§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTESir, I have given Notice that on this stage of the Bill I will move—
That an humble Address he presented to the Crown, praying that Her Majesty will he graciously pleased to communicate to the House the instructions under which the Earl of North-brook is about to proceed to Egypt, and any further Papers bearing on the same.I have placed that Notice on the Paper because I understood it would put me in a more regular position for making the observations I wish to make; but I need not assure the House it is not my intention in any way to interfere with the progress of the Appropriation Bill. Though I hope the Government will be willing to make any such communication to us with regard to Lord Northbrook's Mission and the instructions under which he is to proceed to Egypt as they find it possible to do, yet I shall not press for these Papers against the feeling and desire of the Government. But, Sir, the object I have in view is to call the attention of the House before we separate to the actual position of our Egyptian policy. I know it has been stated that this is not a particularly appropriate moment for doing so, that we are too late, that at this moment there is nothing on which we have to speak, and that I am choosing the wrong moment because the Government have just now resumed 450 or regained their freedom of dealing with the Egyptian Question, which was, to a considerable extent, limited during the time the Conference was sitting. That is exactly the reason why it seems to me it is very desirable we should call attention to the actual position of affairs; it is because Her Majesty's Government have regained the freedom which, to a certain extent, they had forfeited, I am anxious that some expression of opinion should be listened to which might give some idea of the manner in which they ought to use the freedom they have regained. It is a very poor consolation to us to be told that Her Majesty's Government have regained their freedom with regard to Egyptian affairs, if, at the same time, we are led to infer that they intend to use that freedom as they have used their freedom on a previous occasion. What I wish to call attention to particularly is not to the details of the Conference—I am not going into all the questions of the financial position of Egypt; that is a very interesting and important question which has been well discussed in the Conference and in the Papers that were prepared for the Conference; it is one which will engage our careful study and attention; but I do feel, with regard to that part of the question, that there is no special appropriateness in discussing it now. What I am anxious to call attention to is rather the condition precedent to the holding of the Conference—I mean the Anglo-French Agreement, which was of the most serious, and, I might say, of the most alarming character, and which we were prevented discussing at the period when we were anxious to do so some time ago. I am told that that Anglo-French Agreement was entirely dependent upon the result of the Conference; and as the Conference has failed, so the Anglo-French Agreement has failed, and that we may take comfort to ourselves in thinking that it is quite dead and gone. Sir, I wish I was quite sure that it was dead and gone; but that is exactly the point on which I entertain very serious doubts. I quite admit that I have been told by the Prime Minister that it is in a state of suspended animation as is the Franchise Bill in the House of Lords.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEThey are as nearly as possible the same,
MR. GLADSTONENo; my words were that it is in a state of abeyance, and of no force or effect as regards either party.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEIn a state of abeyance. Well, that does not in the least meet the difficulty I am in. It is quite clear that at the present moment these provisions are not binding upon Her Majesty's Government or this country; and, therefore, we have absolute freedom with regard to them. Whether you like to call it by one word or another, that is the moaning of what the Prime Minister has told us. At the same time, the Prime Minister has told us—I will not attempt to quote his exact words, as he is so very particular as to his actual expression—but he has told us very distinctly that, for his part, he attaches considerable value to the provisions of that Anglo-French Agreement. It seems to me that in his own mind—and, I presume, in the mind of the Government—that that Agreement, although it is for the time at an end, is yet so far master of their affections that it may yet happen that it may be brought forward and acted upon at any time that it appears to the Government to be convenient; although we are not bound at present to these terms, yet they are terms that were deemed reasonable in themselves, and it is quite clear Her Majesty's Government may bring them forward, at any moment it suits them. The Conference, as we know, was assembled for financial purposes. When it was mentioned to the House that the Conference was going to be held there was a good deal of anxiety and questioning on the part of different Members in different parts of the House. They wished to know for what purpose it was to be held, and they cross-examined the Government repeatedly as to whether it was to go at all beyond the question of financial matters. We were told that it was to be strictly confined to this subject; and, undoubtedly, so far as the Conference itself was concerned, it was confined to this subject. But it was necessary as a condition precedent that political matters should be discussed, and that political matters were discussed; and an Agreement was entered into without the House being able to pronounce any opinion, or, indeed, knowing anything about the arrangement so proceeded with. When this 452 Agreement was laid before the House, when we saw what it was that the Government were going to commit the country to, provided they came to terms on financial matters, many of us, not only on this side, but on that, and I believe a large number in the country, and many who were not connected with our political organizations, were very much struck by the danger and the objectionable character of the proposals to which the Government had pledged themselves in that Correspondence. We were anxious to call the attention of the House to the matter, and to obtain a vote of the House upon the subject before it was too late, before we went into a Conference which might pledge us irrevocably to this Agreement. I felt it would have been a reasonable thing for us to have taken that precautionary step, for if this Conference had not broken down—and it broke down very much, as the Prime Minister had told us, upon a question of computation, an innocent thing in itself—if in the computation all had concurred, we, at this moment, should have found ourselves bound by that Agreement. We go back now upon the grounds upon which the refusal to discuss the question was based. We gave a challenge; the Government accepted our challenge; and we came down to the House fully expecting that we should argue the question out, whatever might be the result of a Division; but we found ourselves suddenly taken on the flank by a movement of a most unexpected character; it was perfectly fair, but at the same time it was a great surprise, and I hope that even now, before the Session terminates, we may hear from some of the right hon. Gentlemen who took part in that movement, which was afterwards approved by the Prime Minister in an expressive phrase, what their opinion really is upon this matter, which hitherto they have evaded expressing any opinion upon, and which we are told by some out-of-doors—I hope not by any in the House—is a matter that is past, and into which it is quite needless to enter, and about which we need not trouble ourselves. Sir, with regard to the Anglo-French Agreement, I ask the permission of the House very briefly to state the principal objections I have to it. They are throe. Firstly, I objected very strongly to the arrangement which 453 was made under the Agreement for the powers that were to be exercised by the Commission of the Debt, or what is called the Caisse—an arrangement which is briefly, but not quite accurately, called a Multiple Control. That appeared to me to be a serious and even a fatal objection. Secondly, there was the arrangement that in the event of the Conference succeeding we should give a pledge that the British Forces should be withdrawn from Egypt on a fixed date, and that date three years hence, subject to certain provisions of assent on the part of the other Powers to the forces remaining. I objected to that; and the third point was the pledge which, as I understand, was given in this Correspondence, that when the British Forces retired, or at such other time as might be decided upon, we should submit to the Powers of Europe a plan for the neutralization of Egypt. These are the three points—Multiple Control, date of evacuation, and neutralization of Egypt. They are three important political questions, or questions of the first magnitude, which we have never discussed and never had the opportunity of discussing; and now I am only anxious that we should mark what those questions are, fix our minds upon them, and, as far as possible, direct the mind of the country to them. Nothing is more natural, at this period of the year, than that the public out-of-doors should think that as the Conference has broken down, and England, having regained her liberty, they may compose themselves to quiet slumber, and turn their attention to matters which are of more immediate and pressing interest. But this is a dangerous period; it is one in which we must not allow our attention to be withdrawn. With regard to the first of these three questions, the power to be exercised by the Commission of the Caisse, I wish, in the first place, just to call attention to the fact that these proposals were made in a despatch from Sir Evelyn Baring of the 2nd of June, in which Sir Evelyn Baring laid down several very marked propositions, and laid them down with great clearness and great earnestness. I shall just mention what one or two of those propositions are. He began by telling the Government that he entertained a very strong opinion that it was essential, for the interests of all concerned, that the financial combination now about to be 454 framed, so far as the very difficult circumstances of the case permit, should present solid evidence of stability and finality. He went on to say that no confidence, he was convinced, would be entertained in the stability of any financial arrangement which was now to be framed, unless a powerful check were exercised over the expenditure of the Egyptian Government. He went on further to say that there must be a rigid financial supervision over the expenditure, and that it must be mainly, if not entirely, exercised through the agency of Europeans, rather than through that of Natives. He follows out the same course of thought throughout his despatch, and says that, unless the finances are in fairly good order, Egyptian affairs must always constitute a source of disquietude to Europe and special anxiety to England. Now, those are very important propositions, and I call attention to them because they show the spirit in which the recommendations made by Sir Evelyn Baring, and adopted by Her Majesty's Government and by the Government of France, were framed. Now, what were those propositions? They were three in number. In the first place, it was proposed that the Commissioners of the Debt—the Caisse, as we call it—should have the right of taking part in the framing of the Budget. In the second place, it provided that they were to have the right of vetoing any expenditure which might be proposed to be incurred beyond the limits of the Budget; and, thirdly, they were to have the right of supervision, in order to see that the taxes—the revenue—was properly collected. Those are three very great and important powers to confide to foreigners over a Native Administration. It is true that they were extremely well guarded and qualified. Although the Commissioners of the Caisse were to take part in the framing of the Budget, and were to give their advice in regard to the expenditure, it was expressly said that the Egyptian Government were not bound to follow that advice—the advice was to be given, but it was perfectly optional on the part of the Egyptian Government whether they were to take it. Well, then, again, although it was said that they should have the power of vetoing any expenditure with regard to the Budget, that had to be qualified. The 455 qualification came to this—that if any expenditure beyond the Budget was very much desired, it should be an exception, and they should not have the power to veto it. These are all very excellent provisions in a country where you have a thoroughly good financial system, and when it is regularly worked, and worked under proper public control; but I venture to say that in a country like Egypt, with the habits and tastes and feelings of those who have to administer the expenditure, and with a body of gentlemen of four or five different nations sitting over them, with a certain nominal power of vetoing, but absolutely no power to enforce that veto when their recommendations are disregarded—such provisions as those, and those arrangements, amount to little more than a sham. Then I am told—"If, alter all, they are a sham, they are none the worse for that. What you have had hitherto has not been very successful, and it is not a very hard thing to say that these proposals would result in a sham." But I think it would be a very hard thing, and a very wrong thing, to encourage the setting up of anything which would be in the nature of a sham control over expenditure, which would produce an entirely false impression, and lead to divided responsibility. We should be continually hearing that this was allowed by the Commissioners of the Caisse, and that that was done by the authority of the Egyptian Government; and we should never know to whom we had to look and on whom we had to fall back for explanation or redress for any great wrong. And, besides that, it seems to me exactly the course that would be best adapted for insuring the promotion of intrigues and disputes among the Members of the Caisse themselves. So that, instead of being merely nugatory, it would be a perfectly mischievous and a very bad financial arrangement. But, Sir, if I had had to criticize this arrangement before the meeting of the Conference—I had hoped to be able to do so—I should have taken an objection to it in the same spirit, I daresay as nearly as possible in the same words, in which Lord Granville took his objection to the final proposals of the French Plenipotentiary. Lord Granville said that those proposals would result in financial confusion in Egypt, and that they would give to the Mem- 456 bers of the Caisse a mastery over Egypt and its affairs, which the British Government could never assent to. I say that the proposals which were contained in Sir Evelyn Baring's despatch of the 2nd of June, which were adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and which formed the basis of the Anglo-French Agreement, were proposals which would have led to evil and mischief, and, as I think, to a very serious condition of affairs in Egypt. Now, Sir, I may be told that the Government and the Liberal Party generally in the country, and in the House, are always ready to cry out against anything in the nature of a Dual Control, which is their especial abomination, or a Multiple Control, or anything in the nature of control. I quite agree with them. I think that the Dual Control, though it had some advantages, though it was a powerful engine, and gave opportunities for doing a great deal of good, which ought not to be forgotten when we speak of it, had, at the same time, great disadvantages, and especially had the great drawback of its being dual—that is to say, of introducing two elements which were likely not entirely to agree one with the other. What you would have had here would have been a Multiple Control—a Control exercised by several persons instead of by two, by several Powers instead of by two. The chances of disagreement would have been multiplied indefinitely, and the difference between the old Control and the new Control would have been comparatively little, as I think. Where it would have been of any value at all, it would have been in favour of the old system, the Dual Control, as against the new and Multiple Control, because unquestionably the Dual Control, though it was open to great objections, did accomplish this—it put the Controllers in the possession of considerable power and authority. They were able to accomplish some excellent work, and, as Sir Evelyn Baring himself points out, by the attendance of the Controllers at the Councils of Ministers, they exercised no inconsiderable power in the administration of the country. Now, if you are looking to a good financial state of affairs, you must not exclude the administration of the country from your view, because the finance depends upon the administration; and surely it would be desirable, if you are 457 going to give advice, if you are going to do anything in the way of improving that financial administration, that you should have the power of giving advice at the moment when it is most needed, which is at the very time when the expenditure is or is not going to become necessary, according to the decisions which the Government of the day may take. Now, Sir, I have mentioned summarily the objections which I feel to the provisions of the Anglo-French Convention with regard to the Multiple Control. But there is another point on which I wish to speak, and that is the provision with respect to the evacuation of the territory. I am not one of those who desire at all to see the indefinite detention of our troops in Egypt, and I am very anxious indeed to see the time when it may be possible for the troops to come properly away; but I am quite sure that fixing a day, and fixing it at such a limit, is exactly the way to prevent the very object which you have in view—that is to say, prevent it, unless you are prepared to come away in such a manner as the hon. Gentleman the Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) advocated on Saturday. His idea was, come away, and turn loose in Egypt all those personages who have any kind of pretensions to rule. Let us have Ismail, Arabi, and the Mahdi, and everybody else you can imagine. Let them all fight it out together, and let England sit by and see what will happen. I venture to think that that is not a policy which will commend itself either to this House or to the country. I do not think that the House could endure a state of things which would lead Egypt into a condition of anarchy. If we were to adopt such a policy as that we should never be able to hold up our heads again before the Powers of Europe for very shame. When I read the information which was sent round when the Conference began to be considered, I could not but look at the grounds which were stated by Lord Granville in his Circular for considering if necessary to revise the Law of Liquidation. He stated that—
