether the English Member of the Commission was consulted. All these things show us the great dangers that are going on. We find language used which in its spirit, if not in its terms, refers to the necessity of the principle of the neutralization of the Canal. With this staring us in the face we ought to be very cautious that no Convention is made behind our backs which we might bitterly regret afterwards, and which Parliament would have no opportunity of discussing. Then we come to the next meeting of this Conference. I do not know that we shall be more satisfied with the second meeting than we are with the first. Although it is quite true, if the reports we hear are correct, that they accepted the English proposals in regard to the Canal in time of war, we find that all the more difficult questions on which there was likely to be disagreement and argument and differences of opinion are put off till the end of the Conference. First, as to the Guarantee and the superintendence of the Canal. See how different the proposals are to the propositions which the Government accepted as a basis. There are three schemes. The first is that there should be an International Permanent Commission like that on the Danube in 1856. What single, solitary point is there in which the Danube can be compared with this Canal? I would ask the learned Professor of International Law at Cambridge what he thinks of this proposition. I chink he would tell you that there is not one point of similarity. We have this Canal going through the coun- 1894 try of Egypt, and practically in one country; whereas we all know that the Danube passes through different countries and is totally differently situated. The second proposition is that Turkey, as Suzerain, under the control of the Powers, is to manage the Canal. How is that to be rendered compatible with the sixth and eighth proposals of Lord Granville that Egypt should take all the measures to enforce the conditions as to the passage of vessels in time of war? The third proposition is that the Conference should merely be formally called upon to vote the neutrality of the Canal, and trust to the honesty of all the Powers to carry it out. If such propositions are to be brought forward and discussed, we ought to be still more on our guard as to the final result. I have endeavoured to show that there is great danger in this question of the Suez Canal. I think I have conclusively shown by the opinion of the French Ambassador that this third declaration is practically inseparable from the other two. We are equally entitled to watch against the one as we are to watch against the others. I do not desire the House to consider that I wish to raise any question to disturb our relations with Foreign Powers. I do not wish the House to consider that I have any desire or wish to challenge the Convention in its terms. The sole object I have in the Motion I am about to make is to insure to this House that which in my opinion this House is entitled to, and which the country will require this House to exercise—namely, the right of supervising the Convention that is to be the outcome of this Conference before we are tied hand and foot by Her Majesty's Government making an engagement behind the back of this House. The Prime Minister to-night said he was willing to meet us as far as he could, and I expected he was going to make some proposition to the House. I hope still that, in the course of this debate, Her Majesty's Government will go a step further than they hare yet gone, and that they will meet us in this matter, so that there may be no division of opinion upon the question. All we want is that Parliament should have a controlling voice in this matter. I do not want to treat this as a Party question. As a Member representing one of the largest commercial constituencies in 1895 the Kingdom, I know that this is a matter which is watched with intense eagerness and desire in every quarter of of England; and I feel confident that if the Government were to consult the wishes and feelings of this country, they would give to this House practically all that I desire—namely, an assurance that before any Convention is entered into which binds us with other Powers, as far as the Suez Canal is concerned, this House will be consulted as to its provisions and will be able to give a vote—aye or no—as to whether they consent to it or not. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by formally moving the Amendment of which he had given Notice.
§
Amendment proposed,
To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House, taking into consideration the terms of the Declarations of the Great Powers of the 17th March, declines to proceed to the discussion of the details of this Bill until it shall have before it the Convention which is to be concluded with regard to the Suez Canal,"—(Sir R. Assheton Cross,)
—instead thereof.
§ Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
MR. GLADSTONEI must refer to the closing sentences of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. The right hon. Gentleman said he was in hopes that I should go a great deal further than I have done already in regard to consulting the House in this matter; but the right hon. Gentleman did not indicate with any clearness what steps he wishes us to take. There is only one word which I could gather, and I think it is this—that he wished the House to be consulted before the Convention is concluded. The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that we cannot consult the House in regard to the formal proceedings; but we have promised to let the House know exactly what we are about; and if that is so, the House will have an opportunity, on a Motion for Adjournment or in other ways, of letting its voice be heard. As far as I know, these are the only consultations which there can be. The Government cannot propose Motions in the House. We can perfectly ascertain the views of the House; but as there is no money concerned, they cannot submit the question 1896 to a formal judgment. I believe I have shown that, in the only modes known to Parliament, the House will be practically consulted, so far as I am able to judge; and there will be on the part of the Government every disposition to accede to the wish of the right hon. Gentleman.
§ LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILLThe remarks which I feel compelled to ask the House to allow me to make are most reluctantly extracted from me by the very vivid memory I have of some advice given to the Conservative Party only two or three days ago by no less a person than the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, speaking, as it were, ex cathedrâ. He told us we ought to be very careful not to make feeble and ineffective attacks upon the Government, because the result always was to give them a larger majority than the real feeling of the House would entitle them to, and induced the public to believe that they are being granted a greater amount of Parliamentary confidence than is really the case. Well, Sir, I do not mean to insinuate for a moment that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire (Sir E. Assheton Cross) was either feeble or in effective. Such an insinuation would be extremely unbecoming and quite untrue. It appeared to me that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman was very interesting, very exhaustive, and very weighty. But what I would suggest, with all possible respect to the right hon. Gentleman and to the Leader of the Opposition, is that they are running the risk of making an attack on the Government which may be argumentatively effective, but which will be numerically weak and ineffective. Viewing the state of the House and the apparently apathetic condition of public opinion, and remembering the result of the last division on this question, I cannot imagine that the decision which the House will come to will show anything but a very large numerical majority on the side of Her Majesty's Government, or will have any effect but that of doing precisely what the Leader of the Opposition told us ought not to be done, by giving the country to understand that the Government possesses on this question a larger, much larger, amount of confidence than we know they do possess. That is a suggestion I will throw out, 1897 with very great respect, to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire. I think the Prime Minister has placed the House generally, and the Conservative Party in particular, in rather a disagreeable position in regard to this Egyptian Agreement. I am not alluding to the remarks the right hon. Gentleman made concerning other matters. The Prime Minister said in effect—"The result of our interference in Egypt has brought this country into such an extremely reduced condition that we are obliged to break the law of Europe to save it from bankruptcy. The European Powers were extremely angry at this breach of the law of Europe, and so Her Majesty's Government concluded an Agreement which, if you do not sanction it, will entitle the European Powers to intervene by force in Egypt, and if you resist then you will be at war with united Europe." Of course, if the Prime Minister comes down and says that if we do not sanction this Agreement there will be a war with Europe, it is very difficult for the Opposition, as it would be for any body of reasonable people, to refuse him the sanction he asks for; but I think it is a strong appeal, and an appeal the strength of which ought not to be frequently resorted to. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!] The Prime Minister stated that he had been reading an article in The Quarterly Review. I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman not only on turning to such excellent quarters for political information, but also on being able to find leisure for the study of that rather voluminous and weighty work. But I do feel inclined to protest against the right hon. Gentleman attributing to the Tory Party a statement of policy with regard to Egypt which he found in the pages of The Quarterly Review. I did not know that The Quarterly Review was ever supposed to represent officially or authoritatively the policy of the Tory Party. It makes guesses at that policy at times, but I did not know that it ever went further than that. With regard to the statement that The Quarterly Review makes, that the Tory Party claim for this country an exclusive predominance in Egypt, I do not know that I have myself ever heard that claim put forward by any Gentleman who is entitled to speak on behalf of the Tory Party. I imagine 1898 that the position many on this side took up with regard to the Agreement and to the policy of the Government is something to this effect, that all the sacrifices we have made since July, 1882—all the money we have spent, all the lives we have lost—have been made not only in our own interests, but in the general interests of Europe; and that this fact entitled the Government to claim and threw upon them the absolute duty of obtaining greater consideration for British views and larger concessions to British claims than have actually been conceded in the negotiations which have taken place. I do not know that any Member who is entitled to speak authoritatively on behalf of the Tory Party—at any rate, any Gentleman sitting on the Front Opposition Bench—has pushed the position further than that. No claim, to my knowledge, has been set up which would exclude the fair and equal rights of Europe. Turning to the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman, I wish with every possible respect to ask him to kindly give his attention to one or two considerations which may possibly, before he goes to a division, modify his present intention. The right hon. Gentleman has in his Motion mixed up two questions, which, as far as I can see, are entirely separate, and not only so, but which there was every reason should be kept separate. I think that this combination of the great question of the navigation of the Suez Canal with this Financial Agreement which the House of Commons has already decided upon is an impolitic combination, and may be an extremely dangerous one to the very object which he has so rightly and so properly in view. The House of Commons is now pledged to the acceptance of a Financial Agreement—and the right hon. Gentleman himself disclaims any desire to reverse that position—but it is absolutely unpledged as to questions relating to the navigation of the Suez Canal. On that point we at the present moment occupy a position of the greatest possible advantage, because I do not know that any opinion has ever been expressed by any responsible Member of Parliament outside the Government as to that question. That is a great advantage, and I should view with the greatest possible alarm any act by which that position was in any degree compromised. The right hon. 1899 Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire appears to be under the greatest alarm lest Her Majesty's Government should conclude an arrangement which would commit the country to certain principles with regard to the navigation of the Suez Canal without the knowledge and sanction of Parliament, and the right hon. Gentleman has no confidence that Her Majesty's Government will be likely to conclude any arrangement which will be satisfactory to the British Parliament. In that sentiment, judging from the past, I entirely concur. But I deny entirely the Constitutional right of the Executive Government to conclude any arrangement about the Suez Canal which will have one spark of validity without the consent of Parliament. This House votes money every year in connection with the charges for the Suez Canal, and therefore, not so much technically but Constitutionally, I believe the Executive Government of the country have no power to commit the House and the country to Treaties respecting the navigation of the Canal without the consent of Parliament. But is it not absolutely ridiculous and preposterous as well as dangerous to assume that a Government, which may be turned out at any moment, can, of their own pleasure and without the consent of Parliament, conclude arrangements with respect to the navigation of the Suez Canal by which the whole of our shipping interests, the whole of our commerce, the whole of our manufacturing interests, and millions and millions of people would be affected, without coming to Parliament for its consent? If such a proposition had been put forward in the Reign of Charles I., I could have understood it; but I am surprised that anyone acquainted with the customs of Parliament and the Constitution of the country, like the right hon. Gentleman, should have made any suggestion of the kind. I do not altogether follow the right hon. Gentleman. No doubt, technically, the power of the Crown to conclude Treaties is unlimited. But what would be the procedure? Questions would be asked, of the Government about what was going on at the Conference. A Motion for Adjournment would be made if those Questions were not answered, and some information would be elicited, on which a Vote of 1900 Censure would be proposed. If the Government had agreed to proposals of which Parliament did not approve the Vote of Censure would be carried and the Government would go out. I really do not know any recent instance of any great Treaty about which public opinion was very strongly excited and in which British interests were very much involved, having been concluded without a full discussion in Parliament in the first instance. I think the right hon. Gentleman is really endeavouring by means of these unjustifiable alarms to get the House of Commons to reverse its previous decision. Of course, it is a very proper object to endeavour to defeat an Agreement which is considered obnoxious, and to use any instruments which may be convenient for that purpose. Any stick is good enough to beat a dog; and in the Suez Canal Agreement the Opposition would, under any other circumstances, have had a very good stick. But I think in this instance the Opposition are using a stick which is more likely to beat themselves and the object they have in view than the Government. If the Agreement is opposed by a large majority, you will not only re-affirm the excellence and merit of an instrument about which the public are not exactly enthusiastic, but you will have compromised the country about this question of the Suez Canal, and have committed it in a way it is certainly not desirable to commit it. Suppose the Government, under such circumstances, do conclude a Convention respecting the Suez Canal and a large number of Members of this House disapprove of it. In that case the Government will come down and say—"All these things have been discussed; you raised them and you sanctioned them; we had no power to do this." On the other hand, if no question is raised, the Government will go on bearing the whole responsibility of the negotiation, and having before them the fact that they have pledged themselves not to commit the country to any principle respecting the Suez Canal without the consent of Parliament. Under these circumstances, I do appeal to the right hon. Gentleman to consider whether he is not injuring the object he has at heart by mixing up this Agreement with the financial proposals of the Government respecting Egypt upon which the House has already decided. 1901 There is another argument which I wish to submit to the House. The Tory Party very rightly assert that the relations of the Government with all Foreign Powers are extremely strained and unfriendly owing to the foreign policy that has been pursued by the Government, and they endeavour to convince the country that were they in Office those relations would assume a far more harmonious and friendly character. That I am perfectly certain would be the case. But, after all, this is an Agreement which, be it good or bad, the Powers of Europe have agreed to, and in which some of the Powers are very deeply interested. I doubt whether, if you are in a position before long to direct the Government of the country, and if you have indulged in an obstinate and protracted and rather quarrelsome resistance to this European instrument, you will have predisposed the Powers to welcome your advent to Office, or whether you would be likely to improve to any considerable extent the strained and unfriendly relations between this country and the rest of Europe. At all events, I feel certain there will be a considerable amount of imprudence and even rashness in any large section of Parliament at this moment taking a line which would be viewed as unfriendly by any great European Power. Of the advantages or disadvantages of the Agreement the country must judge. The whole thing will be before the country in a short time. It is an Agreement which satisfies nobody in particular, and which everybody recognizes as giving no quid pro quo for all we have laid out; but I hold very strongly that it would be unwise, seeing that we have possibly before long some great enterprise to undertake, to refuse an opportunity of settling a difference with the Powers which is becoming rather acute. Under all the circumstances of the case—in view of the pledges given by the Prime Minister with regard to the Suez Canal, in view of the undoubted power of Parliament to examine any Treaty which the Government may wish to conclude, and in view of the present position of our foreign relations generally, especially in regard to the great difficulty which is hanging over us on our Indian Frontier—I do hope I may be allowed, without exciting any displeasure in the right hon. Gentleman, to appeal to him to 1902 reconsider his intention of taking the sense of the House on his Amendment.
