VOTE OF CENSURE. [ADJOURNED DEBATE.]

HC Deb 13 May 1884 vol 288 cc180-236

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [12th May], That this House regrets to rind that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government has not tended to promote the success of General Gordon's Mission, and that even such steps as may be necessary to secure his personal safety are still delayed."—(Sir Michael Hicks, Beach.)

Question again proposed.

Debate resumed.

MR. CHAPLIN

Sir, I shall not detain the House except for a very short time. I have no desire to make a speech on this occasion. I have already had an opportunity of stating my views publicly on this question, especially with, regard to the conduct of Her Majesty's Government. As far as I know, those views have never been questioned since; and it is quite unnecessary, therefore, to repeat them to-day. I desire, with the permission of the House, to make one or two comments upon the debate, as far as it has proceeded up to the present time; and, in the first place, I desire to offer my sincere congratulations to my right hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) upon the powerful indictment he has brought against Her Majesty's Government. If I congratulate him upon that, I congratulate him still more upon the reply of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister; for a lamer, a more impotent, or a more unhappy contribution to a great debate on the part of the right hon. Gentleman when called upon to vindicate the honour of his Government and his country, has assuredly never been heard before from an English Prime Minister within the walls of the English Parliament, and I sincerely hope it will be many a day before such a reply is heard again. Why, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman hardly wrung a cheer throughout the whole of that debate, even from his own supporters sitting thick behind him, except when, in reply to the charge—not of the right hon. Member for East Gloucestershire, remember, but the charge of General Gordon, the hero, the Christian hero, the man of genius. This remarkable man—the importance of whose mission the Government could not possibly overestimate—in reply to his charge of indelible disgrace, the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister turned upon my right hon. Friend and put to him this question. He said— If it be an indelible disgrace not to rescue those garrisons which are mentioned, then it follows as a matter of course that it is an honourable obligation upon you to rescue all the others which are not mentioned? The Prime Minister put this question to my right hon. Friend, and exulted over him because he was dumb. But I think the right hon. Gentleman had forgotten some previous proceedings on this question. It was a most necessary question to put to the right hon. Gentleman; the Prime Minister had answered it himself before. It was a very old device of his, and he had tried it on a previous occasion. I remember, not very long ago, moving the adjournment of this House in order to try and persuade Her Majesty's Ministers to take some steps, at least, to save the garrison and population of Sinkat from being massacred. What did he say to me in reply? He said— The hon. Member is quite ignorant upon this subject. He does not recognize the importance of the appeal made to mo. Sinkat and Tokar are not the only garrisons which demand the attention of the Government; but it is equally the duty of the Government to consider all the other garrisons in the country. Well, now, Sir, I want to put a question in turn to the right hon. Gentleman himself upon the subject. What was the object of General Gordon's mission? That has been pretty freely stated already in the course of this debate. Amongst other things, it was to rescue the garrisons of the country. "Yes," says the right hon. Gentleman; "but it was to be done by pacific means." What does he mean by that? Does he mean to tell the House that if it was impossible to accomplish that object by pacific means he had all along determined to desert them? That is the only logical conclusion, which it is possible to draw from the right hon. Gentleman's observations last night, and he has been met already by the indignant replies of the gallant English gentleman now beleaguered in Khartoum, when he told the Prime Minister that whatever the views of his Government might be it was an act which, as an English gentleman, he would never consent to commit. Now, Sir, I want the House to consider for a moment what has been the pith of all the charges which have been made against the Government during the course of this debate. The object of General Gordon's mission has been plainly stated. It was to accomplish the evacuation of Khartoum, the safety of the Egyptian garrisons, and especially of the European population of Khartoum; and the duty of the Government was correctly and accurately described by my right hon. Friend last night. That duty, in a word, was not to interfere in any way with General Gordon. I think it has been pointed out pretty plainly that on four or five distinct occasions propositions of great importance, which have been made by General Gordon, have all of them either been thwarted or refused, or not complied with. There was, first of all, the proposal on the part of General Gordon to go possibly to the Mahdi. Then there was the demand for the appointment of Zebehr; and then there was the request that at least, if that could not be granted, some 200 Indian troops should be sent to Wady Haifa; and, finally, there was the appeal for the opening of the Berber and Suakin road. Now, the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs last night disputed the assertion with regard to the proposition of General Gordon to go to the Mahdi himself; but I should like to call his attention to two despatches which we have before us. They are to be found in Egypt, No. 16, and the despatches are Nos. 1 and 2. Sir Evelyn Baring had already sent messages to General Gordon by telegraph—I may say here the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister split a good many straws last night between what he called dissuasive and negative telegrams — but Sir Evelyn Baring concludes his first despatch in these words— I hope you will give me a positive assurance that you will on no account put yourself voluntarily in the power of the Mahdi."—[p. 2.] Then comes this message to Lord Granville— I venture, therefore, to request that your Lordships will inform me as soon as possible whether I may give General Gordon a positive order from tier Majesty's Government that he is on no account to visit the Mahdi."—[Ibid.] And now listen to the reply. It went back the same night at a quarter-past 11 o'clock— Your message to General Gordon, referred to in your telegram of to-day, is approved, and you are authorized, if you think it necessary and desirable to do so, to convey to General Gordon our approval of it."—[Ibid.] In the face of that despatch the Government have the assurance to get up and say General Gordon has not been prevented from going to the Mahdi himself. Well, now, as to the second point, what have the Government to say about the demand for the appointment of Zebehr? They refer to speeches that have been made by Conservatives on this question, and they asserted that if Zebehr had ever been appointed my right hon. Friend the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) would probably have moved for his recall. I do not remember those speeches myself; but, even if they had been made, I beg to remind the House that they were made when we had seen none of the despatches on the subject. What do those despatches disclose? Why, this fact, that the Government, having persuaded General Gordon to undertake this tremendous task, thereupon insisted upon a policy of their own, and which General Gordon very soon discovered was absolutely impossible, except on conditions of his own. All his conditions, I maintain, were refused, and yet the Government still insist upon their policy being fulfilled. Now, what were those conditions? Over and over again Sir Evelyn Baring, the Representative of the Government, pressed upon them the appointment of Zebehr. Sir Evelyn Baring said—"He is the only possible man." Now I want to call the attention of the House to a despatch of General Gordon upon the subject. What did he say in regard to his mission, the importance of which can- not possibly be over-estimated? He said— The co-operation at Khartoum of Zebehr and myself is an absolute necessity for the success of my mission. In fact, it came to this, that if the Government insisted upon the policy on which they first embarked, there were only two alternatives left to them—one, upon the showing of General Gordon and, I think, of Colonel Stewart, was absolute anarchy in that country; and the other was the adoption of General Gordon's plans. The Government declined to do either, and I am bound to say I think they have not the smallest right to place General Gordon in a position from which these consequences must entail; and there is not the slightest doubt in the world that the whole of this extreme and exceptional difficulty is owing to their policy to evacuate Khartoum, and to the cardinal fault which lies at the root of all this difficulty on the part of the Government—namely, the refusal of the Government to have anything to do with the affairs of the Soudan, and when they have taken upon themselves the control and the practical government of Egypt, their declaration that the affairs in the Soudan were entirely beyond the sphere either of their military or political operations—a policy which everyone connected with Egypt at the time, and everyone most thoroughly acquainted with the circumstances of the country, declared to be absurd and impossible. I need not dwell upon the third request which was made by General Gordon, moderate as it was, that 200 Indian troops should be sent to Wady Halfa; but, lastly, I want to call attention to what was said by Her Majesty's Government with regard to General Gordon's demand that the Berber and Suakin road should be opened. The right hon. Gentleman made two statements upon this question last night. First of all, he said—"It is quite true that we declined to send troops to Berber and other places, and, in so doing, we acted upon the advice of the military authorities." ["Hear, hear!"] An hon. Member says, "Hear, hear!" I think we might have been told who those military authorities are. That is a fact which up to the present time has been carefully concealed from the House and the country. We have the highest military authorities, on the other hand, giving precisely an opposite opinion. We have General Stephenson and General Wood in Egypt, and I think I read somewhere the other day the opinion of Sir Lintorn Simmons, who is usually considered a high authority on military matters. On the 8th of May, Sir Lintorn Simmons said— I am one of those who believe that diplomatic and military operations may still, even at this late stage, he available to prevent the indelible disgrace which must fall on us as a nation if Gordon and his faithful companions should he added to the countless list of lives which have been sacrificed since our occupation of Egypt in 1882. Then the right hon. Gentleman went on to say— You may say we think you might have gone on to Khartoum. That is the very thing which General Gordon has never desired, asked for, or even hinted at, though I admit an expression in a telegram might seem to lead to a different conclusion. I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman, under these circumstances, how he is able to explain some paragraphs in the despatch No. 301? One of them was quoted last night by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford (Mr. A. J. Balfour); but, inasmuch as the Government have resorted to their usual practice of taking no notice whatever of questions which appear somewhat difficult to answer, I have no hesitation to press it on their attention again. In that despatch, dated Cairo, March 24th, 1884, from Sir Evelyn Baring to Lord Granville, I find the following passage:— General Gordon is evidently expecting help from Suakin, and he has ordered messengers to be sent along the road from Berber to ascertain whether any English force is advancing. Well, now, I think that some explanation of that despatch is due from the Government to the House and the country. "Under present circumstances," the English Representative adds— I think that an effort should be made to help General Gordon from Suakin if it is at all a possible military operation. And then, in support of its being possible, he gives the authority of General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood, who— While admitting the very great risk, are of opinion that the undertaking is possible."— [Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 186.] I call upon the Government to depart from their usual practice, and when plain questions of this importance are put to them, to explain them to the House without any further delay. The right hon. Gentleman made a further statement last night. He said— General Gordon has never asked at any time for an English soldier. I think it may be true, according to the letter, that General Gordon is too proud, perhaps, to appeal to an English Government for the assistance which is withheld from him; but I wish to remind the right hon. Gentleman of the despatch dated April 16th. I am afraid I have not got it with me; but what General Gordon said is this—"As you refused to send relief up here, or to Berber, I leave to you the indelible disgrace, &c." Relief up here! What does that mean? Belief up to Khartoum. It is possible to suppose, from what we know of the heroism and gallantry of General Gordon, that he is a man to go whining for relief at Khartoum unless he really desired the help of English soldiers? That is another question which I hope the right hon. Gentleman is studying now. I trust some Member of the Government will, at last, receive the commission to give plain answers to plain questions, answers to questions upon which the heart of the country is stirred at the present moment.

MR. GLADSTONE

I am reading the despatch which the hon. Gentleman says he had not with him. I will read, the passage— You state your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you refuse me Zebehr.…I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to the Equator and leave you indelible disgrace," &c.—[Egypt, No. 15 (1884), p. 1.]

