§ SUPPLY—considered in Committee.
§ (In the Committee.)
§ (1.) £343,000, Army Reserve Force.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he wished to make a few remarks upon the present position of the Army, the present condition of recruiting, and the present condition of the Reserves. He was bound to say, in the first place, that they were placed in a very difficult position, and he was extremely sorry at that moment not to see the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War in his place.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he was glad to hear it, and, therefore, until the arrival of the noble Marquess he would defer the more important observations he wished to bring before the Committee, and would proceed with some other remarks. It would be in the recollection of the Committee that the Army Estimates were introduced on the 17th of March, and they were then promised by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War that if the first Vote were granted, at something like 2 o'clock in the morning, they should have a full and ample opportunity for discussing the statement of the noble Marquess. But he was sorry to say that three and a-half months had now gone 234 by, and until the present moment no opportunity had been afforded to the Committee for the discussion of the very important matters dealt with in the noble Marques's speech. It was quite true that on the night of the introduction of the Army Estimates his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Leitrim (Colonel Tottenham) brought forward some statements in connection with the Motion he had down on the Paper on going into Committee of Supply; but, unfortunately, the Motion could not be put to a Division, seeing that another Motion had been negatived before the question raised by his hon. and gallant Friend could be brought forward. It was at this particular moment in the history of the country that he thought a full and fair discussion of the condition of the Army and Navy ought to take place in the House of Commons. He recollected that the noble Marquess, in answer to the speech of his hon. and gallant Friend, said he could not go into many of the minor and technical details; but he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) hoped that before the debate closed that night the Committee might hear something from the noble Marquess with regard to the statements which had been made by his hon. and gallant Friend. There was one portion of the statement of his hon. and gallant Friend which had reference to the condition of two regiments which had been sent out to the Mediterranean. He understood the noble Marquess to admit that the statements in reference to those two regiments was fairly correct. The statement of his hon. and gallant Friend was that there were two regiments composed of 1,895 rank and file; 900 of whom had had less than two years' service, and 770 less than one year's service; 515 had never fired a shot, and 520 were under 20 years of age. There was one other statement made by his hon. and gallant Friend in reference to which the noble Marquess asked his hon. and gallant Friend what the regiment was. The statement was that the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade at the Curragh had an establishment of 539 non-commissioned officers and men, being 19 over its present establishment; and yet upon the 1st of October, 1883, it had only 12 men who were fit for guard or garrison duty. The noble Marquess had naturally no opportunity of stating at that moment whether the statement was correct or 235 not; but his hon. and gallant Friend went on to give several other instances, all of which went to show that there were not sufficient men who were able to perform their duty—that was to say, who were fit to do duty with the regiments of the Army at home. And now he wished it to be understood that it was in regard to the Army at home that he intended to direct his observations that evening, and not to the Army in India. The noble Marquess knew perfectly well that it was the Army at home they had more or less been always discussing, and not the Army in India. The Army in India, except that it was short in its numbers by 4,134 men, at that moment was, he did not deny it, an efficient Army. One of the greatest mistakes which, in his humble judgment, the noble Marquess was always making was in endeavouring to show that his (Sir Walter B. Barttelot's) great object, and the object of those who agreed with him, was merely to decry the short-service system. That was not the case; and all he would say on that point was that they had not approved of the short-service system, and for this one reason—that the short-service system had never had a fair trial, and had never been properly or legitimately carried out. He had endeavoured, as far as he was able, to suggest amendments in the system in the direction he thought it was wise to improve it; and he, and those who agreed with him, had this consolation and satisfaction—for it was a satisfaction—that the recommendations which he and his Friends had constantly urged upon the noble Marquess and others sitting on the Treasury Bench had, to a certain extent, and some of them to a large extent, been carried out. They had pointed out rightly, fairly, and justly that the backbone of the British Army was the non-commissioned officer; that anything which permitted the non-commissioned officer to leave the Service and go into the Reserves after a short service—a system which had been carried out for so many years—was a signal mistake, and would, in the end, be absolutely disastrous to the Army. What had been done in consequence of the complaints which had been made? Non-commissioned officers were now allowed to re-engage and go in for a pension; and he thought that a wiser course had 236 never been taken. Another point which he had mentioned the other night, and which he would mention again that night, was, that it was a very hard case indeed for a non-commissioned officer who had served faithfully for 17 or 18 years, and then committed some trifling offence, for which he had been reduced to the ranks, that he should lose all chance of obtaining a pension, and be compelled to leave the Service, instead of continuing as a private, and trying to retrieve his character and regain his stripes, or, at any rate, render himself entitled to a pension at the end of 21 years. He and his Friends had also said that the time for India was a great deal too short; and what had been done with regard to the time for Indian service, and in regard to all services? It had been raised from six years to eight years; and, in cases of emergency, it could be increased to nine years. That, he thought, was a step in the right direction, although he would like to see it go further, and extended to 10 years for troops to serve, he would not say abroad, but who enlisted to serve abroad, so that they would have a clear eight years' service from every man after he had learnt his duty, and the country would have a right to believe and feel sure that men in such a position would be able to discharge their duty thoroughly and efficiently. At home the authorities themselves had considered it wiser and more prudent to extend the service by one year, and the service was now for seven years, instead of six years as formerly. The noble Marquess had tried, in the case of the Guards, enlistment for three years; and no doubt if he could get a sufficient number of men for the Army to go out to India and serve on foreign stations it might be wise to enlist all the Infantry for three years on one condition—namely, that such men should not go abroad, and not leave the country. But then, of course, there naturally arose the very difficult question—namely, the question how they were to provide a sufficient Army for foreign service? The noble Marquess had given them no inkling as to how that difficulty was to be met, and it was the great difficulty with which they had to contend. He should like to read to the Committee some remarks which were made on the Motion of his hon. and gallant Friend the 237 Member for Leitrim (Colonel Tottenham) by his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley). He said—
It mattered not what Government was in Office—whether the Head of the Government was in favour of a spirited foreign policy, or was pledged to peace and to avoid blood-guiltiness and the extension of the Empire—the burdens of and the strain upon our Army increased year by year.He went on to say—They had at the present time Egypt upon their hands, and it was possible that they might have to provide for the permanent occupation of the Soudan. In those circumstances, the state of the British Army was of the utmost importance; and when they were told by everyone competent to judge—by every officer of the Army, from the highest to the lowest—that that Army was not in an efficient state, he did not think that the House was bound to be satisfied with the simple official denial, which was not supported by facts or figures."—(3 Hansard, [286] 94.)He thought there was a great deal in what the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had said; and he ventured to hope the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War would give them some facts and figures with regard to the condition of the Army at home, because it must be remembered that, with the exception of the Army in the Colonies, they were paying the enormous sum of £16,000,000, more or less, for their Army at home. The Army in India they did not pay for, and, therefore, that might be taken out of the calculation altogether. Certainly, £16,000,000 was an enormous sum, especially when they considered what number of men they would be able to put into line at the present moment. He should very much like to know whether, if the noble Marquess desired, at 24 hours' notice, to throw 10,000 men upon any given point upon the coast of this country, he would be able to do so? He would like to have an answer from the noble Marquess; and he thought it would be startling to the country to find that it was not even in a better position than that. It was a very difficult thing, particularly when the Press was not entirely favourable to any discussion upon the Army, and when the Press took up the case of the theorists against those practical soldiers, whose only and sole object was to do their duty, to ascertain whether they had got the appliances and the means wherewith to be able to 238 do that duty. He was prepared to assert that in no Service in the world had they got better regimental officers than they had in the English Army; and yet he found, from one end of the Army to the other, that there was but one opinion—that the Army at home was not in the condition it ought to be in. He would defy the noble Marquess, as Secretary of State for War, to get up and say that that was not the general and, he might almost say, the universal opinion of the officers of the Army. They did not take up that position because they wished to quarrel with their bread and butter. They did not say that the men were not men they could deal with; but it was the peculiarity of the case with which they had to deal that there was not one of them, if he was asked what the condition of his regiment was at home, who would be able to tell them that, if that regiment was called upon to-morrow, it was fit to undertake active service. There might be one or two exceptions; but, as a general rule, that was the case, and no one knew it better, or ought to know it better, than the noble Marquess. He had no wish to offend the noble Marquess; but he would remind him that in days gone by there were great discussions in that House as to who was to be the Head of the Army, and the House of Commons decided that the Secretary of State for War, whoever he might happen to be, ought to be the Head of the Army. He was the responsible man—not the Commander-in-Chief and the other officials, and not the Military Authorities, but the Secretary of State for War. Unfortunately, the Secretary of State for War was aided, in a great degree, by civilians, whose great object—he would not say whose entire object—was to keep the expenditure down; and it was on account of the expenditure that the fighting part of the Army had been starved, and starved, too, in that one great point—the effective and efficient First Line they ought to be able to place in the field. He ventured to hope, and he stated so last year, that the noble Marquess would, if he had not already done so—and he hoped the noble Marquess would be able to say that he had done so—make a personal examination into this matter. Hearsay evidence was all very well; but hearsay evidence was not the evidence they ought to have in that House. What 239 they ought to hear, on the authority of the noble Marquess, was this—"I have been down myself and examined these regiments, which I was told were in such an inefficient state; and I have satisfied myself they are sufficiently fit to take their place in the field, and fit to be sent to any place which the necessities of the case may call upon them to go." Could the noble Marquess say that? Could he get up in his place and say that he had gone down himself to Aldershot, to Portsmouth and Dover, the Curragh, and elsewhere, and ascertained that the regiments were efficient, and fit to do the duty they might be called upon to perform? The statement of the noble Marquess, in introducing the Army Estimates, was made so long ago that it must be very wearisome to the Committee to go back to what occurred three and a-half months ago. He should like, however, to place before the Committee the statement which the noble Marquess had made, and he confessed he did not altogether agree with it. He should like the Committee to hear the two statements, and also the reply of the noble Marquess to the figures he would have to produce. In the statement the noble Marquess made on this subject, referring to the Infantry of the Line, he placed the numbers on the 1st of January at 43,745 men of the Line at home; but of this number 18,404 were under one year's service. That was not all; they were mainly men not fit for active service, and they contained a large number of untrained recruits of less than six months' service. He proposed to take issue with the noble Marquess on that subject; because, in the latter part of the noble Marques's statement, he told the House that there were nearly 10,000 men who had been recruited, and who were under 19 years of age. If the noble Marquess had named a younger age than that he would have been much nearer the mark. Last year it was questioned whether some of these men were not older than it was said they were. He had taken the trouble to make a personal inquiry, and he had seen the baptismal register of one of these youthful soldiers, which he had picked out from a number of others, and would read to the Committee in order to show the age at which some of these recruits were enlisted. The register was dated the 13th of April, 1868, 240 and gave the name Samuel, a boy—he would not give the other name. This boy enlisted on the 17th of September, 1883. Having been born in April, 1868, and enlisted in September, 1883, he was very little more than 15 years of age at the time of his enlistment. He (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was not one of those who decried young soldiers. He never had done so; but what he said was that they could not make young soldiers do the duty of men who had got to their full strength and to their full muscle. They were told by the noble Marquess, with a sneer, that it was young soldiers who fought at Tamasi and El Teb. If those battles had been lost, they would have heard a great deal about their having been lost by young soldiers; but that was not the question. It was not in a first action, when they were landed at a particular place and taken up to fight at once, that these young soldiers failed; but if it had been necessary to march them on to the Nile, to Berber, 250 miles, of which more than 100 were across the Desert, it would then have been seen whether they were able to do the work. That was the real question—whether they would continue to do the work of a campaign, or whether, after their first battle, and their first exhaustion, they would not die, or otherwise become unfit for service? The noble Marquess went on to say that there were 15,375 short-service men at home who had passed over one year's service. There were 4,000 long-service men, and 5,377 had re-engaged. The noble Marquess added that in regard to the Army serving abroad a very different state of things was shown; and what he thought he had a right to complain of was that the critics of the Army in the House of Commons and in the country seemed to ignore altogether the condition of the Army abroad. He did not think the noble Marquess was justified in making that statement; and he would appeal to those who had heard the debates whether it was not to the Army at home that the criticisms had nearly always been confined, and that they had not been extended to any extent to the Army abroad. What they had said was this—and it was what they said now—that to keep up that Army abroad they drew the life-blood out of the Army at home. They took every effective and efficient man and 241 sent him abroad; and they did that to such an extent that at the present moment he believed they were not able to send out the proper reliefs to India. For the month of June they were 9,980 men short; and if he were to take the absolute number of men short in the Infantry and Artillery, leaving out the Cavalry, it would be found that they were 10,650 men short. The noble Marquess went on to refer to the Infantry of the Line in India; but he would not follow the noble Marquess into that matter. He did not dispute for a moment—and he had never disputed—the fact that they had, for the most part, in India men who were fit and able to do the work. The noble Marquess, however, seemed to forget that the House of Commons had decided that no man should be sent to India who was less than 20 years of age. Whether the rule was always carried out he would not pretend to say; but this much he did know—that it made a vast difference whether a lad was 17, or 20, or 21, in regard to the work he was able to do. He did not think he need trouble the Committee with the latter part of what the noble Marquess had stated; but as a contrast to the statement of the noble Marquess he wished to say to the Committee that they had now 67 battalions at home. The number of men in those battalions ought to be 42,600, and there were seven battalions of Guards, whose numbers ought to be 5,600, making altogether 48,200. Of course, they had not got that number of men; but supposing that they had—and he would ask the noble Marquess whether he could deny his facts, or assert that he had exaggerated them in the least degree?—they must take away 17,000 men, recruits and others, who had not learnt their drill, and had not gone through musketry instruction, whom it would be utterly impossible to send or place in line. If they took away those 17,000 from the 48,200, they would have 31,200 men left; but from that number would have to be deducted 4,556, being the number of men who were short in the Line. He believed this was only a moderate estimate, and he took it from a most useful book—The Monthly Return for the British Army for the month of June—according to which they were 4,556 men short in the Line and in the Guards, That would leave 26,644, all 242 the men the noble Marquess could possibly put into Line. The noble Marquess would, doubtless, say that they had a Reserve. He was not going to deny that they had a Reserve; but what he did mean to say was this—that if they called out the Reserve to fill up the vacancies in each regiment to enable them to be placed in the First Line, they would be taking those they ought to rely upon for filling up the regiments after the first brunt of an action had been borne. Who were they going to send out from the country, and where were they going to get the men? The number of men they had in the Reserve of Infantry was 32,000. He took that number from the monthly Return—32,026—and of Guards, 1,859. If, in addition, they took the Militia Reserve at 27,000, he thought they would be making a handsome allowance. But the noble Marquess had never, for one moment, gone into the question of how many of these men were fit to be called out, and how many would respond to the call, if called out, or would pass the medical inspection. He (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) had been told that 10, and some even went so high as 20, per cent would be found absolutely and entirely unfit to take their place in the Line, and who could never be able to be called upon for active service. His own opinion was that if the Reserve was to be of any use it should only contain men who were fit to be called out—men who had gone through their proper musketry instruction and exercise, and were seen on parade every year. If it was true that they were going to have a new weapon in the Army, it was highly essential that these men should be called out and taught what they had to do with it. Would the noble Marquess get up and tell the Committee that the Reserve, if allocated to different regiments, had got their clothing, their accoutrements, and everything else in readiness for them; or would they be in the position in which they had been placed before—that when the embarkation was about to take place men would be sent down from different parts of the Kingdom, without clothing or accoutrements, to join regiments, knowing nothing of their officers, and waiting to be formed into companies on their voyage out? Yet it was upon the efficiency of these men that the future existence of this great Empire was to depend. Surely, then, it 243 was a serious consideration whether they had only got 26,644 men whom, in the case of an emergency, they could put into Line in an efficient condition besides the Reserve. He thought the country ought to consider the present position they were in. Let them look at Ireland. Was the noble Marquess prepared to take away the Army, or any portion of the Army, now in Ireland? He thought the answer of the noble Marquess would be "Certainly not." In Ireland there were something like 19,000 Infantry. Of course, many of them were young soldiers, who were probably not fit to go abroad; but there they were. Taking it roughly, there might be 9,000 or 10,000 men who might be fit to be sent abroad; but of the others who remained, could they send one man? His own opinion was that they dared not take them away, and leave nothing but young soldiers in Ireland. Then, again, let them look at the state of Zululand and the whole of South Africa—were the affairs there in such a condition that they might not be expected to send more troops to South Africa? Then, again, let them look at India and Afghanistan, and the advance of Russia. Could any Secretary of State, who had the interests of the country at heart, afford to overlook the condition of matters there, and not feel that instead of denuding those countries of troops he might be called upon at any moment to add to their strength? As to Egypt, could the noble Marquess say for a moment that there was the slightest probability, at any rate for some considerable time, of his being able to take a single man away from the regiments now serving in Egypt? He would not go back to what the noble Marquess had formerly stated. That was not the time, and it would be out of place to do so. But he would ask the noble Marquess whether, knowing what he now knew, he did not think it far more probable that more troops would be required there? Indeed, he (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) believed that two regiments had been placed under orders that day to go either to Malta or direct to Egypt. Therefore, the noble Marquess knew that he might be called upon at any moment to send more soldiers to Egypt; and every man they took from the Home regiments—every man they sent out—left harder duties and more work to be performed 244 at home. If the noble Marquess would question any man—he did not care who that man was—who was filling any responsible position at the War Office, or in the Army, he would be told that it would be utterly impossible to carry on the duties at home if they were to keep even the Army they already had in Egypt for any length of time in that country. If they continued to keep the troops in Egypt they would need 20,000 men more to discharge the duties of the Empire; and even if the troops returned from Egypt, 10,000 more men would be required under the present system of short service. He believed that had been laid down as a principle even by Lord Wolseley, who stated that it was the very least number that could possibly be sufficient for carrying on the work of the Empire, and for placing them in that position of comparative security which a great country like this ought to enjoy. He had thought it right to make this statement, because they generally had from the noble Marquess, and others who were officially connected with the Government, very pleasing accounts, which people, both inside and outside the House, were inclined to believe. Personally, he was far from being contented with the present state of things; and he believed that if the country really thought or knew what the present condition of the Army at home was there was no sacrifice they would not make in order that the Army might be placed in a complete and perfect position to defend the British Empire from all comers throughout the world. He had read in The Times that morning an article upon the condition of the Army, which was called Discontent in the Army. It was a very curious fact that The Times and The Standard, and other newspapers, while condemning the statements that were made in that House, and while condemning the statements made by officers who had come round to the same mode of thinking, were constantly making the very same statements themselves, when they could make them, as if they were making them upon their own account. The Times of that day stated that one of the great sources of discontent in the Army was the mode in which the men were treated in regard to rations. He was now turning away from the question of numbers to the conditions of recruiting, which certainly ought to be such as 245 to make the Army more popular than it was; but the stoppages, and the fact that the men did not get the full amount of pay they were entitled to expect, were great drawbacks in the recruiting service. There could be no doubt about it that if they would feed the man better and pay everything they had promised him, as he understood their promises when he went into the Service, he would make a better and more efficient soldier. They all knew that the way to an Englishman's heart was through something else; and certainly if they wanted to make him happy and contented they must increase the present rations, which were certainly not sufficient for a growing man. A soldier got 1 lb. of bread and, what purported to be, ¾ lb. of meat daily; but when they took away the bone, and made other allowances, it did not amount to more than ½ lb. He was led, when he enlisted, to believed that he would be provided with groceries and vegetables for nothing, seeing that they were invited to join by notices, in which they were told that they were to be given free rations and food free of charge. A man, instead of getting free rations, had to pay about 4d. a-day for groceries, vegetables, and other necessaries of life. The stoppages, including wear and tear of clothing, often amounted to 7d. per day; and the consequence was that the man got into debt from the very commencement of his service. If these stoppages were got rid of, and the man was kept at the depôt under good, kind, and considerate officers until he had been properly drilled by good non - commissioned officers, and then sent to the battalion with which he would have to serve, they would hear much less of complaint than they now did. Under the present system, the recruit was hurried and hustled through his drill; was then sent to the battalion at home; when he arrived there he did not know whether he was to stay or to join the battalion abroad. He began to find that he had very hard work to perform; he was placed under stoppages for one thing or another; he did not know his officers, or to which battalion he was going to belong, and yet people were surprised to find that he was discontented. He continued to serve on; perhaps he was sent out to India; and at the end of his time he told everybody, 246 as all these men did, that he had been taken in, and that he had not received the terms which were promised to him at the time he was enlisted. Whilst he was upon this point, he hoped the Committee would allow him to draw their attention to one other matter in regard to The Times' statement that morning. He found in the article to which he had referred one of the most curious passages which he had ever read in any newspaper—namely, a doubt expressed whether the soldier should be required to live in barracks, or whether he might not live where he pleased, and only come into barracks when his duty required him, or called upon him, to do so. If such a state of things existed, he should like to know what would happen either in London or elsewhere, seeing that a regiment was liable to be turned out at night and ordered to march anywhere? If such a necessity arose, where would they find the men? This curious article was certainly not written by anyone who had the discipline of the Army at heart, nor did the men complain of any restrictions they had to suffer in that way. What they did complain of was, that they were refused all the rights they were promised at the time of their enlistment. They alleged that they were unfairly treated; that they were punished severely for trifling offences; and that many were not punished and dealt with severely when they deserved it, and had really committed something in the nature of a great crime. He thought the men would be perfectly satisfied with the present conditions of their service, provided they had a free kit, and a free mess, and if these charges in the shape of stoppages were not laid upon their shoulders. There was another point in regard to which the writer in The Times was quite right—namely, that some relaxation should be made in the matter of sentry duty. There was nothing more irksome and tiresome than too much sentry duty. When a man was unable to get more than two nights consecutively in bed, it was a very hard case indeed upon him, when he was engaged in a time of peace, in soldiering in this country. There was another thing the men complained of, and complained of most bitterly and justly—namely, that they had to do all the work of the regiment before they were properly drilled, and that they were then accused of not 247 knowing their duty. How could a man know his duty? How could he be under military discipline, or be fit to take his place in the front, until he had gone through all the preparatory stages, which stages should really be preparatory stages? He ought not to be called upon to perform other duties until he had completely learnt his first and preliminary business. Then came the point—and the noble Marquess know it well—that they had not men enough to do the duty unless they placed these boys absolutely upon duty before they had learnt the business they came into the Army to learn. These were the questions which were agitating the soldiers' minds. There was another question—namely, that they did not know how soon the Warrants might not be changed, and when, after having enlisted for a certain time, and upon a particular understanding, they might not be called upon to do something else by some new Warrant that might be issued. Let them adhere to the terms upon which they enlisted a man, and endeavour to keep the men as long as they could, giving them every facility for staying in the Army, and making the terms as elastic as possible. They made the best soldiers by giving indulgent terms; and the more elastic they made the terms, the more likely they would be to induce long-service men to remain and to go out to India, than by any other means. He would not go into the question of discipline in order to compare the discipline of one branch of the Service with that of another. There was one thing, however, which he desired to say—namely, that a man on joining a Cavalry regiment knew that he was to remain in that regiment. The result was that he knew his officers, and he knew his brother soldiers, and he was conscious that he would not be sent away from the regiment against his will. It was only by volunteering that he could be taken out of that regiment; and that circumstance tended to maintain that esprit de corps which, although it had been so much decried lately, really made a regiment efficient, and was one of the great objects which men who desired to see the Army efficient should have at heart. That regiment which attained the highest esprit de corps was generally the best regiment in the Service. Unfortunately, in many instances, the only object of a man who joined the 248 Army was to get out of the Service as quickly as he possibly could; and until that idea was dissipated from his mind, and he knew that the regiment was his home, and that everything was being done for him to make him happy and comfortable, things would go on very much in the same way. He was glad that the noble Marquess had not attempted to meddle with the Cavalry regiments. If the noble Marquess were to attempt to meddle with these regiments, and did anything that might tend to do away with the esprit de corps which now existed among them, it would be the very worst thing that could happen to the finest Cavalry in the world. His own opinion, and he believed the country would be very glad to do it, was that they ought to spend more money upon the Cavalry. They ought to increase the Cavalry, and to follow, as they were fond of following, the example of foreign countries—especially the German example. In Germany, although they had a very large Reserve, and although the men turned out so admirably and well, they never allowed their Cavalry or their Horse Artillery to fall short. The Horse Artillery and the Cavalry were always kept up to their full strength; because everyone knew that if a man had not been upon a horse for two, three, or four years, to bring him back from the Reserve and place him on a horse to go into active service was one of the most mischievous things they could do. If they would increase their Cavalry, and increase their Indian Cavalry regiments, by one troop more than they had at present, and keep the force up to its full strength, they would have the finest and best-disciplined Cavalry in the world. He had felt it his duty to trouble the Committee with these remarks. He had not gone into minor or technical details connected with enlistment or anything of that kind. He had passed them all by. They wanted to get as many men as they possibly could; but it was of no use having men unless they were fit to go upon active service. The noble Marquess knew, and knew perfectly well, that the younger men were not fit to go upon service, and that there was a good deal to be done before they could be fit to go on service. The noble Marquess knew that before that could be done satisfactorily the Army must be increased. No doubt the suggestion 249 would be unpopular with a number of hon. Members who sat below the Gangway on the other side of the House; but he believed the most unpopular thing, and the worst thing that could happen to the noble Marquess, or to any man in his position, would be for some great and terrible disaster to occur, which God grant might never happen. But if it were to come—and surely it would come—what would be the result if they were obliged to engage with any European nation, unless they were better prepared? It was in order that they might be better prepared—and the noble Marquess was the one man responsible for their being better prepared — that he had ventured to make these remarks. He would not go into the question of the Commissariat, although it was a question that ought to be looked into. They ought to have at least one Army Corps up to its full strength, with every appliance that could be procured for it, with its Generals who were to command, and everything perfect, so that it should be complete in every respect, and ready to move at a moment's notice.
