§ MR. STOREYOn several occasions, in fact on many of the early days of the Session, I painfully attempted to obtain from the Foreign Office some information regarding the captive crew of the Nisero; and I have not been able to satisfy myself, on behalf of those for whom I now speak, that the Foreign Office has exhibited that energy and determination which it ought to have done. On Monday I gave Notice of a series of Questions, expecting that the noble Lord (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) would be able this afternoon to give such an answer as would relieve the intense anxiety which prevails; but I find that the answer which he gave was misleading.
§ MR. SPEAKERThe hon. Gentleman is not in Order in making a statement. [Cries of "Move, move!"]
§ MR. STOREYI will put myself in Order, Sir, by moving the Adjournment of this House in order to discuss a subject of urgent public importance.
§ MR. SPEAKERAn hon. Member proposes to move the Adjournment of the House for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance—namely, that the condition of a British crew now captive and in imminent danger of death in Sumatra, and the dilatoriness of the Foreign Office in taking effectual steps for their release.
But the pleasure of the House not having been signified, Mr. SPEAKER called on those Members who supported the Motion to rise in their places, and not less than Forty Members having accordingly risen in their places,
§ MR. STOREYsaid: I should not have taken this course this evening were it not for the extreme anxiety with which the friends of the imprisoned men are filled. Let anyone who think I act improperly listen to the following extract from a letter received from the father of a young boy now in prison in 1892 Sumatra, and when he has heard that, I venture to think he will not blame me for the step I have deemed it my duty to take. That gentleman says—
The authorities of the Foreign Office seem to delight in mystification and delay. One feels almost heart-broken to think of the waste of precious time, and that while the officials are complimenting each other the captives are perishing.If I thought that any action of mine would operate against the captives I would be very glad to preserve silence, as I have done on many occasions. But what are the facts? It is now 232 days since those men were first brought into captivity. For two months they were on the coast, and since then they have never been for more than a night or two above 12 miles distant from the shore. That shore is within three days' sail of a British establishment with a naval and military force, and notwithstanding that we have been without information respecting those men for months together. Once during that long period they have been in absolute want of food. The only news we have been able to obtain is that first one and then three of them are dead. Then, curiously enough, the moment news of this serious importance comes to the House and the country, we have increased action on the part of the Foreign Office; but whilst no news came there was no action. I freely admit that this is a difficult and delicate question, and I would not simply stand here to find fault with the Government if I thought that our officials had committed no more than an error of judgment. But I find, after a laborious examination of the Papers, that our officials in England have ignored the opinions and well-considered views of the officials on the spot, and neglected to take any action as advised by them. In making these observations I hope it will be understood that I make no accusations against our officials in the East. On the contrary, I am bound to admit that whether they be civil, military, or naval authorities, every one of them has exhibited enterprize and energy which I should wish to see imitated in this country. At the very earliest stage of all, the naval officer there, with a courage which one cannot sufficiently admire, proposed to cut the Gordian knot by landing his sailors and marines to rescue the men. One of our civil officers admits that if that had been done at the 1893 time it was proposed, the result would probably have been much, more satisfactory than have been the attempts since made by the Government of England on behalf of the crew. But methods familiar to Blake and Nelson are out of fashion in these mild and philanthropic days. We can apparently afford expeditions to deliver ruffians and convicts on the Coast of the Red Sea; but when men of our own kin are kept in captivity until they die off one by one like flies, then we realize the impropriety of using force to rescue those of our own blood. The Foreign Office made a mistake in the latter days of last year. I am not going to press the error of judgment strongly against them, because everyone may err. But what they do is this—instead of believing this was an English matter to be dealt with by the English Government, they leave the matter to be dealt with by the Dutch Government. Now, if they had done that under the advice of the officials on the spot I would not consider them to. blame; as a matter of fact they were warned, not by one, but by every official on the spot, that that precise method would result in failure. On November 24, Consul Kennedy wrote that there would be a chance of the surrender of the crew to the British, but not to the Dutch Government. On December 26, Lloyd's agent said, "Dutch powerless." On December 13, Governor Weld said, "The Dutch cannot get the men," and therefore he recommended that the Government should try direct negotiations. The Government, instead of accepting that advice of the officials, withdrew the Pegasus from the station, and left to the Dutch the release of those English captives. This was a great mistake. Now, what did the Dutch do? Count Bylandt, the Dutch Ambassador in this country, wrote on December 29th to the Foreign Office that the officials at Acheen only intended to employ force in case the shipwrecked prisoners were maltreated or assassinated. An admirable method, truly, of delivering them! But what happened? Within nine days of that declaration of the Dutch Government, whilst our men were not being ill-treated, the Dutch suddenly landed troops and burnt down the Rajah's town. They made no attempt to deliver the captives. They did not land any troops to surround the small town; they simply shelled it 1894 from the sea, and while it was burning, and when the Rajah had retired into the country, they landed, and there was a skirmish which was dignified in the despatch as a serious engagement. It is not my opinion alone that the Dutch did not care to deliver the captives. Here is the deliberate statement of Governor Weld written on February 2nd, and received at home on March 6th. He says that "the expedition as carried out was ill-advised in the interests of the crew." The conclusion is obvious. The Dutch simply cared to keep open the dispute with the Rajah, whom they had failed to conquer, and it was a matter of indifference to them what became of the crew. If it were a matter of indifference to them, how much the more reason why the British Government should keep in view mainly the safety of these men. I admit that the mistakes of the Foreign. Office, and the slowness of the action of the Government, might find excuse in the fact that so far the whole bearing of the case could not be known to Ministers at home. But without labouring the point of their conduct between November when the news came, and January when the Dutch expedition failed, I must ask the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whose reticence I confess I admire, to explain to me two or three later matters which have most painfully impressed, not only myself, but a very large number of persons throughout the country. Will the noble Lord explain how it was that in February, three months after the men had gone into captivity, the responsible Adviser of the Crown (the Earl of Derby), who was at the head of the Colonial Office, had not taken the trouble to read the Papers, or to understand, in the slightest degree, the circumstances of the case? I charge upon that noble Lord an indolence which I hope is not characteristic of all his dealings with public affairs. He did not, on February 11, three months after the wreck, understand the simple A B C of a question which, the Government assures us, is intricate and difficult. I will give chapter and verse in proof of my assertion, and if I do, I shall ask the House to agree with me that the Ministers of the Crown have not exhibited that anxiety in this important matter which they might have done. On the 11th of February, the Dutch expedition having 1895 failed a month before, the Earl of Derby sent the following despatch to Governor Weld—Cannot undertake to name any sum now, or alter settled Acheen policy. Maxwell should first ascertain what ransom sufficient: hut if Tempoh repays pepper debt, why crew detained?Now listen to two short telegrams which the Earl of Derby had received prior to that date. First of all Governor Weld telegraphs on February 2, as follows:—Situation difficult since Dutch abortive attack. It is becoming evident money secondary; Rajah wants English protection; at least belligerent rights and free trade with English for Achineese. Crew, some ill, more delirious. No news since attack.That contains a distinct statement of what the Rajah really wanted, and the measure of the difficulty. At page 28, Governor Weld again telegraphs under date February 9—All concur prisoners readily given up if ports opened free trade English guarantee Sultan Acheen. Arbiter can go to him only by means of refugee Acheenese hostile to Dutch. Tempoh willing go with Maxwell. Rajah Tenom pay pepper debt. Rajah bears high character. No news of crew."