ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE. (Hansard, 11 February 1884)

§ Mr. CHAPLIN
, Member for Mid-Lincolnshire, rose in his place, and asked leave to move the Adjournment of the House, for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely, whether Her Majesty's Government have taken, or intend to take or not, the most effectual measures in their power for the relief of the garrisons and population of Sinkat and Tokar, now in imminent danger of massacre and destruction; but the pleasure of the House not having been signified, Mr. SPEAKER called on those Members who supported that Motion to rise in their places, and not less than Forty Members having accordingly risen in their places,

§ MR. CHAPLIN
said, the Motion arose quite unexpectedly, so far as he was concerned, out of an answer, or rather a series of answers, which were given by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, in reply to a Question put at an earlier part of the evening by his (Mr. Chaplin's) hon. Friend the Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett). The Motion proposed to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance, and he could conceive that there was no question of more definite and urgent importance than one which, like that, involved the lives not only of gallant soldiers, but populations, he was told, of thousands of women and children 487 besides. The right hon. Gentleman declined to give a definite answer to the Question put to him that afternoon. What was the ground on which he refused to give an answer? The right hon. Gentleman explained to them that it was impossible for him to give an answer, such as he thought would be satisfactory to the House of Commons, unless that answer was given in debate. Well, he (Mr. Chaplin) proposed, with as little delay as possible——

MR. GLADSTONE
I beg your pardon; that was not my answer. I said I was not prepared to make, in answer to a Question, a statement such as would be accepted as satisfactory to the House; and I also stated that my materials for making an answer would be fuller tomorrow.

§ MR. CHAPLIN
said, he did not gather the last part of the statement—[Mr. GLADSTONE: Most distinctly.]—but, of course, he would admit the accuracy of what the right hon. Gentleman had stated. The purport, however, of the right hon. Gentleman's reply was this—that he could not give an answer satisfactory to himself, and he desired to make his answer in the course of debate. He (Mr. Chaplin) proposed tonight to relieve the right hon. Gentleman of that disability, at all events; and he hoped, in the course of the debate which would arise, the right hon. Gentleman would be able to give a distinct answer. He (Mr. Chaplin) had taken this course, because it was impossible to over-estimate the anxiety which was felt in the country with regard to those 400 men who, they were told, were at Sinkat at the present, and with regard to the gallant Commander Tewfik Bey, and with regard to the unhappy women and children whose fate, he believed, was merely a question of hours Many of them might well have asked the question why effectual steps for then-relief had not been taken before now. That part of the discussion might, however, he postponed until the occasion when the whole policy of the Government in regard to Egypt was arraigned, as it would be very shortly. Sinkat, he was told, was about 30 miles from the coast of the Red Sea. Tokar was somewhat further, and he knew nothing of the forces that might be available on the Red Sea, or at the disposal of the Government at the present moment; but 488 surely it must be within the resources and the power of England to take steps to relieve the people of these places. He did not ask for details as to what steps the Government intended to take; but what he thought was that, without an hour's unnecessary delay, they ought to have a distinct answer from the Government as to whether they did or did not intend to take the most effectual measures in their power for the relief of the garrisons and populations of these places. That was a question upon which the public mind was excited, and there was intense anxiety at the present moment in regard to it, and he could not help being astonished that the right hon. Gentleman bad come down to the House that evening unprepared to give a definite answer. This morning, in one of those admirable letters which The Times correspondent at Cairo had written, he said— Jeered at as we are by foreigners, believed by the Natives to be deliberately working for their annihilation, can we be surprised that even an English official of the highest rank should state—' I am ashamed to own myself an Englishman;' and that another official in the English service should say—' Thank God, I am not an Englishman.' Having witnessed the policy of and the proceedings of the Government in connection with Egypt, to this extent he was bound to say that there was a feeling of humiliation at the present time. If an evil fate should befall these unhappy people, owing, in any degree, to the inaction, the vacillation, and the dilatory conduct of the Government, it would be regarded by thousands and millions as nothing less than a national humiliation, a national shame, and a national disgrace. It would be opposed to the best and the highest traditions of this country, and it would be abhorrent to the sentiments and feelings of the English speaking men and women throughout the entire world.