§ COLONEL COLTHURSTsaid, he wished to say one or two words with respect to a point which had been mentioned by his hon. and gallant Friend, who had attributed a good deal of the discontent in the Army to the work the men had to perform upon guard and fatigue duty. He was afraid that could not be avoided, so long as the present system continued of fixing so low a minimum strength to the Home battalions—namely, 520 men. If they were kept up to 520 it would be bad enough; but, as a matter of fact, they were not, because they had to deduct from them the drafts which were constantly being made, and a battalion rarely numbered more than 350 or 400 men. That was a reform that was entirely within the power of the noble Marquess to carry out. He did not think that the drafts required during the year should be taken from any battalion which was not in excess of its establishment of 520 or 600, as the case might be. By keeping up the battalion to its full strength of 520 men, all the difference would be made between its comfort and discomfort. The second point of his hon. and gallant Friend, in which he concurred, had reference to 250 the stoppages for groceries. He did not think the noble Marquess could confer a greater boon upon the Army than by abolishing the stoppages for groceries, and, by so doing, preserve the actuality of a man's service with the promises made to him on his enlistment. He believed it would enable the noble Marquess to get rid of the deferred pay, which was also the cause of trouble, because, by giving deferred pay, they gave a positive inducement to men to leave the Army and go away. At present it acted as a great hindrance to re-enlistment, because there were a very few men who were able to resist the temptation of putting their hands upon £18 or £32. They, therefore, preferred their discharge to entering into a re-engagement. If they were given 4d. a-day, in the shape of extra pay, with entirely free rations, the noble Marquess might very easily do away with deferred pay altogether. He would confine himself to these two points, because he believed there were many other Members, who wished to address the Committee, who were better qualified than himself to discuss the question. He allowed that the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War had endeavoured, quite as much as any of his Predecessors, to meet the views which had been expressed in that House by those who were best acquainted with the Service; and he hoped the noble Marquess would be able to do even still more towards securing the efficiency of the Army and the comfort and contentment of the men.
CAPTAIN MAXWELL-HERONcongratulated the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War upon the very lucid statement he had made in introducing the Army Estimates. No doubt, the natural outcome of the new military administration was that there should be grievances to remedy and inequalities to redress. A good many grievances had been brought under the notice of the House; but there was only one which he desired to touch upon that night, and it had reference to the purchase captains. The purchase captains had spent a large sum of money in acquiring an improved position with a prospective view to promotion.
THE CHAIRMANpointed out that the hon. and gallant Member was now dealing with a subject that was not at present before the Committee.
CAPTAIN MAXWELL-HERONsaid, he had understood that they were to discuss the whole question of the condition of the Army upon the present Vote.
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERremarked, that his hon. and gallant Friend would have an opportunity of discussing the question he had referred to upon another Vote.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, the arrangement came to on the last occasion was that an opportunity would be afforded upon the present Vote of discussing questions relating to the organization of the Army, the recruiting, and the personnel of the Army; but it would not be regular to go into questions relating to purchase until they came to the Non-Effective Votes.
§ SIR ALEXANDER GORDONsaid, the remarks which had been made by the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) with regard to rations opened a much wider question than the hon. and gallant Member was aware of. If the Government undertook to give every soldier a complete ration every day, it could be done without difficulty when the regiment was in barracks. But it was necessary also to provide for occasions when the troops were sent away on an emergency. Troops were sent abroad at a very few hours' notice to a part of a country where there was no Commissariat and no Government establishment; and in that case the men were provided with a grievance, unless the equivalent of rations was supplied, seeing that they would have to provide themselves. Unless, therefore, a system of stoppages was resorted to, they would be in a complete difficulty. A part of the arrangement was to provide the men with food as a condition of service; and if they did not provide it they were entitled to the value of it, or a grievance at once arose. It was, therefore, thought much better to provide the soldier with the bulk of his provisions—for instance, bread and meat, and leave extras, such as vegetables and groceries and other things, to be charged against him when provided. There might, however, be times when the Government would find it altogether impossible to provide these things; and, therefore, caution was necessary on their part. His object in 252 rising had been to draw the attention of the noble Marquess to what appeared to him to be an error in the preparation of the Estimates, including deferred pay as part of the Effective Services. On page 18 regimental pay and deferred pay were put down for this year at £4,500,000, being an increase of £85,000; but, in his opinion, the deferred pay, which was included in that Estimate, ought to be entered in the non-effective account, seeing that it was not available until the soldier had left the Service. When he left the Army and became non-effective, he got his deferred pay. The men who received deferred pay did not come under Vote A, and the Estimates for Effective Services were only for men who were included in Vote A. Therefore, he thought the account for deferred pay ought to be placed in the Vote for Non-Effective Services, because it was really a Non-Effective Vote. He should like to call the attention of the Committee to the way in which this Vote had increased within the last three years. It would be found that in the last three years both the regimental pay and the deferred pay had increased.
THE CHAIRMANI must point out to the hon. and gallant Member that he is referring to Vote 1, which has already been passed.
§ SIR ALEXANDER GORDONwished to remind the right hon. Gentleman that he had informed the Committee the last time the Estimates were under discussion that, although it was quite true that Vote 1 had been passed, there would be an opportunity of discussing the Vote when they came to the Vote for the Reserves.
§ SIR ALEXANDER GORDONwould ask, then, upon what points the discussion was to take place? They were certainly told they would have an opportunity of discussing the question; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer said in the most definite terms, at 12 o'clock at night, that a full opportunity would be afforded. He wanted to know, then, upon what Vote the discussion would take place? He had waited patiently, because he had been distinctly informed that this was the opportunity the Committee would have.
THE CHAIRMANThe hon. and gallant Gentleman has put a question to 253 me; but I think there has been some confusion between the statement made by other Members of the House and myself. Speaking from the Chair, I never gave any intimation that all the questions raised by the Army Estimates could be discussed upon this Vote. No doubt, certain questions which could have been discussed upon Vote 1 were agreed to be held over until this Vote; and there was a general understanding, both in regard to the Navy and Army Estimates, that, provided Vote 1 were agreed to on the first night, certain questions which hon. Members desired to discuss could be raised on a subsequent Vote. But what I would now point out to the hon. and gallant Gentleman is, that upon Vote 8 he cannot discuss matters which have already been passed in Vote 1.
§ SIR ALEXANDER GORDONsaid, that, no doubt, the right hon. Gentletleman was correct, and he would not dispute his ruling; but next year he would take the opportunity when, at past 12 or 1 o'clock in the morning, the Secretary of State for War asked the Committee to vote £4,000,000 or £5,000,000 of money without discussion, to leave over £4,000 or £5,000 from the Vote, in order that the Vote might be kept open, so as to enable a discussion to take place. After the ruling of the Chairman he would, in reference to the remarks he desired to make, wait until he could obtain another opportunity.
§ COLONEL O'BEIRNEprotested against any Vote of public money for Cavalry Reserves as a useless expenditure. Everyone who had served in a Cavalry regiment, as he had, knew that a Cavalry soldier, after he had left the regiment for eight or 12 months, was perfectly useless for any military purpose; and it would be necessary for him to have served continually for two or three years before he could be rendered a fit and competent soldier. When it was desired to send out a number of soldiers to Egypt a short time ago, a number of men were looked up from the Reserves who certainly were not fit for military service in the sense they ought to have been. He therefore objected to this part of the Vote, on the ground that they were voting money upon no good ground whatever. The Army Estimates were sufficiently large as they were. They amounted to £ 16,000,000; and he thought 254 that any proper economy that could be effected should be adopted by the Government.
SIR FREDERICK FITZ-WYGRAMsaid, he thought the main cause of the failure of recruiting was due to the dissatisfaction which was felt and expressed by the Reserve men at the result of their military service. Of course, he knew that there were other reasons, and probably among them was the extreme dislike felt by both officers and men to the new battalion system; but he thought the main cause was the dissatisfaction felt by the Reserve men at the result of their previous services. He had talked to many of them at various times, and their general statement was couched in these terms—"We were happy and contented while in the Army. We were well enough treated, and had nothing to complain of as long as we were in the Army; but the result was unsatisfactory to our future prospects. We had been leading an idle life for seven or eight years, and when we joined the Reserve we felt ourselves incapable of doing that good day's work which an employer requires. We found that we had lost our aptitude for work, and we felt ourselves quite stranded." He was talking to some of the old soldiers of his own regiment some time ago, and the views they expressed were somewhat similar—namely, that they were well enough treated in the Army, and that they had nothing to regret; that they had seen the world, and had been to India; but that they had made a mistake. They said, in effect—"When I and Jack were working in a carpenter's shop we were both getting 15s. a-week. Jack stuck to the shop, and I went into the Army. At the end of my period of service I go to the same shop for employment. I find that Jack is now getting 30s. a-week, and I am not worth 15s." He thought that was the great cause of discontent which the men felt at the result of their service. The question was, what was the remedy? It was clear that the Reserve was absolutely necessary under the short-service system; but he thought the Government might do something for the men in the way of providing industrial employment for them in the Army itself. There was in every regiment a certain number of men of various trades, and many others who would like to learn a trade if they 255 had an opportunity. He noticed in the Estimates a sum of £10,000 for the reconstruction of huts at Aldershot, £10,000 for the reconstruction of huts at the Curragh, and similar items for Shorncliffe and elsewhere. Now, he believed that all these military works might be undertaken by military labour, with great advantage both to the soldier and to the Service. He noticed that a large sum was required at Aldershot for trenching Cove Common, and at other places for repairs and drainage and other purposes; but there were a great many agriculturists in the different regiments who were perfectly competent to perform any agricultural labour that was necessary. Looking through the Army Estimates, he found that some £600,000 or £700,000 were expended annually in the repair and building of fortifications and other works, and in the repair of barracks. It seemed to him that all this work ought to be undertaken by military labour; and he believed there was intelligence enough among the class of men enlisted in the Army at the present day to fit them for any sort of work that might be imposed upon them; and the intelligence of the men would be rightly developed if they were associated with others who understood the nature of the work they would be called upon to do. Of course, it would be said that under a system of this sort the drill would go to the bad; but he did not concur in that view at all. He did not believe in the necessity for constant drill. If a drill took place for two hours in the forenoon, and one hour in the afternoon, and an hour for theoretical instruction on, perhaps, two days in the week, that would be quite sufficient to keep the trained soldier in a perfectly efficient military state; and a certain portion of time in the forenoon and afternoon of the remaining four days a-week might be devoted to other purposes. If that were done, he believed the men would be able to go back to their old work, thoroughly competent to earn a livelihood. In his opinion, the great reason of the failure of the recruiting system was the want of such a system of industrial employment. He should like to see all the artizans in a regiment collected into one or two companies, and as many men as liked might be allowed to go into them with a view of learning a 256 trade that would be useful to them in their future life. Anyone who had served in a campaign knew the extreme value of the Royal Engineers, and that their services were estimated far more highly than those of men of the ordinary rank and file. He did not see why they should not put all men who wished to learn a trade into a selected company, under special officers and non-commissioned officers with extra pay, and form them into an Engineering Company. In that way, he thought, they would get rid of the dissatisfaction now felt by the soldier at the result of his service. Of course, the recruit would pass one year in learning his drill, and then for the remaining six or seven years he would be learning to labour for his own good, for his future good, and for the good of the Army. Failing such a system as that, he thought there was only one other remedy for the present state of things, and that was that the primary term of enlistment should be reduced to one year and a-half. He took that period of time, because he thought it was quite sufficient for an ordinary soldier to be thoroughly trained. In two years in a Cavalry regiment they were able to teach a man everything they wanted to teach him. Of course, a Cavalry soldier had a good deal more to learn. It was obvious that it would take a longer time to teach a man to ride than it would be to teach him to walk straight. At the end of a year and a-half, if a man did not choose to be re-engaged, he might go back without detriment to his civil employment; and in that time he would not have lost his aptitude for his ordinary labour and work. He would, however, give him a chance of going into the Service, or of enlisting for six years longer, with the right of discharge at the end of six years without a pension, but with the right of re-engagement; and if, at the end of another six years, he thought fit to be discharged, then at the close of 14 years' service he would retire with a pension. Personally, he had no belief in the value of old soldiers of over 14 years' service. A man who had been knocking about the world, in hot climates, for 14 years, was generally unfit for a modern campaign. He thought he was right in his idea that the discontent in the Reserve was the main cause of the failure of recruiting; because he noted that in the Cavalry 257 regiments the establishment of all the regiments was full, and, in fact, overfull. As a matter of fact, although the Cavalry did not exactly pretend to teach a trade, they did teach a trade, and kept the men up to the full hard work of it for seven or eight years' service. In the Cavalry the men were taught the care and management of horses, and were, therefore, generally sufficiently instructed to enable them to earn an honest livelihood when they left the Service. He had always supported the short service system, if it was properly managed, which he did not think it was at present, and also a system of Reserves. At the same time, he believed that the system of Reserves, although suitable for the Infantry, was totally unsuited to the Cavalry. There was a distinct difference between Cavalry Reserve men and Infantry Reserve men. An Infantry man who went into the Reserve kept his limbs, his arms and legs, in daily use; and if he were called upon to rejoin a regiment, he was pretty well fit to take his place in the ranks. But in regard to the Cavalry the case was very different. Most of the men, on leaving Cavalry regiments, were employed about the stables; but they became carters and drivers, and seldom got on the back of a horse. Men after leaving the Service grew older and stiffer; and after being in the Reserve for some time they became totally unfit to be put back again all at once into the ranks of their regiments for active service. He would ask hon. Members to read the accounts of what occurred in the Egyptian Campaign. They would see how men were hustled out of a ship and put on horseback at once. Could Reserve men be fit for such work after being absent from the saddle for four or five years? The Germans, from whom they had copied a great deal, had altogether given up the idea of a Reserve for the Cavalry. Their system was to have regiments of five squadrons, four of which went to the war, while the fifth formed the depôt. The weakly men and the weakly horses were drafted into the fifth squadron, which in turn supplied the four squadrons which were sent into the field with men, as vacancies occurred. The result of this was that the German Cavalry regiments were able to be placed in the field without any necessity for resorting to drafts from the second line, as was our 258 case in the Egyptian Campaign. He believed that five squadrons were absolutely necessary for the efficiency of a Cavalry regiment—namely, four in the field, and one to fall back upon. There were various reasons why four squadrons were necessary for the field; and one was that their drill book was constructed on the principle of having four squadrons. Therefore, he would earnestly ask the Secretary of State for War to add a fifth squadron to every regiment of Cavalry, so as to have four squadrons in their full strength fit for the field at once. It had been found that the principle of augmentation did not answer. Regiments placed on the augmented strength, and supposed by the nation to be fit for war, were not really fit until they had been on that strength for two years, because it took that time to train the augmentation recruits. Modern wars were short and sudden; and it was perfectly useless to rely upon men who were not thoroughly trained, besides which, by augmenting the strength of a regiment, in the way now resorted to, they would only succeed in obtaining a certain number of regiments of augmented strength, none of which were fit for service for want of a fifth squadron. He was quite aware that the proposal he made would, if carried out, cost a good deal of money; but he believed that the nation was willing to pay for anything that was absolutely necessary to preserve the efficiency of the Army and the honour of the nation. If, however, it came to such a question, he would prefer to see a smaller number of regiments, if each regiment were good and of effective strength. The Secretary of State for War or the House must fix the number of men a horses they chose to maintain. He only argued that the men and horses, whatever their number might be, should be so trained and organized as to be efficient and fit for the service of the country.