—[Netherlands, No. 1 (1884), No. 64, p. 28.]The Governor of our settlement there deliberately sets out the bearings and magnitude of the difficulty the Government had to encounter; and yet on the 11th of February the Earl of Derby replies—"If Tempoh pays the pepper debt, why are the crew detained?" Why indeed? Had not Governor Weld told him? I can only come to the conclusion that he had not taken the trouble to read the Papers. While the Earl of Derby was in this state of ignorance, attempts were being made to obtain the release of the crew by direct negotiations through Mr. Maxwell. On March 22nd, Maxwell failed in his negotiations, and reported the fact by telegram to the Foreign Office. What did Lord Granville do? Observe, the case was this. The Dutch expedition had failed, and the English negotiations direct had also failed; and Lord Granville, receiving that intimation on the 22nd of March, communicated the fact to the Representative of the Dutch Government, and asked if his Government had got "any further news." Then, until the 26th of April, not one single thing more did the Foreign Minister for England do that I can find in these Papers to secure the 1896 release of these poor men. By this time, he not merely knew the danger in which the men were placed, but also the only way of escape. On January 25th, as hon. Members will see by the Papers, page 40, Governor Weld communicated to the Foreign Office very distinctly his views, and this was received by the Foreign Office on the 6th of March, 16 days before they were aware of the failure of Mr. Maxwell's negotiations. Says Governor Weld—I venture to recommend that diplomatic negotiations be set on foot with a view to some arrangement to secure freedom of trade and the avoidance of future difficulties like the Nisero case. In this case it should be distinctly understood that in my opinion no payment, even if it be considered right in policy to make a payment as a ransom, will avail without a promise, with our guarantee, to ameliorate the political condition of the Rajah and his people, and afford them some protection. If this is not done, the crew will probably die in captivity."—[Ibid. No. 78, p. 40.]Again, at page 57. the same Governor writes to the Earl of Derby, under date of February 9, and this was received by the Foreign Office on March 13—still before they learned the failure of Mr. Maxwell's negotiations — and in that despatch he says—No one person from whom I have sought information, whatever be his sympathies, doubts but that an English guarantee of open ports and free traffic with Penang, such as was undoubtedly contemplated by our Treaty with the Netherlands of 1871, would immediately effect the release of the detained crew."—[Ibid. No. 82, p. 57.]Yet again, at page 60, on the 17th of March, Governor Weld telegraphs home—Maxwell received well by Rajah. Conditions written. Free trade essential."—[Ibid. No. 86, p. 60.]Again, at page 76 of the Papers, Mr. Maxwell communicates to the Foreign Office his opinion, under date of March 22nd. He says—The only means by which they can be released, and the question settled, is by requesting the Dutch to carry out the spirit of their Treaty with us regarding freedom of trade, and at the same time offering mediation with the Sultan of Acheen, a course which would relieve them as well as the Acheenese from many difficulties. At present the Sultan and the Rajah of Tenom are masters of the position, and we may expect repetitions of the Nisero case whenever occasions present themselves."—[Ibid. No. 97, p. 76.]Whilst at page 86 Captain Bickford says— 1897At the conclusion of this stage of the Nisero affair, I would venture to remark that, in my opinion, the chances of release of crew are very email indeed, unless this free trade is granted.…. The Dutch are now apparently going to make use of native (Acheenese) allies to act against the Rajah. This may possibly succeed, but of course the risk to the imprisoned crew would he great."—[Ibid. No. 97, p. 86.]And finally, at page 87, Mr. Maxwell reiterates—I have now no hope that the crew of the Nisero will be peaceably surrendered to the Dutch, or to the English, unless free trade on the West Coast of Acheen is re-established as fully as it existed before the war." — [Ibid, No. 97, p. 87.]I think I have established conclusively that, from the 6th of March forward, the Government knew and understood the only conditions under which negotiations with the Dutch could be successful. Yet it was not till April 29th that Lord Granville spoke plainly to the Dutch Government. I should like, too, to direct the attention of the noble Lord to another point which has caused much feeling in the North Country, and some explanation of which, I think, he is bound to make to this House. It was on the 26th of April that the sad additional news came to England of the condition of these men. It was contained in a telegram found at page 94, and which reads as follows:—Latest news of Nisero 31st March. One, Italian, dead; three ill; in great straits from want of food. After consulting with Senior Naval Officer, suggest that ship of war use utmost endeavours to convey stores; but at the same time will be difficult to communicate."—[Ibid. No. 98, p. 94.]That telegram was supplemented by a letter from the Governor, saying that it would be easy to communicate by boats. The point I want to put to the noble Lord is this, and it is one which, I think, is very discreditable to the officials of the Foreign Office. That telegram is of a very simple nature. It is in effect—"Here are British subjects dying of starvation; give me instructions to send out ship with provisions to them." That telegram was sent to the Colonial Office, and thence to the Foreign Office on the same day. Therefore, on the 26th of April, Lord Granville and his subordinates were in possession of the fact that these men were dying from want of food. Saturday passed, Sunday passed, Monday passed, and nothing was done. No order was sent from the Foreign Office till the 29th of April. [Lord EDMOMD 1898 FITZMAURICE dissented.] The noble Lord (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) shakes his head. I can only follow the Papers, and if the Papers are wrong I am not to blame. According to the Papers, it is clear that no order was sent from the Foreign Office with regard to the ship until the 29th of April. I do not know whether the noble Lord will contradict that fact. I understood when he shook his head that he would. If he does he will have to correct his Papers, not me. So far as the Papers are concerned, it is quite clear that it was the 29th of April. Then the Earl of Derby telegraphed to Governor Weld—Make every effort to convey provisions to Nisero crew from either coast. Consult Maxwell and Senior Naval Officer. Supply requisite stores. Report fully by telegraph."