§ MR. NORWOODsaid, the noble Lord had made a powerful Party speech, and his advice from a Party point of view was very wise; but the noble Lord's argument did not affect his (Mr. Norwood's) position as the Representative of a large commercial port. Without committing himself to the opinions of the right hon. Gentleman opposite, he would remind the House that they never had the opportunity of expressing a single opinion with respect to the Suez Canal Convention. He had listened with the greatest possible interest to the speech of the Leader of the House. He could assure the House that, if the right hon. Gentleman had felt himself in a position to have given them a more definite assurance that the House would have an opportunity of considering the matter before the Treaty was concluded, he would not now be found raising his voice on the question. The right hon. Gentleman had talked about the Constitutional manner in which a debate might be raised, but he had not gone so far as to say that the Convention would be a question which would require the confirmation of Parliament. Governments made astonishing blunders in commercial affairs, and he could not help fearing that if this important question was referred to the Great Powers, our diplomacy would not be able to protect us from some unfortunate concession which would be detrimental to the interests of this country. He was one of those who very much doubted the wisdom of the Declaration of Paris as affecting the maritime power of this country. The Russian newspapers were now openly advocating the breaking of the arrangements in regard to privateering, and we were threatened with Russian privateering in the event of war. He believed that these paper arrangements only fettered the Power which desired to carry them out honourably. The Suez Canal was a great and important undertaking, and, no doubt, shortened the distance to India and China; but he was convinced that the Suez Canal was strong enough to take care of itself in case of a great European war. The principal holders in the Canal were French people. Their prestige and pride and interest was in the Canal, and he could imagine no Government 1903 in France which could afford to set at nought the material interests of a large body of the people of that country. Almost all the other mercantile countries had a large and increasing interest in the Canal, and he could not see why we should apprehend that there could be any serious obstruction or injury to the Canal even if we left it to protect its own interests. He agreed, however, that it might be desirable to neutralize the Canal, and to make its approaches free from hostilities. But he would point out that by the 3rd clause of Lord Granville's proposals it was stipulated that no hostilities should take place in the Canal, in its approaches, or in the territorial waters of Egypt; but supposing hostilities were declared, and even if Turkey herself were a belligerent or Egypt our Ally, the entire Littoral of Egypt would be neutral ground, and we could not pursue an enemy anywhere within the three-mile radius on the Mediterranean or the Red Sea Coast of Egypt, the former extending some 500 and the latter 700 or 800 miles, while our enemy would be freely permitted to take refuge in the Ports of Alexandria or other anchorages. He could not imagine a position more damaging to the country than the embarrassment caused by such an arrangment. Then Clause 1, which required that the Canal should always be open to the vessels of all countries, demanded attention. It must also be borne in mind that the chief maritime countries of Europe were only about half the distance of this country from the Suez Canal, and therefore we should, in the event of war, be at an enormous disadvantage as compared with them as respects access to the Canal in time of war. He should not venture to criticize at any great length the heads of this Convention, for he did not consider that that would be the proper time to do so; but he did think it was the proper time for him, as representing a shipping constituency, to say that this subject was one of extreme nicety and difficulty and of grave importance, and one which the House ought to have an opportunity of debating, and debating effectually. It was no use to tell him, as the Prime Minister had done, that it would be in the power of any hon. Member to move a Vote of Censure on the Government if the terms of the Agreement were objec- 1904 tionable, or that the Convention would be laid on the Table when signed.
MR. GLADSTONEsaid, he had stated that the communications previous to its signature would be laid on the Table. It was the intention of the Government to make the House fully acquainted with everything that might affect the interests of the country.
§ MR. NORWOODsaid, he had not understood the right hon. Gentleman to say that. But he wished to have a distinct understanding. If the right hon. Gentleman would say that the House should have before it sufficient documentary evidence as to the form the Convention was likely to assume—if they only knew that they would have an opportunity of protesting against what they might think contrary to their interests—he should not have another word to say; but he never understood that there was a distinct and definite assurance that they would be able to raise the question before the signature of the Convention. Certainly it was utterly useless, as he had said, to be told that if the Convention proved objectionable, he could get up and move a Vote of Censure on his own Party. No man could be content with a position like that. This was a subject of the deepest importance and interest; and with every belief in the good faith and good intentions of the Government, he could not but remember, after recent experiences, that when Her Majesty's Government entered into discussions with the Ministers of Foreign Powers the result was too often a concession to those Powers, and he feared lest this should be the case again. He hoped to obtain a distinct assurance that this important matter would not be concluded without the House having another opportunity of considering it.
MR. GLADSTONEWith the permission of the House I should like to say a word of explanation. My hon. Friend seems to be under an impression that I recommended the House to be satisfied with the assurance that this Convention would be laid on the Table, and that if the House disapproved of it they could censure the Government. I must say there was not one word in my speech which either recommended or contemplated any such method of proceeding. On the contrary, I found fault with the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman, because I said that was 1905 all it offered to the House. What I offered to the House was—I am not aware that we should have had the power to submit the Convention in form before it was concluded—but what I offered to the House was, that as to every substantial question and every important question, involving the interests of the commerce of this country, we should use our best endeavour to make the House fully aware of our views and intentions before we came to any conclusion or any binding engagement, and that we were convinced we should have no difficulty in giving effect to that end.
MR. STAVELEY HILLsaid, he wished to express the pleasure with which he had heard the closing sentences just uttered by the Prime Minister. If that were really the intention of the Government, then the right hon. Gentleman (Sir R. Assheton Cross) had done a good work in causing it to be announced to the country. He could not agree with the noble Lord (Lord Randolph Churchill), for how many times had the House been promised a full opportunity of knowing what were the details of measures about to be agreed upon, and how many times had they found that the Convention, Treaty, or whatever it might be, was very different indeed from that which they had been led to expect? In his opinion they would have been trusting to a broken reed if they had abandoned the present opportunity and relied, as they were now told to do, on obtaining a future opportunity of moving a Vote of Censure if the Convention turned out to be unsatisfactory. Those who had studied International Law could see there were grave dangers and pitfalls even in the draft Convention as it now stood, and he was afraid that those who had the conduct of the negotiations on behalf of England might consent to terms which the acuter eye of the House of Commons would detect as objectionable and most detrimental to the country, but which official blindness would prevent Her Majesty's Government from perceiving. If he understood the Prime Minister's phraseology, it was to the effect that the House of Commons should have a full opportunity of examining and criticizing the details of this Convention so far as they might affect an exercise of the national strength and the national resources. If that was the case 1906 they would be satisfied; but he submitted that the House ought not to be satisfied with anything short of a declaration to that effect. The question of the merits or demerits of the Convention rested, of course, to no inconsiderable extent on the consideration of the duties and the responsibilities which connected Egypt with this country. The Government said that they owed certain duties and responsibilities to Egypt. The Prime Minister had over and over again put pressure on the House by stating that the bankruptcy of Egypt was imminent and that we must save Egypt from bankruptcy. But, he asked, why should this be so? Was it because we had conduced to the bankruptcy of Egypt ourselves? If this was the case, there could be no doubt we had laid up for ourselves a considerable store of difficulties. Who was it that bombarded Alexandria, destroyed the Egyptian Army, and ordered the evacuation of the Soudan? Who was it that made it necessary to provide the greater part of this sum we were now proposing to guarantee to Egypt? It was, of course, the English Government themselves. They had brought about this Egyptian bankruptcy, and having brought it about, did it not seem to them that the best thing they could do was to take this opportunity of imminent bankruptcy and make the best terms with the creditors of Egypt? The Report which Lord Northbrook had made with reference to this Convention showed that the total amount of indebtedness of Egypt was £100,000,000, including the £9,000,000 now to be provided. He had stated that the total revenue of Egypt from the land and other sources amounted to £8,900,000. It would be much better if England, recognizing, as she must do, that it was she who had caused this bankruptcy, and that she possessed the greatest interest in the Suez Canal, not only on account of its importance to us as a mercantile country, but on account of the large interest we received from the Suez Canal shares, instead of offering this £9,000,000 to Egypt, were to guarantee the whole Debt of Egypt. The total indebtedness of Egypt was £100,000,000, and if England guaranteed 3½ per cent, she would be enabled to benefit the Egyptian taxpayer by reducing his taxes; there would be a surplus sufficient for a Sinking Fund to 1907 pay off the total Debt within that reasonable term during which she might control the country, and the bondholders would be benefited by the rise in the value of their securities which would follow on such action. Criticizing the 7th Article of the Convention, the hon. Member wished to have an explanation of the meaning of a Joint and Several Guarantee on the part of one of the Powers, while a postcript which was added abrogated this liability? He wished to know how under one clause of the Agreement they found this Power agreeing to a Joint and Several Guarantee, and in another portion of the Convention discarding that Agreement and saying that she would only be liable for her own share? They also found in this Article of the Convention that all the Governments guaranteeing the loan were going to their Parliaments for consent. Would the Prime Minister undertake in any way that there should be some similar clause in the Convention delaying its completion untill there should be an acquiescence on the part of the Parliaments of the different countries engaging themselves in the Convention which they were about to sign? If a provision of this character was laid before the House of Commons, then he thought the right hon. Gentleman had done a good work in bringing this matter forward. If this were not done, he hoped the House would divide on the question, in order to see who were in favour of protecting the interests of England.