§ MR. RYLANDSsaid, the hon. and gallant Member for South Hants (Sir Frederick Fitz-Wygram) had made a very interesting speech; but while he (Mr. Rylands) was not in favour of very long service, he thought that the present term of enlistment was too short; and he was therefore surprised at the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Member that it should be still further reduced. He had been a Member of the House for a very 259 considerable number of years, and he had never been present at a discussion of the Army Estimates without hearing on all sides complaints of the inefficiency of the Army and its utter inadequacy for the defence of the country. During the time of his Parliamentary experience there had been several Committees and Royal Commissions appointed, and the opinions of experts had been brought to bear, with a view of showing in what respect the Army was defective, and how its defects might best be remedied. A great variety of promises had been made, and within his own experience a large sum of money had been spent for the abolition of purchase. Subsequently to that they had, in his opinion, adopted, most unwisely, in order to accomplish what was desired in the way of the flow of promotion, a system of forcing out of the Army many officers of ability who wished to make the Army a profession. They had had opinions laid before them in regard to the length of service of the most conflicting character. At one time it was recommended that every man who enlisted in the Army should be enlisted for a considerable number of years; at another time they were told that they ought to have very short service indeed. As he had stated, his feeling had been, and he was only expressing an opinion, without any education on the subject which could have attached to it much authority — but his own opinion had always been something between the two extremes. He thought it was somewhat undesirable to have an excessively long service; but he had always thought that in the recent change they had gone too far, and that the present term of enlistment was too short. But now the hon. and gallant Gentleman, who had made his maiden speech that night, and who, no doubt, as a military authority, was an acquisition to the House, had astonished the Committee by suggesting that the present short service, which some of them thought too short, should be reduced still further and brought down to one year and a-half. Now, to persons outside who had not the great advantage which hon. and gallant Gentlemen opposite possessed, of belonging to the Army, it was most difficult to form an opinion of a satisfactory character with regard to these discussions; but what they had to say in respect of the question represented the 260 feeling of the public at large who were without technical information. What they had to say was this—that for the £16,000,000 a-year now charged for the maintenance of the Army they ought to have an efficient Army. Some hon. Gentlemen imagined that he was opposed to any military expenditure whatever. That was quite a mistake. No doubt he wished that the country could do without an Army or a Navy; but he was bound to say that no one, looking at the present state of the world and the present position of political affairs, could suppose that it would be possible, at the present time, for this country to dispense with adequate means of defence. Of course, in the position they were in, they were obliged to consider what their policy ought to be. If their policy was a policy of defence—if their policy was one of avoiding as far as possible complicated intervention in the affairs of foreign nations, no doubt they might be satisfied with an establishment that would not require so large an expenditure of money upon it as some hon. Gentlemen were inclined to demand. He did not think they ought to go in, in this country, for a very large Army. He thought they should go in for a moderate Army, and for suitable Reserves, and for a Militia and Volunteers to reinforce the Army if necessary. But if they were to have a small Army, then he was entirely in accord with hon. Gentlemen opposite in the belief that they ought to have a thoroughly efficient Army. He strongly protested against recruiting the Army with mere lads without either bone or muscle, who were not fit to stand the wear and tear of a soldier's life. They knew from experience that much of the mortality in the ranks had arisen from the fact that their soldiers were of too tender years; but they wanted something beyond soldiers of strong physique and bone and muscle able to stand the wear and tear of a soldier's life. They wanted soldiers who could shoot. If he had not been grossly misinformed, they had soldiers who could not shoot. Now, he was very much opposed to killing people at all. So far as he was concerned, he would be very sorry indeed to be called upon to do any duty of that kind; but if they were called upon to spend £16,000,000 a-year for that purpose they ought to see that they got an efficient instrument for their 261 money. They ought to learn a lesson from their past experience. No one could doubt that at Majuba Hill the Boers displayed their power of shooting to much greater advantage than our own troops. Every shot cut down our men, who fell by wholesale, and the superiority of the marksmanship of the Boers over that of our own soldiers was most extraordinary. They ought to take great care that as regarded their Army it should be trained so that every man should be a thoroughly good shot. He had been told by a most distinguished military man that he believed the extraordinary improvement which had taken place in arms of precision was really a disadvantage rather than an advantage, and had really rendered the effectiveness of the Army less than it was before in this country, because so few men knew how to make use of these arms of precision, or how to handle them; and there was a great amount of loss of power in having such arms put into the hands of men who did not understand them, and who were not carefully instructed as to their use. Then, again, they not only wanted men who could shoot, and who knew their duty as soldiers; but he entirely agreed with the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) that it was of the greatest consequence that an esprit de corps should be maintained. He thought that, upon the whole, a great deal was lost in that respect. It was important that men should be made to feel, at the time they went into the Army, that they were entering into an association the character of which was something to be proud of, upon which they could rely, and which would afford them pleasure to be connected with—an association which would, at all events, inspire them with a good feeling towards the whole body to which they belonged. He had noticed the article in The Times of that morning which had been quoted by the hon. and gallant Baronet opposite (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), and he was bound to say that his view of that article corresponded very much with that which the hon. and gallant Baronet had expressed. But what had struck him all through in reading that article was this — there seemed to be a want of elasticity in their military arrangements. The men who joined the Army were trained purely as if they were machines, and without the 262 slightest regard to the feelings which they might be expected to entertain. He recollected two or three years ago the great struggle they had in that House in order to get rid of flogging in the Army. He remembered very well one of the arguments which he used when sitting on the Bench opposite against flogging — namely, that they ought to induce respectable men to enter the Army, and that no system should be maintained which would tend to prevent men of respectability and character from joining the Army. He believed that flogging demoralized the Army, and the very fact that it existed had tended to prevent a certain class of men from entering the Army. He believed that, although, perhaps, flogging had not been frequently resorted to, the moral effect of its abolition had already been felt in the recruiting, and he hoped it would be felt still more in getting a higher class of men into the Army. When men entered the Army they found themselves treated in a manner in which it would be impossible to treat any other class. He was afraid, in many cases, it often happened that the very treatment of recruits by the non-commissioned officers was calculated to excite ill feeling, and to make the troops discontented. He would like to see brought into the Army something more of that feeling which existed in all ranks and classes among the civil population. He should like to see the feelings that existed between the employers and the employed cultivated also in the Army, so that while discipline was enforced the feelings of men who were placed in a subordinate position should be fully recognized, and that they should not be treated as though they were mere dogs. He quite agreed with the remarks which the hon. and gallant Baronet opposite had made in reference to the employment of men upon sentry duty. The number of men employed in all kinds of weather upon sentry duty seemed to him to be unnecessarily large. These duties were discharged very frequently under circumstances which impaired the health and even sacrificed the lives of the men engaged in the discharge of that duty. But he knew perfectly well that when anything was proposed to improve the condition of the Army, hon. and gallant Gentlemen opposite would say—"Yes; 263 but it will cost more money. Will you give us more money?" Now he thought that the country was paying too much already; and he, therefore, objected to give hon. and gallant Gentlemen more money. He thought, however, that if they would look through the Estimates they would find, apart from the pay of the common soldier, apart from the cost which might be necessary to improve his position, and which he should not grudge—apart from all that, they would find in the Estimates ample evidence in the Manufacturing Department and the Commissariat Department, and in the various other Departments, that opportunities did exist for wasteful expense, and that by exercising judicious economy a large sum of money might be saved every year. There had been an enormous increase in the expenditure during the last 12 years in the various Departments to which he had referred; and he thought he would not be far wide of the mark when he said that at least £2,000,000 a-year might be saved without interfering in any way with the efficiency of the Army. There had been another enormous increase of charge in connection with the Non-Effective Service. He believed that very considerable charges for Non-Effective Services were made in a manner which was not justifiable and could not be defended. His own opinion was that they were charging that Vote with a sum of money which might be very much better employed, and what he would venture to say to hon. and gallant Gentlemen was this—"If you want to improve the condition of the soldier do not lead him to expect that this country can afford to give an extra amount of money every year for the charge of an Army already so excessive as far as expenditure is concerned." Let them Bee if they could not find some means of effecting economy. He thought it could be found in connection with the various Votes to which he had alluded; and then let them, if they possibly could, bring such action to bear upon the administration of the Army as would tend to increase the comfort of the soldiers, and encourage a disposition on the part of the working classes of the country to enter the Service.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI have listened with great pleasure to the observations of the hon. Member 264 for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) on the subject of maintaining at as high a standard as possible the character of our troops and also to the statement he made, that the paramount interest felt by him in the efficiency and contentment of the Army was shared by a large number of his Colleagues. While it is true that my hon. Friend expressed the desire that, almost irrespective of cost, an efficient Army and a contented Army should be maintained by this country, it is equally true that towards the close of his remarks my hon. Friend endeavoured, somewhat feebly, I think, to maintain his character as an economist by suggesting that there were other Votes not so intimately connected with the pay or well-being of the soldier on which large reductions might be made, which would recoup the cost of what might be found necessary for the increase of the efficiency and contentment of the Army itself. Of course, my hon. Friend is justified in referring to other Votes for his purpose. We cannot be expected to give up any portion of Votes which have been passed; but I think if my hon. Friend is prepared to say that £1,000,000 or £2,000,000 can be struck off the Votes which are to come forward, he is bound to show to the Committee—not merely to make sweeping statements—the items on which reductions can be made, and to point out why he thinks the Votes can be reduced without interfering with the efficiency of the Service. On the subject of expenditure on materials of war, I will only make one or two general observations. My hon. Friend is perfectly well aware that the progress which has of late years been made in all the branches of military science, and the development which has taken place in respect of the various materials of war has rendered necessary very considerable expenditure upon those articles—either produced by the manufacturing departments or produced by contract—and that foreign nations as well as ours are spending very much larger sums of money than was formerly the case upon munitions and materials of war. Passing from that subject, I will make a few observations on what has fallen from hon. and gallant Gentlemen opposite. I was very glad to hear the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) say that he 265 does not desire now, and that, in fact, he never did desire, to attack the system of short service; all that he did was to criticize the kind of short service, and I gathered from his remarks that he, to an extent, approved of some of the modifications which have been introduced into the short-service system. Now, Sir, I am extremely glad to hear that the hon. and gallant Baronet accepts the principle of short service; and I think we must all believe now that it is impossible for us to go back to anything like long service. Remarks have been made with regard to the difficulty of recruiting and to the alleged unpopularity of the Service. But the fact is that the idea with regard to the unpopularity of the Service is erroneous, for we obtain every year recruits in much larger numbers, the number this year being greatly in excess of that raised before. Therefore, under these circumstances, it is impossible to say either that the recruiting is a failure or that the Service is unpopular; on the contrary, I say that the Service is much more popular than it ever was within our recollection. While I concede that all our efforts ought to tend to perfecting the working of the short-service system, I am not, and I think I have not shown myself to be, blindly prejudiced in favour of that which must be, to a certain extent, considered an experimental system, and that I am willing to introduce certain changes into that system, and into our present organization when necessary, which might adapt it more to our home wants and to the wants of our Indian and Colonial Service. The hon. and gallant Baronet referred to a statement made by the hon. Member for Leitrim (Mr. Tottenham) as to the condition of certain battalions, and especially of certain battalions in the First Army Corps, or in the First Line, as he described it, of our Army. I do not propose to follow the statements of either of those hon. Gentlemen in detail; they were, however, to the effect that a large number of the men who composed the battalions of what ought to be the First Army Corps were men of short service; that in some cases they were men of somewhat less height and size than those who had hitherto been enlisted; and, in fact, it might be said with truth that the First Army Corps did not consist of battalions so 266 hardened and so entirely composed of fully-trained soldiers as was my Predecessor's intention when he laid down the constitution of the First Army Corps. On the last occasion of our discussing the subject, I admitted that fact, which was explained by the statement I made in moving the Army Estimates in March last. I said on that occasion—
Last year the occupation of Egypt was considered to be a temporary and provisional one, and the battalions there were considered as still forming part of the First Army Corps, and no special measures were taken to replace them. Now, however, that the necessity for the occupation of Egypt appears likely to be somewhat prolonged, it is proposed to place the battalions in Egypt on the ordinary Colonial Establishment of 800 strong, and to raise a corresponding number of battalions at home to take their place in the First Army Corps. The total increase that will be necessary for these purposes is 2,400 men."—(3 Hansard, [286] 113.)Well, Sir, I admitted that in all probability the force in Egypt would have to remain there longer than was at first contemplated, and that the force in Egypt, consisting to a great extent of battalions which constituted what the hon. Member for Leitrim called the First Line, was not as it ought to be; but what I claim is, that we are taking measures for placing the First Line, or First Army Corps, in the condition in which it ought to be. Of course, it is impossible to make those measures come into effect instantaneously; it can only be by a gradual process that the battalions composing the First Army Corps can attain to the numbers, or that the men of those battalions should have the length of service or the physique which it is desirable that they should possess. What we are doing is to take such steps as are essential for increasing the reserve of those battalions in order to bring about that result as rapidly as possible. The hon. and gallant Gentlemen, as I understand him, says he is generally satisfied with the state of our Army in India and in the Colonies, but that the great subject of complaint was the condition of our Army at home. Well, Sir, a great deal has been accomplished when we are in a position to admit that our Home Force is capable of supplying garrisons for India and for our Colonial stations, which are admitted to be in an efficient and creditable state. And now as to the numbers of the Army at home. The hon. and 267 gallant Gentleman, as I understand, expressed some doubt as to whether it was possible for us to place 10,000 men in the field. Without following the hon. and gallant Gentleman into that calculation, here are the numbers of the Army at home on April 1, 1884–84,957 effectives, non-commissioned officers and men, or very slightly below the full number, the Establishment being 86,752. In addition to that number of men at home, there were in the First Class Army Reserve 37,493 men; in the Militia Reserve there were 28,482 men; and the Militia, having been subsequently called out for training, I believe the Militia Reserve reached its full quota of 30,000. Then in the Second Class Army Reserve there were, at the date referred to, 8,065 men. Besides these Regular Forces, there is the Militia, which, excluding the Militia Reserve, numbered 82,525, and there were 209,365 Volunteers, and 11,441 Yeomanry. Well, Sir, the figures which I have just stated show that you have a Reserve available for foreign service of 65,975 men, and that the Second Class Army Reserve, together with the Militia and Volunteers, gives you a force for home defence of 311,000, even nut counting such Regular troops with the Colours as would be left behind in England in the event of its being necessary to send an Army into the field abroad. What, then, is the condition of this Army at home? I understand the hon. and gallant Gentleman to say that it consists of men who are so young, so small, or so weakly, that they are not really efficient. Well, Sir, I have acknowledged on previous occasions that a large proportion of that Army must largely consist of recruits, and it is both possible and very probable that by taking a particular battalion or battalions selected for the purpose of examination you may find some battalions to be in a condition of extreme inefficiency; but I do not think that the Committee ought to judge of the state of the Army either at home or abroad by instances taken in that way. They should take the figures relating to the Army as a whole. I have stated just now what were the actual numbers a few weeks ago of the Army serving at home, and I have here a statement of the proportion of service of the men in the Army at home on the 1st of January last. At that date, taking all arms, there were 293 men per 1,000 under 268 one year's service, and 524 per 1,000 over three year's service, or more than half the total number at home; or, taking Infantry only, there were 361 per 1,000 under one year's service, and 457, or nearly half, who had over three years' service. Next as to age. There were 797 per 1,000 men in the Army at home of over 20 years of age; and as to height, taking all arms, there were 737 men per 1,000 above 5 feet 6 inches, and only 124 under 5 feet 5 inches, while, taking the Infantry alone, 673 men per 1,000 were over 5 feet 6 inches, and but 150 below 5 feet 5 inches in height. I will now state the figures with regard to chest measurement. I find that at the date mentioned for all arms there were 747 per 1,000 of over 35 inches, and only 92 per 1,000 of under 34 inches; or, taking Infantry alone, there were 686 per 1,000 of over 35 inches and 126 per 1,000 men under 34 inches. These are the particulars as to the length of service and physique of the Army at home. I do not pretend that they are absolutely satisfactory; but I say that they do not warrant that amount of condemnation which the hon. and gallant Gentleman has passed upon the men who go into the Line. Then the hon. and gallant Member said that the small or weak battalions would have to be supplemented from the Reserve. Well, Sir, that is admitted, and every hon. Member who has spoken on the subject has admitted that fact. But the hon. and gallant Gentleman went further, and said we should have nothing to fall back upon in time of war. Now, I think that this is not a true statement of the case. We should have to fall back on the Reserve to make up our Home battalions; but can the hon. and gallant Member point out to me a single country, however great is its Military Reserve, which can place its battalions in the field for all purposes without calling on the Reserve? Why, Sir, it is the very essence of the Reserve that it should be used in time of war to fill up the battalions to war strength. The hon. and gallant Gentleman seems to me not to understand the intention of the Reserve as it exists and as it was stated to be. It is avowedly for the purpose of filling up battalions for all purposes, and not merely as a Reserve to fall back upon in time of war. We have other Reserves to fall back upon if, unfortunately, at any 269 time we should be called upon to go to war—namely, the remainder of the Reserve and the whole of the Militia. With reference to the question of free rations raised in an article of The Times of this morning, and which has been often mooted, it is a question which touches on the larger question of the soldiers' pay. There can be no doubt that the soldiers' pay has been largely increased of late years, and it may be necessary in the course of time that there should be a further increase. It might be that the most desirable way of improving the position of the soldier would be to give him free rations; that, however, is a question which is not one for present decision. But what the Committee must understand is that it is simply a question of the pay of the soldier, or whether it is necessary to add to the advantages which he at present possesses. The hon. and gallant Member for South Hants (Sir Frederick Fitz-Wygram), whose contribution to the discussions on military subjects I am sure will always be welcomed in this House, spoke to this effect—that if, as a matter of fact, the Army is more popular than it has ever been before, it is no reason why we should not as far as possible endeavour to remove anything which interferes with its popularity, or why we should not do everything in our power to increase its popularity, and in that I entirely agree with him. I listened with interest to the observations which the hon. and gallant Member made as to the position of a man who found himself, on passing to the Reserve from the Line, unable to obtain profitable employment, and to the suggestion of industrial occupation by which the position of the soldier in that respect might be improved. Certainly, I think that, looking at the matter from the point of view of the Estimates, no impediment could be found to the adoption of such a proposal; on the contrary, looking at it from a financial point of view, it might be of considerable advantage. I believe my hon. Friend (Sir Arthur Hayter) will be able to state to the Committee that the Estimates for the Army are, to a certain extent, increased by the necessity of employing a greater number of civilians than would be the case if it were possible to obtain military labour. But that is a question which must be settled for the most part by the Military Authorities, 270 who are best acquainted with the time which must necessarily be devoted to the military instruction and education of the soldier. I can hardly follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman into the details of the Cavalry organization which he gave us. I can only say that his suggestion in relation to that branch of the Service is worthy of consideration, although I am unable to hold out any hope that the considerable increase in the numbers of the Cavalry which he indicated could be made. I am somewhat surprised at what fell from the hon. and gallant Gentleman with regard to the comparative uselessness of the Cavalry Reserve, because I should have thought a man at the age of 30 or 40, who had been once in training, and had mastered the Cavalry drill, would be able speedily to come back to it after one or two years, and make a very efficient addition to a Cavalry regiment. With regard to the numbers of the Army, I may supplement the statement which I made a few months ago by a statement of what has taken place since that time. Since the beginning of the present year there has been a small but still a substantial increase in the strength of the Army. Owing to the present arrangements for the Militia the number of recruits who come to the Line from the Militia is very considerable during the winter months, the number being comparatively small at the time the Militia are called out for training; the six months which have now passed are not, therefore, the best for recruiting purposes. But although the increase in the strength of the Army this year is not a very large one, still I think it satisfactory as compared with the increase during the corresponding period of last year. During the six months of last year, instead of the small gain I have mentioned, there was an actual loss. As a matter of fact, we are, on 1st July, about 3,000 men in excess of the number at this time last year. No doubt the establishment is deficient still by about 9,000 men; but, as I have endeavoured on many occasions to explain, that is owing to the regulations sanctioned by Parliament not permitting the deficiencies in the Indian Service being balanced by recruiting in excess of the establishment voted by Parliament; and, therefore, when the deficiency occurs that deficiency 271 is temporarily transferred to the Home Army from which the Indian deficiency has to be supplied. The same observation applies to some corps in the Home Army; and, therefore, there will always be a deficiency in the effective as compared with the establishment. No doubt there is a want of elasticity in the present system, and it was to remedy that want of elasticity that I have proposed an increase of the establishment of the Infantry and the Reserve, although I said in proposing it that I did not anticipate that we should at any time recruit completely up to the increased establishment. The deficiency in the numbers of the Army is frequently spoken of as a serious danger. Now, I venture to think that it is not a serious danger. A serious inconvenience no doubt it is, because there is a difficulty in supplying the wants of India, and in keeping up the garrisons of the Colonies; but as to its being a serious danger I do not think, now that we have the Reserve, that it constitutes a danger anything like that which used to exist when the Army was not up to its establishment. In case of danger or emergency it cannot be too often borne in mind or repeated that we have the Reserve to fall back upon from which our ranks might be filled and more than filled. But not only so. Without calling on the Reserve at all, if serious danger threatened the country, or if it appeared necessary rapidly to increase the strength of the Army, the stoppage by Proclamation of the outflow of Infantry into the Reserve from the Colours would in a few months bring up the Army to its full strength. That outflow goes on at the rate of about 200 per week. At all events, whether there is, as some hon. Members think, a serious danger to the country, or simply, as I have said, an inconvenience of a temporary character, it is one which it is always in the power of Parliament to meet and overcome. No radical defect has been proved to exist in our present military organization. The system of short service has been proved to be popular; and if it be necessary to have a larger efficient force to put in the First Line, that can at any time be secured by somewhat increasing the Establishment voted by Parliament, and by increasing the pecuniary advantages of the soldier. It is a mere question of money; and, although I consider 272 it extremely undesirable to alarm the country by asking for a large increase in the Military Estimates at the present moment, it seems to me that it ought to be a source of satisfaction to us, and give us a sense of security, that at any moment it is possible to increase our military resources to any extent required by the simple process of spending more money upon them. I am not saying that at some future time an increase may not be necessary; but, until we have thoroughly discovered and tested the working of the present system of organization, and the minimum Establishment necessary in order to keep it in working gear, I think it would be imprudent to ask Parliament to vote more money and men than are absolutely required for the safety and security of the country.