—[Ibid. No. 105, p. 97.]That was certainly not received till the 30th of April. I ask whether the noble Lord does not think that very grave neglect was displayed by the officials of the Foreign Office in not sending that telegram before the 29th? I can assure him that in my own town, inhabited by sailors, the fact that for three whole days Lord Granville and his subordinates should have had in their possession knowledge of the fact that these men were without food, and that there were individuals itching with anxiety to send out a ship—that Saturday, Sunday, Monday, even till Tuesday—all that time should be allowed to pass before a single executive order was sent from the Foreign or Colonial Office, has caused very much dissatisfaction. I have left for a time the thread of my argument. I had arrived at the point when the Foreign Office learnt the only chance there was of obtaining the release of these men through the Dutch. When did Lord Granville act? I told the House that he had received information of the real facts on the 3rd, 6th, and 17th March. He never acted at all until the 26th April, when the sad news came of the death of this man, and the serious state of jeopardy of the others. In fact, as far as the Papers make it apparent, it would seem that all that time, from March 22 until April 26, when new circumstances had arisen to jog the memory of the Foreign Office, they sat quiescent, and allowed this state of things to go on. At last, on April 29, three days after the news came, and on the day the message I read went out, Lord Granville did write 1899 a despatch, which I must do the noble Lord the credit of saying was a firm despatch, to the Dutch Government, pointing out the circumstances, which he might just as well have pointed out at a time when there was some chance of doing good—namely, at the beginning of March. He wrote a despatch, I say, pointing out to the Dutch Government the serious consequences which might ensue if this case was allowed to create the feeling which it was calculated to create in England, and offering the mediation of the British Government between the Dutch and the Rajah of Tenom. Did the Dutch Government show such anxiety for the safety of these men as should induce the House to leave it in their hands? The despatch went out on the 29th April, and on the 8th May Lord Granville had again to write to the Dutch Minister begging him to Bend a reply. It came next day, and it was one which indicated very clearly that the Dutch Government did not consider so much the interests of our British subjects as its own interests in connection with the Rajah of Tenom. It absolutely declined the mediation of England. And why? Because the presence of the British as mediator might have a prejudicial effect upon the prestige of the Dutch authorities. On May 9th the reply came, and once again Lord Granville exhibits his "masterly inactivity." He has nothing more to say to the Dutch Government until the 31st May. Then he makes a further demand upon it. What had happened in the meantime? We left the men on the 31st March, one dead, the others ill, probably dying; and on May 27 Lord Granville received a despatch from our Acting Administrator there which seems once again to have stirred him up, for on 27th May the despatch dated the 20th April was received at the Foreign Office. Our Administrator says—Seeing that the Dutch authorities are apparently perfectly hopeless in the matter, and are doing nothing likely to have a practical effect; and whilst, further, it is abundantly clear that the members of the crew will drop off one by one unless suitable provisions and medicines are supplied to them. I have to-day telegraphed to your Lordship as follows:—'Latest news of Nisero, 31st March. One, Italian, dead, three ill. In great straits from want of food. After consulting with Senior Naval Officer, suggest that ship of war use utmost endeavours to convey stores; but at the same time will be difficult to communicate,'1900 And yet, with a knowledge of that despatch, the noble Lord tells me curtly to-day, when I put a specific inquiry to him as to what the Dutch Government had done, and were going to do, that I must wait owing to the fact that active negotiations are going on. In my judgment there have never been any active negotiations yet. At one time after another the Foreign Office has been galvanized into activity by the serious news which has arrived, and as soon as they possibly could they have dropped a matter which was naturally unpleasant, and which might by-and-bye settle itself. I freely admit to the noble Lord and everyone that hears me that it cannot be a thing to contemplate with a light heart that there should be any difficulty between us and a friendly Power like the Dutch. I should be the last to say one unnecessary word in this House or in the country to cause unpleasantness between us and the Dutch Government; but, after all, if circumstances have caused unpleasantness, the actions of the Dutch Government have assisted in this; and I do not think we are quite called upon quietly to leave our men to die, or be content with the reiterated assertion of the noble Lord that negotiations are again being carried on. I have told the painful story, and I have risen for the specific purpose of trying to obtain from the noble Lord a statement of what is being done. For I tell him frankly that there is nothing in the past history of the case, nothing in the circumstances I have detailed to the House, that makes me trust for a moment to the Foreign Office in this matter. I remember the early delay; I remember the inability on the part of Lord Derby to ascertain the facts. I cannot explain, or justify, or excuse the delay in May in sending relief to the captives. I cannot tell why, time after time, we are to be put off, waiting whilst nothing effectual is being done. And when I remember that we know of the death of three of these men; that others are ill; that the climatic conditions are such, that we may naturally expect, unless something be done, all, or most of them, may perish, and that no amount of silence on my part will help the men, whilst, perhaps, utterances in this House may do something to expedite matters. I think I have established sufficient justification for the unusual course I 1901 took in this matter in bringing this question before it.
§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."— (Mr. Storey.)
§ MR. BROGDENsaid, he did not rise for the purpose of justifying any part of the action of the Foreign Office or of the Colonial Office in this matter. He left the noble Lord the task of defending or replying to the charges that had been made of delay and negligence. He was concerned rather with the freedom of the crew of the Nisero, with the unfortunate position in which they were placed, and with that view of the case which had regard to the Rajah of Tenom being so influenced that the captives might be released. The position which the Rajah of Tenom had taken up on this question was not unparalleled amongst the barbarous tribes of that region, though it certainly was not often witnessed. Usually, shipwrecked men received kindness at the hands of such people; but this case was certainly an exception. It was a well-known, fact that the Rajah had friends at Penang and Kassala, and had the means of communicating with the adjoining civilized districts, and he must have known what had taken place in this House and elsewhere. Instead of helping the shipwrecked crew forward to their destination he had taken them into the interior of the country, though not, perhaps, very far, and when he had them there he had refused to set them free. He pretended to be very friendly with and submissive to England; he said that he would kiss the feet of the English; and if spurned from one foot would cling to the other; but, in spite of all this, he had exercised a considerable amount of brutality upon these unfortunate men, and it was certainly impossible to call him a friend to the English people. But the House must take into consideration the fact that this was a subject of great delicacy. The Rajah had made use of these circumstances in order to make demands upon the Dutch Government, which no Government could concede. He wished, however, to impress upon the House the necessity of dealing with this question in regard to its internal and international relations, rather than as a mere question of deep sympathy with these unfortunate men. He asked the House 1902 to consider what the case would have been, and how it would have been regarded in England, if the subjects of a friendly Power, not, perhaps, equal to their own, but still a considerable Power, had been captured in a remote part of the British Dominions, and the Power in question had claimed the right itself to obtain the freedom of the captives? In his own opinion, the difficulty in this case had arisen, not from neglect, but from over anxiety. Instead of leaving the responsibility on the Dutch Government from the beginning, we had allowed our own people to treat with this Rajah as if he were an equal or a tributary of our own; and we had, in consequence, realized the old saying that "too many cooks spoil the broth;" whereas, if the responsibility had been left solely on the Dutch Government, they would have been obliged to take some steps that would have before now produced good results. Anyone who knew that country would know that an expedition would be utterly unavailing. There were means, however, by which these savage tribes could affect each other; and it was by such means that the Dutch Government would endeavour to establish relations with this Rajah. While everything should be done that could be done, either by money or other means, to secure the freedom of the captives, it should be remembered that there were circumstances affecting the relations between two friendly Powers which demanded a proper exchange of courtesies. While, then, he hoped the House would consider the desirability of enforcing on the Dutch Government that they should do all they could to procure the liberation of these men, he also hoped that we should impress upon them the responsibility they were under, and leave them to discharge their duties as they thought best.
