HC Deb 04 November 1884 vol 293 cc959-88
MR. GORST

, in rising to move the Amendment of which he had given Notice, said: Sir, I wish I could feel quite certain that I should not incur the Prime Minister's displeasure in bringing forward this subject on the present occasion. I know that it would be useless to plead the importance of the question, because the Prime Minister would probably say that the importance of the subject is no excuse for bringing it forward in the form of an Amendment to the Address. But my real excuse, in asking the attention of the House to the question to-night, is not only that the question is important, but that it is extremely urgent. I hope I shall be able to convince the Prime Minister that nothing but a very strong sense of public duty has induced me to brave the accusations which will be made against me of impeding the progress of Public Business by raising a question of this kind. The story to which I have to direct the attention of the House is a very shameful one, but a very short one. It comprises two periods. The first is a period of three months, during which Montsioa enjoyed the formal protection of the British Government. It began by a visit paid to him by the Commissioner sent to Bechuanaland, and ended with his defeat and entire subjugation by the freebooters of the Transvaal. With reference to this period, the charge made in the Amendment which I am about to propose against the policy of the Government is that they have been guilty of a want of precaution in not taking effectual measures to protect Montsioa against these freebooters. Of course, that is not an urgent matter. It is important; but it is a matter which may, no doubt, wait. The second period, about which I shall have a story to tell, is a period of two months which have elapsed since the entire subjugation of Montsioa became known to Her Majesty's Government. The charge in reference to that period is that Her Majesty's Government have delayed declaring to the Government of the Transvaal, and to the marauders who have taken possession of Montsioa's territory, their intention of using force, if necessary, to turn them out of that territory. That is a matter that is urgent, because every day that elapses without that declaration of intention from Her Majesty's Government not only prolongs the dishonour of this country, but increases the difficulty of any ultimate settlement. These marauders have now been upwards of two months in occupation of Montsioa's territory. They are establishing farms there; they are creating new interests; and in a short time vested rights will have grown up in this country—just as they grew up in Stellaland—which the Government will find it very difficult to interfere with, and the restitution of the territory which has been seized will become impossible. That, I think, is a justification for asking for an immediate declaration, at this moment, of the intentions of the Government. But there is another reason which might be urged in favour of a discussion in this House, and even in favour of passing some Resolution by the House—namety, that if the Envoys of the Transvaal have formed a correct estimate of the Earl of Derby, he is a Nobleman extremely disposed to make himself pleasant to the acting Powers. He has no desire to interfere with their requests; he does not wish to coerce and control them in any way whatever, and they have told their fellow-countrymen that it is only the mischievous results of public opinion in England which prevents this amiable Nobleman from doing everything they desire. If this is to be the case, it might be well to bring the pressure of a little of this wholesome public opinion to bear upon the Earl of Derby, and induce him to prefer the interests and honour of his own country to the desire to make himself agreeable to foreigners. I do not intend to trouble the House with any of the history contained in the Blue Book so recently laid upon the Table of the House, and I shall, therefore, not travel back to the early history of Bechuanaland; but I think it right to remind those Members of the House who are not so familiar with the history of the question that there were debates on the subject of Montsioa's territory running on during the whole of the year 1883. At that time this same Chief was undergoing an attack from freebooters, who issued from the territory of the Transvaal, and who are said to be, and who are believed to be, encouraged by the Transvaal Government. Those debates were never brought to a conclusion. I believe they were adjourned down to the very end of the Session of 1883; but in the course of those debates the Government were compelled, by information which turned up from time to time, to make several admissions of which I wish to remind the House. They were obliged to admit that Her Majesty's Government were under obligations to Montsioa; in consequence of his fidelity to British, interests in time of trouble; they were obliged to admit that the Transvaal Government had broken the Convention of 1881; and they were obliged to admit that the British Government was bound to protect Montsioa against the incursions of these Transvaal maurauders. They promised the House of Commons that they would fulfil their obligations, and the particular mode by which they chose to fulfil them was by entering into the Convention of 1884—a Convention made at the beginning of this year with the Government of the Transvaal. In that Convention they stated that their only direct interest, as far as the Convention related to Bechuanaland, was that involved in the protection of Montsioa and Mankoroane, so that the desire of protecting those two Chiefs was the sole motive which had induced the Government to enter into that Convention so far as it related to Bechuanaland; and the Transvaal Government undertook, on their side, strictly to maintain the boundary and to guard against trespasses and irregularities. Now, having said that, I should like to ask the Government whether past experience has induced them to place implicit reliance with any Convention entered into with the Transvaal Government? It seems to me that they were bound to take adequate steps for the protection of these Chiefs, whom they admit they were under obligations to protect, and if they chose to rely exclusively and solely upon a Convention with the Boers, they must be liable to censure if the result of that Convention was not to afford the protection they were bound to give. They had no right to pay their obligations to those two Chiefs by a draft on a Government so bankrupt of all honour and credit as the Transvaal Government. I come now to the story of the result of this effort of Her Majesty's Government to protect Montsioa. He was visited on the 20th of May in the present year by the British Commissioner. There was a formal British Protectorate announced. A Treaty was