COLONEL STANLEYsaid, he had only a few remarks to offer in reply to the statement of the noble Marquess. So far as he understood, the noble Marquess seemed to be very well satisfied with the state of affairs; although he very frankly owned that, in respect of the quality and number of men, there were deficiencies which he would be glad to see remedied, still he looked, on the whole, with satisfaction on the result of the present year's recruiting. He was bound to say, however, that the net result, so far as he could gather from the figures given by the noble Marquess, oven supposing the recruiting to continue to be as successful as it was now, and making allowance for the percentages stated by the noble Marquess, would be that there would exist a deficiency on the full establishment at the end of the year, after all the efforts made, and upon the conditions to which the noble Marquess had referred. That, he hoped, was not a position which would lead the noble Marquess or the War Department into a state of optimism as regarded the future; because it must be borne in mind that good recruiting—although he did not say that was to be regarded from a pessimist point of view — had undoubtedly arisen concurrently with a period of great agricultural and commercial depression, during which periods they knew that men were induced to enlist more freely. Although, of course, the improvement in recruiting was not entirely due to that circumstance, it had, he thought, undoubtedly tended 273 very largely to swell the number of recruits. There was another point on which he thought the noble Marquess had been somewhat led away by the figures before him. The noble Marquess spoke of the question as being simply one of getting recruits into the Service. But there was something to be considered of much more importance than that — namely, the waste which arose from various causes after the men were got into the Service. It was plain that no permanent improvement could take place while the waste occasioned by men leaving the Service a short time after enlistment corresponded with or exceeded the gain by enlistment. He did not speak from exact figures, or even from personal knowledge; but he was led to believe, from information which reached him from many quarters, that the noble Marquess would have no difficulty in ascertaining that there were an abnormal number of vacancies caused by desertion, and by men taking their discharge. If that were correct, it probably pointed to causes tending to create dissatisfaction with the Service; and if such existed, the abnormal waste resulting therefrom would affect the well-being of the Service even more than the inducements which might be held out to recruits in the first instance. There was another point in the noble Marquess's statement against which, if he had rightly understood the noble Marquess, he desired to enter his protest, and that was in relation to the system of Reserve. The noble Marquess would correct him if in error; but he understood him to say that the system of Reserve was mainly established with the view of bringing up the Forces to war strength. Now, he should be very loth to admit that such was by any means the primary object of the Reserve. Primary, in a certain sense, it was doubtless to bring up the forces to full strength for field service; but there was, in his opinion, a more important function which the Reserve fulfilled—namely, that of supplying gaps in the ranks caused by vacancies and casualties. So far as he understood it, the Reserve system arose out of the condition of affairs during the Crimean War, when the difficulty felt was not that of filling up battalions to their full strength, but of keeping up the strength of battalions after they had for some time been exposed to those circumstances 274 which produced casualties in the field. It was quite true that some alteration might be necessary in deference to the tendency of modern warfare to be short and sharp; but he should not like it to go forth uncontradicted that the Secretary of State for War was entirely satisfied with having a body of Reserves which might not be sufficient to fill up the number of men required in the field. He was not going to enter farther into the question of the Reserve, and would simply add that he saw no reason to change the opinions upon the subject which he had formed and frequently expressed. He thought, in the speech of his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Hants (Sir Frederick Fitz-Wygram) to whom he was sure both sides of the House had listened with great pleasure, and whose voice it was to be hoped would be frequently heard in their debates, there were points which evidenced careful thought in respect of the matters under consideration. His hon. and gallant Friend, in making his suggestions, spoke, of course, with a knowledge of the subject which no one could gainsay; but whether, as a matter of practice, it would be found easy to adopt the suggested reforms connected with civilian labour in the Army Service was a question upon which, at that moment, he (Colonel Stanley) would hardly like to pronounce an opinion. If men were so employed they would be withdrawn from military duty, and that, again, would cause increased duty to be thrown on their comrades, who were not so employed. There were many questions as to working pay, which were not quite so easily disposed of as, at first sight, hon. Members might be inclined to imagine. His hon. and gallant Friend, however, spoke after so much practical experience on these points that one was bound to suppose that he had considered all the ins and outs of the matter and found a satisfactory solution of his own problem; and he (Colonel Stanley) hoped the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) would not lightly put aside the matters which were raised in the speech of his hon. and gallant Friend. He (Colonel Stanley)hoped that after the two admissions made by the noble Marquess—one actually made, and the other made by implication—the one being that, although the recruits were large in number, many of them were not quite of such a 275 stamp as might be desired, and the other, made, as he had said, by implication, being that after all the efforts made the Army would still be considerably below its proper strength at the end of the year — the War Department would not relax their efforts to make the Service as elastic, and as pleasant to the recruit, as possible. He hoped, also, that if the War Authorities found that after all their exertions there was still a greater drain upon the Army than the best means of recruiting could meet, they would not feel it inconsistent with their duty to come forward and ask the House to assent to further proposals.
SIR HENRY FLETCHERsaid, he would not detain the Committee more than one or two minutes; but he desired to congratulate the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) and the War Office authorities upon the large number of recruits they had got this year to enter the Army. It must, however, be remembered that the increased recruiting this year was owing in great measure to the depression of trade, which he regretted to say existed throughout the country. He could not agree that the increased number of recruits had been obtained because the Service had become much more popular than it was in former years. A test of the popularity of the Army was the number of re-engagements at the end of the first period of service. He believed that, as a matter of fact, men were very loth to re-engage after their first period of service. He feared that the regiments, under the new system, did not form as happy homes as they used to do. Soldiers did not like to be shifted from one battalion to another; they could not settle down, make friends, and keep them, as they could formerly. With regard to the Reserves, there were now, on paper, a very largo number; and he hoped that, in the event of the country having to engage in any military campaign, the authorities would use their best endeavours that the men of the Reserve should be sent to their old regiments, and not to any regiment that might come up first. It was, no doubt, a great pleasure to a Reserve man to go back to his old regiment, and it was a great pleasure for his officers to receive him; but when a Reserve man was sent to a regiment of which he might know nothing, and to a regiment the officers of which might know nothing 276 of him—it was very detrimental to the interests of the Service. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War alluded to the fact that foreign countries had Reserves to fall back upon in the event of war breaking out; but he (Sir Henry Fletcher) believed he was correct in saying that, generally speaking, the Reserves in the Foreign Armies were as far as possible sent to the regiments in which they had first served. He was reminded by his hon. and gallant Friend (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) that they were invariably sent to their old regiments. He hoped that in respect to Reserves they would in future copy the system of the Foreign Armies. With the system now adopted in this country the Reserve men were very dissatisfied. He was afraid that the War Office authorities did not hear all the complaints which the Reserve men made; but it was positively painful to him, living as he did in the country, to see Army Reserve men wandering about in want of employment, owing to the system which had hitherto been adopted in regard to them. There was one other question which was brought forward by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) — namely, that of rations in the Army, upon which he (Sir Henry Fletcher) had a few words to say. He thought the noble Marquess had given them some slight hope that the question of rations should be thoroughly looked into. He impressed upon the noble Marquess, as he did last year, that it was most desirable that the soldier should have a good breakfast ration. The young growing lads in the Army had nothing now for breakfast but dry bread and a cup of tea. It was too much to call upon them to do several hours drill on a comparatively empty stomach; indeed, it was detrimental to their own health, and to the interests of the Service generally. When the lads came in from the morning's drill they were thoroughly exhausted, and the first thing they were apt to do was to rush to the canteen and drink beer or porter, which in many cases was a very undesirable practice. He earnestly hoped that the question of the breakfast ration would be most seriously considered. It might be argued by the authorities of the War Office that an improved breakfast ration would cost a larger sum than they could recommend 277 the Committee to vote. He had no doubt it would cost £200,000 a-year; but he thought the money would be well spent, because a good breakfast would be a means of enabling the young soldiers to perform the work required of them.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he would like to have one question cleared up by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington). He understood the noble Marquess to say that the Reserves were used to fill up the gaps in the Army. They all knew that 18,800 men were sent out to Egypt from this country, but that that number could not have been sent out unless a certain portion of the Reserves had been called out. As a matter of fact, about 4,500 of the 18,800 men belonged to the Reserve. Other Reserve men, however, were called out for the purpose of filling up the regiments remaining at home. The noble Marquess had said nothing which conveyed to him (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) the idea that unless the Reserves were called out there were sufficient fighting men to send out to engage in any small war that might occur. It was quite true there were men out in Egypt at the present moment; but if the noble Marquess were required to send out to Egypt another 10,000, could he send them out without calling out some of the Reserves? His (Sir Walter B. Barttelot's) belief was that the noble Marquess could not; and, therefore, they were in the position he had already stated—namely, that their first fighting line could only be made up by calling out the Reserves. He maintained that if on the occasion of every petty war they were obliged to send out some of their Reserves, the usefulness of the Reserve Force would be greatly impaired, because the intention with which the Force was created was that it should fill up the gaps which occurred in time of war. The noble Marquess also stated that they had 67,000 Infantry, or some such number, but that that number included 24 battalions in the Colonies.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he did not specify the Infantry; but he said there were at home 84,957 men of all arms.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he based the whole of his statement upon the Infantry of the Line, and he did not take any account of the Artillery 278 or the Cavalry. The noble Marquess in his first speech said that, after making the necessary deductions for recruits, there were only 26,000 men whom they could possibly put into line, and they were employed in Ireland and elsewhere. If he was wrong with regard to the Reserve he should be glad to be corrected by the noble Marquess. He repeated that nothing the noble Marquess had said had shaken his (Sir Walter B. Barttelot's) statement, that they could not send an Army out of this country without calling out the Reserves. Ten thousand was the smallest number that could be sent out; if 20,000 were sent out they would have to call out a large number of Reserves.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he was not quite sure what the question was that was addressed to him by the hon. and gallant Member (Sir Walter B. Barttelot); but he was aware that when the Reserve Force was established it was intended that there should always be a certain number of Reserve men capable of being sent out with the First Army Corps if need be. As he explained in moving the Estimates last year, it was not possible to send out the Egyptian Expedition without employing some Reserve men. He had already said measures were being taken to replace regiments which were in the First Line. The situation had been modified by the battalions which were now in Egypt having been, up to the present year, considered as forming part of the First Army Corps. The number of Reserve men who took part in the Egyptian Campaign was only 1,600 Infantry, although a larger number was utilized for the purpose of filling up vacancies in other regiments.
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, he had only one word to say in reply to his hon. Friend (Sir Henry Fletcher) respecting rations. As the hon. Gentleman knew, the soldier received a full ration, without payment, when on active service. As to the rations at home, bread and meat were supplied by contract; but it was found that groceries were more easily supplied by the sergeants of companies from the local tradesmen.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (2.) £438,800, Commissariat, Transport, and Ordnance Store Establishments.
279§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he would like to ask the noble Marquess what steps he had taken to put the First Army Corps in a thoroughly efficient state with regard to Commissariat and Transport and the Medical Service. The noble Marquess had said that every care would be taken that the First Army Corps should be efficient in all its appliances for war; but perhaps he would say in what state it actually was. This was one of those questions which had very properly excited the public mind. The people would very much like to know what was being done. When one went down to Aldershot and saw the long line of buildings there almost tenantless, one was inclined to think that hardly anything had been done to put the Commissariat and the Transport Corps on a proper footing. He would not now go into details, because a Committee was inquiring into the Commissariat and Transport Services in the Egyptian Campaign.
§ MR. BRANDsaid, his hon. and gallant Friend asked him whether there was at present a Transport Service sufficient for an Army in case of active operations.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, that what he really wanted to know was whether the authorities could put an Army Corps into the field complete in every particular?
§ MR. BRANDsaid, his reply was that they could do so. There were certain details with respect to Commissariat and Transport generally, which remained to be settled; and a Departmental Committee had been appointed to consider some points of detail which were raised by the Adjutant General in regard to the Egyptian Expedition. The proceedings of that Committee had, however, been suspended, owing to the appointment of a Committee of that House to consider the Commissariat and Transport arrangements during the Egyptian War. As soon as the proceedings of the Committee of the House were closed, no doubt the question would again be considered by the authorities of the War Office.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTasked where the Transport for the First Army Corps was?
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTinquired whether the Transport had ever 280 been called out and tested at Aldershot or elsewhere; and whether there was, in reality, an efficient Transport Corps?
§ MR. BRANDsaid, the hon. and gallant Gentleman had asked a question which he (Mr. Brand) had answered. It was the fact that one Army Corps, fitted with every appliance, could be put into the field.
SIR FREDERICK FITZ-WYGRAMsaid, he was a member of the Departmental Committee to which the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Brand) had referred; and he was under the impression that the result of their inquiries was that the Commissariat and Transport Services did not possess half the requisite number of horses or men.
§ MR. BRANDsaid, he merely contended that there was transport material for more than one Army Corps. He did not mean to say there were horses sufficient. As to men, there was a considerable number of Reserves who could be obtained in case of war for service in the Transport. What he had said all along, and what was perfectly true, was that there was transport material sufficient for one Army Corps. He maintained that horses and men could be obtained within a short time.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILasked if nothing was being done at Aldershot for the education of the men of the Transport? He did not wish to press the matter unduly; but it must be remembered that a good deal had been said lately about the inefficiency of the Commissariat and Transport Departments. The matter was more or less sub judice; but he was certain the Committee would be glad to think that some good would spring from the inquiry which was proceeding. It had been hinted that the inquiry would not proceed to as great a length as was at first supposed. How that might be he did not know; but he thought it was important to satisfy the public that all was being done to make the Commissariat thoroughly efficient in case of its being required to enter the field.
§ MR. BRANDsaid, that a School of Instruction had been established at Aldershot for the Commissariat Service; and only three days ago the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War authorized the issue of full equipment for the instruction of the men in their duties.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORsaid, that in this Vote there was an item of £1,600 for taking a remain at Woolwich. He would like to ask the hon. Gentleman the Surveyor General of the Ordnance (Mr. Brand) if he could inform the Committee what was the scope of the duties undertaken by the gentlemen who were taking the remain—whether the remain would include all the stores which were now lying at Woolwich, or whether it was merely a remain of the stores taken over from the manufacturing departments during the last financial year, or during any limited period?
§ MR. BRANDsaid, he was much obliged to the hon. Gentleman for mentioning this subject; and in answer to him he would like to say a few words in respect to the whole question of the remain. The remain was a serious undertaking; but he was convinced it was a wise one. Stock was being taken of everything in the Arsenal; and so far the results had, on the whole, been satisfactory. Certain errors in the system of keeping accounts had been discovered, and it was hoped that in the future these would be remedied. He must say, in justice to the storekeepers, that, considering there had been no remain taken for nearby 25 years, and considering the enormous number of dealings at Woolwich recently, they had done their duty admirably — indeed, it was surprising that so few errors in the accounts had been disclosed. To keep an account of stock was a work of great labour; and he doubted whether it would be possible to get anybody to keep it if, at the same time, officers of the Department were to be held personally accountable for the stores. In campaigns there must necessarily be a loss of stores; there was a great loss in transferring stores from one regiment to another. It was only by the experience of skilled officers that they were able to judge of what stores ought to be written off charge, or what stores ought to be charged against regiments. Then, again, there would be great difficulty in ascertaining the value of the stores in the Arsenal. How were they to be valued? There might be a gun in stock which was somewhat out of date; yet that gun would have to be valued at the same value as a new weapon. They would have to deal again with the value of stores returned from 282 the Navy. He should say that, on the whole, it was wise to leave the matter alone, and rest satisfied with the better system of account of stores which he hoped would result from the remain now being taken.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORsaid, the hon. Gentleman would, perhaps, allow him to express the personal satisfaction with which he had heard the answer just given. Many of the demands which had been made by the Treasury in respect to the audit of stores were, if not unreasonable, at any rate not practicable. It was perfectly clear that in any campaign the loss and the use of stores must be very great and rapid, and that there could be no proper, effective, and detailed audit of stores made. Neither did he think that the claim which had been made as to the annual valuation of all stores on land was a reasonable one, because there was no practical value to be obtained by it. The amount of labour involved would be something enormous. What he thought the country, and the Committee especially, ought and might reasonably insist upon was that a large Department like the War Office should, at any rate, know what were the stores it had in its possession. They were aware—indeed, they had just heard from the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Brand) — that the War Department did not know, and had not known for 25 years, what stores it was actually possessed of. That an enormous quantity of stores—stores amounting in value to many millions of money—were lying, and had been lying for many years, at Woolwich, was admitted; but the War Department now proposed to take a complete remain of all its stores, so as to be able to start clear with a balance. When once that balance was established, the Committee would be able to obtain annual statements of the taking on charge and of the discharge of stores which would enable them to know, at any moment, exactly how they stood in regard to stores. It appeared to him that the Committee would be well satisfied if that end was secured; and he, for one, would not press the Government to do anything more. The Auditor and Comptroller General, in successive years, had insisted, somewhat strongly, upon having a complete system of audit in regard to the stores. He (Mr. Arthur O'Connor) 283 was not prepared to go so far with him; but he thought they ought to have a full statement of the actual stores in hand at any given moment. He hoped they would follow the system which had been begun at Woolwich, at all the different out-stations, until they found themselves in a position at last to give complete accounts of all the stores of every kind in the possession of the Government.
§ MR. RYLANDSpointed out that the first Vote in Class III. related also to the Commissariat Department. He ventured to say to the noble Marquess, in answer to the appeal which had been made to him (Mr. Rylands), that in this Department the expenditure had gone on increasing to an enormous extent. The Committee were in a somewhat unfortunate position with regard to this Vote, because there was a Committee of Inquiry in regard to the Commissariat Department sitting at the present time; and hon. Members who did not happen to be upon the Committee were hardly able to form an opinion as to what they were doing, and would have to wait until all the facts were before them, in the Report of the Committee, before they could express any strong views. He could only say from the facts which had been brought under the notice of the House of Commons in former years in reference to the administration of these Departments that he should not be surprised to find that the Committee would be able to prove that a very wasteful expenditure had been incurred which might have been prevented. With regard to the remarks of the hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. A. O'Connor), he (Mr. Rylands), as a Member of the Public Accounts Committee, entirely supported the view which the hon. Member had expressed. The provision of a large stock of stores, unless it was managed in a business-like system, and they were able to ascertain from time to time what stores they had in stock, must inevitably lead to a large unnecessary expenditure of the public money, and, very probably, many of the stores were wasted. His hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Brand) said that was impossible; but he (Mr. Rylands) was by no means certain that it was impossible. His hon. Friend stated that for 25 years nothing wrong had been found; but now they knew that 284 there was to be stock-keeping and stock-taking, no doubt the Department would obtain a good deal of information as to the general movement of stock, and as to what was in their possession. From time to time there ought to be stock-taking, so that the authorities might really know what they had in their possession.
§ MR. BRANDsaid, that was intended to be done in future years. It was arranged that there should be stock-taking each year.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked if the hon. Member thought the sum of £16,000 charged in the Vote would be sufficient to defray all the expenses?
§ MR. BRANDsaid, it was rather difficult to answer that question. He could not commit himself exactly to any figure; but he thought it was very possible they would not spend more than the sum of £16,000, which had been mentioned.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked how many men were employed?
§ MR. BRANDreplied that at one time there were 22 gentlemen employed regularly, in addition to a number of assistants. The total number was then reduced to 10, and it had now been reduced to eight. He believed that before the end of next month it would be still further reduced.
§ MR. WARTONsaid, he did not quite understand Vote 9. He found at page 4 a statement as to the Commissary Generals and other officials, and, referring to the amount expended, he found it was considerably in excess of the same amount last year. It amounted to £438,000, and showed an increase of £3,370 over last year. At the foot of the Vote there was a note, which stated that the total emoluments of these officers serving at home and abroad were shown in Appendix No. 10. Turning to Appendix No. 10, at page 169, he found that the figures there given did not in any way correspond with the sums which were given on page 42. He quite understood that they were given as an abstract; but he did not find that they at all corresponded with the figures in the Vote.
§ MR. WARTONPage 169.
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERrequested the hon. and learned Member to look on page 167.
§ MR. WARTONsaid, he had done so, and he did not find any figure there that agreed with the figures at page 2.
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, the Table he referred to was that which gave details of the distribution and charge of the Commissariat and Transport Department for the year ending the 31st day of March, 1885.
§ MR BRANDasked the hon. and learned Member to take the first figure. He would find that there was one Commissary General at the headquarters of the War Office, and another in Ireland; and the pay of a Commissary General was provided for in Vote 16?
§ MR. WARTONsaid, the charge on page 42 for Commissary Generals, &c., was £34,748, and he did not find any corresponding figures on page 167. It was perfectly true that there was a total of £55,404 given for the whole; but it did not appear to correspond in any way with the figures given before. He wanted to know why they should have this sum of £34,748 without any corresponding figures to make up the same amount?
§ MR. BRANDsaid, that if the hon. and learned Gentleman would make an addition for himself, he would no doubt find the amount correct. If he looked at the Vote he would see Commissary Generals, Deputy Commissary Generals, Assistant Commissary Generals, Deputy Assistant Commissary Generals, Quartermasters, &c., within a bracket, and the total salaries amounted to £34,748.
§ MR. WARTONsaid, he saw at once that it was quite possible to give the same figure on both pages. All he said was, that if they had a figure of £34,748 which was intended to be explained on another page, they ought to be able to find a recapitulation of similar items with the same total of £34,748. He did not say that the figure was inaccurate, or a single £1 wrong; but he contended that when what pretended to be an abstract was given on one page and an explanation of that abstract on another, the figures ought to correspond, in order to show how £34,000 on one page tallied with the sum of £34,000 on another. He had no doubt it was possible to add up 500 figures on one page and make them correspond with the total on another; but the Committee ought to know how each one of the sums was made out.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he thought he could satisfy the hon. and learned Gentleman. If he would refer first to Vote 9, page 42, he would see an Estimate for the pay of the Commissariat and Transport Staff, which amounted, in the present year, to £81,199. The pay of Commissary Generals, Deputy Commissary Generals, Assistant Commissary Generals, Quartermasters, &c., was given, and at the bottom of the first line at the foot of the page he would find the figures £81,199. If he would then turn to the Appendix at pages 167 and 168, and look at the recapitulation on page 168, he would find the details there given, which amounted to the same figure of £81,199.
§ MR. WARTONsaid, the noble Marquess was quite right.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he wished to ask a question in regard to this Vote. He was very much obliged to his hon. Friend (Mr. Brand) for what he had said; and he presumed that when the different stores had been enumerated, and it was known exactly what they were, the House of Commons would have an opportunity of seeing what there was in store, and of knowing, year by year, whether the stock was kept up to the present mark, or whether it was allowed to decrease. He thought that was a very important question.
SIR FREDERICK FITZ-WYGRAMsaid, he entertained a very high opinion of what he had seen in connection with the Commissariat officers. At the same time, he thought they were not altogether fairly treated, because there was no school in which they could be taught their duty; such, for instance, as that of ascertaining whether the bread, meat, forage, and various other articles supplied were good. He had talked to a good many of the Commissariat officers and the Commissary Generals, and he had been told that there was nothing they regretted more than the absence of such a school, in which an officer could be taught to know what articles were good and what were bad. There was a test which could be applied to almost every article; and fraud could be committed in regard to almost everything supplied. For instance, in regard to beef, it was not very difficult to know 287 cow beef from ox beef; and forage was very much in the same condition; but for want of instruction very officers possessed the necessary knowledge. Some years ago, the Secretary of State for War set up a school for veterinary surgeons; and the veterinary surgeons of the Army derived a great amount of knowledge in enabling them to test what articles were good and what bad. He felt confident that nothing would tend more to the efficiency of the Commissariat Service than a school in which every Commissariat officer could be taught these things. It would not be a very expensive matter. It would only be necessary to keep a collection of articles; and a Commissariat officer, when he joined the Service, could be sent down to learn all that could be learnt with regard to the good and bad stores, and the possible frauds that might be committed in the issue of stores.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (3.) £3,058,000, Provisions, Forage, &c.
