RESOLUTION.

HC Deb 07 March 1884 vol 285 cc878-910

DR. CAMERON

, in rising to call attention to the cruelty, waste of money, and danger to British Arms, in recent campaigns, caused by the defective organization of the Indian and British Transport and Commissariat Services; and to move— That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the working of the Commissariat and Transport Services of the British and Indian Armies in the recent Egyptian and Afghan Campaigns, and to consider what changes, if any, are required to secure increased efficiency in these Services, said, that on the Army Estimates last year he ventured to call attention to sundry shortcomings in connection with the Commissariat and Transport arrangements of the last Egyptian Campaign. There never had been a war in which more ample opportunity had been afforded for preparation; and, at the same time, there had never been a war which more conclusively demonstrated the utter incapacity of these Departments to cope with the demands of actual warfare. Telegraphing the other day—on the 26th February—from Suakin, the Correspondent of The Daily News said— Dr. Macdowell, the chief medical officer, complains that his transport is insufficient, and says he will have the greatest difficulty to meet the requirements if casualties in the coming fight amount to, say, even 300. Of course, he did not found his case upon that. He intended to rest it solely upon well-substantiated facts, and he referred to this telegram simply because, if substantiated, it would show that one of the most glaring faults of the last campaign was being again repeated in Egypt. At the end of a campaign it was usual for the gentlemen at the head of the several Departments of the Army to make Departmental Reports. He would like to know from the noble Lord the Secretary of State for War whether it was not the fact that the head of the Commissariat Department drew up a Departmental Report in connection with the operations of the last Egyptian War; and whether it was not true that in that Report the Chief of the Department said the Department had got into a positively unworkable state, that it was going from bad to worse, and that immediate re-organization was necessary if its efficiency was to be maintained? In the discussion on the Army Estimates last year the noble Lord opposite (Lord Eustace Cecil)—whose opinion was of great value, because at one time he was Chief of the Ordnance—said his view was that, if it should be found necessary at the present moment, the country could not send out an Army Corps consisting of 20,000 men. [Lord EUSTACE CECIL30,000.] That was a very unsatisfactory state of matters with which to rest content; and if it was a true representation of the state of affairs, it was clear that if at any time we should find ourselves confronted with a well-organized and powerful foe we might have to pay very dearly for our neglect. In the last Egyptian War every branch of the transport broke down. The divisional transport, the auxiliary transport, the regimental transport alike broke down, and the commissariat arrangements entirely broke down, so far as they depended upon transport, and so far as they hung upon the absurd system of purchase and handling of supplies en route. According to the plan of the campaign, a Transport Corps was to have been attached to each Army division; but the transport belonging to one division did not land at Alexandria for a fortnight after the division to which it belonged arrived, and the result was that so much valuable time was thus lost in getting the men accustomed to their work. At Ismailia only one division—the second—was able to march with its transport. The first division and the Cavalry division landed without their transport, and the result was a very great amount of inconvenience and a very considerable amount of delay. Now, he asked, who was to blame for this dislocation of departmental arrangements? He confessed he did not know. Last year, with a view of raising the question, he put down a Motion for the reduction of the salary of the Director of Supplies, and the noble Lord (Lord Eustace Cecil) then said— It was far from his object to suggest that, if any official ought to be censured, it should be a subordinate, but that the censure should go higher; and in reference to that point He would say nothing as to whether, in his opinion, the responsibility ought to rest upon the General or his Chief of the Staff."—(3 Hansard, [280] 1720.) Now, he (Dr. Cameron) did not pretend to allocate blame; but what he would say was this—that the Commissariat Department entirely repudiated the blame. Therefore the matter was precisely one of those where inquiry was very desirable. At work in Egypt our transport arrangements proved utterly inefficient. The divisional transport attached to one division was unable to carry forward two days' supplies. No provision was made in the departmental scale for the carriage of fuel and forage; and the consequence was that, in order to make room for these, so much of the supplies for men had to be left behind. In one division, out of 55 baggage carts, 26 were taken up by the Divisional and Brigade Staffs and Commissariat and Transport gear, leaving only 29 for the carriage of supplies. The carts sent out had been reported over and over again as unfitted for the work. The drivers, supplied chiefly from the Infantry and the Militia Reserve, knew nothing of the management of horses, could neither ride nor drive properly, and the saddles supplied had been discarded in every branch of the Army as calculated to produce sore backs. Then, when we got hold of the railway, there was no one to control the movement of supplies, and there were constant complaints that the supplies most urgently wanted and ordered up could not be got to the front. Now, this question of the railway service was a most important one in modern warfare. In a war in Europe the railway would be to us of vital importance. The whole war would require to be fought out on the railways. Sir Robert Rawlinson stated that a railway was sent out to Egypt; but he (Dr. Cameron) was told by officers who were there that though it was understood that locomotives and other plant were sent out, when they were wanted they could not be got out of the vessels in which they were loaded, and were consequently sent home. When this matter was under discussion last year the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) said that when our Army landed at Ismailia there was absolutely no transport, and the statement of the hon. and gallant Baronet was quite correct. The hon. and gallant Baronet, moreover, said that at that precise juncture any number of camels could have been had on the spot at £16 a head, including kits; but, he added, a General Order had been issued that camels were not to be bought, and, owing to this red-tape regulation, the much-needed transport could not be procured. The Commissary General and the Transport Department were not to blame. They were not consulted; the Commissary General was, he understood, not even told of the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to change the base of operations in Ismailia. He went without being informed of what was to take place, or being afforded an opportunity of making arrangements. At that moment mules were being purchased at Smyrna, Syria, and elsewhere; but the purchase and shipment of these animals was conducted in such an unskilful way that out of 1,100 sent to Egypt, two-thirds, when landed, were totally unfit for work. Of the purchase of one lot of mules—those bought at Smyrna—he had been able to bring the particulars before the public. The purchase of these mules at Smyrna was effected in a most unbusiness-like manner. They were bought contrary to the advice of the veterinary surgeon, sent out with the officer intrusted with the purchase—that officer did not belong to the Commissariat Department—and they were sent on a voyage of nine days to Ismailia with nothing to feed upon except chopped straw. The result was that out of 600 animals 400 were landed unfit for service. Some were sold, some were shot, and the rest were got to work in from a week to a fortnight. But they were landed on September 5, and Tel-el-Kebir was fought on September 13; so that at the precise juncture when most needed they were unfit to work, and could not be got to work until the war had been decided. The saddles and saddlery sent from England were faulty. A quantity of Turkish pack-saddles which were procured were even worse. Many of them bore stains which testified to their powers of galling previous animals that had carried them, and, the mode of loading them not being apparent, they had to be recon-signed into store. The drivers sent out from England were inefficient; but the auxiliary drivers hired at Malta, Cyprus, and elsewhere were worse. They were described as a "rabble," hired under various agreements, which were