MR. CHAPLIN

Yes, Sir; and although, upon, the showing of the right hon. Gentleman himself, General Gordon was evidently anxious for relief at Khartoum, and intensely disgusted because he did not receive it, the right hon. Gentleman has not scrupled for weeks and weeks to convey the impression that General Gordon never wanted an English soldier. Well, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman was deaf and dumb to the appeals of such a hero; but I must say I was astonished that the author of the Bulgarian horrors should be deaf to another appeal which was made to him from the inhabitants of Berber. That appeal is to be found on page 32 and in Despatch No. 18. What is it that they tell the Prime Minister of England, who drove his great Predecessor from Offices on the grounds of the atrocities that were being committed in Bulgaria, for which Lord Beaconsfield was never responsible for a single instant, and because he refused to interfere to prevent them? This is what they say— The Egyptian Government and the other Powers are aware of the condition of ruin, murder, pillage, rape, and other illegal atrocities of which the Soudan is the theatre.… We Europeans, Turks, Egyptians, Hedjazites, Algerians, came to the Soudan relying on the support and protection of the Government. Now, if it abandons us to-day, through indifference or weakness, its honour will be everlastingly tarnished in thus handing over its servants and subjects to death and dishonour. If Egypt has given the Soudan up to England, we implore that great, chivalrous, and humane Power to come to our help, for it is full time. Can it raise us again after our death? We await help from England, from our Government, or from any charitable Power, for if the same state of things continues for ten days or a fortnight more our country will be ravaged and we shall be lost. We implore you, then, to quiet our minds by announcing to us the immediate despatch of a force to our assistance. If not, certain death awaits us. Let me contrast the conduct of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister on this occasion with the language which he addressed to Lord Beaconsfield at that time. He was speaking of the horrors in Bulgaria, and he called upon the English Government to take certain steps without delay with reference to them. This is what he said— There are two great objects in view. First, to put a stop to the anarchical misrule. I think we have been warned by General Gordon that if Zebehr is refused, anarchical misrule is the inevitable result. "Anarchical misrule (let the phrase be excused)"—I am not prepared to excuse it on this occasion— the plundering, the murdering, which as we now seem to learn upon sufficient evidence still desolate Bulgaria. Second, to redeem by these measures the honour of the British name, which in the deplorable events of the year has been more gravely compromised than I have ever known it to be at any former time. I leave it to the English public to judge between the right hon. Gentleman and the man whom he traduced. I doubt not that the verdict of the people of the country will be that the right hon. Gentleman has in the last sentence I have quoted most accurately described his own career on that Bench. I think, moreover, they will be able to measure and gauge exactly the depth of the sincerity, aye, I will say, the cant, of all the proceedings of the Government. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister taunted my right hon. Friend (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) for having ridiculed the Government, because they had thought it necessary to wait for information. What have they been about for the last five months? Why have not the Government all the information? Nothing was easier than for them to acquire it. I remember that in the very beginning of this Session my right hon. Friend the Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) and my right hon. Friend the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) called particular attention to the position, and requested the Government to inform the House what was to be their policy, and what preparations they were making in the event of danger to General Gordon, as both my right hon. Friends believed at that time not only possible, but probable. No answer whatever was made by the Government. Their appeals were treated, I will not say with contempt, but the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was dumb. On the following night, deeming this question to be of great importance, I made a second appeal to the Government. I said to the right hon. Gentleman—"Suppose General Gordon finds himself hemmed in and surrounded by the Mahdi? "—which is admitted to be the case now— "have the Government made, or are they making, any preparations whatever to assist him, and, if they are, will they be good enough to inform, the House what course they intend to take, because they may depend upon it, that if anything happens to General Gordon, they will be held accountable by the English people?" Last night the right hon. Gentleman taunted us on this side of the House by saying that the course we are now taking is nothing but an attempt on our part to gain a transfer of political power from them to us, and some few hon. Gentlemen are foolish enough to believe that. Why, is it possible to suppose that any body of men in their senses, with the legacy which the right hon. Gentleman after four years of Office would leave behind him, would care to take his place unless they were compelled by a sense of overwhelming duty? I can imagine nothing more distasteful, more repugnant to any political Party in the country, than to be compelled to succeed to the position which the splendid policy of the right hon. Gentleman, after four years of Office, at the head of his great majority, would leave to whoever might be so unfortunate as to be his successor. Well, now, what is to be done? That is the question of all others which is stirring deeply the heart of England at the present time, and upon that point the right hon. Gentleman has told us next to nothing. Last night he told us it may be our duty to plant a force of British troops in the Soudan, and that we may have to endeavour to use the resources of the nation to accomplish the rescue of General Gordon. Half-hearted language of this kind, at a juncture such as this, will not be sufficient for England. There must be no "mays" in this case, no more "endeavours" to use the resources of the nation. Of this I am quite satisfied, that the English people are determined that all and everything which is within the power and the might and the resources of the Empire must and shall be done, and done without delay, for General Gordon; and then, if, happily, we should succeed in rescuing that gallant hero from his present dangerous position, the English Parliament and the English people—no thanks to this Government—will at least have accomplished something to wipe away the stain which you on that side of the House have placed on the bright lustre of our country's name—no thanks at all to this Government, whose policy in this matter has been a veritable outrage upon English feeling, a discredit and slur upon the English name, an undying disgrace to themselves, and a deep dishonour to the country of which one and all of us belong.

MR. O'CONNOR POWER

said, he had listened with great attention to the speech which had just been delivered, and the impression which he had received from that speech was that they were not making any progress in elucidating the important question involved in the Motion of the right hon. Baronet. The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) was good enough to characterize the speech of the Prime Minister as a speech which had failed to grapple with the complaint alleged against the Government; but he (Mr. O'Connor Power) was bound to say that he had formed a totally different opinion of that speech. He regarded it as a complete vindication of the policy of the Government; and he thought the hon. Member would have established a better title to their gratitude if he had endeavoured to prove the description he had given of the Prime Minister's defence of the Government. A very important part of the hon. Member's speech was that in which he said that all the difficulties arose from the determination of the Government to have nothing to do with the Soudan. Well, he wanted to know what was the exact significance of observations of that kind? If the hon. Member and those who agreed with him entertained the idea that the Government should adopt the policy of going into the Soudan, remaining there until the whole country had been pacified, and substituting for the disorder which now existed an organized and settled form of government in every part of that wild country—if they meant this, why did they not say so? Why did they not enlighten the British taxpayer as to the cost which would be involved and the responsibility which would be incurred in assuming so tremendous an undertaking? Many of the communications sent by the Government to General Gordon had never reached him; and some of the telegrams which he had sent expressed opinions formed in total ignorance of the desire of Her Majesty's Government to help him in every efficient way, and of the circumstances by which the whole question was surrounded. Perhaps the most touching part of the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire's speech was that in which he quoted the complaint of a number of persons in the Soudan, who described themselves variously as Turks, Egyptians, and others, that they were subject to all the dangers of murder and pillage, and cried out in vain for assistance. Now, he asserted on the authority of travellers who knew and had seen them, that those very people who thus complained had been perpetrating murders and pillage in the Soudan for many years; and as long as they were successful in carrying desolation to the homes of the brave Arabs whose only crime was that they fought for their country's independence, there was no one found in the rank of the Conservative Party to appeal to the sacred cause of outraged humanity. He denied that the British Government had assumed any responsibility for the pacification of the Soudan. All their declarations in telegrams to Sir Evelyn Baring and General Gordon, went entirely to prove the contrary proposition. The complaint of the Opposition was, in the first place, that the policy of the Government had not tended to the success of General Gordon's mission. But was it not fair to inquire what the Government could have done which they had neglected to do, that would have been better calculated to induce the success of General Gordon's mission? The second complaint was that measures were delayed for Gordon's protection and safety. One would think that there were no natural difficulties in the way—and that the climate and everything affecting the movements of a large Army were matters of no consequence and no consideration at all. It was clearly pointed out by the Prime Minister that no measures which could be adopted without further delay for the protection of General Gordon had been neglected up to the present moment; and they had from the right hon. Gentleman the assurance that any further necessary measures would be adopted as soon as they were physically possible of adoption. The hon. Gentlemen who censured the policy of the Government were not among the number of those who censured their policy at the time when the origin of these great difficulties came about. He opposed the policy of Her Majesty's Government at that time, because he was opposed to the interference of the British Government in the domestic affairs of the people of Egypt. He occupied precisely the same position today; and if he had to choose between a policy which, while fully discharging any responsibilities that had been incurred, sought to minimize that interference with a strange people, and a policy of unlimited interference and unlimited sacrifices, he had no hesitation in preferring the former. This country was now suffering for the bombardment of Alexandria, which he regarded as a great national sin; but he acknowledged that the Government had, since that deplorable event, done the best in their power to limit their interference with Egypt; and it was their desire to restore to full working order the principles of self-government in that country which had freed them, in the judgment of Europe, from any responsibility for the disasters which befell the Egyptian Army in carrying out a policy which Her Majesty's Government had repeatedly condemned. It had been hoped that the occupation would be temporary and the sacrifices limited. They now, however, saw the evil consequences of interfering in the domestic affairs of other people. He understood the position of the Government to be simply this—they recognized fully their responsibility for the safety of General Gordon, but they emphatically disclaimed responsibility for the whole of the Soudan. As a believer in the doctrine of nationality, he rejoiced in the success of the Soudanese in defending their homes against Turkish and Egyptian invaders. If the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire and his Friends had the courage of their convictions they would invite the House to sanction the task of pacifying the Soudan; but such a task would be an enormously costly one. The expedition to Magdala with an Army of 3,000 cost £15,000,000 sterling. Probably an Army at least three times as large as that would be necessary for the pacification of the Soudan, and with the reconstruction of its Government it would be likely to involve an expenditure of £25,000,000 or £30,000,000. Nor would it stop there. When they had conquered the Soudan, the Conservative Party, in their thirst for aggrandizement, would be looking out for more deserts to conquer, and for new fields on which to shed human blood, and sacrifice the resources of the people of this country. Hon. Gentlemen opposite blamed the Government when it did not fight, and still more when it did fight, when they attacked it on the ground of the money and the blood expended. What interest had the hard-working, peace-loving taxpayers of this country in the settlement of the Soudan? No hon. Member had shown that they had any. He was bound to say that this Gordon scare was, in his judgment, one of the most impudent impostures of the day; and to say that the opinion of this country was affected by it was to say what was not in accordance with fact. He did not look upon the opinion of St. James's Hall as public opinion. He had himself, perhaps, had as many opportunities recently as Gentlemen on the Conservative side of feeling the pulse of public opinion. [An hon. MEMBER: In Mayo.] He could undertake to say that in Mayo the public opinion of St. James's Hall was looked upon simply as the opinion of a few London newspapers, who, perhaps, fancied that they were entitled not only to reflect the opinions of yesterday, but to mould the opinion of to-morrow. He had been at a meeting of thousands of people where the sentiment that "the Government of this country were too often involved in war, and in extending the responsibilities of the Empire" was cheered in the most enthusiastic fashion. He supposed he should be told that the people of London were represented by the unmannerly but well-dressed mob who misconducted themselves at the opening of the Health Exhibition. Those persons were just as much the representatives of London as those at St. James's Hall were the representatives of England. He was glad that the Government had resolved to pursue a policy which would commend itself to all who believed in the doctrine of humanity; and he approved warmly what the Prime Minister had said last night—that he was not willing to war against people who were fighting for their freedom. In what position would General Gordon have appeared if they had put him at the head of an army as one who had come to conquer by force of arms? It would have taken away the last chance of his success, and would have simply prevented him from exercising in any way his great influence over the people whose friendship he was sent out to secure.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

