§ MR. TOTTENHAM, who had given Notice that he would call attention to the present condition of the Army and the system of recruiting; and to move—
That a Select Committee be appointed to report upon the best mode of carrying into effect the recommendations of the Committee of Military Officers presided over by Lord Airey, embodied in their Report dated March, 1880,said, it was a matter of regret that for many years now past the Army and its reorganization, or rather the revolutionizing of its system and constitution, had been made a battle-ground for Party warfare, and the field of ill-judged and ruinous experiments. On the Opposition side of the Rouse there had been no desire to bring the Army within that region. In endeavouring to combat the. revolutionary theories of experimental theories, and prevent the extinction of customs and traditions which had so long stood the test of times of peace and times of war, they considered they were best serving that country whose influence they believed those changes were calculated to lower and destroy. He might be told that to expose the weakness of the Army was not the best way of supporting and upholding that influence. To those who, to hide the shortcomings of a system for which they wore responsible, used such an argument as that, he would say that it was high time that the country should know into what a state the Army had drifted, and to what shifts it had been necessary to resort to keep up a semblance of efficiency on paper. The noble Marquess now at the head of the War Department was not personally responsible for the changes to which he was about to allude; but, anxious as he might be to defend the acts of his present and former Colleagues, he must be forced to admit that the results had not been what the country was led to expect. Since 1871 the Army had been subjected to the most violent changes, and with what result? Had we got a bettor, a more contented, or more efficient Army to-day than we had in 1870? Or had the Service grown in popularity with either officers or men? He said emphatically, No. The authorities were daily increasing the number of officers compulsorily turned adrift in the prime of life from no fault of their own, but from the accident and ill-luck of pro- 74 motion to a higher grade not having fallen to them before they reached an ago at which they were as competent for their duties and for active work as at any period of their service. These were men who entered the Service with the intention of devoting their lives to the service of the country, and who little thought that that, country would blast all their hopes of promotion, of advancement, and the fulfilment of an honourable career, by cutting them adrift in the prime of life, after they had given the greater part of their best years to its service, with a pittance, which, without a homo, a mess, or supplementary means or employment, was insufficient to support them in the position of gentlemen. The country could not expect such men to speak of such treatment as that in other terms than of discontent and disgust, and these sentiments could not but be felt among the non-commissioned officers and men as well, and added to their own list of grievances. By this system they were daily adding to the Pension List, which had grown from £.500,000 odd in 1871 to £1,300,000 odd in 1884. Neither commanding officers nor those under them wore likely to take the same interest in men who might at any moment be drafted into another battalion. In his judgment, and in the judgment of those who had the best knowledge on the subject, it also made the worst possible school for young officers, who were taught to study the characters and capabilities of their men; but they must feel that there was no object in learning the characters of men who might be, and must be, almost immediately sent away from them. The men, in like manner, instead of being taught to look upon their battalion and their company as their own, did not know at what time they might be sent away at the shortest notice. The system of linking together regiments which had neither custom, traditions, or local connection in common was unpopular in the highest degree in the Service, and was eminently destructive of that esprit de corps, which ought to be the very soul of the Army. He had received scores of letters from officers commanding battalions who know that he took an interest in the subject, and they all agreed that the system of making one battalion feed another was fatal to efficiency. All who had any knowledge of the subject—all, at least, who were without 75 prejudice—must disapprove of the system. As far as the Army in England was concerned, it was hardly an Army at all. They had heard some after-dinner speeches which were calculated to mislead in the strongest possible degree, and to point to a state of affairs very different from what actually existed, and they had had an example of this lately in a post-prandial speech of a noble Lord. The figures quoted, or rather misquoted, by one who ought to have been very careful how he quoted, were figures which he had vouched by his own signature. But if anyone would take the trouble to see for themselves the actual material of these figures, he would find n lamentable and a pitiable exhibition. To call them soldiers was a misnomer. They were boys of 16 and 17, enlisted under false representations made by themselves as to age, boys of not necessarily more than 5 feet 3 inches in height, or 32 inches in chest measurement, by a recent Warrant. The noble Marquess had declined that day to verify some figures which he (Mr. Tottenham) had put before the House in the form of a Question. He regretted that the noble Marquess had considered it expedient to do that, because he thought that he should be wanting in his duty to the House and the country if he did not show that the figures he had put on the Paper were not only absolutely correct, but were simply typical instances of what might be multiplied over and over again in every regiment. The noble Marquess was recently asked for a Return that would have given, in great measure, figures of a similar nature to those mentioned in his Question that day; but the noble Marquess had answered that it would not be for the benefit of the Service that those figures should be given in the case of individual regiments. Now, he felt himself obliged to bring forward certain figure, leaving the country to consider whether it was not for its interest that they should be stated. Two battalions which were in the 1st Brigade of the Division at Alder-shot had recently loft for the Mediterranean. They formed part of the first line of defence of this country. They sailed at a strength of 1,695 privates, of whom no fewer than 960 were of less than two years' service, and 770 were recruits of less than one year's service, while 519 of those men had never fired a shot, and 76 had gone through no course of instruction in musketry. Those men were supposed to be all of a suitable age to go upon service anywhere, cither in the field or in a tropical climate; but 521 were supposed to be under 20 years of age. though he was informed on good authority that 721 would be nearer the mark. It would be little wonder, then, if such men melted away like flies when they went upon service in the field. In the recent post-prandial speech to which he had alluded, certain figures were given by the Adjutant General of the Army; but they had to be contradicted in "another place" by the Under Secretary of State for War as having been given in mistake. Now, he said that figures of that kind had no business to be given in mistake; and even if they had boon critically accurate, they would be misleading in the highest degree. They were told in those figures that 91 per cent of the Army were over 20 years of age, 58 per cent over 5 feet 7 inches, in height, that 83 per cent were over 35 inches' chest measurement, while 78 per cent were of more that two years' service. That was not a proper method of conveying the facts to the country. In those figures, which were taken on the 1st of January, 1883, when they had over 11,000 men of the Reserve in the ranks,. which naturally increased to an abnormal extent the averages in all those different measurements, there were lumped, together Household Cavalry, Guards,: Artillery, and all arms of a higher standard than the lane, which necessarily increased the Line averages. He