§ MR R. N. FOWLER (LORD MAYOR)said, that his objection to this arrangement was that he thought it very unwise on the part of this county to enter into a Guarantee in regard to which it might possibly bear all the loss, and which must lead to a great deal of political difficulty. Assuming that Egypt was not able to pay, it seemed to him obvious that the whole of the amount must fall upon this country; and if that was the case, he thought it would have been much better for this country to have taken the whole burden on its own shoulders. If we were bound to enter into this Guarantee, he believed it would have been much better to have undertaken the whole duty ourselves; but instead of doing this we were taking other countries into a partnership of a commercial character. He asked the House whether it was likely that the 1908 other Powers, having entered into this Guarantee, would allow the matter to stop there? Would they not make their participation in this Guarantee a reason for interfering with the government of Egypt? They would say—"We are equally responsible with you, and being equally responsible with you, we have a right and a duty to see that Egypt is well governed." After all the expense this country had been put to in regard to the administration of Egypt, he certainly was of opinion that the Government were entitled to see that this country maintained a dominant influence in Egypt. He would support his right hon Friend (Sir E. Assheton Cross) on the important question he had raised in regard to the Suez Canal. Our interest in the Canal being paramount, it was the duty of the country to guard that interest. The noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) had appealed to the Mover of the Amendment, as the Government would have a majority, not to divide the House on that occasion. Such an argument might be carried much further than the noble Lord himself would be prepared to see it pushed. Such an argument might be used against taking a division on any question, because the majority of the Government varied from 60 to 140 according to the course taken by the Gentlemen below the Gangway. It was all very well for the noble Lord, who was a great orator, to recommend them not to divide the House because they were in a minority; but in his view it was the duty of every Member of the House, however humble, to express his opinion, if not by speech at least by his vote, on important questions, even though he might be one of a minority. He remembered the late Sir W. Stirling Maxwell telling a story of his having once been in a minority of four along with the present Prime Minister, Lord Cardwell, and Lord Aberdare, who ultimately turned out to have been in the right, while the majority were in the wrong. He could not therefore endorse the doctrine of the noble Lord; but held that it was the duty of the Party, after the able speech of his right hon. Friend, to enforce their view on the House, even although they might now be in a minority.
§ MR. D. DAVIES, notwithstanding what had just fallen from the last speaker, joined in the appeal that had 1909 been made to the right hon. Member for South-West Lancashire not to divide the House. An Agreement had been practically entered into with five or six other Powers; and if the House were now to make an alteration in that Agreement, which he understood had been partly acted upon, a portion of the money having been paid, they would have to apply to the other Powers to assent to such alteration. For the credit of the House of Commons itself, after the decision at which it had previously arrived, he trusted that the right hon. Gentleman would not press that Amendment to a division. Whether a better Agreement could or could not have been made a year ago was not now the question. The Agreement had been solemnly entered into, it had been acted upon, and by it they must abide; and if the Opposition went to a division, the country would come to the conclusion that they wanted to draw the Government into more serious trouble before the General Election.
§ MR. WARTONsaid, that he should feel more inclined to be guided by the right hon. Member for North-West Lancashire, who was a better judge of how the Tory Party ought to act on that occasion, than by the hon. Member opposite who had kindly proffered them his advice on that point. The noble Lord the Member for Woodstock had argued that, whatever Convention the Government might enter into, the House had powerful weapons which it could always employ, among them being the right of putting Questions. But what was the use of putting Questions to any Member of the present Government, particularly regarding foreign affairs? What information did they obtain in that way from the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, or from the Prime Minister himself? The right hon. Gentleman always tried to put the Opposition in a corner, because while important matters were immature they were told that nothing could be said about them, and when they had become mature it was too late to say anything. It was most important that the House should know what the Government were going to do in regard to the Suez Canal, because the extraordinary propositions which they brought forward in July two years ago, and which they were compelled to withdraw in order to escape a defeat, were not 1910 calculated to inspire confidence in the action of the Ministry on that subject. There was no proposition, however wild, eccentric, or unjust to England, that this Government would not make if they possibly could, only withdrawing it if there seemed to be a danger of serious opposition from their own followers; and that was a common occurrence. What were the Opposition to do? Questions were of no use, and a Vote of Censure could not be carried on a Motion for the adjournment of the House. Money had gone and blood had been spilt, and yet for all that the Government were giving up everything. The real policy to pursue was an English policy, and not one of preference of every other nation to ourselves. It was all very well for hon. Members opposite to hug themselves with the idea that they had only to vote for the Government to be safe, and that they had only to escape through this Session. He thought that every opportunity the Opposition gave them of recording such a vote as that would tell against them in the country. They made a great mistake in supposing that the real feeling of the country was in favour of this cold, cruel, and un-English policy. It would have been better for their Party if hon. Members opposite had honestly and straightforwardly spoken out and told their Leaders what they thought of their policy.
