§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, he wished to call the attention of the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the recent advance of Russia. He had asked the noble Lord that afternoon the distance which had been covered by the Russian Forces from the Caspian towards India since the present Government came into Office. At the outset of the few observations he was about to make, he must beg the indulgence of hon. Members opposite who were in the habit of regarding reference to these advances as the views of alarmists, and not justified by the facts of the case. The question was one which had altogether passed out of the region of controversy. It was a subject of the gravest national and Imperial importance; and there could not be the least doubt that many of those who were once accustomed to ridicule the danger to their Indian Empire which these advances involved had now ceased to ridicule, and regarded them with apprehension, if not with alarm. The noble Lord had given that afternoon an answer which he would be very sorry to describe as disingenuous, but which was certainly altogether wide of the facts of the case. He stated that the Russian Forces had advanced so many miles in 1878, and so many miles in 1879; but he had omitted to state to the House the important truth that this was merely a temporary advance, and that the forces engaged in it were badly defeated by the Turkoman Tribes, and compelled to fall back upon the Caspian At that moment there was good reason to believe that a Russian Army was in possession of Sarakhs. The noble Lord seemed to think it a matter of no importance that the great Military Power of the Czar should have covered a distance of 500 miles onwards in the direction of our Indian Empire since the year 1880. It was of no use to quibble about Old and New Sarakhs, because the two towns were opposite each other on the banks of a river which was easily passable; 1096 and it was not likely that the miserable Persian garrison there would be able to offer any opposition to the Russian Army advancing beyond it. Now, the seriousness of this advance was not to be disputed, and he recommended any hon. Member who wished fully to realize the gravity of the question to read the report of a remarkable lecture delivered by Sir Edward Hamley at the Royal Institution. This accurately described the great danger to their Indian Empire that was involved in the advance of Russia. He might also refer to a statement which appeared a few weeks ago in the Russian semi-official newspaper of the Caucasus, and which stated plainly the position of the Russian Army at the present time. He did not, of course, admit the correctness of the opening statement; but the article was to the effect that if the Russians desired it they could undoubtedly acquire India, and that their policy was to liberate the people of India from the British yoke. That plain-spoken article actually revelled in pointing out the change of front and bearing on the part of Russian officials towards this country. Time was when this Russian advance was concealed, but that was no longer necessary; rather it was held in terrorem over this country as a lever which would be exercised in case of ail European or any other struggle. The danger of the position lay in the Russian Forces having acquired a fresh basis of operations close to the Afghan Frontier; they had shown their power by acquiring as allies the independent races which intervened between them and Afghanistan. They were pushing their outposts steadily onwards; they had advanced even more than the distance of 500 miles of which he had spoken, and already deputations from the Turkoman Tribes bordering on Afghanistan, and some actually within the Afghan limits, had gone to the Czar's Representatives at Merv and offered their submission. It ought also to be remembered that Prince Dondoukoff-Korsakoff was actually at Merv. No doubt that name appeared formidable, and it should remind hon. Members opposite that it belonged to the Russian official who was so successful in 1878 in Russianizing Bulgaria. That Prince had been sent to do the same work amongst the Turkoman Tribes which he had so vigorously performed in Roumelia, The 1097 Indian Government had nothing to trust to but their ill-guarded frontier, stripped of its defensive power and strength by the action of the present Cabinet. He understood the Government were pushing forward from Sibi to Quetta the railway which was abandoned some four years ago, and that efforts were being made to find out a frontier from Quetta northwards. In fact, the Government were doing secretly what they blamed the Government of Lord Beaconsfield for doing openly. So long as British troops were in Candahar they had a really great defensive position. They had a grasp of Afghanistan. They held then such a strong position that they could safely have treated the Russian advance with ridicule. At the present moment they had no practical strategic position in Afghanistan. They were fortifying Quetta certainly; they believed the Government were pushing forward the construction of the railway to Quetta; but, on the other hand, the Russians were pushing on their railway; it was said it had been extended another 100 miles. It was significant of the extreme ignorance and secretiveness of the Government that it was not known how far the Russian railway had advanced. That was a point on which the Government ought to give the Committee the fullest information. They had an Agent at Meshed, which was not far from the Russian advance posts; and, by means of Native spies, the British Agent at Meshed, and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Teheran, ought to have been able to give the fullest information concerning the construction of the Russian railway. They were told the other day that great preparations were being made by Russia for an advance on India. That advance was no longer a matter of great alarm; it was no longer a question for the contempt of the Prime Minister, nor to be treated as an old woman's fears. It was an actual danger close at hand, which must be met by vigorous precautions, and by the most prudent military preparations. This question differed very much, indeed, from the other important questions which were now under the consideration of the House and of the country; it differed from their difficulties in regard to Egypt, and from their difficulties with regard to Ireland. Any of those difficulties might be settled the moment the Government was reso- 1098 lute, when the Government made up their mind as to a fixed policy, and when they enlisted the support of the country. The Egyptian and Irish difficulties lay within the grasp of England to settle; but the advance of a great and overwhelming Military Power towards their Indian Frontier might reach a point when it was not within the power of this country to deal with it. That point had not yet been reached, but they were fast approaching it. The time would come when, having given up all the great positions which Nature, and circumstances, and Providence—[Laughter] He was sorry to hear hon. Members laugh at a statement of that kind. He maintained that when they had given up the great positions which Nature, and circumstances, and Providence —[Renewed laughter.]