AFFAIRS OF SOUTH AFRICA.

HC Deb 29 October 1884 vol 293 cc441-514

SIR HENRY HOLLAND

said, that, after the very full and frank explanation of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) as to the reasons for the delay in the production of the Bechuanaland Papers, he should not do more than reiterate his expression of regret that the Papers promised so long ago as the 7th of July last were only distributed that morning. He must, however, express his regret and unbounded astonishment—a regret and an astonishment which would be felt on both sides of the House by hon. Members who had interested themselves in this question — that the Papers now presented only came down to the 14th of August. Nothing could be more inconvenient, as had been just pointed out by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), because the discussion must now be incomplete owing to that fact. The House had no information about the recall of Mr. Mackenzie; none about the mission of Mr. Rhodes; none as to the murder of Mr. Bethell; none as to the steps which had been taken by Her Majesty's Government to bring to justice the perpetrators of that murder; they had no information as to the outrages that had been committed by the Boers on Montsioa, or as to the sham Treaty that had been wrung out of him after he had been reduced to extremities. He could not understand, nor would the country be able to understand, why, although some of the Correspondence might be incomplete, some further Papers could not have been published, some despatches, or some telegrams, bringing the matter down to a later date. But even upon the Papers presented, however incomplete, there was quite sufficient evidence, in his opinion, to show that the policy of Her Majesty's Government had been most unsatisfactory; and he must add that the words which had been put in the Speech from the Throne did not tend to throw any clear light on the question what their policy would be in the future. He could not help entertaining serious doubts whether, even now, Her Majesty's Government realized the gravity of the position, and whether they were even now prepared to fulfil the obligations which they had incurred. Before dealing with the Papers which had been presented, he desired, however, to clear the ground for discussion by a few preliminary observations. In the first place, it should not be understood that he, or anyone who criticized the action of the Government, underrated in any way the difficulties of the case. No one who had studied the affairs of South Africa, and the proceedings that had taken place there, could doubt the gravity and importance of those difficulties; but he must observe that those difficulties had, in the present case, been enormously increased and aggravated by the policy of drift and concession pursued by Her Majesty's Government. What was the main difficulty with which they had had to contend? It had been the Boer element—how to deal with the freebooting Boers, as well as with the Transvaal Government. Now, it appeared to him that the policy of Her Majesty's Government had been such as to justify the Boers in believing that, if we were not actually afraid of them, at all events Her Majesty's Government were afraid of incurring the expense and trouble which must be incurred in holding our own against the Boers, and that we were ready to make any concession rather than incur that expense and trouble. If they were to believe all that appeared in the Colonial papers, and there was no reason to disbelieve such statements, the Boers openly avowed that they had conquered this country, and could conquer it again; they advised the Native Chiefs to put no trust in the honour and protection of this country, or in our fulfilment of pledges of protection; they had not hesitated to attack our protected Ally, and to wring from him a sham Treaty; they had not hesitated to murder a British officer in the execution of his duty, and to insult the British flag. He regretted to say that the speeches of Members of Her Majesty's Government had strongly tended, in his opinion, to confirm the Boers in their view. He would refer to one of those speeches now, and he would deal with another speech later on. On the 6th of February, last Session, he had put a plain Question to the Government, and asked for a plain answer. He asked them to assure the House and the country that, if the Convention then under discussion was broken by the Transvaal Government, they would be prepared to enforce the observance of it. It surely was not too much to assume that there was a probability, a strong probability, that those who had with impunity and profit to themselves broken the former Convention would break the new Convention also, unless assured that the Government meant to act firmly and insist upon an observance of it. Indeed, as was said in the course of that debate by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster)— Judging from the past, they would be perfectly blind and perfectly foolish if they were satisfied that the Convention would maintain itself."—(3 Hansard, [284] 142.) Now, what answer did the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain) give to that plain Question? He said it was a most unusual request; that it would hardly be becoming to anticipate a breach of the Convention by the other contracting party, and to say what the Government would do in that event. That, he (Sir Henry Holland) ventured to think, was a most evasive and unsatisfactory answer. He had not asked the Government to assume, or express their belief, that the Boers would break the new Convention; but it was most reasonable and important to know what the Government would do in such a case. The speeches of Members of the Government were perfectly well known to, and noted by, the Transvaal Government, and the Boers; and an evasive answer like that given by the President of the Board of Trade would confirm the Boers in their belief that the Government did not intend to depart from the policy of inaction, which, much to the benefit of the Boers, they had hitherto maintained. Another point to which he desired to call the attention of the House was this. The present state of affairs in Bechuanaland, and our responsibilities there now, even from the Government point of view, differed materially from the former state of things in Bechuanaland or in Zululand. He said from the Government point of view, because the view of himself and of many hon. Members on both sides of the House had always been that, as by the policy of the Government we had incurred grave responsibilities to the people and Chiefs in Zululand, amongst whom we had partitioned that country, so we had in Bechuanaland incurred responsibilities to our "Native Allies," Montsioa and Mankoroane. The Government, on the other hand, as the House was aware, had disputed the extent of that responsibility, and had dissented from the term "Native Allies," as applied to these Bechuana Chiefs. Upon this latter point, he would only observe that he thought no one who had carefully read the former debates, the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford and other hon. Members, and the despatches of Sir Hercules Robinson, could doubt that those Chiefs were fairly ranked as our Allies. He would venture to quote a few words from one of the despatches of Sir Hercules Robinson in support of this view— Montsioa and Mankoroane are now on the point of being exterminated, in consequence of their fidelity to the British Government, and because of the assistance they gave to British subjects in the Transvaal War. But whether the Government were then right or wrong, whatever their responsibility was on former occasions, there could be no question now as to our obligations to Montsioa and Mankoroane, and as to our engagements to protect them and their territory against the Boers. The last point he desired to notice was as follows:—Hitherto a distinction had always been attempted to be drawn between the action of the freebooting Boers, though subjects of the Transvaal Government, and the action of the Transvaal Government itself. But without holding the Transvaal Government directly liable for all the outrages committed by their subjects in Bechuanaland, there could be no doubt now, upon the facts stated in the Papers which had been presented—and further Papers, he believed, would only confirm this view — that that Government had connived at these outrages; that they had not bonâ fide endeavoured to restrain them, and that they had attempted to profit by them. It was clear, from the Papers and the telegrams of Sir Hercules Robinson, that recruiting for this commando was carried on at and near Pretoria, and that the Proclamation of Nicholas Gey, declaring war against Montsioa, and promising booty, by a distribution of that Chief's land, to those who would fight against him, was openly published in The Volksstem newspaper in Pretoria. It is true that, after pressure put upon them by Mr. Rutherford, the Resident, under orders from Sir Hercules Robinson, the Transvaal Government did publish a Proclamation forbidding their subjects to cross the frontier. But the true value of that Proclamation was well understood; and it was not worth the paper it was printed on, as it was not followed up, so far as they could judge from the Papers, by any restraining action on the part of that Government. But that was not all the case against that Government, though it was all they could learn from the Papers presented by the Colonial Office. Unless they had been misinformed, they learnt from the Colonial newspapers and letters that after all the outrages had been committed, after Montsioa, owing to our neglect of duty and inaction, had been reduced to the last extremity, there appeared upon the scene a deputation from the Transvaal Government, who offered to Montsioa, if he would submit and make a Treaty with them, to clear his territory of Boers, and withdraw the commando. Those who could withdraw could have prevented, had they been so inclined, the invasion. The mention of this Treaty brought him to the other speech of a Member of the Government to which he had before referred, and which he thought as unfortunate as the speech of the President of the Board of Trade. He confessed he was astonished at the defence of the Transvaal Government put forward by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Courtney). Unless his speech to his constituents was wrongly reported, he appeared to have argued that the Transvaal Government had shown that they were sensible of their obligations under the Convention, and their desire to act up to it, by their proposal to submit this so-called Treaty to Her Majesty for her sanction or disapproval. In other words, after having connived at these outrages committed by their own subjects; after our protected Ally, Montsioa, had been reduced to the last extremity; and after they had wrung this shameful Treaty out of him, they proposed, forsooth, to satisfy the letter of the Convention of 1884, by submitting the Treaty to Her Majesty! Such a course appeared to him (Sir Henry Holland) to be simply adding insult to injury. The hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury was willing, in a true Christian-like spirit, to pocket both insult and injury; but even he must have doubted whether he had not been too hasty in doing this, when he learnt that even Mr. Joubert—a Boer of Boers and a Leader of the Transvaal Government—was so shocked at the action of that Government that he retired from Office. But here, again, a speech like this from an important Member of the Government could not but have had a very bad effect in the Transvaal. He (Sir Henry Holland) had begun by saying that the policy of Her Majesty's Government had been most unsatisfactory. Of course, there could not be now a full discussion upon this question, owing to the incompleteness of the Papers, and it must be deferred until the further Papers were presented, which he hoped might, in spite of the Factory Acts to which, the Under Secretary of State had referred, be pressed forward with all speed. But, even upon the Papers before the House, there was sufficient to show that up to the 14th of August their policy had been most halfhearted and unsatisfactory. Their first step was to send out Mr. Mackenzie to Bechuanaland. He (Sir Henry Holland) had himself always doubted the fitness of Mr. Mackenzie for that post. Not that he doubted Mr. Mackenzie's zeal and energy; but Mr. Mackenzie was a missionary, and he had taken a very active part—he did not say wrongly—on behalf of Montsioa in the quarrels and disputes which had arisen in that country. His impartiality, therefore, might well be doubted, in a position in which it was above all things necessary that a man of absolute impartiality should be employed. But whether he was, or was not, the right man, one thing was clear—that whoever was sent out should have been backed up by a strong police force. He (Sir Henry Holland), and others, had constantly pressed upon the Government the necessity of employing a police force to guard the frontier of Bechuanaland; but the Government had always opposed the suggestion, and held that such a step, would lead, if not to annexation, at all events to increased danger of disturbances and, perhaps, war. He had always contended that the very reverse would be the result of such a step, if taken in time. He had always contended that if we provided, not a military, but a strong police force, on the frontier, we should not have to meet incursions of freebooting Boers. If the Boers had known that there was on our side of the frontier a strong body of men to keep them in check, they would have hesitated to advance. It had been because we had allowed the Boers to assemble in increasing numbers close to the frontier, and to cross over in small parties with impunity, that the extremely difficult and dangerous state of things had arisen, which might, after all, lead us into war, and which certainly would now entail upon us increased expenditure and possible loss of life. And the result had proved the correctness of his view. Well, the Government had, at a late hour, adopted his suggestion; but, unfortunately, they had done so in a half-hearted manner, and had not realized the increased difficulties of the case. What did they find? Why, as late as June 27, after full knowledge of what had passed, after full knowledge of what was threatened, Major Lowe-had only 50 police under his command, and had earnestly to press for an increased force. Now, he contended that the Government, when they learned that fact in June last, should at once have telegraphed to Sir Hercules Robinson, and ordered him to recruit more police in the Cape, or elsewhere, at Imperial expense, and send them up to Bechuanaland. Anyone who studied the Papers would see that the difficulty under which Sir Hercules Robinson laboured was that he had no authority from the Government to incur any expense, and that he was not able to get the Cape Government to incur any expenditure or render any assistance. Her Majesty's Government should at once have authorized the expenditure necessary to increase the police force. But nothing had been done since June 26 by the Government, so far as they could judge by the Papers. On June 26 two telegrams were received by Lord Derby from Sir Hercules Robinson. In the first telegram, which would be found at page 33, Sir Hercules Robinson, after stating that a British Protectorate had been announced over Montsioa's territory, and that the Goshenites had been warned of this fact, and after stating the fact of Nicholas Gey's Proclamation of War having been published in The Volksstem newspaper and of the recruiting from near Pretoria, went on to say— I at once telegraphed Acting Resident to warn Transvaal Government that Montsioa is now under British protection, and that if a publicly advertised expedition against that Chief is organized by persons living within the Transvaal, and the marauders with their plunder are allowed to return to the Transvaal, Her Majesty's Government will assuredly hold the Transvaal Government responsible for such proceedings. And at the end of the telegram, after stating that he had authorized Mr. Mackenzie to organize, if necessary, a temporary force of burghers and police sufficient to expel the marauders, he says— The invasion, if it takes place, will be an act of impudent defiance of British authority, and the invaders should, I think, be expelled and punished at any risk or cost. Do you concur? This was a most important and pressing question; but the House would be surprised to hear that no answer was given to that question until the 4th July, and then only in very ambiguous terms. They learnt from Lord Derby's despatch of the 4th July, which would be found at page 35 of the Papers, that he had on that day despatched a telegram approving the communication to the Transvaal Government, and the instructions given to Mr. Mackenzie on the subject, and in that telegram he had— Observed that any attack upon the protected territory must, of course, he repelled, and that Her Majesty's Government were confident that you fully appreciated the importance of not risking a reverse in the absence of reinforcements. That answer, he submitted to the House, was most unsatisfactory and uncertain. What had Sir Hercules Robinson asked? He had asked what was the policy of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the threatened invasion of Bechuanaland, and he was told that it was to be repelled if he had sufficient force, though the Government were perfectly aware, from his telegram, that he had not that force. It was, no doubt, difficult to give full instructions in a telegram; but they should have given him some orders about raising a force at once at Imperial expense, and that telegram should have been followed up by a despatch going fully into the case, and explaining their views of the position. But nothing further had been given—no orders, no directions, no intimation of their policy. What could Sir Hercules Robinson conclude from this but that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to abide by the same policy of inaction which they had hitherto maintained? He ventured to think that this reticence was not fair towards a Governor placed in so responsible and difficult a position as Sir Hercules Robinson was placed in. But the case against the Government was even stronger than that, because, on the 2nd July—that was, two days before the telegram of the 4th July was despatched—Lord Derby had received a third telegram of the 2nd July from Sir Hercules Robinson, which would be found at page 34. The first paragraph ran as follows:— Rutherfoord telegraphs June 26, Transvaal Republic issuing strong Proclamation, forbidding burghers taking part in hostilities against Montsioa. I have directed him to urge that restraining steps be taken, as some stronger measure than mere paper proclamation necessary to relieve Transvaal from responsibility for raids publicly advertised and organized within Transvaal. And then, after stating the increase of marauders, and the danger of allowing them to settle in Montsioa's country, he ends by saying— Please authorize Treasury Chest to supply another five thousand pounds, if required. Now, he (Sir Henry Holland) thought the House would be surprised to learn that the only answer sent to that pressing and important telegram was that Lord Derby "would reply to it as soon as possible," and that, in fact, so far as appeared from the Papers, no further answer was sent, at all events, up to the 14th August, when the Papers end. Here was a telegram, practically asking for an approval of the stronger message sent to the Transvaal Government, and asking for £5,000, and yet no answer was given to it, except the promise of a reply as soon as possible. So that the matter stands thus—that no answer, except the ambiguous answer given in the telegram of 4th July, had been sent to the question as to the policy of Her Majesty's Government; no approval or disapproval had been given as to the stronger message ordered to be pressed upon the Transvaal Government; and no answer as to the request to be allowed to expend £5,000. The only other despatch from Lord Derby was one dated 14th August, which merely approved the proceedings which had been approved by his Lordship's telegram of the 4th July. This despatch ended the Papers presented—a most lame and impotent, indeed, he thought a discreditable conclusion. So much for the Papers. But now let the House observe what had happened since the 14th August. Mr. Mackenzie had been recalled. Mr. Rhodes had been sent up to Bechuanaland, and returned; and he (Sir Henry Holland) would now venture to trouble the House with a few extracts from Mr. Rhodes's Report, of which he presumed the Colonial Office had a copy, as it was stated to have been sent to the High Commissioner, and appeared in The Times so long ago as the 23rd September, from which newspaper he had taken these extracts. It was stated that— Messrs. Rhodes and Bower report to the High Commissioner that they are satisfied that the Transvaal has the power, but never will use it, to stop the violation of the Western border. That Goshen freebooters fell upon Montsioa, but an armistice of 14 hours was gained. The Boers demand compensation for the war, and the recognition of Goshen as an independent Republic, with right to the Queen to place a Resident there. The Commissioner would not accede to these terms, and warned them of the consequences of carrying on war against protected British subjects. Montsioa sent messages that he was reduced to the last extremity, but, having faith in the Queen, had refused all the Boer overtures to submit. Hs would only do so to save the lives of the women and children. Mr. Rhodes replied Montsioa must not consider himself abandoned, for the Queen's Government would fulfil their obligations. He would only say, in passing, that he should like to know when and how Her Majesty's Government intended to fulfil these obligations? The Report then goes on to state that— When the Commissioner left, the Goshenites resumed the war on Montsioa, who had to succumb. Mr. Joubert was called in and concluded a Treaty on similar conditions to those rejected by Mr. Rhodes. Messrs. Bower and Rhodes warned Mr. Joubert of the serious responsibility of such proceedings. The report in the paper adds that the Commissioner had inquired into the revolting circumstances of Mr. Bethell's death— Mr. Bethell, an acting officer of police, was wounded in a conflict with the freebooters, and afterwards killed in cold blood, his body being subjected to indignity. Now, he (Sir Henry Holland) could not doubt that Mr. Rhodes must have made a Report about Mr. Bethell's death to the Colonial Office, although no mention had been made of it. He did not propose to go into that painful case. He would leave it to be dealt with by those hon. Members who were more directly connected with Mr. Bethell. But he could not help expressing his astonishment that the Government had only really taken the matter in hand, and issued instructions, some three days ago. Even now the House did not know the contents of the telegram to Sir Hercules Robinson, whether he was to act and take steps at once to bring these murderers to justice, or whether he was only "to advise and report," which seemed to be the usual form of instructions given by the present Government. Before they considered what the Government were going to do, they had a right, and the country had a right, to ask—"Why has action been taken so late? Why has the Government waited till just before Parliament met?" Why had action been taken so late as to ruin our character in South Africa for an honourable performance of our engagements, and to lead Colonists and Natives to believe that we were unable or unwilling to act up to those engagements? Why so late as to call forth indignant protests at the Cape, for one could read between the lines, and see that, while offering us support, the Colonists were indignant at our inaction? Why so late as to cause greater expenditure of money, if not of life, than if we had acted firmly before these outrages had been committed? What was to be the action of the Government now? Looking at the past, it was only fair to ask whether it was to be real and effectual, whether the Government were really alive to the gravity of the case and prepared to deal with it, or whether the Micawber policy was to be continued of waiting to see what would turn up? The paragraph in Her Majesty's Gracious Speech was far from satisfactory. It began— I have to regret that circumstances have occurred on the South-Western Frontier of the Transvaal which demand my vigilant attention. If the Government had acted with proper vigour, that sentence should have run somewhat as follows:— Circumstances have occurred which have received my vigilant attention, and which have necessitated the adoption of active measures to secure peace and the due protection of the Native Chiefs, in accordance with my pledges to them. The Speech went on— In conjunction with the Government of the Cape Colony I am engaged in considering the means which may be required to secure the faithful observance of the Convention of the present year. He, for one, heartily hailed the co-operation of the Cape Government and Colonists. He had never doubted their readiness to assist us, if they saw we were determined to act; but our inaction had encouraged those Colonists, and there was a considerable number of them, who were in their hearts favourable to the Boers and to the Africander policy, while it had discouraged our friends, who viewed the Boer proceedings with distrust and alarm. He would, therefore, seek the co-operation of the Cape Government, and would press for it. But it must be remembered that the Imperial Government had duties and obligations of its own, which the Cape Government had not; and we were bound to meet those responsibilities, and to act up to them at once, without waste of time or delay in negotiating and making arrangements with the Cape Government as to the exact amount and mode of assistance they would give. Our duty in this respect was well stated by the hon. Member who moved the Address with so much eloquence and ability— If peace is ever to reign in South Africa, if respect for the British name is to continue there, and if South Africa is to remain an integral portion of Her Majesty's Dominions, we shall have to deal with the matters arising there with a firm and steady hand. The Speech from the Throne was not comforting; but he could not but think that since that Speech was composed, Her Majesty's Government had had to reconsider their position, in face of the feeling in the country, and had seen the necessity of more decided action. He was glad to learn that Sir Charles Warren was to be supported by a strong force. He had feared lest Sir Charles Warren should be sent out as General Gordon was sent out, alone, as a scapegoat into the wilderness, to bear the sins of the Government upon him, or, as Lord Northbrook had been sent out, "to advise and report." He trusted that the force would be a sufficient force. He trusted, moreover, that if, as was not unlikely, upon the report of this force going up into Bechuanaland, some kind of peace was established there, the Government would not be satisfied with this, and adopt a retrograde policy. Such a peace could only be temporary, and would be broken again if the Government resumed their former policy. Some exhibition of force must be shown in Bechuanaland; and, peace or no peace, Sir Charles Warren, backed up by some force, should go up and endeavour to establish a firm and lasting peace there, and once for all impose some lasting check upon the Boers. Without some such show of power, the Transvaal Government would soon renew their policy of aggression. He thanked the House for having listened to him with such patience, and he felt that an apology for the length of his speech was the more necessary, because it was clear that the discussion must be renewed at some later date when further Papers had been presented.