Her Majesty's Government are to be congratulated upon having obtained the support of an Irish patriot; but I am afraid that it will not be a very solid advantage to them, because he is a patriot altogether out of harmony with the general body of his Party, and he is a patriot who will cease to be a patriot if the coming Division should lead to a Dissolution. Irish patriotism! We know what Irish patriotism is worth when it becomes incorporated in a Government majority. When it stands alone, fighting for its own hand, unconnected with either Party, it is often honest and sincere, although we may think it misguided; but Irish patriotism, once incorporated into a Government majority, is nothing more than a beggar on the look - out for some substantial mark of favour from the Crown. I make a present to the Government, with the greatest liberality, of the Irish patriotism they have secured this afternoon. The hon. and learned Member for Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power) boasts that he is the friend of freedom and humanity; and, to justify his boast, he proposes to vote against a Motion which expresses regret that the best and most tried friend of freedom and of humanity that this century has seen has not been supported effectually by the Government, and is now placed in a position of imminent peril. That is how the hon. and learned Member endeavours to show that he is the friend of freedom and humanity. Then I must compliment him on his tact in reminding the House and the Prime Minister of a demonstration that was made the other day of public opinion—a demonstration which I do not suppose meets with any sympathy in this House, and to which I am as certain that no future speaker will allude, as I am that no past speaker has done so. But to pass to the question before the House, I do not think that it is necessary to debate this question with any amount of heat, or any amount of set oratorical phrases, or any amount of invective or vituperation. The question itself is as clear and simple a question as ever presented itself to Parliament. The Motion before the House is couched in terms of extreme moderation. The Prime Minister said last night that it was not manly or courageous; I take leave to doubt whether the Prime Minister or any one of his Colleagues is a judge of what is manly or courageous. Those are qualities in which Her Majesty's Government have proved themselves conspicuously deficient, and the want of these qualities renders them incapable of detecting them in other people. In any case, it struck me as a most singular criticism on the part of the Prime Minister. What is the Motion of the right hon. Baronet? It is a Motion expressing regret that the efforts of General Gordon have not been properly seconded by the acts of the Government at home, and expressing a determination to provide now for the safety of General Gordon. I myself can see nothing unmanly or wanting in courage in such a Motion as that; but I am bound to say that I can see a great deal that is wanting in courage in the Prime Minister's speech last night. I wonder whether the Prime Minister recollects an incident which took place in 1830? The right hon. Gentleman would have been about 20 years of age, and, I have no doubt, was well acquainted with political incidents. The Duke of Wellington made a speech on the subject of Parliamentary Reform. When he sat down, there were buzzings, and whisperings, and colloquies, and an evident amount of consternation on his own side, so much so that the Duke asked what was the cause of it, and the reply was—"Your Grace has announced the fall of your Government, that is all." If the Prime Minister had occupied the singularly advantageous position which I occupy here, and had been able to discern the intense, eager expectation of his supporters when he rose to address the House, the deepening gloom which settled down upon them as he proceeded to his remarks, and the blank dismay which overcame them when he closed his speech; and if he had been able to see what I saw—the buzzing, the whispering, the colloquies which went on in the Lobby—and had asked the noble Lord the Member for Flintshire (Lord Richard Grosvenor), what was the reason, the noble Lord, if he had been an able and an intelligent and a learned noble Lord, would have replied to the Prime Minister—"Sir, you have announced the fall of your Government." What was that speech? It was an announcement in the most solemn manner on the part of Her Majesty's Government by their chief Representative of the final and definite abandonment of General Gordon. Of that there can be absolutely no doubt whatever in the mind of anyone who listened to him, or who has read the report of his speech. That speech reminds me of the conduct of a Roman Governor of 1,800 years ago, who washed his hands in the face of the multitude. That speech, I say, announced in the most open and unmistakable manner the abandonment of General Gordon. That is a course which I am certain the country is not prepared to adopt, and which I am equally certain Parliament is not prepared to ratify. What was the mission of General Gordon; what was its nature? The mission, to my mind, was in theory and intentions one of the noblest ever undertaken. The object of the mission was twofold. It was to rescue the faithful garrisons who were scattered over the Soudan, numbering something like 30,000, exclusive of women and children, and it was to restore freedom and tranquillity to harassed and oppressed tribes. The whole nation acquiesced in that mission, as I believe it acquiesced in the abandonment of the Soudan. I do not think it could be asserted for one moment that any person on the Opposition side of the House has ever advocated the reconquest of the Soudan; and I may say that I have never heard anybody, who is responsible on this side of the House, censure the abandonment of the Soudan. But although the nation and the Opposition acquiesced in the abandonment of the Soudan, the nation felt deeply the solemn and high duties which that abandonment imposed upon them; and the nation hailed with pleasure, and I may almost say with rapture, the mission of General Gordon, long delayed as it was, and was prepared to condone many an error, because the Government had intrusted those high duties to be discharged by so generous, so gallant, and so noble an officer as General Gordon. I do not believe that any mission which ever left the shores of this country had ever created so much interest. Every step taken by that officer from London to Khartoum was watched with the most intense anxiety by the public. But the very intensity of the interest excited is the measure of the responsibility imposed upon the Government to do their part in assisting General Gordon to carry his dangerous mission to a successful conclusion. The Prime Minister said with great bluntness last night that the Government had discharged their responsibility to the utmost. I take leave to traverse the right hon. Gentleman's statement, and say that the Government have not discharged one bit of that responsibility. I assert that, as it was the duty of the Government to have seconded to the very utmost the mission of General Gordon, they ought, at the outset, to have considerably increased their force in Egypt and to have sent British troops up the Nile. The first appearance of General Gordon in Upper Egypt prevented disturbances. He found a state of semi-order, and he pacified it completely. There can be no doubt, if it had been known in those regions, as it would have been known, that the force at Cairo had been increased and British troops had been moved up the Nile, the first effect of the mission, instead of being transient, would have been permanent. More than that, the season of the year was exceptionally favourable for the movement of troops, and I assert that that movement was perfectly consistent with the pacific character of the mission of General Gordon. Material support is not out of character with a mission which is essentially pacific; and if any supporter or Member of the Government should deny that assertion I have only to point to the conduct of the Government with respect to Suakin in order completely to make out my case. The conduct of the Government in that case was to give material support to the efforts to restore order in the Soudan; and why should material support have been limited to Suakin? I submit that the first failure of the Government to recognize their responsibility to General Gordon was in not increasing the troops at Cairo, and moving troops up the Nile contemporaneously with General Gordon's advance to Khartoum. Then, the Government had another warning. Soon after General Gordon arrived at Khartoum he made what may be called his frantic appeal to the Government to send him Zebehr Pasha. I have never been one of those who have been disposed to blame the Government for not acceding to that request. I think not only that Zebehr is a man with whom no British Government ought to have any connection; but I believe that he would have done his best to assassinate General Gordon when he got to Khartoum. But the Prime Minister, curiously enough, told the House last night that he thought General Gordon was right in asking for Zebehr, and said he had been disposed to go almost any length to meet the request. The right hon. Gentleman, however, as was pointed out by my hon. and learned Friend (Mr. Gorst) in the able speech he made last night, gave an extraordinary reason for not doing what he thought was right, and what he was prepared to go almost any length to do. He said—"I did not do what I thought I should do, because I feared I might be placed in a minority."

MR. GLADSTONE

The noble Lord has represented what I said with perfect inaccuracy. I did not say that I should in any case have sent Zebehr; but I said that, whereas the arguments for sending Zebehr might have been very nearly balanced, and, in the minds of some, might have preponderated, the one argument that was conclusive against it was not that the Government would have been placed in a minority, but that the sending of Zebehr would have been stopped by a Vote of the House of Commons.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

That is exactly the same thing. If the Prime Minister had come down to the House and proposed to send Zebehr, and a Vote had been taken against him, does anyone think that he would have retained Office? It would have been a Vote of Censure on the Government. My contention, therefore, is right. I feel that that is a fair construction to put upon the words of the Prime Minister. It is in accordance with former acts of the right hon. Gentleman, because I recollect that he once said he did not restore order in Ireland when he might have done so, because he was not certain whether at that time he should have obtained a majority of the House of Commons. But what I wonder at is, that the Government, knowing the character of General Gordon, knowing his love of the Soudanese, knowing his hopes of contributing to the happiness of those races, and his opinion of this abandoned ruffian Zebehr, and seeing that General Gordon, had made an appeal for his services did not open their eyes to the fact that General Gordon's position at Khartoum, had become untenable, that his mission was far more desperate than had been imagined, and that his position was one of imminent peril. I wonder, and shall wonder for ever, that the Government at that time did not take measures to provide for the safety of General Gordon—to increase the British Forces at Cairo, and to move British troops up the Nile. It was as early as the 22nd of February that the Government refused to allow Zebehr to go to Khartoum, and certainly at that time a movement of troops might have been carried on without the slightest risk. What would have been the position of General Gordon now if troops had then been sent up the Nile? That is the second conspicuous, undeniable, uncontradicted failure of the Government to provide for the safety of General Gordon, or for the success of the mission on which he was sent. Just let me turn for a moment to the Suakin expedition. The Prime Minister taunted the Opposition because they cheered him when he announced that expedition. We cheered that announcement, not because we were in love with the dangers of the expedition, and not because we did not see them, but because it occurred to us that the dangers were far outweighed by the advantages which would obviously result from the expedition. The object of that expedition was, I imagine, at the time, threefold. It was to preserve the safety of the ports on the Red Sea, to relieve Tokar, and to open up a route to Berber. On those grounds, and on those grounds alone, did we cheer the announcement of the Government; but when we found, to our disgust and dismay, that not one of those objects had been in any part attained, we lost no time in condemning the expedition to Suakin, and supporting the Motion of the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere). That was, I think, a clear, consistent, and honest course of conduct. General Gordon was undoubtedly adverse to the expedition. He impressed on the Government that it was too late to do anything for Tokar—and he was perfectly right; but I can quite understand that, finding his influence already beginning to fail, he did not like to put an absolute negative on the expedition; and, thinking that the presence of troops at Suakin would support his position at Khartoum, gave it a qualified assent. General Gordon, however, did not imagine, nor did anyone else, that the Government would have allowed the troops to fight two vindictive, bloody, and unprovoked battles, and then sail away without having effected anything more permanent or satisfactory. Let me just compare the Government's treatment of Suakin with their treatment of General Gordon. What is Suakin? Suakin is a dirty, wretched, plague-stricken port on the Red Sea, of no value to Egypt or to anyone but the Soudanese tribes. What is General Gordon? The Prime Minister told us last night, in an admirable phrase, that General Gordon is "a great personality;" more than that, he is the Envoy of the Queen; more than that, Gordon's life is invaluable to his country, because a nation does not turn out Gordons by the dozen every day. The Prime Minister worked himself into a fury with the right hon. Gentleman last night, because he said the Government ought to have given material support to General Gordon. But why was it wrong to do that for General Gordon—a great personality, the Envoy of the Queen, a man invaluable to his country—which you did so lavishly and so uselessly for this dirty, plague-stricken port on the Red Sea? For this port the Government shed blood in torrents; they poured out money like water; but for Gordon they refused, over and over again, to advance one British soldier one single step; they refused to provide him with one single half-penny of money; and they refused to take a single word of advice he offered to them. In comparing the treatment of Suakin by the Government with the treatment of General Gordon, the logic of facts is hopelessly fatal to their position. As I listened to the Prime Minister last night a curious idea came into my head. I thought of the singularly different—the inexplicably different—manner in which different individuals appeal to his sympathies. I compared his efforts in the cause of General Gordon with his efforts in the cause of Mr. Bradlaugh. I remember the courage, the perseverance, the tenacity he displayed, and the amount of time of the House of Commons which was consumed by the Government in their desperate adherence to that mail. If the hundredth part of those invaluable moral qualities bestowed upon the cause of a seditious blasphemer—[Cries of "Oh, oh!" and "Order!"]— had been given to the support of the Christian hero, the success of General Gordon's mission would have been at this time assured. And this struck me as most remarkable when the Prime Minister sat down—that the finest speech he over delivered in the House of Commons was in support of the seditious blasphemer—[Cries of "Order!"]

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

I rise to Order. I wish, Sir, respectfully to ask you whether a Member of the House has a right to call another Member "seditious?"