made, and a cession of jurisdiction from Montsioa was accepted. The country at that date was clear from any freebooters. Montsioa himself had driven them out, and they were living under a man called Gey, at a place called Rooi-Grond, which was within the Transvaal territory. These men were informed by the Commissioner of the establishment of a British Protectorate, and they wey warned of the necessity of respecting it. So far well. Perhaps I ought to mention that from that date down to the time when Montsioa was entirely subjugated, he had a British officer living in his place; not only Mr. Bethell, about whose appointment as an English officer there may be some question, but a Deputy Commissioner constantly living with him, and there is the testimony of that British officer that no aggression ever took place on the part of Montsioa, and that he never broke the peace. But hardly was the back of the British Commissioner turned when, on the 13th of June, the people from Rooi - Grond robbed Montsioa's garden and fired on his people. A week later, on the 20th of June, they attacked a reaping party—persons engaged in industrial pursuits. These Natives were attacked by two parties—the one fired upon them outside the Transvaal territory, while the other fired a cannon 100 yards inside the British boundary. They killed a number of these peaceful people, and afterwards rode over the ground despatching the wounded and all those who had concealed themselves. On the 24th of June, the man Gey published a proclamation in The Volksraad, a newspaper issued in Pretoria, in which he declared war against Montsioa, although Montsioa was under British protection, and called for volunteers to enlist at Pretoria, offering them a share of the booty, and inviting their co-operation. On the 25th of June, the day after this proclamation, the freebooters attacked a party about three-quarters of an hour from Montsioa's place—Mafe-king—and murdered one of his men. On the 1st of July, about a week later, four waggons were sent out for wood with eight people in charge of them. When they were about a mile distant from Montsoia's place, they were attacked by Rooi-Gronders. Six were killed, some of whom were boys. A little boy of seven had his leg shattered by an explosive bullet. One man only was lucky enough to escape. This story is not told by Native evidence, but it is given on the evidence of the British officer officially appointed. On the 8th of July the Rooi-Gronders seized 60 cattle, and killed 11 men and one woman, who were in charge of the cattle. A little child of eight years, who had got bewildered by the firing, ran from a garden towards the Boers, and was deliberately murdered. This little child under eight years of age was deliberately murdered by these freebooters. On the 17th of July, emboldened by the outrages they had already committed, they attacked Montsioa's place at Mafeking, in force, and attempted to take it, but failed. On the 28th they took 3,000 cattle and 400 sheep; and on the 31st they paraded the cattle in front of Montsoia's place for the purpose of tempting his people to recapture them. They succeeded in their design and killed 100 men—Mr. Bethell, our officer, being among the slain. I will not enter into the question of his murder now, because that subject formed part of the debate last Wednesday, and it is my desire to keep clear of anything that was stated on Wednesday, and to confine myself, as far as possible, to the new information which has now been laid before the House. It must be remembered that I am not giving one-half of the atrocities which are reported in the official Papers. If any hon. Member wishes to see a more complete list of these atrocities than I have given, if he will turn to page 123 of the Papers he will find a list given there by our Assistant Commissioner, who not only gives an account of the atrocities, but the evidence by which they are supported—many of the cases having come under his own personal knowledge. On the 2nd of August the Transvaal Government itself came upon the scene. A most remarkable deputation was sent out. A Mr. Snyman, who called himself, and who was, a Native Commissioner of the Transvaal Republic, and therefore a Government officer, came with six others as a deputation from the South African Republic. He produced a letter signed "Paul Krüger," in which the Commissioners were instructed to do their utmost to stop the fighting. But a certain field cornet named Theumissen, who was with him, as one of the deputation, said he had received verbal instructions from the Transvaal Government to get Montsioa's consent to the annexation of the Baralong territory to the Trans vaal. This Mr. Snyman refused to address Montsioa in the presence of the British Commissioner, and the British Commissioner had to go away, leaving Montsioa and Mr. Snyman by themselves. Mr. Snyman then made an address which will remind the House of the address of Rabshakeh, when he was sent by the Assyrian King to stop Hezekiah and the beleaguered subjects of Jerusalem, for he used the same arguments and spoke in the most scornful way of England and the British Government. He said— Don't trust England. She has no soldiers, and she will never fight for you against the Transvaal. Paul Krüger has entered into an alliance with 10 European Powers, among whom are France and Germany, by which the independence of the Transvaal is secured, and English interference prevented. Look," said he, "at Mankoraane. England promised to extend her protection to him, and the result is that he has nothing now; all his land has been taken from him. Snyman also said that he had power to withdraw "the Volunteers," as he called the freebooters, and he took an oath to that effect. Montsioa replied that he had always recognized the Transvaal as making war upon him; but he added that since the country had been proclaimed British territory they had been making war not on him alone, but on the British Government, and he could not withdraw his word which he had given to Her Majesty's Government. Perhaps the House may suppose that these people—Snyman and Field Cornet Theumissen—were enthusiasts, who were not acting in the name of the Transvaal Government in this mission of theirs; but what took place was communicated to the Transvaal Government not only by our Resident at Pretoria, but by Sir Hercules Robinson himself, and they did not repudiate Snyman, nor say that he had not acted in their name. It was, therefore, concluded that his mission was genuine, and that he had really been sent to deliver the scoffing message he had delivered to Montsioa. In the meantime, while Snyman was scoffing at Her Majesty, poor Bethell's body was lying unburied in Rooi-Grond, exposed to the indignity of being kicked by the freebooters. Then they sent a flag of truce to ask that men and waggons might be sent to take the body