MR. WODEHOUSE

said, it would be unnecessary for him to follow the hon. Member who had just sat down over the whole ground traversed in his speech; but he would make a few observations on some of the topics to which it referred. They were obviously at a disadvantage in discussing these events which had taken place on the Southwestern Frontier of the Transvaal without Papers up to a recent date; and he had no desire to prejudge questions or proceedings on which further Papers would give authentic information. But the House knew, from Papers already in their hands, that, after concluding a Convention with the South African Republic, Her Majesty's Government decided to establish a British Protectorate in Bechuanaland, the expenses of which were to be jointly borne by the Imperial and Cape Governments. They accordingly appointed Mr. Mackenzie to be the Agent and Representative of British authority in the new Protectorate, and, as was pointed out by the hon. Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland), that appointment was a peculiar one. He did not condemn it; it was made on the strong recommendation of Sir Hercules Robinson. He only said that it was peculiar, and that Mr. Mackenzie's personality alone had a marked significance, because, from the time of the Anti-Slavery movement down to the present hour, the Missionary had been the type and incarnation of principles as to the treatment of Natives which irritated the Dutch Boers of South Africa. Moreover, this particular Missionary, Mr. Mackenzie, was known to be the eager advocate of a far-reaching policy of Native administration by European officers, and the central idea of his policy was the expansion of such a Native administration under Imperial, and not under Colonial control. Mr. Mackenzie, however, soon vacated office, apparently in deference to the suspicions and ill-will of our partner in the Protectorate, the Cape Government, and his place was taken by Mr. Rhodes, a Cape politician. Now, Mr. Rhodes was also a man with a policy; but the central idea of his policy was to exclude what he called the Imperial factor from Bechuanaland. If, then, the very divergent policies of the two Imperial Agents afforded any clue to the aims and intentions of Her Majesty's Government, there would seem to have been some change of view on their part, when Mr. Mackenzie gave way to Mr. Rhodes. To judge from the Papers distributed that morning, Mr. Mackenzie did not appear to have had a very clear insight into the situation with which he had to deal; but in estimating his success, every allowance should be made for the miserably inadequate resources at his command to vindicate authority amidst bands of reckless and desperate men. An officer sent up to establish a Protectorate in the name of a great Power should at least be armed with the means of rendering the protection which he offered a reality and not a mockery. All our world-wide experience taught us that a great Power in contact with turbulent and barbarous communities could seldom, if ever, conduct affairs with credit and success on a rigid adherence to the limited liability principle. The House knew so little at present about the circumstances in which Sir Charles Warren was being despatched to South Africa, that he would only express a hope that that officer would not be denied a sufficiency either of men or of money to insure the success of his mission. At the present moment an attempt was being made to settle matters in Bechuanaland by the combined action of the Imperial and Cape Governments; and he (Mr. Wodehouse) must own that this partnership with the Cape Government filled him with misgivings. The observance of the Convention by the Transvaal Government, the execution of justice on the murderers of Mr. Bethell, the expulsion of freebooters from Montsioa's territory, and our general obligations towards the Natives were Imperial matters; and, while admitting the advantages of Colonial co-operation, he would decline to confide Imperial obligations towards the Natives or Imperial honour to the keeping of a Cape Government. He would explain why he said so. The late Cape Ministry—the Ministry of Sir Thomas Scanlan—lent cannon to the Transvaal Government for the subjugation of Mapoch and his tribe, but would never give facilities for the Natives to obtain arms and ammunition for their own defence, and when they were asked by Her Majesty's Government to lend a few policemen for service in Bechuanaland, they refused to do so. But matters were worse now under the auspices of the present Cape Ministry, whose very existence depended upon the support of that extreme Africander Party, whose scarcely veiled object was to thrust British Sovereignty out of South Africa, or at least to reduce it to a mere empty name. He hoped, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government and that House, as guardians of British interests and the national honour, would narrowly examine all proposals for the settlement of Bechuanaland issuing from such a source; and he would beg Her Majesty's Government not to feel too confident that, after all, the Cape Government would take Bechuanaland off their hands. He was aware that both Houses of the Cape Legislature had passed Resolutions favourable to the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Colony; but Cape politicians were seldom hampered in their movements by any austere and pedantic consistency, and he believed that the extreme Africander Party would rather have Bechuanaland annexed to the Transvaal than to their own Colony. No doubt, if everything were smooth and peaceful in Bechuanaland, the Cape Government and Parliament might be willing to annex it; but while there were any risks to be run, while there was any occasion for the forcible assertion of authority, we should look altogether in vain for substantial help from that quarter. Now, turning to the opposite border of the Transvaal, he must express the regret with which he read the despatch of the Secretary of State of the 19th of August with regard to the Zulu Chief, Usibepu. That Chief was described by the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, only a few weeks ago, as a brave man and a good friend of England; and now his overthrow had been shamefully accomplished by filibustering Boers without a finger being lifted to save him. The Secretary of State said that whatever risk or inconvenience there might have been in rendering him assistance, it would have been rendered, had there been any obligation on the part of the Government to aid him. But was there no obligation? To his (Mr. Wodehouse's) mind, nothing could efface the obligations imposed on us towards the Zulu people by the cruel wrong of the Zulu War. Moreover, we knew, on the authority of Lord Wolseley himself, that none of the 13 Chiefs appointed by the Imperial Government would have accepted their positions, had they had the slightest expectation of the restoration of Cetewayo, and it was the acceptance of this position which especially drew upon Usibepu the implacable animosity of the Usutus. Most emphatic testimony had been repeatedly borne by Sir Henry Bulwer to the loyalty of this Chief, and his habitual deference to the advice of Sir Henry Bulwer and the Resident Commissioner, and, considering that his one or two so-called offensive operations were really defensive, in spirit and purpose, it seemed hardly generous to fling them in his face as excuses for leaving him a victim to Boers whom he had never wronged. He was at least entitled to something more than a bare refuge in the Reserve, coupled with a lecture and a warning that if he did not behave himself there, he would be turned out. Lord Derby said that opinion was hopelessly divided as to the degree of blame to be assigned to each Chief and Party; but as regards Usibepu, the witnesses in his favour were Sir Henry Bulwer and Mr. Osborn, while the only witnesses against him were entirely irresponsible persons. Surely, then, Her Majesty's Government might attach the most weight to the testimony of their own officers, especially when one of them was a gentleman of such high character and so much experience as Sir Henry Bulwer. Next, as to the question of appointing Commissioners on the Eastern border of the Transvaal, the 2nd Article of the new Convention stipulated that the South African Republic should appoint Commissioners, whose duties should be to guard against trespassing over the border. Whether such Commissioners had been appointed he did not know, nor did it matter much, for the Boer Commissioners would be pretty certain to ignore their duties. But the 2nd Article of the Convention also provided that, if necessary, Commissioners were to be appointed by Her Majesty's Government, to maintain order and prevent encroachments. If, then, disorder and anarchy constituted necessity, surely there had been more than enough of both to justify the appointment of Commissioners. Again, the 12th Article of the Convention recognized the independence of the Swazis; and he believed their territory to be in imminent danger of absorption by the Boers. In the spring of the present year, Sir Hercules Robinson and the Resident at Pretoria had pressed on the Secretary of State the need and advantages of a British Agency among the Swazis. Lord Derby admitted that there might be advantages in such an Agency, and directed that the King of the Swazis should be asked whether he would defray the cost of it. If the Secretary of State meant to do nothing, why did he put that question to the Swazi King? Why raise false hopes? On the other hand, if the establishment of a British Agency in the Swazi territory was a good thing, why was it not done? What were they waiting for? Waiting till it was too late? With regard to the consequences of postponing action, he would remind the House that in the middle of last July the Under Secretary stated, in reply to a Question, that such an event as the establishment of a new Boer Republic in Zululand was a thing of the future. That was a reason for doing nothing. But the sequel proved it to be a thing of an exceedingly near future, and it was now a thing of the past—an accomplished fact. That, he supposed, was an equally cogent reason for doing nothing. The creation of this new Republic in Zululand raised considerations of vital importance for the future of South Africa. He understood it to be the view of Her Majesty's Government that this Republic was set up, as it were, at the invitation of the Zulus; that the Boer adventurers were invited to come and were given a vast tract of country as the price of Usibepu's destruction. We might be sure, however, that if the establishment of this Boer Republic in Zululand were contemplated by us with tacit acquiescence, other Republics of similar character would spring into life, with the open or secret encouragement of the Transvaal authorities. No one could cling any longer to the belief that the Transvaal Government would ever take honest measures to prevent trespassing; and Boer marauders had never had the slightest difficulty in trumping up these so-called invitations, because, if the actual Chief of a district objected to their presence, they set up a rival and pretender, from whom they professed to have received grants of land in return for their recognition of him as paramount Chief. The Boers created a disturbance, and then they announced that the disturbance demanded their intervention in the interests of humanity and peace. Let us realize that acquiesence in the establishment of these Republics was virtually the surrender of South Africa to the Boers. They wanted to get down to the sea, and they would soon seize the Amatonga country as well as the Swazi country. With the Boers on the sea in the East, and the German Settlement at Angra Pequena in the West, he apprehended that, difficult as had been the management of South African affairs in the past, it would be a good deal more difficult in the future. There were some in this country, he knew, who looked upon the expansion of the Boers in South Africa with indifference, if not with positive satisfaction, and who seemed to think that their rule was beneficial rather than otherwise to the Natives. Those views, he, for one, could not share, and he still leaned to the hope that the policy of Her Majesty's Government in South Africa would be inspired by a desire to maintain there the Sovereign authority and supremacy of the British Power.