MR. SPEAKER

In reply to the hon. Baronet, I have to say that I do not think the term "seditious blasphemer" applied to a Member of this House is a proper and Parliamentary expression. [Cheers, and cries of "Withdraw!"] I am sure the noble Lord will withdraw the expression.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

I withdraw it. I meant it merely as a political criticism. I withdraw it in deference to your opinion, Sir, and particularly in deference to the political sympathies of hon. Gentlemen opposite. I was going to say that the finest speech the right hon. Gentleman ever delivered in the House of Commons was in the cause of this Gentleman whom I am prohibited from characterizing; and the least effective speech he ever delivered was, by common consent, in the cause of the Christian hero. That is not only a fair political criticism; it is a great deal more; it is an instructive historical parallel. The Prime Minister made a most extraordinary remark last night, which shows the incapacity of the present Government for dealing with these difficult commotions abroad. He said, in reply to the right hon. Gentleman, who questioned the wisdom of the Government in not sending troops to Berber—"What would be the use of sending a few British troops?" Well, for 50 years the Prime Minister has been more or less consecutively in the service of the Crown, and in that capacity he has been identified with some of the most glorious exploits of British valour; and, after all, he gets up and asks the House of Commons what would be the value of a few hundred British soldiers? Surely, when he asked this question, he must have been thinking, not of the earlier military glories with which he was connected, but of the unfortunate events at Laing's Nek and Majuba Hill. For my part, I think the value of a few hundred soldiers at Berber would have been everything. They would, in the first place, have opened up the road. Their very passing across the Desert would have produced a great effect; it would have confirmed the wavering, given hope to the fugitives, and saved the garri- sons. It would, undoubtedly, have been apparent to everyone in that part of the world that those British troops were merely the precursors of others, and it would have prevented the present isolation of General Gordon. The troops were ready and anxious to go; General Graham was anxious to go. I do not know whether the Prime Minister knows it, because, in his exalted position, he may be denied the knowledge open to humbler men; but I know that the feeling of the troops coming away from Suakin was one of utter and intense disgust. Because those brave men who, whenever they performed deeds of fame, are exposed to the jeers and jibes of many hon. Gentlemen opposite—[cries of "No!"] —these brave men were filled with the conviction that all their bravery had gone for nothing, and, more than that, that they had slaughtered brave and gallant foes for no purpose whatever. The whole of that force was only too anxious, too desirous, by opening up the road to Berber, to place something tangible on record as the result of their exertions. The drift of the Prime Minister's argument last night appeared to me to be a very extraordinary one, and one which would be repudiated by the public, because he argued that the Government had no longer any duty to perform towards the Soudan garrisons. [Mr. GLADSTONE: I did not say so.] The right hon. Gentleman said he sent General Gordon to get the garrisons out; General Gordon had failed, and really he and his Colleagues cannot any further be bothered with the matter. That was the whole drift of his speech, because the House noticed how he descended upon the right hon. Gentleman, and asked which garrisons were to be rescued—that of Dongola, Bahr Gazelle, or what others? Well, Sir, the duty of the Government is to recognize the claims of every one of them. That was the duty recognized by a unanimous House of Commons at the beginning of the Session. ["No, no!"] Then, why was it not questioned at the time? It was recognized by a unanimous House of Commons when General Gordon started on his mission. ["No!"] I adhere to that assertion. It was the duty of Gordon to rescue them when you sent him out, and the duty of rescuing them still lies heavily upon this country that placed them in peril by the abandonment of the Soudan. At any rate, there is one duty perfectly beyond argument, and that is the duty of England to support her Envoy on all occasions. The position of an Envoy is sacred, not so much to the country to which he is sent, because that may be an uncivilized country, but essentially sacred to the country which sent him out, and essentially sacred when that Envoy is placed in a position of peril in a distant land. I assert that the fear to go to war in support of an Envoy is a certain indication of a decaying Empire; and the abandonment of an Envoy by a British Government, with the sanction of a British Parliament, is the surest sign of a falling State. The right hon. Gentleman says that, in October, he will consider this question again—a very reasonable allowance of time, not at all too long a time, to procure the information of which the Government stands in need—and he imagines that by October, having obtained that information, the Government will be able to devote their attention to the rescue of General Gordon. Does he think that England will wait till October to hear what the Government is going to do? Does the right hon. Gentleman think England is going to turn over on her side and go to sleep again without giving another thought to this business? If so, I can only conceive how low an estimate must the Prime Minister have formed of the countrymen who so long have worshipped and put their trust in him. Such is their reward for the devotion of many years that they are supposed to be capable of the dilatoriness which distinguishes the right hon. Gentleman himself. If the Prime Minister thinks that the British people will wait till the month of October, does he think that the Mahdi will wait till then? Because, whatever may be the qualities of the British people, the Mahdi has shown qualities which enable us to calculate the rate of his advance. Does not the right hon. Gentleman propose to take any steps to guard the inhabitants of Lower Egypt against the incursion of the Mahdi until the time when he says climatic influences will not endanger the health and life of the troops? If the right hon. Gentleman does not propose to take any steps for that purpose, I cannot believe that the decision of the Government will be endorsed by the House of Commons. Very little, to my mind, would be necessary to arrest the Mahdi—a slight movement of troops, a slight movement of ships, a little more energy, a little more precision, a little more common sense, a little more consistency in your foreign despatches, and the tiling would be done. But now the Prime Minister is going to meet the Powers of Europe in Conference. He is going to meet them, after this debate, if he survives it; he is going to meet in Conference on the Egyptian Question Powers represented by standing Armies numbering millions of men. I like Conferences, and advocate them under certain conditions. But I will illustrate my meaning. Compare the position which Lord Beaconsfield occupied at the Congress of Berlin with the position which the Prime Minister will occupy at the Conference which is now to take place. The one, by a mere movement of the Fleet, and by a movement of troops, arrested the advance of the Russian Army at the very threshold of the goal to which for a century they had been approaching; the other appears as having been afraid, and as having stated his fear in this House, to arrest the march of a barbarian and to rescue an English Envoy. I should like to know whether the Government can appear on terms of equality with the other Powers in such circumstances as these? The Government go to the Conference having done a dishonourable act. The Conference will not be so much a coalition for the consideration of European affairs of Powers meeting on terms of equality as a tribunal called together to pronounce judgment on the crimes of a delinquent and recreant nation; and I greatly fear that in this Conference the Government will find that they have created a Frankenstein. The Government denounce the motives of those who bring forward this Vote of Censure, and say that it is dictated, not by a love of country, but by a spirit of Party and a desire for the transference of power. The Prime Minister has had 50 years of Parliamentary experience; and I ask him to tell us, from motives of intelligent curiosity, whether he ever know a Vote of Censure which had not for its object and for its end a transference of power, and if that is the general character of Votes of Censure, why is the particular Vote of Censure which the right hon. Baronet proposes so vile in his eyes? The right hon. Gentleman says that the Opposition is ambitious and unjust. It is not for me to defend the Opposition from those aspersions; but I should like to know from the Prime Minister or any of his Colleagues, whether, when the Prime Minister conducted in 1877 that agitation which electrified the country, he was not ambitious, he was never unjust? Were not these adjectives applicable to him when he publicly boasted—I think it was at Oxford—that for a considerable time he had rested neither night nor day in his endeavours to thwart the policy of Lord Beaconsfield. The taunt cannot come from him with any great validity that the present Opposition is either unjust or ambitious, or that this Vote of Censure is dictated by a desire for the advancement of a Party. I hear a great deal about the deplorable weakness of the Opposition. Well, I certainly did not detect any deplorable weakness in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman who proposed this Motion last night, nor did I detect any deplorable weakness in the sonorous and resonant cheers which greeted that speech continually from beginning to end—a speech with reference to which I may be permitted to remark, with all deference, that it was a magnificent indictment, all the more magnificent because it was so measured and so grave, and I think it must have recalled to the Prime Minister himself the best days of Tory Leadership. But what does this transference of power mean which the Prime Minister says is so mischievous and pernicious? So far as I can make out, it means the immediate and certain rescue of General Gordon as opposed to the autumnal and uncertain rescue of General Gordon in six months' time; it means the restoration of order in Egypt as opposed to the continuance of anarchy; it means the repulse of the Mahdi as opposed to a general Mahomedan rising; it means, I believe, the taking over of Egypt under English protection, and extending the might of Britain over that disturbed land for a time, and for all time. That is what I believe a transference of power means in regard to Egypt. May I go on, and ask what it means at home? It means — I look all round the House, and the different sections of the House—to the Whigs a cessation of voting day after day that black is white, a Parliamentary diet which even the ordinarily tough and leathery political stomach of the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) is unable any longer to assimilate. What does it mean to the Radical Party? It means that, after abandoning for four years every principle on which they came into Parliament, they will at length be able to reconcile their principles with their votes. But we are told there must not be a transfer of power, because the Radical Party could not support anything which would prove an obstacle to the progress of the Reform Bill. Why should that prevent the Radical Party from taking a just view of the position of General Gordon? Parliamentary Reform is no longer a Party question. I cannot go into the whole treatment of this matter by the Opposition; but this is certain—that whatever transfer of power takes place, the whole question of Parliamentary Reform will be dealt with on a more complete, on a more genuine, and a larger basis. [Interruptions.] I do not know why there should be this demonstration. I simply state what is the policy which has been pursued by the Opposition. Do the Irish Party fear that the loss of the Reform Bill will militate against their interests? I should think that the treatment given by the House of Commons as a whole to the Motion of the hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) would dissipate any idle fear on that subject. I believe the object of this Vote of Censure is to transfer that power, and the sooner it comes the better it will be for the country. For 19 nights and days we have debated this question—for 19 nights and days with more or less anger and more or less acrimony. The Government, when they went to Egypt, abandoned every shred of principle they possessed, and Egypt has been their Nemesis, and I believe will be their ruin. The whole question of Egypt is at last, thank God, presented to us in an intelligible and simple form, and it is—"Will you, or will you not, rescue General Gordon now?" Answer me "Aye," or answer me "No." The people of England, of Scotland, and I believe of Ireland, say "Aye." [Cries of "No, no!"] The Prime Minister and a few Radical fanatics below the Gangway alone say "No." But great as is the Prime Minister's power, long as has been his career, dazzling as is his eloquence, and undoubtedly glorious as is his name in such a position as this, the odds are so overwhelmingly great that even the Prime Minister himself must either submit or resign.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

The noble Lord, who has just sat down, promised the House a very moderate speech, and that there should be no Party attack in it; but I hardly think he has fulfilled his promise.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

I did not say there would be no Party attack in it.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

I understood the noble Lord to say so; but, at any rate, I am not going to follow in detail the speech of the noble Lord, for it will doubtless be answered by some Minister. There are parts of it to which it will not be difficult to reply; but there are other parts of it, I am sorry to say, which it will not be so easy to answer. We have a Vote of Censure before us. It would have been in the power of the Government to meet that Motion with a traversing Motion; but they have taken a bolder course, and from their point of view I cannot blame them. The Motion expresses regret that the Government have not promoted the success of General Gordon's mission, or taken steps to secure his safety. I understand that by moving a direct negative the Prime Minister asks the House to express approval of the course which the Government have taken.