MR. GLADSTONE
Sir, I was rather surprised when I heard the intention of the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Chaplin), because I certainly conceived that there were indications made in various parts of the House, when I replied to the Questions put to me earlier in the 489 evening, that, in the position which I hold, speaking on the part of Her Majesty's Government, it would be needful to acquiesce, at all events—I do not say to approve, though I thought I saw considerable signs of approval—to acquiesce in the declarations which I made. It appears to me, however, that the hon. Gentleman has forgotten an essential part of the declaration I made, although I reminded him of it in the course of his speech, and to it he attaches no importance whatever. I stated that it was impossible for me to make a full and adequate exposition upon this question at the present time in answer to a Question.

§ MR. CHAPLIN
What I asked for was a plain "Yes" or "No."

MR. GLADSTONE
No doubt the hon. Gentleman thinks the question can be settled by a plain "Yes" or "No."

§ MR. CHAPLIN
So it can in this case.

MR. GLADSTONE
The hon. Gentleman comes down with his infallibility and his omniscience, and says he only wished me to reply to this with a plain "Yes" or "No." I tell the hon. Gentleman fairly that I do not think, as far as I can gather rightly from his speech, that he is aware of the extent of the question of which he has been speaking. He is speaking of the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat as if they were the only garrisons whose fates were involved and whom we had to consider. That is not the case.

§ MR. CHAPLIN
There may be others.

MR. GLADSTONE
I will tell you more about that when I come to an exposition of the ease; but, so far as I can see, the hon. Gentleman does not seem to have the remotest idea of the extent and the relations of the questions he has raised. I said to the House, and I now state it again, that no part of this subject had escaped our attention; I state now, as the expression has been used that this is a question of hours, that we have some means, through the knowledge which the Admiral possesses of the position of Her Majesty's ships, of judging whether it is a question of hours or not. If Admiral Hewett were in Suakim with a force adequate for a given purpose, and ready to set out with that force, it might be a question of hours; but the hon. Gentleman, as I apprehend, has no information that that 490 is the case; and I venture to state to him that it is not only not a question of hours, but that nothing would be gained, but much might be lost, by forcing the Government, if he would force the Government, to a premature statement on a subject not ripe for it. ["Oh, oh!"] Why not yet ripe for it? [Laughter]. The hon. Member for Eye is accustomed to that form of interruption. He is one of the youngest Members of this House; but he has learned it with a perfection which I do not think could be exceeded if he had been a Member for two generations. Why is it not yet ripe for it? Because, as I have said, fuller materials are yet to be in our hands. It is necessary for us to hold communications with reference to this subject, and it is impossible for us to arrive at final or safe decisions without the result of these communications. I cannot now state the nature of them. It would be entirely premature; it would do nothing but mischief. As I said, it is necessary for us to hold these communications, and to take them into consideration, and I may perhaps remind the hon. Gentleman that it was only on Tuesday last that we heard of the disaster to General Baker, that at the time we heard of that disaster I believe we had lost the means of communicating by telegraph with General Gordon. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman says it is not necessary we should communicate by telegraph with General Gordon, but that is a matter I can only explain in connection with a full exposition of the functions and office of General Gordon in regard to the Soudan. I decline to go into it now. I have said all I can say. I have said the materials are not ripe. I have said that I do not believe that in any respect this case will be damaged by a postponement necessary for us to arrive at safe conclusions and to make a full statement to the House. Beyond that I cannot go. I assure the hon. Gentleman I am as anxious on the subject as he is; but the public interests are committed to our charge. We must not, we cannot, to satisfy the hon. Gentleman, or gratify a natural curiosity founded upon inconclusive evidence—although I do not question the genuineness of the feeling—go beyond our province. I need not repeat, perhaps, what I said at an earlier period of the evening; but I beg to remind hon. Gentlemen that there is 491 no question, in our view, and we ought to have the means of judging, of any advantage being derived from a premature statement. There is no military question dependent upon anything that may happen, so far as we know, between to-night and to-morrow night. If the hon. Gentleman looks at Sinkat and Tokar, we are bound to look at the whole of the Egyptian garrisons in the Soudan. We are bound to treat the question as a whole, and that will be the manner in which it will be my duty to treat it. I may say that I am physically and absolutely incapable of treating it to-night, for since 9 o'clock this morning, the longest interval I have had from Public Business is the time, Sir, you have been out of the Chair. That would be a very good argument for the moment, but not for the Motion the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote) is to make to-morrow. For me it is a strong argument; but I should be sorry to urge it, were it not that it would do absolute mischief if I were to enter upon a partial statement. I ask the House to allow me to state the judgment of the Government at the first moment that we can hope to be in possession of the full materials.