SIR FREDERICK MILNER

said, it seemed to him that Her Majesty's Government were to be subjected to a very severe cross-fire from both sides of the House. It was difficult for an Englishman to speak of South African affairs without a feeling of intense bitterness and contempt for those who were responsible for their present unsatisfactory condition. It would be his object, in dealing with this question, to avoid all bitterness and partizanship. His object in rising was to draw the attention of the House to the murder of Mr. Bethell; but, before doing so, he desired to allude to what the Prime Minister the other night, in reply to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, said with regard to South Africa. He said— The right hon. Gentleman has referred with a just reserve to the subject of South Africa. My hon. Friend the Mover of the Address aimed, I think, at depicting what he deemed to be a just position on this subject—namely, that we ought to make up our own minds as to that which we deem to be necessary, either for the honour or for the just interests of the country; and, having made up our minds, to adhere firmly to the intention so formed. That is, I believe, a perfectly accurate description of the present position. In framing the Convention of 1884, we certainly endeavoured to proceed on the lines of moderation; but that was with the view that, having proceeded on those lines, the stipulations contained in that Convention must be respected, and it would be our duty both ourselves to adhere to them, and likewise to expect, and if necessary require, that they should be adhered to by others. He thought the House would agree with him that these were noble sentiments, and, if strictly acted up to, he had no doubt that they might speedily anticipate a satisfactory settlement of the present chaos in South Africa. But he ventured, with all due deference, to assert that the Prime Minister had enunciated many noble sentiments in his time which had, alas! remained sentiments only to the present day, and they could only hope most sincerely that he really did mean business this time. It seemed to him that if the Government had only made up their minds in 1881, after the disgraceful truce following the defeat of our troops at Majuba Hill—if they had only made up their minds as to what they deemed necessary for the honour and just interests of the country, and having done so, if they had adhered to the intention so formed, the Convention of 1884 would never have been required; but, on the contrary, the original Convention would have been enforced to the letter, the rights of the loyal Natives would have been respected, and South Africa would have been spared the horrors of the past three years. He trusted he was right in thinking that the Government had at length realized the necessity for prompt and vigorous action; but he confessed he, like the hon. Member who introduced the debate, had read with regret the paragraph in Her Majesty's Speech dealing with the affairs in the Transvaal, and instead of reading that Her Majesty was engaged in considering the means which might be required to secure the faithful observance of the Convention of the present year, he wished they could have read that Her Majesty had decided to send out Sir Charles Warren as High Commissioner to insure that the terms of the Convention of 1884 were rigorously carried out. He was sick of hearing what the Government were going to do; he longed to see the time when they would act with promptitude and vigour. It seemed to him a great pity that Her Majesty's Government, having once decided the line to be taken, should not have left it more to competent men on the spot to carry out, in the best possible way, what they had decided to be necessary for the honour and just interests of the country. He was very much struck by an extract he read in a Radical paper the other day, which bore him out strongly in this view by saying— Three-fourths of our difficulties all the world over arise from our ignoring the self-evident fact that any sensible man on the spot, in a position of responsibility, is much more likely to be right than a dozen gentlemen sitting round a green table in Downing Street, who are preoccupied with other affairs, and know next to nothing about the local conditions of the case with which they are called upon to deal. Turning to the object for which he rose, and about which he put a Question in the House on Monday last—the murder of Mr. Bethell—as a representative of his family, he had been requested to bring the subject to the notice of Parliament, and place before the House and the Government what he hoped they would consider the most reasonable demands of his family. He had got the facts supplied from a letter by Mr. Bethell's brother. Mr. Christopher Bethell went to South Africa in the early part of 1878, and soon after his arrival joined the Diamond Field Force under Sir Charles, then Colonel, Warren. He served through the operations in Griqualand West and Bechuanaland, and was then sent by Sir Charles Warren to Bechuanaland, as Intelligence Officer, to reside with Montsioa, Chief of the Baralongs, and Sir Charles Warren had borne testimony to his services and his abilities. Early in 1880 the post of Intelligence Officer was abolished; but Mr. Bethell remained with Montsioa, and became his agent and adviser. It was hardly necessary for him to remind the House that Montsioa had long been a faithful ally of ours. Before 1880 he was actually protected by us. In our Transvaal troubles in 1881 he not only protected our friends who escaped from the Boers, but offered Sir George Colley material assistance. The Convention of 1881 made him an immediate neighbour of the Transvaal Republic; but he was assured by our Government that the boundary should be respected, and that we should not forget the rights of our faithful allies. Mr. Bethell remained with Montsioa, as he had said, to the interest of Montsioa and the welfare of the Native tribes. As Montsioa's agent, it became his duty to report to the authorities that the Boers were not observing the Convention, but raiding across the borders and stealing cattle. The aggressions went on unceasingly, and it was mainly owing to his support that Montsioa and his people were enabled in some degree to keep off his robber neighbours. This was no exaggerated statement, as was known to anyone who was conversant with the affairs of Bechuanaland. They knew that Montsioa, immediately after Mr. Bethell's death, succumbed in despair to his foes. The Boer filibusters had an intense dread of Mr. Bethell, and regarded him with almost superstitious awe in consequence of his miraculous escapes. He knew for a fact that for some 12 months before Mr. Bethell's death a price of 5,000 dollars was set on his head by the Boers. Towards the end of last July the filibusters crossed the boundary in force, and collected a quantity of cattle. On July 31, anxious to bring on a battle, they drove their capture in sight of Montsioa's kraal. Mr. Bethell led the Natives, who went out to recapture the cattle. In the fight that took place he was badly wounded, and left lying on the ground, the Natives being defeated with great loss. He was found by two or more Boers, who taunted him with having at last fallen into their hands, and presently shot him dead—murdered him as he lay. Shortly before his death Mr. Bethell was appointed by Mr. Mackenzie Acting Chief of the Frontier Police, and was recommended to the proper authorities for the regular appointment. He was thus a Government officer in the execution of his duty when he was murdered. He was also an Englishman, who fought to uphold British faith—who fought, in short, as most of his countrymen would admit, for the honour of our Flag. From another account supplied him by Bethell's brother, now at the Cape, it appeared that he was wounded while herocially endeavouring to rescue Montsioa's son, who was left wounded on the ground. Such was a short account of this brave man's career in South Africa, and he thought the House would agree with him when he said they had lost as gallant a hero as ever bore the name of Englishman. There was something to him inexpressibly touching in this brave man's death. In the fulness of his youth and vigour of his manhood, he gave up his friends, his prospects, the comforts of civilization, and made his lot with these half-savage tribes. And what for? Simply because he recognized the duty that was due from England to them, and, like the gallant Gordon in the Soudan, he determined to do his duty by these Native tribes, and leave to the English Government the indelible disgrace of having deserted them. Bethell was absolutely worshipped by every Native in Bechuanaland. They looked upon him as their saviour and only friend, and among the Colonists he was universally liked. In a notice which appeared in a Cape Town paper in a deep mourning border, it was said— The late Mr. Bethell was a courteous gentleman and of great promise. He made friends wherever he went, and it filled the hearts of many here with deep sorrow when they heard that one they loved so well had been sent to his grave thus early in his life in this cruel way. His relatives at home have the deepest sympathies from the people here, and knowing as we do how strong Colonel Warren's affection for his late nephew was, we tender to him our sincere condolence. He submitted to the House what he trusted the Government would consider the reasonable demands of his family. In the first place, they demanded the arrest and trial of his murderers. They did this in no vindictive feeling, but simply in the interest of justice and humanity. The only piece of recrimination in which he would indulge was in saying it seemed to him a most extraordinary thing that Her Majesty's Government should have allowed all this time to elapse without taking any steps which would have appeared palpably necessary to take in order to avenge the death of this noble man. The whole circumstances of the case were well known to his family before the end of August, and had he known the Government had not the same power of obtaining information as the family had, they would have been only too glad to have supplied them with the full facts which would have justified them in taking immediate and prompt action. This was no ordinary crime—not a murder committed in the heat of passion or under the influence of drink—but a deliberate, cold-blooded, brutal murder of a brave man, lying wounded and helpless on the field of battle; and he thought the House would agree with him that a more atrocious crime could not possibly have been committed, and that the common interests of justice demand that the murderers should be delivered up. In the second place, they asked that the death of Mr. Bethell might accomplish that for which he gave his life. They asked that the Government even now at the eleventh hour might do their duty to those Natives who had been loyal and true to them in their hour of need. They asked that the Government would insist upon the restoration of their land and compensation, as far as possible, for the cattle that had been taken away from them, and that the Government should make preparations for defending them in future from the incursions of their rapacious neighbours. It had been urged that to do this would involve an enormous amount of expenditure, and probably a great loss of human life. Even if it were so, he maintained that it was England's duty to do it. But he thought the Government had altogether mistaken the character of the Boers. Certain enthusiasts had described them as most devotional, God-fearing, psalm-singing, pastoral people, who cared for nothing but living peacefully and quietly on their farms. As a matter of fact, from information he had received from residents there, the opinion he had formed of them was that they were the most bloodthirsty, treacherous race that ever disgraced the civilized world. He could give authentic accounts of barbarities and ants of cruelty they had practised which would shock hon. Members, and he never respected more the discernment of his hon. Friend the Lord Mayor of London—one of the most hospitable Lord Mayors that ever did the honours at the Mansion House—than when he refused to receive at his table the delegates of this blood-stained race. But in addition to this, he had it on the best authority—namely, that of Mr. Bethell himself — that the Boers, when once tackled, were the most arrant cowards, as bullies were generally known to be; and he was perfectly certain of this, that if once England were to show a firm front and to let them know we were not going to stand any nonsense, they would knuckle down and give very little further trouble. It was the position of irresolution which Her Majesty's Government had taken up since they had been in Office that had induced those men to treat us as so much dirt. However, he did not wish to enter now into a general discussion of our policy in the Transvaal. Our Colonies were now thoroughly aroused, and there was no doubt that the Government had at last realized that proper action must be taken. God knew that he had not brought this matter forward in any way from Party feeling, and no one would rejoice more than himself if the Government would now at the eleventh hour recognize their duties and win back the respect they had lost. He had endeavoured to place before the House an absolutely accurate account of the life and death of this brave English officer, who sacrificed his life in vindication of English honour, and he trusted the Government would not think him unreasonable in what he had asked. He had demanded that, in common justice, those devils in human shape who perpetrated this atrocious and abominable crime should at once be given up to justice; and, for the rest, he could assure the House that nothing could help more to soothe the grief of the relations and friends of brave Christopher Bethell, than if they knew that by his death he had been the means of obtaining that for which he so cheerfully sacrificed his prospects, his comforts, and his life—namely, the recognition by England of the rights, services, and claims of those loyal Native tribes among whom he lived, and for whose sake he died.

MR. CROPPER

said, that, in common with all Members on his side of the House, he sympathized with the last speaker in what he had said, as a public man and as a relative, of the sad death of Mr. Christopher Bethell, of which the country had heard with feelings of regret and indignation, and whose career seemed to have been distinguished by so much bravery and so much devotion to the Native tribes. We were accustomed to find brave men in the Public Service; but it was not common to find men so devoted, not only to their duty, but also to the rights of men whose skins were dark, and whose circumstances were so different from ours, and in whose cause they were willing to live and to die. He should be supported by both sides of the House in expressing sympathy with his relatives, the two Members for York. It was, perhaps, useless to echo the complaint that the Blue Book had been delivered that morning, and that there had not been time to study it. With respect to Mr. Mackenzie, he confessed he had not heard with any great feelings of hope of the appointment of that gentleman as Military Superintendent in Bechuanaland, for he thought it always well that Missionaries should not rise, or, he would say, fall, from their true position as teachers of religion to offices that required the use of force and involved the possibilities of bloodshed. It was to be regretted, however, that when Mr. Mackenzie did accept that position there was but slight attention paid by Her Majesty's Government to his absolute necessities. On the 26th of June he applied to Sir Hercules Robinson that his small force should be raised to 100 men, and that £5,000 should be sent to him. [Mr. EVELYN ASHLEY: It was sent.] The statement of the hon. Gentleman was the best answer that could be made to his observation, but it was unfortunate that the fact was not mentioned in the Blue Book; and it did not appear, at all events, that Mr. Mackenzie had received the 100 men whom he required. It did not appear in what circumstances or under what compulsion Mr. Mackenzie had resigned, and it was to be hoped something would be done for him by the Government he had tried to serve. He trusted they would hear what the Government intended to do with regard to the protection of the line between the boundary of Montsioa and that of the Boers. Unless there was a show of force the Convention with the Boers would not be sufficient to protect us and the Natives from constant encroachment. Having entered into the Convention, and made a determined demand for a trade route and a delimitation of territory, we must not shrink back from the position we had taken on account of an expense which would be insignificant compared with what we were incurring in the North of Africa. If Sir Charles Warren was sent out, he ought to be assured that he should not be deserted, but that he should be upheld in the demands he was expected to make on the Boers. He knew nothing personally of the Boers; but he had heard from many eye-witnesses what manner of men they were. From conversation with the learned Missionary, Dr. Moffat, and others, he was assured that the Boers were inveterate slave-holders, and that they acted with intolerable arrogance to any whom they could in any way tyrannize over. It was said the Boers had a great respect for the Bible; but he was afraid it was the respect of the South American slave-owner, whose favourite text was—"Cursed be Canaan." In the ultimate result all these questions must be dealt with by the Cape Colony. He did not think we should suffer because the Germans took an adjacent strip of territory; but if the Cape Colony joined with us in preventing any tyranny over the Black races, or the aggression of the Boers upon territories which we had said belonged to others, we must encourage and support the Cape Colony. He trusted to hear from the Front Bench that we could not go on temporizing, and would act decisively. Let it not be said that they entered into Conventions and made demands, but that the moment anyone was bold enough to violate the Convention and refuse the demands, they shrunk into their shell and feared to enforce their rights. As to the delay in producing the Correspondence, it was idle to say there was any difficulty in finding the labour required to print and issue a few sheets of paper.