MR. GLADSTONE

I did not do that.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

I imagined it would be stated and claimed as an acknowledgment that the House of Commons had approved of the action of the Government. But I am sorry to say I cannot express that approval. Nor is it made more easy by any allusion to the future to pass over past omissions. It is a very serious matter for a man not to be able to support the Government of the Party to which he belongs when a Vote of Censure is moved; and I feel it to be a very serious matter. I felt it to be a very serious matter when the former Vote of Censure was moved; and, as a matter of fact, I am sorry I cannot take the course now which I took on that occasion. I, therefore, hope the House will allow me briefly to give my reasons. It was asked by the Prime Minister last evening what was General Gordon's mission. The noble Lord has asked that question, and it seems to be useless repetition for me to ask it again; but there does appear to me to be a most extraordinary misconception of what the object of that mission really was. It has been said by the hon. and learned Member for Mayo (Mr. O'Connor Power) that the object of the mission was merely the withdrawal of the garrisons, and I do not wonder at that conception, because the despatch we have received this morning appears to show that that is now the opinion of the Government. The Foreign Secretary says in his despatch of May 1 that the object of General Gordon's mission was to accomplish the evacuation of the Soudan, and the safe withdrawal, if possible, of the Egyptian garrisons from that country. Now, that is a complete ignoring and forgetting, and, I had almost said, disowning of what was originally stated to be the object of the mission. I need only refer my right hon. Friend to what he stated in the debate on the previous Vote of Censure. He then said the object of the mission was to extricate the garrisons and to reconstitute the Government of the country in which the garrisons were situated. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Read on.] I am quite willing to read on. The conclusion of the right hon. Gentleman's sentence was— And of reconstituting it by giving back to those Chiefs their ancestral powers which had been withdrawn or suspended during the period of the Egyptian Government."—(3 Hansard, [284] 274.) Undoubtedly that was the mode by which at that time General Gordon was to reconstitute the Government of the Soudan. But does my right hon. Friend say, or has the Government by their action enabled my right hon. Friend to say, that if they found a difficulty in doing it by that particular method, they did not consider it their duty to do it by some means or other? Now comes, I think, a question which naturally suggests itself to many hon. Members below the Gangway, and that is, why was this mission undertaken? The garrisons were in danger, the Native Christians were in danger; but there were garrisons and Native Christians in danger in other parts of the world. It might have been a matter of humanity to attempt to rescue them; but why should this mission have been undertaken in the cause of humanity? And, again, why attempt to reconstitute the Government of the country? What had we to do with the anarchy existing in the Soudan, and why should we attempt to prevent it? It was because my right hen. Friend knew, and the Government knew, that it was our duty to attempt to carry out these objects. It was no mere question of humanity, it was a question of duty. And it was because this Government, acting in the name of the Queen, had taken upon themselves the condition of the Soudan and had ordered its abandonment. The Egyptian Government had protested against that abandonment, and it was by that act that the Government of the right hon. Gentleman showed themselves before Egypt and England and Europe to be the real Governors of Egypt, and the persons really responsible for the actions of the Egyptian Government in the Soudan. They acknowledged that responsibility. I have no ground of complaint of their thus acting. The point is not so much that they have altogether ignored responsibility, as that, after having acknowledged it for a time, they seemed now to have forgotten it, and do not realize the meaning of the promises they have made. Now, my right hon. Friend seems to doubt whether what I have stated was the view of General Gordon. But what happened? Remember, General Gordon was sent out from England, it is true, to report. That mission was soon ended, and it would, indeed, have been rather an absurd mission to have sent him merely to report. By the time he got to Cairo it changed, and he had instructions to go to the South with Powers; and he was distinctly told by Lord Granville— You will consider yourself authorized and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to intrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring."—[Egypt, No. 2 (1884), p. 3.] What were those duties? Not merely that he was sent as an Envoy. I admit that he has that character, and I agree with the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) that we are bound to secure the safety of this Envoy as of other Envoys; but he was sent, not only as an Envoy; he was, in fact, ordered by our Government to go to the Soudan as Governor General of the Soudan. It is useless to say he wished to do so himself. He may or he may not have wished it. He may even have suggested it; but the Government, acting as they did, were bound to support him. He was appointed Governor General by a Firman of the Khedive—in fact, upon the instructions of our Government, because they were given by Sir Evelyn Baring, who informed the Government at home that they were given—and these were the instructions given to him— We trust that your Excellency will adopt the most effective measures for the accomplishment of your mission in this respect, and that after completing the evacuation you will take the necessary steps for establishing an organized government in the different provinces of the Soudan."—[Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 28.] But there was something much more important than words; it was the act of sending him out as Governor General. He might have been sent without any direct power over the people, and without any responsibility. He might have been sent merely as an Envoy to try to negotiate the extrication of the garrisons; but he was sent down as Governor General to exercise the power of Governor General. It was said that this was for temporary purposes. I do not deny that; but from day to day he was incurring fresh responsibility—the Government must have known it — and performing a great many governing acts, such as opening prison doors, forgiving taxes, dismissing many officials, appointing many other officials, issuing edicts, and summoning a Council. Can it, then, for a moment be supposed that any man thus in power to exercise such authority, who knew that the Government at home had sanctioned his being put in that position and were aware how he was using it, would imagine that he was to get rid of that position and to slink away, leaving the Native Government to take care of itself, as soon as difficulties increased? I do not think that any man going on behalf of the great English nation would do that. I think he would be very loth to take up such a mission upon such terms. The Government said they did not ask him to do what he did; but they knew very well what he was doing. Of all the men possible to conceive as unlikely not to feel for what he had made himself responsible, going as he did in obedience to English, orders, there was no man so little likely to do that as General Gordon. he says in one of his despatches afterwards—"To take that course would he mean." And I think he was right. Now, just let me say a word about the position in the Soudan. We must not be led away by vague terms. The reconquest of the Soudan is often mentioned. We must define what we mean by the Soudan. There was a part of the Soudan at the time of General Gordon's mission in the possession of the Mahdi, and other parts in which the rebellion had not taken place. It was in these districts that he had to stem the invasion if he could, to rescue the garrisons, and to see that anarchy did not follow their withdrawal. He took steps which at first succeeded. The Government approved what he had done. They beheld his acts with pride, and congratulated him on his success. For a time all went well. Originally, it is quite true, General Gordon thought that the Government could be reconstituted by putting back in power the Chiefs displaced by the Egyptian Government. But by the time he got to Cairo he saw reason to fear that at Khartoum and in one or two of the other large towns this course would be very difficult, because no Chiefs of the old families were still in existence. The Government knew that he had given up this hope, yet they did not give up the task of reconstituting the Government. Then he came to the conclusion to ask the Government to appoint Zebehr. I entirely agree with the course that the Government took on this point. In passing let me say one word about General Gordon. I think there is hardly anything in his remarkable life, or in the story now being transacted at Khartoum, which better shows the unselfish and chivalrous devotion of the man than his action about Zebehr Pasha. He knew that Zebehr Pasha hated him; that he was his deadly enemy; that he had reason to fear that if he came to the Soudan he would cause his death. He was informed of that at Cairo; but he possesses two strong characteristics. In the first place, he has absolutely no fear of his life; and, secondly, he carries no rancour. I think the Government were perfectly right in the conclusion they came to, though I scarcely think they came to that conclusion, as now stated, on the evidence of public opinion. No doubt, public opinion would have been against the appointment of Zebehr; but, so far as I can recollect, there was no expression of opinion before the 10th of March, and on February 29 and on March 5 the Government had, in forcible language, expressed their surprise at this suggested appointment, and given a strong opinion against it. Most of us are agreed on this point—that no fault is to be found with the Government for this decision. They were right in refusing to send Zebehr; but that ought to have made them see the responsibility that rested on them to find some other plan for the restoration of order in the Soudan. No plan was suggested. General Gordon pointed out that we had taken the Government away from these people, and that we could not leave them in anarchy. He was asked to suggest someone else. But it was the duty of the Government to have suggested someone else. I do not think it would have been very difficult. I ventured to give a hint on this point during the debate on March 10. I think the natural course would have been for them to have said to General Gordon—"Proclaim yourself as Governor until you have consolidated the Government, and have good reason to believe that anarchy will not result from your departure." I believe that course would have been successful. Nothing whatever was done. General Gordon offered his resignation. If nothing was to be done, that resignation ought to have been accepted. It was not accepted. He was asked to remain; but upon what conditions? Without support, without assistance, without help. This was not merely a question of our duty to the people of Khartoum and of the- honour of General Gordon, so that the men who trusted him should not come to misery. It was a question of his personal safety. What was his chief danger? As early as February he said the danger is not from attack from without, but from conspiracy within. Surely the Government must have seen the danger of his being deserted. His danger from traitors was immensely increased by his not being able to hold out to those who were rallying around him the assurance that they would not suffer when he left them. There are passages which show that. In one telegram Gordon points out that his difficulty is due to the haziness of the future, and the fear entertained by some persons of compromising themselves by supporting him. On March 3 he wrote to Sir Evelyn Baring— If you wore the people of Khartoum, you would, like they would, make terms with Mahdi by making me backsheesh to the Mahdi."— [Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 156.] Why did not the Government recognize their responsibility, and say—"We have sent you there for a certain duty, we will give you power to stay there, and we will support you until you have performed your duty." If this had been the tone adopted there would have been no talk of an expedition in the autumn. Instead of that garrison after garrison was deserted. The people naturally feared to support General Gordon, for they knew that the Government would force him to go away, and then they would be left to the tender mercies of the Mahdi. I have permission to read an extract from a letter written by Sir Henry Gordon, who has not, it must be admitted, shown any feeling against the Government— The Government," he says, "will not allow Zebehr to go, nor will they tell General Gordon to administer the country himself. The people are, therefore, like terrified sheep, and do not know which way to turn. If General Gordon were ordered to remain they would flock to him; but they fear he will have to leave them, and then God help them; they will fall a prey to the Mahdi. This was the secret of the whole matter. General Gordon was formally asked to remain there; but without assistance or help. Not only was no hope of support given to him—all his appeals for help were disregarded. No help was either given or promised. I dare say the Secretary of State for War will explain why no troops marched from Suakin to Berber. Some military men thought the attempt might be made, others that it could not. But I much doubt whether the actual expedition would have been necessary. If preparations had been made, if officers had been sent down, and if there had been an evident intention shown on the part of the Government to support him, that probably would have been sufficient. But there was no help, and not even an assurance of help, and at last came that telegram of which we do not know the exact date, but which appears to have been sent to him in obedience to Lord Granville's instructions on March 13, and which informed General Gordon — "Osman Digna's troops dispersed. No succour for you from Berber." Let us mark the immense change that has happened since the time when General Gordon got that telegram and the position now before us? General Gordon did not get this telegram until April 8; and it is no use mentioning telegrams sent to him after that time, still less is there any use in mentioning telegrams sent by him before that time. Those telegrams he sent still believing that the Government were going to support him, and they are now quoted as a proof that he is in no danger. What was the danger? Not that he would not be able to beat off the men who attacked him in Khartoum, but that there would be treachery and desertion. Treachery and desertion had shown themselves, and he had been compelled to shoot three men who had proved themselves traitors; and that is his danger now. His danger is that, stimulated by what is happening at Berber, and by what is probably now happening at Dongola, encouraged to revolt, and fearing to follow him, he will find in Khartoum a large majority of opponents, partly out of hatred and still more out of fear, and but very few friends. My hon. Friend the Member for Andover (Mr. Francis Buxton) and the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) seem to suppose that General Gordon at any moment could get away. Well, if he was to follow such advice as they would give him, he probably could get away. He probably might go by himself, and might possibly be able to take Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power with him; but this we may be sure of—he may find it a hopeless contest to carry on his mission, and he may make an effort to take away those persons who have been intrusted to his care; but he is not the man to slink off by himself, or along with his two English friends. We have heard a great deal about the condition of his mission, that he was to use nothing but pacific means. Now, I confess I heard with very great surprise the Prime Minister's definition of this condition last night. The right hon. Gentleman said— The next difference between us and the right hon. Gentleman is when he contends that General Gordon had authority from us to pro- ceed by warlike means if pacific means should fail. I contend that he has not adduced a rag of evidence to support that allegation, and that it is contradicted by every declaration that we have made in Parliament, and by every passage that we have submitted to Parliament. I am sorry the Prime Minister is not present now; but does he really mean that that was the condition? Does he really mean that this officer, the Envoy of the Queen, a man carrying on this difficult task, was sent as Governor General to Khartoum upon the understanding that he was not to use anything but pacific means in any event? Was Khartoum the only place in the world to be so governed; and was General Gordon the only person who was expected to do it on such a condition? It is undoubtedly true that it was his desire, and the desire of the Government, that there should be no resort to violent methods. Of course, it was their desire and their hope that he would succeed by the strength and power of his personality; but if they meant that no other means were to be used in any circumstances, he ought to have been warned of this before he left. Not only was he not warned, but he very quickly found that he would be compelled to have recourse to force. On February 27 there is a despatch of his in which he says to Sir Evelyn Baring that— Having put out my programme of peace, and allowed sufficient time to elapse, I am now sending out forces to show our force."—[Egypt, No. 12 (1884) p. 102.] The Government did not object to that. Then, again, he very naturally supposed that the landing of the force at Suakin was meant for his assistance. I have no doubt that when he heard of those battles, he supposed that they were for the purpose of giving him assistance. I entirely approved of that expedition to the relief of Tokar; but I grieved very much that it was thought necessary to fight battles after the fate of Tokar had been decided. At that time I had this hope—that they were to lead to the opening of the road to Berber. I do not believe the Government themselves had any notion, while the most warlike means wore being adopted on the Eastern Coast of the Soudan, that nothing but pacific means were to be adopted in Central Soudan. But General Gordon evidently thought those troops were to go to his rescue, and we read touching accounts of scouts being sent out to look for them in his helplessness, or, at least, his want of support. If he had seen the despatches, however, he would have thought still more certainly that that support was coming to his aid. We find the Government saying, in a despatch to Admiral Hewett— We do not want you to take warlike action; it is not necessary; but if you think you can open up the road to Suakin, you may go forward to Tamanieb; and for that purpose he did go forward to Tamauieb. Finally, we come to the last stage. Now, my right hon. Friend gave us an interpretation of a telegram last evening. It is an important telegram to General Gordon, if he gets it, because it is the last declaration of the policy of the Government. It is important to us in this debate, because it is upon that telegram that we are to judge -what is now the policy of the Government. My right hon. Friend said it was a covenant to Parliament and a covenant to the nation. Now, I confess that I do not think, if General Gordon gets that telegram, he will put that interpretation upon it. It does not appear to me to contain any covenant whatever. Messengers are scouring all that part of Africa, from Abyssinia far away up to the Western Desert, in order to see whether they can get this message through to General Gordon. If he does get it, in what position will it probably find him at Khartoum? Struggling for his life; and not merely for his own life, but for the lives of all those who have boon intrusted to him. What does the telegram say? It contains three questions and one assurance. The first question is— That he is to state and keep us informed to the best of his ability, not only as to the immediate, but the prospective danger at Khartoum. I believe everyone but the Prime Minister is already convinced of that danger. I do not say that he is aware of the danger himself; I think he would act very differently if he was; and I attribute his not being convinced to his wonderful power of persuasion. He can persuade most people of most things, and, above all, he can persuade himself of almost anything. Then the despatch continues— He is to advise us as to the force that would be necessary in order to secure his safe removal. Now, observe, it is not the removal of those who have trusted in General Gordon; it is his removal only. It might be supposed that you could not remove him without also removing his followers; but I am afraid that despatch must be read with the despatch of March 16, from Lord Granville to Sir Evelyn Baring, in which he says that the Government were unable to authorize any advance of British troops in the direction of Berber until they had received military information with regard to its practicability, and that, if ordered, it would be confined to securing the safety of General Gordon. If that is the meaning of it, we can have little doubt what will be the answer which General Gordon will return to it. Then comes an assurance; but not a promise of help—rather a promise of no help— We do not propose to supply him with a Turkish or other force for the purpose of undertaking- military expeditions against the Mahdi, such expeditions being beyond the scope of the commission which he holds, and at variance with the pacific policy which was the purpose of his mission to the Soudan. There is no assurance whatever that he would have support either for carrying out the original object of his mission, or oven for securing the safety of those who were acting under the orders of the Government, and whom he had induced to follow him and greatly to endanger themselves. Then comes the last question, and I do not doubt the answer which will be given— If with the knowledge of this fact he decides on remaining at Khartoum he should state the cause of his decision and the intention with which he so continues. The answer, I think, which will be returned to this will be that General Gordon will not desert those who have trusted him; that he will do what he can at the danger of his own life to protect them if possible. That is the answer he will make; and I believe the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere), who cried "Hear, hear!" a short time ago, would make the same reply. [Cries of "No, no!"] That is the last written declaration of the Government. But we have the spoken declaration of my right hon. Friend last evening, and does it go further? Is it more than this, that when we obtain this information, when we know why General Gordon chooses to remain, if we still find it necessary to send out an expedition to help him, we will do so? My right hon. Friend said he would not wait an indefinite time; but it is clear that he would wait a considerable time. But the interpretation of the Prime Minister's speech last evening is to be found in the action of the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) and the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), who do not now feel it necessary to move their Amendments. They are satisfied with that speech. They are satisfied that every possible means will be adopted to get rid of that expedition, and that there will be great delay in undertaking it or in preparing for it. They do not think there is much danger of such an expedition. General Gordon may die; he may go to the Congo; he may try some other despairing method of rescuing himself and his followers. Then, possibly, he may do another thing. I do not know whether it lies in my right hon. Friend's estimate, but it does he in mine, that the wonderful resources of that wonderful man may come out when he is left by himself, as they did in China, as they also did in the Soudan when he was there before. He may be found a match for all his enemies; and although he be not supported by English power and the English Government, he may yet assert the grandeur of the English character and the heroism of a brave and devoted Englishman. It is quite possible that, after all, General Gordon may succeed, and that before October comes you may find that his success will be so clear that for very shame's sake you will have to support him, and take, or try to take, some credit for what he has done. But what we have now before us is this last telegram as the policy of the Government. It is impossible for me to express approval of that policy with that telegram before me. My hon. Friends below the Gangway are jubilant at this moment. They are conscientious in their views. I do not say this in any sneering manner. They feel most keenly the possible bloodshed and the burdens that may fall on the English taxpayers. But let me tell them that if they were to set to work to make bloodshed probable and to impose tremendous burdens on the taxpayers, they could not do it more surely than by the course they are now pursuing. Preparations for General Gordon's support, if they had been made some time ago, would have sufficed. It is just possible, though I fear hardly probable, that if those preparations were made at once, and if General Gordon himself could be informed that British power was behind him, an expedition would not be necessary. It may be said you cannot get a message delivered to him, and cannot get an answer from him; but it is one thing sending a message through enemies, and another sending it to enemies; and if they once knew that British power could, and if necessary would, do what it has done in Egypt and at Suakin, I believe that, with that power behind General Gordon, the expedition might not be necessary. But if the policy is adopted of giving no certain hope, or prospect of such an expedition, but only holding out its possibility if certain information be obtained, then all the tribes will rise in greater force, and every man who hates Egyptian rule—as many have reason for doing—every man who fears what the Mahdi or his followers will do, will rally round the standard of the Mahdi's friends; and while you would find still that in order to satisfy your own consciences (said the right hon. Gentleman, turning to the Radical Benches)—yes, even your consciences —[Loud and continued cheers from the Opposition, and interruption.]—I will explain what I mean. I know what the feelings of many of my hon. Friends below the Gangway are on this matter. I was brought up among men of that stamp. Some of the dearest of my own relations were men whose consciences were very strong upon these matters; and not for the sake of philanthropy, much less for the sake of interest or of honour—not merely for such a cause as that for which Osman Digna's troops were dispersed after Tokar had surrendered—not merely for the cause for which the bombardment of Alexandria was ordered—but under no conditions, and in no circumstances, would their consciences have allowed them to send out an expedition. But there are some men who have almost such consciences, but have not them entirely. Their confidence in non-resistance principles is not so strong as that. That is what I mean. There might come a time when even my hon. Friends would reconsider their peace notions, and would feel that an expedition should be sent out. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister does not suppose that I am alluding to him, or that I think him one of those persons who have this dislike to war; but let me say that when that expedition comes it may cost millions of money which might have been saved, and very likely cause the death of thousands of men whose lives might have been spared. You may depend upon it that this country will not allow you to disavow your responsibilities. But it may be in your power to make them much more costly and much more difficult to fulfil. I have only one further word to say. I have still some hope that as in the Soudan so in Egypt—I do not want to bring in that question now—the Government may at last wake up to the reality of facts and to the responsibilities of their position. But as regards the Soudan itself, let me entreat them to ponder over these words of their own agent, Sir Evelyn Baring, which appear to me to be very weighty, and to deserve their utmost consideration. In his despatch of February 28, he says that— Whatever may be said to the contrary, Her Majesty's Government must, in reality, be responsible for any arrangements that are now devised for the Soudan, and I do not believe it is possible to shake off that responsibility. It is because I cannot but feel that they are engaged at this moment in a vain, a useless, though also a dangerous, and what may turn out to be a costly attempt to shift off that responsibility, that I find myself utterly unable to support the Government on this occasion.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