§ GENERAL SIR. GEORGE BALFOUR, as one who had had in former years considerable intercourse with Singapore, Malacca, and Penang, and had thereby acquired some knowledge of Sumatra, wished to deny the assumption of the hon. Member who spoke last, that the Malay people in that part of the world were barbarous and uncivilized. They were nothing of the kind, for they had the advantages of the Mahomedan civilization; and it was in evidence that the son of the Rajah of Tenom, who had 1903 the crew of Nisero, was being educated at Penang. With, regard to the trade in that locality, no sea was better adapted for navigation than the Straits of Malacca, and consequently the business done by the petty Chiefs was extensive. The hon. Member said we ought to look to the Dutch to free the prisoners; but he (General Sir George Balfour) considered that the handing over of Acheen and of the whole of the Island of Sumatra to the Dutch in 1871 was one of the most cruel and unjust acts ever committed by a British Government. In 1824 engagements were entered into with the Dutch which, taken in connection with previous engagements, limited their power and protected the Malay States from aggression; and we had allowed the Dutch, by our 1871 Treaty, far greater claims than they could ever carry out. In his opinion, the present difficulties were caused by that monopolizing spirit which pervaded the Dutch character. The Rajah, in a wrong way, was putting a pressure on us to keep that Free Trade with Penang which he had so long enjoyed. From 1871 till now it was notorious that the Dutch had never been able to go beyond the sea-shore of Acheen. He was persuaded that the Dutch were exercising rights over Malay States which our Treaty did not justify them in exercising.
§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICEsaid, that there was one thing, and only one thing, in the speech of the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Storey) with which he could agree, and that was when he had said that this question was one of great difficulty and delicacy. He thought that they must all agree in that. The hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Brogden) had brought forward the international side of the question in a manner which, he thought, must have convinced the House of the importance of that view. At the same time, while he was prepared to ask the House to consider how difficult and delicate a question this was, he, nevertheless, felt how abundantly justified was the anxiety of the House and of the country upon this subject. Although, as a Member of the Government, he regretted the course which the hon. Member for Sunderland had adopted, because, in his opinion, it was unnecessary, nevertheless he was aware that the hon. Member stood in a 1904 peculiar position with regard to this question, because it so happened that in his constituency there were a considerable number of relatives and friends of the unfortunate people who were now in captivity. At the same time, listening to the speech of the hon. Member, he could not help being reminded of how often the same set of facts struck different minds in a different way. What was the hon. Member's charge against the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office? It was the charge of delay and indifference; but when the Papers bearing on the case were laid before Parliament an article had appeared in The Times which said that, whatever difference of opinion there might be on this question, whatever charge might or might not be made, one thing at least was certain—that no charge of delay or indifference could be made against the Colonial Office or the Foreign Office, and that the conduct of the Foreign Office in this matter might be taken as a bright example to be followed upon all occasions. The writer of this article said he could only express his regret that all Departments did not found their conduct on these lines. But he was not going to shelter the action of the Foreign Office or the Colonial Office behind any article in any newspaper. He proposed to meet the only two specific charges contained in the long series of observations made by the hon. Member for Sunderland by examining the facts which he had alleged. The principal charge which the hon. Member had made was with reference to the telegram of the 29th of April. The hon. Member argued that because a telegram was received on the 26th of April, and no action was taken until April 29, that culpable indifference must be imputed to the Department. The hon. Member some time ago placed a Question on the Paper relating to this subject; but, for some reason best known to himself, the hon. Member refrained from asking that Question. He regretted that Question had never been put, as it would have afforded an opportunity of explaining the whole of the circumstances of the case. Technically speaking, no doubt the telegram was received by the Foreign Office from the Colonial Office on the 26th of April, which was a Saturday; but so late on that day was it that it was almost Sunday morn- 1905 ing. There were, as the hon. Member knew, certain difficulties in the way of transacting business on Sunday; but attention was paid to the telegram notwithstanding. Great efforts were made to reply to it at once; but it was absolutely necessary that whatever measures were taken should be taken in consultation with the Admiralty, because they must be done through one of Her Majesty's ships, and on Sunday it was found to be practically impossible to take the steps they desired. Communications were opened on Monday morning, the position of the Pegasus was ascertained, and also what communication it was desirable to send, because a great deal depended upon the local facilities the commander of the Pegasus could obtain in collecting provisions for the captives. The communications with the Admiralty took place on Monday; on Monday evening the Colonial Office was also communicated with, and on Tuesday morning the telegram was sent. The Pegasus left her station on the 1st of May, and, owing to the care with which the measures had been taken, the mission of Captain Bickford in the Pegasus was completely successful; and on May 3 three months' provisions and medicine was sent to the captives, sufficient, indeed, with care, to hold out for a much longer time. That was a plain, unvarnished tale, and he left it to the fairness and justice of the House to say whether, after what he had stated, there had been any delay, or whether the measures taken by the Foreign or Colonial Offices or the Admiralty were or were not well chosen. The second charge the hon. Member made was that between May 9 and May 31 Lord Granville appeared to have entirely neglected the matter, and his reason for that assertion seemed to be that he found two despatches bearing those dates in the Book, and assumed that nothing occurred between them. But the hon. Member did not appear even to have read the Blue Books, of which there were two, because, had he done so, he could hardly have failed to see that the long despatches of those dates could not have been written without personal communication between the Secretary of State, the Netherlands Minister, and the Representatives of both Governments at the Hague. Between those dates constant communications were taking place. He saw the Nether- 1906 lands Minister himself on this question. When the hon. Member declared that a painful feeling existed in the North of England, if it existed at all—which he did not believe—it was due to what he must term the inaccurate statements which the hon. Member himself had published in newspapers having a large circulation in the North. To show that this feeling did not exist to the extent that was represented, he might say that he had had constant communications from the unfortunate relatives and friends of the imprisoned crew, and he had received over and over again the thanks of those people for the attention given in the Foreign Office to their case. He had both private and semi-official letters acknowledging this fact. Then, what happened on the last occasion on which this matter was before the House? Why, the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Slagg), who had been more frequently at the Foreign Office in connection with this matter than the hon. Member for Sunderland himself, immediately rose in his place and at once contradicted the charges brought by the hon. Member against the Foreign Office and himself, stating them to be most unfair, and declaring he had always found the Department fully cognizant of the gravity of this question. The hon. Member was always claiming, practically, to be the only Member in the House who had taken up this subject; but the hon. Member was in Egypt until a recent date.