§ MR. H. S. NORTHCOTEsaid, the Prime Minister had contended that there was no connection between the questions of the Suez Canal and the Financial Convention. The right hon. Member for South-West Lancashire had very effectually disposed of the contention; but if it were necessary to prove it a second time, the proof would be found in the very title of the Parliamentary Paper, which described the document as relating to the financial arrangements with Egypt and the free navigation of the Suez Canal. He, therefore, considered that Ministers were stopped by their own act from separating the two questions. He did not propose to go into the merits of the Joint International Guarantee into which the Government had entered. He entertained a very strong opinion that the Multiple International Control was very dangerous, and was likely in the near future to lead to very unpleasant results; but as the 1911 House had by a considerable majority sanctioned the arrangement, he did not think that was a fitting occasion for stating the grounds of his objection to it. The Prime Minister had, however, invited the House to express an opinion upon the merits of the Convention. He was quite aware that it was not in accordance with diplomatic usage, nor did he think it desirable or possible for the House of Commons to become in its corporate capacity a negotiator. Diplomatic proceedings of that nature had to be conducted by a small number of responsible statesmen. But when they had to consider how the commerce of a great highway like the Suez Canal was to be conducted, he thought it desirable that the House of Commons should have an opportunity of laying down in broad lines the grounds on which and the spirit in which the Government should enter upon such negotiations. Her Majesty's Government appeared to take it for granted that the House of Commons and the country at large sanctioned and approved of the doctrine laid down in Earl Granville's despatch of January, 1883; but he could not say that he shared in that view, and, at all events, he thought the country would require a great deal more explanation and amplification of the statement before they would be prepared to sanction it. There were several points on which the country would expect to be more fully informed of the views of the Government. The proposal of the French Government accepted by Her Majesty's Ministers was for the appointment of a Commission of seven or eight Powers to produce a formal Act for the free use of the Suez Canal; but there ought to be some explanation of what was meant by that phrase. The country wanted to know whether the Government would consent under any circumstances to free use being allowed to lead to the neutralization of the country of Egypt, or whether it was intended to lead to the neutralization of the Suez Canal? That the Canal should be free for all ships under all circumstances was a very proper provision; but he took exception to the limit of time for ships to be in the Canal being confined to ships of war, because if there was any question of the rapid transport of troops by us to India, it would be possible for a Power with which we might be on hostile terms to have the 1912 Canal blocked by a number of its merchant vessels, or a merchant vessel might be sunk. Then as to the prohibition of the landing of troops or munitions of war in the Canal, he wanted to know whether, in case a ship were sunk in the waterway, that prohibition would operate to prevent the landing of troops for re-embarking them beyond the obstruction? That was a very important and practical point to be considered, for it must make the greatest possible difference as to whether the second point could substantially be accepted by this country or not. The third point in the despatch was that no hostilities should take place in the Canal or its approaches, or elsewhere within the territorial waters of Egypt, even in the event of Turkey being one of the belligerents. Now, that seemed a most extraordinary and wide provision. The Canal or its approaches! Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, he presumed, was about to reply for the Government, would inform the House what was meant by the "Canal and its approaches, or elsewhere within the territorial waters of Egypt." How far did the territorial waters of Egypt extend? How much of the Mediterranean on the one hand, or the Red Sea on the other, would be neutralized? If no hostilities were to take place within the ordinary International three-mile limit, did that apply to the whole Coast of Egypt, the Mediterranean, and the Red Sea? If it did, what was the meaning of the fourth point in Lord Granville's despatch—namely, "That neither of the two foregoing conditions shall apply to measures necessary for the defence of Egypt?" Did it mean the defence of Egypt against an attack from Abyssinia, from the Mahdi, or from any European Power? These were some points in the proposals of Lord Granville on which an answer should be forthcoming. He should like to give an instance. Would it be in violation of the letter or spirit of these conditions, supposing, as was stated in the papers a short time ago, it was considered desirable by Her Majesty's Government that General Graham's troops should be recalled from the Soudan and sent to Gallipoli? If a state of things should unfortunately arise to necessitate the recall of this Force and its transport elsewhere, would they be allowed to 1913 pass through the Canal or embark elsewhere within the three-mile territorial limit, or would they have to be conveyed across the Indian Ocean and sent round through India? These were considerations in support of a demand for further information. But he would also say that, although he had stated one or two objections upon detail that had occurred to him, he did think that at the present moment there were considerable objections upon general grounds against entering into the proposals for the neutralization of Egypt, and certainly of the Suez Canal. He could not help thinking that at the present moment the affairs of the country were in a sufficiently critical state to render it very doubtful if the present were a moment for doing anything to shackle the free hand of the Government of England in the affairs of Egypt. He earnestly and devoutly trusted that the negotiations might continue with Foreign Powers in a way to secure the maintenance of a satisfactory peace. He had not the slightest scrap of Jingo spirit, and he earnestly desired that everything possible should be done to secure an honourable peace; but he could not help thinking that while grave events were ponding in Central Asia, even if this Motion of his right hon. Friend were accepted—if this arrangement as to an Egyptian loan should be temporarily postponed until a satisfactory arrangement with regard to the Suez Canal were arrived at—he thought it would be a benefit alike to the cause of peace and the interest of this Empire. It would leave us much freer than if we entered into an arrangement with other Powers who would do little to befriend us, and might cripple us if this country were called upon to make serious sacrifices. For these reasons, and quite recognizing the courteous spirit with which the Prime Minister had appealed to his right hon. Friend, he thought the latter had done well to press his Motion, and for these reasons he should support it.
§ DR. FARQUHARSONcontended that this was not the time to discuss the question of the Suez Canal. He agreed with the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock that this Amendment was nothing more nor less than a veiled attack upon the Convention. It was quite clear, if the Bill were delayed, the position of Egypt would be most serious. It was 1914 said the position of Egypt was due to the operations of Her Majesty's Government. That seemed a most extraordinary proposition. It was well known the Debt of Egypt was largely contracted by Ismail Pasha. To say that it was due to the operations of Her Majesty's Government was a fallacy of the most transparent kind. This country had deliberately undertaken certain responsibilities towards Egypt, and they were bound to help her in this crisis. He rejoiced at the proposals Her Ma-Majesty's Government had brought forward, because they gave some prospect of retoring financial peace, order, and prosperity to the country. It was frequently said—After the amount of money this country had spent in Egypt, why not get the whole credit and profit of it? The great argument against it was, that if we were to take upon our shoulders the entire control of Egypt, we should be unable to resist the call to annex the country permanently, and everyone knew the responsibility which would fall upon us if we took any move of that kind. He would not have ventured to intervene in the debate had it not been that he had recently visited Egypt and spent some time at Cairo. Before that visit he confessed he somewhat inclined to the scuttle-out policy; but he was now opposed to it. He had not taken counsel with the Jingoes at Shepherd's Hotel in Cairo, but had conferred with men like Sir Evelyn Baring, Scott-Moncrieff, and Edgar Vincent, and with the people themselves; and, as the result of his inquiries he was convinced that England was doing a good and great work in Egypt. That country was making rapid progress, socially and morally, and to leave it before the completion of its reform could never have been satisfactory. The chief obstacle to our popularity in Egypt had been the non-payment of the indemnity. It was, therefore, a cause for congratulation that that obstacle was now to be removed. Among the benefits which we either had already conferred or were about to confer in Egypt were the abolition of the kourbash and of the corvée, the improvement of the administration of justice, and the admirable progress in the matter of irrigation.
§ MR. ELTONsaid, that the question to be decided was whether the Convention should or should not hold good. If the 1915 Suez Canal was to be looked upon as an arm of the sea it must be open to all for purposes of innocent navigation. But, by the common consent of the Powers, an arm of the sea which was in the dominions of a particular Power ought not, unless of very large dimensions, to be used for purposes of belligerent navigation without leave, the reason being that such an arm of the sea as the Suez Canal might be damaged by the belligerents, and that its use by them might involve in hostilities the neutral country in which it was contained. He approved this old rule. In 1883, however, Lord Granville suggested the expediency of allowing the Canal to be used for belligerent purposes. It was easy to understand why such a proposal was then made. The Government at that time kept announcing that the British were going to leave Egypt, and they felt that it would be ridiculous if, as the result of our Expedition to Egypt, England's highway to India should be closed against her in the event of war. That was the reason why the Government made this proposal, which most dangerously gave to all other Powers the same privilege which we derived for ourselves of passing ships of war through the Canal. But the situation was now changed. We were not likely to leave Egypt unless we were thrust out of it, and while we remained in possession of the country we could have no difficulty about obtaining leave to use the Canal for purposes of belligerent navigation should we desire to do so. Why, then, not leave matters as they were? When they gave a right to any man they also gave the full means of enjoying that right, and it would remain for the parties concerned to find out the best means of enjoying it. Was there anything to prevent a clever diplomatist from using his ability to find out, as this was a new question, new developments? If the control of the Canal was given to the Powers, the control of the whole of Egypt would fall into their hands. He hoped that even at this hour we should not advance another step without being made much more certain than we were now of the nature, he was going to say of the trap, into which we were about to fall. He did not see why we should be bound so strictly when other Powers thought themselves entitled to alter the conditions. He thought we should 1916 rather retire at once than do anything which might interfere with the security of our road to India.