The finances of Egypt have been brought into very serious difficulties owing to the destruction of property at Alexandria, and the awards in compensation amounting to a sum of about £4,250,000; and, secondly, by the protracted endeavour of Egypt to hold the Soudan.458 When I read these two reasons for summoning a Conference, and asking for a change in the Law of Liquidation, I said the first of these matters is one to which England has a good deal to say, because the destruction which involves awards of compensation to the amount of some £4,250,000 or upwards was directly due to the policy and the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government. And, again, when the protracted endeavour of Egypt to hold the Soudan was given as another cause of the financial embarrassment of that country, I could not but recall to mind that when Lord Dufferin was in Egypt, and was drawing up a scheme for the Egyptian Army, he was directed by the Government to withhold advice, which I confidently believe, if he had been allowed to give, might and would have exercised an influence which would have prevented that protracted endeavour to hold the Soudan, and have also prevented a great deal of the disgrace, annoyance, and anxiety inflicted on Egypt in consequence. Therefore, if that is the case, it is impossible for us to look without anxiety, as if it did not concern us at all, upon the evacuation, of Egypt by our Forces until the condition of the country is such that we know it may be safely undertaken, and in such a manner as not to leave confusion and chronic disorder behind. But if the time should come when that evacuation may be effected, I cannot see what good is to be done by fixing the date many years before. On the contrary, much harm may be the consequence, because you excite hopes, and fears, and intrigues among the people of Egypt, and you cause anxiety, incertitude, and terror out of all proportion to the real condition of affairs. If hon. Gentlemen want an illustration of the sort of feeling which may be aroused, I would ask them to bear in mind what took place in France towards the close of the first arrangement under the Republic of 1848. An arrangement was made for the President to hold Office for a certain term of years, and as the time for the evacuation of the Presidental Office drew near the whole of France became agitated and alarmed by the thought of what might happen, and the terror was such as to stop all business proceedings and to lead to intrigues of every kind and sort, until in the month of December, 1851, the coup d'état was 459 brought about as much as anything else by the state of alarm and anxiety in which the people were found. Then there is a third point, and that is the principle of the neutralization of Egypt. It was one of the stipulations, and one of the points in the agreement to which I am referring, that this country should be prepared before the time of the evacuation of the country to propose a scheme for the neutralization of Egypt. Now, neutralization is a word that is rather attractive; it has taken many people's fancy, and they have thought that it might furnish a means for bringing about a settlement satisfactory to all parties. We are told—"Look at Belgium, look at Switzerland, and see how happy these countries are under a neutralized condition, and then see whether the same thing cannot be done with Egypt." I wish to know whether the Government has over seriously considered or thought out this scheme of neutralization, and how it would be applied to Egypt, because I fear that the case of Egypt is one in which such a proposition would be hardly brought into action. You compare Egypt with Belgium and Switzerland. Let me point out one or two differences. In the first place, Belgium and Switzerland are independent States, as much so as Portugal or Holland, or any other State of Europe. But Egypt is not an independent State. Egypt is a part of the Ottoman Empire, and I want to know under what arrangement you are to neutralize Egypt, whether it is still to retain its connection with the Ottoman Empire, whether it is still to be a portion of that Empire? If it is, and if it is to be neutralized, you would very seriously affect the military power of Turkey in any war. And if it is not to be a part of the Ottoman Empire, how far can you carry out the neutralization of a country in which Turkey is so much concerned. And there is yet another difficulty, supposing you get over the difficulty with regard to the Porte. Let us look at the great distinction between Egypt and Belgium and Switzerland. Belgium and Switzerland are States surrounded entirely by other European States, parties to the guarantee, and willing and able to maintain it—or, at all events, which are subject to the public law of Europe. They have formed engagements to protect the guarantee. That is not the position of 460 Egypt, which is not surrounded by a number of such Powers bound by engagements to protect her neutrality. You have a large frontier of Egypt on the South and West exposed to warlike tribes and to Asiatic and African Powers, who will not respect your guarantee of neutralization, and you will find that Egypt will be in a very different position from that which the countries which I have mentioned would find themselves in in similar circumstances, Another point of distinction is this. Belgium and Switzerland are two States which, if let alone, are perfectly competent to go on in their own way and to manage their own affars; they have a capital Revenue, a good financial system; for their size are very powerful, and are capable of defending themselves. I believe the Army of Belgium at its war strength amounts to upwards of 100,000 men. I am not sure what is the strength of the Federal Army of Switzerland; but I believe it is something like 113,000 men, and, in addition, there is the Landwehr of some 90,000. I do not suppose I need draw the other side to the picture, and ask what force Egypt has. You must consider, therefore, how thoroughly different are the conditions, and in what a position you may place yourselves if you ride off on the idea of neutralization and commit yourselves to such a policy. I have thought I should not be wasting the time of the House in bringing this matter before it. I have not endeavoured to rake up old sources of controversy. I have abstained from passing any judgment upon what Her Majesty's Government may be going to do, in the first place, because I do not know what it is; and, in the next place, because I am anxious not to interfere with their proceedings at a critical time. But I do think that, before I conclude, I ought to put a Question, and I ought to get some explanation from the Government as to what it is they are really going to do. What is the nature and object of this Mission of Lord North-brook, which is now filling the minds of everyone? It is very curious that we began the Session with the Mission of General Gordon, and we are closing it with the Mission of Lord Northbrook. There was some difficulty in going into Egyptian affairs at the beginning of the Session, because we were told we might be interfering with General Gordon's 461 Mission; and now there is some difficulty in going into them because we may be interfering with the Mission of Lord Northbrook. I do not say that these are circumstances which are in any way suspicious; but they are worthy of no, tice and I want to know how far the parallel between Lord Northbrook and General Gordon is to go? General Gordon, we were told, is a hero, and Lord Northbrook is a Cabinet Minister. I do not know which is the climax and which the anti-climax. I do not know that the position of a Cabinet Minister will excite more enthusiasm than the position of a hero. But, at all events, everybody feels that this is a desperate card played by the Government, either knowingly for the purpose of gaining time and staving off inquiry, or it may be for some other reason. Sometimes it looks to me like a move made by a bad chess player, who does not exactly know what to do, but has to make some move. I hope that it may lead to the beginning of some new policy, and some new principles which may become the position of so distinguished a nobleman as Lord Northbrook. All I want to know is, what is Lord Northbrook sent out for? I am afraid that here, again, we have a parallel with the case of General Gordon. What was General Gordon sent out for? It was in order that he might "report and advise" as to the withdrawal of the troops from the Soudan; and now Lord Northbrook is sent out to "report and to advise." "Reporting and advising" seems to be a favourite phrase with the Government. He is to report and advise upon what sort of advice his Colleagues are to give to the Egyptian Government. That is rather a roundabout business, and, in my opinion, it would have been simpler, if there was anything important for him to advise upon, that he should give that advice directly to the Egyptian Government. I am asked sometimes—"What would your policy be in this case?" I would reply that our policy would be very different indeed in some respects from that of Her Majesty's Government; but if we were pursuing a policy involving what they are now going to do—sending out one of their own Colleagues to Egypt to advise them as to what should be done—our policy would be to arm him with greater powers, to put him into direct communication with the Egyptian Government; 462 to trust to his knowledge of the feeling, and opinions of his Colleagues, whom he could consult at any moment by telegraph; to intrust him with the power of giving advice, and of giving it promptly and with authority, which he never can do if it is to be done by transmitting backwards and forwards, and consulting as to what should be done. That is the old policy. That is what Lord Dufferin was obliged to follow. Lord Dufferin had no powers himself to give orders or to do anything. If he had had such powers, among other things, he would have stopped the expedition of General Hicks when there was still time, and would have saved us from the disgrace which was inevitably and inseparably associated with that expedition. Well, Sir, I should be glad to know what are to be Lord Northbrook's instructions? Is he to have that power without which he will be unable to produce any effect whatever? You must leave no time for the intrigues of others. You must give your Representative power to act effectively, and at once, and, I believe, if you do that, you may yet bring matters to a satisfactory issue; you will probably be able to bring about arrangements satisfactory to this country and acceptable to the other Powers of Europe. You have exhausted your means of procedure upon the old lines. You have tried Conference after Conference, and they have all failed, and you must not hanker any longer after a mode of procedure, which has failed. You have tried to proceed in accordance with the advice given by able men like Lord Dufferin and General Gordon. Now you are to take the advice of Lord Northbrook; but, after all, by whom is Lord Northbrook himself to be advised? By Sir Evelyn Baring? If so, why not ask Sir Evelyn Baring to give us direct advice; and why, if it is Lord Northbrook whose advice is to be acted on, not intrust him with the power of giving that advice on the spot? Before closing my remarks, I wish to say one word, not in regard to our own interests, or of European interests in Egypt, but one word on behalf of the unfortunate people of Egypt. Whatever may be the rights and the wrongs of this country—not of successive Governments, for I am not going to argue the case of one Government against another—whatever may be the arguments you may bring forward on the one side or on the other, 463 this, at least, remains—that justice is not being done to the people of Egypt, and that the effect of your proceedings has been to weaken their position, and to do them more harm than good. I am not going to trouble the House with any financial details and with any examination of the principles of Egyptian taxation, or anything of that kind; and certainly I am not going to enter into the question of what ought, or ought not, to have been done in regard to the Conference. But I want to consider the question of the two great classes into which Egypt is divided—the oppressors and the oppressed. The oppressed are not very far to seek. They are the unfortunate Native Egyptian cultivators of the soil, whose industry and patience are beyond praise, and who do extract from the soil the proceeds which form the financial wealth of the country. The oppressors are the dominant races, the Turks or the Circassians, who extract the taxes from the people, and who, in doing so, not only take all that they can get out of the people for the State, but take care to feather their own nests in the process. There is very great difficulty in attempting to deal with a condition of affairs such as this. If Egypt were in South America or elsewhere, we might confine ourselves to expressions of sympathy and goodwill; but looking to the position in which Egypt stands, and how it is situated, and looking at the history of our dealings with that country, we cannot thus put the matter aside. This is the proposition which I wish to impress upon the House—that, bad as is the condition of the fellaheen under a strong Government, it is even worse under a weak Government. It was, no doubt, very bad in the days of Mehemet Ali. He was a Ruler who was very stringent in his measures, and who was prepared to get all he could out of the people. But, after all, what he took was taken for one man, and he had power to stop any mischief that others might be inclined to do, and he took very good care not to allow the Mudirs, or Sheiks, or other small authorities to rob the people, because it was really robbing his own revenue. But where you have a weak Government you have a Government which cannot control these people, who are in direct communication with the peasantry, and who will, therefore, plunder and oppress the peasantry 464 in a manner that will not take place under a strong Government. Well, you are not very likely to get a strong Government in Egypt at the present time, unless it is strengthened in some way by the assistance of Europe or the assistance of England. Europe has been tried, and we do not see any very satisfactory results at this moment. England, I believe, has still the power to do that which she ought to do, and is bound to do. There are steps which can be taken for the improvement of the condition of the Egyptian people, if the influence of England be but properly used; and if it is clear that England has that power by the proper use of her influence and of the great position she at present holds, England is deeply culpable if she fails to do her duty, and is deeply and doubly culpable if she fails because she is afraid of having her action misinterpreted. There is a great deal that might be done. Whatever may be the exact limits of the produce of the laud tax, we know that there is one great and crying necessity which must be provided before that tax can be fairly handled, and that is the completion of a fair Cadastral Survey. The whole foundation of our improvements lies upon a fair Cadastral Survey. You will never have that under a Native Government. It will come too late to be of any service. I know there is a Cadastral Survey partly accomplished; but it is not carried on with energy. The next point is the establishment of interior tribunals to which the oppressed taxpayers may have recourse, and where they may feel that justice will be done to them. But you will not have that unless, in the first place, you have a power which will compel the Native authorities to submit to these tribunals; and you must get something more than that; you must win the confidence of the people to induce them to go to these tribunals and bring their cases before them; and you must not leave them in a position in which they will say—"These things are very excellent; we might get our cases heard and settled, but we know that this will not last long—we know that as soon as the English pressure is withdrawn we shall go back to the old state of things, and be again at the mercy of those whose vengeance we shall have provoked." Gentlemen who know Egypt say that one-half of the sadness that 465 exists there is concealed because the people are afraid to disclose all their sufferings. I say England must step forward, and must not shrink from the position into which she has been brought. She must make use of the freedom which we are so happy to think she has regained, to effect a peaceful settlement, which will be one that we can look back upon without blushing and without shame. I trust that the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government, although he may say, as he said the other day, that he has no absolute instructions to give to Lord Northbrook, will yet be able to give us such information as to the spirit of the communications or instructions with which Lord Northbrook is furnished, as will enable us to feel, when we are separating for the Recess, that a matter of this great importance is in good hands, and that it is being carried on in a proper spirit.