—had placed within their power, this country might find itself in the face of a force majeure which it would be impossible to cope with. It was one thing to deal with small difficulties and small forces in Egypt; it was one thing to deal with difficulties which might arise close at our doors—in Ireland; but it was quite another thing to hurl back the enormous Military Power of Russia, more especially would it be difficult to resist, especially when the British Government had deliberately given up to Russia all those natural bulwarks and coigns of vantage which they once possessed, and which it was still in their power to regain, but which they were abandoning in the face of the clearest warnings and most imminent danger. There could be no doubt as to the course which the Government ought to take. There would, perhaps, be two or three years of comparative quiet, during which the Czar's Administrators and Generals would be organizing the Turkoman Tribes, and preparing them for an advance on India, during which they would be intriguing in Afghanistan and India itself. He reminded the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the unfortunate tone of the Native Press of India with respect to the Russian advance. The Indian Native Press seemed to have taken a unanimous cue —he did not know from what source, it might be inspired by the Russian Government; but, from whatever source they took the cue, they undoubtedly were writing about the Russian ad- 1099 vance, about its advantage to the Indian people, about the leverage it gave the Natives of India over the English Government. Their position with regard to the advance of Russia towards India was one which merited the very careful attention of the Ministry, who ought at once to take steps to complete not only the road but the railway to Quetta. They should have a most perfect understanding with the Ameer on this question, and they should be in a position to put other pressure upon him than that which mere bribes would produce in case of an actual advance of a Russian Force upon India. The Russian paper he had quoted foreshadowed the dangers which might arise in regard to Afghanistan. They had comparatively little to offer Afghanistan in comparison with what the Russians had to offer them. The Afghans had been for 800 years the traditional raiders upon India, and they knew that they had more to gain by a free right to invade and pillage India, which an alliance with Russia would give them, than they had to gain by our casual subsidies. He again asserted that it was important that they should not only hold influence over the Ameer by bribes, but that they should be in a position to put actual military pressure upon him if that were needed. For that purpose a railway to Candahar was an absolute necessity. They should not allow this dangerous advance to continue, lest an actual invasion of India might be made when they were least prepared to meet it, when, perhaps, they were at war with another Power, or, perhaps, when they had a serious revolution at home. He asked the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in justice to his character for accuracy, to withdraw the statement he made that afternoon, or, at all events, to contradict the inference which would be drawn from that statement—namely, that in the years 1878 and 1879 the Russian Forces advanced 150 or 200 miles eastwards. It was clear that that was a temporary inroad which ended in a disastrous defeat, and which could not be justly or fairly described as an advance in any way similar to the permanent conquest and annexation which had since taken place.
§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICEsaid, the hon. Member seemed to have forgotten that at the commencement of 1100 the Session there was a regular discussion on this question, which was brought before the House in a very able speech by the hon. Gentleman who was the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope) in the late Government. Speeches on that occasion were made by the noble Lord the Member for Middlesex (Lord George Hamilton), by the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke), by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), and by himself. When he called to mind the speech which the hon. Member then made, he could not find that the hon. Gentleman had that night introduced any new matter, except the charge of inaccuracy against him (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice). And that, indeed, was not exactly new matter, because the hon. Gentleman was so often charging him with inaccuracy. The hon. Member's indignation against the President of the Local Government Board was even greater than it was against him. If he held his present Office much longer he felt that the accumulation of indignation in the breast of the hon. Member would overwhelm him; but he should, however, in that case, be able to console himself with the reflection that it was all owing to what the hon. Gentleman called "Nature, circumstances, and Providence." The hon. Member deprecated making this a Party question; but what had he himself done? For the last two or three days he had had a Question on the Paper, which could only tend to make it a Party matter. The hon. Gentleman had desired to ascertain, through the Question he had placed upon the Paper, by how many miles the Russian Frontier had been advanced during the tenure of Office of the present Government, and by how many miles the Russian Frontier was advanced during the time of the late Government. He quite agreed with what was said by the hon. Member, and also by the hon. Gentleman (Mr. E. Stanhope), on the