away; and when they were sent they confiscated them, and seized the persons who were sent with them. They next sent a second flag of truce, and Mr. Wright, the Assistant Commissioner, went out to speak to the freebooters himself. Although under a flag of truce, they treacherously made our officer a prisoner, carried him off to Rooi-Grond, threatened to put him in irons, and kept him a prisoner there until he succeeded in making his escape. It may be supposed that when these facts were communicated to the present Government, some regret was expressed; but when the Transvaal Government were made aware that a Queen's officer had been thus treacherously seized under a flag of truce and kept a prisoner in their territory, they did not express a single word of regret for the outrage which had been committed. A despatch from the Secretary of State at Pretoria to the High Commissioner would be found at page 82 of the Blue Book, in which he said— Through the hon. Mr. K. Rutherfoord, temporarily acting as Consular official of England at Pretoria, this Government has been informed that the Volunteers of Rooi-Grond, under cover of a flag of truce, have taken prisoner Mr. Wright, Assistant British Commissioner in Bechuanaland. While taking cognizance of this, I have the honour to acquaint Tour Excellency that this Government has no doubt that both the Special Commissioners who have been sent off will know how to adjust this matter also. They took cognizance of the fact, but simply intimated that their Commissioner, M. Joubert, would, no doubt, adjust the matter with the British Commissioner; but there is not a single word of regret for the atrocious outrage committed on a British Commissioner. Of course, they were promptly informed by our officials of the events which had taken place; and their only remark was that they considered it only possible to put an end to the troubles in Rooi-Grond by going to work in a peaceable manner and not employing force. That was the course taken by a Government which had promised England, in a Convention concluded only a few months before, that it would strictly maintain the boundaries and guard against trespass and irregularity. On the 25th of August, about three months after Montsioa had been received under the protection of the British Government, Mr. Rhodes, our Commissioner, visited Rooi-Grond for the purpose of meeting M. Joubert, who had been sent for by the present Government in order to pat a stop to these troubles. It was a very remark able thing that when Mr. Rhodes wished to go to Rooi-Grond, he found he could not go through. British territory, but that he was obliged, by a circuitous route, to make a detour through the Transvaal. The territory under the protection of Her Majesty was absolutely closed to our officer who was acting on behalf of Her Majesty's High Commissioner. The night he arrived at Rooi - Grond, a desperate attempt was made by the freebooters to capture Montsioa's place at Mafekmg. Firing was heard going on all night, and Mr. Rhodes was so indignant that he refused to enter into negotiations unless 14 days' armistice were at once entered into. They refused to make an armistice unless Montsioa would sign the terms of a Convention practically surrendering at discretion, and giving up the whole of his territory to the freebooters. Mr. Rhodes accordingly left; and M. Joubert remained behind, to what was called, "mediate," and the result of his mediation was the unconditional surrender of Montsioa to the freebooters. His fortifications were to be broken down in eight days, and he was stripped of the whole of his land with the exception of 10 farms which were loft to him. Before that Treaty was made, and while Mr. Rhodes was at Rooi-Grond, he found that he was not able to visit Montsioa or to see him, so beleaguered was he by the freebooters. But Montsioa managed to send a messenger to him—like General Gordon at Khartoum—and that was the last that had been heard of Montsioa. This message expressed to Mr. Rhodes the unswerving fidelity of Montsioa, and warned the Commissioner that although Montsioa was in the hands of his enemies, and might be made to sign Treaties and make declarations, no importance was to be attached to them, because they were wrung from him by superior force. That ends the history of the three months during which Montsioa enjoyed British protection. I think I am not exaggerating, or using language too strong, when I say that a more disgraceful story was never put before a British House of Commons. Just notice the points of the story. First, a formal protection was announced to this unhappy man; this formal protection was immediately followed by most atrocious attacks—most cruel and barbarous atrocities committed on his people—a British officer stationed with him was murdered; another British officer was captured under a flag of truce; and the Transvaal Government gave their open sanction to the proceedings. Perhaps some people may say that I am using language too strong when I say "open sanction." That, however, is not my language, but the Earl of Derby's. In one of his despatches the noble Earl is betrayed into the expression— The Transvaal Government have openly sanctioned this conduct towards Montsioa. The result of our protection, then, is that this unhappy man has been completely subjugated, his land has been seized with the exception of 10 farms, and all his fortifications and means of further resistance are destroyed. I now close the first period and begin the second. What did the British Government do? It was on the 6th of September that the Earl of Derby received a telegram announcing that the Transvaal Government had taken Montsioa under their protection, and that all his rights would be respected. It was not a telegram which dropped upon him like a thunderclap from a clear sky, for, on the 3rd of September, or three days before, he got a telegram from the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, giving him a full account of the atrocities I have related to the House—giving a full account of the peaceable conduct of Montsioa since our protection was accorded him, together with a full account of Snyman's mission to scoff at British protection, of its being communicated to the Transvaal Government, and of its not being disavowed by them. All this the Earl of Derby knew on the 3rd of September. I do not know if he ought to have taken immediate steps in the matter or not. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade told the House on Wednesday last that there had been no delay, and the Papers not being then before Parliament, the right hon. Gentleman could not be contradicted. Since then the Papers have been produced, and I should like to hear the President of the Board of Trade venture to tell the House a second time that there has been no delay.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