MR. GLADSTONESir, when towards the close of the lengthened address of the right hon. Baronet he came to the subject of the condition of the fellaheen, I was in hopes that we were at last going to get upon some ground of common interest, where the mind and heart of every man would be inclined to support the right hon. Baronet, if his remarks were of a character that aimed directly at the purpose of humanity and justice and nothing else. Well, their aim I will not dispute; but I want to know what advantage is to be derived from such remarks as the right hon. Baronet made in this part of his speech? He says that a weak Government is worse than a strong Government. I am not prepared to assent to that principle without limitation—[A laugh]—in spite of the laughter with which, as usual, any opposition which the hon. Member does not like is met with by him in his habitual mode of regulating the manners of this House. A weak Government may be worse than a strong one; but if the right hon. Gentleman thinks that the strong Government of Ismail was better than the weak Government of Tewfik, why did the right hon. Gentleman put down the strong Government and set up the weak one? Tewfik is the child of the right hon. Baronet. The elevation of Tewfik to the Khedivial Throne was the special work of the right hon. Baronet; and it was that elevation, which was, in fact, a more entangling 466 and more perilous engagement to the British Government than even the Dual Control, which was the other part of the right hon. Gentleman's performance, and the dangers and defects of which he has to-day, for the first time after four years of experience, scantily admitted. Now, Sir, as to the lamentable condition of the fellaheen of Egypt, the right hon. Gentleman gives it to be understood that Europe has tried her hand and has failed. When did Europe try her hand and fail? She has not tried her hand at all. She has tried her hand at a Conference and failed. She has never tried her hand with regard to the internal government of Egypt. France and England, by the advice of the right hon. Gentleman and his friends, tried their hands and failed. Europe has not yet tried her hand, and I am at a loss to conceive what shadow of support there is for that strange assertion on the part of the right hon. Gentleman. Then the right hon. Gentleman describes the miserable condition of the fellaheen in a manner to which I take exception on two grounds. He says, for example, you may establish Civil Courts in Egypt; but when you have done so and left they will not dare to resort to them. That is an underground and an unavowed argument for the permanent retention of the power of England in Egypt. He said that he wished to get out of Egypt as soon as possible, and yet he makes use of arguments showing that even if you establish good institutions they cannot work, at least after you have retired. The moral of that saying, whether the right hon. Gentleman is aware of it or not, is plain—it is that you ought to remain in permanent possession of power in Egypt. [Opposition cheers.] Some of his Friends cheer that sentiment, and thereby renounce the principle of action which the right hon. Gentleman made the basis of his policy—namely, the withdrawal from Egypt when the purposes of improvement for which we went there are accomplished. I must confess to a feeling of astonishment that the right hon. Gentleman should speak of the present condition of Egypt as if he believed that no good had been done in Egypt by the constant and active exertions of the very able men who have been sent to Egypt for the purpose. The right hon. Gentleman said—"I am afraid we shall have a succession of Reports like those 467 of Lord Dufferin and of General Gordon, which was expected but has not yet come to hand." But the right hon. Gentleman should recollect that the Report of Lord Dufferin was not a Report of advice and inquiry, but was a Report as to things that had been done as well as of things that were to be done. It was not a question of speculative improvement; and why does the right hon. Gentleman choose to overlook and take no notice of the very distinct assertion of the English Agents with regard to the great changes that have already been effected in Egypt by English efforts? Has the right hon. Gentleman taken the pains of referring to the despatch of Sir Evelyn Baring of the 28th of June?
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEYes.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEYes, I have.
MR. GLADSTONEThen I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman has taken no notice of it. I think it is hardly fair.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFRead it? It is perfectly worthless.
MR. GLADSTONEThe hon. Member says it is perfectly worthless. Perhaps if he had been in Egypt he would have made a better thing of it.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFI hope so.
MR. GLADSTONESir Evelyn Baring is a man of the highest character and ability, not to be surpassed in the range of the diplomatic or general service—[Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: Oh, oh!]—and the mocking of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock, who never has had to confront any difficulty greater than that of a platform speech, and who does not know what it is to look in the face the solution of these difficult problems with which Sir Evelyn Baring has been struggling, is misplaced. The noble Lord should support his Friend in that summary method of disposing of the official and formal statements of honourable and very able men on the subject of what has been done in Egypt. Sir, the whole of that despatch is full of detailed statements of the practical improvements that have been introduced into Egypt. In Egypt No. 25, at page 125, in regard to corporal punishment—[A 468 laugh]—the laughter of the noble Lord I will not notice—he says—
By far the most important reform effected since the British occupied Egypt has been the partial suppression of the use of the courbash, I say the 'partial suppression,' because I am not prepared to say that even now the courbash may not be occasionally used; but I am convinced that its use is now comparatively rare. It used to be very frequently employed for two main objects, viz.: (1) the collection of taxes; and (2) the extortion of evidence. I think I may say with confidence that the use of the courbash as a general practice in connection either with the collection of taxes or the extortion of evidence has ceased.Is that, Sir, a small matter in the condition of a country situated as Egypt is now situated? Is not that a matter that had some claims on the notice of the right hon. Gentleman when he was opening up to us the condition of Egypt? Was it right on his part to overlook a result of that kind effected, by the Agents of this country, simply because those Agents happened to have been appointed by a Government to which he is opposed?["Oh, oh!"]
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEThat really is an assertion that I must notice. I must ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw that expression. I never made any Party charge against Sir Evelyn Baring. I think the right hon. Gentleman has no right to make such an observation.
MR. GLADSTONEI will say it is most unfortunate for the right hon. Baronet, when coming forward in his place to discuss at large the state of Egypt, and show what had to be done, and what has been done, entirely to pass over that formal Report of Sir Evelyn Baring showing the great results accomplished under great difficulties by his energies and those of others, including the suppression of corporal punishment. [An hon. MEMBER: Partial suppression.] I beg pardon, it is not a partial suppression I was speaking of, but the suppression of corporal punishment in the collection of the Revenue and extortion of evidence. I say that the right hon. Gentleman's account of the state of Egypt, if he will not condescend to notice what has been said by Sir Evelyn Baring, and prefers to tell us what he has picked up from somebody with whom he has been conversing—I say his account is but a worthless statement. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the Cadastral Survey. Does he suppose 469 that it has been overlooked? On the contrary, every effort has been made to press it forward, and it has been pressed forward so far as was possible. Why does the right hon. Gentleman refer to that matter and say that nothing has been done?
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEI said it had been completed in one district; but I complained that it had not been gone on with as fast as it should have been.