§ (4.) £782,500, Clothing Establishment, Services, and Supplies.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he did not see the Secretary of State for War in his place; but he should like to know if anything had been done in regard to a change of uniform. He ventured to express a hope that the question had dropped out of sight, because the more he heard of it the less, he thought, the country would be inclined to see the old and popular uniform of the Army changed. It might be desirable, in certain climates, and under certain conditions, to wear some other uniform; but he was satisfied that, all things considered, the red uniform of the British Army—that fighting uniform that was known all the world over—was far better to be seen and to be dealt with in the field, and that it would only introduce unnecessary complications to alter the colour. He trusted the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War would be able to give the Committee an assurance that there would be no change from the red uniform. He believed that very great difficulties would ensue if such a change were made.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, that before his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance answered the 288 question of the hon. and gallant Baronet he wished to express his regret that his right hon. Friend the Member for North Hampshire (Mr. Sclater-Booth) was not present, as his right hon. Friend had been particularly anxious to ask a few questions in regard to the proceeds of the sale of clothing, in which his constituency at Aldershot was very much interested. His (Lord Eustace Cecil's) interest did not extend in that direction, but was rather of an opposite and different character. He was, nevertheless, anxious to know how the sales of clothing had resulted, and what advantage had been given to the troops. He had heard a certain amount of grumbling on the part of the soldiers, who alleged that they had been deprived of what was called their perquisites. They said it was the Government, and not themselves, who had gained by the transaction; but they all knew, at least those who preceded the noble Marquess and the hon. Gentleman in the Offices they now held, that the subject had been much inquired into some time ago, although it was not exactly carried out at the time. He rather thought that the right hon. Gentleman the present Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Childers), when Secretary of State for War, carried out the present plan in its entirety; and, at the time it was carried out, it was supposed that it would be of advantage, not only to the Government, but to the soldier himself. It would be as well that the Committee should have some light thrown upon the working of the system, because it had now been for two or three years in existence. They saw, by a comparison, that there had been a decrease in this Vote, which arose, he was inclined to think, in consequence of the sale of old clothing; and that decrease would, of course, make it appear that the Government had been benefited, while the private soldier might probably have suffered proportionately. He would be very sorry that that idea should get out, because in these days they heard so many grievances and so much grumbling that it was not necessary to add another cause of complaint. The attention of the Committee had already been called to an article in The Times of that morning, two columns in length, devoted to the grievances of the soldiers. If a private soldier failed to 289 discover any grievance there were plenty of people to give him the notion that he was being put upon, and that he did not obtain his rights. He thought it was desirable, therefore, that this mysterious affair should be explained, and that it should be made known to the Committee that the present system in regard to the sale of clothing was really of advantage to the private soldier, as well as of advantage to the general public. He did not know that he had anything further to comment upon in reference to this Vote. It showed a decrease, and therefore he did not think it came under the category of those Votes which his hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) thought it right to call in question. He had not stopped the hon. Gentleman just now in the conversation which had occurred upon the Commissariat Vote; but, of course, the hon. Gentleman was fully aware that in regard to Votes 12 and 14 he would have an opportunity of bringing forward those items of expenditure he complained of, and which he had promised to bring under the notice of the House, in answer to the challenge of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War. He (Lord Eustace Cecil), having had the care of these Departments for a considerable time, wished he could see his way as clearly, as he had no doubt the hon. Gentleman did, to effecting the economies the hon. Gentleman was going to propose. Considering the great increase which had been made in the comfort of the Army, and the necessity of showing the private soldier that he was still cared for both at home and abroad, and that he had every sort of allowance and comfort he could require, it was very difficult to effect a reduction of expenditure of any kind. The private soldier nowadays had a number of things which were never dreamt of or known in former times, most of which had been given to him within the last 20 years. No doubt, it could be proved by his hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) that the expenditure in the Army had increased, and especially in connection with these particular Votes; but it must be remembered that the value the country got for the money expended made the Service much more popular with the soldier. It was only fair to the soldier to say that the comfort 290 of all classes had increased enormously; and that the soldier, drawn as he was from the labouring and artizan classes, on entering the Army expected a great increase of advantages, both in reference to clothes and to comforts, above those he had hitherto enjoyed. He would not detain the Committee further than by asking the question he had mentioned respecting the produce of the sale of clothing. He was quite certain that if his hon. Friend could give the Committee any idea of the way in which the scheme was working, it would be very satisfactory to know that it was working beneficially as well as economically.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORremarked, that in this Vote there was an item of £163,000 for wages for making garments, some at Government establishments, and others in the hands of contractors. For making clothing at the Pimlico Clothing Factory a sum of £60,000 was put down, and for contracts for making clothing a sum of £20,000 was charged; but, as he was informed and believed, the whole of that £20,000 had not been, at any rate in recent years, devoted to the service for which the House had voted it, because some other services had been defrayed out of it—such as civilian clothing for discharged men. At any rate, only £20,000 were taken for contracts for making clothing, against £60,000 for making up clothing at the Pimlico Clothing Company. In order to test the comparative expense of making up clothing at the Pimlico Factory and in the hands of contractors, he had moved some time ago for a Return, which, by the courtesy of the Surveyor General of the Ordnance, had been hastened so that he should have it by that evening. That Return showed exactly that which he had anticipated—namely, that for all the leading and most important articles of clothing for the Army, the saving, when, the work was placed in the hands of contractors, as compared with the expense of the same service at the Pimlico Clothing Factory, was very considerable. For Infantry tunics for privates the charge at the Factory was 11s. 4d.; whereas, for making up the same articles, the materials being issued to the contractors by the Government, and the making up only charged by the contractors, the total cost was only 10s. 9¾d. For kersey frocks for the Infantry the 291 contractor charged only 8s. 6¼d., against 8s. 9d. in the Factory. Of course, the difference in a single article was not very much; but when they come to such a figure as 42,000 articles, the difference in the charge amounted to a very considerable sum. Then, with regard to tweed trousers for the Militia and Artillery, the charge in the hands of the contractors was 9s. 2d., against 9s. 11d. at the Clothing Factory; for the rank and file of the Rifles, 7s. 11d. in the hands of the contractors, against 8s. 6¼d. in the Clothing Factory; and tweed frocks for the rank and file of the Infantry could be procured from the contractor for 11s. 2d., while in the hands of the Government employés they cost no less than 13s. 1½d. He held in his hand a long list of articles which, of course, it would be too wearisome to read to the Committee; but in almost every case he found the same result. Briefly, he might say this—that in the same articles, such, for instance, as the frocks of the Artillery, there was a difference in favour of the trade of more than 50 per cent in regard to the mere making up of the garments. Kersey frocks for the Infantry showed a difference in favour of the contractor of nearly 20 per cent; tweed trousers for the Artillery showed a difference in favour of the contractor of nearly 50 per cent. and tweed trousers for the Infantry a difference in favour of the trade of more than 30 per cent. Now, what he wished to urge upon the Government was this, that if, according to their Returns, and if, according to the figures given in the Army Manufacturing Establishments Returns, it could be shown that so large a saving could be effected by putting this work out to contract, it would certainly appear to be a very good thing if they would extend the system and put as much work out by contract as they possibly could. Instead of paying £60,000 for the work done in the Pimlico Clothing Factory, raid only £20,000 for contract work, it would be well if the figures were reversed, the £60,000 being taken for contract work, and the smaller sum only for the work done in the Pimlico Clothing Factory. He had no doubt that in certain articles the Pimlico Clothing Factory could produce for the country a more satisfactory outfit than could be obtained for the same money from contractors; but where they had a very large number of 292 simple articles, such as tweed trousers or frocks, he did not see why nearly the whole of the orders could not be given to outsiders, who, if they knew they would receive the orders with certainty, would compete one against the other, so that the saving now effected by such contracts would be materially increased by reason of the rivalry between the contractors themselves. He did not know whether the hon. Gentleman the Surveyor General of the Ordnance had had this matter under his consideration; but, probably, the Motion he (Mr. A. O'Connor) had made for the Return he had referred to would have directed his attention to it.
§ MR. BRANDsaid, the noble Lord the Member for West Essex (Lord Eustace Cecil) had put some questions to him with reference to the results of the change introduced with regard to the sale of clothing. The change was not, as the noble Lord supposed, actually introduced by the right hon. Gentleman the present Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Childers); but he thought the actual decision was made by his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley), who was now sitting on the Front Opposition Bench, although the first suggestion came from the Quartermaster General, and was approved of by a considerable number of officers. A paper had been circulated asking for the opinion of officers, and very few of them had returned a reply that was adverse to the change. At first the steps that were taken were very cautious; and, in the first instance, the change was only applied to certain batteries of Artillery by the direction of Viscount Cranbrook; but the result was so successful that, in 1879, he thought, the plan was extended by his right hon. and gallant Friend opposite. The figures showed that the gain to the men had been very considerable indeed. Without going into them with any unnecessary detail, he might say that the average total value of the extra articles which had been supplied on account of the change amounted to 8s. 8d. per man in the Royal Horse Artillery; 8s. 9d. in the Foot Guards; 6s. 7d. in the Cavalry; and 3s. 6d. in the Infantry of the Line, and, in addition to that, the men had been supplied with a coat, waistcoat, and shirt, suitable for winter wear, and also a summer suit. He thought those 293 were advantages which, might be considered very great, and they had only been able to give them to the rank and file of the Army by reason of the old clothing having being transferred to the State. A sum of £30,000 was annually received from the sale of old clothing, and it was clear that if they had not been able to obtain that fund they could not have given the advantages to the soldiers which he had just enumerated. The hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) had referred to the question of changing the colour of the uniform. The exact position of that question was as follows:—A certain amount of kharkee clothing had been issued to regiments at home and abroad, and the Government were now awaiting Reports from the commanding officers of the regiments to which it had been issued. At the same time, it had been decided to adopt, with the kharkee clothing, a white helmet; and, if it was finally approved of, it was supposed that it would lead to certain advantages. In regard to the questions put by the hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. Arthur O'Connor) in reference to the making up of clothing by contract, and in the Pimlico Clothing Factory, he would submit that it was not a question now of establishing a new Government Factory, as they had a Government Factory already in existence. They had spent a large sum of money upon it, and it was perfectly clear that the less the amount of clothing made in that Factory, the greater would be the cost of production. Up to 1861 Pimlico was the only place were cloth was cut and issued to be made up by the trade. Certain experiments were then made at Woolwich, and female operatives were employed in the manufacture of clothing. So successful were the experiments that the late Lord Herbert established this Clothing Factory. It was a great mistake to suppose that the general trade did not derive immense advantage from the work it was necessary to have done in order to clothe the Army. In 1880–1 there was a sum of £1,254,165 expended upon clothing; and if they deducted £112,000 odd for the Establishment charges, they would find that the actual sum spent was £1,141,000, and out of the whole of that large sum of money expended, £74,000 went into the trade of the country. Some time ago a 294 change was made by which all the material formerly supplied by the trade was supplied direct from the Government Factory, so that now it was, as the hon. Gentleman had pointed out, a very easy thing to make an almost exact comparison between the cost of the articles made by the trade and the articles made by the Factory. He would point out that from that very change the trade derived great advantage, because, by issuing articles direct from Pimlico, companies or individuals possessing only a small amount of capital were able to engage in the work, seeing that the material was supplied to them. There were other remarks which might be made in reference to the comparison instituted by the hon. Gentleman—for instance, they could check the prices of the trade, and they could make up special measurements, of which they had 30,000 last year. All the small garments had to be made at the Factory; and when they compared the cost of the Factory with that of the contractor, they must bear in mind that, in the case of the Factory, they had to pay the interest on the capital expended in the building, and the charges of inspection, which really went to increase the cost of production at the Factory. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, he believed, if they were to take the whole amount of the work done at the Factory away from it, and have the articles supplied by the trade, they would not save the country a larger sum than £2,000 or £3,000 a-year. Then, again, as he had said, they could not possibly check the prices of the trade, unless they had a Government Factory of their own for making up clothing. That was the only way in which they could impose a check in regard to the clothing, and fight the combination against them. Then, again, it was of manifest advantage to the country to be altogether independent of the trade, and to be able to turn out their own clothing in the event of an emergency. In the next place, they could not supply, by private contract, clothing for special regiments. During the course of the year 3,000 requisitions had been sent into the Factory for clothing, and 3,000,000 articles had been sent in for repair. It would be most difficult to enter into contracts for that work. On the whole, he would submit to the hon. Member that the decision come to by the late Secretary of State for War, who was 295 now Chancellor of the Exchequer, was a reasonable settlement of the case as between the trade and the Factory. The arrangement gave five-sevenths of the work to the Factory, and the remaining two-sevenths to the trade.
§ MR. RYLANDSsaid, he approached the subject not at all from any point of view as to what should be done for the trade in comparison with the arrangements made for the supply of clothing by the Factory. The real point was, which was most economical for the country? If they required a large number of articles for the Public Service, it would be false economy, and would lead to no great advantage to the country, if waste were permitted in the manufacture of stores on the one hand, or if articles were manufactured which could be supplied more cheaply by the trade itself. The point he wished to press on the Committee had been pressed 20 years ago by Mr. Cobden. Mr. Cobden urged upon the House of Commons that the increase of vast Government manufacturing establishments was a mistake. Mr. Cobden pointed out that the effect of the Government attempting to supply the articles it required by the creation of manufacturing establishments would necessarily lead to very much larger costs in connection with the articles supplied by the Government, and would be a great loss to the country. Mr. Cobden desired that the Government at that time should make a careful inquiry as to the coat of the different articles they were producing; and the Government did, in fact, lay upon the Table of the House certain Returns showing, as they alleged, the exact cost of the articles they manufacured. The noble Marquess who was now Secretary of State for War was Under Secretary of State for War at that time, and had to sign the Returns. Mr. Cobden alluded to the Returns as being very inaccurate and most misleading, and he remarked at the time, that the noble Marquess, whom he spoke of as the greatest manufacturing tailor in the country, had presented his account to the House in such a form as rendered it comparatively worthless. He admitted that since that time there had been an improvement in the book-keeping of the Government. He was quite prepared to admit that the Government now put as elements of cost charges which were formerly ex- 296 cluded. They now put down a charge for rent, and he believed one for the interest on the capital employed in the manufacture of different articles; indeed, on the whole, they pretty fairly brought under the notice of Parliament, as far as they could, the cost of the articles they produced. But even now he believed that a very careful investigation would show that there were many charges in the course of a year which tended to raise unduly the cost to the country of the goods it manufactured. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War challenged him earlier in the evening to show where the economies which he said could be made in these Estimates could be made. He maintained that during the 20 years which had elapsed since Mr. Cobden made speeches in which he warned the House of the great expenditure which was likely to be created in State manufacturing establishments, there had been a vast increase in this Vote. The actual increase was £174,900, but there had been no very great increase in the numbers of the Army; in fact, they were almost the same as they were when much lower Estimates were laid before the country. His (Mr. Ryland's) contention was, that instead of going upon the principle which successive Governments had adopted of gradually enlarging their manufacturing operations, they should adopt the policy of restricting such operations. He had a very strong impression that by purchasing in the open market a much larger proportion of their stores, the Government would effect a great saving. He said so, because it appeared to him that Governments were the worst manufacturers in the world. They had no chance of competing with private manufacturers. Every department of expenditure was subject to a greater or less degree of public pressure; they had their establishment charges, they had their clerks and superintendents, and in every direction there was a pressure put upon them to increase the salaries, and, in fact, to increase the numbers of those employed. Take the wages of the workpeople. Was it possible for a Government which was under the control, more or less, of a popular House of Commons, to keep down wages to a limit that ordinary manufacturers would? Nothing would induce him to believe for a moment that 297 the Government could manufacture articles as cheaply as a first-class manufacturer in the country. When the Government undertook the manufacture of goods, they engaged a certain number of men, and they must keep them always employed. Whether there was a demand or not for any particular articles, they still went on producing them. In warlike stores it frequently happened that improvements took place, and then the Government, as manufacturers, found themselves in possession of an enormous stock of articles at Woolwich which were obsolete in pattern, or which had been made useless in consequence of the improvements. If the Government went into the market, they would just buy the quantity they might require for the time being. Of course, they would keep a fair and reasonable stock in reserve; but they would not have the inducement to go on manufacturing articles in order to keep their men employed. This Session had not now long to last; therefore, it was impossible for him to suggest the adoption of an immediate change. But what he did suggest, and what he had suggested in former debates, was that the Manufacturing Department of the Government ought to be carefully investigated by a strong Committee of the House—not a Departmental Committee, but a Committee consisting of men conversant with business operations, and men fairly representing the judgment and experience of the House. He believed that the result of an inquiry into the cost of their large manufacturing establishments, and as to the relative cost of articles produced in the national manufactories, and those which could be obtained from private manufacturers, would be that a very considerable economy would be effected in this Vote, and that without any deficiency, either as regarded quality or quantity, of the stores supplied to the Army.
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORsaid, he did not propose to follow the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) over the wide field he had surveyed, because, although the hon. Gentleman did enter upon a great many topics, and cast a glance over the last 20 years, he concluded by saying he had no practical suggestion to submit to the Committee. Well, he (Mr. A. O'Connor) proposed to go upon a totally different line. He had a 298 practical suggestion to submit to the Committee, and in discussing that suggestion the hon. Gentleman the Surveyor General of the Ordnance (Mr. Brand) very ingeniously introduced a number of points which had nothing whatever to do with the nature of the suggestion. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Brand) mentioned many things on which he (Mr. A. O'Connor) was not at all at issue with him, and which had nothing to do with the merits of the proposition he (Mr. A. O'Connor) put forward. It was perfectly true that they had a large Clothing Factory at Woolwich, and that into the estimated cost of whatever articles were manufactured at that establishment would have to be thrown a certain percentage for establishment charges. No one disputed that. Then, again, there were certain articles which were much better made at this Clothing Factory at Woolwich than they would be if put out to contract, because they were only required in comparatively small numbers, and they were of a special make. Of course, a contract for a limited supply of articles would not furnish that advantage which a large contract for a single article would afford. What he proposed was, that it was very much better on every account that the simple articles which must be got year after year, and sometimes twice a-year, such as serge trousers, should be put out to contract, instead of being made in Government establishments. The Surveyor General of the Ordnance said he considered the arrangement made by the late War Minister a fair settlement of the dispute between the trade and the Government establishments; but he (Mr. A. O'Connor) respectfully demurred to that way of putting the matter. It was not a question between the trade and the Government establishments; it was, as the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) had said, a question of what was cheaper for the country. He (Mr. A. O'Connor) had shown plainly, from a Return furnished by the War Office itself, that it was more economical to get tunics and trousers, of which the Government wanted tens and hundreds of thousands every year, from private contractors than to get them from the Army Clothing Factory. Then, why in the name of common sense should these articles not be got from private contractors? He had in his hand a statement of the prices 299 for making up clothing which were tendered by the Auxiliary Forces Uniform and Equipment Company of London and Limerick on the 2nd of May, 1884. The prices related to such articles as frocks for the Cavalry, great coats and trousers for the Infantry, and also scarlet tunics. On the opposite side was a statement of the prices paid for making the same description of garments in the Government Factory; they did not include any establishment charges at all, but they were simply the prices paid in hard cash for the direct labour of cutting out and making up. And this was the result:—The contractors offered to make up Cavalry frocks for 2s. each, the Government paid 2s. 9d.; the contractors would make cotton and kharkee frocks for 1s. 8d., the Government paid 2s.; tweed frocks for the Artillery the contractors would make up for 1s. 11d., the Government paid in their own Factory 3s. 1d.; and so it was all through the list. The total tender for making up 167,000 garments was £10,258; whereas the Government paid in their own Clothing Factory for absolute labour in making up the same garments, £12,611. Then, according to the Army Manufacturing Return, there must be added to the £12,000 on account of direct labour, £1,500 for indirect expenditure, whatever that might be. The total, therefore, for work done at Pimlico was £14,124. On the other hand, there was to be allowed—and this was what the Pimlico Factory claimed against the private contractors—one halfpenny per garment for Government inspection when the clothing was made by private firms. Anyhow, there was a difference in favour of the trade in this particular tender of no less than £3,518. It seemed to him that the case was perfectly clear. There was no attempt to strain or exaggerate the position in any way. The figures were taken from Government documents, and on this one tender alone there was shown a saving of £3,518, and this irrespective of the establishment charges, which were very heavy. What he maintained was, that when they found so assured a saving by the system of issuing their material to contractors to be made up, they ought to extend the system, and get just as good an article at very much less cost. That was the only point he raised, and he did not at all wish to join issue with the Surveyor General of the 300 Ordnance on all the other points he had introduced.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, he did not wish to prolong the discussion unduly; but he thought there were one or two things to be said on the question. He confessed there was a great deal to be said in favour of employing private contractors, and there was a great deal to be said in favour of having Government Establishments. His hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance (Mr. Brand) had told them that the whole matter in dispute amounted to about £2,000 a-year; that the clothing cost that amount more than it would if supplied privately. The Committee must look at the advantages which accrued from a Government Establishment. First of all, there was a great advantage in time of emergency, in time of war. At such a time the Government were able to lay down exactly what the price should be, so as to prevent anything like a combination of contractors against them. A combination of contractors invariably took place in times of emergency. The Committee would recollect the stories which were told in 1870 as to what France had to go through—she was simply at the mercy of the contractors. Again, there was another advantage accruing from a Government Establishment. They might always depend upon the quality of the manufactured articles, and that, perhaps, in warlike stores, was even more important than in clothing—in clothing, of course, it was of great importance. Then, again, there was the question of cleanliness of manufacture. They all knew that infectious diseases had been constantly conveyed by the articles made in private shops. The practice of letting articles out to be made privately prevailed to a certain extent now; but he had always felt that the practice should be minimized as much as possible, because of the frequent complaints that infection was traceable to certain goods supplied by clothing manufacturers. The hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) had said that everything that was made at the Clothing Manufactory could be made as well and as cheaply privately. That, to a certain extent, might be true; but it certainly was not true in respect of all warlike stores at the Arsenal. There were certain things which must be manufactured by Government. They really 301 could not depend upon contractors to supply some goods of the same quality as Government could themselves manufacture them. He held, therefore, that the country did not pay an outrageous sum for the advantage of manufacturing its own goods. He was sure that his hon. Friend (Mr. Brand) would give the fullest information in the matter, so as to set at rest any difficulties and doubts which might arise in the minds of hon. Members. At that time of the Session he should deprecate, as he had deprecated over and over again, the appointment of a Committee, which probably would entail a great deal of labour, but result in nothing satisfactory. The matter had been inquired into, not only in the House of Commons, but outside, and it had formed the subject of debate over and over again during the last 20 or 30 years. He thought the hon. Gentleman (Mr. A. O'Connor) who brought forward this matter, and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), might be very well content with having drawn attention to the subject. He had no doubt that anything that could be done in the way of diminishing expense would be done. The late Government had great difficulties to encounter in reference to the Clothing Factory. It might be in the recollection of some hon. Members that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Sheffield (Mr. Mundella), in his capacity of a private Member of the House, called attention to the irregularities which went on at the Clothing Factory. A Committee was appointed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South-West Lancashire (Sir R. Assheton Cross), consisting of the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Hibbert), the hon. Member for Abingdon (Mr. Clarke), and the hon. Member for Leeds (Mr. Barran), all business men, and two of them specially acquainted with the tailoring business. They went into the matter most carefully, and they found that the irregularities, and the starvation of the employés which was alleged, had no foundation whatever in fact—they said that if anything the employés were too well treated. As he had said before, this was a question which depended very much upon the fluctuation of trade. It was exceedingly difficult to lay down broadly that the employés were better paid or worse paid, because they had to 302 provide for any emergencies. They might be perfectly certain that they could at all times depend upon good workmen, and that they were thoroughly comfortable, especially when it was possible to have the whole of the Government manufacture and its arrangement called in question, in consequence of some tale of hardship, or some story which might get about as to the way in which the factory employés were treated. He had entered into the question at a greater length than he intended, and he had only to say in conclusion that the Committee might rest assured that they got value for their money.