not always kept, and as being sent out without proper clothing or war equipment. No pay books were forthcoming for long after the troops were landed, and the payments to the auxiliary drivers were irregular, and the desertions numerous. The regimental transport was on a scale corresponding with the rest. Each regiment on a war footing was supposed to include a certain amount of transport—men, waggons, and horses. But the horses were non-existent, or existed only on paper; the men were volunteers selected from the ranks at the last moment, and not half trained to their work; and as to the waggons, it was found when they were used in Egypt that the regulation number of horses, two to each cart, could not drag them empty over the sand. The consequence was that the regimental transport was constantly left far behind, and that large quantities of supplies were lost through its inefficiency. Indeed, so hopeless did some of the troops come to consider it to carry forward their reserve supplies by means of their regimental transport that they gave up the attempt altogether; and on one occasion a ton of biscuits and preserved meat, and about the same amount of oats, barley, and potatoes, intended for use on the following day, were found to have been deliberately abandoned on the camping ground from which our men had just marched. He might amplify these cases, but must pass on to the Commissariat. Among other provisions sent out was two months' flour. It was bought without consulting the Commissary General or his Staff. It was shipped in a manner of which the experience of the Commissariat Department led them to disapprove, and, when landed in Egypt and baked, the bread made from it was so bad as to be unfit for human food. That was the description given of it before Lord Morley's Committee. It was of the utmost importance to get at the second consignment of flour, which, though bad, was not so bad as the first. When the Commissariat officers at Ismailia proceeded to search for it, they found it so stowed away on board the Empusa that it took them two days of hard work to get at it. Groceries were urgently needed; but it took three days to get at the tea on board the Amethyst, and five days to get to the sugar. A lot of stores were sent out in cases so weak that they got smashed in the transit, and the stores were destroyed. Quantities of goods were sent out in cases too large for convenient handling, and had to be repacked. The wood supplied to the troops was in such large blocks that, where Native labour was not available to break it up, great inconvenience was entailed upon the troops dependent on it. A large quantity of the hay which was sent out was pressed by some new patent process, and was landed in such a musty and mildewed condition that it had to be used for bedding. Now, who was responsible for all this? Not the Commissariat Department. They were not consulted, as he had said, about the purchase of the flour, or about its mode of shipment, any more than they were about the hay or the mules. Both these operations were conducted in direct defiance of their experience. It was the system, the entire system, that was at fault. What he wanted was an independent inquiry into this system of divided responsibility and no one to blame. He understood that a departmental inquiry had been instituted; but he had heard of a good number of departmental inquiries, and he never knew one to end in any much more thorough-going reform than the establishment of some new lucrative berth for some favoured official. They had had far too many departmental inquiries in connection with the Commissariat. What was wanted was a good, thorough, and independent investigation. They knew what a prominent part sausages played in the German War. Well, sausages and cheese were sent out to Egypt; but they did not arrive till our troops occupied Cairo. A corps of Indian muleteers were sent, but did not arrive till the war was over. Stationery forms were always in great request in war time. All sorts of requisitions and transactions required stationery forms. Well, stationery forms were sent out, but were not landed in Egypt till a month after the troops had arrived. All the weighing machines sent out were found, when landed, to be broken. A lot of iron huts sent out did not arrive till the war was concluded, and the siege train, he understood, suffered the same fate. He again asked the noble Lord, had not the head of the Commissariat Department, who declared that it was in an unworkable condition, indicated that, so far from being in the way of improving, it was going from bad to worse? He asked him, had any of the recommendations which had been based on the experience of the Egyptian Campaign been carried into effect, or was the Department still in the same unworkable condition which its Chief admitted and lamented? It would be said he exaggerated. He could only say that if he got the Committee he asked for he was prepared to prove every statement he had made. He now came to the Afghan War. Telegraphing from Simla in June, 1879, The Times Correspondent said— It is earnestly to be hoped that the successful termination of the campaign may not prevent the fullest inquiry into the causes of mismanagement so discreditable and so dangerous. The Khyber Force, was," he adds, "for some time so helpless, owing to the want of transport, that they could not have advanced to Cabul if Yakoob Khan had defied us. In March of the same year, 1879, an officer of high rank in our Army, in a private letter which he held in his Land, wrote— There is no doubt about the fact, which will come out some day, that the Candahar Force under General Stewart could not get on farther than Candahar owing to the great mortality among the transport animals. Mr. Charles Williams, an experienced war correspondent, in his notes on the first portion of the Afghan War, said that in consequence of the impossibility of bringing up food for the Kurrum column the Native troops had to be put upon half-rations— Seven hundred camels died in a week, and in less than a month it came about that this column could neither feed itself nor move back for food from want of transport. Nor was it much better, "he added," with General Biddulph's column; and it is a matter of fact that General Lacy's brigade was kept oscillating on the road between Candahar and Giriskh in this wise—when provisions reached it from Candahar it moved towards Giriskh three or four marches. As they were consumed, and the camels died, the brigade fell back towards Candahar until it met another convoy, when it resumed its march. And this was repeated not merely once or twice. In his work on the Afghan War, Mr. Duke had published a letter from General Roberts in which that officer wrote—"In the Kurrum Pass our great difficulty was want of transport; "and if he were to quote from the work of Mr. Howard Hensman he might multiply evidence to the same effect. The history of the whole campaign was, however, summed up by a well-informed officer who had written to him (Dr. Cameron) in this single sentence—" Over and over again our columns could not move for want of transport." Had they been in such condition in the presence of a daring and enterprizing foe, the inability of the troops to move must certainly have led to disaster. He would not argue the question as to whether camels were the proper animals to employ in such a campaign; but, evidently, if used, only strong adult camels should have been relied upon for such service. But that was very far from being the system adopted by the Indian Department. Baby camels, camels incapacitated from age, ponies barely able to drag their own carcases through the campaign, were all bought up for the Transport Service. Anything more atrocious than the cruelty and neglect culminating in such tremendous losses as occurred in the Afghan Campaign I have never heard or read of. These were the words of an officer of great experience, and thoroughly well entitled to speak on the subject. Putting aside," he continued, "the horrid cruelty, the direct loss must have been immense; but the indirect loss will be felt in the agricultural districts from which the animals were drawn for long years to come. And in this connection Mr. Charles Williams mentioned that, in the opinion of the civil authorities in Scinde, one-third of the available animals in Scinde were used up in the first phase of the Afghan War. And the officer from whom he was quoting went on to say— Veterinary science in the Afghan, as in the Egyptian Campaign, was utterly ignored by the Indian authorities. There was no veterinary organization—nothing but the grossest mismanagement as far as animals were concerned. The Indian authorities entertained the utmost contempt for the dictates of veterinary science, and the result was that they neutralized in Afghanistan and afterwards in Egypt the elaborate precautions we took with the animals intended for the Transport