MR. GLADSTONEHow does the right hon. Gentleman know that? Has he examined into the subject sufficiently to enable him to pronounce that the English Agents have failed in their duty with regard to the Cadastral Survey? In one of the recent despatches in "Egypt," I find—
Another proof of the increasing confidence in the accuracy and utility of the work is furnished by the applications which are now being received from private individuals for copies of the Cadastral plans and extracts from the registers in relation to their properties. In many instances the administration of the land survey has been employed to decide disputes between proprietors.That described the progress made up to last September, since which further progress has been made; and yet the right hon. Gentleman undertakes to condemn the English Agents in Egypt, because they have not done as much as he thinks they ought to have done. Sir Evelyn Baring also says—Besides these and other minor reforms … I maintain that a new life has been breathed into the spirit of the Egyptian Administration and into the Egyptian people. The people are beginning to learn that there is such a thing as justice between man and man."—(Egypt, No. 25, p. 127.)I maintain, therefore, that the right hon. Gentleman is not equitable, and has no justification whatever for the disparaging account which he has given of the exertions of his fellow-countrymen in Egypt, and I maintain that his reference to the difficulties of the work that has been done and is to be done means, if it means anything, the permanent retention of the power of England in Egypt, which, in a former part of his speech, he absolutely disavowed. The right hon. Gentleman goes back to the subject of General Gordon and General Hicks, and on the subject of General Hicks he is again extremely wise after the event. He knows very well that we were not interfering with the 470 proceedings of General Hicks, or of the Egyptian Government in regard to General Hicks. He remained carefully silent, waiting for the chapter of accidents; but after the expedition of General Hicks, for which we were in no way responsible, turned out unfortunate, the right hon. Gentleman has been most copious in his references to it, taking every opportunity of referring to the folly of not interfering with that expedition of General Hicks, although he never recommended any interference so long as the power of interfering existed. He says that he was told at the beginning of the Session that he must not speak on Egyptian matters for fear of interfering with the Mission of General Gordon, and that now he must not speak for fear of interfering with the Mission of Lord Northbrook. Who told him either of those, and when was he told? I remember, indeed, hearing the right hon. Gentleman say, when General Gordon had been about three or four weeks in the Soudan, that General Gordon had failed. I remember that declaration of the right hon. Gentleman, which was a splendid proof, both of his statesmanship and of his patriotism, and especially of his affection for General Gordon; but I defy and challenge the right hon. Gentleman to say—so far as I know—I challenge him to say that there was any attempt to prevent the discussion of the affairs of Egypt by pleading that it might interfere with the Mission of General Gordon. And so with regard to the Mission of Lord Northbrook, the right hon. Gentleman is perfectly justified in giving his view of the present situation, and asking the Government distinctly what they have to say upon it. Now, Sir, he says he takes this objection to the Mission of Lord Northbrook—that it ought not to be a Mission to inquire and advise, but a Mission to act—a Mission to act, that is to say, by directly influencing the Khedive of Egypt. The Mission of Lord Northbrook is a Mission to inquire and advise; but there is nothing in a Mission to inquire and advise which need absolutely to prevent it being a Mission for action. Such a case I could quote. It happened to myself under the auspices of the right hon. Gentleman among others. A Mission was intrusted to me—I am not quite sure whether the right hon. Gentleman was in the Cabinet or 471 not, perhaps he was not; but, at any rate, under the auspices of those with whom he was politically connected. The case of Lord Durham was another case, which was, in the first instance, a Mission of inquiry, and which became a Mission—I think I am correct in saying—of action. But it is thought to be unreasonable—I do not in the least complain of the right hon. Gentleman saying it—that Lord North-brook should be sent to inquire and advise. The reason why Lord Northbrook is sent to inquire and advise is this. We have been in Egypt struggling with a multitude of difficulties against which we may, I think, say we have made very favourable progress until the summer of last year. They have been immensely aggravated since the disasters of General Hicks and General Baker in the Soudan; but we came into a position during the present summer, when again they threaten to be aggravated, and at every point the Egyptian problem was additionally perplexed by financial disasters. We have done our best to cope with that financial disaster, and it is, at any rate, a negative compliment that the right hon. Gentleman has not found any fault with the methods which the Conference of the European Powers made to cope with it. But, Sir, those endeavours having failed and the consequence overhanging us in the shape of Egyptian bankruptcy, the financial famine affects and colours every Egyptian question. It places us in a new position in the face of Egyptian affairs. It is not one new embarrassment added to old embarrassments; it is the overspreading embarrassment which goes through the whole, and places every Egyptian subject, more or less, in a new position. Sir, it is with a view to consider that new position in connection with the financial embarrassments that we have thought it wise that Lord Northbrook—a man intimately associated with us in his views and feelings as well as conversant with Eastern subjects and Eastern administration—should go to Egypt for that purpose; and that is the reason why I vindicate the Mission of Lord Northbrook as a Mission of inquiry and advice in the first instance, for us, but of course to be accounted for hereafter by the results it may produce. The right hon. Gentleman says that we have now regained, by the failure of the Conference and the 472 total collapse—which I admit it to be—of the Anglo-French Agreement, our freedom. But he says that the having regained your freedom is a reason why we want to know how you are going to use it. That may be, but our telling him how we are to use it is very like the surrendering of the freedom we have just regained; and though it is fair that that freedom should be surrendered when we are in a condition to frame our own policy afresh, after the dislocation which I admit it has undergone, yet, viewing the nature of this financial crisis, and its effect upon the entire subject of Egyptian politics, in my opinion we should be guilty of gross folly were we at this time, and when Lord Northbrook is preparing for the purpose of his Mission, to anticipate its results. But, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman has spoken chiefly of the Anglo-French Agreement, and I will follow him in his remarks upon that subject, but not at any very great length. The right hon. Gentleman says that he and his Friends were anxious to have obtained a vote upon the Agreement, but that they failed. They failed through an intervention which they thought was an unprecedented intervention. Probably since that time they have looked back to 1863, when a parallel case occurred—parallel excepting in one point, and it is this, and it is a very remarkable point. In 1863, on the question of Poland, Lord Palmerston had obtained a day from an hon. Member, and having obtained the day from the hon. Member, he undertook to give a Government day in return. It was when he was giving this Government day in return—that is to say, paying the debt, that the House, feeling the inexpediency of the discussion, interfered, and put Lord Palmerston in a minority, and silenced the hon. Gentleman who had been so confiding as to give up his day beforehand. It silenced him just as it silenced the right hon. Gentleman opposite. The right hon. Gentleman seems to think that if the Conference had come to a result we should have been bound in consequence of the failure of that debate; but it would have been nothing of the sort. He was told over and over again—and I never heard him complain that the language was deficient in clearness—that he was in no circumstances to be bound by the Anglo-French Agreement except in consequence of a vote, or, at 473 the very least, by the silent admission and acceptance of his Party. It was to be entirely dependent on the opinion of Parliament; and the right hon. Gentleman, wanting to make a case for raising an Egyptian discussion at a most unseasonable time, says that that discussion would have been the means of preventing what would have been a great catastrophe but for the failure of the Conference. He is entirely wrong. The failure of the Conference had nothing to do with it. If the Conference had succeeded, the Anglo-French Agreement would have been entirely subject to the sanction of Parliament. The right hon. Gentleman makes comments on the principal objections to the Anglo-French Agreement. I shall only dwell briefly on those objections. He says that the Multiple Control would have been extremely injurious, and he appears to found his objection on two contradictory grounds—one, that it was an enormous power to give; and the other, that it was no power at all. He says that power was a sham—that we ought not to have anything to do with the establishment of a sham. In that I entirely agree with him; but he cannot maintain these two objections together. What is his reason for saying that the power of the Anglo-French Agreement was a sham? His reason is this—that in the Agreement itself you do not find the executory provisions by which the veto of the Commissioners of the Egyptian Debt was to take effect. Certainly not; you do not find in that preliminary Agreement those executory provisions; but they were to be devised for the purpose of making that veto effective. There is nothing, however, in the objection that it would have been a sham, or that it would have been open to the objection of the right hon. Gentleman, and that it ought to be condemned on the principle on which Lord Granville had condemned it. I will ask the right hon. Gentleman just to reconsider the matter fully. He says, upon the whole he admitted, that the powers committed to those Commissioners were extremely well guarded and qualified. I am very glad, indeed, to have that admission; but what I wish to point out is this—the powers given to the Control, the powers given to the Commissioners of the Debt under the Anglo-French Agreement, were simply of a negative and restraining character. 474 They were not made masters of the collection of the Revenue; they were not made masters of the Government of Egypt. Their power was entirely addressed to the one purpose of preventing this excess of expenditure which might have endangered the Revenue set apart for the purpose of paying the dividends of the National Debt. I ask the right hon. Gentleman this. Our plan was to ask that the bondholders should take a share of those sacrifices which have been borne by the people of England, and which have been borne by the people of Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman has not censured our demands upon the bondholders. But was it not fair, if we made that demand upon the bondholders—did not equity require of us that we should endeavour to contrive some provision by which the bondholders might have had a better security against the breaking down of the income appropriated to them through excess of expenditure in Egypt? Surely that was an equitable demand, and, as far as regards the conferring of the restraining powers on those Commissioners, I hold, it was a just and fair principle. The right hon. Gentleman says that anarchy would not be tolerated, and that it would not have been safe for Europe; and he seems to have anticipated the anarchy as a consequence of our withdrawal. The withdrawal was not to take place unless the Powers of Europe assembled together declared that there would have been no anarchy at all. But what is the meaning of the compassion of the right hon. Gentleman for Europe, which was to suffer from this anarchy when all the European Powers were to have the opportunity of requiring the withdrawal when there was no anarchy; and unless there was no risk of anarchy, there would be no withdrawal. As to the comparison of the condition of France in 1852, I understand the right hon. Gentleman to make this apology for the coup d'état of 1852, that there was this fixed date for the election of President. Well, Sir, I think that coup d'état has never been accepted, and never will be accepted, by this country. It is looked upon by this country as a conspiracy against liberty. The right hon. Gentleman's apology does not in the least degree better the cause of that coup d'état, or avail in the least to sustain the argument for the purpose for which it was 475 intended. The right hon. Gentleman, has referred to the conflagration of Alexandria, and says it was directly due to the policy of the British Government. I want to know to what part of the policy of the British Government it was due?
§ LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILLSending the Fleet.
§ BARON HENRY DE WORMSAnd not landing troops.
MR. GLADSTONEThen I understand, according to the right hon. Gentleman, that it was the duty of the British Government not to send the Fleet.
§ MR. WARTONAnd not landing troops.
§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEWe cannot go into a full discussion of the subject. It was the whole course of the policy of the Government from the time when they failed in their arrangements with France, when they bombarded the forts, and the whole policy pursued by the Government at that time led directly and necessarily to the conflagration.
MR. GLADSTONEIt is quite evident that what the right hon. Gentleman has said, ascribing the conflagration at Alexandria to the policy of the British Government, is one of the stock accusations of his Party, which, no doubt, it is the duty of the Opposition to make. But the right hon. Gentleman ought to have taken the pains to look through those charges. What does he now say? He says that the conflagration was duo to a series of causes, in which he includes the bombardment of Alexandria, when the conflagration fook place before the bombardment. [Cries of "Oh, oh!"] All the ruin that took place in connection with the riots and massacres in Alexandria took place long before the bombardment.
§ BARON HENRY DE WORMSBut that is not the conflagration.
MR. GLADSTONEThe fires took place in June, the bombardment in July. The right hon. Gentleman says that it was directly owing to the policy of the British Government. Why did the right hon. Gentleman tie us to the French and leave us tied in honour to the French? We had to arrange as we best could in the hopeless engagement 476 which the right hon. Gentleman entered into, and if there was any connection between the conflagration and the British policy, no doubt it was, as the noble Lord said, the sending of the British Fleet to Alexandria; but that British Fleet was sent to Alexandria——
§ MR. WARTONNo troops were allowed to land.
MR. GLADSTONENo troops were allowed to land. The hon. and learned Gentleman, after his usual fashion, interrupts me in the middle of a sentence. His complaint is that we did not send both the Fleet and an Army. Well, how am I to reconcile that with the connection which the right hon. Gentleman seeks to establish between our policy and the conflagration at Alexandria? Then the right hon. Gentleman goes on to the subject of neutralization, and says that you cannot compare the case of Egypt with that of Belgium. He seems to think that to secure the independence of Belgium was an easy thing; that no danger was involved in the operation. It is quite true that Belgium is an independent State, and Egypt is not an independent State. The neutralization of Egypt must be subject to the consent of the Porte by the law of Europe; but I do not see the force of the objection if that consent be obtained. The right hon. Gentleman says that Belgium is surrounded by Powers under the public law of Europe. I suppose he does recollect what took place with respect to Belgium shortly before the Franco-German War, and what arrangements were contemplated, at any rate, by one great Power—I am not sure that it is known which—for the appropriation of Belgium. I am not aware that the danger in Egypt would be nearly so great in any plan of neutralization, if any such plan were found to be advisable, as the dangers in the case of Belgium, which for several centuries had been the favourite battle-ground of Europe, and was sometimes called the "cockpit" of Europe. I mention these things simply in the way of comment on the right hon. Gentleman's remarks and objections, not as if I were discussing at large the policy of the Agreement now dead. That Agreement was adjusted to a certain state of things when the influences operating on the Egyptian Question were setting in a certain direction. That state of things has entirely disap- 477 peared. What I have said is to be understood as a justification for the action which we took at a given time under given circumstances, and is not to be understood as in any way referring to the future, or throwing any light upon what may hereafter be right and expedient to do. I think I have gone through the main points raised by the right hon. Gentleman. I am glad that he does not propose to divide the House in asking for the instruction to be put to Lord Northbrook, because I have shown why it is impossible for us to enter into this subject now, the reason being that an entire change has passed over the whole face of the affairs of Egypt, every Egyptian question being modified and shaped anew in a greater or less degree in consequence of its financial difficulties. I will only say that I think the right hon. Gentleman was quite justified in his demand, if he makes a demand, that we should be careful in whatever we do in counselling Lord Northbrook, or otherwise to respect the supreme authority of Parliament. I think I may say that we have shown no desire to escape from that authority. There never has been a complicated and difficult foreign question in my recollection which has been kept so incessantly under the view of Parliament as the Egyptian Question. I do not hesitate to say that in certain particulars its difficulties have been immensely aggravated by the incessant discussion in this House. While I say that—and while I could wish that moderation should be observed—I fully admit that it would be monstrous and wholly out of keeping with the genius of our Constitution were the Executive Government to do what, I am bound to say, other Executive Governments have sometimes done, to undertake to commit the country to vital and fundamental questions of policy, involving far-reaching results, in such a way as that Parliament should have nothing to say to them. If there are examples of that kind on record—and I am sorry to say there are—they will remain on record only as beacon lights to warn us away from dangerous ground. It is our principle as well as our policy—it is, I admit, the necessity of our position in addition to both—that while using our best endeavours to bring the unparalleled complications of this question into something like form and 478 order we should take care to proceed so as not to commit this great Empire finally to this or that particular method of arrangement—I mean in fundamental points—without having passed them under the review of those Legislative Bodies which are entitled to discuss what we do, and which, especially in this House, are entitled to control it. That assurance I can justly give. But I think I should go beyond my duty and attain no good purpose if, on the present occasion, I were to enter into any further explanation on the subject of Lord Northbrook's Mission.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, the right hon. Gentleman's statement was even more nebulous than usual, although it had produced that seraphic smile on the countenance of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which always appeared after a speech of his great master. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) thought the House had a right to ask the Government why we went to Egypt, why we stayed there, and how we were to escape from the political complications which they had got up between us and Prance, and nearly every other State in Europe. The Conference had shown that we had no ally in anyone of them. After the battle of Tel-el-Kebir the country was informed by the noble Marquess that we were to remain in Egypt six months, and the Secretary to the Treasury told us that Egypt was to be allowed to stew in its own juice. Egypt was certainly stewing; but he doubted whether it was in her own juice. The only reason now alleged for continued action was that it was necessary to maintain in power the Khedive Tewfik, who must fall as soon as our troops were withdrawn. The right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government had informed them that he had inherited this difficulty from the late Government, and that the late Government had declared their earnest intention to maintain the authority of the Khedive. But, in his (Sir H. Drummond Wolff's) opinion, the whole of the difficulties in which England was involved in Egypt and elsewhere had been brought about by an endeavour to realize those Mid Lothian projects which were founded on the so-called but non-existing Concert of Europe. Information of a most important character had been mutilated or withheld, and public documents had been falsified 479 by the Government. In answer to a Question asked by the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) on the 7th of July, the First Lord of the Treasury, with the view of throwing dirt on the late Government, produced a falsified document, which he was afterwards obliged to correct. He referred to the document marked "Egypt, No. 11," in which there was nothing about maintaining the authority of the Khedive, and from which passages were left out without any indication of the omission. That was a falsified document, and it was not the first document which had been falsified.