§ LORD JOHN MANNERS
Sir, while I admit that the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister is occupying one of the most painful and one of the most embarrassing situations which it is possible for any human being at this moment to occupy, with the whole responsibility of Egypt resting upon his shoulders, in addition to those devolving on him through the Office he holds, still, I cannot but think that my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) has done nothing but his duty in calling the attention of the House to that which is a matter of urgent and pressing public importance. I have heard with regret the statement of the right hon. Gentleman that the fate of Sinkat and Tokar, so far as any intervention on the part of Her Majesty's Government is concerned, was bound up with all the other garrisons throughout the Soudan.

MR. GLADSTONE
I have not said that.

§ LORD JOHN MANNERS
The hon. Gentleman limited his Question to Sinkat and Tokar, and the Prime Minister told him he took a narrow view—that there 492 were far larger interests—and he alluded to General Gordon's mission to Khartoum, and he led the House to understand that my hon. Friend had not looked at the safety of all the garrisons throughout the Soudan. That being the case, the House has heard to-night, and the country to-morrow will read, with the deepest regret and humiliation, that Her Majesty's Government have got no plan, and that they have never given any consideration to this matter.

MR. GLADSTONE
I have never said that Her Majesty's Government have given no instructions.

§ LORD JOHN MANNERS
Well, I will put it in this way—that Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to tell the House of Commons that they have taken any effective steps to save the lives of those brave men in those two fortresses. My hon. Friend who made the Motion, as well as the hon. Gentleman who put the Question (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), most scrupulously confined the Motion and the Question to the fate of those two garrisons. It is no answer for the Government to say that great and grave complications have to be considered, that they have to review all the circumstances of the case, that the telegraph has broken down, and that they cannot communicate with General Gordon. The country can only draw one conclusion.

MR. GLADSTONE
I have never said we could not communicate with General Gordon.

§ LORD JOHN MANNERS
No; what the right hon. Gentleman said was that some days ago they were in great difficulties, and then he went on to say that they were unable also at present to communicate with General Gordon.

MR. GLADSTONE
Knowing that the communication with General Gordon was interrupted by his leaving the line of the telegraph, but it had been restored.

§ LORD JOHN MANNERS
That confirms what I have said. I must say that the House of Commons and the country will deeply regret that the Government have not availed themselves of the repeated opportunities given them for satisfying the just apprehensions and alarms and expectations of the nation on this most painful question.

§ SIR JOHN HAY
said, that perhaps he might be allowed to say a word or 493 two on this question, because Admiral Hewett, who was a friend of his, was, at that moment, acting under instructions of which they had no information. It was a fact which must be known to the House, that no orders could be given to an Admiral Commanding in Chief unless issued by two Members of the Board of Admiralty, and countersigned by the Secretary to the Admiralty. Neither the Treasury, nor the Foreign Office, could send orders to conduct any act of war or business on his station; therefore, his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Carapbell-Bannerman) was cognizant of the instructions which were sent to Sir William Hewett. He (Sir John Hay) was aware that the Secretary to the Admiralty was not able to give the information to the House if the First Lord of the Treasury or the Members of the Cabinet did not give him sanction; but he would say that the Cabinet and the First Lord of the Treasury were much to blame if the Secretary to the Admiralty was not allowed to give the information which was asked as to the means at present at Sir William Howett's disposal, and his orders as to the disposing of those men. They knew that Admiral Hewett had 140 Marines, and they knew that the Orontes was stopped with men coming from India and China, some of whom only had arms, and that a certain number of unarmed men were with Admiral Hewett. They knew that Suakim was an island, and that, therefore, it could be defended. But they had no information whether Admiral Hewett had any force going to the relief of the garrison of Sinkat, within 30 miles, or any arrangement for the relief of Tokar. He spoke with a degree of deep regret, seeing that a gallant friend of his, Commander Moncrieff, was sent to his death there by Her Majesty's Government, who encouraged and allowed him to go out in the same manner in which poor General Hicks was sent to the shambles, and as General Baker had been allowed to march to defeat.