§ MR. STOREYThe noble Lord has just repeated statements which he made on a former occasion, though I did not take the trouble then to contradict him. I never blamed the noble Lord. The moment the Session opened I put a Question in this House, and from Egypt I sent Questions to my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr. C. M. Palmer), who kindly put them for me. From the first I have followed the case with interest; but I never stated I was the only person who had done so.
§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICEsaid, he believed the action of other Members was perfectly independent, and did not require to be prompted by the hon. Member. The assistance and advice given by those other Members had been most valuable, because they fully understood and appreciated the difficulty of this painful question; and while they naturally exercised all the influence in 1907 their power to show the Foreign Office the great interest that existed on the subject, they abstained from those constant attacks, which had in no way assisted the Foreign Office, but had, on the contrary, been a difficulty in their path in the course of the negotiations they had been carrying on. The hon. Member had made two main charges; but there were other vague charges which he could hardly have intended to be taken seriously. He said that, as far back as February, they should have acted in the spirit of Blake and Nelson. [Mr. WARTON: Hear, hear!] The hon. and learned Member for Bridport cheered that statement; but that they should at the very commencement of these proceedings have adopted a violent and high-handed course of action was a proposition that he did not think Her Majesty's Opposition, any more than hon. Members on his own side of the House, would advance. The sovereignty of the Dutch in Sumatra was not disputed; and the original arrangement, which was the father of all the successive arrangements relating to the Island of Sumatra, was made not by a Liberal Government at all, but by a Conservative Government, and by one whose name, he believed, was still honoured by his Party, for it was made as far back as the time of Lord Castlereagh. With regard to the charges made against Lord Derby, he must say a few words. The charge was this—that at an earlier period of these proceedings Lord Derby had sent a telegram showing he had not read the Papers relating to the question of how far the debt of the Chinese merchant was the original cause of these troubles. Lord Derby was perfectly acquainted with the Papers, but they were not at that particular moment as yet quite explicit on this point, and his telegram to the Governor of the Straits Settlements was for the purpose of having the matter fully elucidated. The statements of the hon. Member showed that he had read the Papers very carelessly; for example, by far the most part of these transactions were in connection with Mr. Maxwell's mission; but the hon. Member had not condescended to notice it. Mr. Maxwell's mission took place in March; but the full account only reached the Foreign Office in April. While they were waiting for Mr. Maxwell's Report, it was perfectly impos- 1908 sible for the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office to judge what further measures would be necessary. That was an answer to the charge of delay brought by the hon. Member against the Foreign Office upon this point. Moreover, they were awaiting the arrival of Governor Weld, from whom they expected to receive valuable advice and assistance. Governor Weld had since arrived, and the Foreign Office had received such advice and assistance from him. This would show that many of the charges against the Foreign Office were utterly without foundation. When the hon. Member came to the present aspect of the negotiations, and complained that his Question regarding them was not answered, the reply was plain and simple—these negotiations were not only going on actively, but were going on from day to day; and while they were pending the Foreign Office could not report from day to day what was said by the Netherlands Government to Her Majesty's Government, and by Her Majesty's Government to the Netherlands Government. They had such a sense of the gravity and importance of this question, that they could not make any partial or incomplete statement. He appealed to hon. Gentlemen opposite whether the Public Business could be carried on if the adjournment of the House was to be moved every time an Under Secretary, with the full approval and authority of his Chiefs, said it was not in his power to make a statement which naturally he would be the first to desire to make as soon as possible? He hoped before long to be able to lay further despatches on the Table, and also to state the views the Government took when they had received the final answer of the Netherlands Government. He regretted to have stood so long between the House and its Business, which it was anxious to enter upon; but he felt that the charges which were made against the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office were most unjust, and, under the circumstances, almost cruel. They had laboured to do everything they could in this matter, and if they had not done so, they would have been lacking not only in official duty, but in the commonest feelings of humanity. He hoped the time was far distant when, whatever differences there might be, one Party would make such a charge against another. He left the 1909 melancholy distinction of having done so to the hon. Member for Sunderland, and concluded by repeating, that whatever was the duty of the Government would be done, and he hoped with satisfactory results, though he was fully aware of the great difficulties and risks that had to be encountered.
MR. GORSTsaid, that, notwithstanding the long speech of the noble Lord, he failed to see that he had made the case much better than it was before. The noble Lord had attempted to shelter himself behind The Times leading articles. It was not the first time the noble Lord had quoted articles in the public Press; and, knowing his literary tendencies, he thought that probably he contributed the article to The Times himself. When, however, the noble Lord came to specific answers to specific statements, he was singularly unfortunate. The tone of the noble Lord's speech alone was enough to induce them to think that there was a screw loose somewhere. With regard to the charge of delay from April 26th to the 29th, he (Mr. Gorst) found that instead of the telegram of the 26th being only technically received on that day, and practically on the Sunday morning, as represented by the noble Lord, it was received on the Saturday in sufficient time for the Colonial Office to receive a despatch about it; for, according to the Blue Book, the following letter was rewritten on the 29th by the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office:—
Tuesday. Sir,—I am directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th instant, forwarding copy of a telegram from the acting Governor of the Straits Settlements, stating that, according to latest accounts received, one of the crew of the Nisero was dead.
§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICESir, the hon. and learned Member, I am sure quite unintentionally, has misquoted. The telegram is not dated the 26th, it is dated 29th April.