said that, to give the public any just idea of the averages, they must separate the Homo and Indian Armies and calculate them separately. But he would now I give the actual figures of three Line battalions, not selected, but the first three he could obtain from one English station, and the House would see what a different story was told. In those three battalions the total strength of non-commissioned officers and men was 2,230 on the 1st of January. Of those, 575 wore under 5 feet 5 inches, 1,017 under 5 feet 6 inches, 1,485 under 5 feet 7 inches, or 66 per cent of the whole; 773 were under 35 inches' chest measurement, or 34 per cent of the whole; 708 were under 20, or 31 per cent; and 934 were under one year's service, or 41 per cent. Those figures wore critically correct, and he would vouch for their 77 accuracy, and they were the same from which the general Annual Return was compiled by the Adjutant General. Of those battalion?, one was on the highest establishment, and among' the first for foreign service. One was in the intermediate, and the other in the lowest grade of numbers. In another battalion quartered at another station, on an establishment of 520, the average height of the whole battalion was 5 feet 4½ inches, and the average chest measurement 34½ inches. The Inspector General of Recruiting's Report for 1882 showed that 554 men per 1,000 were under 20 years of age; 495 per 1.000 were under 9st. 4lb. in weight, and 272 under 5 feet 5 inches in height. Those particulars were omitted from this year's Report for the first time, for what reason he knew not. The standard for the Line was now 5 inches lower than it was in 1869 and 1870, when it was 5 feet 8 inches. The standard for the Guards was now 1 inch lower than the Line in those years, He would next examine the monthly Returns by the light of actual facts; and the noble Marquess's objection to particularizing regiments in the Return he was recently asked for, and in his answer to him that evening, would be understood. On the 1st January, 1884, a battalion of the 60th Rifles had an establishment of 520 privates, and, according to the Return, 437 Effectives; but, as a matter of fact, six companies at head-quarters had only 85 men for duty, including the band. The Royal Irish Regiment on the same day had an establishment of 950 men, being one of the first for foreign service; and yet they had only 659 Effectives, being 291 men short of the establishment. The East Surrey had an establishment of 950, and 830 so-called Effectives, being 120 short of the establishment. The Northamptonshire 1st Battalion had an establishment of 520, the Effectives 345, or 175 short of the establishment; while the 2nd Battalion had an establishment of 800, and 615 Effectives, or 185 short of the establishment, making the number short on both battalions 365. According to the Return, the South Staffordshire Regiment had 520 men; but there were only 238 men in the ranks, or 282 men short of its proper strength. Worse cases, however, remained. The Dorsetshire Regiment, the 1st Battalion of which was at home, bad an establishment of 850 men; 78 but of this number only 402 wore Effective. The 2nd Battalion, which was in India, and which was supposed to keep up its strength, had only 613 Effective men, or 207 short, the whole regiment being 665 men out of both battalions short of its proper number. The Durham Light Infantry, the 1st Battalion of which was in India, had an establishment of 820 men; but only 459 were Effective, there being 361 short. The 2nd Battalion, which was at Gibraltar, had an establishment of 950 men, only 784 being Effective, and the number short in the battalion being 166. The number short in both battalions was 527. Out of the nine battalions he had mentioned, no less than 2,240 men were short, and in two regiments alone there were 1,182 men short. To go back to the 1st of October last, he wished lo point out that there was one battalion stationed at the Curragh, in Ireland—tho Rifle Brigade—who had on its establishment 539 men, being 19 men over its establishment. On the same day, however, that battalion had 12 men tit for guard or garrison duyt—12 men out of a so-called effective establishment of 539 private soldiers. Now, he thought that a stronger case than that could hardly be made out. He defied the noble Marquess opposite, or those who were responsible for the administration of the War Department, to controvert the figures he had brought forward. [The Marquess of HARTING-TON: Which battalion?] The 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade, stationed at the Curragh. The figures he had submitted to the House were taken from the monthly Return and the Annual Return which were presented to Parliament, and which were supposed to represent the true state of the facts. These were only typical cases, but they were cases which would apply to the great majority of regiments in the Service to a greater or less degree. He held that it was criminal weakness on the part of those who were responsible for this state of things to continue to deceive the country. These were the battalions on which they had to rely for defence, and many of them would compose their first line, in the event of national danger, or in the case of a European war. He had seen some of those battalions on parade himself. The commanding officer of one of them made the observation to him—" The companies which you and I commanded here in 79 different regiments 25 years ago would have walked through my entire regiment to-day." That he fully be believed, for a more miserable exhibition than the battalions he was speaking of he had never seen. He believed that the expression of that commanding officer was literally true; and all he could say was, God help the country in the hour when she had to be defended by such an array as he had seen. The boys were, no doubt, good boys enough, if time was given to them to grow; but it must be remembered that while the grass was growing the horse was starving. It was high time that the country should know that they were paying, not for an effective, but for a non-effective, Army at home. The short service system, as hitherto carried out, was a failure pure and simple. Under it a man had no sooner been made into a soldier than he was sent into the Reserve, to the detriment of his own regiment and of the first line of which it formed a part. Without its old soldiers, and consisting of nothing but young men and recruits, a regiment would not go through the same amount of work, and could not be relied upon in the hour of trial. They had had instances of that in Zululand and elsewhere; and to the mind of the soldier it was an axiom of military experience. This was not a new theory of modern times. It was one insisted upon by the Duke of Wellington, the greatest soldier of modern days. In his letters to the Prince Consort, recently published, the Duke of Wellington said—The example, the life and soul of the regiment and squads is, under the officers, in the old soldiers who have served 10, or nearly 10 years, and have attained 27 or 28 years of ago.He also stated that the conduct of the regiment in all situations, and particularly under the fire of the enemy, depended upon the countenance and example of the old soldiers. The Duke of Wellington also referred to the painful impression made upon the minds of the officers by the Act of Parliament limiting the period of enlistment to 10 years. What stronger evidence could the country have than the opinion of this, the first soldier of the century—that was to say, if soldiers' opinions connected with their own profession were to be of any avail at all? What stronger expression of opinion than this could be adduced; and whoso were the opinions, he should like to know, which 80 could be set against those of the conqueror in a hundred fights, and whoso practical knowledge, extending over the campaigns of years, dwarfed to insignificance those of recent date, aided by every appliance which science could suggest? The opinion of the great Duke was one which was an article of faith in the minds of 99 out of every 100 soldiers in the Service past and present. The opinion was that oil the old soldiers the morale of the regiment, the steadiness, the smartness, the discipline, the pride in their regiments and in the Service depended, and, above all, that esprit de corps which was an element which recent innovations had done so much to