§ MR. SPEAKER
I must point out to the right hon. and gallant Gentleman that he is going far beyond the Motion of an urgent character which the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Chaplin) proposed to bring forward.

§ SIR JOHN HAY
said, that General Baker's men were a portion of the garrison of Suakim, and were now under 494 Admiral Hewett's directions. They were not to be relied upon; and he should like to hear whether it was intended to arm with arms the disbanded men sent in the Orontes, and how long the Carysfort would take to come from Alexandria? According to his calculations, she could not arrive for the next five days. The House had a right to know, if the Government proposed to relieve the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar, what means were at the disposal of Admiral Hewett, and what orders were sent to him by the Secretary to the Admiralty, which the right hon. Gentleman refused to communicate.

§ MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN
said, that as the right hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir John Hay) commenced by telling them that Admiral Hewett was a friend of his, he might have conveyed to some hon. Members the idea that he was speaking on behalf of Admiral Hewett, though not by special authority. But Sir William Hewett had raised none of the objections which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had raised as to his appointment. He had made no complaint of insufficient instructions. The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government promised that, if possible, they would lay on the Table to-night the instructions given to Admiral Hewett, so that they should be circulated to-morrow morning. That he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) would take care should be done. With regard to the other questions which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman had alluded to, he hoped the House would not take as accurate all that he had stated as to the course of events. So far as they had been under the control of the Government, all he need say was that fortunately they had been able to supply Sir William Hewett at once with all the additional force, both men and arms, he had asked for. He had no reason to suppose there had been any delay beyond what Sir William Hewett would necessarily expect.

§ MR. BOURKE
said, he thought the discussion showed clearly that the House and the country had suffered from allowing the debate to collapse on Tuesday last. This question of the relief of the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar must have been fully discussed on that occasion, and then the country would have been in possession of the views of the 495 Government with respect to those two garrisons. He must say that it did seem extraordinary that though six days had elapsed since then, they were still unable to answer the question. The position seemed to be this. It appeared almost impossible for the other garrisons in the Soudan to be relieved, and for that reason Her Majesty's Government would not hold out their hands to relieve Sinkat and Tokar. It was perfectly true that Her Majesty's Government had given tremendous pledges to fortune in sending out General Gordon. Those pledges were the very reason why Her Majesty's Government hesitated with regard to Sinkat. They had put themselves into such a position that they were afraid to tell the House when they were going to take hostile measures with regard to Sinkat, lest General Gordon might be imperilled as well as the garrisons he was trying to relieve. If the House was told by the Government the desperate position of those garrisons, with an assurance that they were afraid to make any declarations because the other garrisons would be in danger, he thought it very likely his hon. Friend (Mr. Chaplin) would say—Well, if that was the position in which the Government had placed themselves, he would not take any responsibility. The Government had placed themselves in such a position that they could not relieve Sinkat and Tokar until they heard from General Gordon. He did not think they had much chance of hearing from him for some time.

§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKE
said, there was; they had heard from him that day.

§ MR. BOURKE
said, he was glad to hear it. But if General Gordon got to Khartoum, would they then be in telegraphic communication with him? As Gordon advanced the chances were that the telegraph would be cut, and then they might find General Gordon absolutely shut up in Khartoum, so that they would require to send a large army to relieve Khartoum and release General Gordon. However, if the statement were not delayed beyond to-morrow, he thought the House would be satisfied with the declaration of the Government.