MR. R. N. FOWLER (LORD MAYOR)

said, he had listened with great pleasure to the speech of the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Wodehouse). The hon. Member not only expressed the views entertained by the Opposition, but he hoped by many hon. Members on the Ministerial side. He (Mr. R. N. Fowler) could scarcely pretend that he had mastered the Papers issued only that morning; but he wished to call the attention of the Under Secretary for the Colonies to the despatch in page 1, from which it appeared that the Transvaal Government had demanded that their affairs should be transferred from the hands of the Colonial to those of the Foreign Office. A similar demand was made by them in 1872 or 1873, and refused by Lord Granville and Lord Kimberley, who were then Foreign and Colonial Secretaries of State; and he hoped Her Majesty's Government would pursue the same course on the present occasion. But this demand was an illustration of the impertinence of these Boers, who wanted us to deal with them as if they were a great European Power. They originally crept Northward, because 50 years ago they were angered by the abolition of slavery. They were essentially a slaveholding Republic, and they did not seem to have made any advance in 50 years, but were just as cruel and bloodthirsty as ever they were. He did not doubt but that up and down in the Transvaal State there were many excellent people who wished to live peacefully with the Natives around them; but the misfortune was that these were not the class of people who had the control of the State. The Government of the Transvaal and its most active supporters were men who thought it was their right to treat the Natives like cattle as long as they were useful, and when they ceased to be useful considered themselves at liberty to murder them if they pleased. He had received a letter that morning suggesting that as the Government were sufficiently restored to a sense of their duty, to direct steps to be taken for the punishment of the murderers of Mr. Bethell, it would be desirable also to press for the punishment of the murderers of Captain Elliot, who were acquitted by a jury of Boers and went about the country boasting of it. The truth was the Boers did not think it a crime to murder Natives, and they had scarcely more regard for the lives of White men. The great mistake which this country made was the surrender of Pretoria. It might not have mattered under other circumstances; but the great misfortune was that we gave it up after a defeat. It was all very well for the Prime Minister to talk in an election address of "blood-guiltiness," and for other Members of the Government to speak of their magnanimity; but the Boers did not believe in their magnanimity. They believed simply that the British Government had given way because they were defeated. Nothing went more to his heart when travelling across the Free State than to hear the conversation of the Boers on that point. They said—"It is all very well for the English to say that they could have gone on. They made peace because they were thoroughly beaten." No doubt, that impression was stronger in the Transvaal For his own part, he deplored the fact that when we were actually prepared to have given the Boers a lesson, and had 10,000 men on the spot, we drew back and made peace. After that great and fatal error, it was hopeless to expect to do anything with these people until we had impressed them with the conviction that we were not to be tampered with. As it was, they believed we were beaten, that we were afraid of them, and that they could set us at defiance; and unless we sent out troops we should not dispossess them of that idea. He had as great horror of war as anyone, but if ever there was a righteous war it was that in which we were engaged with the Transvaal. We were carrying on a war against one of the most wicked and degraded races under the sun. One of the most pathetic events that ever occurred was the demonstration of the Natives on hearing that they were to be transferred from the Sovereignty of the Queen to the tender mercies of the Boers. He was thankful that the Opposition side of the House had no responsibility for that. They supported the Motion of his right hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), and thus entered their protest against this disgraceful surrender. He would also acknowledge that it was owing to the stand made by Lord Derby in the cause of humanity that the Boer delegates went back without attaining all they had expected. Still, the Boers thought that the British Government would not enforce Treaties, and, therefore, they were determined to put an end to their obligations. The time had now come when it was the duty of the House to insist that Her Majesty's Government should adopt a firm and decided policy on this subject. It was of no use sending out Sir Charles Warren unless we supplied him with a force of police, and, if necessary, with troops, and placed funds at his disposal. The Boers not only believed we were afraid of them, but they trusted to the support they knew they would receive from certain Members of Her Majesty's Government. He saw present on the Treasury Bench a right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Chamberlain) who had been a defender of the Boer Republic. He was sorry not to see there the Secretary to the Treasury, the hon. Member for Liskeard (Mr. Courtney), who recently took occasion in addressing his constituents to throw doubts upon the stories that reflected on the Boers, and did the best he could for his old clients. He apprehended that the hon. Gentleman did not think it would be pleasant to be in his place on that occasion. Although he was sure the Prime Minister would have heard with pleasure the able speech of the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Wodehouse), it would have been anything but a good, quarter of an hour to the Secretary to the Treasury.

MR. GLADSTONE

observed, that it needed no ingenious hypothesis to explain the absence of the Secretary to the Treasury, who worked very hard all day in his Office.

MR. R. N. FOWLER (LORD MAYOR)

said, he quite admitted the industry of the hon. Gentleman, but thought he might have spared time for this debate. However, the point was that the support which the Boers received in high quarters induced them to set at defiance what was said in the House of Commons or by Sir Hercules Robinson. He could only say that he hoped, now the public were becoming alive to the course which had been taken by the Boer Republic, and to the class of men that the Boers were, they would demand of the House of Commons and of the Government that they should pursue a bold and fearless policy, which would restrain any further atrocities of the Boers in South Africa.

SIR DONALD CURRIE

said, he was glad the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was present at that debate, because he (Sir Donald Currie) was convinced that when facts were brought to the right hon. Gentleman's knowledge, he would give his own special care and attention to the subject. It was well known to the country that after the Transvaal War the argument of the Prime Minister was that the Ministry had been misled in the information conveyed to them by their agents, but upon being correctly informed as to the position of affairs in South Africa, the Government at once took action. The position in South Africa at the present moment was critical, and he would even say perilous. All that we had heard from that country was of the most serious import; and he did not speak too seriously when he affirmed that, in view of the weak condition of our Navy, at no time in the history of this country had our position in South Africa as a Maritime Power required more earnest and careful consideration, and it was to this he ventured to bring the consideration of this House, apart altogether from Party considerations. The condition of affairs in South Africa was grave, excessively grave, commercially, socially, and politically, owing to the Imperial course of proceeding towards South Africa for 30 years past, and notably in the last 10 years—nay, since we gave responsible government to the Cape in 1872—had been of the most serious and embarrassing character. With regard to responsible government, we had pressed it on the Cape, and it was only accepted by a majority of 1. He would confine himself to the national interests involved in the policy which the House was to affirm, or the Government were to adopt and carry out. If he had a policy in his business, he carried it out; and if the Government decided upon a policy, they ought to carry it out. The policy of this country should be consistent with our obligations; and he would confine himself specially to Zululand, for with regard to Bechuanaland quite enough had been said. We were so inconsistent! We were now imperilling Swaziland, to which country the Boers claimed to have a right. The Amaswazis had been always friendly to this country, and they had supplied the men who had enabled Sir Garnet, now Lord, Wolseley to gain the battle against Secocoeni. They were now likely to be absorbed by the Boers—in the first instance attacked by freebooters from Natal, the Free State, and the Transvaal. The late Government—he would not provoke Party dispute—thought it wise to throw over Cetewayo's friendship, although the Zulus never once had attacked us, but looked to us as their protectors and friends. He remembered the late President of the Transvaal, Mr. Burgers, when he was in this country, living with him (Sir Donald Currie), snowing him a letter, which he could find in no Blue Book, sent to that gentleman by the Colonial Minister of the day containing Cetewayo's proposal to Sir Garnet Wolseley to allow him to attack the Boers. He also saw the letter which Sir Garnet Wolseley then wrote, and which also he could not find in any Blue Book, advising him to do nothing of the sort, and Cetewayo refrained; and yet, afterwards, our Government declared war against the Zulus, after arbitration with respect to disputed border grazing lands claimed by the Boers. War broke out, and Cetewayo was beaten; and then what did the Zulus do? Had they ever once since the war turned upon us? With the bravery which characterized them as a nation, they acknowledged they were beaten, and asked us to govern them, and we refused. But that was not all. Not only did we not take care of them, but we handed them over to be ruled by a dozen Chiefs — a policy which had proved an utter failure, as might have been foreseen. Over and over again the Zulus had asked us—both the late and the present Governments—for fair play; but were told by the Colonial Office that we could not interfere, although they had proved to demonstration how unjustly they had been treated, particularly by John Dunn, who it was stated in the Blue Books just published had 1,700 odd Royal cattle as his prize, a short time after the battle of Ulundi. Was that justice to these people? They had asked us to govern them, and Sir Henry Bulwer, it now appeared, had urged upon Lord Derby to arrange for the government of Central Zululand. Three months ago, he (Sir Donald Currie) had asked the Prime Minister in that House whether the Government would take measures to secure good government in Zululand, and to prevent further bloodshed and robbery, out of regard to our credit and honour, for we were largely responsible for the unhappy condition of that country. Talk about Afghanistan and the break up of that country through our interference! The people in Zululand were starving, and many thousands of them had died through starvation and internecine war. This was typical of this phase of our policy—that we interfered in foreign lands, and then left the people to settle their own affairs. That was a cruel policy, and he claimed now, on behalf of the Zulus, that they were entitled to our protection. Sir Henry Bulwer had warned the Government that unless firmness was shown, now that the Boors had joined the Zulus, in a short time most serious dangers would arise to English interests in South Africa. What was to be the effect on the Reserve, now that we had decided to restrict our power there? The population of Natal was some 20,000 Whites, men, women, and children, with 400,000 Natives and refugee Zulus; and if there were to be some 300,000 more thrust in, without any unoccupied land to settle them on, they were going to have, as sure as they lived, in the future, in Zululand much more serious complications than they had in Bechuanaland. He would tell the House what had been said to him by the late President of the Transvaal, when he (Sir Donald Currie) disputed the right of the Boers to interfere with the Swazi tribe. The late President claimed that the Zulus had given a certain power and right to the Boers in the Transvaal in respect to St. Lucia Bay. Now, if the freebooters went to St. Lucia Bay, and if the Germans were to develop still further their claims to Angra Pequena and that district, we should be in this position, that the whole territory, East and West, might come under the influence of those who might be inimical to our interests in South Africa. That was a matter of serious import to us. Seven years ago it was proposed to Prince Bismarck that he should take the Protectorate of the Transvaal. With the French on the Eastern side of South Africa, and in some way or other influential in Madagascar, he wanted to know where was our security for the ocean route to India? And we should bear in mind that the White population in South Africa were estranged by our policy; the Natives would cease to have confidence in us; and the Germans, as well as the French, had interests different from ours. The Prime Minister wrote an article in The, Nineteenth Century strongly in favour of the Cape route to India, and he (Sir Donald Currie) attached more importance to that than to the Suez Canal, which, at any moment, might be shut up in a state of war. He thought it would be most difficult for this country to maintain its communications through the Suez Canal if at war with a Naval Power such as France, possessing Tunis on the one side and Toulon on the other. In the event of a war, what was to be the position of this country if they were to be debarred from reaching India and Australia through the Canal, or of taking the Cape route in safety? He had no desire to aggravate our dangers by stimulating panic; but he had told his constituents, three years ago, that nothing but a grievous disaster would waken up this country to our naval and military position and the risks to our Colonial and Eastern Empire. Speaking on behalf of the Zulus and South Africans in general—both the Black races and the White — he claimed that the Government, for whom no one in that House would doubt his friendship, should frame and make up their minds to carry out a clear, a firm, and a distinct policy. That claim he made in the national interest. He did not hesitate in Perth, the other day, in closing the speeches which it was his duty to deliver to his constituency on the extension of the franchise, to urge that, by a calm consideration on the part of both Parties, the question of electoral reform might be settled, because there were large and important Imperial questions waiting to be dealt with by that House; and if Ministers, instead of being wearied to death by fatiguing Questions and unnecessary delays, were allowed time to attend to their business, the Government might then have an opportunity of carrying out a settled policy which would promote the interests of this great Empire.