Service of our troops. The letter from Simla already referred to contained the following words:— I forward by this mail Civil and Military Gazette of 19th March, 1879. It will give you an idea of the fearful mortality among the camels at the front, and really we cannot be surprised at the loss. I have been fighting for sanction for administrative veterinary officers to be posted with the various columns at the front; but the Government will not sanction the expense. However, facts are cropping up showing the grossest neglect—or, rather, I should call it rascality. Steele reports that out of 70 camels he examined lying dead at Quetta 26 were but two years old. Mr. Edwards, veterinary surgeon, reports that many of the female camels were with calf, and died of slipping their calves. Thousands of animals have died from neglect, ignorance, and rascality. The officers of the Transport have been chiefly taken from Infantry regiments, and are ignorant to a degree upon all subjects pertaining to animals. I have reported all this officially, and there is sure to be an investigation, and Government is sure to burke the whole thing. From that extract it would appear that the facts had been all officially reported, and if the Committee were granted, he should be able to prove, by means of the Reports, the facts he had stated. The Report had, of course, been burked, as it was predicted it would be. He wanted the facts brought to light for the sake of the efficiency of the Service, because India was going on pursuing the even tenour of her way; and on the first occasion on which our troops had to cooperate with Indian troops, if let alone, she was sure to land us in some mess. He now came to the cruelty and waste. If the House thought the statements he had to make were incredible—and to his mind they were so horrible as to make him wish to be able to believe they were incredible—all he could say was that if he got the Committee he undertook to prove every one of them. In the Kurrum column, of 6,000 animals 40 per cent were reported as either too young, too old, or in other respects so physically incapable of performing the work of the campaign that it was sheer waste of public money to buy them. Everywhere the veterinary surgeons reported the same thing as to the large number of unfit animals purchased for the Transport Service in the Afghan Campaign. Of a batch of 400 ponies inspected at Jhelum, 395 were condemned as utterly unfit for the work. Again and again he found it reported that when animals had been purchased under proper veterinary supervision, the fact that they had been so purchased was at once apparent, and among them the number of rejections for unfitness for work was not more than 5 per cent. But the Indian authorities treated veterinary opinions with the most profound contempt. They held, he was told, that the requirements of the veterinary surgeons were far too high, and maintained that what they wanted was baggage animals that could carry a load of so many pounds weight. Accordingly, they loaded the wretched animals, including the condemned ponies, and sent the 395 to the front with the rest. The result was that the miserable brutes died by the way, and we lost not only the money expended in purchasing them, but also the loads they carried. Anything more cruel than sending on animals unfit for such service was to him inconceivable. They stood as so many animals of burden on paper; but we lost both the animals and their loads. No improvement in this state of things took place as the war went on, and it was estimated by competent authorities that in the two phases of the Afghan Campaign no fewer than 60,000 animals and 30,000 other baggage and slaughter animals died, and of these it was estimated that at least one-half died because they were utterly unfit for the work for which they were bought. He did not know the exact value of the animals thus purchased; but, taking the camels at £20 a-head, the loss sustained in camels alone must have been upwards of £500,000 sterling, and the cost directly and indirectly to the British taxpayer in beasts and material, including the loss caused by the delays from the breakdown of the transport, must have amounted to many times that sum. And now he came to the cruelty, and he ventured to say that any man with the smallest feelings of humanity would shudder at the barest recital of it. From every quarter it was described as having been simply atrocious. The transport animals were in charge of ignorant Native salootries or farriers. Infectious diseases were rife amongst the animals; and no precautions were taken to prevent their spread. Animals suffering from rinderpest, scabies, glanders, and pleuro-pneumonia were beaten forward with the rest without any precaution taken to separate them, and the consequence was that every elephant in the Kurrum column got the foot-and-mouth disease, and in some cases the soles of their feet sloughed off, carrying the nails with them. No provision was made for shoeing animals; and at a dozen stations visited by one veterinary officer there were no shoes, no nails, no workmen. No care was taken to prevent sore backs; there were no dressings, no medicines, no instruments. It was with difficulty veterinary surgeons could get sacking to put over wounds to keep off the flies. At Quetta, out of 15,000 animals 80 per cent of the ponies and 20 per cent of the mules suffered from sore backs. At Cabul there were 1,700 cases of sore backs. Hon. Members might think it absurd to make so much fuss about sore backs; but the sore backs to which he referred were such as, by their extent and fœtor, sickened even the most experienced veterinary surgeons—backs on which the packs had eaten through the muscles and laid bare the ribs beneath. Sore backs swarming with maggots, backs in camels in which the sores had laid bare the spinous processes of the vertebraæ, and in which the tissues were so infiltrated with purulent matter that when, to put them out of pain, the wretched beasts were shot, the coverings of the back gave way with the shock of the animal's fall, ejecting the fœtid contents to a considerable distance. Such a state of things might seem incredible; but if he were granted the Committee he asked for he would be prepared to prove that what he had said was literally true. It might be said such cases were rare; they were not rare, they were common. From everywhere he had the same testimony. One gentleman going through the Bolan Pass counted as many as 300 dead camels on one side, and 200 on the other, and saw many others dying and the ravens picking out their eyes while they were yet alive. He could multiply instances of this kind, but would content himself with one wholesale case. Between October and December, 1880, 2,000 animals were sent to Sherawak to pick up. Of course, there was no veterinary surgeon in attendance. In the month of March the animals that survived were sold by auction. They numbered but 10 or 15; all the rest were rotting in the valley. The same mismanagement existed from the beginning to the end of the Afghan War, and the same mismanagement was repeated in connection with the Egyptian War. Among the witnesses as to the cause of the Afghan breakdown was General Showers, who ascribed the failure in the Transport arrangements as largely to the absence of all administrative veterinary control. He said— The fact of there having been no administrative veterinary officer with any of the columns will hardly be credited. Since this report the Indian Government, so little economical in many other affairs, had been guilty of the economy of cutting down their veterinary staff one-third—from 70 to 46. When they sent then-contingent to Egypt there were only four veterinary surgeons attached to it. Two of these went on with the troops, and two only remained with the transport, which embraced 6,000 or 7,000 animals. In our British Forces we considered it necessary to send one veterinary surgeon for every 250 or 300 animals. The result of this Indian arrangement was that glanders was introduced into Egypt once, and rinderpest on two separate occasions, despite elaborate precautions by our own Veterinary Department. He did not propose to offer any suggestions as to how this state of things should be remedied. He could, if necessary, quote a number of what appeared to be common-sense suggestions that had been made; but it was his opinion that what was above all things required was a knowledge of the facts, and of the extent of the evil. If the Committee he asked for was appointed, it would have no difficulty in finding numbers of competent men to make suggestions; and he would very much rather trust to the common sense of a Committee of the House of Commons for a reform of the evils which he had endeavoured to expose than trust the matter to the consideration of a Departmental Committee of experts. In conclusion, he begged to move the Resolution which stood in his name.