§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT
said, the Government had made the fact that they had not heard from Major 496 General Gordon the excuse for their failing to take measures for the relief of Tokar and Sinkat. He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) did not envy their feelings when that became known to Major General Gordon. As to those places their condition was truly pitiable; indeed, the garrisons in them had been described by the correspondent of one of the morning papers as "chewing the leaves of the trees to alleviate their hunger." Why were not reinforcements sent to Admiral Hewett; and why, if it was decided to send reinforcements, had not the fact been declared to the House and the country? Because the Government had not made up its mind to take that step. The Government might say the sending out of reinforcements would have a bad influence on the results of the mission of General Gordon; but that was an excuse which would not be accepted by the country at large as satisfactory. The correspondent of The Times had telegraphed that morning that it was difficult adequately to describe the humiliation of the English in Egypt, adding these words— Within four days of a British Army 7,000 strong, within a few hours of a post where a British Admiral is tardily allowed to take the supreme command, are a small, starving garrison, who are allowed to treat with barbarians for their lives, and who will probably be all massacred. Why, he asked, were not 1,500 men from the garrison at Cairo sent five days ago to the relief of Sinkat and Tokar? The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister told the House that at one time he had hopes that the force which had been given to Baker Pasha might achieve satisfactory results. But the Government had been told and warned betimes that the miserable, undisciplined, badly-armed set of cravens whom Baker commanded must inevitably meet with the fate which was ultimately theirs. Baker's mission was a desperate one, undertaken by a gallant man who carried his life in his hands, in order to strive to atone for the shortcomings of Her Majesty's Government, upon whom the whole of Europe was crying shame. From St. Petersburg to Rome, from Paris to the remotest limits of the civilized world, let hon. Members opposite read what the Press was saying about them. So long ago as Septem- 497 ber 18, Tewfik Bey, the gallant Governor of Suakim, whose fate now rested in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, said that, though he had crushed for a time the rebel movement in the neighbourhood of Sinkat, he must have a reinforcement of 2,000 men, if he was to maintain his position. Why was not something done to meet his views? Not one single step had been taken by the Government for the purpose of relieving the beleaguered garrisons, though the terrible state in which they were had been known for months. Suleiman Pasha months ago warned the Government that the Egyptian troops were absolutely unreliable, and applying, with a slight alteration, the words of Admiral Hewett as applied to the Egyptian Governor, he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) would say that "the fall of this place into the hands of the enemy would be a lasting disgrace "to the Ministers of the Crown. Yet, notwithstanding all warnings, they for months during the latter part of last year kept on repeating the cuckoo cry of "We are not responsible." This childish repudiation of responsibility had perforce been reversed, and in their despatch of January 4 the Government avowed their full responsibility. Under the régime of Her Majesty's Ministers men had been dragged in chains to fight against the troops of the False Prophet, despite their piteous cries not to be sent to the front. The Government had not been able like men, much less like statesmen, to grasp the situation, but had connived at brave English officers and poor, ill-clad, and ill-fed Egyptians being sent to their doom.

§ MR. SPEAKER
I must remind the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) that he is going far beyond the Question of urgent importance, to ask which the adjournment has been moved.

§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT
said, he was, of course, bound by the ruling of the right hon. Gentleman; but he was not aware that he had by a single sentence exceeded the limits of the Motion, which he took to be the fate of Tewfik Bey. At the same time, as be bad said, he bowed to the ruling of the Chair, though it might appear to him as being somewhat incomprehensible. The Government were responsible, according to their own showing, for what was going on, because they had imposed the present policy of withdrawal upon 498 the Egyptian Government against their will; and yet, with 500 blue-jackets at Suakim and 7,000 British soldiers at or near Cairo, they were allowing the brave Egyptian garrisons at Sinkat and other places to perish. What reason was there for this delay, in honour, in justice, or in humanity, excepting the pitiable vacillation and weakness of the Government. Why should not Parliament, the country, and the civilized world be told that these brave men were to be relieved, and that they were not to be allowed to be massacred almost in sight of British troops?