MR. GUY DAWNAY

said, he was well aware that owing to a recent and, as he hoped, culminating atrocity in Bechuanaland, that was the part of South Africa which especially engaged the attention of the country at this moment; but though he hoped later to make some comments on that subject himself, he wished first to touch briefly on matters relating to another portion of the country, which should not be lost sight of in any debate dealing with Boer aggression. He thought that the House must have noticed with some surprise that there was no mention in the Queen's Speech of Zulu matters, no reference to all the mess and muddling and murdering there, and the absence of such mention was emphasized by the special manner in which the South-Western Frontier of the Transvaal had been singled out, as though it was the only portion of South Africa which was to be favoured with that "vigilant attention" which had been so long and hitherto so vainly called for. Before, however, entering into the state of things which existed in that country, he should like to raise his protest against the unfortunate position in which the House was again placed owing to the absence of Papers and Blue Books on the subject. If, at the commencement of last Session, the Papers had been ready and the House had been able to take the discussion on the state of Zululand on the Address, instead of having to postpone it until a later period of the Session, a far more general and adequate interest would have been aroused in the subject, much of the deplorable condition of affairs which now existed might have been prevented; and, certainly, to take one point, Usibepu would never have been allowed to be driven—by the help of the Boers, and after the slaughter of a great portion of his tribe—from the territory which he ruled by our appointment, and in a manner which Sir Henry Bulwer allowed gave him claims on our assistance. It surely might be possible to distribute these Papers a week or more before the Session, in order that Members might avail themselves of the opportunity—often the only opportunity, always the earliest and most legitimate opportunity—of bringing important questions before the House in the discussions on the Address. He had, for example, only been furnished with Blue Books on South Africa about two hours before the meeting of the House, and they only carried the story down to the 23rd of July. Failing other information, he must trust to the Under Secretary for the Colonies to answer some questions with regard to Zululand. In answer to one that he had addressed to the hon. Gentleman a few days ago, he had been told that the Reserve was in a most "satisfactory" condition. That was easily comprehended when they remembered that the previous "unsatisfactory" state had meant that our Resident Commissioner in the Reserve had had to fight for his life against the Usutus; that on another time a party of our Border Watch had been attacked by Usutus, and out of eight men, three had been killed and three wounded; and, finally, that these Usutus had actually crossed into Natal and had fought with Natal Kaffirs, and in another case had fired on and wounded a Natal Native on Natal soil. They could now hear that the state of the Reserve was more satisfactory, without having to strain their capacity for gratitude to the Government for the comparative order that might now prevail. It was, however, with regard to Usibepu, and the intentions of Her Majesty's Government towards him, that he especially wished now to inquire. No one could read Lord Derby's despatch, on the concluding page of the Blue Book, without an uncomfortable suspicion that we had behaved very meanly to that Chief, and the closer the perusal of the preceding pages, the more fully that suspicion would be converted into certainty. As far as he could see, the Colonial Office gathered all their information upon Zulu affairs from and through Sir Henry Bulwer. They accepted his promise, but invariably refused to act upon his conclusions. They refused to listen to him with regard to the restoration of Cetewayo. They refused to listen to his representations with regard to the danger of allowing the Boers to join the Usutu Party against Usibepu; and the consequence was that we had now a new Boer Republic to deal with, and we had lost the powerful and friendly Chief who would have maintained the balance of Zulu power. As Lord Derby—in order to excuse the meanness of his treatment—had thought fit to make very grave reflections on the conduct of Usibepu, he (Mr. Guy Dawnay) must ask the House to be allowed to call Sir Henry Bulwer to witness to the conduct and character of that Chief, and to the frequency with which the Government had been warned of the injustice and folly of abandoning him. On May 6, Sir Henry Bulwer wrote to Lord Derby in these words— If the Boers do join the Usutu Party' it is certain he will not be able to hold his own against such a combination. He will be destroyed, and his destruction will involve that of his people, the finest and bravest in Zululand. His destruction will be wholly undeserved; for whatever may have been said by the Usutu Party, and by those who have so ill-advised that Party, Usibepu took up arms only in self-defence, and to hold the territory which was assigned to him, and with no object of conquest or self-aggrandisement, as has been plainly shown since his success at Ulundi, in July of last year. His destruction will be altogether unmerited, and I do not hesitate to say it will be the greatest misfortune to the Zulu country. A great portion of the country will pass away from the Zulu people, and the remainder, with the exception of the Reserve, will under the Usutu dynasty come sooner or later under the domination of the Boers. On these accounts, then, for the sake of the Reserve, for the sake of Usibepu, and I may say for the sake of the Zulu people themselves, I venture to submit that there should be some interposition on our part. On May 8, Sir Henry Bulwer again wrote— It will, indeed, be a cruel case, if the Usutus, with the aid of a Boer force, are able to defeat Usibepu. He will not deserve his fate, and his fate will be a reproach upon us in the Native mind which it will not be easy to remove. I would, therefore, trust that some interposition on our part may yet be in time to avert that fate, and the further consequences that will result from it, for there can be no doubt that we shall feel the effect, when once we have lost so brave and loyal a friend of the English Government. Three weeks later, then, the Boer alliance was no longer a matter of doubt. Sir Henry Bulwer made a final appeal for action on the part of the Government— The position in which Usibepu is placed by the alliance of the Boers with the Usutus, and by the declaration of their intention to attack him should he not recognize Dinuzulu, is indeed deplorable. He appeals—and he has some claim to appeal—to us for our assistance, but we are unable to give him any. Finally, after Usibepu had been routed by the Boers, and his tribe given up to slaughter at the hands of the Usutus, Sir Henry Bulwer made a final remonstrance to Lord Derby, on June 16— It is impossible to regard without feelings of the greatest pain and concern the ruin that has thus been brought upon the Chief Usibepu. He was placed and left in the position of an independent Chief by us. He has always looked upon himself as belonging to the Government, and has always shown himself a loyal friend to the Government. Immediately after Cetewayo's restoration he became, because of his independence, the object of the fiercest hate of the Usutu leaders. His territory was invaded by a formidable Usutu force two months after Cetewayo's restoration. The invaders were driven back with prodigious loss. But the event was the beginning of a long series of conflicts which ended in the destruction of "Ulundi and the flight of Cetewayo. That "Usibepu punished and spoiled those who attacked him is unquestionable; but he never Bought to take advantage of his successes or to extend his rule. His desire was to be left alone and in peace in the territory over which he had been placed, and when he was forced into action it was, with few exceptions, to resist the intrigues and attacks directed against him. Had we taken over Central Zululand for the benefit of the Zulu people, we should have found no more loyal neighbour or supporter than Usibepu. But we hesitated to do this; we left the country to take its chances. We left it in confusion and disorder, and the Usutus have made a bargain with the Boers which has brought about, on the plea of the restoration of order, this most undeserved fate on the head of a Chief who has proved himself to possess as chivalrous and gallant a nature as the history of the Zulu nation can show. As he had said, no one could read these despatches without coming to the conclusion that we had behaved very meanly towards that Chief. What were Lord Derby's excuses for his refusal to listen to Sir Henry Bulwer? That— Usibepu had often acted on his own responsibility. His recent defeat was the consequence of his victory in 1883, and of his ambitious projects of the present year, and Her Majesty's Government has never entered into any engagement to aid or to defend him. He (Mr. Guy Dawnay) denied that the recent defeat was the result of the victory in 1883. It was the result of being forbidden to follow up that victory, and because the Reserve had been used against him, as it was not allowed to be used by him, as a "focus for intrigues and plans of future retaliation." Lord Derby next asserted that the position in which Usibepu found himself "was the consequence of his ambitious projects;" but he (Mr. Guy Dawnay) should like very much to ask the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, what were the "ambitious projects of the present year" to which Lord Derby referred? What proof was there of any such thing? All he (Mr. Guy Dawnay) had been able to find in the Blue Book was the statement that a few days after the death of Cetewayo, and after he had just defeated two attacks of Usutus, he asked to be allowed to hold the ground he was then occupying in consequence of his defensive victories. When he was told that he could not be allowed to hold it, he at once acquiesced in the refusal. Therefore, one thing was quite clear — namely, that however much Her Majesty's Government might repudiate all responsibility in reference to him, they had, when it suited their purpose, never shrunk from exercising control over him. He admitted that, as was said in the despatch, Her Majesty's Government had never entered into any formal agreement to defend him if he were attacked, or assist him, and he never required any aid to defend himself against the Zulu Chiefs; but it was an undisputed fact that Her Majesty's Government had entered into a solemn engagement with the Boers that the Eastern Frontier of the Transvaal should not be violated by an invasion of Zululand; and they were bound, under the exceptional nature of the agreement, to see that that paragraph of the Convention was kept, and it was to the fact of their having permitted that engagement to be violated with impunity, that Usibepu owed his defeat, and not to any inability to hold his position as a Zulu Chief amongst the Zulus. Unless Her Majesty's Government put forward some better form of argument than the bare and unsupported assertions contained in Lord Derby's despatch, he maintained that the refusal to grant Usibepu any assistance or moral support could only be classed with the refusal to help Montsioa, and could only be looked upon as most discreditable to this country; and he was afraid that eventually this cowardly conduct on our part would entail upon us the same punishment, and be revenged upon the British taxpayer. He should also like to know what the views of the Government were as to the Proclamation of Dinazulu and Mr. Grant, and the cession of land to the Boers; and whether they considered, as Sir Hercules Robinson did, it was a mere attempt on the part of the Boers to repeat the story of Stellaland in Zululand; and whether, in that case, it was to be treated with remonstrance alone, or whether they would have to wait another 18 months before they heard that the "vigilant attention" of Her Majesty's Government was directed at last to the Eastern borders of Boerland? He need not say that he had not changed the views which he expressed in the debate on this question three months ago; but he did not know whether the Government had or had not retreated from the position—the indefensible position, as he considered it—which they had then taken in regard to the amount of their responsibility to the Zulus. He would only say that his opinions had had since then the endorsement of Sir Henry Bulwer, had been confirmed by subsequent facts, and he was afraid would also be justified by future events. He now desired to say a few words about the South-Western borders of the Transvaal, to which public attention had been called in so special a manner, owing to the horrible and inhuman circumstances attending the brutal murder of a gallant gentleman and a British officer. The word "murder" did not, in any adequate manner, describe the atrocity of those who did Mr. Bethell to death. It was not an act committed under the influence of any of those evil passions which ordinarily led to crime. Even among some savage nations a wounded and unresisting enemy excited a natural pity and sympathy; but to those brutes in human form, whose vileness and lust of blood and pillage they had so long allowed to reign supreme in Bechuanaland, a wounded officer lying helpless before them was but an unresisting prey on whom, with the greater security to their own cowardly carcases, they could wreak their hatred of Englishmen, and the innate brutality of their nature. He agreed with his hon. Friend the Member for York in his belief that Mr. Bethell, gallant as he was, and eager as he was in the cause of the Bechuanas, would have thought his life well given, if his death could serve to win, as he thought it had served to win, public attention to this question. It would indeed, be matter for the very deepest satisfaction, if they could only believe that the Government did seriously intend now to put their foot down, and had made up their minds at last to stand at bay, and to show to these Boers that there was a limit even to the humiliation to which we would allow ourselves to be subjected, and a limit to the outrages which we would permit to be inflicted upon our helpless Bechuana allies. He said "if they could believe;" but they could not but remember that paragraph in the Queen's Speech in 1881, in which, with all the authority and solemnity of a Speech from the Throne, in the most distinct and unambiguous language, it was announced that the Queen's authority should be vindicated. And they also recollected that that vindication meant Majuba Hill and the Convention between a beaten country and the victorious Boers. He could not, in passing, help saying that it would have been better for his own reputation, for the credit of this country, as well as for the happiness of many a bereaved and ruined home, if, before penning that paragraph in 1881, the Prime Minister had recollected a passage which he had been ready enough to remember on a recent, and, as it seemed to him, less decent occasion— Beware Of entrance to a quarrel; but, being in, Bear't that the opposed may beware of thee. He wondered that the Prime Minister could, with the memory of Majuba in his mind, have dared to quote, and threaten with, those words. They could not but recollect also that, in the autumn of 1881, the Prime Minister, speaking at Leeds, speaking with all the authority of his position as Prime Minister, declared urbi et orbi— Those men were mistaken, if such there were, who believed that because the Government had granted much to the Boers, it was to encourage them to ask for more. And they must remember that that announcement but heralded by a certain number of months the surrender of our Suzerainty over the Transvaal, and the fresh farce of replacing by a new and equally worthless piece of paper the tattered shreds of the old Convention. When these facts were remembered, he thought that they might be acquitted of any very blameworthy want of trust in Her Majesty's Ministers, or in the value of the present announcement, if they read without any exaggerated confidence that after repeated insults, after repeated violations of the Convention, after repeated acts of murder and depredation committed by the Boers, Her Majesty's Government had at last been so far stung and goaded to action that they had promised to give these matters their "vigilant attention." It was not these repeated insults that had aroused the Government. They had borne them with somewhat monotonous humility, and with more than Christian forbearance. It had not been the repeated breaches of the Convention, which the Boers seemed to have considered was made to give them greater opportunities to defy this country. It was not repeated acts of outrage, pillage, and murder—it was not even the brutal murder of a British officer in cold blood that had aroused the Colonial Office. Those at the Colonial Office would be more than human if, by this time, they could help having grown callous to the reports of such chronic crime. It was not this that had awakened the Government from their dishonourable lethargy and inaction; it was the voice of the people of this country, and of our most distant and far-separated Colonies; it was that feeling of indignation which had been excited in every English-speaking, English-feeling breast; it was that feeling which had been evoked by the eloquence, the sincerity, and patriotism of his right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), and of others who had dared to be as patriotic and as manly as himself. That was the real motive power in this matter, as well as the perception that not only was our honour at stake, but—and it was a very serious, though he trusted a secondary consideration—that our trade interests were also involved, and very seriously threatened. It was a point absolutely beyond contradiction that if the Boers in any manner once gained a footing in Bechuanaland, they would gain an entire control of the whole of the interior trade of Africa south of the Zambesi. Let any Government which so wantonly threw over the interests of our trade in that country reckon with the depressed artizans in our manufacturing towns. There was an old saying which they had often heard, and which, he thought, there was no disposition to contradict, that "Trade follows the flag." The flag of this country, as they knew but too well, had lately been obliged to be buried and concealed in Bechuanaland to save it from insult from the Boers. Trade would but too surely follow—he feared he might say was but too surely following that flag, and had already shown signs of diminution and decay—dying of our dishonour. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford had shown a desire to raise this question from the narrow, low level of Party politics. He (Mr. Guy Dawnay) would be glad if that could be done; but, after our previous experience on this subject, he was afraid it would, at least, be very hard so to raise it. This policy of the Government in reference to the Transvaal afforded no isolated instance of the action of the Government which they condemned. It was merely the most notorious instance of that "squeezability" which had, in fact, led to the coining of the word to express so constant an element in the Government policy—to designate that yielding to pressure which had distinguished—he would say which had disfigured—the whole page of their history. They had never, as a Party, wearied of pointing out the fatal results of this policy of surrender; and the very action of the Government at present—their doing in the autumn of 1884 what they had been begged to do—what they had been warned against not doing in the spring of 1883—was a sufficient witness to the justice of their criticism. On the other hand, those who ordinarily ranked themselves as the supporters of the Government had, with one or two notable and most honourable exceptions, ranked themselves as readily on this Transvaal question as on other points under the flag of their Party Chief, and had identified themselves with, and made themselves responsible for, the South African scheme. If ever there was a question in which Party feeling should be sunk, and in which national feeling should alone prevail, it was a great Imperial question like the present. On this question he believed there was staked, not only the fate of South Africa, but the future of our whole Colonial Empire. By their past action the Government had not only degraded and humiliated the name of England in the eyes of the Natives, by what they considered tame submission to defeat, by what was cowardly repudiation of our alliances, and abandonment of our Allies. They had not only taught the Boers that the Convention which they won at the muzzle of the rifle was but a term intended to salve the conscience and soothe the ear of those hon. Members who supported the Government, and who preferred the idea of signing a Convention to that of suing for peace; they had not only further taught them, in the words of the President of the Board of Trade, that the "Convention would not prevent its provisions being reconsidered, if they should prove at any time offensive to the Boers;" that it would not prevent the granting of a new Convention, to be again, in its turn, whittled into nothingness. It was not only that; but their past action had tended to show to all our Colonies throughout the world that for them the tide of Empire had turned, that the ebb of Empire had commenced, that the honour of England had become a matter of Votes and Budgets, and that Colonial loyalty and love for the Mother Country was only prized when it could be had on easy terms of gratis affection, without the chance of responsibility accruing in return. In conclusion, be would only ask the House to allow him to read a few words of a letter from Mr. Mackenzie recording the words ad dressed to him by a Bechuana Native, as they contained the best and briefest advice that could be offered to the Government. The letter was written by Mr. Markenzie from Vryburg in Stellaland on July 23 to a correspondent in England, and the paragraph he wished to bring to their notice was as follows:— I assure you the name of the Queen is still prized in many a hamlet in Bechuanaland. (It is wonderful it should be so.) One Chief, who, it had been said by the Boers in England, wanted to live under the rule of the Transvaal, sent a letter to meet me many miles from his town, to declare that he, too, would be under the Queen. 'Yours is by far the best Government' said another gray-headed man; 'but you have one great fault—you always go away when we want you most—Do not go away again.'

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

said, that South African debates were apt to be discursive, and he did not think that this discussion had been an exception to the rule, as he had been quite over-whelmed by the different questions referring to all parts of the world which he was called upon to deal with. He was also confronted by a great deal of inconsistency on the part of various speakers, and in no speech more so than in the eloquent one they had just heard. In that speech they had been appealed to to treat this matter simply and solely from the national and patriotic point of view; and yet that appeal had been prefaced and followed by as bitter an attack upon the Government for what it had done as any Party attack that had ever been made. Hon. Members ought not to take credit for appealing to the House to make a question a national and patriotic one, at the same time that they themselves made it a Party question. A crumb of comfort, however, he had, and that was that in none of the speeches had any fault been found with the action of the Government at the present moment, or since the last discussion that had taken place on South African affairs, with the exception that it was said they had not given sufficient support to Mr. Mackenzie; and therefore, he said the Government really and truly found themselves pretty well in accord with the House of Commons in the policy they were adopting. ["Oh, oh!"] In answer to the complaint of the hon. Baronet (Sir Henry Holland), he would repeat that he was exceedingly sorry that the Papers were not before the House; but he would point out to the hon. Member—and though he (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) was speaking as a comparatively young Member of the House, yet he was corroborated in what he was going to say by the authority of the Prime Minister—that it was a mistake to suppose that the occasion of the discussion on the Address in answer to the Speech from the Throne was to be looked upon as the opportunity for an exhaustive discussion on matters alluded to in the Speech. If it were to be so regarded, they must change the Rules and Regulations of the House with regard to printing. It had been said that the printing might have been done in the Recess; but no printing could be done in the House except by order of the officers of the House, and that could not be done when the House was not sitting. As far as the Colonial Office was concerned, they had done the best they could. If they were to consider in future that exhaustive debates were to take place on the Address upon Papers laid on the Table the day the House met, then they must alter the Rules which regulated the production of Papers. Before entering on the general question, he wished to say a few words about the speech of the hon. Baronet the Member for York City (Sir Frederick Milner), who had spoken as to the death of Mr. Bethell. He should be very sorry to allude to that subject without saying that he considered that gentleman had shown a gallantry and pluck quite worthy of the admiration of every one. It was clear that he had lost his life mainly by having waited behind to endeavour to save the life of a Native struck down by his side. Although it could not, of course, alter the brutal character of the treatment to which he was afterwards subjected by the filibusters, still it might be some consolation to the relatives of that gentleman to say that anyone who had read the account must say that his first wound must have been mortal, and that his life could not have been saved, even if the second shot had not been fired. He would now proceed to defend the Government against the charge of apathy and delay which had been brought againt them. He denied emphatically that the Colonial Office had shown any apathy in the matter, or that there had been unnecessary delay in taking steps to secure the apprehension of the murderers. What the hon. Baronet the Member for York City did not sufficiently realize was this—that if Her Majesty's Government were going to make a demand for the punishment or extradition of the murderers, they must know who they were, and be prepared with evidence to convict them, and to satisfy the Power to which they were making the request. Now, he asserted positively that, until this month, the Colonial Government did not know, and he did not believe that anyone in the country knew, that even the names of the murderers were known. Until that information was received, the mere knowledge that Mr. Bethell had been killed, and by unfair means, was not a ground on which they could approach any Government, and say—"We demand the extradition of the murderers." The answer, of course, would have been—"Who is it that you want?" They were now in a position to name the murderers, and prove who they were, and their guilt. It had been said, as an imputation against him, that he had talked about the legal difficulties that might arise. He would not enlarge upon that, because he did not wish to be told that he was puttings arguments in the mouth of the Transvaal Government. As a matter of fact, the question was not a simple one; it was very complicated, the territory on which Mr. Bethell was killed being neither British nor Transvaal territory. It was clear that the tribunals of the Transvaal would not be competent to try the case; and after the experience gained in the trial of Captain Elliot's murderers, he thought it just as well that the Transvaal tribunals should not try the case. There were similar difficulties in the way of extradition; and, in fact, the whole question was full of complications. His own opinion was that the best way to obtain justice would probably be to instruct the Commander of our Forces to get hold of them, and try them by court martial, for acts contrary to the usages of civilized warfare, when he should arrive in the locality. Whether that course should be taken or not was a question which other and different authorities must decide. Coming to the question of the Treaty, he had first to refer to two speakers that day, who had called upon the Government to account for the speeches of the Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Courtney), and the tentative opinions expressed therein. Well, he was not bound to answer for that hon. Member; but this he would say—that doubtless the Secretary to the Treasury was the only occupant of the Front Ministerial Bench who held the opinions which he had expressed. Now, as he had said, the great point that had been made by the hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst, in the course of the debate, was that Her Majesty's Government had not sufficiently supported Mr. Mackenzie. He heard with pleasure the sentence in the speech of the hon. Baronet the Member for York City in which he said that they ought to trust to the advice of people on the spot. That was exactly what they had done on this occasion. Ever since Mr. Mackenzie had been sent out they had consistently acted on Sir Hercules Robinson's advice, and they had not refused any request which he had made. The maximum police force said by Sir Hercules Robinson to be necessary was 100 men, and he had never recommended an increase in that number. The hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst referred to the telegram received on July 2 from Sir Hercules Robinson, in which he said—"Please authorize Treasury Chest to supply another £5,000 when required." As a matter of fact, the answer to the hon. Member's strictures in connection with that request was that it was complied with at once—the £5,000 was sent to Sir Hercules Robinson 10 days afterwards—a period which only afforded time enough to set the Treasury in motion.