I beg the hon. and learned Gentleman's pardon, I did not say there had been no delay.

MR. GORST

In that case, I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to justify the delay now that the facts of the case are happily known to the House of Commons. Let me ask the House once for all to contrast the pusillanimity and delay of the Colonial Office in Downing Street with the energy and courage of the High Commissioner in Cape Town throughout the whole of these proceedings. On the 8th of September, the Earl of Derby, having got this telegram on the 6th, after two days, sends a telegram to Sir Hercules Robinson, asking for his observations. He gives those observations on the 11th, by informing the Earl of Derby of the result of Mr. Rhode's visit to Rooi-Grond, and all the remainder of the information I have laid before the House in full. In that telegram on the 11th of September, Sir Hercules Robinson counsels delay pending the arrival of Mr. Rhodes at Cape Town, and I have no doubt that the Earl of Derby most thankfully accepted that advice. But on the 15th of September there was another telegram received from Sir Hercules Robinson, which the Colonial Office has not thought fit to print in these Papers. It is a common practice, I am sorry to say, in the preparation of Government Papers, that the most important documents are frequently left out; but there is secondary evidence of the contents of this telegram, because at page 79 there is printed a despatch from Sir Hercules Robinson, dated September 24; there is no date as to when it was received at Downing Street, but it contains secondary evidence of the missing telegram of the 15th. On the 11th, a telegram was sent from Sir Hercules Robinson, giving a full history of the case and counselling delay. On the 15th, a telegram was sent which is not printed, but the substance of which I am able to give to the House, because Sir Hercules Robinson says in the despatch of the 24th— I had the honour, on the 15th, to despatch a telegram to your Lordship. I should like to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies where the text of that telegram is which is mentioned in the despatch of the 24th? I find a subsequent reference to the telegram on the 17th; perhaps that may be the one. The despatch says— At Rooi-Grond, the position is calling for immediate consideration, as the freebooters have invaded the Protectorate, and have taken possession of Montsioa's country, and there is only the choice of turning the freebooters out by force, or abandoning Bechuanaland. Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower reported that the Rooi-Grond, and Zululand movements are said to be believed to have been instigated by Transvaal officials. I ought to have mentioned to the House that the reason for delay counselled on the 11th was that Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower were expected to arrive immediately, and therefore that telegram was despatched. The despatch further states— That Mr. Rhodes was of opinion that if it were only known that Her Majesty's Government were determined to maintain the Protectorate by force of arms,"— the old story all over the world— it might be possible, even then, to make an arrangement which would clear Montsioa's country without fighting. Sir Hercules Robinson concluded by saying that if Her Majesty's Government should decide to enforce the Protectorate, he would recommend that Mr. Rhodes should be authorized, on his return to Bechuanaland, to announce that decision, and to avail himself of any opening for a possible settlement. Sir Hercules Robinson said— The case was one calling for immediate decision, before the Rooi-Gronders established themselves at their farms. That was the despatch forming the telegram of the 15th of September. On the 17th, there was another telegram giving the full details of all the attacks made on Montsioa and of Snyman's mission, and adding that the accounts had not been disavowed; and there was a telegram on the same day from the State Secretary of the Transvaal, stating that— Being implored by Montsioa, the Transvaal Government had taken him under their protection. A statement which the Earl of Derby, from information already in his hands, knew to be a deliberate misstatement of the fact. After that, will the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade say anything about excusable delay? We have now reached the 17th of September. On the 21st, the Earl of Derby is still most attentively considering all these telegrams; and he telegraphs to Sir Hercules Robinson to know the extent of the co-operation which would be given by the Capo Colony if active steps were taken. [An ton. MEMBER: Hear, hear!] Some hon. Member seems to think that that was a very fair telegram. So it was, but it might have been sent with a little less delay. On the 23rd he gets an answer to his telegram stating that no assistance was to be expected from the Cape Colony except in the event of annexation, and referring him to a despatch in which it was stated most distinctly that it was only proposed to recommend the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony on certain conditions, one of which was that the British Government should pay every 6d. of expense incurred up to the day of annexation, and from that declaration the Cape Government have never for a single moment swerved; so that on the 23rd the Earl of Derby knew very well that the Cape Government would give no pecuniary assistance, and no assistance of any kind to the operation of turning the freebooters out of the Montsioas Territory, although, when they were turned out, the Cape Government were perfectly willing to annex the territory. Sir Hercules Robinson became evidently anxious at the delay which the President of the Board of Trade says did no harm, because on the 24th, the next day, he telegraphed again to the Earl of Derby respecting the telegram of the 17th, which is also not printed, and which cannot be the same telegram as that mentioned as of the 11th.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