completely and utterly destroy—an. element which theoretical civilians, who had no practical knowledge of the influence it had upon the regiments in the Service, pooh-poohed by their acts, while they uphold it by their words. Esprit de corps was not necessarily acquired by a recruit with his uniform. It was by what he saw and heard, and the force of example set him by old and experienced soldiers with whom he associated in his daily life, that he acquired by degrees those habits of discipline and unquestioning obedience to his officers. If they eliminated from the ranks all those whoso service and long training made them objects of respect and attention on the part of the recruits, they took away from these recruits that feeling of emulation which prompted them to try and become smart and efficient soldiers. A soldier could be made from average material fit to go on sentry or to take his part in a drill or parade in the course of a year; but they must also take into consideration that a soldier was something more than a military machine. The man whom they might make into a soldier in a year was not a soldier in the full and true sense of the word, and he held that they could not make a soldier under a minimum of at least five years' service. That, at the present time, was the very period at which he was shortly to be turned out of the Service into the Reserve, and just at the time when he was able to render some equivalent to the State for what he had cost it. His contention was that they were living in a foul's paradise. He supposed that nothing would house those who were holding the reins of government, and those who were responsible for the present state of the Army, until 81 such another storm burst upon this country as had burst upon their neighbours across the Channel, who, when the storm burst, found themselves totally unprepared. That might be our case any day. We were, with our eyes open, following a system which they had had ample warning was a fatal one, and which had been tried and found wanting. It was a system which had been condemned by even' person who was most competent to judge of it. It was probable that he should be told that, in the event of need, these boys he had described would be replaced by Reserve men. and that they would not be sent abroad with their battalions. This had been done in the case of the battalions going to Egypt, and notably in the case of the 87th Regiment, now called the Royal Irish Fusiliers. When that battalion went to Egypt, in 1882. it was obliged to leave 400 recruits behind, who were not of age, or who had not gone through the usual training of recruits qualifying them to go on foreign service. They were filled up by au equivalent number of men from the he -serve. This really amounted to turning their second line of defence into their first line. What was the use of having au effective strength on paper, if they were unable to produce it in the flesh under arms when the pinch came? For years they had now been sacrificing their Army to the creation of a shadowy Re-serve, and with the result that neither was efficient in point of numbers, and the first line was inefficient in point of effective qualities. Lord Card well, the father of this scheme, calculated, in 1871, that in 12 years a First Reserve would be created of 178,000 men. and Pensioners 13,493, making a total of 191,493. But in July, 1882, there were only 37,795 men of all classes. Each battalion should be a distinct unit, and once a. man was attached to a battalion he should continue with that battalion during- his Colour service, without being liable to arbitrary transfer. To enable each battalion to be kept up in an efficient state, it would be necessary considerably to increase the number of men at the depôts. Sooner or later they would have to increase the number of their private soldiers. During the last four years the tendency had been all that way. The number on the regimental establishment—he drew a distinction between that and other establishments, such, as the Stall'— 82 in 1880–1 was 123,791; and the present Estimates provided for 130,114 men, being an increase, step by step, of 6,323 in four years. That was a step in the right direction, but it was not sufficient. It would be necessary very considerably to increase the strength of the Army at all events of the rank and file. This, he understood, was the opinion not only of military critics, but of those responsible for the Army. Unless the Army was to cease to exist as an Army, the number of men must be increased. The country must make up its mind to have the Army in a state of efficiency, and supply the necessary men and the necessary funds. Turning to the Auxiliary Forces, he found that for the year 1882 the Militia were 23,638 men short, the Yeomanry 3,275, and the Volunteers 38,781, making a total of 65,694 men short of the fixed establishment. They were endeavouring to do with a standing Army of 191.000 men what was fairly the work of 250,000. Supposing that they were to increase their Army to the extent that he suggested, by increasing the establishment of the depôt to enable them to feed both battalions, what would they be doing in comparison with Continental countries? Russia, with a population of 84.000,000, had a standing: Army of 841,000 men; Germany, whose population was 45,000,000, had an Army of 445.000 men; while France, with a population of 37,000,000. had an Army of 496,000 men. England ruled over no less than 234,000,000 people, and yet had only an Army, including her Indian Establishment, "of 314,000. These figures showed that, while Franco had one soldier to every 74 persons, and Russia and Germany one to every 100 persons, England, with nearly treble the population of Russia, and more than six times that of France, had only one in every 715 persons. With such a disproportion of military force as this, the least that the country could expect was to have its Army in a state of thorough efficiency, and that it should get value for the heavy bill it had to pay. In 1880, when Lord Airey's Committee presented their Report, they were informed that at the rate of depletion then in progress 30,000 recruits would be annually required to keep the Army up to its establishment. But the number recruited short of this in 1883 was 3,000, which had to be added to previous deficiencies in 1881 and 1882. And to 83 this, again, must be added the number of men whose time had expired, and who had come homo and been discharged into the Reserve during the relief season. The country must not imagine that because 33,000 recruits were passed into the Service during the year the whole of those 33,000 were still in the Service. Taking the Annual Returns of 1882, it would be seen that out of the whole 23,395 enlisted only 21,247 were serving at a date three months afterwards, being 2,148, or 91 per 1,000, less—nearly 1–10th of the whole. Of these no less than 43.9 per 1,000 had purchased their discharge; and the balance was made up of those who had broken down, deserted, or who were found medically unfit. In the previous year the figures were even larger, showing, out of a total recruited of 25,863, a loss from the same causes of 2,568 men, or 100 men per 1,000. Taking the same rates for the past year, it followed that the number shown as recruited would not in reality be 33,000, but 3,000 less; or 30,000, as against, the 36,000 Lord Airey's Committee informed the country was what would be required. During the throe years since that Report was presented, the actual numbers of recruits joining and remaining in the Service after three months was no loss than 35,460 short of what they were then informed by the most competent and exhaustive inquiry would be required for the service of the country; and, instead of 108,000 men, they had only got 74,542. It must also be remembered that as much as £12 bounty had been given during the past year to upwards of 6,000 men in India to re-engage. Where would the numbers and efficiency of the Army be now without this extra expenditure, which had bean rendered absolutely necessary by the absence of men to make up the required drafts from home? He might be told they could not get men enough even at a reduced standard. There were, however, plenty of men if they chose to pay them. If they could not get men for a shilling they must pay more. So long ago as 1872 the desirability of all recruits joining and being drilled at the depôt was recognized