MR. PULESTON

, in seconding the Resolution, said, that his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow deserved thanks for bringing forward a matter of great importance and practical utility, and one vitally concerning the interests of the nation. If but one-quarter of the statements and statistics given to the House by his hon. Friend were true, even then it was difficult to conceive how the Government should hesitate for a moment to grant the Committee now asked for. The country would regard it as extraordinary if the proposed inquiry were withheld, in face of the startling and shocking facts presented to the House by his hon. Friend, who had stated on his own responsibility that he would bring before the Committee abundant testimony to the correctness of every statement he had made. Ho, therefore, preferred to believe that the Government would at once respond by accepting the terms of the Resolution. He regretted to see so many Benches empty while his hon. Friend was speaking; but in those days, unhappily, under the auspices of the present Government, the House had become intoxicated and saturated with questions of Bradlaughism and other exciting topics, and had lost its taste for healthier and more useful discussions. In days gone by Members discussed the Estimates, considering them to be most important matters closely affecting the well-being of the country; but now, when the House attempted legitimate work, hon. Members suddenly vanished. The sooner, however, they reverted to the serious consideration of matters like the one now before them, the better it would be for the credit of the House and the interests of the country. When our Commissariat and Transport notoriously broke down in the Crimean War the remedy was suggested that the control should betaken away from the Treasury, and the control of the Transport was then vested in the War Office, and very properly; but, nevertheless, little improvement resulted. Then, in 1867, he thought they had Lord Strathnairn's Committee, which made a Report on the French model. No notice was taken of that Report, and, perhaps, the French system would not now be approved; but, at all events, it was an effort in the right direction. Yet nothing more was done until 1870, when all of a sudden a panic arose as to probable contingencies connected with the Franco-German War. It was then feared that the same breakdown that happened in the Crimea and elsewhere would recur if the Commissariat and Transport Services were called upon. When Lord Cranbrook was Secretary of State for War he abolished the civilian Controller—also a right thing to do; and then they had a Committee, with Lord Cadogan as Chairman; but, forgetting the proverb about peace being the right time to prepare for war, nothing effectual was done, and the consequence was that when war suddenly arose everything was hurry-scurry and wild confusion. He did not now ask for the adoption of any specific plan; but let the Government grant a Select Committee which would thrash out that subject, and before the Committee everything they had to urge pro and con could be brought forward by the Government. His hon. Friend had referred to the war in Afghanistan. In that case Bombay was forced to supply camels and other baggage animals, and had to do it in a very haphazard sort of way, scouring the whole of Scinde for everything. Within three or four months after that pretty much the whole of the beasts of burden in Scinde were destroyed. We had devoted ourselves to purchasing camels which were too young or too old, and which were not suited for the purposes of frontier war. Not only had this loss of money been knowingly incurred, but it had been an utterly useless sacrifice; the public interest had not been advanced by the expenditure; on the contrary, human life would absolutely have been saved by the practice of economy. As regarded the supply of mules, the best thing would be for the Government to breed them in India. It might be urged against this that we should have to keep them in times of peace; but they might be let out to the cultivators of the soil, and the Government would have them when they were in need of them. Thus the breeding of mules would entail no loss whatever on the Government; while in times of famine it would be found of the greatest importance to have mule trains. Thus the keeping of mules would not be a luxury as it had been described, but a source of profit. With regard to the loss of transport animals by General Stewart's column, not only had there been the danger of being deprived of means of transport, but in one case 500 dead mules lay absolutely polluting the air and water and imperilling life. In Egypt, again, he thought that we had been very fortunate in being victorious at Tel-el-Kebir, for such had been the state of affairs that we could not have remained there much longer without starvation and the difficulties of transport operating against us. As it was, the want of transport had locked the troops up here and there, not to speak of the great loss of stores incurred. Gatlings were no use unless properly horsed; but in Egypt any tagrag and bobtail out of the camp followers had been appointed to look after the horses. The Surveyor General of Ordnance said last year that we should wait until we saw the weak points in our transport system before any changes were undertaken. Those weak points were now apparent, and had called forth the Resolution of his hon. Friend. He would only add that this question of Transport and Commissariat was one of deep interest, not only to the Army itself, but to the country; and he hoped that the Government would grant this Committee of Inquiry. By so doing they would have the credit with the public at large of acting in the best interests of the nation.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the working of the Commissariat and Transport Services of the British and Indian Armies in the recent Egyptian and Afghan Campaigns, and to consider what changes, if any, are required to secure increased efficiency in these Services,"—(Dr. Cameron,)

—instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. J. K. CROSS

Sir, I will not discuss whether the Afghan War is a Party question or not, but will answer the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron), with reference to the Afghan Campaign, leaving my hon. Friend the Surveyor General of Ordnance to deal with the more contentious question of the Egyptian War. The facts of the case are much as they have been brought to the attention of the House. My hon. Friend has spoken of the outbreak of the War in 1878, and described the condition of the Transport at the time, as well as its condition on the second outbreak, after the massacre of Sir Louis Cavagnari in September, 1879. There is no doubt that, when the first period of the Afghan War had ceased, the Transport material had been dispersed. The Transport demand for the second period of the Afghan War was very sudden, very large, and required the utmost expedition. Sir Michael Kennedy, in his Report, pointed out the difficulties which occurred at the time. He says— With regard to the Commissariat and Transport, this state of things was very undesirable. The disadvantages it involved were not unrecognized or under-estimated; but it could not he avoided if the operations were to he carried through at all. It was a race against time. The railways brought troops and supplies to the front; and it was absolutely necessary for political, military, and even economic purposes, to strike quickly, and nothing was ready at the commencement.

DR. CAMERON

I rise to Order. The hon. Gentleman is quoting from a Report not on the Table. May I ask him to lay it on the Table?

MR. SPEAKER

If the hon. Member quotes from a Report no doubt he will lay it on the Table.

MR. J. K. CROSS

I was going to say I would lay it on the Table. The extent of the operations which had to be performed is also very well described by Sir Michael Kennedy— The amount of material which those considerable demands from first to last involved, for forces that numbered in the aggregate 42,600 fighting men, 40,000 followers, and 72,000 animals, was very great, when it is taken into consideration that the troops would necessarily depend to some extent on the natural produce of the country; and, like all armies operating in advance of a distant base, would be compelled to draw bulky articles, such as grain and forage, from the districts occupied. There was, however, some occasional difficulty in obtaining local supplies; but it never lasted long, or pressed very heavily. The troops or followers never for a day suffered any want or inconvenience, although the animals were occasionally short of rations. That was the Report made after the second period of the Afghan War; and, though my hon. Friend alluded in strong terms to the troops being on half rations, the contrary is proved, so far as the second period of the war is concerned.

DR. CAMERON

I was only quoting from a Paper on the subject.