These despatches take the place of telegrams. When there is a formal despatch it is not the custom to print the telegram, the two being word for word the same.

MR. GORST

This is a despatch, then, confirming the previous telegram?

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

Yes.

MR. GORST

Very well. A despatch was sent on the 17th, and would be received on the same day. In the despatch of the 24th, Sir Hercules Robinson points out that the steps taken by the Transvaal Government in placing Montsioa under the protection of the Republic, was an open and defiant violation of the Convention. He says— I pointed out that this was simply the annexation by the Transvaal of about one-half of the British Protectorate, and was an open and defiant violation of the Convention. It appeared to me clear that the choice of Her Majesty's Government lay between the abandonment of the Protectorate and the Convention, or an announcement that existing engagements would be insisted on, if necessary, by force of arms. The first telegram arrived on the 6th of September, and on the 17th you find Sir Hercules Robinson laying down, in the most distinct way, that the only choice was between the abandonment of the Protectorate and the immediate announcement that existing engagements would be insisted on, if necessary, by the force of arms; and yet the President of the Board of Trade says there was no unjustifiable delay. The delay did not stop there. The Earl of Derby still sat doing nothing. On the 1st of October, the Transvaal Government became impatient. They reminded him that they had sent telegrams, and they seem to have had some misgiving lest the wicked organs of public opinion might produce some undue effect on the pliant and gentle mind of the Earl of Derby, because they commence their telegram by saying— I trust this matter will not succeed in disturbing friendly relations. Well, the Earl of Derby does nothing; but "justifiable delay" still goes on, and on the 6th of October his officer at the Cape endeavours further to stir him up. Sir Hercules Robinson telegraphs on October 6th, to say that greater delay will greatly increase the difficulties of any settlement, and it was not until the receipt of that telegram that the Earl of Derby took any action at all. On the 7th of October he did take action, and the action he took was to send a telegram to the High Commissioner, not making the heroic announcement which the High Commissioner desired, and which he said was the only alternative to the abandonment of the Protectorate, but saying— I informed you by telegraph yesterday that Her Majesty's Government desired you, on receiving the concurrence of your Ministers,"— To do what? To turn the freebooters out of Montsioa's territory? No; but— to call upon the Government of the South African Republic to annul the recent acts by which it acquired jurisdiction over the Chief Montsioa, as a violation of the Convention of 1884. So that, after whole months of delay, being pressed by his officer to come to some decision of some kind, he at last screws himself up, on the 7th of October, to desire the South African Republic to annul its recent acts. But the High Commissioner, on the 11th of October, in informing the Earl of Derby that the Government of the Transvaal had annulled its recent acts, goes on thus— Practically, this withdrawal leaves matters unchanged in Montsioa's country, which is in possession of the freebooters calling themselves the Government of Goshen, who are parcelling out the land among themselves. I have asked Ministers what part they will be prepared to take, and as soon as I receive an answer will advise fully as to the measures I consider necessary for expelling marauders. Sir Hercules Robinson, two days after, on the 13th of October, sent a full and perfect sketch of the measures he considered necessary, and on the same date he informed the Earl of Derby again that the Cape would do nothing except what was indicated in the Memorandum of July 6th, that being the answer they had given on the 23rd of September, and the answer from which they had never swerved. Sir Hercules Robinson does not seem to have had faith in his official superior, because, on the 14th of October, he again telegraphs to the Earl of Derby, and in his last telegram he says— I think, the Proclamation having been withdrawn, the Government of the South African Republic should now be informed that Her Majesty's Government are determined to expel the freebooters from Montsioa's country, if necessary by force of arms; and that Her Majesty's Government expect the Government of the South African Republic to carry out in good faith the Convention of 1884. With that last attempt to stir up the mind of the Earl of Derby the telegraphic correspondence ends, and what further despatches may have passed since the 4th of October we do not know. But we know one thing, and that is, that the Earl of Derby, from the 6th of September down to the present time, has never yet made that announcement which the High Commissioner at the Cape says is the only alternative to the abandonment of our Protectorate of Bechuanaland—an announcement to the Transvaal Government and the freebooters, that the latter will, if necessary, be expelled by force from Montsioa's territory. The Earl of Derby has known all these things. I suppose now, after what has been stated by the President of the Board of Trade, he will defend the course which has been taken, and say that there has been no unnecessary delay; but I should like to hear the argument by which he justifies it. The position of the Transvaal was known to the Earl of Derby on the 6th of September. After more delay up to October 11th, he knew that the Proclamation was withdrawn; but he knew that matters remained just as they were, and he has been pressed three or four times, as I have shown, in telegrams from Sir Hercules Robinson, to make the announcement which would pledge the British Government to the restitution of the land taken by the freebooters, and that announcement he has never yet made. One thing is perfectly clear, and that is, that the views of the Cape Government and the views of the British Government are directly opposed in this matter. The Cape Government have now gone upon a sort of Roving Commission to Rooi-Grond for the purpose of making terms with the freebooters—of settling matters with them as they settled with the freebooters of Stellaland, and of leaving them in the same way to remain in possession of a portion of Montsioa's territory, persuading Montsioa to agree to allow the matter to be patched up in some sort of way or other. The policy of the High Commissioner is to declare to the freebooters and to the whole world that, coûte qui coûte, the British Government will turn these men out of Montsioa's territory, and restore him to his possessions. I have said enough to show the House that this is an important matter and an urgent matter. It is very important and urgent as regards Montsioa. His three months' enjoyment of our protection, and his two months in the hands of his enemies in absolute subjugation to them, must make him, at all events, somewhat impatient at the decision of the dilatory Earl of Derby. But important as this question is in regard to Montsioa, I think it is ten-fold more important as regards our own position in reference to South Africa. The Earl of Derby, before the deputation which waited upon him yesterday, made use of some very brave words; but they were very general words, and did not pledge him to any particular or specific line of policy. But I do not think that our position in South Africa can be maintained now by mere brave words. The incidents which I have described to the House show that our authority and our protection have been scoffed at and trampled upon, not only by the South African Republic, but even by the little Republic of Goshen. Our allies, immediately after our protection has been accorded them, have been slaughtered and subjugated. Our protection has proved utterly futile, and our promises to these Native Chiefs have been ignominiously broken. Under these circumstances, Mr. Speaker, I think I am justified in asking the House, for the sake of the preservation of the honour and interests of Great Britain, to address Her Majesty in the words of which I have given Notice.