SIR HENRY FLETCHERsaid, he did not quite gather from his hon. Friend the Surveyor General of the Ordnance (Mr. Brand), when he replied to the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), whether the regiments at home, as well as those abroad, were to be supplied with kharkee, in the event of the experiment made with such clothing being successful, and also whether white helmets were to be supplied to all the troops. He should like also to know what the exact shade of the kharkee to be adopted was, because he understood there were several shades of kharkee. It would, perhaps, be in the recollection of the Committee that the Colour Committee recommended a dark grey for the service uniform of the Army. There was one other question connected with the Clothing Vote he wished to put to the Surveyor General of the Ordnance. It was whether it was still the practice in the Army to serve out to recruits the old clothing? As he had said on previous occasions, the practice was a very objectiouable one to recruits, and prevented many men enlisting. He was fully persuaded that if new clothing could be given to recruits, it would prove an inducement to men to enter the Army.
§ MR. BRANDsaid, the white helmet had been issued on trial to the regiments who had kharkee clothing. It had been suggested that if the kharkee clothing was successful, the white helmet should be issued to all the troops both at home and abroad, but no decision had been come to. It was hardly possible for him, at the present moment, to state the exact colour of the kharkee; but if the hon. and gallant Gentleman 303 (Sir Henry Fletcher) would call at the War Office, he would show him a garment made of the material. As to the ultimate decision with respect to kharkee clothing, he could only say that if, on their making their Reports, it was found that the commanding officers of the regiments who had kharkee on trial were satisfied with it, it was, no doubt, the intention of the Secretary of State for War to issue kharkee clothing for the undress uniform of the whole Army. There was no question of changing the colour of the uniform of the Army. The colour of the uniform of the Army was red, and it would remain so. The only suggestion was that the undress should be of a colour which was recommended by the Committee which had inquired into the subject. There was only one other question that his hon. Friend (Sir Henry Fletcher) had asked him, and that was with reference to the clothing of recruits. That question had engaged his (Mr. Brand's) attention for a long time, and he was happy to say that the Secretary of State for War had agreed to an arrangement which would, he believed, remove all the grievances in regard to the matter. He did not think he could be more precise in his statement, because there were some details which had still to be considered.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, he did not think the answer of the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Brand) was quite clear. The Committee would like to know very definitely whether it was intended to change the uniform of the Army? The hon. Gentleman had said that the undress uniform was to be of kharkee; he supposed the colour was a kind of brown. The question was whether the troops were to wear kharkee upon all occasions, because, if they were, the outcry in the country would be very great indeed; if the fighting dress was to be of kharkee, whether the troops were in Europe or not, the feeling of dissatisfaction would, he was persuaded, be universal. He hoped that, whatever else might be done, the old red colour would not be got rid of.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he thought he had already explained that what was intended was that if the colour of the kharkee clothing was found satisfactory, kharkee would be issued as the undress uniform of the Army both at home and abroad.
SIR HENRY FLETCHERsaid, he was sorry to trouble his hon. Friend (Mr. Brand); but he would like to thoroughly understand whether the white helmet was to be worn with kharkee as the undress uniform?
§ MR. BRANDsaid, be thought his statement was perfectly clear as to the white helmet. The white helmet had been issued to certain regiments, and it had been suggested—only suggested—that in case the Reports respecting kharkee were satisfactory, the white helmet should be issued instead of the present helmet to the regiments both at home and abroad.
SIR FREDERICK FITZ-WYGRAMsaid, he understood the full-dress was to remain red, and that the kharkee was to be adopted as an undress. He should like to know whether there was any advantage in the latter, and, if so, what advantage, because, for his own part, at present, he was unable to see any? In active operations, supposing a line of Infantry were sent to take a position a distance of 2,000 yards, they would be in skirmishing order. The enemy firing upon them would not be able to distinguish single men, but only the general line; therefore, there would be no advantage in a neutral colour over the red. Then, when the line got within point blank distance, say 300 or 400 yards, the line would be distinctly visible, and the enemy would fire at individual men, and it would not matter whether the colour was red, blue, or brown.
§ MR. TOMLINSONsaid, the dust colour was tried as an experiment. There was a regiment stationed at Preston, and he had seen the men go about in black helmets with the kharkee. It did not seem to be at all an undress uniform. The men wore it with all their accoutrements. He should like to know whether it was intended to supply the Rifle regiments with this kharkee as well as the Line?
§ MR. BRANDsaid, that question would be considered by the Military Authorities as soon as the Reports of the commanding officers to which the issue had been made were received.
COLONEL STANLEYwished to know whether the question of the hon. and gallant Member behind him (Sir Frederick Fitz-Wygram) was to be answered? A great many people were interested in the matter.
§ MR. BRANDsaid, the main object of the change in the dress was to avoid the great danger which many military authorities considered attached to the wearing of red on active service, considering the arms of precision now used in warfare. It was intended that the new uniform, if generally adopted, should be the fighting dress of the British Army.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ (5.) £1,262,500, Supply, Manufacture, and Repair of Warlike Stores.
§ COLONEL NOLANsaid, he wished to draw attention to an official lecture delivered a short time ago, the general effect of which was that the whole of their present heavy artillery were to be completely out-built by some new pattern adopted from the French and German. It seemed there was to be a complete renewal of the heavy ordnance, which would necessitate a similar renewal of the projectiles and carriages. This country had been seven or eight years behind the times with heavy ordnance, owing to their perseverance with the muzzle-loading system; but at length they were going to give that up and follow the example of the French. The lecturer (Colonel Maitland), on the occasion to which he had referred, delivered a remarkably able address, and concluded that there were only two things necessary to give effect to the change—one being time, and the other money. The time was fixed at three years—that was to say, it was stated that by that time they would have a sufficient number of these new powerful breech-loading guns. It was to be hoped they would have no necessity for the use of heavy ordnance before that period, for, should they be in a great war before the end of three years, they would find themselves completely unfit to carry it on. Of course, at the end of one year they might have a large number; but, in the event of an emergency, they would have reason to regret being so much behind the times. Then, besides time, they required money to carry out the change, and that was dwelt upon by the lecturer. Seeing that the Secretary of State for War was present, he had looked forward with curiosity to see what would be his expression of opinion at the conclusion of the lecture; but the noble Marquess had left without expressing any opinion, and, with admirable 306 strategy, had carried off his Financial Secretary and the Surveyor General of the Ordnance, declaring that they were wanted at the War Office. In another matter, also, the noble Marquess had shown his wisdom. He had put in the Chair the late First Lord of the Admiralty, who took great interest in guns, but at present was unable to speak with any authority on financial questions, being in Opposition. He (Colonel Nolan) would like to ask whether the Vote included the arrangements which were to be made in changing the character of the heavy ordnance during the ensuing year? He should also like to know whether there had been an Estimate prepared of the total cost to the Country of carrying out the change? The Vote was a very large one; but it would have to be much larger if the statement in the lecture were to be acted upon. For the Land and Sea Services something like 40,000 or 50,000 tons of guns would have to be constructed, and would cost about £2,500,000, Speaking roughly, another £2,000,000 would be required for gun-carriages and projectiles. A great many of the existing gun-carriages could be turned to account, no doubt; but it would be necessary to construct a great many new ones. No figures were given at the lecture as to the expense which the change would entail; and although appreciating the difficult position the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War was placed in, he (Colonel Nolan) was very sorry that no Estimate had been submitted. He should like to be informed now whether there would be anything asked for this year, or in future years, in addition to the ordinary Vote for renewing the heavy ordnance? He should not have put these questions in consequence of statements made in a lecture had it not been that this was of a different character to ordinary lectures. It was virtually an official lecture given by the Government. The technical statements in it were beautifully arranged and very clear, and the lecture received the applause of everyone. It was evident, from Colonel Maitland's remarks, that the change in the Artillery Department would have to be very great; and, for this reason, he (Colonel Nolan) did not think it would be beneath the dignity of the Secretary of State for War to make some little statement that night as to what expense 307 such a complete change as that proposed would render necessary. He (Colonel Nolan) had often spoken on this question in the House, though without much effect; but he must say the conclusions arrived at by the lecturer were important and so wise that a Minister could adopt no other course than give effect to them. As he had said, a great deal of expense had now to be incurred owing to the representations which had been, years ago, made to the Government as to the superiority of breech-loading guns not having been entertained.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILbelieved he could tell the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Nolan) how it was that in this country, in connection with heavy ordnance, the muzzle-loading system had not been changed for the breech-loading for so long a period. The muzzle-loader had been considered superior until great improvements in the manufacture of powder had altered the conditions, and rendered it necessary to adopt an altogether new kind of gun; and it was as to the manufacture of that powder that he should like to know a little more. He believed there had been a great improvement in pebble powder, and he should be glad to know from the Surveyor General of the Ordnance (Mr. Brand) whether there was a good supply in store of the new description? Of course, he did not expect the hon. Member to state the exact amount of that or any other powder in the Government Stores, if he thought it unwise to do so; but he should like him to state whether there was the full supply of M. G. powder in hand, so that they might know that, if emergency arose, there was sufficient in store for all purposes. The Vote was only very little larger than that of last year. The £114,000 increase would not go far towards the £2,500,000 of expenditure which the hon. and gallant Member (Colonel Nolan) declared to be necessary on heavy guns alone, to say nothing about projectiles and gun-carriages. It was clear that such an enormously-increased charge could not be defrayed out of the ordinary Estimates, and they all foresaw, as the Opposition did when they left Office, that a charge of this kind would have to be provided for sooner or later. Whether the expenditure would be met by voting a lump sum, or by voting a sum annually, would, of course, have to be decided by the 308 Executive authorities. As to the statement which had fallen from the hon. and gallant Member, that this country had unduly delayed changing from muzzle-loading to breech-loading heavy ordnance, he could only repeat that the change had been rendered desirable by recent improvements in pebble powder. With regard to magazine rifles, he had asked a Question before, and should like to repeat it. Experiments with magazine rifles had been going on for three or four years, and a great many people were interested in the result. Had any result been arrived at, or had there been necessary and unavoidable delay in the investigations of the Committee? Of course, it was not known to him whether or not they had reported; but if they had, would the Government announce the fact; and would they submit, at a convenient season, that and any other Report or information they might have on the subject? If the adoption of the magazine rifle was approved—and he hoped it would be shortly—it would, no doubt, involve a great expenditure of money. Presumably, the matter was one which the Secretary of State for War had before him. Then there was a question as to rifle bullets, which appeared to be an important one. He understood that the weight of the bullets had lately been reduced by a quarter or one-fifth. No doubt, such reduction had the advantage of enabling the men to carry more cartridges, and of lessening the amount of transport that was necessary in the field; but, to his mind, it had one disadvantage, which he would point out—and if he was in error, he should be glad to be corrected. One of the great advantages of the heavy bullet in former days had been its power of stopping a charge of Cavalry. If the weight was decreased, there would always be a danger of its being inefficient to check Cavalry charges. How did this matter stand? Then they heard a great deal about the manufacture of bayonets. It was alleged that lately bayonets had not been quite up to the proper strength and quality. The Surveyor General of Ordnance had said he would inquire into the matter—that, in fact, it was being inquired into—and that he expected soon to have a Report upon it. It was to be hoped the hon. Gentleman would give them some information on the point—that he would be able to say he had received 309 the Report, and found from it that the bayonets were now quite as good as they were before the recent unfortunate incidents that took place in the Soudan. He should like, too, to know what was to be done in regard to Strensall Common? There was a Bill before the House dealing with it, and he knew it would be more proper to discuss the details in dealing with that measure; but he was very anxious to know whether there was to be anything in the nature of a further decentralization of stores—whether there was to be another central arsenal; and, if so, whether it was to be at Strensall Common or anywhere else? There was one point in which he quite sympathized with the Surveyor General. He had seen throughout that this Vote stood very little chance of being diminished. Even the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), who was not now in his place, would find it extremely difficult to suggest where reduction could be effected without neglecting those requirements which were increasing every year in consequence of improvements which took place in manufactures.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that before he answered the noble Lord (Lord Eustace Cecil), he would say a word or two by way of reply to the observations of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Galway County (Colonel Nolan). With regard to the lecture of Colonel Maitland at the United Service Institution, though a considerable number of official persons were present, it was not an official explanation in any sense of the word, certainly not in the ordinary sense. Colonel Maitland had asked whether there would be any objection to his giving a lecture on the position of the Artillery question; and it was thought desirable that one so well qualified, and who was not likely to state anything to the disadvantage of this country, or to the advantage of other countries, should give such a lecture. The lecture, however, was not a declaration of the opinions of anyone but Colonel Maitland himself. He (the Marquess of Hartington) had not seen the lecture previously, nor did he know until he heard it what it contained. No doubt, there was something alarming in the prospect the lecturer had opened out. The hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Nolan) wished to know what 310 steps Her Majesty's Government proposed to take to bring about the change from muzzle-loading to breech-loading in regard to heavy artillery. Well, it was not intended to undertake any general re-armament, either of the Navy or of the Army, in the sense in which re-armament was generally understood. What it was proposed to do was to provide for the Navy, as well as they were able, guns of the pattern described by Colonel Maitland. If the resources of the country permitted it, it might be desirable to replace some of the muzzle-loading guns in the ships by guns of newer construction; but there was no intention of throwing aside the guns of large size and great power which had been constructed during the past seven or eight years. What had been practically decided on was that the guns of the future used on board Her Majesty's ships, and for their coast defences, should be of the new pattern described by Colonel Maitland. It was not considered desirable to proceed too rapidly in the matter of re-armament, throwing aside their old guns. What the Government were doing, and what, he thought, they were bound to do, was this—they were adopting for present manufacture, for the supply of their wants as they arose, the newest and best type of gun it was possible to get.
COLONEL STANLEYsaid, there was a question he desired to ask the Surveyor General of the Ordnance when he got up to answer hon. Members on points of detail, and it was this—How far within the limits of this Vote was the War Office able, as a Manufacturing Department, to comply with the demands of the Navy? Because that was by no means the least important side of the question. As the noble Marquess said, with perfect truth, a great many guns in the Service, though they would be superseded by guns of a newer type, were by no means obsolete, and would, no doubt, prove very efficient for land defences. The custom at the War Office had always been to allow the Navy the first call on the best guns. Very wisely, the best guns were manufactured for the Navy first, and that, of course, entailed a great deal of correspondence between the two Departments; and it was difficult, no doubt, to adjust the manufacturing capabilities of one Service to the requirements of the other. But what 311 he wanted clearly to understand from the hon. Gentleman the Surveyor General of the Ordnance was whether he was able to keep pace, so to speak, with the demands of the Navy for new guns? As he (Colonel Stanley) understood it, a certain class of ships were laid down to carry these new guns. In the year 1879 or 1880, it was his duty to explain that under the progressive powder a larger gun was used, and that, therefore, in order to comply with the necessary conditions of shipbuilding, breech-loading guns had to be manufactured. No doubt, ships had been designed and laid down to carry the new kind of gun. However, what he wished to know was this—was the War Office keeping pace with the demands of the Navy, or were the ships waiting for armaments which the War Office from some cause or other, whatever it might be, were unable to supply? The country was very anxious on this point, and he, therefore, trusted the Surveyor General of the Ordnance would favour him with some information in regard to it.
§ MR. TOMLINSONdesired to bring a matter before the attention of the Surveyor General of the Ordnance with regard, not to the heaviest guns, but some of the lighter steel-lined guns. He understood that these guns which the local Artillery practised with did not shoot true. There was a battery at Southport consisting of eight guns, only two of which could be made to shoot with accuracy. Had the Government had any other complaints as to these old steel-lined guns? He assumed the Committee would hear something about the bayonets; and with reference to the manufacture of sword blades, he should like to know whether the statements which had appeared in the papers were true? The sword blades were said to be as bad as the bayonets; and it was stated that most of the blades used by the Cavalry were manufactured in Germany. Was that correct? If it was, it showed a very unsatisfactory state of things. Surely they ought to be able to manufacture all their warlike stores at home. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, in moving the Estimates, said it was impossible to procure in this country masses of steel large enough to forge their heavy guns. That seemed to him a most lamentable state of things. Had the Government 312 taken, or did they intend to take, measures to enable them to procure these masses of steel at home? If they did not, and an emergency arose, most lamentable results might take place. With regard to the Martini-Henry rifle, could the Surveyor General of the Ordnance give any more definite promise than had been given hitherto as to when it would be issued to the Volunteers?
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORsaid, he wished to draw attention to the item of "Produce of sales of Old Stores at Woolwich." What he wanted to know- was, whether the result of the investigation now being made at Woolwich was such that a very large quantity of stores had been discovered which were only fit to be broken up and sold as old materials; and whether there would not be a very large deficiency next year on that account?
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, his recollection was that last year the suggestion was made that this Vote might be decreased; but that was said to be an impossibility. He saw, however, that it had been decreased by £114,500, and he was led by that circumstance to ask the question whether any provision had been made for arming the Horse Artillery and Field Batteries with the new breech-loading gun? A great deal had appeared in the newspapers about the new gun, which was considered to be something very superior to anything they had over before possesssed—that was to say, superior to the present muzzle-loading gun; and, therefore, he would like his hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Brand) to state to the Committee what steps had been taken to furnish this new gun to the Horse Artillery and Field Batteries, and when they were likely to be so furnished.
§ MR. BRANDsaid, the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) was not quite correct in supposing that there had been a decrease of £114,500 in this Vote as compared with last year's Estimate. He would point out to his hon. and gallant Friend that the Estimate for the year 1883–4 included a considerable number of supplementary items, which, however, being taken into account, left a clear decrease on this year's Vote of about £7,000. In reply to his hon. and gallant Friend's inquiry as 313 to the supply of new breech-loading guns to the Horse Artillery and Field Batteries, and the date at which they would be furnished, he might say that three batteries of 12-pounder breech-loading guns had been issued for further trial to the Royal Artillery, and that when the Reports of those trials were presented, and in the event of their showing that the guns were a success, he had no doubt that a larger issue would be made. He was extremely glad that his hon. and gallant Friend had asked him a question with reference to the supply of guns to the Navy, because it afforded him an opportunity of replying to statements which were frequently made on that subject. The matter was one to which he had given a considerable amount of attention, owing to the attacks which had been directed against the Ordnance Department; and he was able to say that he did not believe there was a single case of one of Her Majesty's ships waiting a day for her armament. As a matter of fact, the contrary was the case—the guns were waiting for the ships. The manufacture of the guns was, he believed, on the whole, proceeding satisfactorily; the value estimated in last year's accounts having been very little more than that produced in the case of guns of large calibre, while in the case of guns of small calibre the quantity produced actually exceeded the estimate. The hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Tomlinson) had asked him a question with reference to the large steel breech-loading guns. There had been great difficulties in connection with the manufacture of these guns—difficulties due in a great measure to the transitions, mentioned by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War in the beginning of the year, from muzzle-loading to breech-loading, and from wrought iron to steel. First, there had been a temporary difficulty in obtaining steel from the English steel manufacturers upon the required conditions; secondly, there had been the difficulty of applying the breech - loading system to these heavy guns; and, thirdly, there had been the almost insane rivalry amongst nations which had led to the use of enormously heavy charges, with comparatively light guns to bear them. With regard to the test laid down by the Ordnance Committee, two officers were sent from this country to visit the steel 314 works abroad. When they returned and reported, the Ordnance Department was instructed from the War Office to take evidence on this point from amongst the manufacturers at Sheffield, the result being that the test was found not to be more severe than the French test, although it differed in respect of some details which it was very difficult to meet. He might say that the Sheffield manufacturers were now turning out this large ordnance satisfactorily. With reference to the second difficulty, it was hardly necessary to point out to the Committee that the application of the breech-loading principle to these heavy guns resulted in there being less strength at the point where the greatest strength was wanted. For this, therefore, compensation had to be found in mechanical appliances. Under the circumstances, then, he considered that the country had gained an advantage by the delay which had taken place; and the Government believed that the mechanism of the guns turned out at the present time was safer and more rapid in its action than any which had been adopted abroad; a conclusion justified by experiments which had recently taken place. Several questions had been put to him by the noble Lord the Member for West Essex (Lord Eustace Cecil) which he would now endeavour to answer. With reference to the quantity of gunpowder in hand, he was able to say that the stores of that article were in a satisfactory condition at the present time, the manufacture having been, during both this and last year, unusually large. The Committee appointed some time ago, although it had been sitting a good while, had not, up to the present time, presented any Report in favour of a magazine rifle. Then, with regard to the noble Lord's question as to the quality of the bayonets used in the Soudan, he would point out that the question was a technical one; although he might say that the result of all the inquiries he had made into the matter was to cause him to believe that the quality of the steel was good. The bayonets in question had been manufactured by persons who had supplied bayonets to the Department for many years—George & Sons, and Harrison & Co., both firms of high repute; and in addition to the fact that the price paid was sufficient to procure metal of a superior quality, the tests to which the 315 bayonets were submitted were most searching and severe. He had no doubt that a number of exaggerated reports of the kind alluded to by the noble Lord had been circulated; but he must repeat his belief that no complaint could be sustained against the quality of the bayonets. There was no idea of establishing an arsenal at Strensall; but, no doubt it was the intention of forming a depôt there for equipment purposes; and he thought it desirable on the ground that at Woolwich more room would be available for stores than was at present the case. The hon. Member for Queen's County (Mr. A. O'Connor) had referred to the item which appeared under the head of "Sale of Old Stores at Woolwich." No doubt there was a considerable quantity of old stores at Woolwich which had been sold, and credit was given in the Estimate for a large quantity sold this year. But there was nothing enormous in the quantity sold at the present time; and he would point out to the Committee that year by year there was always a certain amount of stores which became obsolete. No doubt there was just now a slight increase on the quantity of old stores which generally existed in the Arsenal. Finally, in reply to the inquiry of the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Tomlinson), he might say that the question as to the new rifle was at that moment before the Secretary of State for War, and he had no doubt that before long a decision would be taken as to whether the new rifle was to be issued to the Army or not. As soon as that question was decided he should be in a position to make a statement as to the issue of the Martini-Henry to Volunteers. Having replied, satisfactorily he hoped, to all the questions put to him, he trusted the Committee would allow the Vote to be taken.