Sir, the House has listened, as it always does, with interest, and also with respect, to the evidently earnest and honest expression of the strong opinions held on this question by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster); but I regret that in the expression of those opinions my right hon. Friend should have found it impossible to state the convictions which he entertains on this subject without making personal attacks upon a section of the House with which he acknowledges that for the greater part of his; life he has been identified, and suggesting that there is some difference between the quality of their consciences and that which he possesses himself; and also that he should have thought it necessary to make a bitter and personal, and evidently highly-prepared and long-reflected-over attack upon the sincerity of my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Treasury, under whoso Leadership he has so long served, and perhaps by means of whose support he hag been assisted in acquiring some part of that position which he so deservedly occupies. I think that our debates could be conducted without the necessity of introducing those personal attacks. I do not think that anybody entertains any doubt as to the real and strong love which my right hon. Friend feels for peace and the cause of peace. But, at the same time, we may feel some astonishment that my right hon. Friend's love for peace should always be found exhibiting itself in the utterance of trumpet calls to war.

Referring for a moment to the speech made this afternoon by the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill), there are one or two very short observations that I should like to make. The noble Lord said that the speech of the Prime Minister last night was, to his mind, the announcement of the definite and fixed abandonment of General Gordon. Well, Sir, I do not know what impression it may have made on the noble Lord; but certainly it conveyed to my mind exactly the opposite impression. It appeared to me that that speech, while it contained the repudiation of a policy of military action for purposes external to, outside of, and inconsistent with, the mission of General Gordon, contained, at the same time, the fullest and most absolute recognition of the responsibility of the Government and of this country for the safety of General Gordon. Then the noble Lord also referred to a defect in the policy of the Government from the very moment of the mission of General Gordon to Egypt. He said that that mission ought to have been accompanied by a movement of troops up the Nile, and by the strengthening of our forces in Egypt. But to what point of the Nile could this movement of troops have been in any way made, and what reason had he to suppose that Gordon himself ever thought that such a movement of troops up the Nile into the torrid regions of Upper Egypt was necessary? Not at the time of his first mission. The noble Lord says that it was perfectly possible at that time, and that that possibility was shown by the fact that we did make at that time an expedition to Suakin.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

I said that the despatch of the expedition to Suakin showed that there was no inconsistency in giving help to General Gordon.