MR. GLADSTONEI appeal to you, Sir, whether the hon. Gentleman is to be allowed to say that I falsified a document?
§ MR. SPEAKERI am sure the hon. Member would not mean to impute to any Member of this House that he had falsified a document. The hon. Member ought to withdraw the expression.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFsaid, that in deference to the Speaker's ruling he would withdraw anything. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Withdraw!] He had withdrawn the expression. Really, he must ask the right hon. Gentleman not to interrupt him again. Nobody interrupted the right hon. Gentleman. Afterwards the right hon. Gentleman thought fit to produce the real version of the document, and it was clear that there was no question as to maintaining the Government of the Khedive. The context showed that it was a question of a Native Government, and that Lord Salisbury was not to maintain the authority of the Khedive himself, but to prevent the authority of the Khedive from falling into the hands of any other Power. He would ask the House, calmly considering this subject, to say whether there ever was on the part of a Government a more impudent attempt to mislead the House of Commons? But if it had been the policy of the late Government to maintain this Khedive, that certainly was not the policy of the right hon. Gentleman. The present Government was brought in to reverse the policy of Lord Beaconsfield and to substitute a Liberal for a Conservative policy; and certainly it had never been a Liberal policy to maintain a Sovereign in power against the national will of his people. What had been the conduct of Her Majesty's Govern- 480 ment since Tel-el-Kebir? He sympathized very much with the right hon. Gentleman in his endeavours to alleviate the hardships and to ameliorate the condition of the fellaheen. But had the right hon. Gentleman done so? One instance was sufficient. Lord Dufferin's reform established a Legislative Council, to which certain Constitutional rights were given. But almost immediately after those reforms had been established a Decree was published by the Khedive postponing the presentation of the Budget to the Legislative Council; another Decree postponed indefinitely the presentation of the Budget, which, in fact, had never been presented at all. With regard to Sir Evelyn Baring's Report, he had ventured to say it was worthless, and he did so, because, in his opinion, Sir Evelyn Baring was sent out not merely as a Diplomatic Agent, but as a friend and supporter of the present Government. The practice of Her Majesty's Government on several occasions had been to throw upon their Agents all the responsibility of failure. They had sent out to Egypt first Lord Dufferin, then Sir Evelyn Baring, then General Gordon, and now they were going to send out Lord Northbrook. In fact, the conduct of Her Majesty's Government was very much like that of a shaky commercial firm, who, finding no legitimate business to do, send out agents to different parts in order to draw upon them. For his own part, he could not comprehend what the object of Lord North-brook really was. Blue Book after Blue Book on every conceivable subject connected with Egypt had been laid before Parliament, and he was at a loss to understand on what fresh points Lord Northbrook was to furnish information to the Government. As the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition in that House had said, the only information which Lord Northbrook could obtain he must get from Sir Evelyn Baring. The Prime Minister had compared Lord Northbrook's Mission to his own journey to the Ionian Islands; but that was not a true comparison, because the two Missions differed altogether in character; indeed, according to the right hon. Gentleman's own representation, his Mission to the Ionian Islands was exactly the opposite of that of Lord Northbrook to Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman went out, and himself communi- 481 cated to the Ionian Government the opinion he had arrived at. He went to the Assembly of the Ionian Islands, and made a speech in Italian, of which language the right hon. Gentleman was a perfect master.
MR. GLADSTONEsaid, that it was true that he made a speech in the Assembly; but it was not delivered until he had made previous inquiry, and had accepted a commission of action.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFWell, does the right hon. Gentleman intend to give the same powers to the Earl of Northbrook?
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFdoubted, then, of what use the Earl of Northbrook could be. He contended that, on the right hon. Gentleman's own showing, the two Missions were of a totally different character, although the House had not as yet been informed of the exact nature and scope of that of the Earl of Northbrook's, except that it was merely a mission of inquiry. The position of Her Majesty's Government was, to use a vulgar expression, "between the Devil and the deep sea," and Heaven alone knew which of those two influences would obtain the mastery. What the Conservative Party demanded was that the Government should make some declaration of policy, that they should no longer vacillate, but should endeavour firmly, with a high hand, to restore order in Egypt, look after the interests of the Egyptian people, and secure for this country that supremacy and domination which she had a right to hold in Egypt.
§ MR. ARTHUR ARNOLDsaid, he could not agree with the strictures which had been passed on the conduct of Sir Evelyn Baring, than whom there were few servants of Her Majesty more able and more fit to advise on foreign policy. For himself, he believed that there were few parts of the world which could be neutralized with more advantage than Egypt. Her Majesty's Government, in rejecting the proposal of France at the Conference, and refusing to accede to its adjournment, had made it plain that they entertained a strong and an irreconcilable objection to a Dual or Multiple Control. The failure of the Conference had, of course, led to the practical abandonment of the Anglo-French Control, but it seemed to him 482 that those proceedings reflected the highest honour on Her Majesty's Government. No other Power seemed to have the slightest regard for the real interests of Egypt, and every man who had the good of that country at heart must regret that our proposals were refused by the Powers. He deeply deplored, as a friend of the Government of France, the position which that country had taken up, for it was absolutely impossible to maintain for a moment that in the proposals made by that country they had in view the advantages of the people of Egypt that England offered. Obviously, those proposals were put forward solely in the interests of the bondholders. It was a mistake to suppose that the condition of the fellaheen was such as was imagined by hon. Members opposite. On the contrary, the reports which had been received from Egypt showed that Her Majesty's Government had touched with very great advantage the important subject of irrigation, and that the agricultural condition of the fellaheen was higher now than it was in the time of Ismail Pasha. The attitude taken by Her Majesty's Government at the Conference made him hopeful they would, either through the Mission of the Earl of Northbrook, or by some other means, would persevere in measures for the amelioration of the condition of the people. Egypt was in a condition in which she could not meet her financial obligations, and that was a condition which must be remedied. He thought England had shown that she alone of all the Powers was capable of dealing with this complicated question.
MR. GLADSTONEI wish at this stage to correct an expression which I used when I addressed the House. I stated that the conflagration at Alexandria took place before the bombardment. That is not true. What was in my mind when I used the expression was the ruin and destruction connected with the riots, which took place before the bombardment; but, of course, the conflagration was after.
SIR GEORGE ELLIOTsaid, during the debate several criticisms were passed on Sir Evelyn Baring which he was sorry to hear. He had known Sir Evelyn Baring for many years previous to his first appointment to Egypt, and he remembered very well discussing with the late Earl of Beaconsfield, Sir Evelyn 483 Baring's projected Mission. Sir Evelyn Baring went out there as the fittest man that the Government could select for the work, and he had the opportunity of seeing Sir Evelyn Baring in Egypt under trying circumstances. He remembered taking the liberty of mentioning to the Prime Minister how highly pleased, and satisfied he was with the great work that was actually being done in Egypt. He did not think they had in the whole circle of officials under the Crown a gentleman more suited and who understood the subject so thoroughly as Sir Evelyn Baring. He declined to enter into any Party recrimination, as there had been enough of that; but he still blamed, as he always had blamed, the Government for its tardiness of action from the beginning up to the present time. He had never failed to realize the great difficulties the Government had to cope with; but he had also warned them of what appeared to him to be the too strong leaning of the right hon. Gentleman towards France. He thought the Prime Minister had considered a great deal too much the situation of France in connection with Egypt. That he regarded as the weakness of the situation. That had in a great measure led to their present difficulties. Of course, the Government could not do everything, and no doubt the Prime Minister, with his great experience, knew a great deal more about the subject than he did. He, however, must still condemn the procrastination which had taken place. When he read that declaration made in the Conference by Earl Granville, he felt as if he could have embraced him. He said to himself, when he read those vigorous word—"We shall at least now have a clear course; our hands will be untied, and we shall be free to do the best thing." Previously they never could do the right thing; they were always fettered and bound. They had fought to suppress the rebellion, to keep open their highway to India; they had expended millions of their own money and several millions of Egyptian money to maintain their position, and he hoped they were now about to start upon a new course. If the Government would only let the people of Egypt know that they were in earnest—and the first fruits of the new policy was the voting of £300,000—if they would let them under- 484 stand they were not going to have their hands bound again, and that they were not going to endanger their position with regard to France by the revival of the Dual Control, he was satisfied Egypt would repay them. They could not work with France; it was impossible. They were not the same people at all, and he deprecated united action with France in Egypt or elsewhere. He cordially approved of the Mission of Lord Northbrook; and he could say, from an intimate knowledge of Egypt, that there were great resources which would financially justify our presence in that country, and which would, he believed, if worked with firmness, add in a very few years 50 per cent to the productiveness of the country.
§ MR. W. E. FORSTERI am glad to hear the remarks of the hon. Baronet—remarks which were full of practical knowledge and sound sense. I am not going to detain the House more than two or three minutes, and I wish only to refer to a few of the remarks of my right hon. Friend. I am glad to hear from him that the Anglo-French Agreement is not merely in "abeyance," but actually dead. I rejoice to hear it—that it has entirely disappeared. "Lapsed," I think, was the word; but that was not enough; and later he said, in reply to a remark, that it was not much use talking about a matter that was dead. I think it must be clear to everyone who peruses the Papers that there was some ground for the fear that the arrangement would have been interpreted by France as a Multiple Control, although not intended by us to have that meaning; and that was very clearly brought out by Earl Granville's firm declaration that to such Multiple Control this country would not consent. Another remark of my hon. Friend I was particularly glad to hear, and that was that, although Earl of Northbrook went out to report and advise, it would be a mistaken supposition that he would be precluded from acting. I think, considering the circumstances under which the Government are acting at present, this is as much as can be reasonably expected. There are two other statements on which I will just say one word. First, as to the Report by Sir Evelyn Baring. No one can deny his great talent, and I am not one of those who deny the great services he has rendered to the country 485 in Egypt and in other places. I do not agree with the remarks of the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) that this Report was worthless. I think if the reforms to which it refers are carried out under English Agents they will be a success. I believe some beginning has been made; some reforms have been made on paper, and even some in actual administration; but they will quickly disappear unless you have English Agents to take the supervision of them and see that they are carried out. And I confess I look with some degree of alarm at the present state of matters in Egypt, inasmuch as there appears to have been, to some extent, a change of the policy of the Government in taking away the English Agents in the hope and belief that these reforms would be carried out by the Natives. I believe that is entirely a mistaken hope on the part of the Government. I shall be surprised if the Earl of Northbrook, with his great Oriental experience, does not give as one of his main pieces of advice to his Colleagues at home that not much will be done unless English Agents are appointed to look after these projected reforms. Another point is as to the conflagration. It is quite clear the right hon. Gentleman was referring to the riot, and not to the conflagration; but, at the same time, there is no doubt that the greater part of the Indemnity is for the damages caused by the conflagration. I am not now blaming the Admiral or the Government for not preventing the burning and plunder of the city after the bombardment; but the Government had warning, for I saw it in the newspapers myself, that the consequences of the bombardment and the evacuation of Alexandria by the Army would, in all probability, be exactly what happened, and I believe it would have been perfectly easy to have stopped it by the landing of the blue-jackets; and what was subsequently done by Lord Charles Beresford in restoring order confirms my view. That makes one claim which Egypt has for consideration. The other is, that we were the chief authority in Egypt while this Commission was making up its indemnity bill, and it is common rumour—and I should be surprised if common rumour is much mistaken—that these claims for indemnity have been grossly beyond what 486 they should have been. If anybody could have stopped that, it must have been the influence of the. British Government; but I do not think that was used to stop it. A very considerable portion of the £4,000,000 was, I think, owing, I will not say to a very blameworthy act of omission on our part, but to an omission of what ought to have been done. The sum has been enormously increased by the want of sufficient looking after, the Representatives of each Government naturally backing one another up; and the upshot is that these hardly-taxed people of Egypt are to be taxed in some £4,000,000, though very likely the utmost extent of the damage was not more than £2,000,000, and much of it might have been avoided. I am glad to say that Her Majesty's Government are in a very different position from that in which they would have been if the Conference had succeeded. In that case we had the assurance of the Government, as strong as words could make it, that the House of Commons was not to be bound, and that they would have the fullest opportunity of discussing its proceedings. It is not easy to raise a debate when there must be a new departure, and it is not, I think, an unreasonable thing now for the Government to say—"You must give us time to consider exactly what we shall do in what to us is a new position." To the Government it is a new position; but to me and others it is a position in which we have long felt the Government must find themselves. The Earl of North-brook is going out soon. That is a sign that the Government know they have to deal with great difficulties—difficulties which, I think, the Government have not diminished themselves, but, to some extent, have increased. I agree with the hon. Members that these difficulties may be greatly diminished now if the Government, in consequence of the information they have obtained by the failure of the Conference and the further information the Earl of Northbrook will give them, find that they cannot shirk the responsibilities of their position, and that there is nothing between the policy of the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) and his Friends of scuttling out of Egypt, and leaving her to take care of herself, which no Government could accept, and which the country would not permit, and that of taking charge of 487 the affairs of Egypt for a time. It will have to come to that; and I think I see signs that the Government are becoming more and more alive to the fact that that is a necessity, and I shall be very much surprised if, when we meet in the autumn, we do not find that it has been admitted by action, though it may not be admitted positively by statement.