former occasion when this subject was discussed, that it was undesirable to make this a Party question if it could be avoided; and he asked the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) to set the example himself. The hon. Gentleman had appealed to him to withdraw the statement he made earlier in the evening as to the extent to which the Russians advanced 1101 in 1879. He was very sorry to disappoint the hon. Member; but he really could not withdraw the statement. The hon. Member said the statement was inaccurate, because the Russians were defeated, and at the end of the year withdrew to the Caspian. It was true they did withdraw temporarily; but the next year they overran the whole country between the Caspian and Kizil Arvat. The hon. Member hoped he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) would not insist upon what he called the quibble as to the distinction between Old and New Sarakhs. But it was a distinction of importance, because the new Fort of Sarakhs was Persian, and the old town was upon territory which was not clearly Persian, though it had sometimes boon claimed by them. It would have been a very much graver matter if the Russians had crossed the river and occupied the Persian town. They had, however, occupied a place which was almost deserted, and which was not upon Persian territory. The hon. Member advised hon. Members to read the report of a recent lecture delivered by Sir Edward Hainley. As a matter of fact, Sir Edward Hainley was an intimate friend of his (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice), and they had very often talked over these questions together. They were in close communication only a few days before Sir Edward Hamley gave his lecture, and on a great many of the points of the lecture he had the pleasure of conferring with his friend. Towards the close of his speech the hon. Member frightened himself by rattling in his own ears a great number of long sounding Russian names, and he referred to the "terrible" Russian Prince Dondoukoff-Korsakoff, who was reported to be at Merv. Now, when he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) was in Eastern Roumelia, as a Commissioner, he heard a great deal about Prince Dondoukoff-Korsakoff, and he was not at all sure that what the hon. Member had said about that Prince was perfectly accurate. Prince Dondoukoff-Korsakoff did his best in Roumelia to conciliate the sentiments of the people towards the Russian occupation; but he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) could not, in consequence, share the hon. Member's apprehensions as to the influence Prince Dondoukoff-Korsakoff was likely to exercise over the Afghan Tribes. The hon. Member asked if Government knew all 1102 about the railway which was being constructed from the Caspian in the direction of Sarakhs. He (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had heard of the railway before. He recollected that the hon. Member put a series of Questions concerning it to the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke). ["No, no!"] Well, but he did recollect the circumstance; and if the hon. Member would refresh his memory, he would find he did ask Questions on the subject, of the President of the Local Government Board, when he was Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He hoped hon. Members would notice the extraordinary inconsistency of the hon. Gentleman. The hon. Gentleman said it was very wicked on the part of Russia to construct the railway in question, and then he said that we ought to make a railway to Quetta without delay. If it was a wicked act on the part of Russia to construct a railway, why was it an act of virtue on our part? Was it for a great nation like England to go into hysterics every time a few yards of railway were added to the Russian lines in Asia? The construction of roads and railways in the wild districts of Central Asia, by whomsoever undertaken, was a great advantage to civilization and humanity. He knew he had excited the indignation of some hon. Members sitting on the Opposition Benches, by pointing out the fact that Russian annexation in Central Asia had been accompanied by the abolition of one of the most horrible systems of slave trading that the world had ever seen. He was sure the Committee had not forgotten the cruelties which were perpetrated upon English officers — Captain Conolly and Major Stoddart—at the time of the old Afghan War, by the very tribes whose apologist and defender the hon. Member (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had constituted himself. To him (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) it was an extraordinary thing that any hon. Member, whatever his feeling might be upon the political aspects of the question, should come down to the House and make the fate of these barbarous tribes a matter on which the good relations between Great Britain and Russia should depend. Her Majesty's Government held as strongly as any hon. Gentleman opposite that the advance of Russia in Asiatic regions was a matter of great importance; but they felt that it was 1103 not a matter about which they ought to get into a state of alarm or excitement. It was a matter to be met calmly, with a due consideration of all the circumstances, and with that strength of character which befitted a great nation like this. The position of the different holders of the Office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had never varied in regard to this subject. He could produce extracts from speeches of Lord Clarendon, Lord Granville, Lord Beaconsfield, and of Lord Salisbury, to show that the advance of Russia in Asia had always been regarded as a probability of the future. Lord Clarendon foresaw the probability that some day or other the Russian line of frontier would be close to that of Afghanistan, if it did not reach it; and he fully realized that that day would be a day to be regarded as one which would tax the resources of the statesmanship of this country; but not one which could be turned to the advantage of this country by hysterical alarm and excited discussion in Parliament. That was still the position of Her Majesty's Government with regard to this question. They quite realized the importance of the events which were happening in Asia; but they must decline to discuss those events prematurely, believing, as they did, that discussion would not be conducive to the peace of the world or to the advantage of this country.