§ Vote agreed to.
§
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a sum, not exceeding £740,500, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the Charge for the Superintending Establishment of, and Expenditure for, Works, Buildings, and Repairs, at Home and Abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1885.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONrose to make a statement with regard to the Report of the Commission on the defence of British Possessions and Commerce abroad, and also on the defence of 316 Commercial Harbours in Great Britain and Ireland. The first action taken on the Report in connection with the first subject was to refer that Report to the examination in detail of the Adviser of the State in these matters—namely, the Inspector General of Fortifications; and although the Report was generally concurred in, the recommendations of the Commission were considerably modified in detail, and he was glad to say that a very considerable reduction of the amount proposed to be expended on fortifications was recommended. The Report having been under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, they had given a general approval of the scheme as modified by the Inspector General of Fortifications. The principal stations dealt with in the Report were Aden, Trincomalee, Colombo, Singapore, Hong Kong, Simon's Bay, and Table Bay, at the Cape of Good Hope, and Port Louis, Mauritius. The first step which had been taken was to confer with the Government of India as to the fortification of Aden. It had been decided by the Home and by the Indian Government that the works there were to be undertaken at the joint expense of the Indian and English Governments. The proposal to that effect had been made to the Government of India, and agreed to by them, and the sanction of Parliament would accordingly be asked for the fortification of Aden. The next stations in order of importance whore work was to be done with as little delay as possible were stated to be Singapore and Hong Kong, with regard to which it appeared to the Government reasonable that the expense should be borne either wholly or in part by the Colonies themselves—that was to say, that the Home Government should not be called upon to contribute more than the armament, the works agreed upon being paid for by the Colonies. That view had accordingly been communicated to the Colonies in question. With regard to the stations at the Cape of Good Hope, it was thought by Her Majesty's Government that the cost of making Simon's Boy a secure shelter for ships of war, was an Imperial concern, while they considered that the Colony should be invited to undertake the fortification of Table Bay. Therefore, as regarded the Cape and the other stations to which he had referred, the first step had been 317 taken, and what other steps were taken would depend upon the willingness expressed by the Colonial Governments to contribute to the work to be done. With regard to the commercial harbours, a similar course had been pursued. The plans proposed with regard to these had been considerably modified; they had been modified as much as possible in respect of the expense, and also by the experience which had been gained by the development of engineering science. The question whether the whole or part of the expenditure on the great commercial harbours of the country ought to be borne by the State, or whether they should be contributed to by the localities themselves, was, as he had said, a novel and difficult one. The latter was certainly a new principle, for the harbours on the coasts of the country had hitherto been considered as of more than local importance, and their defence had also been considered as a national duty. In addition to that, there were matters of a rather more detailed character involved. The works having to be necessarily under the superintendence of the Military Authorities, the Local Authorities would have very little control over the expenditure to which they were called upon to contribute. On the other hand, it was impossible, with any reasonable expenditure which the country was likely to assent to, for the Government to undertake the defence of all the harbours and commercial ports in the Kingdom. The Committee would be aware that the trade of the country had of late years shown that, if left perfectly free and unbiassed by any action of the Government, the tendency was continuously in the direction of the development of new outlets and the improvement of natural advantages, one of the consequences of this being that new harbours were constantly being built on their coasts. The question would arise whether it would be just to the whole community, and especially whether it would be just to the minor harbours on the Coast, to give to their more powerful rivals the great additional advantage which would be conferred upon them by fortifying them against attack. That was a question which would have to be studied with considerable attention and care, and upon its solution would depend to a great extent the possibility of adopting the proposals 318 of the Commission. Its solution would also exercise considerable influence upon the time within which the recommendations of the Commission could be carried out. The question was not one for immediate decision, but it would have to be looked at by the House in all its bearings. No doubt, if a disposition were shown by the commercial populations mostly interested in this matter to come forward and assist the public taxpayer in making their harbours secure, or more secure, from attack in time of war, it would greatly facilitate the execution of the work.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILsaid, he was very glad that the noble Marquess had so far forestalled his Notice as to state that the Government had undertaken, better late than never, to deal with this great subject. It was a great subject, undoubtedly, and one which had, no doubt, occupied the attention of the previous Governments, but which, owing to various circumstances, principally the want of funds, had not been dealt with as it ought to have been many years ago. Complaints had arisen from time to time in connection with the state of harbour defences at home and abroad, and he was not surprised at it; and if, now, without entering very largely into the question, he were merely to shadow forth his views upon this subject, which he certainly hoped the Commission and Members of that House had thoroughly considered, he trusted he should not be looked upon as trespassing on the time of the Committee. In the first place, he thought it a most unfortunate thing that publicity could not be given to the Report of the Commission. Although he saw how important it was that everything done by the Executive should not be made public abroad, he thought it was to be regretted that publicity had not been given in this case. It was his opinion, in reference to such matters, that unless publicity was given in some form or shape, looking at the many questions that had to be dealt with, attention was not sufficiently excited in that House with regard to any subject, however important it might be. And he held this subject to be very important. Under the circumstances described the thing was lost sight of, or perhaps only taken up in a half-hearted way, and that, too, after a considerable lapse of time. The noble Marquess said that 319 the question was exceedingly difficult and exceedingly complex, and he told the Committee, with regard to the operations recommended, that the question whether the Imperial Government or the localities were to bear the expenditure was one which required solution before any active steps could be taken. He understood the noble Marquess, however, to say that active steps were being taken of a certain character; but they were only partial as far as the Colonies were concerned, and very little or nothing had been done. He was fortified in that opinion by the statement of the late Inspector General of Fortifications, Sir Lintorn Simmons, at the United Service Institution not long ago, when this question was under consideration. He (Lord Eustace Cecil) was anxious, whatever statement had fallen from the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War that evening, that the public should not suppose that little or nothing was intended to be done. He hoped that what the noble Marquess had stated meant that the Government were really going to take up the question in earnest. Everyone knew that it would occasion the expenditure of a very large sume of money; but still it was a question which ought to be grappled with; and when the Committee considered how very important were the points involved—their population and their immense commercial interests—they would see at once that the question of the defence of their harbours in time of war, by suitable fortifications, was second to none. In the discussion on the state of the Army that evening, the noble Marquess told them that, in the event of invasion, they had a considerable Force to rely upon besides the Volunteers. He had seen it calculated, and had had it before him in figures, that after providing for all the fortifications and garrisons of the country, apart from the Volunteers, the country could not muster a greater Force than 15,000 to take the field at home. Then, if he looked at the Navy, they had it, no doubt, in evidence that the Navy was superior to that of any one Power in the world; but he had figures to show that that superiority, when the English Navy was contrasted with the French Navy, might be taken as in the proportion of seven to five only. Of course, it was perfectly clear that if any other Naval Power were 320 to join with the French, our Navy would have more than sufficient to occupy them in looking after their commercial interests and defending their Colonies abroad. That being so, what were the Government doing at the present time? Now, the noble Marquess had not gone in great detail into the number of the harbours. Looking, first of all, abroad, he found that the noble Marquess dealt simply with the Indian Stations; he said something was going to be done at Aden, something at Trincomalee, something at Port Louis, Mauritius, and also that Simon's Bay, Table Bay, and Cape of Good Hope were to be looked after, it being proposed that a portion of the money required for the purpose of fortifying them should be found by the Cape Government.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI said that the Indian Government and the Imperial Government had both undertaken the defence of Aden; that the Colonies would be communicated with; that it would be inquired how far they would be willing to contribute to the defence of Singapore and Hong Kong; that inquiry had been made of the Cape Government with regard to Table Bay, and that the Imperial Government undertook the defence of Simon's Bay.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILasked pardon of the noble Marquess; but his point was, that there were a great many other places to be looked after and defended besides those which had been named. For instance, nothing had been said about the North and South American Stations, or the Falkland Islands, which were very important as coaling stations; nor had anything been said with regard to the defence of Melbourne or Sydney, or of Cooper's Island in the Pacific. He would like to know what was the Report of the Commission with regard to these places? Looking at the great size of the Empire and the large expense which would be incurred in these operations, the subject, of course, was by no means a small one; nevertheless, he hoped it would be faced as soon as possible. But however important the defence of the stations abroad might be, he thought the importance of their Home defences was even greater, because it was perfectly clear—and he was not an alarmist as to the question of invasion—that a piratical expedition might take 321 place at any time during a European War, which would cause such an amount of damage to be done as would take, perhaps, years to repair. At all events, some of their most important harbours might be placed under contribution, an event which would be extremely disagreeable. He did not think that hon. Members were sufficiently alive to these considerations, and that they hardly knew how little had been done in this matter. They knew that the military ports—for so he might call them—of Portsmouth, Plymouth, Pembroke, Sheerness, and Chatham were in a very fair state of defence; but when they came to what he might properly call their commercial harbours, they found that almost all of them were in a very poor state of defence. Of course, were they in possession of any certain information, such as that which he understood had been reported upon by a Departmental Committee, they would be more able to judge correctly than they were at the present moment. But when he mentioned London, Liverpool, Hull, Glasgow, Southampton, Edinburgh, Newcastle, Bristol, Swansea, Belfast, Sunderland, Folkestone, Newhaven, Yarmouth, Littlehampton, Galway, and other places, the Committee would see at once what an enormous list there was of ports practically undefended. Let the Committee consider for one moment the South and West Coasts of England. The South Coast of the country was comparatively well provided with defences undoubtedly; but on the West Coast there was nothing of the sort. What the defences of Liverpool were he was not prepared to say; he believed that something had been done, although not very much. Then again with regard to the East Coast, which was, perhaps, the most vulnerable of all, they knew there was not on that Coast a harbour accessible between Dover and the Firth of Forth—a distance of 560 miles—except Harwich, which was not accessible in all weathers. He asked if it was right that the country should remain in the position described with regard to Coast defences, considering the powerful neighbours they had at that moment. When they considered that they had had and were passing through a very complicated state of foreign affairs, and supposed for a moment the country at war with Germany, France, or another of the Great Powers of Europe, 322 and that there was a rising in Ireland, he believed they would perceive that the consequences which might follow from a piratical expedition would be very serious. Again, the question was one which certainly ought not to have been brought on at a time when the House was very empty; because he would have been very glad to learn what were the views of hon. Members who represented the many places he had named on the seaboard of the United Kingdom. He was not without hope, however, that the invitation which had been that evening extended to them by the noble Marquess would produce some expression of their opinions upon this most important matter; but of this he was quite certain—whether it was a question of Imperial fortification or a question of local fortification, it was equally impossible to exaggerate the importance of the subject. He would be the last person to ask the Government—or, indeed, any Government—to come down with a full and complete plan; but he did think that when this Commission, which had sat for four years, had reported, not a moment ought to be lost by the Government in maturing their plans; at all events, they might give the House a somewhat more detailed sketch of what they proposed to do, and the manner in which they proposed to find the money necessary for these works. He would impress upon the noble Marquess and upon the Government that this question, however insignificant it might now appear, would some day have an importance which would certainly throw an enormous amount of responsibility upon past and present Governments if it were found in time of emergency, in time of war and danger, that in consequence of the delay, want of action, and want of energy on the part of the Government, the country was totally unprotected against the attacks of any enemy who thought proper to put its ports and harbours under contribution on account of the inadequate state of their defences. He had now only to apologize to the Committee for bringing forward this question in an almost empty House; but he had no alternative. That, however, did not take away anything from the importance of the subject; and, whatever they might think, he hoped he had succeeded in calling the attention of the Representatives of the 323 ports and harbours of the Kingdom to the great question of their defence.
§ MR. C. M. PALMERsaid, the question of the defence of their commercial harbours was one of the utmost importance; and as the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War had invited an expression of opinion from those Members whose constituencies were on the seaboard, he (Mr. Palmer) ventured to express the opinions he held upon the question. The question was one to which for some time past he had paid great attention, from the position he held of having the honour to command an Engineer Volunteer Corps something like 1,300 strong; and he felt that if Volunteers were really to be utilized for the defence of our shores they ought certainly to be the Engineers Corps. He made overtures to the late Government in the hope of inducing them to utilize the Engineer Volunteers for our harbour defences; but the overtures fell through in consequence of Volunteers not being permitted to receive pay more than the capitation grant. Latterly he had followed the question up, and he believed that the example he had set was about to be followed by the commanders of other Engineer Volunteer Corps throughout our harbours, as he understood that similar steps to his were being taken on the part of the Engineer Volunteer Corps on the Clyde, Mersey, and at other places, so that the question was becoming one of national importance, more especially as the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) had said that he contemplated the possibility of the localities contributing something towards the cost of the harbour defences. He (Mr. Palmer) had taken upon himself the cost of experimenting his men in sub-marine mining, and in sending companies of the corps in order that they might be associated with, and go through the drill upon, sub-marine mining with the Royal Engineers. He had lately sent two officers to Chatham to pass and obtain certificates in sub-marine mining. He had such a belief in the intelligence, physique, and general knowledge as practical artizans of the Engineer Volunteers that he felt that if the Government would only encourage the different corps which existed in the country, their harbour defences could be safely left in their hands, particularly if they were 324 occasionally brought in contact and drilled with the Royal Engineers. There were two courses open to the Government—namely, to increase very considerably the number of Royal Engineers, and construct large fortifications around their Coast; or else to encourage, by an increased capitation grant, the Engineer Volunteers. Personally, he thought that the most economical, as well as the most efficient, plan would be to utilize the men who were on the spot, and who were competent to perform the duties of defence. He had ventured to make these observations in the hope that the authorities would be able to see their way to offer additional inducements to very efficient and deserving Engineer Volunteer Corps.
COLONEL STANLEYOf course, it would not be fair to criticize too closely the statement which the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) has made upon these two very important questions of natural defence; but, otherwise, I am bound to say that, if I understood him rightly—and I hope I did not—the conclusions at which he seems to have arrived are very extraordinary. The Commission to which reference has been made has been sitting for some years considering the defence of the Colonial ports; and at home a Committee has inquired into the defences of the mercantile ports. Now, taking the Colonial ports first, what, clearly, seems to be the outcome of all the investigation is, as the noble Marquess says, that the recommendations of the Committee have been very materially modified by competent authorities, no doubt the Inspector General of Fortifications and the Inspector General of Artillery. The result, however, appears to be this—that something is to be done at Aden, and that the Government admit their responsibility for Simon's Bay; but, as regards other places, the magnificent offer the Government make to the Colonies is that if they wished to be defended, they must, in great measure, pay the expenses of the fortifications themselves, and, perhaps, the Imperial Government will be prepared to arm themselves. I do not know that I have repeated the noble Marquess's words; but that is the inference I draw from them. What I hope the noble Marquess will by no means lose sight of is the necessity of giving prominence to the fortifications 325 of Simon's Bay. What we want is to have coaling stations so distributed throughout the world that our ships may keep the sea in time of war, in constant readiness, and within reach of depôts where they can recoal and refit; the object is to preserve great naval coaling stations at the principal and convenient points of the world. I do not think I am mistaken in saying that in the opinion of the most competent authorities—all things considered, one of the most important stations, if not the most important station, in the world, is Simon's Bay, or, as it is commonly called, the Cape. I do not want to go into any vexed questions; but, assuming for the moment that negotiations such as we have heard of lately take place, and assuming that our present road to India through the Canal is to be considered as of secondary importance, it stands to reason that you must coal at the Cape of Good Hope, which will then assume even greater importance than it does at present. In other words, if in time of war, whether due to diplomatic reasons or to the events of the moment, the command of the Canal is taken from you, you will have to fall back upon a long sea passage. I know there are many persons in this House who think that before long the improvements in steam navigation will make it a matter of great indifference whether we go round by the Cape or through the Canal. As, however, I have no desire to enter into extraneous subjects, I will pass that by. What I want to do is to show that from whatever point of view you approach the question, the Cape is one of the most important coaling stations we can possibly have. There are places of scarcely minor importance, such as Singapore and Hong Kong; and what I hope we shall be clearly told by the Government is what they intend to do. Are they going to say to the Colonies—"If you like to make these fortifications we will arm them, or we will bear half the expense; or if you will, by local effort, man them, we will build them for you." These are three direct propositions to which I think we ought to have an answer. So far as regards the leading considerations concerning the Colonial defences. Now, as to the question of the Home ports. I must say that something fell on that subject from the noble Marquess, which I think was almost as extraordinary as 326 any statement we have heard. Are the fortifications which it may be necessary to build for the protection of Liverpool, or Newcastle, or Hull, to be taken off the Imperial charge and thrown on the different localities? Liverpool, for instance, must, under any circumstances, be the port, in a certain sense, for Manchester, and other inland towns; yet if any works for its defence are necessary, is the charge to be thrown upon Liverpool itself? Such a proposition is entirely new, so far as questions of natural defence are concerned; and I can only hope I have misinterpreted the expressions which fell from the noble Marquess on the subject. Does the noble Marquess mean that the defences are to be provided out of national money, and are the forts of which he spoke to be manned by local Volunteers? I think we want a little more information than we have got on this point. I do not say that the noble Marquess could at present have given us more information; but, at the same time, he has just told us enough to make us a little anxious about the principle which may, perhaps, be involved. We must all have listened with pleasure to the observations of the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr. C. M. Palmer). The hon. Gentleman is very well qualified in every respect to speak upon these questions; he has contributed both in time and in money very much to the efficiency of a very fine corps which he commands. I think it is great evidence of the hon. Gentleman's public spirit that he should have taken upon himself the burden of experiments such as those he has in general terms referred to. I believe that what he sketched out is entirely in the right direction, because local Volunteer corps, in which many excellent artizans find a place, are the best bodies to deal with local defence. Probably there will be in such corps a class of men better qualified both scientifically and practically to deal with sub-marine questions than even the engineers themselves. But what we want to know on this point is, first of all, how far the incidence of these fortifications is to rest with the Colonies, and, at home, how much is to be left to local effort? I hope the noble Marquess will be able to give us further information on this point. I must say that the subject comes upon us with rather 327 startling effect; and, therefore, I trust we shall receive more definite information.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI think I have some right to feel somewhat surprised at the tone which has been adopted by the right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Stanley) and the noble Lord the Member for West Essex (Lord Eustace Cecil) on this subject. Surely the subject of the defence of our coaling stations and Colonial Possessions, and of our commercial harbours at home, is one which can be discussed quietly and dispassionately. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman and the noble Lord seem to think that the importance of the subject was a discovery of their own. It is rather strange that when the late Government were not very energetic themselves, some of its Members should accuse us of apathy in reference to the military defences of the Empire.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONThe tone of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman's speech in itself attributed apathy to Her Majesty's present Advisers.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILI never used the word.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI know right hon. Gentlemen opposite did take steps during their tenure of Office to appoint a Commission to report on the state of the defences of the Colonial coaling stations, and of our Colonial Possessions. It is an extremely easy step to take to appoint a Commission, the labours of which we may hope to extend over a number of years, but it is not an easy task to deal with the recommendations of that Commission when they are received. And even when you have made up your mind what you would like to do with the Report, it is a still more difficult task to ascertain exactly from what quarter the funds are to be provided with which to carry the recommendations into effect. I have stated in what manner the Government propose to deal with the Report of the Royal Commission on Colonial Defences. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Colonel Stanley) stated that great importance—and I entirely agree with him—ought to be attached to the defences of the Cape of 328 Good Hope. Well, Sir, the proposal which I have said has been made to the Colonial Government is, that the Imperial Government should undertake the defences of Simon's Bay if the Colonial Government were inclined to take the necessary measures for the defences of Table Bay, which, I understand, is more important as a commercial than as a naval station. That appears to me to be not an unfair proposition. Then as to Singapore and Hong Kong. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman expressed some surprise that all we have done is to invite the co-operation of the Colonial authorities in paying the necessary expenses of the fortifications of those possessions. It appears to me it is not an unreasonable proposition considering the magnitude of the commercial interests which are involved, considering the enormous benefits which would accrue to the Colonies from a position of security. It is not an unusual proposition to make on the part of the Imperial Government that the expense of these fortifications should not fall entirely upon the Imperial taxpayer, but should be borne in part, and in very great part, by the Colonies which will be directly benefited by the defences. Then, Sir, as to the question of the incidence of the cost of the defences of our commercial harbours at home, I have not expressed any opinion on the part of the Government. All I have said is, that the extent to which this subject will be taken up, and, probably still more, brought to a conclusion, depends in great measure upon the solution of the question as to how far the localities are prepared to go in the matter. There is a good deal to be said in favour of the localities contributing some portion of the necessary expense of the fortifications or the other defences required. The noble Lord (Lord Eustace Cecil) read a long list of commercial harbours on our coast. No one, however, supposes that Parliament is to be at the expense of fortifying all the harbours enumerated. If that is so, and if, as is most probable, Parliament could only consent to undertake the defences of those which are most important, it appears to me, as I have said before, there would be some unfairness; because we should be conferring upon the principal commercial harbours defences additional to those which nature has conferred upon them, 329 whilst the less favourable localities would be left out in the cold. I did not announce any settled conclusion on the part of the Government on the subject. I only threw it out as a suggestion which I hoped would be received with consideration both by Parliament and the country; and I think if it should appear that the different localities are disposed to undertake a portion of the necessary expense of their defences, it would probably contribute to the speedy settlement of the question.
§ SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHI think the complaint of my right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley) was that the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) had only thrown the subject out as one for consideration, and that he had not announced any definite policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government, beyond a desire that the localities should, in fact, initiate the works which are necessary to be undertaken at particular places.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI stated that the recommendations of the Committee had come before me very recently indeed. It was only with the object of saving time that I mentioned the point for consideration. The subject is not in that state that it is capable of receiving definite consideration from the Government.
§ SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHI do not wish to dwell upon that point, beyond expressing the hope that the initiation of the works may not be left dependent upon the willingness of the localities, but that when Her Majesty's Government have decided that works are necessary the initiation of the matter may, when the time comes, and I hope it will come soon, be undertaken by the Government. What I was anxious to do was to make a few remarks on the Report of the Commission which has for some time been in the hands of the Government. I understand the noble Marquess has this evening stated to the Committee the intentions of Her Majesty's Government with regard to that Report. I do not think that my right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley), or my noble Friend (Lord Eustace Cecil), at all wished to deal with this matter in the spirit which was attributed to them by the noble Marquess. Of course there are difficulties in the matter. It is, as the noble Marquess remarks, one thing 330 to appoint a Commission, and another thing to carry out the recommendations of that Commission; but even in the remarks of the noble Marquess himself I think it was possible to detect some kind of feeling that as much was not about to be done as he would like to be done. He remarked that you might like to do some things, and then you would have to find the means to do them; and he almost intimated to the Committee that, as many of the recommendations of this important Commission were not about to be carried out, as he himself would like to see carried out, if only the means for the purpose were provided. Now, I do not think it is possible for the Government or for the House to deal with a more important question than the one under consideration. It is a question which is beyond and above all Party differences; and, for my own part, I only wish that Her Majesty's Government had seen their way to carry out what I believe to be the recommendations of this Royal Commission to a far greater extent than the noble Marquess has given us to understand they will be carried out. I do not believe that the House or the country would grudge any expenditure that may be necessary in this matter knowing, as they must know, that it is the most effective insurance for our Empire and the liberties of the country. The noble Marquess stated as a principle which apparently was to underlie all the acts of the Government in this matter, that the localities were to bear one part of the expense, and the Imperial Government the other part. I do not wish to quarrel with that principle where it can be fairly applied. I think it may be very well, as he suggested, that at the Cape the Colonial authorities should be called upon to take any necessary measures for the defence of Table Bay, while Simon's Bay is to be left to the Imperial authorities, Simon's Bay being the most important station in that part of the world. In the same way with Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a rich Colony; it can afford considerable expenditure, it ought to be called upon to bear considerable expenditure in this matter, and the Imperial Government has in its power to compel Hong Kong to bear any portion of expenditure which may be properly thrown upon the Colony. I am sure there is considerable expenditure required in the defence of Hong 331 Kong, and I hope Her Majesty's Government will treat the matter liberally, and will take care that what is done is done in a thoroughly efficient manner, so that Hong Kong will be made, as it ought to be, a securely fortified position. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of that position to our trade and commerce in the Eastern Seas. A good deal is unquestionably required to be done at Singapore, and I think it would be possible to require as much of the expense to be locally met there as at Hong Kong. I should have been very glad, indeed, if we could have heard from Her Majesty's Government that the recommendations of this Royal Commission were to be carried out in their entirety. The Commission was appointed by the late Government with the desire of obtaining an impartial and fair opinion upon all the grave questions submitted to it. The present Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Childers) served on that Commission, and when he assumed Office he was succeeded by another Member of the House not less qualified to deal with such matters. It was a Commission appointed impartially as regards politics, in the hope and belief that it would be possible to deal with these questions, as they must be dealt with, entirely apart from Party politics. I do not believe, speaking as I do with very imperfect knowledge of what the recommendations are, that that Commission would recommend anything that it was not absolutely necessary to do, or that they would recommend anything except what was forced upon them by the very best evidence that could be obtained in all quarters of the world. I do not believe that if the matter were clearly placed before the country, the country will grudge this expenditure, recommended as it is by the highest authority which has carefully considered the subject, and I hope that what is now done will be only the beginning of a thorough carrying out of the recommendations of the Royal Commission.
§ MR. WHITLEYsaid, this country had always believed that whatever might be the arrangements with regard to Colonial defences, yet the whole of England and the Colonies were but one country, and the defences ought to be a matter of national expenditure. The suggestion thrown out by the noble Marquess would be received with great 332 astonishment, and would be a great injustice to the localities concerned. Surely if any places should be defended it was the great commercial centres, which were the great sources of the wealth of this country; and he hoped the noble Marquess would hesitate before he again made such a suggestion. He thought the right hon. Baronet had done great service by calling attention to this matter.
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERwished to say, in reply to the hon. Member for South Durham's inquiry as to torpedo drill, that Treasury sanction had been obtained for the appointment of a Royal Engineer, as extra sergeant instructor for torpedo drill to the Durham and Newcastle Corps. He felt confident that the skilled engineers in his hon. and gallant Friend's Corps would gladly avail themselves of this opportunity for instruction, while the Tyne, since the Corps was formed also of Newcastle men, would afford peculiar facilities for the practice. He considered this new drill with torpedoes as in the nature of an experiment, which, if successful, could, with great advantage to the country, be extended to other Volunteer Engineer Corps. With regard to his hon. Friend's second question of an increase of allowances, that was a large question, which could not be dealt with now, but only when the Estimates were being framed in the Autumn.
SIR HENRY FLETCHERsaid, there was an item of £3,000 with respect to Wormwood Scrubbs; but he had understood that the ranges were closed some months ago. The Household Cavalry used to have the benefit of these ranges; but they had been closed, and he thought some explanation of this item should be given.
§ SIR EDMUND LECHMEREasked for some information as to the old military hospital at Malta; and quoted a Report made by Captain Galton as to the defective condition of the hospital. This matter, he said, had been under the consideration of the Military Authorities for more than 20 years, and plans had been submitted to them; but nothing had been done. This hospital had the advantage of being isolated, and was also well placed with respect to ventilation. He hoped to receive from the noble Marquess an assurance that some steps would be taken in this matter 333 without any undue delay. Considering the near approach of cholera, it seemed most important that this question should be decided as soon as possible.
§ MR. MAGNIACsaid, anyone acquainted with Hong Kong must be aware that upon it centred an enormous China trade, and that very little was required to make it a strong place, and at no considerable expenditure. At the present moment there was a good example of the need of such a place as a coaling station in the proceedings of the French at Tonquin. If the Tonquinese had had a few gunboats they could have stopped the action of the French, who had no place where their transports could coal; and it would be a frightful thing if their trade at Hong Kong, which was vastly greater than that of the French, were placed in such a position. In the event of the loss of Hong Kong, the nearest port would be Vancouver's Island; and no one could tell what would happen to India and China if Hong Kong were lost. He thought this matter deserved serious consideration by the Government; and then, with regard to Gibraltar, he believed it would be impossible for more than one or two iron-clads to moor there in safety for coaling purposes, while the mail steamers upon which we depended in case of war for our communications had to coal in the open bay. In case of war with Spain, the Spaniards with a couple of guns could destroy mail steamers, coal hulks, and all the vessels in the place. He hoped the Government would call for a Report from the Engineers' Department, and that vigorous steps would be taken in these matters.
SIR FREDERICK FITZ-WYGRAMasked the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War why the ranges for the use of the Household Cavalry at Windsor had been stopped?
§ MR. BRANDsaid, he did not think there was any doubt that the erection of a new hospital at Malta was a matter of great importance, and it would receive serious consideration. With regard to Wormwood Scrubbs, it had been found, some time ago, that the firing was dangerous to the public. An officer had been sent to Belgium to inspect the ranges in that country, and on his Report a sum of £3,000 had been taken this year for the construction of a range on the model of the Belgium 334 ranges. That, he believed, would enable Volunteers to practise without danger to the public. With regard to the question put by the hon. and gallant Member for North Hants, he was not acquainted with the circumstances respecting the practice of the Household Cavalry at Windsor.
§ Question put, and agreed to.
§ (7.) £127,200, Establishments for Military Education.
§ MAJOR-GENERAL ALEXANDERwished to ask what decision the noble Marquess had arrived at with regard to the promotion of captains to the rank of major; and whether he proposed to introduce any modifications in the present system? The new examinations were introduced in July, 1881, and all purchase captains were properly exempted from the new provisions. It was also provided that all captains who had held the rank of captain for five years at the date of the warrant should be subject to an examination in tactics only. This last rule had operated very unfairly, because it was only advantageous to those officers whose promotion had been rapid, while subalterns who had been 13 or 14 years in that rank were passed over. Some regiments had been peculiarly unfortunate. He would instance the Northumberland Fusiliers. Promotion in that regiment had been particularly slow, and the consequence was that subalterns who had been 13 or 15 years in that rank had been passed over. The noble Marquess had said the other day that these officers were not turned out of the Army. That was true; but if they remained, they were sure to be superannuated, and would have no chance of promotion; and as they were almost all purchase subalterns, they would have to forfeit their purchase-money. He had suggested to the noble Marquess what he thought would be a fair remedy; and that was, that all officers who had entered the Army under the purchase system before the 1st of November, 1871, should be subject to examination in tactics only; that they should have the advantages given by the Royal Warrant of 1881 to those captains who had been five years in that rank. He hoped the noble Marquess was prepared to adopt some such plan. With regard to examinations generally, although he was no enemy to them, he 335 thought they should be reserved for young men, believing it to be rather hard to call upon elderly men to pass examinations. That was not done in any other Profession, and he did not see why these examinations should be applied in the Army. If they were good at all, they were good for all Professions.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he must remind the hon. and gallant Member, with regard to the system of examinations being applied only to the Army, that in the Law and in the Church promotion was by selection. A clergyman had no right to promotion by reason of his position; nor had he a right to become a Dean or a Bishop; but in the case of promotion from captain to major, the promotion did practically go by senority; and, therefore, there was a reason for these examinations in the Army which did not exist in regard to other professions. The subject had, however, been referred to the Military and Educational Authorities, and it was considered by them that there was no practical hardship imposed on the officers. The present system had been in force for a considerable time; men had passed the examinations and obtained promotion under the system, and he was afraid he could not undertake to propose the changes suggested.
§ COLONEL KINGSCOTEobserved that these officers might know all their duties perfectly well, and yet, because they could not pass an examination by garrison and other instructors, they were disqualified. They were efficient officers; but they had before them this bugbear of going back to school.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that the examination of the officers was entirely of a professional character. They had not to be examined by the Civil Service Commissioners, but by Military Courts, and the examination was in regard to subjects which were useful, which no officer ought to be unacquainted with, and which ample opportunities were given him to be instructed in. His hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Kingscote) was not well informed if he thought officers had to go back again to school to learn the subjects in which, on entering the Army, they were examined by the Civil Service Commissioners. The examination was thoroughly professional.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTwished to ask one question as to the examination on entrance into the Army. He had, some time ago, seen it stated that the marks for English had been cut down. It was said that in many of the cramming institutions they had found out what the subjects were to be, and had, of course, availed themselves of the knowledge, not giving so much attention to English. Now, he should have thought that the one thing most necessary to learn and to know was one's own language; but that was the thing in which so many were deficient. He should like to know how far the reduction in marks for English was sanctioned by the Military Authorities?
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, that the marks for English had been increased, and not diminished. They had been raised from 1,500 to 2,000. The highest figure was 3,000 marks. That was given for mathematics, and also for one ancient language—Latin—and two modern—French and German. In the next class of subjects stood English History, the marks for which, as he had said, had been increased from 1,500 to 2,000. Experimental Sciences—such as chemistry and electricity—had been raised from 1,500 to 2,000, as also had Geography. These were the main alterations which had been made, and he could assure the hon. and gallant Baronet that instead of there having been a decrease in the marks for English History, as he supposed, there had been an increase.
§ MAJOR-GENERAL ALEXANDERsaid, he wished to say a word as to the officers who had been five years captains at the date of the Royal Warrant—1st July, 1881. What he wanted to impress upon the noble Marquess was that the rule, although well intended, gave advantage to those officers whose promotion had been exceptionally rapid. In those unfortunate regiments where officers had been subalterns for 13 or 14 years it was, of course, absolutely impossible that they could have been captains for the requisite number of years. The rule had not been made by the noble Marquess, but by his Predecessor; and, as he had said, no doubt it had been well intended. It was a premium upon rapid promotion, and operated very injuriously against those officers whose promotion had been slow. There was another point which he wished to press on the attention of 337 the noble Marquess. Many of the officers had obtained the necessary, and more than the necessary, number of marks in each one of the subjects, but had failed to obtain the aggregate number required. That appeared to be a very unfair rule. If an officer could obtain the number of marks required for each subject, what did it matter whether he had or had not obtained the aggregate number? Notwithstanding the decision the noble Marquess had declared he had arrived at, he (Major-General Alexander) still hoped he would reconsider the matter, because it had really been causing the greatest possible discontent in the Army. Many of the officers in question were good officers. All the five officers of the Northumberland Fusiliers were adjutants; one was an M.A. of Oxford, one had been very successful in musketry at Hythe, and a third was acting as adjutant in the county he (Major-General Alexander) now represented (South Ayrshire), and felt it hard, because he had been away from his regiment so long, that he should now be passed over by his juniors, who had remained with the regiment, and had had an opportunity of working up which he had not had.
SIR HENRY FLETCHERwished to put a question to the noble Marquess on a matter he had referred to when the Estimates were last under discussion, but as to which he had received no reply, for the reason that there did not happen to be on the Front Bench anyone connected with the War Office. Probably what he had stated had not reached the eyes or ears of the Secretary of State for War. The question was, whether captains were still promoted provisionally pending their passing the examinations? He had brought forward the case of an officer who was promoted provisionally from a battalion in India to a battalion in Malta. It had taken him some considerable time to reach his destination; he afterwards went with his regiment to Egypt, served through the Egyptian Campaign, and ultimately reached Cairo. It would be seen from this description that the officer he was referring to had had no opportunity of studying or of making himself acquainted with the examination requirements. After having been some weeks at Cairo, this officer was called on to go up for his examination for promotion to 338 the rank of major, and failed in some minor point. His provisional appointment as major was at once cancelled, and he was reduced to the rank and pay of captain. This officer, who had served for something like 18 or 19 years in Her Majesty's Service, felt this so much, that he sent in his papers, and retired from the Army. He (Sir Henry Fletcher) had also mentioned, the case of another officer, which had come within his own knowledge—a case where an officer who had been ordered up for examination in July last year had an officer who was fifteenth on the list of captains promoted over his head. The authorities at the War Office must have known that the officer to whom he was alluding was about to go up for his examination. This gentleman had suffered very seriously, for, perhaps, now he might be for ever precluded from obtaining the command of a regiment. Another matter of great interest to officers in the Army was the statement made recently by the noble Marquess as to some alterations to be made in the examinations. He (Sir Henry Fletcher) would like to know this—Supposing an officer was promoted to the rank of major over the heads of three or four, or, it might be, two or three others, would the senior officer, whom he had pushed aside, if he eventually passed his examination—on the second opportunity which he (Sir Henry Fletcher) understood was to be given to him—be placed in his former position as senior to the one who had been promoted in the meantime? That was a matter which had been brought before him by many officers in the Army, and it would be a source of very great satisfaction to those captains who were going up for their examinations for the rank of major if the noble Marquess could give a favourable reply on this subject.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, that, so far as he could follow the question of the hon. Member, it was a repetition of one put that afternoon by the hon. and gallant Member for North Leicestershire (Major Curzon). The answer he (the Marquess of Harrington) had given was to the effect that before giving a decision he should like to wait until such a case as that suggested occurred. He believed such a case had not yet arisen. When it did, he should refer it to the Military Autho- 339 rities, who would give it their best consideration. It was not possible for him to give an answer as to a case which had not yet arisen. With regard to the observations of the hon. and gallant Member (Major-General Alexander), it appeared to him that the question raised was part of a large and complicated one. As the hon. and gallant Member was aware, many of the questions had been settled before he (the Marquess of Hartington) took the Office he now held. It seemed inconvenient to re-open the question; but he would bring it before the attention of his Colleagues at the War Office.
§ MR. TOMLINSONsaid, there was a question germane to this Vote which he wished to ask with regard to the tactical examination of Volunteer officers. As things were, the examination in tactics always took place at the headquarters of the district, and the officers had sometimes to travel long distances to get there. It was felt as a grievance that in these cases no allowance was made for expenses. When these officers had spent a great deal of time and labour on preparing themselves for such examinations, it was hard that they should have to pay their own travelling expenses.
§ SIR ARTHUR HAYTERsaid, that this question should have been put upon Vote 7—the Volunteer Vote; but if the hon. Member desired it, he would be very happy to look into the question.
§ Vote agreed to.
§ MR. CARINGTONmoved to report Progress.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."—(Mr. Carington.)
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he was anxious to meet the wishes of the Committee. As the next Vote would probably lead to considerable discussion, he should be willing to agree to Progress being reported.
§ MR. PULESTONstated that the next Vote was an important one, raising, as it did, the question of the Contagious Diseases Acts. Many deputations had waited on the noble Marquess on the subject, and great interest was taken in it; therefore, he should like to know when the discussion would be taken?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he could not say when it would be possible to bring on the Army Estimates again, and he should not like to give an undertaking on the point. He would suggest whether the subject hon. Members wished to discuss could not be raised on the Naval Vote.
MR. GORSTasked when the Naval Vote would be taken? They were repeatedly putting that question, but could get no answer.
§ MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCKthought it would be well to go on with the discussion of the next Vote on the next Government day, whilst military subjects were in the minds of the Committee.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONreplied, that the requirements of the Public Service would render it necessary for other subjects to be dealt with. Could they not raise the discussion they were anxious to raise on another Vote?
§ MR. PULESTONsaid, they had abstained from bringing the subject before the Committee until they reached Vote 15, in order to meet the views and wishes of the noble Marquess himself. It was hard the noble Marquess should quarrel with them now for having acted upon his suggestion last year. The Secretary to the Admiralty was not present, and they did not know when the Navy Estimates would be taken. Besides, with great respect, he would suggest that they connected the noble Marquess especially with this matter, for the reason that he had moved in it last year. The Committee desired to know something about the Bill of last year, and something about the addition which was to be made to it, if the measure was to be introduced at all.
§ MR. CAUSTONsaid, there were also other matters which hon. Members desired to bring before the Committee. He himself had a point to submit as to military staff clerks, and he had been sitting in the House all the evening in the hope that they would reach the Vote upon which this subject could be discussed. Now, unfortunately, they were going to report Progress at an early hour, knowing perfectly well that there would be very little chance of discussing the matter at a future date. He sincerely 341 trusted that the Army Estimates would be put down for such a day as to insure a discussion being taken which was of so much importance to many people concerned.
§ MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCKsaid, that as the noble Marquess had been good enough to remind them of one thing, he (Mr. Cavendish Bentinck) would remind the noble Marquess of another, which was that under Vote 9 there was an Estimate for police. If he had ventured to address the Committee on the subject which had been referred to under that Vote he would have been called to Order; and that was the reason why he desired to postpone the observations he had to offer on Vote 9 until the subject came before the Committee in its full form under Vote 15.
§ MR. WARTONsaid, he hoped the Government would make further progress with the Estimates that night. It had been perfectly understood early on that they were to have a good night with the Estimates. The Government seemed always anxious to put off a subject when there was a good opportunity of discussing it. The hour was not late, they had the proper officials in attendance, and he, therefore, must earnestly protest against Progress being reported. He had never known a Member of the Government on an ordinary occasion agree to reporting Progress at so early an hour as half-past 12. It might be good policy for the Government to put off the Committee with promises which they expected would come to nothing with regard to taking certain discussions.
CAPTAIN MAXWELL-HERONsaid, he hoped that, at all events, next year arrangements would be made by which all military subjects could be discussed before the first Vote was passed. He was very sorry that he had put himself out of Order that night; but it was through a pure misunderstanding.
COLONEL STANLEYsaid, he hoped hon. Gentlemen behind him would not insist on dividing against the Motion, because he believed that though many of them might be prepared to go on discussing the Estimates some time longer, discretion must be left with the noble Marquess and those who had to arrange the Business of the House.
§ Motion agreed to.
342§ Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.
§ Committee to sit again upon Wednesday.