SIR HENRY HOLLAND

That does not appear from the Papers.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

No. Then the hon. Member stated that no answer was given to the question asked by Sir Hercules Robinson in his telegram of June 26, in which he said— In this case the invasion, if it takes place, will be an act of impudent defiance of British authority, and the invaders should, I think, he expelled and punished at any risk or cost. Do you concur? The hon. Member said that the Government gave no answer to that.

SIR HENRY HOLLAND

explained that he had said that an answer was given, but an unsatisfactory one.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

said, that the answer which was sent by Lord Derby was as follows:— Her Majesty's Government approve your communication to the Government of the South African Republic, as well as the instructions which you have given to Mr. Mackenzie on the subject; the instructions given by Sir Hercules Robinson to Mr. Mackenzie being such as authorized him to form a Native Force sufficient to expel the marauders. The fact was that the break down of the police arrangements was not owing to any neglect in the part of the Government to comply at once with the recommendations of Sir Hercules Robinson. It arose from a variety of difficulties, and among them was this—that the police force was not really established up to its proper strength until the early part of July. Why the delay occurred he could not quite ascertain; but, no doubt, there were difficulties in the way of the establishment, and, above all, of the mounting and transport of the force sufficient to account for it. If, however, Mr. Mackenzie could have brought that force up to Montsioa's territory before the attack took place, the result would probably have been very different. It was not the fault of the Government that the police were not at Montsioa's side at the time, and he dared say it was not Mr. Mackenzie's fault either. Although it was disagreeable in that House ever to say anything against a man who was dead, he could not help expressing the opinion that Mr. Bethell's excess of valour caused him to be precipitate, and to hurry on a fight which it would have been more politic to postpone. There was, in fact, a statement to the effect that Montsioa sent to Mr. Bethell and told him not to fight, but that he insisted on doing so. Mr. Bethell had no policemen with him at the time, his force being composed of Native levies only. The Rooi-Gronders were, of course, anxious to precipitate the fight before the police arrived; and with that view they paraded the stolen cattle in front of Montsioa's laager, in order to entice him out. If, as he (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) wished, Mr. Bethell had been a little less brave, and if he had resisted the temptation put before him, and had waited until Mr. Mackenzie could have sent up the police force, the result would have been very different. There was really no other point for him to answer; but what he thought the House had a right to expect from him was that, as shortly as possible, he should give a statement of the line which the Government had taken in connection with the principal events since the House rose for the Recess, and what the present position of affairs was. Members would recollect that when the House rose Mr. Mackenzie had been out some time, and that the Government were receiving accounts daily of the threatened attack upon Montsioa by the freebooters; but no attack had absolutely taken place. The precipitate attack made by them upon Montsioa's forces and the death of Mr. Bethell happened on the 31st of July, after Mr. Mackenzie's visit to Montsioa, and the news reached this country just about the time the House rose for the Recess. Then the Transvaal Government came forward and sent Commander Joubert to the frontier. About that time also Mr. Rhodes had been sent up by Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner. Mr. Rhodes had been appointed at first temporarily, but afterwards permanently, to replace Mr. Mackenzie, who, about the beginning of August, had been called by Sir Hercules Robinson to Cape Town. With reference to the resignation of Mr. Mackenzie, he wished to say a word or two. Mr. Mackenzie had been selected by the Colonial Office, with, the consent and advice of Sir Hercules Robinson, to go out there as a man who was, in their opinion, in many respects extremely well fitted for the task. Nothing Mr. Mackenzie had done, or which had been brought against him, altered the opinion that he was well fitted for the task. Of course, it was possible to find two or three errors that he might have committed; but this was incident to the career of everyone. He maintained, however, that anything Mr. Mackenzie had done, or anything which had been brought against him, had not shaken his (Mr. Evelyn Ashley's) belief that he was a man who might have done very valuable service, and that he was the best man they could have selected for the post. But Mr. Mackenzie had this one great defect, that he was not a persona grata to the Cape Ministry. As soon as the Cape Ministers officially declared by Minutes and communications to Sir Hercules Robinson that the permanence of Mr. Mackenzie as our Commissioner to Bechuanaland was an obstacle to their going forward, an obstacle to their action, Mr. Mackenzie, with the highest possible feeling, and with a sense of what was right and proper and for the good of the country, tendered his resignation of the office to Sir Hercules Robinson. What Mr. Mackenzie said was this. In his letter to Sir Hercules Robinson he denied being imbued with the prejudices imputed to him, and enlarged on the desire that he had shown to take a wide view of matters, to do justice to all parties and to all interests; but he said that, inasmuch as the Colonial Ministers regarded his continuance in office as a most serious obstacle, if not the only obstacle, to the maintenance of the peace of the Protectorate, he desired to remove that barrier, and with that object he tendered his resignation of the office of Deputy Commissioner in Bechuanaland. Sir Hercules Robinson, in his despatch, said that he thought the reasons which influenced Mr. Mackenzie in taking this step were sound, and he complimented Mr. Mackenzie on the earnest and unselfish spirit which had induced him to undertake the difficulties of establishing the Protectorate in Bechuanaland. In these matters it was of the highest importance that they should work hand in hand, where they possibly could, with the authorities of one of the largest Colonies. Well, Mr. Rhodes had been sent up by Sir Hercules Robinson, on the resignation of Mr. Mackenzie, to meet Commander Joubert on the borders of Goshenland. Having come as Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Rhodes attempted to arrange terms with Montsioa and the freebooters; but having found that the demands of the Goshenite people were unreasonable, exorbitant, and contrary to justice and right, and that even while he was there as Ambassador for the High Commissioner an attack had been made on Montsioa's territory, he had been compelled to leave them with a warning that they were attacking people who were under the protection of Great Britain, and that he would not in any sense be a party to the making of an arrangement. He therefore left, warning them of the consequences. Mr. Rhodes came back and communicated with Sir Hercules Robinson, who had endeavoured to settle also, as far as he could, the hostilities in the Stellaland district. Next, they came to the action of the Transvaal Government, because it was there, for the first time, that the Transvaal Government came upon the scene. After the attack made on Montsioa by the freebooters, that Chief was reduced to a very bad state, having lost a large number of men. Then it was that the Transvaal Government came to his aid, and offered to relieve him from the attacks of those freebooters on condition that he came under the jurisdiction of the Transvaal. He needed not to take up the time of the House by giving any details as to what the condition of Montsioa was; but the House might take it that Montsioa was absolutely an unwilling agent—that he was absolutely commanded by his defenceless condition to come to an agreement with the Transvaal Government. Thereupon the Transvaal Government sent a telegram to Her Majesty's Government, saying that they had taken steps to restore and maintain peace by taking Montsioa under their protection. The Colonial Office put themselves in immediate communication with the Cape authorities, and with Sir Hercules Robinson, wishing to know what was the true state of matters, and what was the view of the Cape Government. In consequence of the communications they received and the information they obtained, they had desired Sir Hercules Robinson, as High Commissioner, to call upon the Government of the South African Republic to disallow their recent acts as being an entire and absolute violation of the Convention of 1884. That those acts were so was, to his (Mr. Evelyn Ashley's) mind, too clear for argument. The result of this communication was that the Transvaal Government at once withdrew the Proclamation establishing a Protectorate over this territory, and very shortly afterwards the Transvaal Volksraad was summoned to ratify the withdrawal of that Proclamation, so that they had not, therefore, any longer to do, ostensibly or openly, with the Transvaal Government. The freebooters, however, were still in possession of the territory; and Her Majesty's Government, remembering that this was the Protectorate which had been invaded by these men, considered only one settlement of this question possible—that force should be used to remove those men from that territory. Her Majesty's Government had been acting in accord with the Cape Government, and the Cape Government had asked their sanction, during the time the military preparations were being made, to go to the territory of Montsioa and see whether, by their personal influence, they could arrange terms without fighting and bloodshed. Of course, Her Majesty's Government would never like to leave any stone unturned to obtain the legitimate objects they had in view without fighting; and, therefore, they had signified to the Ministers at the Cape that, while they would not relax the preparations they were making, they would not oppose any obstacle to the Cape Ministers going to Bechuanaland, and seeing what they could do, provided it was thoroughly understood that no settlement could be made without the consent and approval of Her Majesty's Government, and that Her Majesty's Government would not give their consent and approval to any settlement which did not unreservedly imply that none of the freebooters should remain in possession of Montsioa's territory without the express sanction of the High Commissioner. The position, therefore, was this—the Transvaal Government having, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, broken the Convention, had been called upon to retrace their steps. On that call being received, they did retrace their steps; and the Government having, therefore, only to deal now with the irregular freebooters on the Border, were preparing to send a force to coerce them, and while that force was being prepared the Cape Ministers were trying their hand at peaceful negotiations. They knew that Sir Charles Warren, as he informed the House yesterday, was going out; indeed, they might count on his going out within a very short time—in about a fortnight. The details of the forces Sir Charles Warren would have at his disposal were being settled by the War Office; and the House might be certain they would be perfectly adequate to the object the Government had in view. He did not think there was any other information it was necessary he should give to the House; because it would be more fully and accurately given in the Papers which would shortly be in the hands of Members. He wished, however, to say a word or two in regard to the speech of the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Wodehouse) and the speeches of the hon. Member for Perthshire (Sir Donald Currie) and other hon. Members on the question of Zululand. The fallacy upon which he ventured to submit so many speeches went, which found fault with the Government for not doing last year, or the year before, what they were doing now, was this—that last year and the year before not only was the case not by any means so clear, or the needs so great; but last year and the year before there were elements of danger in precipitate action which he ventured to say the patience and care of Her Majesty's Government had eliminated. The antagonism between the Dutch and English-speaking portion of the South African Races was, he had repeatedly stated, one of the greatest dangers and difficulties which, in their transactions in South Africa, the present, as well as the late, Government had to guard against. They might talk about the sum of money the Government might have to spend now in the course they were going to take; but how much money, and how much more than even money's worth, would have been the cost to this country and the Colony if, by any precipitate action, they had brought about a quarrel of races. That was a very distinct and a very great danger, when they were urged in former periods by hon. Members opposite to take more active and violent measures. What was now our position? By their patience, by their waiting, by their determination to show that they were ready to employ every means in their power before resorting to force; and, further, by waiting till the case was so clear and so distinct in regard to the attitude taken by the Transvaal Government and others that it could not be justified, the Government had succeeded in this—that they had, openly at any rate, a perfectly unanimous feeling in the Cape Colony. He considered that was a result which it was worth while to wait a long time for, and which was a result which they would not have got had they precipitated their action as some hon. Members urged them to do. The Cape Government had in September endorsed, in a telegram which would be found in the Papers, in every way the action of Her Majesty's Government. The telegram was so important that he should like to give an extract from it, because it was really a great tribute to what patience and perseverance could do, to have a Dutch Ministry in Cape Town sending to Her Majesty's Government such a telegram as that. It was received on the 24th of September, and stated— Ministers express their opinion that decisive measures should be now taken for the maintenance of British authority. If hon. Members only knew what had been the feeling in South Africa ever since the first annexation of the Transvaal among the Atricander Race, who now for the first time had a Ministry in Cape Town, with Mr. Hoffmeyer, the head of the Africander Party, as the man who controlled that Ministry, they would know what a great event it was to have the Africander Party asserting that they wished to secure the maintenance of British authority. The object of the Africander Party up to this time had been rather to weaken than to establish British authority, and to establish the authority of the Dutch-speaking population. The telegram went on to say— The Ministers believe that in taking such, a course the Imperial Government will be thoroughly supported by Her Majesty's subjects of every nationality in this Colony. He wanted to know, if the Government had taken the steps last year which they were urged to do by some hon. Members, whether any responsible body of men in Cape Town could have telegraphed them to say that they would be thoroughly supported by Her Majesty's subjects of every nationality in the Colony? They certainly would not have had that support; but he was glad to see from the accounts in the newspapers that meetings were being held in the Cape Colony to support the action of Her Majesty's Government in that respect. The hon. Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Guy Dawnay) drew attention to the question of Zululand. While thinking that time would not allow him and them now to discuss the affairs of that country as well as Bechuanaland, he had nothing further to add to what he had already said with respect to it, except to repeat that Her Majesty's Government had carried out the intention they announced in the House, that they would maintain intact the Reserve. The Reserve was now in a perfectly quiet and secure condition. The hon. Member spoke a great deal about Usibepu's claims on the Government. He (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) did not know that the claims of that Chief were more than the claims of any other bold Chief in South Africa who had been loyal and brave. Usibepu was a strong man, and had shown himself friendly to Her Majesty's Government; but would hon. Members say that they should now send a force to Usibepu's territory, in order to support him and keep him on his throne? The Zulu question was not one, as the hon. Member said, involving any violation of the Convention by the Transvaal Government. It was totally different from the Bechuanaland question in that respect. The frontier of Zululand had not been violated by the Government of the Transvaal; but that violation had occurred through the invitation of the Zulus themselves. He was also asked whether the Government would appoint a Resident Commissioner in that territory, and whether they would look after the Swazis? They had, by the Convention, a right, if they chose, to appoint a Commissioner on the Zulu Frontier; but it was not likely, while the Zulus were themselves in a state of internecine war, as they had been, that the Government should ask the Commissioner to go and take up his residence on that frontier. The Zulus were an independent people, and all these demands that the Government should interfere, and prevent this and that going on on the frontier, and that they should defend Usibepu against Oham, or Oham against Usibepu, really reduced themselves to the old story of whether we should annex that territory.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

What about the Reserve?