MR. GORSTNothing of the kind. Unfortunately, the noble Lord did not appreciate his (Mr. Gorst's) position. It was that the Colonial Office received a telegram announcing the death of one of the Nisero's crew in time to write a despatch about it, and in the letter which he had read the Foreign Office acknowledged the receipt of that despatch and the telegram. The hon. Member asked what the Foreign Office really did on 1910 the Sunday; but upon Monday they opened communication, with the Admiralty. He was bound to say that the Admiralty was the only Department that exhibited anything like proper activity. On that day the Admiralty wrote to the Foreign Office stating that they had received a copy of the telegram of the 26th of April from the Colonial Office, and seeking to move Earl Granville whether a ship of war with provisions should be sent. Therefore, on the Monday the Admiralty were trying to move Earl Granville to express his opinion, and that opinion was not expressed until the Tuesday morning', when letters were written to the Colonial Office and the Admiralty. If the crow of the Nisero were left in starvation three days longer than necessary, the blame was on the Foreign Office, and not with the Colonial Office, or the Admiralty, or the people of Singapore. The noble Lord said that he had answered the two allegations which had been made against the Foreign Office; but he had omitted altogether the third and most important one—namely, that from March 13 to April 29 the Foreign Office did not make a single movement in a diplomatic direction to obtain the release of these men. The noble Lord said that Mr. Maxwell had been sent out, and that until the Foreign Office had received his Report they could not take any further steps in the matter; but the gravamen of the charge that had been made against the Government by the hon. Member for Sunderland was that they were aware, from the information which they had received from responsible officers on the spot, that Mr Maxwell's mission could not succeed, and that unless they took diplomatic steps those men could not be released; and yet, possessing that knowledge, they were content to lie by and to do nothing. The Government ought not to allow themselves to remain under a delusion on this question. The country laid the blame for the captivity of these men upon the British Government, who had allowed them to remain in durance for seven or eight months without making a move to secure their release. And yet, in. the face of these facts, the noble Lord had been good enough to insinuate that the hon. Member for Sunderland was guilty of obstruction, because, by bringing this question under the notice of the House, he was preventing the 1911 Government from proceeding with Business which must be abortive. In his opinion, the hon. Member deserved the thanks of the House for bringing this question forward; and he was sure he would receive the thanks of the country for calling attention to this shameful business. As the Business of that House was now conducted, it was exceedingly difficult to criticize the conduct of any public Department; and he was afraid that the result would be that in the future we should have more of these scandals than in the past. The facts of this case having now been fully stated in the hearing of the House, he was sure that the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister would use his influence, so that the proceedings of the dilatory Foreign Office would be quickened in this matter.
§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICEasked the leave of the House to make an explanation. He wished to explain this matter in regard to the telegram of the 26th, because the hon. and learned Member for Chatham, no doubt unintentionally, had misled the House. He had spoken of this telegram as a Foreign Office telegram. The Blue Book showed that the telegram was a Colonial Office telegram. It could not possibly have been anything else, owing to the position of those by whom, and to whom, it was sent. The information in this telegram was not known to the responsible officials at the Foreign Office till after Office hours on Saturday, the 26th, and he had explained the difficulties of taking action upon it during Sunday, because communications with other Offices were necessary. The House would see the difficulty he was in in replying to these minute and carefully-prepared charges as to dates and days, the hon. Member having brought forward this charge without having given him the smallest Notice of his intention to do so. He had consequently none of the necessary documents with him at the moment; but he had no doubt that the facts would be found to be as he had stated.
§ MR. WARTONobserved that the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Storey) had brought forward this question, not only as an Englishman, but as the Representative of a sailor's constituency; and it had been altogether unworthy of the noble Lord to make the fact that he had called the attention of the House to the matter the ground of a personal 1912 attack upon him. It was clear that the hon. Member for Sunderland, in the course he had adopted, had been influenced by the most upright and conscientious motives. What had led to this unfortunate business was the knowledge that every small State possessed, of the invertebrate character of Her Majesty's Government. The action of this country was paralyzed all the world over, because Foreign Powers had lost their respect for England, on account of the timidity and vacillation of Her Majesty's present Government. He only wished they could have one hour of Lord Palmerston's or Lord Beaconsfield's Government, for then all these matters would be set straight.
MR. GLADSTONEremarked that the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down had worked himself into a fine frenzy on this subject; but that fine frenzy would not advance the House one iota towards the end of this complicated matter, which it was quite clear that the hon. and learned Gentleman had never examined into. The hon. and learned Gentleman, led away by his general prejudices against the Government, and by his disposition to condemn them on every occasion for having degraded their country in the eyes of the world, had brought charges against them which common humanity should have prevented him from doing. He did not intend to enter into the controversial part of this subject, neither did he presume to censure the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Storey) for having brought forward this most difficult and complicated matter. It had been his duty to associate himself with Lord Granville in every matter of this kind; and, therefore, he admitted that he should have been prepared to have met, step by step, any attack that had been made upon the Government in respect of this question. The hon. Member for Sunderland, however, had never conveyed to him that he intended to deliver this carefully-prepared attack upon the Government in reference to these unhappy men, and that he intended to search the Blue Books, and to quote page after page of them in support of that attack, and to give his own version of the facts. In saying this, he was by no means questioning the excellence of the hon. Member's motives in bringing this matter forward; but if the hon. Member had in view the very proper 1913 and natural object of obtaining the liberation of these unhappy men, he did not think that he had adopted the course best calculated to attain that object. With regard to the charge which the hon. Member had brought against the Foreign Office, he must reserve his defence for the time; because he could not undertake, without due Notice, to enter into that defence. But he did say this—that he wished to express his own share in Lord Granville's responsibility, and that he was perfectly confident that when the proper time came for the examination of the Papers it would be found that the charge of neglect and indifference which had been so freely made against the two Secretaries of State, and particularly Lord Granville, had no foundation whatever. He wished it to be understood that Her Majesty's Government admitted no part of the charge which had been made by the hon. Member. He admitted that it was important that the conduct of the Department should be brought to notice; but it was still more important that these people should be released. He was not going to make it a matter of blame that the hon. Member had brought this subject forward; but he had hoped that when the hon. Gentleman adopted so high a tone he saw his way to some method by which the release of the men might be brought about, and would have offered to them some useful and valuable suggestions. It might be that the speech of the hon. Gentleman contained such suggestions, though he confessed he had been unable to perceive them. This was no reason for blaming the hon. Gentleman, because the difficulties of the case were such that they would have defied either official or private ingenuity. But it was rather material that the House should understand that in the face of the heavy accusations which the hon. Member had so freely and so abundantly launched, he did not lay down a policy by which he thought he could point out that the release of those men could be effected. The hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) kept himself within the lines of prudence; the hon. and learned Gentleman did not, he thought, profess to have in his hands a solution of the difficulty. His hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Brogden) gave them his view of the course which ought to have been pursued. His hon. 1914 Friend's opinion was that the British Government ought entirely to have