§ MR. MACIVERsaid, the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire (Dr. Farquharson) told the House what he had learnt at Cairo, and his authorities were the eminent public servants who were acting there for Her Majesty's Government. He also knew Cairo, and he had many friends in Egypt; but not one of these thought that Her Majesty's Government was right, or that the people of Egypt were in any way the better for what they had done. He was one of those who, like a burnt child, dreaded the fire. He had some recollection of the most un-businesslike arrangement with which Her Majesty's Government not long ago were satisfied with respect to the Canal. Their mismanagement of the business was so bad that even among their own political friends they had not, amongst shipowners, a single defender. Her Majesty's Government were not at this moment taking the House properly into their confidence. The Prime Minister had, indeed, said that he proposed to give the House an opportunity of raising its voice. Such a phrase might mean anything or nothing. What the House wanted, and ought to insist upon, was that it should have an opportunity of having its voice heard to some purpose, and that the terms of the Convention should be considered fully, not only in that House but throughout the country. There was, therefore, nothing in the language of the right hon. Gentleman which would justify the House in rejecting the proposition of the right hon. Member for South-West Lancashire. There was one point in the extremely valuable speech of the hon. Member for Exeter (Mr. H. S. Northcote) the importance of which the House seemed to have missed, and that was in regard to the ease with which the Suez Canal might be temporarily closed. He was not one of those who were disposed to minimize the importance of the Suez Canal. He agreed with Lord Palmerston, that if the Canal were dried up it would be an advantage to this country. But the Suez Canal being, unfortunately, there, and likely to continue to exist, it was undoubtedly of great importance to the country. They ought to know what was meant by the Canal. Because, while the actual water of the Suez Canal 1917 might be free to our ships of war as long as it was open, we might, under Lord Granville's despatch, perhaps be debarred from landing troops on the banks of the Canal from those ships. He was not one of those who believed that the Canal could be permanently blocked up. But it would be a very easy matter to block the Canal absolutely for several weeks; and what he asked was, that the Convention should be so arranged that in the event of a temporary block it should be possible for this country to land troops on one side of the obstacle and to re-ship them on the other side. He thought the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire was perfectly justified in asking that the Government should tell them what they meant to do.
§ MR. W. E. FORSTERsaid, it was impossible to deny the great importance of the question respecting the Suez Canal; but the House was in this difficulty—that the question, though akin to the other part of the declaration, was not the real question before the House. Undoubtedly the question of the Suez Canal was one most vital to the interests of this country, and it was of importance that they should know what the arrangement was in regard to it before the country was finally committed to the Convention. The remarks just made by the hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Mac Iver) had some force in them, for unless care was taken in utilizing the Canal there might be, in the way he indicated, very great inconvenience to our ships in getting through it. But although this was the only way in which the right hon. Gentleman opposite could have mooted this question, it was not a convenient way of debating it, because the Guarantee Bill was not a Bill immediately affecting the Canal. He ventured to appeal to his right hon. Friend below him (Mr. Chamberlain) whether an assurance could not be given by the Government that before they finally committed the country to any arrangement about the Canal the Agreement with France should be brought before the House, so that an opinion could be given upon it. If that would satisfy the right hon. Gentleman opposite, he should very strongly appeal to his right hon. Friend to give the assurance. He thought that such an assurance would fully meet the difficul- 1918 ties of the case, and would be almost as much as the right hon. Gentleman opposite could expect to get out of this discussion.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTobserved, that the time might soon arrive when it would be of the utmost importance to this country that our troops should be landed in India at the earliest possible moment. He did not, however, believe any Government with whom we happened to be at war would find any difficulty in securing the blocking or a practical destruction of the Suez Canal for a period of several weeks. A Russian man-of-war could be very easily blown up in the Canal, and he believed that Russian sailors possessed sufficient patriotism for their country to take that step, which might have the effect of delaying the landing of British troops in India for several weeks. He should like to say one or two words about the Convention itself. They had now reached a completely new stage in the relations between this country and Egypt. During the whole of the last century British statesmen, and he might say the country as a whole, had been lavish in their efforts to maintain the predominance of England in Egypt. The sacrifices of the present Government in that direction had been greater than any ever before made. Since June, 1882, we had spent no less than £15,000,000 and lost thousands of valuable lives, and yet the results of this great expenditure and this great sacrifice of life had been absolutely flung away by the Agreement which had just been entered into with the Powers. This was the result of the £9,000,000 of Egyptian money and of the £15,000,000 of English money, and of the thousands and thousands of lives that had been sacrificed, that the people would be handed over to an International Control, which would be exercised in the interests of the bondholders, and would place our interests in Egypt at the mercy of all the other Powers in Europe. It was open to the Government by the exercise of the most obvious policy in the world to secure our permanent ascendancy in Egypt. The present Government, however, adopted a different policy. If Her Majesty's Government had taken the advice which was freely offered them by the great German Chancellor during the past three years, and had gone into Egypt as the lease- 1919 holders of the Sovereign of that country, the Sultan of Turkey, no one could have said them nay, because they would not only have had the material resources of England and Turkey at their back, but a legitimate position which no intriguing could have destroyed. The Government, however, had chosen to adopt a contrary course, with the result all the world would now see. They now found themselves in a condition as miserable and as pitiable as the unfortunate Government of Turkey had been on various occasions with regard to the Great Powers. The President of the Board of Trade in an ingenious speech had totally misrepresented the advice of the German Chancellor. He was not surprised at the line the right hon. Gentleman took, for he occupied a peculiar position in this country, and had always been in the forefront with a policy of surrender of the interests of the country. No Member of the Government was so responsible as he for the prevalence of outrage and anarchy in Ireland, or for the surrender of the Transvaal, and now he was again in the forefront in advocating this miserable and pitiable sursender in Egypt. He did not think sufficient attention had been paid to the manner in which this Agreement had been forced on Her Majesty's Government, or to the fashion in which it had been pressed down the throat of Parliament. The House would remember the long series of notes with which the Ottoman Government was assailed by the present Administration, demanding that they should cede this, that, and the other portions of their territory; in fact, they were never so happy as when shooting Identic Notes at the Porte. On the 19th of January last it fell to the lot of Her Majesty's Government to receive an Identic Note from the Foreign Powers. The Ambassadors came one after the other to force upon Her Majesty's Government this ignominious Agreement, and the result was that Her Majesty's Government accepted it, although it involved the sacrifice of all this country had struggled for in the past. The Government forced the Agreement down the throats of Parliament before the Easter Recess, because they feared the action of public opinion. There never was a more unfortunate thing than that premature debate. If the discussion had been put off the 1920 Agreement would never have been submitted to the House, for within two or three days after the Agreement was ratified the French Ministry, which had been the main instrument in coercing Her Majesty's Government, fell. What were the ignominious words used by the Prime Minister as to this Agreement? He said the ratification was absolutely necessary; that we were at the end of our tether, and that if the Agreement were not endorsed by Parliament the management of Egyptian affairs would pass into other hands. Such words were more humiliating than anything which could be found in the pages of Hansard, and this at the very moment that we had 25,000 troops on Egyptian soil. It could only be concluded from those words that the Government were acting under the strong coercion of united Europe, disgusted at their blunders, and alienated by their pitiable conduct in Egypt. It should be remembered, too, that to prevent this International control and interference over Egyptian finance which was conceded by the Agreement was the very reason why Lord Granville broke up the London Conference last August. Now the Government had consented to an International Commission within two years, and to an International Control, which would either lead us into the greatest possible European complications or would drive us out of Egypt altogether. He sincerely wished it were possible for the House to undo the effects of the vote of a few days before Easter—a vote which he regarded as the most disastrous that had been given during the present Parliament. This Agreement would result in the destruction of British influence in Egypt, and would simply hand over Egypt to a Multiple Board of Control; it was a very serious misfortune to the people of England, and a disgrace to the country. But there was something worse than all behind it, and that was the neutralization of the Canal. There was absolutely no necessity for the neutralization of the Canal. If the Canal was worth anything to us as a means of communicating with India, then, by the Agreement, we were absolutely putting it in the power of any enemy of this country at a critical moment to block or destroy that means of communication; and for this reason, if for no other, he hoped the 1921 House would agree to the Amendment of the right hon. Member for South Lancashire.