by the military authorities; and on the 22nd of February, 1872, His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief issued a Memorandum recommending the plan of regiments consisting of three distinct bodies, and that all recruits should be raised 84 and drilled at depôts. The Committee which was then sitting, consisting of General M'Dougall, Lord Wolseley, and others, recognized also the desirability of this system; and a General Order was issued in April, 1873, laying this down. At that time it was contemplated that the system of one battalion feeding the other should prevail, and that all men should be interchangeable between the two battalions. That system was again recognized and accepted by the Committee which sat in March, 1876, presided over by the right hon. and gallant Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley), and it remained in vogue till June, 1879, when, in consequence of the constant complaints of defects and difficulty of working, the Secretary of State for War appointed the Committee known as Lord Airey's Committee. That Committee went into the whole subject exhaustively, and reported in March, 1880; and to that Report he desired to draw the special attention of the House, as the expression of opinion of a body of officers of the greatest experience, who. having fully considered the matter from the military point of view, came to a unanimous conclusion as to the defects of the system. Like that Committee, he had limited his observations to the Infantry of the Line, as it was in that branch of the Service that the system had most conspicuously broken down. It had broken down in; time of peace, when no strain was upon it—not even that of a small war; and it had been worse when such small wars had occurred. It was to avoid the chance of such a disaster as had been I foreshadowed in some of the letters he I had read that he had felt it his duty to: call the attention of the House and the country to the situation. Speaking of the scheme which had been carried out in 1872, the Report, in paragraph 16, said that the scheme did not provide any distinct and separate preparation for those, more frequent wars, for which the services of the British Army were so frequently required, and which were as onerous on the troops engaged as were the greatest wars, and which required that the men employed should be as thoroughly and fully trained as possible., the Report then showed the urgent necessity of making provision for such: smaller wars, by giving a list of the 42: last wars in which the country had been I engaged between the years 1831 and 85 1880. In paragraph 22 it was said that the demands for men to keep the service battalions at the established strength had been so great that, as a rule, it had been impossible to obtain recruits at the depots, and constant recourse had been had to battalions at home to supply drafts to affiliated battalions abroad, the battalions at homo being therefore necessarily denuded of their men and, again, that great difficulty was anticipated as the older long-service men disappeared in obtaining such a body of non-commissioned officers as ought at all times to exist in a well-conditioned army. The Report went on to say that from the practice as it at present existed by which recruits were kept for a short time at the depôt and then passed on to the battalion, where they remained for a few months and were then again passed on to other battalions, the interest of recruits in obtaining the good opinion of their officers was lessoned, and discipline suffered in consequence. The evidence of the Adjutant General of that date was then quoted in the Report, in the course of which he described the system of calling for volunteers from other regiments as radically vicious, and the most pernicious which the wit of man could devise." As to non-commissioned officers, the Report stated that a great deal of evidence had been taken from Stall and regimental officers, all of which pointed to the great difficulty experienced in obtaining non-commissioned officers of the same type as those which were obtainable under the long-service system, and which showed that a general apprehension existed that, unless effectual measures were taken to remedy that evil, the discipline of the Army would be most seriously affected; and in consequence of that the Report later on proceeded to recommend an alteration in the term of service. The Committee laid down four cardinal points—namely, that the term of service should be altered, that the numbers of the Army must be increased, if its efficiency was to be preserved, that the system of one battalion feeding another should be abolished, and that once a man was posted to a battalion he should remain in it during his Colour service. He apologized to the House for having troubled it with so many extracts; but he could not possibly convey a clearer idea of the situation than by quoting the words of those distinguished officers themselves, instead of attempting 86 to put it into his own words. In the words with which they concluded they showed that the question of expense had not been lost sight of by them. It was a question of expense; but the real question for a rich and powerful country was, whether she would be content with an indifferent article and indifferent service, when, by paying a comparatively small further sum, she could have that which she expected her statesmen to provide her with? He maintained that in the presence of such evidence and recommendations as that Report contained the country would be deliberately flying in the face of Providence if, for the paltry saving of a few hundred thousand pounds, she declined to listen to and be guided by the advice and opinions of such well-chosen and trusty servants. He believed had shown a case which made it imperative almost on Parliament not to ignore and pigeon-hole such a Report as that for the sake of bolstering up a system which, even to those without practical knowledge, was so transparently faulty. What he asked was a full inquiry into the matter from a financial point of view, and the appointment of a Committee which should supplement the he port of those, distinguished officers by further opinion and advice as to the best mode of carrying their recommendations into effect. He earnestly begged the Government to satisfy the legitimate desire of the country and the Army for the fullest information on so important a subject.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, it would be convenient at that point to make a few remarks upon the two topics which had been brought forward by the noble Lord the Member for North Northumberland (Karl Percy) and the hon. Member who had just sat down. The noble Lord called the attention of the House to the system of examination of officers of the Army—a subject upon which he had recently put several Questions to him. He did not deny that there were some cases of hardship, and he could assure the noble Lord that he sympathized very much with the case of those officers who had recently returned from service, and, having failed in their examinations, had been succeeded by junior officers. But those cases were extremely rare, and with care on the part of the officers themselves would never happen. It was open to officers to pass their examinations at any time 87 within one year of receiving their captain's commission. It would only be common prudence to pass that examination at the earliest possible time. But whenever any reasonable ground of excuse could be given—such as foreign service or other duties—for a man's not having gone through a garrison course in preparation for an examination, he was not compelled to go through the examination before being promoted, but was provisionally promoted, and had an opportunity of passing through a garrison class, and corning up for his examination afterwards. The cases of hardship were those of officers coming up before the time had expired, and failing; so that if a vacancy had occurred after their failure they were superseded by junior officers. In all those cases, if officers had accepted provisional promotion, and not gone in for examinations until they had prepared themselves, that supersession would not have occurred. The noble Earl had entered into discussion of several individual cases; but as he had not mentioned any names, it was impossible for him (the Marquess of Hartington) to follow him info these cases.