§ MR. CHAPLINsaid, he was sure that all the Members on the Opposition side of the House would be heartily glad if the Government followed the advice given it by his hon. Friend the Member for Durham (Sir George Elliot). But he confessed he had not been able to augur so hopefully from the speech of the Prime Minister, who had taken the same course which his Government always adopted on questions of foreign policy, and withheld everything he possibly could from the House. With regard to the conflagration of Alexandria, he was never more astonished in his life than when he heard that night the Prime Minister of England say in his place in the House of Commons that the conflagration was precedent to the bombardment. That showed how extremely limited was the interest which the right hon. Gentleman took in these questions of foreign politics; while, on the other hand, had it been one of tinkering the Constitution by domestic reform the right hon. Gentleman would have given the House chapter and verse. Nothing could be more unsatisfactory than the position in which the House of Commons had been left after the statement of the Prime Minister that night. What was their position? A considerable period had now elapsed since the Government declared that the affairs of Egypt were in such a critical condition that it was necessary they should be dealt with without delay, and accordingly the Conference was summoned for that purpose. That Conference had ignominiously collapsed; consequently, they had reverted to their old position, and now the Opposition and the country were most anxious to know what course the Government intended to take in dealing with Egyptian affairs in the future. The Government had met them with barren statements, telling them that the Earl of North-brook was to be sent out as High Commissioner to Egypt, and his Mission was to be one of inquiry and advice; and the reason of his appointment was that 488 the Government found the difficulties of the Egyptian Question greatly exaggerated by the peculiar conditions of her finances, and, accordingly, the Earl of Northbrook was sent to Egypt to obtain further information. But the Government had been supreme there for the last two years; they were well acquainted with the state of the country; they had employed the best men, and had been admirably served by their employés. After all this labour, and after all their experience, at a critical moment like the present, the Government stated it was impossible to tell the House their intentions without a further delay. This plea for further information at the present time was neither more nor less than a plea for further procrastination in taking upon themselves responsibilities which it was their duty to take. From the very commencement they had been desirous of shirking their duty, and he believed they were desirous of shirking it now. The Prime Minister had endeavoured to trace all the difficulties which now prevailed in Egypt to the existence of the Dual Control, established by the Conservatives; but Earl Granville declared, after two years' experience, that it had undoubtedly worked admirably for the finances and administration of Egypt; and he would leave the right hon. Gentleman to reconcile his condemnation of the system with the lavish praise bestowed upon it by his own Foreign Secretary. If our position with regard to the future policy of the Government in Egypt was unsatisfactory, the position in which we had been left with regard to their action with respect to General Gordon was, if possible, more unsatisfactory still. As he understood, the Prime Minister and the Government admitted the accuracy of the letter from General Gordon which had appeared in the newspapers, although the Prime Minister had said a few days ago that it was not free from mystery, because he could not see why General Gordon had put the question which he had to the Mudir. For his own part, he could not see any mystery on that subject; the only mystery was that as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. From the last despatch received from General Gordon, it was evident that he was expecting reinforcements. The question which he would now put to the Government was, whether or not they had 489 now recognized that the necessity for the despatch of an Expedition for the relief of General Gordon had arisen? To that question the Government ought to be able to give a plain answer—Yes or No. If there was a chance that it would be prejudicial to the interests of the Expedition, they did not wish to know the precise measures that were to be taken; but they wanted to know whether or not the Government recognized the necessity for assisting General Gordon had arisen. The noble Lord the Secretary of State for War had some time ago laid down the conditions on which it would be the duty of the Government to despatch an Expedition. That condition was that, in the minds of the Government, a clear necessity should have arisen for General Gordon's relief. The other night the Prime Minister had stated that the Government, were not in a position to say that that contingency had arrived. From that statement of the Prime Minister on the one hand, and from the guarded replies of the Secretary of State for War on the other, he could not make out whether the Government intended to send an Expedition or not. That was a question, however, that ought to be cleared up before the House of Commons rose for the Recess. He wished to lay the facts as clearly as he could before the Government, before the country, and before the House of Commons. He knew that it was impossible to wring information from the Government when they chose to be silent; but if any disaster happened to General Gordon, the burden of the guilt would lie on the heads of Her Majesty's Government.
§ SIR JOHN LUBBOCKsaid, he thought that the Leader of the Opposition had done scanty justice to our countrymen in Egypt, who had already effected much, in the face of great difficulties. The right hon. Gentleman said that the bombardment of the forts "led necessarily" to the burning of the city of Alexandria. Surely the right hon. Gentleman did not mean to say that the burning of Alexandria was justified as an act of war. He did not take so gloomy a view of the state of Egypt as the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff). Her Majesty's Government, in their Estimate presented to the Conference, estimated the produce of the Land Tax at £4,918,000, which was £100,000 less than the average of 490 the last three years, and £200,000 less than the Estimate of the Egyptian Government themselves. They might, he thought, naturally suppose that the produce of that taxation would be more rather than less than it had previously been. Again, they estimated the produce of the Railways at £80,000 less than in 1881. The traffic might reasonably be expected to increase. Sir Evelyn Baring, in a subsequent Memorandum, admitted this; and, indeed, he could not do otherwise, because the receipts for the first three months, instead of a diminution of £80,000, showed an increase at the rate of £160,000 a-year. The Chancellor of the Exchequer included nothing for the sales of the free Government lands, the value of which was very large, and which might certainly be reckoned on for £100,000 at least. He thought the normal Revenue, without any increase of taxation, might be estimated at £300,000 more than the figures submitted to the Conference. But even assuming the figures placed by the English Commissioners before the Conference, the apparent deficit mainly arose from the sums devoted to repayment of Debt. Taking the Estimate for 1884 as presented, he saw no reason why, after having made very moderate Estimates, they should then proceed to write off £369,000. There would, no doubt, be arrears in 1884; but, on the other hand, 1884 would itself benefit by the arrears of 1883. Next, the account included as Expenditure £67,000 for the Sinking Fund on the Preference Stock, £37,500 on the Domain Loan, and £78,000 for the Sinking Fund on the proposed New Loan, making together £182,000 which was clearly redemption of Debt and not Expenditure in the ordinary sense. The same remark applied to part of the Suez payment to Her Majesty's Government, amounting to £200,000. This would cease in 10 years. Now, in an annuity of £200,000 payable for 10 years, £150,000, in round numbers, would be for principal and £50,000 for interest. Here, then, an allowance of £150,000 ought clearly to be made. Taking the Chancellor of the Exchequer's own figures, the estimated Income for 1884 was £9,224,000, and the Expenditure, including the whole service of the Loan, was £9,231,000, of which £332,000 was really for reduction of Debt. Even, then, on the showing of 491 the right hon. Gentleman himself, there was a surplus on the year of over £300,000. Admitting the arbitrary reduction of receipts of £369,000, the deficit would only be £50,000, which, for a country only just recovering from the effects of civil war, could not be called discouraging. He would indicate one way in which, a very large sum might be obtained. At present the managers of the Daira and Domains property themselves farmed tens of thousands of acres. Just imagine two foreigners in England farming an immense property distributed over England, Scotland, and Ireland. The result would inevitably be disastrous. The deficiency in the Daira and Domain Loans was put down at no less than £234,000 a-year. He rather doubted whether, even under existing circumstances, it would prove to be so much; but, at any rate, if the property were sold or let, this deficiency would disappear. He strongly urged the Government to take this course. What Egypt really required was security, justice, and good government. Those who proposed to hand it over to civil war, to be scrambled for by the Mahdi, by Arabi, and by the Khedive, were certainly no true friends to the Egyptians. As far as we were concerned, he hoped it was now understood that we should remain to complete and maintain a good Government. He reechoed the wishes expressed by the hon. Baronet the Member for Durham (Sir George Elliot) and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), that we should secure to the poor Egyptian fellaheen what they had not enjoyed for centuries—a strong, and yet a just Government.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, that no Government he had ever known or heard of had had so many escapes as the present Government in the policy—uncertain, and hand-to-mouth—they had thought it wise and expedient to pursue. Since they were again—most fortunately for themselves—free to act, he hoped, from the lessons they had learnt, and from the opinions which they must recognize as prevailing from one end of England to the other, that they would adopt a policy of determination in the interest not only of this country, but of Egypt itself. With every respect for the French nation, and every wish that we should remain in perfect amity 492 with them, there was not one in this country, except, perhaps, the Prime Minister and those few who shared his peculiar views, who would ever submit to have our influence sacrificed to the sentimentality of France. When the bombardment of Alexandria was about to take place the French Fleet sailed away, leaving England free to do what was best in the interest of Egypt and of herself. Arabi was then in Alexandria with 11,000 Egyptians; and if Her Majesty's Government had only had the courage and determination which every Government ought to have when engaged in an act amounting to a declaration of war, they would have landed 5,000 men, Arabi would have laid down his arms, and the great conflagration which had cost Egypt so much would never have happened. Nothing, however, like the damage for which compensation was asked had been done. He believed he was over-stating the case when he said that £2,000,000 would cover the whole. The Khedive, however, was brought out from his retreat, and, with an English Admiral on one side and an English General on the other, he was made to say that he would be responsible for all the damage that was done.
§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICEsaid, that the examination was made by an International Commission.
§ SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOTsaid, that the Commission came after, and now he had the admission of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Charles W. Dilke) that the claims were extortionate, and it was plain that the property destroyed belonged to men who did not pay a farthing towards the taxation of Egypt. Then came the Suez Canal Question, which was decided by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government absolutely and entirely in favour of France. The arrangement was at once repudiated by the House of Commons and the country, knowing that it was to French interests and French sentimentality that the Government were bowing, though the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that there was no other agreement which could be come to, and that the amount to be paid was reasonable and fair. But the shipowners, to whom 80 per cent of the tonnage going through the Suez Canal belonged, knew infinitely better, and came to a far better arrangement, 493 after the Government scheme had fallen to the ground. And now, for the third time, the Government had tried to conciliate France by an Agreement which, if carried, would have been one of the most humiliating which could have been forced on this country. Fortunately, the French wanted more than we were prepared to give, and so the Conference absolutely failed. That Conference was got up to relieve the Government from the desperate muddle in which they had landed Egyptian affairs. Even the Chancellor of the Exchequer must have felt the humiliating position in which he and Earl Granville were placed when they had such questions addressed to them in the tones adopted not only by the French Ambassador, but by the Ambassadors of Prussia and Austria. He approved the recent financial proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as fair and reasonable; but he was glad that they had not been accepted, because they would now have an opportunity of dealing with and reducing the interest paid to the bondholders in the interests of the Egyptian people. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer should call upon the country to advance money to Egypt, he hoped the House would announce that it would never consent to their withdrawal from that country until the establishment there of a Government which could be depended upon and trusted—and that he did not think could be accomplished in less than a generation—nor to allow any interference with the Suez Canal, their highway to India. He objected strongly to the proposal for the neutralization of the Canal. Would the neutralization of Egypt as proposed be observed in time of war—by Russia, for example? He blamed the Government for their fatal hesitation after the battles of El Teb and Tamasi. Instead of recalling the troops, they ought to have sent them on to Berber, and they would thus have relieved General Gordon at Khartoum. It was absurd to say that English troops could not have accomplished the feat when the success which had attended their campaigns in India was borne in mind. The troops, however, were withdrawn, and now on the Red Sea littoral, though their Fleet was at Suakin, Osman Digna was still to the fore. By retiring, they encouraged the savages to advance. 494 He had, a day or two before, inquired whether the Government intended to relieve General Gordon, and the Government, in reply, asked for a Supplementary Estimate of £300,000, which they said they would use if the necessity arose. But the one thing which all Englishmen desired was that the Government should at once send an Expedition. General Gordon must now, indeed, be a victim to that "hope deferred which maketh the heart grow sick." He hoped that such an Expedition would be at once sent as should, without further delay, relieve General Gordon, and at the same time enable them to retain Khartoum, a position which never ought to be abandoned as the key of the Nile Valley, and the only place from which the Slave Trade could be effectively prevented. In fact, he hoped the whole question of the Eastern Soudan would receive that consideration from the Government which, in the interest of Egypt as well as humanity, it most certainly deserved.
§ MR. VILLIERS STUARTsaid, he had listened with great satisfaction to the Prime Minister's statement that a High Commissioner was to be sent to Egypt, and accepted it as evidence that Her Majesty's Government were preparing to grapple resolutely with that task of reorganization, the completion of which alone would enable them to withdraw from that country either with safety or with honour. He was not an advocate for annexation, nor for the retention of a British garrison one moment longer than was absolutely necessary to establish good government, to effect the reforms necessary for that purpose, to give time for those reforms to take root, and to erect such safeguards as should render a relapse into the old abuses impossible. His earnest desire was to see the population of Egypt emancipated from bondage and rendered independent and self-governing, and no one would rejoice more than he should when they found themselves in a position to ship off their last battalion from Alexandria. But for that very reason he was an advocate for thorough measures now. This work could not be done by any dual system of government. They must achieve the task single-handed, or it would never be done at all. Least of all could it be effected through the instrumentality of the Turkish governing class. The best way to strike at the roots of corruption 495 and maladministration was to strengthen the hands of the Khedive, and give him the advantage of an Official Adviser of the highest standing and administrative ability that could be found to accept the post. He would thus be able to control the Governors of Provinces and to protect the people from oppression. We had given the Powers a second opportunity of taking the problem into their own hands, and they had deliberately thrown back the task upon us. It was high time that the intrigues born of international jealousies should cease—intrigues which had added so seriously to our difficulties in Egypt. We, and we alone, were responsible for the success of our intervention. If we were to succeed, half measures would not do; our reforms could not be carried out through the instrumentality of men who had the strongest personal interest in maintaining the old abuses. If we desired, therefore, to avoid the ignominy of failure, we must virtually take matters into our own hands. His sympathies were with the poorest class in Egypt, and that was the great mass of the population. And it was because he longed to see them emancipated that he advocated the withdrawal of the power from the banc's of those who had so terribly abused it. England had once more a magnificent opportunity, and if she made good use of it she would have fulfilled a great mission. An Egypt delivered from the slavery of centuries and regenerated would become the proudest trophy of her championship of liberty. It would be a national disgrace if, having once put their hands to the plough, they were now to turn back and abandon the noble cause they had undertaken. Two years ago they assumed a very grave responsibility; they dislocated such government as did exist; they broke in pieces the rod of iron, and they had not yet succeeded in putting anything reliable in its place. If they were to withdraw now they would have substituted for the despotism of one man the despotism of a score of oligarchs. He thought that sufficient account had not been taken of the fact that each Province in Egypt was a little despotism in itself. No doubt, theoretically, ample checks had been placed upon the power of the Mudirs; but those who knew Egypt knew how faint was the chance, especially in the remoter Provinces, of a 496 cry for justice making its way to Cairo; and when it did get there, if it passed through Turkish hands, it would be so manipulated that the purposes of justice were only too likely to be defeated. The great object they ought to keep in view was to gain the goodwill of the people themselves, and that could only be done by reforming those abuses which more especially galled them in their daily life. Among those were the methods of taxation, the methods upon which the forced labour system was carried on, and the difficulty of obtaining justice even now. Another important object not to be lost sight of was the development of the resources of the country by improved systems of irrigation, and by embanking the cultivated lands in Middle and Upper Egypt in the same way that they were embanked in the Delta. That would enable cotton and sugar-cane to be grown there. No one who had not inquired into the subject could form any conception of the vast increase in the producing power of Egypt which would follow a wise and enlightened system of government. Embanking and irrigation would enable two or three crops to be obtained from the land instead of one, as now. The poverty in Middle and Upper Egypt was due to the want of embankments and of a scientific canal system. It was manifest that if these were supplied the producing power of the country would be enormously increased. There was scope also for improvement in this respect in the Delta. He was happy to hear that an excellent beginning had been made by Colonel Scott Moncrieff in the latter region; £100,000 a-year had been saved to cultivators in the Delta already. Plenty and prosperity brought contentment with thorn; and if they could regenerate Egypt, not only as regarded her administration, but also as regarded the development of her national resources, they would have the best possible guarantee against such revolts as that of Arabi and of the Mahdi, and they would have guarded against the danger to the peace of Europe resulting from such events. They would also have established the most effective justification of their proceedings in Egypt. Privileges proverbially died hard; but when they stood in the way of the good government of millions of men they must give way. The most conspicuous immunity 497 enjoyed by the privileged class in Egypt was partial immunity from Land Tax. The abolition of this privilege would undoubtedly be unwelcome, and would not increase their popularity with the governing caste. But they could not well be more unpopular with them than they already were. They would be glad to get rid of us to-morrow, together with all fear of reform. One of the arguments which they urged against the equalization of the Land Tax was that some of the privileged lands were reclaimed in the time of Mehemet Ali on the express condition that the owner should enjoy this partial exemption. But the lands so reclaimed did not form a considerable percentage of the total, and their right to consideration was diminished by the fact that they had been reclaimed by forced labour by the fellaheen, without remuneration; and therefore we need feel little remorse in making them pay their share towards the administration of the country. He would venture to make a suggestion with regard to the Alexandria Indemnity. It was that the practice of Insurance Offices should be adopted, and that as much as possible of the Indemnity should be spent in rebuilding the streets and squares of Alexandria instead of handing the amount to the claimants in cash. It appeared to him that that was all they were in justice entitled to ask; and it would confer some benefit on one of the principal cities in Egypt, in return for the burdens thrown upon the taxpayers. He would also venture to suggest that, instead of reducing the interest of the coupons, an Income Tax, say of 10 per cent, should be imposed upon the coupons of all securities, including the English Canal shares. In proportion as the circumstances of the country improved, the Income Tax might be gradually reduced and ultimately abolished. It appeared to him that this course would inflict the minimum of injury on Egyptian credit. As regarded the relief of General Gordon, he had great pleasure in the feeling that the Government had at last recognized their duty in this respect, and he regretted extremely that five Englishmen could be found to go into the Lobby against the moderate demand of Her Majesty's Government. It was argued by them that it should be withheld because General Gordon had not 498 adhered strictly to his instructions. Her Majesty's Government, however, had made no such complaint. They knew that their Envoy was going out on a forlorn hope, with nothing to depend upon except his personal character and resources. When he arrived there he found the state of things widely different from what either he or the Government had anticipated. That in itself necessitated a departure from his original plan. He was placed in circumstances of extreme difficulty, and had to do the best he could. As a matter of fact, he had vindicated the reputation of Englishmen for fearlessness, courage, and resource, and he had kept in check the Soudanese tribes, which would have otherwise invaded Egypt Proper before this. He had, therefore, rendered an important service both to England and to Egypt. He rejoiced that relief was to be sent to him. Not to have done so would be considered by all the world a lamentable blot on the pages of English history. The people of England loved Nelson none the less for applying his blind eye to the telescope and refusing to see the signal for retreat. He was glad to find in the last Egyptian Report that Her Majesty's Advisers had recommended the reduction of the Land Tax in Upper Egypt by 20 per cent, and also the abolition of certain petty taxes. His acquaintance with Upper Egypt had convinced him that such a step was absolutely necessary. It was in a lamentably pauperized condition through over-taxation, and the only means it had of recovering was to relieve it of a portion of that taxation. The case of the Delta was different. The course which would give most relief to the inhabitants of the Delta would be the devising of some means whereby they might be protected from the usurious rates of interest which they had to pay to the local money-lenders. He hoped the Government might see their way to recommend such a modification in the procedure of the Mixed Tribunals as would enable them to refuse decrees in debt cases for more than a reasonable rate of interest, for it seemed intolerable that such exorbitant percentages should be exacted under cover of their bayonets. He would only add his heartfelt good wishes for the success of the Earl of Northbrook's Mission, which he hoped 499 might result in a brilliant solution of the Egyptian difficulty.