§ MR. BOURKEsaid, that the debate had ranged over a very wide field. It was not his intention to go over the various points which had been discussed in the debate the week before last. The Prime Minister recently referred to the speeches which he made in 1855. The right hon. Gentleman had drawn a distinction between the Guarantee of 1855 and the present Guarantee. He said that in 1855 it was supposed that Turkey would not be able to pay either the principle or the interest of the Guaranteed Debt. That statement of the Prime Minister was utterly fallacious. In 1855 Turkey was practically without any external Debt whatever. She did not owe £5,000,000 to bondholders. Even in 1862, when Turkey had borrowed more than £20,000,000 in excess of what she borrowed in 1855, Lord Clarendon and Lord Russell both recommended that Turkish bonds were perfectly good security to lend money on. No doubt that was a very imprudent recommendation. But he had proved that the contention of the right hon. Gentleman was thoroughly untenable. Egypt was more heavily burdened than any country in Europe; while Turkey even now, in respect of her external Debt, was less burdened than any country in Europe. When the right hon. Gentleman said there was no danger in this case of International interference he seemed to have altogether forgotten the International Tribunals, which gave those who guaranteed the loan the most complete and easy machinery for interfering whenever they chose. That was the great danger which he apprehended from the Guarantee, and he ventured to enter his most earnest protest against it. With regard to the Suez Canal, the whole matter depended upon the details of this arrangement, which the House was most anxious to hoar. The right hon. Gentleman some two years ago, alluding to the Internationalization of the Canal, had admitted the importance of that question, using the following words:—
A still bolder suggestion is made by some, involving a great variety of points for consideration—that is, that the proper and ultimate arrangement of this great sea passage between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea can only 1922 be found when the Canal, instead of becoming the property of any private company whatever, or belonging to any nation whatever, shall be placed under the management of an International Commission. I shall not enter into that. I do not presume to give any opinion. There is a great deal that has to be said upon it both in regard to its difficulties and importance.For his own part, he (Mr. Bourke) had always thought that the plan of Lord Granville seemed to be harmless in itself. He believed, however, that it would not stand the test of war, and that it would be impossible to get Egypt to carry out one-third of the engagements thrown upon her. They wanted to know what were the details, and from what they saw in the newspapers he thought they had just cause to be suspicious. They heard that the proceedings now going on were very antagonistic, to English interests, and he thought they had good reason to ask the Government to lay this International Act or Instrument, whatever it might be called, on the Table of the House before its ratification. The right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) had used the word "neutralization." If that word was used in its ordinary sense, as meaning the freedom of the Canal, it was exactly the thing which the country could not accept. The freedom of the Canal was the exact opposite of its neutralization. It was said that extraordinary demands were being made by the French Government with regard to the Sweet Water Canals. We were told that the French Government had said that as the Suez Canal was to be neutralized, and as the Sweet Water Canals wore necessary to the Suez Canal, it followed that they also must be neutralized. That was a thing which we could not consent to, and it was subversive of the authority of the Suzerain Powers, which Her Majesty's Government had over and over again said they were determined to maintain. The territorial rights of the Sovereign of Egypt were, to a great extent, thereby compromised. Then, what were to be the relations between the Canal Company and the International Body which would be constituted? Suppose that the Company were to say to the Powers that great injuries had been inflicted upon them, and consequently upon the commerce of Europe at large for the benefit of which the Canal existed, would 1923 the Powers of Europe be liable in damages? How was the Company to sue the Powers? That was no hypothetical case, because something like it had already happened in the Egyptian War. All those questions deserved the minute attention of the House. They had been told that this was not a time to weaken the Government. It was far from his desire to do so, and it would be admitted that the Opposition had abstained from all action which would tend to such a result. At the same time, he would like to ask the Government whether this was a time when we should tie the hands, not only of the country, but of the Government, for we should tie their hands for all time if we did not take care that the interests of this country in the Suez Canal were not compromised by what was now going on in Paris. Her Majesty's Government might, indeed, have some difficulty in giving the exact pledge that was asked for, as it appeared it was not a Treaty that was being prepared in Paris. It had been described as an International Act, though he did not see how it could be an International Act until Her Majesty's Government had given their assent to what was done. At all events, they had a right to ask the Government this question. Whatever it might be that was agreed to in Paris by the persons who were there now, they ought to know whether that Instrument would be submitted to the House of Commons before it became an International Act. He thought that if that question were clearly answered the House might be saved the trouble of going to a division on this Amendment.