EARL PERCYwas understood to say that he would be glad to furnish the noble Lord with the particulars of the cases to which he had referred.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONThe noble Lord had referred to officers who had served in India. He had been told that the papers done in examinations by officers in India were very much better than most of those that were done at home. Then it was not incumbent on an officer who had gone through the Afghan War, or other active service, to go in for his examination until he had had an opportunity of preparing himself. The subjects in which officers were examined were tactics, military law, field fortification, and military topography. Ail those were subjects with which an officer ought to be well acquainted; and they were the same subjects which qualified a man for promotion from the ranks. No change had been made in the standard of examinations, and there had been no increase in the difficulty of the papers. There was every disposition shown to pass an officer who showed a general knowledge rather than to pluck candidates by catch questions. The noble Lord had said that many more officers had recently failed than was for- 88 merly the case. That might be in consequence of the increase since 1880 in the number of examinations for majorities. The noble Lord said, with some feeling, that those officers wore purchase officers, and had almost a right to their promotion. He believed that no purchase captains had been compelled to undergo this examination, though the rule, no doubt, app he d to a purchase lieutenant who had not purchased a captaincy. It was not denied by the hon. and gallant Member for Berwick-on-Tweed (Colonel Milne-Home) that an examination of some sort ought, to be maintained. If that were so, he did not sec what alteration the hon. and gallant Gentleman thought ought to be made. He had stated what were the subjects of examination, and the House would feel that they were such as officers ought to be tested in. As he had said, he sympathized very much with officers—in some cases with distinguished services—who had suffered supersession; but he did not see how it was possible to have a different standard of examination. All was done that could be done to allow an officer to choose his own time, and when abroad to qualify him to take provisional promotion until he was ready for examination. He had been asked to reconsider the expediency of these examinations; but he did not think it would be in the interest of the Army or the officers to make any material change. All he could undertake was to have a careful inquiry made into the character of the examination, in order to see whether there was any foundation for the allegation or suspicion that it was unduly difficult. That he would undertake should be done. He would now say a few words upon the somewhat lengthy speech of the hon. Member for Leitrim (Mr. Tottenham). He hoped the House would not think him guilty of any disrespect to the hon. Gentleman if he did not follow him through all the topics of that speech. There were some of them which he should think it his duty to deal with when the House got into Committee, which he hoped they would shortly be allowed to do. But even if the subject had been brought forward on another evening, when it would be possible for him to go into greater details, it would hardly be becoming in him to follow a statement so minute and detailed without time for 89 full consideration. The hon. Member began by referring to the grievance felt by officers in consequence of their compulsory retirement from the regiments of their choice. But we were scarcely prepared to go back to the point to which we should be obliged to go if we were to re-open the position of the officers of the Army. Compulsory retirement was owing to the recommendations of Lord Penzance's Commission, which was appointed to consider what steps were necessary to secure a due flow of promotion; and several changes had been introduced to mitigate the hardships arising from the system, and which had the effect of keeping many officers in the Army who otherwise would have had to retire. The hon. Gentleman attacked the system of double battalions, under which a battalion at homo supp he d with men the battalion abroad. It was almost, too late to go back upon that subject also. In 1881. Lord Airey's Committee reported, and the Report was laid upon the Table, and was fresh in the recollection of every one who took an interest in the subject. His right hon. Friend (Mr. Guilders), in moving the Army Estimates in 1881, made a statement of very great importance, when he pointed out that it was impossible at that time to remain where we were, and that we must either go forward in the direction indicated by the Committee presided over by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley), or go back in the direction advocated by every opponent of short service and recommended by the Committee over which Lord Airey presided. He could point out the passage in the speech in which his right hon. Friend clearly described the alternative, and asked whether the House was prepared to undo a great deal of what had been done in recent years, and to adopt single battalions and enormous depôts. That was the time for the House to adopt the recommendation of Lord Airey's Committee: but, on the contrary, it adhered to the system of double battalions and of a common depôt. It appeared to him impossible now, after the lapse of three years, that the House should be asked to pull to pieces the system which it had deliberately adopted, which was gradually coming into operation, and winch certainly had not yet had a full trial. 90 The hon. Gentleman said, in a great variety of forms, and with much variety of illustration, that the Army was nothing but a sham. He did not accept a great many of the hon. Gentleman's statements; but it was impossible for him to follow those statements in detail. The hon. Gentleman said that he had very good reason for refusing to give the details of particular battalions. The rule on that subject had been laid down by his Predecessor, and he thought there was sufficient reason for it. In many cases it would be invidious to give details of the position of particular regiments or battalions. Exceptional circumstances of all sorts might tend to make their position compare unfavourably with that of other regimen Is or battalions, and it might be extremely painful to the feelings of the commanding officers and of the men if such a comparison was instituted. In the first place, the comparison could not be limited to the particulars suggested by the hon. Gentleman and his Friends. If once they gave certain particulars, they could not stop there. They would I be asked to give particulars of all sorts with regard to crime and conduct. That appeared extremely dangerous. He was quite willing to admit that the two battalions which left the other day for the Mediterranean contained a very large number of young soldiers. But that was because there was a great deficiency of the numbers in India, and those battalions had to supply very largo drafts for the battalions serving there. These battalions ought not to have supp he d drafts to India at all: and, therefore, the condition of those battalions was not a fair test of what the Army arrangements would be under other circumstances. Although he objected to giving figures of particular regiments, he was quite prepared to give some general figures as to the length of service of the men divided into large divisions; for instance, men at home and men abroad; but it would have been observed by the House that the hon. Member's statement was confined almost entirely to the state of the Army at home. He admitted that at home the Army was young; and