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

said, the Reserve was as near being annexed as anything they could imagine. As to the question put by the right hon. Gentleman the Lord Mayor, ids right hon. Friend, if he looked at the Convention, would see that there was no question whatever of allowing the Transvaal Government to communicate with Foreign Powers except through the High Commissioner. There was a specific Article in the Convention which said that no Treaty should be made by the Transvaal Government with any Foreign Power or any Native Tribe, except the Orange Free State, without having the consent of Her Majesty's Government. He ventured to say, in conclusion, that hon. Members, however much they might be disposed to criticize this, that, and the other, and to say—although he denied it—that they might have acted last year, or the year before, as they had acted now, would be inclined to acknowledge, in the words of one of the speakers, that the Government had at last laid before the House a clear and distinct policy, and announced what they intended to do. Having cleared Bechuanaland of the freebooters, and restored the status quo, then would come the question in regard to the future of the territory. One hon. Member had thrown doubt upon the prospect of the Cape undertaking the government of the country. He (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) did not himself have any such doubt. The active element in the Cape would, in his opinion, be anxious to take over Bechuanaland, in order that the Imperial power should not be established, because they would rather see the country under the control of the Cape. But however the future might turn out, it was quite clear they had before them a very clear course, and they would require no exhortation from hon. Members opposite to persist in that course. Any delay or hesitation that might have taken place had been amply compensated for by an upright and consistent policy; and he trusted and believed that although we might be obliged to send out a large and efficient force to that country, no real blow would have to be struck, and that we should be able by that force to vindicate our rights and the British Protectorate without having to spill any blood whatever.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

I think the majority of the House will scarcely be of opinion that the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) has been entirely successful in his vindication of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. He commenced his speech by a complaint that we were asked to discuss this subject at a time when it could not be exhaustively discussed. If that is so, it is not our fault. We have felt the importance and the pressing nature of this matter so strongly that it is impossible for us to delay the discussion on South African affairs to that remote date when it shall please Her Majesty's Government to give us the Papers. I am bound to say that I think the excuse which the hon. Gentleman gave for the present imperfect state of information in which Parliament and the country have been left on this subject was by no means worthy of him or of the Government. In these matters it is always the case that where there is a will there is a way. If a serious attempt had been made by the Colonial Office to place the Papers in the hands of Members at the meeting of Parliament, I venture to say that it could have been done. To the best of my recollection, when there was an Autumn Session in a previous year, the Papers on Afghanistan were in the hands of Members some weeks before the House met. The hon. Gentleman has also complained that the hon. Member for the North Riding of Yorkshire (Mr. Guy Dawnay), while declining to treat this matter as a Party question, devoted the whole of his speech to an attack on the policy of Her Majesty's Government. I am sure that anyone who looks at the course of this debate will see that it is impossible for any hon. Member to discuss this question without attacking the policy of Her Majesty's Government. Why, Sir, the most forcible attacks on the Government were made by two of their most staunch supporters—the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Wodehouse), and the hon. Member for Perthshire (Sir Donald Currie). The hon. Member for Bath spoke with an authority and ability on the subject that can hardly be surpassed in this House; and, as everyone knows, the hon. Member for Perthshire possesses a peculiar knowledge of, and interest in, the commercial, social, and political state of South Africa. When hon. Members such as those attack the policy of the Government, I do think it rather unfair to charge hon. Members on the Opposition side of the House with treating this as a Party question, because, with all goodwill, my hon. Friend has been utterly unable to make his speech anything but an attack on the policy of the Government. The hon. Member has stated that the Government are completely in accord with the House of Commons as to their policy. Hitherto we have been quite unable to ascertain that the Government had any policy at all; and if the matter had rested where it was left by the paragraph in the Queen's Speech, which stated that Her Majesty's Government were giving vigilant attention to their engagements, and were considering the means that might be required to secure the faithful observation of the Convention, the Opposition could not injustice to their opinion have passed over the subject without proposing an Amendment to the Address. It has, however, since been definitely announced that the Government had gone far beyond vigilant attention and consideration in this matter, and that they were preparing, under the leadership of Sir Charles Warren, an expedition of considerable magnitude in South Africa. It has been suggested that there is an alternative; that the Government of the Cape Colony have offered their services; and that Her Majesty's Government have agreed that the Cape Government shall attempt to settle the matter by peaceful negotiations. I am not desirous of interference by this country in the affairs of South Africa beyond what is absolutely necessary. Such interference has resulted in the past, and may still more result in the future, in much more harm and danger to ourselves, to the Cape Colony, and even to the Natives, than would have occurred had we left them to settle matters for themselves; but this is a case in which we are bound by most definite obligations and engagements to bear Imperial responsibilities and carry them out. This could not be left to be settled by the Cape Government, unless it was made perfectly clear that that Government, in settling it, would fulfil to the utmost the obligations into which this country entered when it assumed the Protectorate over the Native Tribes in Bechuanaland. I am as anxious as anyone in this House can be to act in harmony with the Cape Government in this matter; and I think I may say that no one can better appreciate the advantage of such harmony than I do. But if I refer to the debate in the Cape Parliament, after which the Resolution proposing to negotiate for the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony was passed, I am sorry to say that I do not see in the speeches made in that debate, and in the spirit which animated the Members of the Cape Parliament, any ground for a strong hope that our obligations to the Native Chiefs will be carried out by the Cape Government. In the speech of one person of considerable importance—namely, Mr. Rhodes, the late Commissioner—what do I find? He is reported to have said that he had been told that one of the chief reasons for desiring to retain this country was that it was looked upon as a good land for the Colonial farmers, and that they ought not to lose such a splendid opportunity of developing the country north of the Orange River; that it was practically destitute of Natives, there being no more than 20,000 souls in all; and that the Cape Colony would obtain enormous assets in the shape of Crown lands. Reading these expressions, and others still stronger, uttered in the Cape Parliament, I venture to say that unless Her Majesty's Government are very careful in the matter they will not be fulfilling their responsibilities to the Native Tribes by leaving them in the hands of the Cape Colony. Then, what do Her Majesty's Government propose to do, if, as is possible, judging from the character of these freebooters, the Cape Government cannot settle this question peacefully? They propose what is a very serious matter—namely, to send a large military expedition to remove these freebooters by force. No one will appreciate the gravity of this proposal more than the Prime Minister himself, who, in March, 1883, when he had charged the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) with a desire to initiate a war in South Africa, used these words— My right hon. Friend urges us to undertake what I shall take leave to designate as a war which is 1,100 miles from the base of our operations. My right hon. Friend does not take into view the fact that in these former wars we had facilities for carrying them on by the aid of the sea, which made the conveyance of supplies a work of comparative ease. This is a proposal to march 1,100 miles into a country with respect to which we should have the aid of a railway for the shortest part of the way, but which, with regard to the rest, everything would have to be done over miserable roads.….Sir, I believe the enormous efforts, risks, and uncertainties of the expedition which my right hon. Friend contemplates, and would put at the back of his earnest remonstrances, are entirely out of proportion to the objects that are in view, or to the ends that he could possibly achieve. It is true my right hon. Friend says—'Only speak firmly, and you will never have occasion to resort to the sword.' I say no Government is worthy to hold Office in this country for a day that would hold firm language of that kind without being perfectly prepared to support it. What is the value of the opinion given by my right hon. Friend that there would be no occasion to resort to war, and what would be our predicament if, after holding that firm language, we had to support our remonstrances by a difficult, a costly, and almost hopeless military expedition? … What we decline to do is to undertake a military expedition for the purpose of rectifying disorders in a country which has always been disorderly, although we know that those disorders are now aggravated partly by the intervention of Boer freebooters. That is a responsibility we cannot assume, and which we will not impose upon the people of this country."—(3 Hansard, [277] 728–30–31.) But it is a responsibility which, nevertheless, is to be imposed on the people of this country. We are told that now at last our word is to be maintained and our honour vindicated. I should like to ask to what it is really due that this serious enterprize will have to be undertaken? It is due to the fact that when in February last we were compelled to assume this Protectorate, we failed at once to make it a reality. The House will recollect the discussion last February on the Speech from the Throne in reference to this matter. Everyone was agreed that the word of the Boers in the new Convention was not a matter of any very great moment; but that the real alteration in the situation was this—the expression by Her Majesty's Government of a determination that come what might the new Convention should be carried out. How was the Convention to be carried out? I find, on referring to the debate, that the Under Secretary for the Colonies (Mr. Evelyn Ashley) made a remarkable speech—a very remarkable speech—comparing it with what he has said in the course of the debate to-day. He told the House that Her Majesty's Government had been in communication with the delegates from the Transvaal, that Her Majesty's Government had firmly insisted on the Frontier Question, and the delegates had assured Her Majesty's Government they would preserve the frontier. He said that Lord Derby had proposed and was determined to carry out the appointment of a Resident Commissioner of some character on the frontier, and that that Commissioner would have under his command some sort of police force, with which he could keep the frontier from the incursions of the freebooters, and added that the Government believed they had secured a settlement, it being a matter merely of police. If that were so, why was Mr. Mackenzie despatched without a sufficient force of police? That question had been asked to-day, and the hon. Gentleman gave absolutely no answer to it. All he said was that the Government had trusted to the authorities on the spot; but they cannot thrust upon Sir Hercules Robinson and Mr. Mackenzie their own responsibilities in this matter. The hon. Member told us as plainly as he could—I thought he deserved great credit for the candour of his statement—that if a police force of even 100 men had at once been placed at Mr. Mackenzie's disposal, all these difficulties and troubles and cruelties to Montsioa would never have taken place.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

The right hon. Gentleman will allow me to say I never made any such statement. I distinctly said that 100 men were placed at the disposal of Mr. Mackenzie, and if they had been moved up the country at once these difficulties would not have occurred.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

Yes; 100 men on paper, as useful as all those Proclamations. If 100 men could not be at once recruited in the Cape Colony, or obtained from any other Colonial source, Her Majesty's Government were bound by the assurances of the Under Secretary at the time to take care that Mr. Mackenzie went up the country with a sufficient number of men levied, if necessary, from our Imperial Forces. Now, the Under Secretary for the Colonies actually said, referring to the cruel murder of Mr. Bethell, that Mr. Bethell was a little too brave. What a way to speak of the conduct of one whom you engaged as your police officer, who was doing his best, in spite of the insufficient force placed at his disposal, to perform his duty, in the cruel and difficult position you sent him to fill, and who met his death in fighting against those who were the enemies of the British Protectorate in Bechuanaland! But the hon. Gentleman was not the only Member of the Government who gave the assurance to the House that a sufficient police force would be employed, for the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Chamberlain) said that if the freebooters from the Transvaal again attacked Montsioa and Mankoroane, they would come into contact with police established at the cost of the Imperial Government, who would, no doubt, give a good account of them. The Under Secretary takes credit for securing the co-operation of the Cape Colony by a policy of patience and perseverance; but what has this policy cost the Native Tribes, and British credit in South Africa? For the last three years we have been debating this question of the position of the tribes on the borders of the Transvaal. Negotiation had, up to this time, been the sole policy of Her Majesty's Government. We have had under the consideration of the House instances of cruelty, of robbery, of oppression against these tribes, to whom, like the Bechuanas, we have incurred direct obligations, or to whom, like the Zulus, we have responsibilities arising from other causes. Have these responsibilities or obligations yet been carried out? Even in February last, how much better was the position of the Bechuanas than now? It was only, I think, at the end of 1883 that this so-called Republic of Stellaland was established by the freebooters at the expense of Mankaroane; and if, when this matter was first brought before the House, Her Majesty's Government had acted with a reasonable amount of firmness, the establishment of that Republic might have been prevented. When Mr. Mackenzie went up he found a community of men, knowing themselves to be in the wrong, and determined to maintain their position, and not, if they could help it, to accept British authority, and in default of having any force at his disposal he could only try to make terms with them. But he found that Montsioa had defeated his enemies, the freebooters of Goshen, who were driven within the borders of the Transvaal. Fifty police, then, would have given a good account of these freebooters, for there were but 30 or 40 of them; but no sooner was it known that, although this British Protectorate had been established, some months were to elapse before the ratification of the Transvaal Convention, than there was a determined and united effort on the part of lawless persons of every nationality to make hay white the sun shone. What these freebooters of the Transvaal did they clearly did with the connivance of their Government, who even permitted gunpowder from the Government stores to be used by them, and whose Representatives in this country insisted that a period of six months should elapse before the Convention was ratified by the Volksraad. In the light of what has occurred, I look upon that delay with suspicion, and I think there was in this matter on the part of the Representatives of the Transvaal Government what amounts to something very like foul play. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had told them that the old anti-English feeling no longer existed.

MR. GLADSTONE

explained that he referred to the distinction between Anglican and Dutch feeling.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

At any rate, the time had come when Her Majesty's Government were not justified in trusting merely to the word of the Transvaal Government in this matter. They must act by themselves, and carry out their responsibilities. The Under Secretary had spoken of the sympathy of the Cape Government, who were acting in concert with Her Majesty's Government. I have no doubt whatever, from the information we have received from the Cape Colony, that the whole English opinion there is of one mind, and is excited and enthusiastic to a degree with reference to the policy to be pursued by the Government. I notice that a Resolution passed the other day, to a great extent through the advocacy of Mr. Mackenzie, at Cape Town, and elsewhere, was to the effect that any failure on the part of Her Majesty's Government to maintain its just rights under the Convention of London, entered into with the Transvaal Government, and to fulfil its obligations towards the Native Tribes under the Protectorate of England, would be fatal to its supremacy in South Africa. This feeling is not only entertained by the English portion of the Cape Colony, but also by the thinking and more respectable portion of the Dutch population. I think, therefore, that we have really the whole of the valuable Colonial opinion on our side, whether Dutch or English; but there is a very different opinion in regard to this matter, which the Government will do well to remember. Not long ago I read a quotation from an article in a newspaper which represents the Africander Party, and which advocated the removal of Montsioa because he would take advantage of the dispute between the Imperial Government and a portion of the Colonists, and would join with the people over the sea in preference to the people on his border, and added that it was important that this idea should be exterminated for ever. I would venture to say that it is a point of infinite importance for England and for our Empire, not only in South Africa, but throughout the world, that this idea should not be permitted to be exterminated. We must fulfil our responsibilities on this matter, by all means in concert with the Cape Government, if possible; but I think we shall not be able to fulfil them without some manifestation of Imperial power. These people have been taught a lesson which they must, sooner or later, unlearn. It may cost men and money to this country; but if it does, the responsibility will rest upon those who, for the last four years, have allowed these ignorant and uncivilized Boers to believe that they can flout the authority of this country in South Africa, and that if they are but firm in their opposition to our wishes they will be permitted to obtain their own way, and ultimately to drive us from that which is one of the most valuable Colonies of the Empire.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