Amendment proposed, To insert in the ninth paragraph, after the words "us," the words "humbly to express our regret that Her Majesty's Government should have assumed a formal protectorate over Bechuanaland without taking effectual precautions to prevent Montsioa from being conquered by freebooters domiciled and organised in the Transvaal under the sanction of its Government: And, further, to express our regret that, after Her Majesty's Government had received full information of the forcible appropriation of Montsioa's land by the Rooi-Grond freebooters, delay, greatly increasing the difficulties of any settlement, has been permitted to take place in announcing the intention of Her Majesty's Government to turn out the freebooters, by force if necessary, from the territory under Her Majesty's protection."—(Mr. Gorst.)

Question proposed, "That those words be there inserted."

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

The hon and learned Member was certainly right in saying that the matter is one which contains important points, and my answer is that Her Majesty's Government have already dealt with all those important points, and that it is not necessary to enter at any length into the other matters referred to by the hon. and learned Gentleman. I shall therefore answer the hon. and learned Gentleman very shortly. The first part of the hon. and learned Member's speech was devoted to what he called the first three months of the period over which these Papers extend, and he worked upon the feelings of the House, and no doubt would succeed in working upon the feelings of people outside, by reading a harrowing account of what these freebooters have done during that period. I am not here at this Table to say that those accounts are not harrowing; I am not here to say that the Transvaal Government have done all that they ought to have done; but what I am here to say, and what I do say, is that Her Majesty's Government are not to blame for what has taken place during those three months. The position assumed by Her Majesty's Government was that they, having concluded a Convention with the Transvaal Government, which they had every reason and every right to look upon as a Convention that would be observed, proposed to declare a Protectorate over the territory, and to provide the force necessary for maintaining the police required to keep order in that territory. The position we assumed, with the full consent of this House, related only to matters of police. In conjunction and consultation with Sir Hercules Robinson, we selected Mr. Mackenzie to go out as Deputy Commissioner, and in concert with Sir Hercules Robinson and Mr. Mackenzie, it was settled before they left England what was the force which, in their opinion, was required to maintain order on the border of the territory. Sir Hercules Robinson and Mr. Mackenzie went out to that country armed with full power to raise the force which had been settled as being the necessary force, and Her Majesty's Government have refused no demand made by the High Commissioner for the means of carrying out the arrangement thus entered into. It is, no doubt, quite true, as the hon. and learned Member says, that this force was not ready and fully organized until the end of June or the 1st of July; but Her Majesty's Government were not responsible for that. They could not undertake to order about a police force in local districts thousands of miles away. They left it in the hands of men on the spot, who knew the local requirements, and were acquainted with the local circumstances, to arrange the working of the force. In justice to Sir Hercules Robinson and Mr. Mackenzie, I have laid on the Table of the House to-day a copy of the telegrams with respect to the raising of the Bechuanaland police force, so as to show the difficulties they had to contend with in raising that force. There were difficulties both in regard to horses, accoutrements, and the raising of the men, and this Correspondence had been omitted from the other Papers; but when I saw the question was going to be raised, I thought it was right that the telegrams which had passed between Her Majesty's Government and Mr. Mackenzie should be published, so as to show the difficulties which had to be contended with in getting the force together. Mr. Mackenzie went up to Montsioa's territory, and, as the hon. and learned Member says, up to the time of his arrival comparative peace had existed there. From the moment of his arrival the attacks on Montsioa began, and there was no police force there to protect him. Mr. Mackenzie knows the country far better than we do, and he had complete discretion to go as far as he liked to go, and to proclaim a Protectorate whenever he thought it would be most useful to proclaim that Protectorate. If Mr. Mackenzie thought it better not to wait for the presence of an organized police force, but to proclaim the Protectorate and to go up himself to Montsioa's house without a police force, I am not going to criticize his acts. These are the circumstances which have occurred, and it is very easy to be wise after the event. As far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, they undertook to provide that force which the Deputy Commissioner and the High Commissioner considered indispensable. Every facility was given by Her Majesty's Government for the raising of the force, and Her Majesty's Government regretted the circumstances that prevented the force from being raised as rapidly as they expected. It appeared that it would take two or three months to organize that force, and if Mr. Mackenzie had stood by, and had delayed proclaiming a Protectorate until the police force was ready, I think the hon. and learned Member would have had much more serious fault to find than he does now. It was then, as the hon. and learned Member says, that the Transvaal Government came upon the scene. The hon. and learned Member has condemned the Colonial Office for having, when it came to the conclusion that force must be used—a forcible demand made upon the Transvaal Government to withdraw their Proclamation—the hon. and learned Member complains that we did not send direct to the freebooters, but sent direct to the Transvaal Government. Was it not natural that Her Majesty's Government should communicate with the Government of the Sovereign State, and not with mere individuals? I have yet to learn that when the Sovereign State comes forward, acting as a State, that we are to pass by an act of a Sovereign Power, and to address ourselves to certain individuals who may be acting under the control of that Sovereign Power. It seems to me that Her Majesty's Government were bound, when they had these facts brought before them, to take immediate notice of them, and to call upon the Transvaal Government to withdraw from the attitude it had assumed. As soon as that Government had withdrawn from the position it assumed, Her Majesty's Government proceeded to announce their intentions in reference to the freebooters. The hon. and learned Member says that Her Majesty's Government have never yet announced their intentions. I am perfectly astonished at that statement. It seems to me that Her Majesty's Government have been doing nothing for the last fortnight or three weeks except announcing their intentions by their acts. They have already announced in this House that Sir Charles Warren is going out as Commissionner, and I have read the telegram announcing that he is going out. Let me take this Blue Book. What is thereon page 139? I find there a telegraphic despatch from the Earl of Derby to Sir Hercules Robinson, dated October 18, in which he says— I have the honour to acquaint you that I have had before me your despatch of the 17th of September, transmitting a communication from the State Secretary of the South African Republic respecting the action of the State with regard to the marauders in Montsioa's territory. I fail to see in the arguments in this despatch, or in the action taken by the Government of the Republic, anything which can alter the view which Her Majesty's Government have taken, that the Republic should be held responsible for any expenses which may be incurred in expelling and punishing these marauders. The fact is, that if hon. Members expect to have every Paper laid on the Table the day it is sent away, I can only say that that would be a very novel thing. This Blue Book is really brought up to the 23rd of October. On the 22nd of October the Earl of Derby sent a telegram to Sir Hercules Robinson, the last paragraph of which referred to the telegram from Sir Hercules Robinson to the effect that an intimation should be conveyed to the South African Republic that steps would be taken against the freebooters. The hon. and learned Member has complained that that telegram has not been answered.

MR. GORST

Upon what date was it received?

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

It was received, I think, about the second week in October.

MR. GORST

On the 17th?

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

Yes; I think it was. The reply forwarded on the 22nd states— Referring to your telegram, I approve of the suggested communication with the Government of the South African Republic. That was the instruction sent to Sir Hercules Robinson to communicate to the Transvaal Government. On the 29th of October we telegraphed to Sir Hercules Robinson saying that Sir Charles "Warren had been selected as Special Commissioner of Bechuanaland, and giving directions as to what steps should be taken. Therefore, I am at a loss to follow what the hon. and learned Gentleman means by saying that Her Majesty's Government have made no announcement or declaration of their intention to use force if necessary. The hon. and learned Member, when the next Blue Book comes out, which I expect will be very shortly, will see all that we have done; but I can assure him that there has been no delay in sending out information as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. With regard to the delay which the hon. and learned Member has mentioned between the first receipt of the news of the action of the Transvaal Government and the final telegram of the 7th of October, in which Her Majesty's Government called upon the South African Republic to withdraw from the position they had assumed, I may shortly say that the question was a very delicate and a very critical one. Her Majesty's Government were making up their minds to a step which might lead to very serious consequences in South Africa, and which required to be very deliberately considered, and, first of all, they were anxious to ascertain from the High Commissioner what the circumstances of the Cape Government were. Considering the gravity of the step which Her Majesty's Government have taken, nobody can fairly say that three or four weeks was a long time to take in the settlement of a matter of this kind. It is now quite clear what steps Her Majesty's Government intend to take. The hon. and learned Gentleman must remember that this is not a Departmental matter, but a matter which must be settled and considered by the Ministry as a Cabinet. I do not think it necessary to detain the House any longer on these questions. As to the first part, we say that we did all we could be expected to do; and as to the second part, we say that there has been no greater delay than was necessary under the gravity of the circumstances.

SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) has, I think, notwithstanding the debate which took place the other day, done good service in calling the attention of the House and the country to the new light thrown upon this question by the Blue Book recently published. I cannot agree with the defence which the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down has made—namely, that a great deal of the speech of my hon. and learned Friend was a matter of past narrative, and that it is easy to be wise after the event. We have heard that before in reference to South African affairs; and although we do not wish to renew the debate of Wednesday last, or to repeat the arguments I and many others addressed to the House in support of the view which has again been presented this evening on fuller information by my hon. and learned Friend, yet I think the opinion of the country, after reading the debate of to-night, in addition to the debate which took place last Wednesday, will be diametrically opposed to that expressed by the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. We do complain, not only on this side, but on all sides of the House, that during the last few months the sufferings of Montsioa have been mainly due to the delay of Her Majesty's Government in making the Protectorate a reality. Her Majesty's Government are absolutely responsible for the failure to make it a reality, because they cannot throw upon Sir Hercules Robinson, or Mr. Mackenzie, the responsibility of the delay in the organization of the police force which the hon. Gentleman has alluded to again this evening. They cannot, by casting the responsibility of this delay upon their subordinates, relieve themselves from the charge of having failed to carry out their own promises to Parliament. My object in addressing the House this evening is rather to call attention to the future than to the past. I do not know whether my hon. and learned Friend intends to divide the House upon his Amendment; but I apprehend that he has proposed it with the idea of calling attention to the subject rather than with any wish to divide. It does seem to me that the Papers contained in the Blue Book last presented justify us in viewing the future in a graver light than before, because they appear to hold out much less hope of a peaceful settlement than that put forward by the Earl of Derby speaking on behalf of the Government. Now, I think my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) very properly remarked that every day which passes makes the settlement of this question more and more difficult. This delay, which is not the delay of one month, as the hon. Gentleman has just stated, but of something like two months, in taking active measures, has already enabled these freebooters practically to possess themselves of the territory of this unfortunate Chief. Every day makes that possession more secure, and gives time for them to be strengthened by the addition of other persons of the same character. Sir Hercules Robinson has stated what in his opinion is necessary for their removal by force—namely, 1,200 troops; but it is highly probable that if there is further delay that force will have to be materially increased. We have not yet received any definite statement from Her Majesty's Government as to the precise measures that are to be taken. I thought just now that the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies was going to tell us. He alluded to a telegram which had been sent on the 29th of October, informing Sir Hercules Robinson of the appointment of Sir Charles Warren as Special Commissioner to Bechuanaland, and giving directions as to what steps should be taken. He did not read that telegram, or we might have been informed what steps were to be taken. So far, the only step before us is that Her Majesty's Government have decided on giving permission to the Cape Government to attempt to settle the matter by peaceful negotiations, and we have seen in the newspapers this morning a statement that two of the most prominent Ministers of the Cape Ministry are about to set out for Bechuanaland in order to make that attempt. What I am anxious to call the attention of the House to particularly is the opinion which has been expressed in these Papers by Sir Hercules Robinson, whose authority everyone will admit, on the probable success or failure of such an attempt as this. First of all, let us remember what the view of Her Majesty's Government is as to the result which should be aimed at. I take it that I shall be justified in saying, from the opinions they have expressed on this matter, that they have made up their minds—first, that those persons among the freebooters who can be found guilty of such crimes as are detailed in the Blue Books shall be duly punished; and, in the second place, that the freebooters shall be removed from the lands they have improperly taken possession of, and Montsioa and his tribe shall be restored in full possession of those lands of which they were in possession at the time the British Protectorate was proclaimed. That, however, is not at all the view of the Cape Ministry, so far as I can judge of their view by this Correspondence, as to what should be effected by these peaceful negotiations. Their idea is the possibility of the annexation of this territory of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony. I find them, on the 13th of October, proposing that one of them should proceed to Bechuanaland for the purpose of communicating with its inhabitants, and endeavouring to restore order and effect a peaceful settlement without the intervention of armed force. And then, again, on the 17th of October, they say— They thought the expulsion of the marauders by force from Montsioa's country would entail great responsibility on Her Majesty's Government, and render annexation difficult, if not impossible. They further stated their opinion— That the consent of the Goshenites is absolutely necessary to render the proposed annexation possible. How is it likely that those people who are to be removed will consent to their removal from the very territory which they have wrongly appropriated in de fiance of Her Majesty's Government? What does Sir Hercules Robinson say upon this point? I think his observations are well worthy the consideration of the House, and that they deserve greater attention than they appear to have received from Her Majesty's Government. Sir Hercules Robinson says— It appears to me this (the proposal of the Cape Government) is, in effect, that Her Majesty's Government should suspend all operations and withdraw the Imperial authority from the Protectorate while the Cape Ministers proceed without any responsibility on a tour of inspection and inquiry. I do not think, in the absence of any evidence of force, Ministers would have the slightest chance of effecting an arrangement which, asregards Montsioa's country, would be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government. The result would be that three valuable months would be lost, the Goshenites would become settled in the possession of Montsioa's country, and the Protectorate would revert to Her Majesty's Government in a worse position than it is at present. He goes on to say— Again, it appears to me necessary for the vindication of British honour and authority that the marauders be removed from the lands which were in possession of Montsioa when he was formally taken under British protection. This, I feel convinced, can now only be effected by force. Well, Sir, that is the opinion of Sir Hercules Robinson; but, Sir, the Earl of Derby appears to have declined to accept that opinion, and to have preferred that of the Cape Government. I think that the Earl of Derby must have sent some telegram to the Cape Government requesting their mediation in the matter. [Mr. EVELYN ASHLEY: No.] Well, but wait a moment. On the first day of the meeting of Parliament, the Earl of Derby said— The Cape has offered to negotiate with the Boers, and believe that they can obtain a peaceable departure from that country. We have telegraphed that they are free to carry out their negotiations. That telegram does not appear in these Papers, and I should very much like to know the terms of that telegram and the precise instructions the Earl of Derby gave on the point. Sir Hercules Robinson suggested— That the Cape Ministers should be told that no arrangements will be satisfactory which do not secure for Montsioa and his tribe the lands which were in their use and occupation in May last when they were formally taken under British protection. That is the view which I understand to be accepted, and which I am con vinced will be the opinion of Parliament and of the whole country. But do the Cape Ministry understand that this is the arrangement they are to endeavour to secure, and that Her Majesty's Government will be satisfied with nothing less? Because, if they do, I confess I am surprised at the views they have themselves expressed in regard to the undertaking of these negotiations. The Cape Ministry can hardly expect to be able to remove the freebooters from Bechuanaland without force after what they have stated on the subject. If, on the other hand, the Cape Government are under the impression that they can make some kind of arrangement for the annexation of this territory which should not safeguard the interests of those Natives who have been directly taken under the British Protectorate, and who are, therefore, in an exceptional position, then they must intend to make some arrangement which will not secure that the views stated in this House by Her Majesty's Government shall be carried out. If this is in contemplation, it would be a surrender of the whole Protectorate, and the most fatal act that the Government could be guilty of towards the Natives of South Africa. I hope we shall have some statement on this point from the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade which will assure us whether the intentions of Her Majesty's Government are thoroughly accepted and understood by the Capo Ministry, and whether it is the resolution of Her Majesty's Government to carry out the punishment of the criminals, to remove the freebooters, and not to lose a moment in making the necessary military preparations for the use of such force as may be required. I am convinced that if this is not clearly laid down, the time is much nearer than we think, when, notwithstanding the words of the Earl of Derby, we shall have to encounter a most serious struggle in South Africa, if we are to maintain British authority in that country.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