MR. J. K. CROSS

On the massacre of Sir Louis Cavagnari in September, 1879, on the unexpected investment of Sir Frederick Roberts at Sherpur in December, 1879, and on the Maiwand disaster in July, 1880, thousands of troops were pushed to the front, and tens of thousands of store and baggage animals—camels, mules, ponies, bullocks, anything that could carry a shot or a tent pole, had to be collected on the instant, as it were. The demand being so imperative, and the emergency so pressing, it was only natural that all kinds of animals should be pressed into the net; and, from the fact that efficient animals could not be got, inefficient ones had to be accepted by the Transport officers, even though it must have been known that a large number of them would fail. It should be remembered that, when Sir Louis Cavagnari's mission was peacefully settled at Cabul, the extra Transport Service used in the previous advance was scattered and practically broken up. On the renewal of the war, its re-organization was placed in the hands of Sir Michael Kennedy. From the Report of Sir Michael Kennedy on the Supply and Transport arrangements during the campaign in North Afghanistan and the Kurrum Valley in 1879–80, it is very clear that we had been caught in a state of unreadiness. Everything had to be improvised, and we were evidently without experienced Transport officers or Transport Service. It was arranged to separate the Transport from the Commissariat Establishment, especially in the field beyond the base, and to place it, giving it separate organization, more closely under the General Officer in command. This Report of Sir Michael Kennedy on the deficiencies of the Transport is, perhaps, one of the most melancholy pieces of military reading ever published. But I think, if my hon. Friend will examine into the matter carefully, he will find that, as the war went on, Sir Michael Kennedy overcame all difficulty. Simultaneously with General Roberts's march from Cabul to Candahar, General Stewart returned to India; and on these two occasions the Transport seems to have been everything that could have been desired. General Roberts marched from Cabul to Candahar, by Ghazni, with 10,000 men, 8,000 followers, and 8,400 Transport animals. The distance was 313 miles, he did it in 22 days, or at the rate of 14½ miles a day, and out of his 8,400 Transport animals there was not more than 1,050 casualties. General Stewart marched from Cabul to Peshawur with 9,559 Transport animals, and had 1,023 casualties. The losses and troubles of the Transport, especially during the second period of the campaign, have caused the Government of India to organize a regular Transport depôt, based on a plan which is the result of the experience gained during this campaign, and the principle on which this plan is based is that a certain portion of the Indian Army should be equipped with one-half regimental transport. This force will embrace 46,000 men, of whom 24,000 are stationed on the frontier. The Transport will be distributed over a larger number of regiments than it will suffice completely to mobilize. This is done to familiarize a considerable number of troops with the management of Transport. Half this number, or about 23,000 men, can be put into the field in their respective districts, fully equipped with transport on the Cabul scale, without requiring additional carriage. For this Transport it is not proposed to employ officers of the British Veterinary Establishment. Experience of more than 25 years on the frontier has proved that regiments can be maintained in a state of perfect mobility, taking charge of their own Transport Establishment, and keeping it thoroughly efficient, without European advice; and there seems no reason to question that similar results would attend similar means on a larger scale. To increase the number and efficiency of the salootree class the Government has recently established in Bombay, Bengal, the Punjab, and Burmah, Veterinary Colleges, presided over by three eminent veterinary surgeons. In 1881–2 the Government of India proposed a reduction of the British Veterinary Establishment in India from 73 to 49. Their reason was the intended introduction for the horses of the British troops of the station hospital system, similar to that which obtained for the men. Under this system the Government of India was satisfied that, while a smaller number of officers would be required, greater efficiency would be secured. The question of the establishment to be ultimately maintained, and its organization, is not yet settled. No reduction has yet been made, and, meanwhile, the actual number of veterinary surgeons in the British Establishments now employed in India is 64. There are 4 administrative officers—namely, 2 Bengal, 1 Madras, and 1 Bombay; 10 on Staff duties—namely, 6 Bengal, 3 Madras, 1 Bombay; and 48 on station and regimental work—namely, 26 Bengal, 10 Madras, 7 Bombay; and there are 2 officers on furlough. This is 15 in excess of the number proposed by the Government of India, and it gives a very efficient service. The total number of horses with the British troops in India is 10,837, including 1,000 mules belonging to the British Mountain Batteries. If you divide this number of animals among the 48 veterinary officers engaged in station or regimental work, it gives about 225 animals per officer. The four regiments of Madras Native Cavalry are in charge of our veterinary officers, and they have 1,273 horses, so these gentlemen have now an average of 300 animals each. The Bengal and Bombay Cavalry number 21,477 horses, and it may, perhaps, be that the men, being owners of their horses, and having a personal interest in their health, look well after them. There is no doubt of the thorough efficiency of the Indian Cavalry; that efficiency was, I believe, clearly demonstrated in the Egyptian Campaign. Although the veterinary hospitals of the Bombay and Bengal Native Cavalry never have been under British veterinary care, that is not supposed to have rendered them less efficient or economical; and, as at present advised, the Government of India have no intention of increasing the number of European veterinary officers in charge. The hon. Gentleman proposes to have a Committee of Inquiry not only into what has happened in Egypt, but into what occurred during the Afghan War. I think I have shown that the Indian officers have taken the question of the Afghan War very much to heart, and have reorganized the Transport Department on the lines I have described. It therefore seems quite unnecessary that we should have an inquiry into this subject. I do not see how the Indian Government could be much bettered by any inquiry made in this country. At the present time, a very large number of officers, who are fully competent to manage the whole of the affairs of the Army, have taken this Report, and have examined it very thoroughly, and come to certain conclusions upon it. Therefore it seems to me, with all due deference to my hon. Friend, that it would be very much better that we should let the Indian Government alone, with the instructions it has received from the Indian Office to press on as much as they can the thorough organization of their Transport Department; and I have no doubt, if it is left to them, it will be arranged in the most perfect possible manner.