avoided operating upon the subordinate authorities in this case, and to have confined themselves to holding the Dutch Government responsible, and requiring it to perform the duties of a Sovereign Power. He could not find any fault with his hon. Friend for making that suggestion; but he thought even his hon. Friend himself would admit that, in this peculiar case, the suggestion, if acted upon, would have been very uncertain in its issue. There were no means which Her Majesty's Government possessed of operating immediately upon the particular Chief under whose authority these unfortunate persons were held in detention. The Dutch Government itself did not appear to possess the means of operating at a given moment. It was, indeed, perfectly true, as his hon. Friend had said, that the Dutch Government was fully responsible; but the mode of enforcing that responsibility was a question of considerable difficulty. There were two things in view. One was the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government for the past, in regard to which he, at least, personally—although his noble Friend near him had made an able statement of the subject—must reserve what he had to say. The other was as to the means of procuring the release, and extreme difficulty attending a case of this kind, where there was, on the one hand, a Sovereign Power placed at an enormous distance, and, on the other hand, subordinate Powers combined and grouped together without a clear and highly-civilized organization. He thought his hon. and gallant Friend behind him (General Sir George Balfour) would admit that this was not an exaggerated statement with regard to the abuses arising in this particular case under one of the local authorities. It would be idle for him to attempt to state what the Foreign Office were at this moment about. It was their daily care to prosecute this subject, and he was not prepared to say how far they ought to express hope with regard to its issue. The Dutch Government was certainly not in an attitude of indifference. The Dutch Government had proposed a measure which it, no doubt, thought to be the best; but there were great difficulties attending the adoption of that measure. For 1915 the moment, he could only say he thought Her Majesty's Government were entitled, not to an acquittal, but to a suspense of verdict upon the main question; and he could give the House an assurance that, as regards the present proceedings not less than in the past, they were using every effort in their power. One word he would venture to say on what the hon. and learned Member for Chatham thought to be a salient point—namely, as to the delays which had occurred. He denied that the statement of the hon. and learned Gentleman was a fair one. The telegram arrived at the foreign Office on Saturday after business hours. Was it right that there should be business hours in a Public Office? He was afraid it was a necessity. He ought to have stated that this telegram arrived after business hours on Saturday at the Foreign Office, and not at the Colonial Office; and the Foreign Office could not act on the telegram until it had communicated with the Admiralty. Now, not only had the Admiralty business hours, but on Sundays the establishment of the Admiralty was not on the spot; and accordingly, on Sunday morning last, when the authorities of the Foreign Office went to communicate with the Admiralty, they found that they could not get the Admiralty put into motion for the purpose of doing what was effectual on that day. He could not go into the details of the matter; but that was the fact as far as the Foreign Office was concerned. Even had the officials of the Admiralty been present, the matter was not one as to which they could lay their finger on the telegraph and say—"Do this." The Admiralty had to make considerable inquiries before it could give its orders. For example, it had to ascertain the precise spot where the vessel was to be found, which had been, he believed, in motion, and on the action of which it was to depend. The ascertainment of that spot was not a thing which could be done in a moment. Perhaps it might be said that all this was circumlocution; but still there were the necessities of a great and complex organization. Instructions to Foreign Agents could not be sent by the Colonial Office, nor could orders to the Queen's ships be sent by the Foreign Office. It appeared that this telegram went off on Tuesday morning, and he could conceive the possible 1916 allegation that it might have gone off on Monday night; but he did not think that in that margin there was to be found anything that would justify the grave charges which the hon. Member for Sunderland had thought proper to make. He trusted that when they again approached this subject they would do so in such a manner as to enable the House to put itself in possession of the facts, and, in addition, to pass a fair and equitable judgment on the entire case, which was one of the greatest difficulty, and which had the most direct and immediate claims both on the official duties and even on the common humanity of the Government of the country.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEremarked that when the right hon. Gentleman called for a full consideration of the course taken by the Government, and asked the House to suspend their judgment, one must feel that he was perfectly justified in making that appeal, especially under the circumstances in which they stood at the present moment. But, on the other hand, he thought the hon. Member for Sunderland had taken a most proper step in calling attention to the subject, because undoubtedly the case, while it was one of great delicacy and difficulty, was still one of great importance, and it was of very great importance that those who were interested in this matter, and also those who were interested in maintaining the honour of England, should be aware that a question like this was attracting the attention of the House of Commons; and he thought this conversation would have done good in this way. The right hon. Gentleman had spoken very truly of the great difficulties inseparable from a large and complex organization such as that of the British Government, in cases especially where several Departments had to act; but it was a great point that it should be pressed on the Executive Government from time to time that the greatness and complexity of its organization was no excuse whatever for any deficiency in its action. The late Government, he maintained, would have found no difficulty in acting on the shortest notice. It was essential that the main point should be kept in view, and that they should not lose themselves in the mere details of organization. The reflections which had been cast on the Admiralty were most 1917 unfair. It would also from time to time happen that one Department should be dependent on another, and it was unpardonable if the Department so called upon could not at once respond to the requirements of the other Department. He had not read the Papers in the case for a long time; but, if he remembered rightly, the Admiralty had acted with great promptitude. He thought the thanks of the House were due to the hon. Member for Sunderland for having brought this exceedingly difficult and delicate matter under the notice of the House; and he trusted, after what had transpired, that the Government would prosecute the matter with greater expedition.
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he did not think there could be any excuse for delay on the part of the Admiralty, since the House provided the First Lord with an official residence, and either he or one of the Lords of the Admiralty was always present to carry out necessary orders. He did not, however, believe that any delay rested with the Admiralty; indeed, the Papers showed that the whole responsibility rested with the Foreign Office. It was, therefore, quite unfair to charge the delay upon the Admiralty. He did not see that there needed to have been any delay. If a telegram had been sent to Singapore a ship could have been put in motion almost as soon as the telegram arrived. Acheen was as near Sumatra as the Isle of Wight was to England, so that effectual naval assistance might be sent there if the Government so wished it. He viewed these proceedings with the greatest distress and dismay, all the more that these 18 seamen were prisoners within five miles of the sea. He knew the coast perfectly well, and he knew the difficulty connected with the bar of the river; and he confessed that it was, in his opinion, a great weakness to request the Dutch Government, who were hated all over that district, to endeavour to obtain the release of those men. The result had been considerable bloodshed without any chance of doing good. He was quite sure, if the matter had been put into the hands of Sir William Hewett, or some other naval officer of that Station, that these men would have been released by this time. The difficulties which had arisen in connection with British shipping had been 1918 due to the handing over of those territories to the Dutch. He had always regarded that as an unfortunate arrangement, and had protested against it at the time. It had caused incessant bloodshed during the last 14 years between the Dutch and the Natives. If we were to take the matter into our own hands, he would undertake to say we would succeed in releasing these 18 men; but if they were not released in the course of the summer, we would have to thank the Rajah only for a grave. He wished he could hear from the right hon. Gentleman that they were going to put the matter into the hands of the Admiralty. The hon. Member had done well to bring this question before the House.