Sir, in the remarks which the right hon. Gentleman has just addressed to the House he stated that he was unable to acquit Her Majesty's Government of blame in this matter, and that the House had a right to complain that during the past three months there had been great delay on their part in coming to the rescue of Montsioa. But if I may venture to make a complaint, it would be that the Gentlemen who have addressed the House on this question—the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) and the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down—have seemed to ignore the real difficulties of the situation. Now, the right hon. Gentleman has had so great experience in reference to South African questions, that I am sure he knows it is not the easy business which it would appear to the House to be, if we had to take account of nothing else than has been referred to by the hon. and learned Member for Chatham. If it were merely a question of punishing a few hundreds of marauders and border ruffians who had committed grave outrages, even in a distant territory, then there would have been, I admit, no excuse for the delay which has taken place, and the matter would have been one which the power of the Government ought long ago to have sot right. But I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman—he knows that behind this difficulty of the marauders there are great and serious Imperial questions which even a great Power like this cannot contemplate raising without the gravest deliberation. Behind these border ruffians there may be, unless the greatest caution is exhibited in dealing with them, the whole feeling and power of the Transvaal State and the Free State, and behind them the whole power of the Dutch population of South Africa. If we were to be set face to face with these, although I do not say we might not come victoriously out of the tremendous struggle that might result in that distant and difficult country, yet we should have embroiled the two races in South Africa, and disordered for an indefinite period the prosperity and welfare of that Colony. Well, Sir, these are serious questions which each Government in their turn have had to keep in mind. The late Government went with rather a light heart into South Africa, and they came out of it, I think, sadder and wiser men; and they ought not to blame us if, in the view of possible events, we are deliberately long-suffering and patient, and do all in our power to prevent the contingencies I have alluded to. Now, the policy of the Government is this—that we are determined, at all hazards, to use our whole strength if necessary to maintain the obligations we have entered into. In doing that we are determined, if we can, to proceed with the assent of our Colonial fellow-subjects generally—not of the British population of South Africa alone, but with the majority of the Dutch population also. We have endeavoured by all possible and reasonable means to conciliate the Dutch population, and to carry them with us in the extreme measures which it may be necessary for us to take. Well, Sir, that is my justification of this delay. When I was speaking on this subject a few days ago, I had only a few minutes in which to explain myself, and it was then impossible for me to make my meaning as clear to the House as I wished it to be. But I repeat that, step by step, we have endeavoured to carry with us the Dutch population, and up to this time I am able to say that we have been to a large extent successful. But the right hon. Gentleman opposite says that the views of the British Government and the Cape Government are diametrically opposed. [Sir MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH: No, no.] Well, then, as that is putting it too strongly, I will say that oven now there are differences between the British Government and the Cape Government. The Cape Government is at the present time a Dutch Government; it represents principally Dutch opinion in the Colony; and, no doubt, they are prepared to make larger concessions to those who are of the same race as themselves, than we might be inclined to do. But we have so far secured their assent to our proceedings, that they have agreed to take over this territory as part of the Cape Colony as soon as the freebooters have been removed from the land which they have invaded, and to make such arrangements as will in future preserve order in the territory; and in the meantime they do not resist the measures which the Imperial Government may think it necessary to take. We have been asked as to the details of the mission intrusted to Sir Charles Warren. That it is a Military Mission I will say, and it will be for the War Office to state what details can be published; but I am sure that it will not be for the interest of the State to make public the details of the orders given to Sir Charles Warren. The Government haviug announced their intention of send ing Sir Charles Warren with a military force to maintain our obligations generally, in the first instance, the Cape Government made an offer to endeavour to negotiate and arrange, if possible, for an amicable settlement. That proposal related only to the time during which the military preparations are going on, and, of course, some period would elapse before Sir Charles Warren, with the force at his disposal, would be ready to act. Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, accepted the proposal of the Cape Government, subject to these conditions—that the military preparations shall go on; that active military operations shall not be delayed by the action of the Cape Government; that any arrangements which the Cape Government may be able to make shall be subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and those arrangements shall of necessity comprise such conditions as will practically restore Montsioa to the position which he occupied when the British Protectorate was announced. These are the conditions under which alone the Cape Government will negotiate, and under which alone Her Majesty's Government have given their approval to the proposal of the Cape Government. If the Cape Government should be unsuccessful—and I am bound to say that I rather share the fears of hon. Gentlemen opposite, that not very much will come from these peaceful negotiations—then Sir Charles Warren has distinct instructions to remove the freebooters from the land which they have unlawfully occupied, and replace Montsioa in the position in which he was when the British Protectorate was announced. Sir, I hope I have made perfectly clear what is the position taken up by Her Majesty's Government. Although we are aware of the difficulty and the danger that will have to be faced, Her Majesty's Government feel that the obligations they have undertaken are so sacred that there is no alternative but to carry them out with all the force which the country may place at their disposal.

MR. GORST

I should like, if the House will allow me, to withdraw my Amendment after the statement of the right hon. Gentleman, which is quite satisfactory.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question put, and agreed to.

Committee appointed, to draw up an Address to be presented to Her Majesty upon the said Resolution:—Mr. STAFFORD HOWARD, Mr. SUMMERS, Mr. GLADSTONE, The Marquess of HARTINGTON, Secretary Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT, Sir CHARLES DILKE, Mr. CHAMBERLAIN, The LORD ADVOCATE, Mr. HIBBERT, Mr. CROSS, Lord RICHARD GROSYENOR, and Lord KENSINGTON: Five to be the quorum:—To withdraw immediately:—Queen's Speech referred.