COLONEL MILNE-HOME

, in supporting the Resolution, said, he considered that an inquiry into what happened in the Egyptian Campaign, including the Afghan Campaign, in the scope of the Committee would not be thrown away. His hon. Friend had stated exactly what had taken place in Egypt. He had seen himself the excellence of the Indian troops, particularly the Cavalry; and he was convinced that we in this country might learn very many lessons from the management of those departments of the Indian Army. But with regard to Egypt he should be surprised—and the whole Service to which he had the honour to belong would be surprised—and disappointed if the Committee was not appointed. He thought the case had been so thoroughly made out by the hon. Member that the Government had no alternative. When he came to the House he certainly did not think it would be incumbent upon him to make any remarks; but the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for India seemed rather to object, and he was afraid that the noble Lord might object to the other portion of the inquiry. Under these circus stances, he should think it wrong to sit silent, for he was convinced the whole Service looked forward to the appointment of the Committee. He was glad his hon. Friend had got such a position on the Paper that he would be able to go to a Division; and, certainly, if he went, he (Colonel Milne-Home) would vote with him. He had no intention of repeating what the Mover and Seconder of the Resolution had said. It seemed to him his hon. Friend had entirely made out his case. If he had not, then it would be for the Committee which he wished appointed to brand him before the country for having brought before the House of Commons most unfounded charges. Therefore, upon that ground, having said that he was prepared to prove what he had stated, he (Colonel Milne-Home) thought the Government should grant a Committee to inquire into the management, or rather mismanagement, of these Departments in Egypt. His hon. Friend had received evidence from many quarters, and, from his knowledge of him, he had no doubt his hon. Friend had thoroughly sifted it. But with regard to the portion of the Service with which he (Colonel Milne-Home) was connected, he could say that every word that fell from his hon. Friend was perfectly true. It was perfectly true that the Transport and Commissariat were nowhere in Egypt. The Cavalry depended as long possible on the ships; and when they left Ismailia it was not owing to the Transport and Commissariat Departments and the management at home that they got any food at all—at the start at all events. It was the good fortune of the Cavalry, after taking the camp of Mahsameh, to find plenty of food for man and beast, which had been left behind by Arabi. Had it not been for that, they would have had to retire, and probably the Egyptian Campaign would have been much longer than it really was. Therefore, at the very outset, he would say, the Transport broke down completely. His hon. Friend had alluded to the regimental transport. They were told before they left this country that the desert, through which they were to pass, was like a paved road. But it was no such thing. The sand was so deep that the carts could hardly be drawn over it, and some of the carts of the regiment to which he belonged were left in the desert to this day. It was quite true that transport horses were supplied to regiments; but he did not think those who understood the desire of the commanding officers to keep the best horses at home would be surprised to hear that the transport horses sent out averaged about the age of 20 years. Many of them had been in previous campaigns, and could not, therefore, be expected to be of much service. Then, as to the railway, it was true engines and immense appliances were sent out; but he knew there was no hoisting gear sufficiently strong to hoist them from the ships, and they had to remain there. What his hon. Friend had stated as to the matter of camels was also perfectly true. There was no doubt about it that the only machines fit to cross the desert were camels, and they found that out by experience by appropriating some stray camels. As he bad said, had the Cavalry not had the good fortune to find everything to their hand at Mahsameh, they would have had to return; and had not the Infantry and the rest of the Army who had attacked Tel-el-Kebir been equally fortunate there, they would have been compelled to retire, and the Army would have been driven back to Ismailia. As it was, they trusted a great deal to Arabi for their food by the way; and, as he had already said, through the campaign the Commissariat and the Transport were nowhere at all. These being absolute facts, surely the Government could not refuse to grant a Committee to inquire why and whence this state of things arose. Allusion had been made to the fact that similar previous inquiries had resulted only in Blue Books. He was old enough to remember what took place in the Crimea, and the mismanagement there of all sorts, especially of the Transport and the Commissariat. It was 30 years since the Crimean Campaign, yet we did not seem to be very much further on in these matters. If this Committee were appointed, he trusted they would have something more than Blue Books, and that they would see due effect given to the recommendations made, whatever Government might be in Office.

MR. CARBUTT

said, the country would never be satisfied until this question was cleared up. His contention was that nothing said by the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India had any real bearing upon the Motion of the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron). The mistake made by the Government, in his view, was in employing on every possible occasion military men to perform duties which could be much better and more cheaply and efficiently performed by civilians, and in not taking sufficient advantage of the mechanical appliances and mechanical skill at their disposal, not only for the transport of war material in time of war, but in its unshipment when it reached the place at which it was intended to be used, or, at any rate, to be disembarked.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

said, he had no wish to criticize harshly anything that had been done in the past in reference to the Transport and Commissariat Services; but he wished to point out that reform was necessary in regard to both of them, the existing state of things being an absolute scandal to the country. His own view was that, having regard to our experiences in the past, provision ought to be made for an Army Corps of at least 25,000 men, who should be fully equipped and ready at any moment to proceed on military service to any part of the world. England was the most wealthy nation in the world; but when war broke out where was she? They should insist upon the Government moving in this matter, feeling satisfied that the country would not grudge the expenditure.

MR. BRAND

said, the speech of the Mover of the Motion for a Committee was replete with assertions of a very startling nature, without any proof whatever being given, and without any authority for them. There were certain statements which the hon. Gentleman made which he (Mr. Brand) could more or less directly meet; and if these statements were examples of his other statements, then there was little foundation of fact in them. For instance, the hon. Gentleman stated that there were at Ismailia, when the troops disembarked, a quantity of camels for sale, and which could have been bought for £16 a-piece——

DR. CAMERON

I beg pardon. I quoted a statement made by the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot).