how any man, considering the fact that they had to employ a large number of men in India and abroad, could be under any misapprehension as to that, completely 91 passed his comprehension. What was the charge against the soldiers? The hon. Member quoted some great military authority in favour of old soldiers; but no Continental Army was composed exclusively, or even mainly, of old soldiers. He regretted that the hon. Member had referred to cases in which, in the hon. Member's opinion, our Army had recently failed to distinguish itself, in Zululand and in the Transvaal. Those reverses were of a character to which every Army must be exposed from time to time; but, whatever they might think of the policy of recent military operations in the Soudan, no Member would deny that their soldiers, on the two occasions of recent battles, had shown great courage and steadiness. One would have supposed that General Graham's force was entirely composed of old soldiers. That was not the case. There were three Infantry battalions at E1 Teb 2,340 strong, of whom 470 were under one year's service, and 1,375 were under three years' service. If these engagements had ended in reverses, no doubt the numbers would have been eagerly quoted as showing the worth-lessness of young men; but as they had resulted in obtaining great credit, probably they would hear little of the ages of the troops engaged. Nothing had been said about the Army abroad. That was composed of men who were the first exposed to foreign service, and to whose ago and training, therefore, the greatest importance attached. The Army at-home would be, and must be, acknowledged to be a training school for the Army abroad, in India and elsewhere; and in case they had to call on their Home Army they must rely on the Reserves. He would presently go into statistics on this question; but it would at once appear that the calling out of the Reserves immediately altered the situation, and they had at once an Army composed mainly of veterans. He regretted that the Forms of the House did not permit the hon. Member to move his Resolution. No doubt the Motion had an innocent look; but he would gladly have seen how many hon. Members would have been prepared to follow the hon. Member in his request for a Committee. He did not conceal from them that the alteration proposed was not only a radical departure from the scheme now adopted by both Parties in 92 the House, but it contemplated an enormous addition of 70.000 or 80,000 men to the present establishment.
§ MR. TOTTENHAMI never suggested anything of the kind.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that, in the hon. Member's opinion, our present Army was doing work which required a much greater Army, and that was the same thing. But if the House desired an Army composed of men of longer service, it was perfectly in their power to have it, without destroying the arrangements now existing; but if they desired to have an Army of longer service there was no alternative but to increase their establishment; and he did not think, considering that the Army had proved sufficient for all foreign service, and that they had at home a large and increasing number of men in the Reserve, thereby making them perfectly secure against any emergency, that the House would be inclined to make any large addition until it had been conclusively proved that the military duties and exigencies of the Empire, both at home and abroad, could not be provided for without further calling upon the taxpayer. It would however, be his duty, when the House was in Committee, to state the reasons for which the Government considered that some increase of the establishment ought to be asked for in the present year. In their opinion, those additions would be sufficient for present needs; but, although he was very far from saying that at some future time the establishment should not be increased, he protested against the idea that it ought to be increased simply because some battalions n a peace establishment were rather below their authorized numbers. With these remarks he trusted ho; might be allowed to lay before the House the state of things which he had described with regard to the Army; and I he appealed to hon. Members to postpone further discussion until after that statement, when it could be carried on with far greater effect and ability.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, he was not present at the time; but he was glad to hear that the noble Marquess was quite prepared to reconsider the character of the examinations which certain officers had undergone.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI did not say that. I did not say I was prepared to make any alteration in the 93 character of the examinations: but that I would inquire whether there had been any undue stringency in the papers set, and whether there was any foundation in the allegation that marks had been more sparingly given.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, he was sorry he had misunderstood what had fallen from the noble Marquess. He thought there was a very great grievance felt by many, and he trusted that the impression that an attempt had been made to get rid of a certain number of gentlemen would prove unfounded. He regretted that there had hardly been a quorum in the House during this discussion; it was not a compliment to the Army or to the constituencies that the attendance should be so small. During the Recess the noble Marquess drew a commiserating cheer from an audience by saying that he was opposed by a phalanx, of Army officers who were always asking for more. As one of the phalanx, he said that all he asked for was efficiency. The real question was as to the waste of the Army. The question was not how many recruits we could enlist in a year—whether 35,000 or 40,000—but how many men fit for foreign service we could obtain; and he held that we were not able to obtain the seasoned men we ought to have for foreign service. There were only two remedies, and both would cost money. One was the old plan, which had never failed, of giving a bounty. It was had recourse to last year, when £12 was given to every man in India who agreed to continue his service; and the result was the obtaining of a largo number of recruits. The objection to giving a bounty in this country was that bad men enlisted over and over again, and that could be prevented only by marking or cupping; but sentiment would not hear of this remedy, and therefore we had to do away with the bounty system. Unfortunately, sentiment was a very expensive thing; and if the Ministerial Party would deal in a sentimental way with the Army, and not in a reasonable and practical manner, the country would have to pay for it. Another alternative was to enlist young soldiers, as boys were enlisted for the Navy, and to train them at camps, depôts, or schools. But that system was a very expensive one, although the systematic adoption of it might reduce the expense. A certain 94 amount of work was got out of a boy on board ship, but it could not be got in the same way out of a young soldier. There was nothing new in these debates he was sorry to say. Objections were yearly raised and suggestions made, and the Ministerial Party were responsible for their not being carried out. He could not understand why the noble Marquess should have refused to give the ages of the men in two battalions that were not going to the war. The late Government did not refuse to give the ages of the men who were sent to Zululand. He could not understand this policy of concealment, and why the noble Marquess should not make a clean breast of it. The noble Marquess had given the House some figures as to the ago of some of the troops in the Soudan; but unless he gave the statistics on the