§ MR. CHAMBERLAINWhen the right hon. Gentleman rose to address the House I hoped he was going to refer at once to the question which has occupied the House, I think, about five hours in a somewhat desultory debate; but the right hon. Gentleman could not resist the temptation of endeavouring to prove the inconsistency of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister with himself. Accordingly the right hon. Gentleman referred over and over again to the explanations of the Prime Minister, which, I think, are sufficient to satisfy any reasonable person. My right hon. Friend in 1855 opposed an International Guarantee; and he did so, as the reports show, distinctly upon the ground that 1924 there was, in his opinion, a probability that the funds would not be forthcoming to meet the interest upon the loan, and that thereupon there would arise an International right of control. Now, on the contrary, my right hon. Friend defends and supports an International Guarantee in the case of Egypt, on the ground that even in the opinion of Gentlemen opposite there is not the slightest probability that there will be any failure to pay the necessary interest, and that consequently no additional International right will ever arise. Then the right hon. Gentleman went on to ask a number of questions of detail as to what might arise under a hypothetical Convention with reference to the Suez Canal. All these questions are entirely premature. The only question before the House is this—whether or not the House will have an opportunity of considering the Convention before it is finally agreed upon. I do not know that I am able to add anything to what the Prime Minister said at the very outset of this debate. My right hon. Friend was understood by all of us on this side of the House to give an unqualified affirmative to that question. In anticipation my right hon. Friend did give the assurance which now, after five hours' debate, he is still asked to give, and which I now repeat in the plainest terms I can employ—namely, that before this International Act is adopted by the British Government the draft project and the Protocol shall be communicated to the House of Commons, so that they will have an opportunity of expressing an opinion upon it before it is ratified.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEThe last words of the right hon. Gentleman are of very great importance, and I venture to think they carry the assurances of the Government very decidedly in advance of those which we received from the Prime Minister early in the evening. I think if we are to understand that the pledge of the Government is that which has now been notified by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, my right hon. Friend may be very well satisfied with the result of the discussion. His object has been, and our object has been, a practical one. We cannot exaggerate the enormous importance to this country of obtaining a satisfactory solution and settlement of 1925 the question relating to the Suez Canal. If that was recognized as an important question last year, how much more important is it at the present time? If it was important a few weeks ago, how much more important is it now, when we know the very extreme importance which it will be to us within a short time to know that we have command of the highway to the East? The question is one which the Prime Minister has admitted to be in itself important, but which he and others have said ought not to have been brought forward at the present moment, as this was not the occasion on which it ought to be discussed. Indeed, the Prime Minister went so far as to say that this was a proceeding somewhat in the nature of tacking. Tacking has no particular connection with another measure which the House is bound to pass; but in this case there is the strictest possible connection between the Financial Arrangement and the Arrangement for the navigation of the Suez Canal. These two things are presented to us, and were presented to the Powers responsible for the Convention, as part of one Arrangement; and when we are told—"If you will only pass one part, you will afterwards be able to deal with the other," I wish to ask the Government, the House, and the country to bear in mind what a lever you are losing in this matter by deciding on the Financial Arrangement before you begin to deal with the Suez Canal itself. The right hon. Gentleman told us early in the evening we might be assured that the House will have an opportunity of pronouncing an opinion upon the Arrangement with regard to the Canal. He said it will be laid on the Table, and that there will be, at least, opportunities of moving the adjournment of the House in order to discuss the matter if we liked to do so. The noble Lord the Member for Woodstock admitted the great importance of the subject, and said it was a matter which would be discussed, because it so closely affected the great interests of the Empire that it was impossible to suppose the Arrangement would be allowed to come into operation without being properly criticized and decided upon by Parliament. What I would point out to the noble Lord is, that he probably was quite right in saying that sooner or later there must 1926 be a disscussion on any arrangement that may be arrived at; that if a matter of such great importance were allowed to pass, and then you were to challenge it, you might be told that you would run the risk of giving offence to the other Powers concerned. But the noble Lord says you will be able to pass a Vote of Censure, and that the Government would suffer from the consequences of such a Vote, which, of course, they would; and, further, the noble Lord added that the Treaty itself would thereby be sot aside. But it would not. There is just the point. The Government might be censured. Parliament might say it was a bad Arrangement, and might turn out the Government; but there the Treaty would be, and all the Governments of this country would be bound by it—just as they are bound, whether they like it or not, by the Declaration of Paris. The important questions of privateering and so forth and other matters were decided without reference to Parliament; and though Parliament might have pronounced a different opinion on those subjects afterwards, and might have turned out the Government of the day, still the obligations incurred by the Government of the day would have been binding upon us. When you consider the enormous importance of a proper settlement of this question of the Suez Canal, I say we ought to act, and to act in time, and that it was the duty of my right hon. Friend, or of someone else in this House, to challenge the attention of this House while there is still time for us to consider the matter. What has just been said on the part of the Government has, I admit, placed us in a much better position. I understand that we have a distinct undertaking on the part of the Government that before this Arrangement is permitted to become binding upon this country and to become an International Act, it shall be submitted to Parliament, and that an opportunity will be given to us to make observations upon it, and to pronounce an opinion upon it.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEI ought to have said "laid before Parliament." The word "submitted" might imply some infringement of Prerogative. 1927 It will, I understand, be laid before Parliament, and there will be an opportunity for Parliament freely to express its opinion on the important points raised by it. That being the understanding which we have, I admit that we may, under the circumstances, be satisfied, with that, and that it is not necessary for us to call on the House for any special vote on the subject. I hope that, under the circumstances, the Motion will be withdrawn, and that the matter will be left in the position in which the Government seem to place it.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.
§ Bill considered in Committee.
§ (In the Committee.
§ Clause 1 (Short Title).
§ Clause 2 (Power to Her Majesty to guarantee annuity of £315,000 for loan to be raised by the Egyptian Government).
§ MR. TOMLINSONsaid, he wished to propose an Amendment which would, in his opinion, enable the Government to join in the Guarantee, notwithstanding the limited liability of Russia under it. Under the clause, as it stood, the only Guarantee that the Government could enter into was a Guarantee jointly with the Foreign Governments named in Article VII. set forth in the Schedule to the Bill, and severally upon the terms and conditions set forth in the Articles in the said Schedule, for the purposes of a loan to be raised by the Government of Egypt. Therefore, if one of the Powers did not join in that Guarantee according to the terms of the Articles set forth in the Schedule, the Government would not be authorized to bind this country with regard to it. It appeared, on the face of the Guarantee itself, that one of the Powers was not to be bound by the Articles of the Guarantee, because there was a Declaration by the Russian Government appended to the Articles, but not forming part of them, in which the Russian Plenipotentiary stated that if in course of time the Guarantee stipulated in Article VII. of the present Convention should come in force, it was to be understood that in the accounts between the guaranteeing Powers the 1928 share falling to Russia should in no case exceed the sixth part of the annual interest guaranteed. What he proposed was to amend the clause by adding after the word "guarantee" in the first line, the words "either solely or," and at the beginning of line 15, after the words "jointly with" the words "any one or more of." The clause would then read—
It shall be lawful for Her Majesty to guarantee either solely or jointly with any one or more of the Foreign Governments named in Article Seven, set forth in the schedule to this Act, and severally, upon the terms and conditions set forth in the Articles in the said schedule, the regular payment of the annuity of three hundred and fifteen thousand pounds sterling, mentioned in the said Article Seven, for the purpose of a loan to be raised by the Government of Egypt.
§ Amendment proposed, in line 14, after the word "guarantee," to insert the words "either solely or."—(Mr. Tomlinson.)
§ Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)I cannot accept the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman, because this country is bound by the terms of the Convention to accept the Guarantee as it stands. The exception which the hon. Member regards as an exception in favour of Russia is really no exception at all, and it has been allowed by this country and the other Powers to be made.
§ MR. TOMLINSONsaid, that under those circumstances he would not press the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Clause agreed to.
§ Remaining Clauses agreed to.
§ Schedule.
MR. STAVELEY HILLsaid, that, by Article VII. of the Convention, the Governments of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Prance, Germany, Italy, and Russia, undertook either to guarantee jointly and severally, or to ask authority from their Parliaments to guarantee jointly and severally, the regular payment of the stipulated Annuity of £315,000; but by the Declaration of the Russian Government, at the end of the Schedule, Russia excepted herself from a joint and several Guarantee by 1929 providing that in the accounts between the guaranteeing Governments the share falling to Russia should in no case exceed the sixth part of the interest guaranteed. He wished to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what would be the position of Russia under those circumstances? Of course, Turkey was excepted from the Guarantee; and, so far as Russia was concerned, it did not appear to be any joint and several Guarantee at all.
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)The state of the matter is this—Under the terms of the Guarantee, Russia cannot be called upon to do more than pay one-sixth of the amount of the annual interest on the loan.
MR. STAVELEY HILLasked how, under the circumstances, Russia could remain in Article VII. as one of the guaranteeing Powers?
§ Schedule agreed to.
§ Bill reported, without Amendment; to be read the third time To-morrow.