MR. BRAND

said, that only showed what he was endeavouring to prove—namely, that a great many of these statements were founded on hearsay. Then the hon. Gentleman said the saddles sent out from England were bad. He (Mr. Brand) would admit only this as to the pack saddles, that they were not so well fitted for pack service as the Indian saddles. The hon. Gentleman said the advice of the Commissariat Department had not been taken in the purchase of a quantity of hay which had turned out bad; but the fact was the hay had been purchased in the usual manner, and was inspected by officers of the Commissariat Department. The hon. Member said that the Commissary General had published a Report in which he said that the Department was going from bad to worse. All that he could say was that that Report was not within his knowledge, although, undoubtedly, the Commissary General had recommended that certain changes should be made in the Department. The hon. Gentleman said there never was a war which had so clearly proved the insufficiency of the Medical Transport Service; and to enforce that statement he quoted the opinion of the principal medical officer at Trinkitat, to the effect that the Transport in the Soudan would not have sufficed for 300 wounded. They had no report whatever as to the Transport; but it was clear that 300 wounded out of so small a force as that engaged would have been a very large number indeed. His reply was that, under great difficulty, and after the first few days, the Commissariat Department in Egypt worked well, that the system was being remedied in a good many particulars, and that a Committee at the War Office was now inquiring into the whole matter of the organization of the Department. The hon. Gentleman also spoke of the suffering caused to the troops in Afghanistan and Egypt; but Lord Morley's Committee had shown that in the case of Egypt there was plenty of fresh meat, biscuits, and minor comforts for the troops. With the exception of a small temporary difficulty on arrival at Ismailia, the patients were not in want of any of those supplies. There was no doubt in his mind, after reading the Report, that the suffering imposed upon the men and officers in Egypt was suffering which was inseparable, unfortunately, from active service in a hot climate. With regard to the conduct of the Veterinary Department, there was no doubt that the horses and mules had suffered greatly from the heat, the flies, and the sand, as well as from the want of water, while they had been sent on active service before they had had time to recover from their long sea voyage. But what, he would ask, would have been the condition of those animals if the Veterinary Department had not been thoroughly efficient, and if its members had not done their duty in a most admirable manner? At the time when the cattle were landed, rinderpest was rife at Odessa, from whence we obtained slaughter cattle; but, owing to the precautions of the principal veterinary officer, who had them inspected and doubtful animals slaughtered, the disease was prevented. The glanders having broken out among one troop of the Bengal Cavalry, the principal veterinary officer ordered the infected animals to be destroyed and the remainder of the troop isolated, and thus this disease also was prevented from spreading. It must, therefore, be taken that the Veterinary Department in Egypt was thoroughly well organized. The hon. Member had arrived at the conclusion that the whole system of the Commissariat Department was wrong; and he directed his complaints, in the first place, against the way in which the Department was officered. He admitted that nothing was more important than that the officers of the Department should be well trained. But what were the facts of the case? At the present time the Department was officered by trained Departmental officers, and by officers who came temporarily from the regiments to the Department. The old class of officers was being gradually absorbed, and in course of time the Department would consist of officers temporarily engaged. In 1878 the late Government effected certain changes in the Commissariat and Transport; and if any mistake were made then, it was in not making it a thoroughly military Department. Giving his own personal opinion, the best plan to be pursued was to follow in the lines indicated by that change, and constitute the Department a portion of the regular Staff of the Army, imposing duties of transport and supply upon the Staff officers under the Commander-in-Chief. One condition was essential—that those officers should be thoroughly trained for the work they had to perform. A Departmental Committee was now sitting at the War Office to inquire into this subject. It was often said when this country went to war it was unprepared in the matter of Commissariat and Transport. But the system in this country was identically the same as in other European countries. There was not a single instance in which any European country maintained in time of peace the transport necessary for a time of war. Even if it were desirable, it would be financially impracticable, as it was impossible to know what sort of transport would be required. In the Red River, in 1870, the transport was canoes and carriers; in Ashantee, entirely carriers, and no animals; in Natal, we had transport of oxen and mules; in Egypt, pack transport; and in Suakin, camel transport. That, he thought, clearly showed, even if they maintained in this country a large stock of transport and material, they would find, when they went to war, very possibly that they had not the materials required for the service. What was wanted was a knowledge of the countries where they could purchase the animals they required at the shortest notice; and they also wanted experienced officers to send out to buy those transport animals. Steps had been taken to get a nucleus of drivers, and a small nucleus of transport was kept in this country for the purpose of training; and, in addition, steps had been taken to have in hand, in case of necessity, a body of skilled auxiliary drivers. When the Egyptian War took place the Indian Government provided an organized body of drivers; and in the case of any wars in which they might have to engage in foreign countries, a body of men such as he had described would be of immense advantage. Upon what facts did the hon. Member rely in order to prove that there had been a breakdown of the Transport Service in Egypt? With regard to the flour, it was purchased under the best advice; it no doubt suffered from the excessive heat and from prolonged detention at Alexandria in the hold of the ship. But the hon. Member had failed to prove that even if it had been inspected by the Commissariat the same thing would not have happened. In future, however, they would take care to send flour, not in barrels, but, as far as possible, when necessary, in tin cases. As to the hay, it was actually inspected and passed by the Commissariat. On the whole, he thought the House would agree with him that, considering the enormous amount of materials and stores sent out, very few mistakes, indeed, had been committed. He might remind the House that the Transport Service itself really had no real trial in Egypt, inasmuch as the war only lasted three weeks from the disembarkation of the troops till the day on which the battle of Tel-el-Kebir was fought. The transport was not disembarked for three or four days after the troops were landed, and that was for military reasons over which Transport officers had no control. The transport was organized on the assumption that they would have possession of the railway and Canal; but, owing to the action taken by the enemy, it was impossible to take advantage of the railway and Canal for several days. When, however, the obstructions were removed, the railway and Canal afforded sufficient transport. We should never have been able to take such prompt action in shipping supplies to the East if the late Government had not authorized the establishment of a reserve store at Woolwich, which had been of very great value in this crisis. The hon. Gentleman further complained of division of responsibility in the Department. In reality there was no division of responsibility whatever, and in practice there was no difference between the system in times of peace and during war. He maintained that the hon. Gentleman had not proved his case with respect to the Egyptian Expedition. In all recent wars there had been no breakdown in the Transport Service—he might even say no hitch. The Government did not admit that there was any necessity for the proposed inquiry; but still some good might possibly arise from having the statements of the hon. Gentleman verified, or otherwise, as the case might be. Therefore, on the understanding that this inquiry was to be confined entirely to the operations in the recent Egyptian Campaign, and that it was also to be confined to the working of the Commissariat and Transport Service—for the medical arrangements had already been inquired into by the Committee over which Lord Morley presided—the Secretary of State for War would not oppose the Resolution.

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, he did not like the debate to close, after the speeches which had been made and the references made to himself, without saying a few words. The hon. Mover of the Resolution had quoted him as saying that we could not put 30,000 men into the field. What he had said was that it would be impossible to send an Army Corps of that number into the field properly equipped, and it certainly would be impossible to send out a second such Corps. He had repeatedly called the attention of the House to that state of things, which was most unsatisfactory. His hon. Friend the Surveyor General of Ordnance, while admitting our deficiencies in respect of Transport officers and drivers in case of emergency, had said that no country in the world kept up a Commissariat Service sufficient for its needs. No doubt that was so; but he felt sure that there were several Foreign Powers which could, on an emergency, put into the field an Army Corps of 30,000 or 40,000, or even more. It was the duty of the Executive to see that we were sufficiently provided in this respect. The Secretary of State for War should have the courage of his opinions. If it was necessary that a corps d'armée should be equipped at every point, and ready to proceed at the shortest notice, he thought the Secretary of State for War was bound to come to the House and say so, and at the same time ask the House to provide the necessary money. He had been on foreign service in the field, and was, therefore, quite ready to admit that it was not always possible for a person in that position to judge of anything more than what took place under his own observation. It was seen that, for some reason or another, a deficiency existed; but a person so placed was not sufficiently behind the scenes to know to what extent that deficiency existed. Some of the reasons for this deficiency had been indicated in the speech of the Surveyor General of Ordnance. He had stated, in addition to other matters connected with the Service, that the drivers of waggons were not sufficiently trained. He had admitted, in the most palpable manner, that a re-organization of the Department was judged to be necessary. He said that certain deficiencies had been considered, and that a Committee had been appointed by the War Office to inquire into these deficiencies. Not content with that, however, the hon. Gentleman, much to his surprise, granted almost all that was asked in the Motion of the hon. Member who had brought the subject under the notice of the House. In his opinion, that showed how his hon. Friend and the Secretary of State for War were open to the influence of opinion, and that they saw a strong feeling existed in the House of Commons that an inquiry was necessary. He was not opposed to granting a Committee under the circumstances. He thought it would have a certain good result in calming the feelings of the public on the matter; but whether it would result eventually in any great change being introduced he, from his official experience, very much doubted. He had seen a great number of Committees and Commissions with respect to our Military Service; and the result had been, as a rule, that although the Committees had expended a great deal of time and labour in collecting much valuable information for the use of the Secretary of State for War, the advice of those Committees had not been followed generally, and very often it had been departed from. There was a recent case in point. A Commission was appointed not long ago to inquire into the whole system of recruiting. It was commonly known as Lord Airey's Commission. That Commission made an exhaustive inquiry into the whole subject, and after their labours had been completed they offered a large number of recommendations. The present Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was then, he believed, Secretary of State for War, had hardly followed a single recommendation of that Committee. This fact, he thought, showed that, although they might multiply Committees and Commissions, they did not necessarily insure the efficiency of the Service. He would much rather, under present circumstances, trust to the pressure of public opinion in keeping the Executive up to their duties, and in insisting that the Executive should take the House thoroughly into their confidence as to what was necessary to be done. The Executive should also not be afraid to come forward and ask for money where money was required. A great deal of complaint had been made with regard to waggons. There had been an error made in sending out to Egypt large, heavy waggons, which, as they had been told, stuck in the sand. If they had a sufficient number of trained officers who at any moment could be sent into the localities, which were well known, where the best baggage animals might be purchased as speedily as possible, there would be little difficulty—provided the Government knew their minds and their policy—in finding a sufficient supply of transport and animals necessary for the small Armies sent abroad by this country. A remark had been made with regard to the change that had taken place in the military character of the Commissariat and Transport. It was true that that military character was given to the Service after a great deal of consideration in 1878. The Successors of the Conservative Government had approved that military character, which was done on the advice of the Military Department. The great difficulty, however, was to find a sufficient number of officers who would undertake these appointments. The officers were naturally anxious to stay with their regiments in time of war, and to take a share of the fighting if any was taking place. Difficulty was experienced in getting the officer who was temporarily appointed to the Commissariat to stay with the Commissariat instead of going to the front. The Conservative Government dealt with the difficulty to a certain extent by insisting that officers should have a temporary appointment on probation. Now, however, he understood from his hon. Friend opposite that the officers were never permanently appointed. If that was so, a change had been made upon the scheme as originally introduced. The idea of the originators of this change was that competent young officers of a few years' standing should come into the Department, and after a proper amount of probation—say of three, four, or five years—they were then confirmed in their appointments.