subject in full, neither the House nor the country would be able to form an opinion as to the actual age of the British troops engaged there. It had been stated in a morning journal of that day that one or two of the battalions now engaged in the Soudan were unfit for prolonged service in that part of the world. It was not any doubt of the gallantry of our troops engaged there, but the fear that they were unable to stand the strain of a prolonged and severe campaign, that led him to press Her Majesty's Government upon this point. If our troops were unfit for such severe service the matter was a very serious one to a great Empire like this. It mattered not what Government was in Office—whether the Head of the Government was in favour of a spirited foreign policy, or was pledged to peace and to avoid blood-guiltiness and the extension of the Empire—tho burdens of and the strain upon our Army increased year by year. We had at the present time Egypt upon our hands, and it was possible that we might have to provide for the permanent occupation of the Soudan. In these circumstances the state of the British Army was of the utmost importance; and when they were told by everyone competent to judge—by every officer of the Army from the highest to the lowest—that that Army was not in an efficient state, he did not think that the House was bound to be satisfied with the simple official denial, which was not supported by facts or figures. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, at the Mansion House, had expressed himself 95 in very decided terms on t he subject. His Royal Highness had said that, although many of the regiments serving abroad were in a state of efficiency, the I condition of the Army at homo was not such as be could wish, it being so reduced in numbers that it was scarcely able to discharge the duties it had to perform, and that it was for the country to say whether that state of things should continue or not. Did the House believe the Duke of Cambridge or the Secretary for War upon this point? He asked the noble Lord why the responsible Chief of the Army, with his public character and his official knowledge, should say one thing and the Secretary for War something very like another. He did not wish to be hard upon the noble Lord. What he wished the noble Lord to do was to make a clean breast of the matter to the House, and if he did so the thanks of the country would be due to him. If the noble Lord only had the courage of his opinions, and would take steps to put the Army into a thorough state of efficiency, neither that House nor the country would begrudge him the money required for the purpose. He had always advocated the greater use of coloured troops in hot climates. In the future we should have a fine opportunity of doing with the gallant race who had opposed us in the Soudan what Lord Chatham did with the Scotch Highlanders, he could not but think that line recruits would abound in that part of the world in the future. If we could find coloured recruits in India, he did not see why we could not obtain Arab recruits who would make good soldiers, and prove of great use in holding the Red Sea littoral where English troops could hardly live. Everybody knew what it cost us to put into line a comparatively very small Army; and if any War Minister could discover the means of increasing that Army in the matter of age and in the matter of size by a reasonable expenditure, he would solve the problem which they had all been talking about during the last 20 years. He trusted that the noble Lord would, in the statement he was about to make, be able to inform them that he had devised some scheme for giving us a more efficient Army at the least possible cost to the country.
§ MAJOR GENERAL ALEXANDERsaid, he thought the House was much indebted 96 to the hon. Member (Mr. Tottenham) for his interesting speech on a highly important subject. The action of the hon. Member was the more meritorious when they considered how difficult it was at the present time to of further most friendly criticism on the condition of the Army without exposing themselves to the denunciation of what the hon. Gentleman had called the post-prandial orations of distinguished military officials. The Adjutant General showed himself to be very impatient with those who differed from him on the subject of recruiting, and quoted stale statistics to prove him self in the right and his critics in the wrong. Even the great Lord Wolseley, like humbler mortals, might occasionally fall into error; but it seemed strange that he should have imagined in the month of January that he was quoting from a Return which seldom or never appeared before October. Although they were quite willing to acknowledge the error to be unintentional, they were at liberty to set aside the statistics of the Adjutant General as entirely misleading and fallacious, because they applied to a state of things which doubt less existed in 1882, but which did not exist in 1883. There was, however, in the Adjutant General's speech one fact which was perfectly accurate—namely, that in 1883 we enlisted over 33,000 recruits: but were those recruits enlisted upon the same terms and under the same conditions as the much smaller number who passed into the Service in 1882? If not, the comparison between the two years fell to the ground. The Adjutant General was perfectly aware that in April last a General Order was issued relaxing all the conditions as to ago, height, and chest measurement that were so emphatically insisted upon by the late Secretary of State for War. If the recruits of 1883 had been enlisted upon the same conditions as prevailed, in 1882 the satisfaction of Lord Wolseley would have been perfectly natural; but under the actual circumstances he failed to see any cause for elation. It had been suggested to him that many of the recruits obtained in 1883 would have gone into the Militia if they had not enlisted into the Army. As the Militia was a component part of the Army, it was a matter for regret that it should be below its strength. Lord Wolseley had stated that by the system of short service 97 what he pleased to term the miserable system of bounty had been got rid of., The noble Lord had. however, succeeded, by offering largo bounties, in inducing more than 6,000 men in India to extend; their service with the Colours. He failed to see the distinction which Lord Wolseley drew between a bounty offered on enlistment and one offered on re-enlistment. At the festive board of the Artists Lord Wolseley stated that England at no time of her existence had possessed an Army more worthy of the nation than the present one; but before the Channel Tunnel Committee he said—