§ MR. SLAGGsaid, he felt quite as keenly for those unfortunate men as the hon. Member for Sunderland himself; but he could not agree in the accusations of lukewarmness, which the hon. Member had brought against the Government. In all his communications with the Foreign Office he had found the utmost anxiety to obtain the release of those men, and the utmost energy in taking measures to that end. The hon. Member would have done more good if he had suggested some practical means of effecting the release of the prisoners. It would have been absurd to wage war either against the Dutch Government or the Rajah of Tenom. He had had very long interviews with the captain of the Nisero, who described to him the condition of the country. Anyone who heard that description must have been convinced that a warlike proceeding against the Rajah either by the Dutch Government or by the forces of this country must have ended in complete failure, and possibly in the death of the captives to effect the object desired. It often happened that subjects of this country were placed in positions of great danger and hardship under conditions with which we were unable easily to cope. This appeared to be one of those cases. The Rajah, when attacked by the Dutch Government, had only to remove the captives further into the interior; and even if our Government had sent an armed force to rescue them the Rajah would simply retire into the country, where our force could not possibly follow him. He agreed with the hon. Member that 1919 the Dutch Government were not free from blame. They had assumed the sovereignty over the country without discharging the responsibilities of that position. He hoped, however, the result of this debate would be to bring pressure upon the Dutch Government to do a good deal more than they had yet done for the release of these unfortunate captives. But beyond the diplomatic pressure which the Foreign Office had brought strongly to bear on the Dutch, he did not think the Government could have done anything, or that they had boon in any way negligent.
§ MR. O'DONNELLsaid, he hoped that the House would take note of the statement of the hon. Member for Manchester (Mr. Slagg) on behalf of the Government. It could only be inferred that the Government would do nothing for these men. The only crumb of comfort which seemed to be afforded by that discussion was that the Dutch Government would be impressed by the tone which it had taken. Speaking entirely from an unofficial point of view, he felt bound to express his own regret that the right hon. Gentleman the Premier had succeeded once more on that occasion in speaking eloquently and well and saying very little after all. He hoped the relatives of those men would find some encouragement in the right hon. Gentleman's speech. For himself, he must confess he was less acquainted with the policy of the Government in the matter after the right hon. Gentleman had spoken than before he had addressed any observations to the House. If those men had been bondholders they would not have been allowed to perish within five miles of gunshot of the British Navy. All the great Departments had been whitewashed, but it would probably turn out that the number of those prisoners would successively be reduced from 24 to 18, and then to a dozen or to six; and before the right hon. Gentleman, in a set debate, made another eloquent and unmeaning speech on the subject, it might be that there would not be a single British sailor to rescue. An unfortunate fatality appeared to hang over the expeditions of rescue of Her Majesty's Government.
§ SIR ALEXANDER GORDONsuggested whether the Government might not take the same steps which were adopted some years ago for the release 1920 of an Englishman, who was captured by brigands in Greece. On that occasion Her Majesty's Navy had been employed in negotiating for his relief, and he believed they offered a sum of money. The negotiations were conducted with great ability and success; and he asked whether the same means might not be adopted to rescue the survivors of the crow of the Nisero?
§ MR. STOREYI think I should best consult the interests of those on whose behalf I speak by asking the permission of the House to withdraw my Motion. No good object will be served by continuing the discussion. But perhaps the House will allow me, for one moment, to refer to the speech of the noble Lord (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice), and to make a reference to a personal subject. A personal objection has been raised against my bringing this matter forward without Notice, and I think I am entitled to show that the censure of the Prime Minister—
MR. GLADSTONEI distinctly refused to pronounce any censure whatever, and expressly guarded myself against making any personal reflection. I protest against the hon. Member's assuming that there is any such implication on my part. Is the hon. Member in Order?
§ MR. STOREY, who, on rising again, was met with cries of "Order!" said: I believe, Sir, I am not entitled to reply.
§ MR. SPEAKERThe hon. Member for Sunderland has made a substantive Motion, and is, therefore, entitled to a reply.
§ MR. STOREYI am thankful to you, Sir, for instructing me in the presence of older Members of the House who would have deprived me of a right of which I was not conscious when I rose. But I will not take full advantage of my right. I wish, however, to point out to the House that the noble Lord did not do mo the honour to state my complaints correctly, much less to reply to them. What I stated, and now re-state, was that I could not understand why, from March 22nd, when the Government knew that their policy of negotiation had failed, until April 26th, they absolutely did nothing at all. What does the noble Lord tell me is the reason? He says that, although they had a telegraphic reply from Captain Maxwell, they could not do anything until they had detailed 1921 information by letter. Well, Sir, is not that admitting my contention—that while they were getting detailed information, they left these men to the merry of their captors; and when they admit my contentions — [Interruptions from the back Liberal Benches.]—I am really sorry to annoy those hon. Gentlemen behind me — after they admit this contention of mine, the Prime Minister thinks he settles the point by saying that I should tell the Government how I would settle this matter. Sir, "There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;" and there was a tide in the affairs of the Government when, if they had acted, they would have settled this question. But it was because they neglected the opportunity that they failed to rescue these men. At the risk of offending hon. Gentlemen, I will refer to another point. The Prime Minister seems to think that he answers my other contention by pointing out that, having received a telegram on April 26th, and that being a Saturday, nothing could be done until Tuesday, because it was necessary for the different Departments to communicate. I do not believe the common people of this country will accept that as an excuse. I will venture to tell the Prime Minister what I think should have been done. Bear in mind that when the Government received that telegram they knew that the men were perishing for want of food. All they had to do was to telegraph to the authorities on Saturday; but they did not do so until Tuesday. When the loss of the Nisero originally came to Singapore, the authorities there telegraphed for leave to send a ship; and the Departments, having laid their heads together, at last sent out orders. But while the Departments were deliberating the authorities at Singapore had already sent the ship. That contrasted curiously with the circumlocution and red-tape of the Foreign Office at a later time. In conclusion, I can assure the Prime Minister I have brought the case forward with a simple desire to let all parties in the House know what neglect there has been, and with the hope that there may be no neglect in the future, and that whatever it is possible to do may be done for the safety of these men.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.