I should not have risen if the President of the Board of Trade, or some other Member of the Government, had desired to reply to the speech of the right hon. Baronet. Let me refer, in the first place, to the exceedingly awkward position in which the House finds itself, owing to the absence of the Papers which we were promised. If it is the fault of the printers, I do not think that it ought to be considered a sufficient excuse that the Factory Acts are the cause of the delay, for the printers might very well have sufficient hands to meet extra demands. The Papers presented this morning, and which, through the courtesy of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary, I saw yesterday, bring us up to this point—that Sir Hercules Robinson had stated to the Transvaal Government that Monfsioa's territory was under British protection; that notwithstanding that he was attacked, and he was in very great danger; that Mr. Mackenzie had been sent up there, and was asking for reinforcements, but that he had not obtained them; that the Cape Government refused to give them; and that our own Government were, in some way or another, unable to give him what he required. The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies had stated that Mr. Mackenzie was expected by the Government to organize this police force, and I believe he also stated that the police were at his disposal. I cannot reconcile these statements with the information which I have myself received from Mr. Mackenzie, nor with a long letter from the Correspondent of The Times, the information in which was evidently received from Mr. Mackenzie. On the 19th of August last Mr. Mackenzie wrote a letter, of which the following is an extract:— Poor, poor Montsioa! I am afraid he has had to give in. I sent him some ammunition, and was about to send some more with a few men to help him when I was called to Cape Town. I began with 10 policemen, and stipulations not to have more than 25 without special leave. My own journeys have been performed without protection of arms. At an early date I exposed, after personal inspection, the position of the Transvaal people at Rooi Grond and Montsioa. They had no foothold out of Transvaal. The Transvaal winked at their levying war on their own account. Two months ago I appealed to His Excellency on this subject, feeling sure that I was in no position to fight the Transvaal with a few policemen. I understood my hon. Friend to say that it rested not so much with Mr. Mackenzie, as with Sir Hercules Robinson. On that point I cannot give any opinion without seeing the despatches; but I think that when the Government sent out Mr. Mackenzie they were bound to have taken care that he had a sufficient force of police with him in accordance with the statements of the Under Secretary and the President of the Board of Trade, that the Government would provide a sufficient force to keep order. I was glad to hear the testimony that the Under Secretary bore to Mr. Mackenzie's conduct and to his self-sacrifice. It is due to Mr. Mackenzie to state that he did not ask for this appointment—that it was given to him on the recommendation of Sir Hercules Robinson without any solicitation of his friends on his behalf. He was appointed because it was believed by Sir Hercules Robinson and by the Government that he was the man best suited for the post; and reading through the Papers I think it will be proved that Mr. Mackenzie acted with great discretion, great forbearance, and remarkable ability, and has shown a self-sacrifice which is rare in the manner in which he thought nothing of his own position, because the instant he felt he was considered by any person of authority not likely to succeed, at very great cost to himself and the sacrifice of his whole future, he resigned. This is the position of affairs at the point up to which we are brought by the Papers circulated to-day. We are to have further Papers. At present the Under Secretary says that the Government have nothing to answer, except in regard to this matter of the police. But we cannot now refer to what has happened since, because we have not the Papers. But there are questions which, I think, we have a right to ask, and, if not entirely answered by the despatches, should be answered by the Government. One question is—Why did Sir Hercules Robinson assent to the resignation of Mr. Mackenzie? Another is—What are the instructions that were sent to his successor? I understand that the Prime Minister intimates that it has been answered that Mr. Mackenzie's resignation was accepted because the Cape Government objected to him, and could not work with him; but it must be remembered that Mr. Mackenzie was employed for the fulfilment of a duty undertaken by the Home Government. The Convention he was to see fulfilled was not a Convention with the Cape Government. There was no mention of the Cape Government in it. It was an arrangement between Her Majesty's Government and the Transvaal Government, entailing obligations upon us towards the Natives. My hon. Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Wodehouse), in his speech to-day, which I listened to with the greatest pleasure, owing to the knowledge he has of these questions, made one statement with which I cannot entirely agree—namely, that we had entered into a sort of partnership with the Cape Colony for the purpose of carrying out this matter. There may have been a correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Cape on the subject; but there was no mention of such a partnership in the Convention, nor have I seen any mention of it in the documents which have been laid upon the Table. The second question which I have to ask is—What were the instructions given to Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Bower when sent in the place of Mr. Mackenzie? Was Mr. Rhodes sent to represent a different policy from that which Mr. Mackenzie represented? Will the House allow me to give an expression of wonder at the change from one of those poor Natives? Mankoroane wrote a letter, dated September 4, of which I have a translation, which shows that it was a bonâ fide letter. He is immensely puzzled by these variations of policy, and the poor fellow writes in very great distress. He says— I have been thinking, are there two Queens? I dismissed my agent. It I had known that the Queen had no power, I should not have put away my agent. But I cast him off through confidence that, as the Queen had received me, I was protected by a power not needing to be added to by agents. Now, here I am, shall my confidence leave me? I know not. For to-day I look round on every side, being alone. I know not where to look for my life. If there is change of policy, I want to know what it is? No answer has been given to-day to a question, which I should like to repeat—namely, "What action was immediately taken by the Government upon hearing of the attack on the Natives under our protection? Was anything done at once? I should have supposed that a telegram would have been at once sent to Sir Hercules Robinson, asking—"Is the statement true which appears in the newspapers? If so, demand reparation?"

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

Which attack is the right hon. Gentleman referring to?

MR. W. E. FORSTER

One attack was made in June, upon which no action was taken; but I am now speaking of what took place on July 31 against Montsioa, which led to such sorrowful consequences to the Native Chiefs, and in which Mr. Bethell was killed, or, rather, murdered. Before information was received that this officer had been murdered in cold blood, the fact was known that there had been this attack upon those under our protection; and I want to know why the Government did not telegraph at once to Sir Hercules Robinson—"Is this true? If so, demand reparation instantly from the Transvaal Government, and take care that they induce those filibusters immediately to leave the territory." We have Sir Hercules Robinson's own statement in the despatches circulated to-day that this expedition was organized and planned in the Transvaal territory, and that the Proclamation against it was almost a sham. There are several other questions which, if I had time, I might ask; but what is of real importance is what the Government are now going to do. I am very glad that Sir Charles Warren is going out. I believe from his antecedents that he is the best man that could be sent. He showed great ability, vigour, and discretion in restoring order in Griqualand West, and is much respected both by the Natives and, I believe, by the Dutch farmers in that territory. I am also very glad to believe that the Government have now come to the conclusion that no man is of much use there unless he has some force behind him. We are not told what the actual force is which Sir Charles Warren will have at his disposal; but I am glad to trust from the rumours which have reached me that the force will be sufficient, and that power will be given to Sir Charles Warren to take out and enlist there as many police as may be necessary. If the Government are taking that course, they are taking the best course. But then there should be a knowledge that the police would be supported by Regular troops, though, I believe, a mounted police are better adapted for dealing with the filibusters than the Regular Army. Now, one word with regard to the possibility of Sir Charles Warren, when he goes out there, finding an arrangement between the Cape Government and the Government of the Transvaal which may seem to settle the matter. We should all rejoice if the Transvaal Government, finding out that we are in earnest, and the Cape Government also, finding out the feeling of every loyal man at the Cape, and especially the feeling of Englishmen, though the present Ministry obtained power by Africander support, would do their best to settle the matter. But the Government must not be sanguine that this is a real settlement; they will have to take care that it will not be simply another Convention. A force will be necessary in Bechuanaland to keep order, and it will be absolutely indispensable that some officer should go there to see that order is preserved. The Under Secretary.—I do not know whether intentionally—seemed to dwell on the position of Montsioa as the one difficulty. That is not really the case. There is the so-called Republic of Stellaland, and it is a sad thing that such a condition of affairs should exist in a country under our protection. The Republic of Stellaland, acting, as they say, under our Protectorate, have imprisoned our Agents; and I must say I was surprised at the answer of the Under Secretary, who, when asked whether Mr. Wright had been taken prisoner, said that there was no occasion to take steps, because he was now free. But people who did such a thing to an Agent of our country ought to meet with some punishment. I do not say that from any feeling of revenge, but because, if people are allowed to do such acts with perfect impunity, you will never have an end of them. I could give details which would surprise the House of the atrocities already committed; and therefore I say that a mere settlement on paper saying we are restoring his land to Montsioa will not prevent the future being a mere repetition of the past, and will not at all meet our present difficulties. Unless you have something besides talk, unless you take some action, you will never have any peace and quietness there. One word more. I think this sad history gives us two or three lessons—first of all, a lesson of the necessity of firmness and consistency. I need hardly dwell upon that. Much allusion has been made to the Treaty of Majuba. I was in the Government which was responsible for that Treaty; but I never should have been responsible if I had not supposed that we should have guarded against the danger of that Treaty being violated, and that we should have given the Boers to understand that we made it, not from any fear of them, or on account of the difficulties of dealing with them, but because we thought it was right. They were quite sure to suppose that we made it out of neglect, indifference, or cowardice. We did not care what they thought of it so far as we were concerned; but it did matter to those for whom we were responsible, whether they had any reason to think so, and we should have taken care that there was after that Treaty a force sufficient to prevent a breach of it. Since that, I must confess that the way in which the first breaches of the Convention were received here was calculated to make the Transvaal Government believe they were able to do what they liked. Another lesson is that the penny wise and pound foolish policy is the most dangerous. The hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) is not here. He assumes the position of champion of the public purse, and is much concerned lest we should go to great expense in these matters; but of all the expensive courses which it is possible to take delay is the worst, for it will make the Boers think that we are afraid, or at any rate reluctant, to meet them. That is a course which is sure to entail upon us the greatest expenditure in the end. An hon. Friend of mine to-day asked me—"Are we to go to war?" Well, Sir, my reply was that it was impossible to overrate the amount of blood shed and of money lost by this policy of delay; and we have not seen the end of it. We must not be too sanguine as to what is happening at the Cape; and we must not suppose that we can shift our own responsibility upon the Colonists. Even the English Party there have hesitated in supporting us, because of the treatment which our Allies have met with, and the policy of vacillation that has been displayed. The English Colonists, in fact, have begun to fear to support us; and if matters had been allowed to go on as they were doing there would soon have been a time when it could be said that England had no friends at the Cape. Persons may think that it is from old associations I speak thus; that it is because the fathers or grandfathers of those people were slaves that I have a strong feeling about them. But I do not admit that because people are black and because their fathers were slaves we should not fulfil our promises to protect them. It is not, however, a question of black and white; the question is whether we are to keep this Colony or not? That is what it really does come to. Some have said—"Oh, let that Colony go; the Cape of Good Hope has been nothing but a trouble and nuisance to us since we have had to do with it." ["Hear, hear!"] Yes; hear, hear; but is that hon. Gentleman aware of the vast interests of this country in South Africa? I am glad to know that there are some £20,000,000 of English money invested there, for it will be to the interest of the bondholders to see that justice is done. There never was anything more clearly proved than that justice to the Natives—to those poor unfortunate Blacks—is bound up with the preservation of English interests and the security of the Colony. But supposing we did let the Colony go, and that we lost that trade route to the interior, there is yet another trade route to be considered, which has already been alluded to to-day, and that is the route to India and Australia. Is it to be supposed that we could keep St. Simon's Bay as a coaling station with the Cape Colony independent? We should find that it would not long be an independent Colony, for it is one which Germany would greatly like to have, as it is widely different to the pestilential places on the West Coast of Africa which are now receiving their attention. It is a Colony with which the German Government might gratify the Colonial aspirations of Germany. Do you suppose that Germany would allow us to keep St. Simon's Bay as a Gibraltar in German territory? No; if you mean to give up the general government of the Cape Colony you may make up your minds that you will have to go away altogether; and, after all, it would be better to go away voluntarily than to remain and neglect your duties until you are compelled to go. I wish to make only one other remark. The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies gave one of the grounds of defence of the Government policy of delay which was the most extraordinary I ever heard. It was that by our waiting, by our delay, and by our patience, we have at last brought matters to a state in which a strong feeling has been excited at the Cape, and that the consequence is that the people at the Cape are now supporting the Government. I wish the Members of the Government could read the speeches which are made in the Colony by those who are expected by my hon. Friend to support them. There is nothing which has been said upon any platform by hon. Gentlemen opposite that is more humiliating to the Government than the way in which these men at the Cape have expressed their feelings with regard to what they consider as desertion until now. What else are we to expect, if we are to submit to injustice and to allow our officers to be murdered and imprisoned, and if we are to allow the Queen's Government to be insulted and our Allies to be despoiled on the ground that if enough of that were done, then there would be a feeling evoked at the Cape in favour of us? I sincerely hope that no Under Secretary for the Colonies will ever again venture on such a defence of the policy of the Government.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

My right hon. Friend has only left me a few minutes in which to reply to his observations.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

I offered to give way for you.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

I am anxious on the part of the Government that the speeches which we have heard should not be without some reply; but, in order to make that reply, I am compelled to compress what I have to say into the few remaining moments rather than that another day should be wasted on this subject. My right hon. Friend observed truly that both he and the country were most anxious to know what course the Government proposed to take at the present time, and I confess I think myself that the country will take a much greater interest in that than in the recrimination which has been addressed by one side of the House to the other. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) was unable to deprive himself on this occasion of the pleasure of making a Party speech, and he attacked the Government in the strongest possible terms, not for what they now proposed to do, but he attacked them for the past, and for the delay in the proceedings which we have now declared we are about to take. I listened to the right hon. Gentleman with great interest, and I confess I was astounded that, with his experience, he should imagine that the difficulties in South Africa could be so easily and so speedily settled as he now supposes. He said if only a short time ago we had sent out 50 police to the border of Bechuanaland all these dangers and difficulties and this expensive expedition would have been avoided. I should like to know whether, when the right hon. Gentleman occupied the position of Secretary for the Colonies, he would not have thought twice or thrice before sending 50 police anywhere, with a knowledge that in all probability it would bring about a general convulsion and perhaps a general war? The right hon. Gentleman absolutely ignored that which he knows, as well as I do, is the whole crux of this problem—namely, that we are dealing with a population four-fifths of which are of a different blood from ourselves, and that there is no possibility of a peaceful settlement in South Africa without such a sacrifice that we cannot contemplate imposing upon the British taxpayers, unless we have the cordial co-operation of the Cape Colony. I am surprised to hear responsible persons like the right hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend the Member for Bath Mr. Wodehouse) suggesting that we should put aside considerations addressed to us from the Cape, that we should ignore altogether the Africander sentiment, and try to deal with this thing exclusively from a British point of view, and that we should yield nothing whatever.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

I utterly deny that I made any such statement.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

I am quite satisfied to leave the argument to the appreciation of the House. I have not time to meet it now. I wish to traverse entirely the position taken up by my right hon. Friend behind me, and the right hon. Gentleman opposite, that we have suffered by delay. I deny that we have suffered by delay. I say that the situation now is totally different from what it was some time ago. It is absolutely different in this respect, that we can now go forward and maintain our just obligations with the certainty that we have the general assent of the Dutch population of the Cape, and that change has been in consequence entirely of the patience, the long-suffering, if you like, that we have shown. When I consider the great interests at stake, the tremendous consequences which might have followed from an opposite course, I am quite content to sit still under the taunts of my right hon. Friend and the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and I am quite sure that the public generally will justify the course we have taken.

Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL and Mr. WILLIAM REDMOND

here rose together, and the SPEAKER called upon the latter.

MR. WILLIAM REDMOND

moved the adjournment of the debate.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

said, he desired to point out that the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) rose before the hon. Member for Wexford Borough to move the adjournment.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

wished to know whether moving the adjournment of the House would prevent an Amendment being moved?

MR. SPEAKER

said, the hon. Member for Wexford Borough rose, and was called on by name, but he gave way to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Chamberlain). When the hon. Member rose the second time, he thought it right to call upon him again.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

said, he also wished to move the adjournment. His noble Friend intended to have moved the adjournment, in order that he might have an opportunity of moving his Amendment to-morrow.

MR. SPEAKER

said, the adjournment could not be moved twice. It had been already moved by the hon. Member for Wexford Borough (Mr. William Redmond), and it was entirely optional with the latter to say whether he would give way to the noble Lord or to any other hon. Gentleman.

MR. GLADSTONE

said, it would be for the general convenience of the House if the noble Lord would bring on his Amendment to-morrow.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

said, he would endeavour to do so.

Motion made, and Question, "That the Debate be now adjourned,"—(Mr. William Redmond,)—put, and agreed to.

Debate adjourned till To-morrow.