If every available man were turned out under arms we should have 500,000 men with muskets—I will not call them soldiers.By which of these two statements did Lord "Wolseley elect to stand, for they I could not be "both right? They flatly contradicted each other. The Inspector; General of Recruiting, admitting that many commanding officers found fault with the ago of the men enlisted, said that lads of 18 were undoubtedly young and required time to develop, but that their youth was a fault on the right side. But there was no time for recruits of 18 to develop, for they passed into the Reserve at the age of 21. The Times had said that those who commented on the extreme youth of recruits were de-tractors of our young soldiers. He wished to say that he had never impugned the courage or steadiness of our young soldiers; but he contended that it was not wise, politic, or humane to tax the lads beyond their strength, for it was impossible for them to do the work of full-grown men.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he would not detain the House long; but this was one of those opportunities: which, he thought, everyone who was interested in the welfare and well-being of his country was bound to avail himself of. Before the noble Marquess made his statement to the House, he wished to put two or three pertinent questions to him, upon which he hoped to obtain an explicit declaration. The one thing which they all felt was that, in the event of a great emergency, they would not have sufficient men to fight their battles. They thought the Army was neglected and inefficient; and he should like the noble Marquess to state the number of fighting men who could be put into the field if the occasion 98 should require. They were paying £16,000,000 and more for their Army at home and in the Colonies. India paid for the Army we sent there; but we paid for what was supposed to be a perfect machine at home. He had made a careful calculation of the number of men they could at that moment put into line, and he believed they could not find more than 31,000 men. They had something like 70 battalions, including Guards, and to raise them to war strength it would be necessary to take absolutely the whole of the Reserve, including the Militia Reserve. He wanted the noble Marquess to say why he thought the Reserve were the proper persons to fill up their first line in the Army—namely, the Army they ought to have at home; because it they had to do that it was virtually returning to the old system of putting absolutely and at once all of the men into the field, with no Reserve whatever to fall back upon. At present they had 30,000 men in Ireland; 10,000 in Egypt; and in the event of any other strain occurring, if they wanted to send out 20,000 or 30,000 men, it would be impossible to find them without calling upon the Reserve. And he ventured to say that that could not be done if they were to carry on the ordinary duties of the country. If they were required, as they had been before, to send out 18,000 men to Egypt, they would have to call out 10,000 or 11,000 Reserve men, 4,000 or 5,000 to make up, with efficient old soldiers, the 18,000 to be sent abroad, and the remainder to do ordinary duties at home. That was the state in which the country was; and, in his opinion, they were living in a fool's paradise unless they took steps to increase the Army very materially. If the noble Marquess could not show that the Army was sufficient for the purpose's for which they were paying all this money, he was bound to propound a scheme to render it more fit. In the 4th page of the Report of the Inspector General of Recruiting they were told that it was calculated by the actuaries that the number of recruits required to meet the wants of the year 1883, including the normal deficit, was 39,242; and the actual deficit, taking all things into consideration, was 30,607. Turning to Appendix A, a statement would be found that there were 23,096 men recruited in the territorial districts in 99 1883; and if the total number actually required was more than 39,000, he wanted to know how it could be made out that the deficit was only 7,600 on the 1st of January last? His own be he f was that it was something like 16,000; and when they came to consider the details which had been given by the hon. Member for Leitrim (Mr. Tottenham) there could be no mistake as to the condition of the Service. Indeed, he thought the requirements would be found to be somewhat larger than was given in the Inspector General's Report. If he was right in these two points, what was the value of such a Return? All these Returns could be easily cooked, and in many instances they were not substantially accurate. He should, therefore, be glad if the noble Marquess, when he came to make his statement, would go carefully into these particulars. He had been exceedingly sorry to hear the noble Marquess again say that, in the interests of the country and of the Army, he could not give details in regard to particular regiments. In olden days all the details asked for wore supplied. The only reason could be that the inefficiency of some of the regiments was so great that the noble Marquess dared not give the particulars to the public. Indeed, if a Return were given it would appal the outside public, who would then know to what Her Majesty's Government were trusting for the defence of this great Empire. He hoped the Committee would be afforded a full opportunity for discussing all the noble Marquess might say in his statement; but he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) should certainly like to have in that statement the real facts of the condition of the Army of this country at the present moment.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, he did not propose to detain the House at any length; but he merely wished to put a question to the noble Marquess at the head of the War Department, or to any other Minister who chose to answer it. He wished to ask the noble Marquess if he was prepared at once to repudiate the Proclamation said to have been issued at Suakin for the capture of Osman Digua? ["Oh!"] Humanitarian Members opposite might, perhaps, dislike any reference to the fact that a reward had been offered, practically, for the assassination of Osman 100 Digna; but he wanted to have a distinct assurance from Her Majesty's Government on the subject. The Proclamation, which was in the following terms, was said to have been issued by Admiral Howett:—
I, the English Governor and General, Civil and Military, of Suakin, make known that whosoever will bring in the rebel Osman, the murderer, who has by his lies caused the blood of the tribes to be spilt at Kl Tub and Tamanieb, alive or dead, shall receive 5,000 dollars reward.He wanted to ask, in the first place, what right this Proclamation had to call Osman Digna a "rebel?" To whom was he a rebel? Was he a rebel to the Mahdi. or to the Khedive, or to ourselves? And by what right, unless he was a rebel, could British officers offer a reward for his head, and in such a way that if he could not be captured alive he was to be assassinated? He further wished to know whether the reward of $5.000 offered, or said to have been offered, was included in the; Estimates about to be submitted by the noble Marquess?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI believed have no right to trouble the House again; but perhaps I may be allowed to answer the question which has been asked by the hon. Gentleman. I have very little to add to what I stated at the time of Questions. The hon. Member now asks mo whether the Government are prepared to repudiate the Proclamation which is said to have been issued. Now, before the Government repudiate any act performed by an officer who has, in very trying and difficult circumstances, ably discharged the duties intrusted to him, it is incumbent on the Government to satisfy themselves by the fullest information as to the nature and character of the act they are called on to repudiate. I have already stated, in reply to a Question, that the moment I the Government saw the statement in the newspapers they sent off a telegram to Sir William Hewett, asking for information on the subject. Lord Northbrook: has received a reply to that telegram, and Lord Northbrook has telegraphed. for further information. I do not know where the hon. Member opposite obtained the copy of the Proclamation which he has just read to the House; but, judging from the telegram we have received, I should say it is not the Pro- 101 clamation which was issued. Until we have the Proclamation before us I think it would be impossible for the Government to take any steps to repudiate it. I cannot conceive that any funds for the purpose referred to by the hon. Member are included in the Estimates about to be presented to the House.
§ Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.