MR. BRAND

here interposed, and was understood to say that the temporary appointment of these officers, as stated by the noble Lord, was not correct

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

said, he was glad to hear that that was not the case. Aremark had been made—he thought by the Mover of the Resolution, to the effect that he had expressed an opinion that no censure attached to the Commissariat officers, but that it was rather applicable to persons in the highest quarters. He certainly made a remark of that kind. He thought that the Commissariat officers were unjustly blamed, and that the General Officer commanding was really the person responsible. It would be remembered that Questions were asked at the time by Members sitting on that side of the House, displaying some alarm at the fact that several Chiefs of Departments in the War Office had been appointed to commands in Egypt, and were allowed, nevertheless, to retain their appointments in the War Office. The Surveyor General of Ordnance, Sir John Adye, for instance, was appointed Chief of the Staff in Egypt, and his Office here was put in commission. He had very able officials under him at the War Office, and these all did their duty to the best of their ability under circumstances of considerable pressure; but the inconvenience of such an arrangement was manifest, and if we had been engaged in such a war as that in the Crimea, instead of being at war in Egypt, the consequences might have been serious.

Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted, and 40 Members being found present,

LORD EUSTACE CECIL

, resuming, said, he was endeavouring to point out the inconvenience of officers of high position in the War Office being given commands in the field and being allowed to retain their posts at home. This threw a considerable amount of extra work on the Departmental officers that remained at home, and a great pressure of work fell on the Secretary of State for War. In these observations he had no desire to reflect on any individuals. He believed that one and all did their duty thoroughly, and laboured in a way seldom surpassed. It would be remembered that in the case of one ship that was sent out to Egypt with stores, everything was found to be at the bottom that ought to have been at the top, and everything at the top that ought to have been at the bottom. In order to avoid contingencies and accidents of that kind, which sometimes occurred owing to the want of proper supervision, it might be well if a supercargo was put on board each ship going out with provisions to the seat of war, who would be able to point out where everything was packed. He hoped that the Secretary of State for War and the officials of the War Office were alive to the state of things, and that they were doing something towards remedying the defects that existed. The hon. Member who introduced this Motion had brought a large number of important facts to the attention of the House; and the result of making these public would, he hoped, lead to their being thoroughly inquired into by the Government. The hon. Member had good reason for being satisfied with the result of his Motion, which, it might reasonably be hoped, might lead to increased efficiency in the Public Service.

SIR ALEXANDER GORDON

expressed his gratification at the fact that the Government had consented to appoint a Select Committee.

DR. FARQUHARSON

said, he must congratulate the hon. Member for Glasgow on the success which had attended his Motion. He hoped the Committee would make an inquiry into the conditions which attended Army medical transport. They knew that the difficulties which attended the Army medical transport in Egypt were almost entirely due to the fact that that transport was diverted to other purposes. He held a very strong opinion that the Department would never work well in time of war until it had a separate and inalienable transport of its own. He would like to ask the Surveyor General of Ordnance whether that very important question would be taken into consideration by the Committee?

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

said, that if the Committee was to be productive of good, it would be desirable that the inquiry should be devoted to very definite and, at the same time, limited objects. He did not think that a Committee, wandering over the whole sphere of the operations in Egypt, and going into controversies which were more or less discussed by Lord Morley's Committee on a previous occasion, would be likely to be productive of much good. He did not deny that some good might come from an inquiry directed to the object of obtaining the results of the latest experience as to the working of their system of transport in the field. The medical transport, of course, formed a part of the transport of the Army, and could not be separated from it; and anything of that nature would, he conceived, come strictly within the terms of the Reference to the Committee. In granting that Committee, he hoped it would be very distinctly understood that they did not at all assent to the accuracy of a great many of the statements which were made impugning the working of the administrative Department in the recent campaign in Egypt. Still less did they admit that anything whatever had been proved as to any shortcoming on the part of individuals. All he understood to be alleged was that there were defects in the system which might be improved, and if the Committee could point these out it would have done a very great service. He thought the most convenient course on this occasion would be for the hon. Gentleman the Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) to withdraw the Motion he had made, and to move it in the amended form.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the working of the Commissariat and Transport Services of the British Army in the recent Egyptian Campaign, and to consider what changes, if any, are required to secure increased efficiency in these Services,"—(Dr. Cameron,)

—instead thereof.

Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put, and negatived.

Words added.

Main Question, as amended, put. Ordered, That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the working of the Commissariat and Transport Services of the British Army in the recent Egyptian Campaign, and to consider what changes, if any, are required to secure increased efficiency in these Services.

Resolved, That this House will immediately resolve itself into the Committee of Supply.—(Lord Richard Grosvenor.)

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."