THE MARQUESS or HARTINGTON

Yes; but the noble Lord spoke particularly of the favourable situation, and said it was shown by our expedition to Suakin that we might have relieved General Gordon. But that expedition to Suakin was one which did not necessarily involve the retention of the troops at Suakin or in that neighbourhood, and it was anticipated that those troops would soon return to Egypt. But what would have been the use of despatching troops to some point—the noble Lord does not show us what the point was to be—up the Nile, until General Gordon had executed his mission? Then the noble Lord made some remarks upon the proposal to send Zebehr, and he said that the only reason why the Government would not send Zebehr was that they would have been placed in a minority on the question, although the noble Lord himself approved the decision of the Government. The Prime Minister said that, while there might be a great deal to be said both for and against General Gordon's proposal with reference to Zebehr, there was one argument, in his opinion, conclusive against it, and that was that not only this Government, but any Government that made such a proposal, would have been placed in a minority, that it would not have been in the power of any Government to support such a decision, and that to hold out to General Gordon the prospect of assistance from Zebehr could be only holding out a delusive prospect, and would only embarrass him. The noble Lord said also that the demand for Zebehr showed General Gordon's opinion of the weakness of his position at Khartoum. That demand for Zebehr had nothing to do with General Gordon's position at Khartoum. It was made at the moment of his arrival at Khartoum, when he tells us that he was receiving messages of congratulation from all parts of the country. The demand, therefore, at that time showed no such acknowledgment of weakness as it is represented to contain by the noble Lord.

I must ask the House for a, moment to forgive me for referring to a question somewhat personal to myself. An hon. Member last night—I think it was the hon. Member for Hertford (Mr. A. J. Balfour)—accused me, as well as Her Majesty's Government in general, of having concealed from the House the wishes communicated by General Gordon. I would refer to an answer given by me on the 1st of April to a Question put by the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), as to whether we had received any confirmation of a report in The Times that General Gordon was expecting British aid? I stated that we had received communications from General Gordon up to the same date as the telegram in The Times, and that General Gordon did not appear to have made any request for British troops to be sent to Khartoum. Now, that answer which I gave to the hon. Member for Eye is perfectly accurate, not only as far as we knew at that moment, but also up to the present time. But that there might not be the slightest misapprehension on the subject, within two days of giving that answer I made a full statement to this House, in which I laid before the House all the information which I had then on the subject, and which is all the House has now. I said that General Gordon had never suggested to me the employment of British troops for the relief of Khartoum. In that statement I claim that I laid before the House all the information then in the power of the Government to give, and it is practically all that is known now in the House.

I shall not, in what I have to say, make any reference to certain expressions contained in the telegrams of General Gordon, which have been somewhat eagerly grasped at by the Opposition. What we have to look at in those telegrams is the information and the advice which is contained in them. As to the expression of General Gordon's opinion, or the language in which it is couched, I do not think that we ought to trouble ourselves much more about them than if they came from any other sources. It is quite clear to anyone who has road the whole series of General Gordon's telegrams that he is a man of extremely impulsive character; that as soon as an idea comes to him he immediately proceeds to telegraph it; and that his frame of mind varies very rapidly from day to day, even from hour to hour. It is also perfectly well known that General Gordon, Christian hero though he be, has a quick temper as well as other people; and I am not surprised that, with the extremely imperfect knowledge of the views and intention of the Government that was in his possession, he expressed his indignation in somewhat strong language. But the fact that General Gordon spoke of indelible disgrace—an expression which has been fastened on by the Opposition—has not necessarily the effect of attaching it to us. I say that it would be indelible disgrace if we should neglect any means at the disposal of this country to save General Gordon; but if General Gordon tells us that indelible disgrace attaches to the Government with reference to these other garrisons, then I say that I do not admit that General Gordon is, on this point at least, a better authority than anyone else. The Government were under no moral obligation to use the war resources of this Empire for the relief of those garrisons. General Gordon's mission did not involve the employment of military force; and the fact that he has been despatched to Khartoum, and that he has done, and is doing, all that he considers to be best and most advisable to relieve these garrisons, does not alter the moral obligation that rests upon Her Majesty's Government, and cannot in itself affect the accusation of indelible disgrace.

It appears to me that the scope and character of General Gordon's mission have been very much lost sight of, and have been misrepresented and exaggerated throughout the whole of this debate. A great part of the speech of the right hon. Baronet who brought forward this Motion appeared to me to be founded on the belief that General Gordon had been despatched by the Government for the purpose of stamping out the insurrection and putting down the movement headed by the Mahdi. The language of the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) last night appeared to have very little reference to the subject we are discussing. What has the position we hold in India, what have the measures by which that position was assumed, to do with the position we hold in Egypt? If the hon. Gentleman thinks that we have already annexed Egypt, and that it is incumbent on us to take similar measures for the protection of Egyptian territory to those we should take if danger were threatening our Indian Frontier, then it seems to me that the hon. Member for Orkney has made greater advances than hon. Gentlemen opposite would endorse. I dissent entirely from the version of the mission of General Gordon which has just been given us by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, and from his theory of the responsibility which he appears to think the Government have undertaken for the resettlement of the Soudan. He says that the mission of General Gordon was dictated primarily, not by motives of humanity, nor even of policy, but that it was a mission on which we sent him in fulfilment of a duty; and my right hon. Friend bases his argument on the fact that we have insisted upon the Egyptian Government abandoning the attempt to hold those vast Provinces which it has been proved they had not the power to hold. Well, Sir, I entirely dissent from and repudiate the contention of my right hon. Friend. We were in a position to give the Egyptian Government advice, and to insist upon its being followed; but unless the right hon. Gentleman can show that the advice was not good advice in the interest of Egypt itself, I cannot conceive how it can be established that we have taken any responsibility upon ourselves by giving that advice and insisting on its being accepted. My right hon. Friend argued that because certain powers were intrusted to General Gordon, he thereby made himself and those who employed him responsible for the present and the future of the Soudan. That appears to me to be an assumption totally unfounded, and I may almost call it a monstrous suggestion. Unless my right hon. Friend can show that new responsibilities were undertaken by General Gordon, and that General Gordon did anything, or could do anything, to aggravate the situation of danger and difficulty that existed before his arrival at Khartoum, it is impossible for me to see how the assumption by him of certain powers placed either him, or those who employed him, in a position of new responsibility in regard to the Soudan.

What was the exact character and object of his mission? At the time General Gordon was despatched the situation was one of very great difficulty and anxiety, as it is now. The position of the garrisons in the Soudan and of the Egyptian officials there appeared to be one of the greatest danger, and almost hopeless. They were separated from each other by enormous distances, frequently by immense deserts, and were only united to each other by rivers, the navigation of which was extremely precarious and difficult. They were separated by still further distances from. Egypt, the base on which they had relied; and the moral support and influence of the Egyptian Government, by means of which alone they had up to that time held their position in the Soudan, had been destroyed. For that condition of things the Government never have admitted or accepted any responsibility. It was not Her Majesty's Government who sent the Egyptian officials or garrisons into that position of danger. They did not encourage, but on the contrary they dissuaded, the fatal expedition of General Hicks, which brought about the collapse of the Egyptian authority in the Soudan. In the opinion of the Government, the first condition of the problem before them, a condition openly and frankly avowed to the House, was that British troops should not be employed for the purpose of extracting those garrisons and officials from the position in which they were placed, owing to no action of the British people or Government, but to the mistakes made in former times by their own Government. The attempt might have failed in its object, and could only have succeeded through the reconquest of the Soudan and the subjugation of those who had had revolted against what was universally acknowledged to be an intolerable and oppressive Government. Her Majesty's Government were not prepared to reconquer the country either for the Egyptian Government or for this nation; neither were they prepared to make sacrifices of English treasure and life for the purpose of re-endowing the Egyptian Government with the Provinces of the Soudan. It was, in their opinion, no part of their duty to risk English treasure or life in enabling the Egyptian garrisons to march out with flying colours from their positions in the Soudan. At the same time, there existed in this country a very strong and natural desire that some effort should, if possible, be made to mitigate the sufferings of the retreat of those garrisons. One chance of this there appeared to be. There was one man of known ability and energy who had great experience in the government and affairs of the Soudan, who was believed to have acquired great influence in that country, who was universally pointed to by the public opinion of this country, and who appeared himself to be of opinion that it would be possible by sending himself, without the support of any military force, to accomplish something for the withdrawal of the garrisons. In the conversations which General Gordon had with Members of the Government, before he undertook his mission, he explained to some extent the views which he entertained on this point. General Gordon said that in his opinion the danger of massacre of the garrisons was greatly exaggerated, that the power of the Mahdi was greatly exaggerated, and that it was probable that no opposition would be offered to the peaceful withdrawal of the Egyptian officials and such portions of the garrisons as might desire to leave. General Gordon further expressed his opinion that probably the greater number even of the Egyptian population would not desire to leave, that the greater number of the troops would probably join the Mahdi or the insurrectionary party, and that the withdrawal of such persons as it might be desirable to withdraw could be effected without any great difficulty or great risk of massacre. At the same time, Sir Evelyn Baring had asked, on behalf of the Egyptian Government, that a British officer should be sent to superintend the evacuation of Khartoum and the retreat of the other garrisons. It seemed to us at that time that this was a chance which we ought not to throw away, and that we should be wanting in our duty if we refused the offer of General Gordon's services, rejected the demands of Sir Evelyn Baring and the Egyptian Government, and allowed lives to be sacrificed through the known incapacity of the principal Egyptian officials of the Soudan. This was the primary object of the mission which General Gordon accepted. It is perfectly true that he thought it might be in his power to do something more—to secure the establishment of a Government in the Soudan to replace the Egyptian Government. The evacuation, even if it should lead to the establishment in Khartoum and other places of the Mahdi, or the heads of the insurrection, was the primary object which General Gordon went out to accomplish and which he willingly accepted.

I am not going to imitate the conduct pursued by some hon. Gentlemen opposite, in condemning without further information or in casting blame or doubt on General Gordon when his proceedings appeared to be somewhat inconsistent with the objects for which he left this country. We know what was the treatment he received from hon. Gentlemen opposite. No sooner was there a whisper of a Proclamation which appeared to countenance some extension of the Slave Trade than the most indignant protests were made from the other side of the House, and we were asked if we were going to support an envoy who proposed to re-establish the Slave Trade? No sooner had the rumour of General Gordon's application to have Zebehr sent to him reached this country than similar opposition was made, and there were similar notices of resistance. But although none of us are entitled to throw any doubt whatever on the measures which General Gordon thought fit to adopt, I am bound to say that there are some portions of his policy which, as at present advised, are not clear to us; and it is not clear to us that he has not departed in some respects from his original purpose. It is possible that General Gordon over-rated at first to some extent the probabilities as to the success of his mission; he might have overestimated his own strength in dealing with the objects to be achieved, not merely the removal of the garrisons, but the reconstitution of the Government of the Soudan, and, what he thought a necessary preliminary to the reconstitution of settled government in the Soudan, the crushing of the power of the Mahdi. It may be that he found that the execution of his original intentions, as I have described them, was perfectly impossible. But on the evidence before us we have had proof, to some extent, that the situation of the garrisons was not inaccurately estimated by General Gordon. In the case of Tokar, the gar- rison, though it surrendered, was not massacred, and it does not appear that even without the intervention of a British force that garrison would not have been allowed to depart. In the case of Shendy, the massacre of refugees does not appear to have been confirmed, and, so far as we have heard, the emigration of the officials and army from Berber has been accomplished without loss of life. Up to the present time there is nothing to show that General Gordon was wrong in believing, as he stated before he left this country, that probably there would be no difficulty put in the way by the inhabitants of the country of the Egyptian garrisons and people leaving the places which they then occupied.

The Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman says that the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government has not tended to promote the success of General Gordon's mission. But he omits to state whether there was any possible course which, in the opinion of his Colleagues, would have been more successful. The speeches made in support of the right hon. Gentleman's Motion, however, go a great deal further—for they go so far as to say that the course taken by us tended not to promote, but to defeat, the success of General Gordon's mission. Let me examine the allegations. The first allegation appears to be that the military operations at Suakin exasperated the Mahdi and the people whom he led. Now, not one syllable of proof has been brought forward by the right hon. Gentleman or any of his supporters that that has been the case. The telegrams go entirely in an opposite direction. On the 29th of February, General Gordon, speaking of a rising of tribes near Kassala, says in a telegram to Sir Evelyn Baring— Hadendowa have raised tribes near Kassala; attacked Kassala, but were repulsed. Road still closed. As Baker's defeat has caused this, you ought to do something to draw these Hadendowa down to Suakin." — [Egypt, No. 12 (1884), p. 121.] Therefore, on the 29th of February it is quite evident that Gordon did not disapprove of the operations. Then on the 3rd of March, speaking again of Kassala, he says— I have no doubt but that Graham's victory will withdraw the enemy from the vicinity."— [Ibid, p. 156.] That does not show that General Gordon thought that the success of his mission had been endangered by the operations. On the 8th of March, he says— Kassala will hold out without difficulty after Graham's victory."—[Ibid. p. 145.] I maintain then, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that it is impossible to support the allegation that the military operations undertaken by the Government have tended in any way to aggravate the position of General Gordon at Khartoum.

Then we come to the proposal of General Gordon to send Zebehr. That is a question which need not be discussed at much length, because it is not seriously maintained by the Opposition that a different course ought to have been followed by Her Majesty's Government. The most that has been said—and it is the only practical suggestion—is that if this was refused you ought to have proposed something else. Well, I am not aware, after all the experience we have acquired, what it is suggested by Gentlemen opposite that we ought to have done. It is left to my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford to do that, and he says— "Gordon ought to have been asked to remain in Khartoum himself, and to establish a settled Government there and in the Soudan." What knowledge has my right hon. Friend that it was in the power of General Gordon to do so? And I would ask my right hon. Friend what help it was possible in February or March to give to Gordon? What assistance would it have been possible to render him in the task of establishing a settled Government in Khartoum and the Provinces? Then it is said that we ought to have taken advantage of General Graham's success, and despatched troops to Suakin to open the road and occupy Berber. In the first place, I would repeat what I stated on the 3rd of April, that the sending of troops to Berber has never been suggested by Gordon himself as au isolated operation, or except in connection with the proposal which he made that Zebehr should be sent out to succeed him. That I assert. But in the next place, what is of more practical importance, I must ask the House to consider what was the possibility of such an operation. As far as I am aware, the reliance of the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends is on a telegram of Sir Evelyn Baring, dated the 24th of March, in which he states shortly the opinion of General Stephenson and General Wood that the operation, though one of extraordinary military risk, was not an impossible one. Well, at that very time operations were in progress which were in that direction, and might possibly have had the effect of opening out communications with Suakin. In accordance with the recommendations of General Gordon, Sir Evelyn Baring, and the military authorities, advantage was taken of the victories gained to push on a reconnaissance in force in the direction of the road to Berber, and, if possible, to establish communications with that town. What was the result? What was the experience gained by that limited operation? Although the season had not reached the greatest heat the troops suffered fearfully, so that on one day's march almost half the small force employed had to fall out from the effect of the heat. That operation, accompanied as it was by great suffering to the troops, while it was not seriously resisted, though it found that a certain small force was still collected under Osman Digna, proved conclusively that any military expedition on a considerable scale in the direction of Berber was absolutely impossible. I do not deny that it might have been possible at great risk and the certainty of great suffering to send a small force of Cavalry. That was possible. But that force, if sent at all, must have been sent entirely unsupported by Artillery or Infantry. And in the attempt that had been made by far the most difficult part of the route had not been experienced. The difficulties of movement over the first 150 miles, though they might be overcome, were immense; but they were as nothing compared with the difficulties of the route over the last 100 miles. I remember the Questions that used to be addressed to me two or three years ago when General Roberts undertook his march from Cabul to Candahar with a considerable and perfectly-equipped Force. I then received most urgent expostulations and admonitions from Gentlemen opposite as to the inexpediency and recklessness of cutting off such a force from its base and sending it to march in an enemy's country without provision for perfect communications. I am, therefore, surprised at the extreme facility with which hon. Members opposite adopt the proposal that it would have been wise to send a small force of Cavalry across 200 miles of desert—100 of which are without water—without any provision for communicating with its base, and with the absolute certainty that, whatever might befall it, no reinforcements could reach it for months. And what was the object to be accomplished in return for this extraordinary risk? No one could suppose that a small force of 200 or 300 Cavalry would have been sufficient to undertake any considerable operation for the practical assistance of General Gordon. What he relied upon was the moral effect that would be produced by sending any British soldiers at all, and I do not deny that it is possible that if this risk had been run, and if this force had successfully arrived at Berber, a moral effect might have been produced; but that is entirely a matter of supposition, and is utterly incapable of proof.

So far as our experience goes, the moral effect of the operation of British soldiers in the Soudan may very easily be over-estimated. We were told that the moral effect of sending a force to Suakin would be such that there would be no fighting at all; but the moral effect was not even to save the garrison of Tokar. The siege was continued, and the garrison surrendered. At all events, it might have been supposed that the moral effect on the troops under Osman Digna would be such that they would not remain to fight our troops, and that they would disperse. But the Native levies, far from being impressed by the moral effect of a British Expedition, remained to fight two of the most sanguinary and obstinate engagements ever fought by British troops; and there is no reason to suppose that the tribes whom we might have encountered in marching to Berber, and the tribes in arms between Berber and Khartoum, are of a stuff so different from that of which those serving under Osman Digna are made, that the moral effect would have been what General Gordon anticipated. It is evident that if the moral effect had not been that which was expected by General Gordon the difficulties of General Gordon's position would have been greatly enhanced. I should like to know what would be the feeling of this country at this moment, and what would be the language of hon. Members opposite, if besides having General Gordon and Colonel Stewart beleagured in Khartoum, we also knew that a small force of British Cavalry, unable to take the offensive, was shut up in the town of Berber, and that no force for its extrication could be sent without a delay of many weeks?

The right hon. Gentleman says, in addition, that the steps necessary to secure the personal safety of General Gordon are still delayed. Where does the right hon. Gentleman obtain that information, and to what steps does that part of his Resolution point? The right hon. Gentleman does not say that any steps are actually necessary; he only says that certain steps which may be necessary are still delayed. In our opinion, before an Expedition for the relief of General Gordon is ordered or announced, it is the duty of the Government to satisfy themselves, by every means in their power, both of the necessity and practicability of that course. Such an expedition, the difficulties of which are very little appreciated by some hon. Members opposite, is not to be undertaken without the clearest proof of its necessity. Such an expedition ought certainly not to be made for the purpose of enabling General Gordon to "smash" the Mahdi, as he has expressed it. Such an expedition ought not to be made for the purpose of giving a satisfactory Government to the inhabitants of the Soudan, a task which is beyond the responsibility which the British Government ought to undertake. Such an expedition is not to be made even to enable the garrisons of the Soudan to march out with the honours of war. We must be satisfied, as far as it is possible for us to satisfy ourselves, that such an expedition is necessary to secure the safety of General Gordon, and of those for whose safety he has made himself responsible. It is necessary that we should be satisfied that the original view as to the possibility of evacuation is now impossible of execution. General Gordon will not be called upon by the Government to do anything which will be derogatory to his honour or to his character. Those who have trusted themselves in his service, those who have fought for him, those who have increased the perils in which they stood before by entering his service, no doubt General Gordon is responsible for, and cannot desert; but there is no reason to believe that if escape is possible for him it is not also possible for those who stand towards him in the relation which I have described. But the fact that General Gordon has risked his life in a pacific mission, in a mission of mercy, does not make him responsible for the performance of impossibilities. It does not make him responsible, and it does not make the Government any more responsible than they were before his mission was undertaken, for the safe withdrawal of the garrisons from the Soudan, which were not placed there in the service of England or by the orders of England. There is nothing to show that the danger in which those garrisons have always stood since the victory over General Hicks has been in any way increased by any orders given by General Gordon, or any measures taken by him. For the relief of those garrisons General Gordon is not bound in honour, but he is bound in honour not to desert those who have co-operated with him and taken service under him.

Before the steps referred to in the Resolution of the right hon. Gentleman are decided upon or announced, the Government are bound to satisfy themselves of the practicability as well as of the necessity of such steps. They are bound to satisfy themselves by inquiry, by the collection of information, by consultation with the best authorities with whom they can communicate, before they commit this country to an undertaking which must be difficult, and which may be one of enormous difficulty. They must consider the scale of the preparations which will have to be made, the route which it will be possible to take, and the time of year when it will be possible for operations to commence. The noble Lord the Member for Woodstock said that my right hon. Friend had announced that in October the Government would begin to think what measures it might be possible to take for the relief of General Gordon. The Government, I may tell the noble Lord, will not postpone considering the matter till the month of October, for they are thinking now, and have been long thinking, what measures they could take for the relief of General Gordon. Is the noble Lord prepared to say that this or any other Government would be justified in risking the health and safety of an expedition by sending it out before the month, of September or October? I have spoken of the difficulties of any possible operations. Is the House aware that by the river route the distance from Cairo to Khartoum is 1,600 miles, intercepted by cataracts, and that many parts of the river are very little known, and have never been traversed by large bodies of men or used for the carriage of large quantities of forces? I have described the nature of the difficulties of the route by Suakin. Does the noble Lord think that an expedition on a large scale in the very height of summer is feasible or justifiable? I do not say that measures of the kind I have indicated are impossible, but I do say they are of such a magnitude that they are not to be attempted, and certainly not to be announced, until their practicability has been clearly demonstrated, and until the measures which it will be necessary to take are clearly foreseen. If such necessity should be proved, and if such practicability should be demonstrated, then I believe that this country will be prepared to grudge no sacrifice to save the life and honour of General Gordon. At the same time, it will be prepared, if it be possible, to give relief to those garrisons for the safety of which, as I have said, we admit and accept no responsibility, but whose sufferings unmerited, undeserved, and cruel, not by reason of any claims they possess upon us, in the name of mercy and humanity, we fully and completely appreciate.

SIR HARDINGE GIFFARD

said, that if the speech to which the House had just listened had been made two months ago, they would probably not now have been engaged in discussing the state of things in the Soudan. It was evident now that the Government had come to the determination to do what was right, only that determination came too late to be given effect to. He confessed he listened to some of the observations of the noble Marquess with considerable regret. The course adopted by the noble Marquess reminded him of the practice attributed to some savage nations, who, when their idols were dumb to their prayers, proceeded to heartily belabour those idols for their obstinacy. The House had had from from the Government two phases of opinion as to General Gordon. First, General Gordon was described as a Christian hero and as a genius; but now that the idol had not responded, he was described as a man of quick temper and impulsive views, who committed to telegrams the first notion that occurred to him. If that had been the description which the Prime Minister gave to the country of the person to whom this important mission had been intrusted, it was doubtful whether that mission would have secured the universal assent that it did obtain, and which was obtained by statements that were very different from those just made to the House by the noble Marquess. It seemed to him that at the bottom of this question there was something that the noble Marquess had not grappled with at all. En passant, he might observe that it was somewhat curious that the defence of the Government was left, perhaps necessarily, chiefly to Members of the Government. Certainly the speech of the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) and the speech of the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) did not suggest that outside their own ranks the Government had any very efficient support. But the question with which the noble Marquess had failed to deal was the question of the original responsibility of these acts.

It being ten minutes before Seven of the clock, the Debate stood adjourned till this day.