§ SIR ROBERT PEELsaid, that this very interesting discussion showed how unwise the Government were in listening to the blandishments of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen). He did not suppose that any of those who sat on his own side of the House thought that the Prime Minister laid a trap for the Opposition; on the contrary, many persons believed that the right hon. Gentleman had fallen into the snare himself; because, if he had acted in the way the House wished on a former occasion, it was patent to him that it would have been far more satisfactory to the House and to the country than for the right hon. Gentleman on the very last day, or nearly so, of the Session, to slip out by a back door at the instance of the two right hon. Gentlemen who sat at the corner Benches opposite (Mr. Goschen and Mr. Forster). The burthen of the speeches made from both sides of the House was—"What are you going to do with General Gordon?—what are you going to do with this Cabinet Minister, Baring—the Earl of Northbrook?—what are you going to do with Sir Evelyn Baring? We want to know whether you have complimented the Government of Turkey on its anxious solicitude for Egypt, and we want to know numberless other things." How is the Prime Minister going to answer them? A more extraordinary demonstration than that made by this speech of the Prime Minister he had never listened to. He had attacked his right hon. Friend (Sir Stafford Nortkcote) in a manner that he had rarely witnessed in that House. He had trampled and jumped upon him; and, in fact, he had acted like one of his Abyssinian allies with whom he proposed to deal in regard to his friends the Soudanese. He had attacked the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill), and his attack was the most astonishing he had ever heard. The noble Lord had ventured to qualify an extravagant panegyric which the Prime Minister had passed upon Sir Evelyn Baring. He recollected that the Prime Minister passed exactly the same kind of fulsome panegyric upon his right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) just before he relinquished Office as Chief Secretary for 500 Ireland. The Prime Minister had said, when the noble Lord was questioning this panegyric upon Sir Evelyn Baring, that he was only capable of making platform speeches in the country. If there was over a taunt ill-placed it was that one; because they all recollected that if there was a man in England who, when he made platform speeches, was called upon to eat his words afterwards, it was the Prime Minister. They all knew that humiliation and apologies succeeded his speeches in Mid Lothian. But that was not enough. He also attacked his hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drurnmond Wolff), and he thought the right hon. Gentleman was very unfair in his attack upon the hon. Gentleman. The hon. Member for Portsmouth said he considered that the Prime Minister's speech was very nebulous. For his own part, however, he thought it placed the present grave state of affairs in a most sunny aspect. He maintained that it was most unfair to the country to limit this discussion to one night at the very end of a Session, inasmuch as the Prime Minister had distinctly challenged the verdict of Parliament. When on a previous occasion the question was about to be brought forward, the Party opposite voted against the Government, and the Government subsequently expressed their satisfaction with the conduct of their own Party. The Papers which had now been laid before them represented the most cool surrender of British and Egyptian interests it was possible to think of; and as a noble Lord had remarked on reading them, he hardly knew whether to laugh or cry—to laugh at the folly of the Government, or to cry at the dishonour of the country. In referring to the plans with regard to the Anglo-French Convention, the Prime Minister said that—
Those who prepared those plans and proposed to carry them out ought not for one moment longer to continue to be the Government of this country if they failed to meet with the judgment of Parliament.Was Parliament in a position to judge whether they had failed or not? It was acknowledged that the Conference had failed, and where now was the Liberal Party? No doubt, in their fine spirit of manly independence, they were somewhere fighting against one of the main branches of the Constitution. However, 501 if they were unable to obtain the judgment of Parliament upon this matter, they knew what the judgment of Europe was, because every Power in Europe, except Italy and Turkey, declined to give their approval of the plans of Her Majesty's Government. He did not consider the adhesion of Italy to be of very much importance, for the Italian Government never gave its adhesion to any European arrangement unless some valuable consideration was offered to it. He had put a Question to the Prime Minister which the right hon. Gentleman declined to answer, and he would append to that Question a further one—namely, Whether Her Majesty's Government, following the precedent of 1873, after the Geneva Conference on the Alabama Claims, proposed to take a Vote for the purpose of presenting another piece of plate to the Italian Delegate? As for Turkey, that Power was not included in the original summons to the Conference, and that was one of the most extraordinary omissions he ever heard of. However, there seemed to be universal satisfaction in the country that the plans of the Government had failed; but they were told by the leading organ of the Party opposite that the Conference was necessary to inspire confidence in the Liberal mind. He questioned very much whether the Liberals had any mind at all. They knew that there was a great deal of matter, because the country had been inundated with it of late. This Anglo-French Agreement represented one of the most humiliating capitulations that could be conceived. If it had been carried into effect, it would have registered their abnegation in Egypt. M. Ferry, who was not a man of much character, but who had the audacity of his opinion, said—It is Europe, and not England, that will be the judge of the exact period of England's final retirement from Egypt;"—and he added with aplomb—France is the mouthpiece of European interests.The Prime Minister said it was his duty to state to the House with much concern that the Conference had failed, and he used the following extraordinary expression:—But amid the wreck of good intentions, it is a great thing that the Powers should have agreed substantially as to the loan needful to be contracted in the present emergency.502 He had reason to know that, if not officially, at least officiously, the Representatives of the Powers were asked whether they would be inclined to guarantee a loan with England, and not one of them agreed.
§ SIR ROBERT PEELThat I leave the right hon. Gentleman, who is an expert Plénipotentiaire, to answer.
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)I again ask the right hon. Gentleman by what Power this proposal of a Joint Guarantee was officiously made?
§ SIR ROBERT PEELsaid, he was given to understand by one who was at the Conference that officieusement—the word was not translatable—the Powers were asked whether, as in the case of the Russo-Dutch Loan and in one of the Turkish Loans, they would agree with England to guarantee a Loan in regard to Egypt, and that they all declined. Over and over again, as he well remembered, the Prime Minister and the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said the Government had received the moral support of Europe in the policy they had pursued in Egypt. He supposed, therefore, that they had bombarded Alexandria with the concurrence of Europe. The consequence of that bombardment was £4,250,000 damages. The Prime Minister did not know when the conflagration took place—whether it was before or after the bombardment. Of course, any man might make a mistake. But the strict consequence of what the right hon. Gentleman had at different times said would be that the consequences of that bombardment ought to be shared by Europe, with whose "moral concurrence and support" they had gone to Egypt; and he, for one, would oppose any loan by this country of £4,250,000 for the payment of those damages. The Prime Minister having referred to the failure of the Conference, referred to the Anglo-French Agreement in terms which must have startled the country. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Agreement was made dependent on the arrival of any result from the Conference. He said that the Agreement was in abeyance. It was like the Government's measure of Reform, and it had no "blinding effect, or force upon 503 either Party." The Prime Minister went on to say—
The British Government, with respect to that Agreement"—that humiliating capitulation, as he should rather call it, that surrender of British interests in Egypt—continues to appreciate most strongly the spirit of friendship, the far-sighted wisdom shown by the French Government in negotiating the provisions of that Agreement.He recollected a time when the right hon. Gentleman did not entertain that opinion of the "far-sighted wisdom" of the French people. Many years ago the Prime Minister said—"The French people are endowed with every gift save one, that is the gift of political sagacity." But there had recently been an interchange of compliments—"The great and noble English people;" "the lofty policy of the Prime Minister"—which had hitherto been unusual in diplomacy. He did not know whether M. Ferry, who was sitting, or rather sat upon, the other day at the Congress at Versailles, had shown "political sagacity;" but he certainly had shown political audacity. The important announcement of the Prime Minister that a Cabinet Minister was going to Egypt to advise the Egyptian Government, was said to have made the Earl of Northbrook faint when he received it. He knew that a great many hearts in the City fainted when it became known. When the Conference failed, up jumped Egyptian Stocks; but when the Earl of Northbrook's appointment was known, down they jumped again. Then the Earl of Northbrook went down to a picnic at Hull, in order, no doubt, to give a certain colour to the outbreak against the House of Lords. The noble Earl went to Hull on the 30th of July, and said—The Liberal Party has the advantage—I may also say the disadvantage—of being the Party of Movement to remedy defects and to widen the bases.He was just the man for that. He would tell the House the cause for anxiety at the appointment of the Earl of Northbrook. The Prime Minister attacked his noble Friend the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) for speaking of Sir Evelyn Baring as a failure. Now, Sir Evelyn Baring was an undoubted failure. Everyone knew that when the Earl of 504 Northbrook was Governor General for India he was in the hands of Sir Evelyn Baring. If the Government wanted to send out men of independent minds let them send the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) and himself (Sir Robert Peel). Depend upon it, they would give a clear, fair Report of the condition of Egypt. But to send out Sir Evelyn Baring and the Earl of Northbrook, who were to make an inquiry into the condition of the country in all its bearings, would result in a manipulation of affairs past all bearing. There was a direct divergence between France and England as regarded the limitation of our occupation, and the neutralization of Egypt and the Canal. M. Ferry made the striking assumption that Egypt should belong to all Europe. But the Government had, no doubt, changed their opinion, and the Expedition to relieve General Gordon and the Mission of the Earl of Northbrook were an electioneering dodge. The Home Secretary told his constituency a short time ago at Derby that the policy of the English Government was to leave the Egyptians to govern themselves. M. Ferry said that could not be their policy, and dismissed as unworthy of a great nation the supposition that England would not be bound by her promises. M. Ferry should recollect that Her Majesty's Government had not fulfilled one single promise made with reference to the proper discharge of her duties in Egypt. All along there had been a shrinking on the part of our Government from ruffling the susceptibilities of France. That was conspicuous all through the piece. But he remembered that in Lord Palmerston's time, when Earl Granville's Father was Ambassador in Paris, that Lord Palmerston on an important occasion said that he must give a categorical answer in Parliament, and that though he did not wish to disregard French susceptibilities, it must be remembered that there were public feelings in England as well as in France which must be respected. He recommended the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to follow the dictum of Lord Palmerston, and always to give categorical answers where they could be given conveniently, and not to give the indefinite and difficult to be understood replies which he 505 sometimes gave. This question of Egypt really lay in a nutshell. What Egypt required was great financial relief from the burdens that had been placed upon her through the plunderings of the loan-mongers. They had gone to Egypt in their own interests and in those of civilization. When the valour of their troops acquired their present position in Egypt, a responsibility was thrown upon the Government which they declined to accept until it was forced upon them by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition in that House. And now, forsooth, after they had borne the heat and burden of the day, and had sacrificed thousands of lives and millions of money, France, their faithful ally, asked them to relinquish the fruits of their success in order that she might participate in them. He recollected that in 1859 there was a very great doubt whether France was their faithful ally; and he recollected that at that time [there appeared in The Times some verses, written by Tennyson, to this effect—True we have a faithful ally,But only the Devil knows what he means.He was not sure whether the Devil knew what our faithful ally meant by her present conduct; but he was quite sure that Her Majesty's Government did not.
§ MR. DIXON-HARTLANDBut they are not the Devil.
§ SIR ROBERT PEEL, proceeding, said, great satisfaction had been felt throughout the country at the failure of this Anglo-French Convention; and yet a Cabinet Minister, speaking the other day, had said—
It is quite true that we have had a very rough passage through very stormy seas; but we are none the worse for it.If Her Majesty's Government were none the worse for it, however, they must have undergone a pretty severe bucketing, and they must have the rude and strong digestion of reapers. It was strange how Her Majesty's Government, instead of treating the House of Commons in a straightforward manner, should resort to prevarication. Take the case of General Gordon, for instance. On the 22nd of April, Earl Granville said—"General Gordon went to the Soudan because he wanted to go, and advised Her Majesty's Government to send him; and Ministers acted upon his advice." But the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board 506 (Sir Charles W. Dilke), in one of his Chelsea speeches, said—Why was General Gordon sent to the Soudan? Because, though the General had no wish to go, the Government ordered him to undertake the mission, and he obeyed.There was another even more remarkable instance—if he might use the word, with all due deference—of prevarication on the part of the Prime Minister. It would be in the recollection of the House that as regarded the necessity of making an agreement with France, before going into the Conference, the Prime Minister said—The French Government never, to my knowledge, made it a matter of necessity that there should be a preliminary communication between England and France before issuing regulations fixing the date of the meeting of the Conference.But what had M. Ferry said on the point? He said, and the whole thing appeared in the Blue Books—The French Government hope that the Ministers of the Queen will not refuse a preliminary exchange of views which is indispensable for determining accurately the mandate of the Conference.Here, then, were the Prime Minister of England and the Prime Minister of France in direct variance with each other on a most important point. The House had doubtlessly noticed the cynically offensive way in which M. Ferry spoke of the English Government. The French Minister went out of his way to compliment the Prime Minister on entertaining the broad and lofty views worthy of that illustrious statesman and of the noble English nation. That was not the way in which the diplomatic relations between the two countries should be conducted. There could be no doubt but that the relations between the two countries were greatly strained. There could be no doubt that the action of France at that moment throughout the world was such as to give rise to the gravest suspicion. Why, even that very day her conduct in China was such as to excite the indignation of every civilized country. Her bombardment of Chinese ports, her conduct in Madagascar, were all calculated to strain the relations between herself and us. The speech of the right hon. Gentleman near him (Sir Stafford Northcote) would be echoed throughout the country as representing the sentiments of the great mass of the 507 people of England, when he asked for that information upon almost every point of Imperial policy which the Government declined to give. Last Saturday night Lord Salisbury presented to that magnificent audience at Manchester—which was a noble reply to the Radical demonstration of the preceding week—a view of these transactions well worthy of the attention of the House. He said—The Government have shed like water the Wood of naked savages, to whom they were not able to state the nature and character of their quarrel.What had been the policy of Her Majesty's Government all through the piece since the bombardment of Alexandria? Look at the lives they had lost; see how the stain of blood guiltiness met them upon every page of the history of these deplorable events which culminated in the melancholy results of this melancholy policy. The policy of the Opposition had been all through this matter to endeavour to show public opinion and to show Europe and the world that the Conservative Party in this country had been only anxious throughout all these events to make the Government feel the real responsibilities of the position which they had acquired, and to drive them into that straight and honest path which the country desired they should take.
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)Sir, the right hon. Gentleman who has just addressed the House (Sir Robert Peel) has certainly not been wanting in strong, I may say violent, language; and if the foreign countries of whom he has spoken with some heat, and to whom, in one part of his speech, he has appealed a great deal, were to look upon him as a Gentleman fairly representing the opinions of the Opposition in this country in respect of foreign affairs, I am afraid they would form a very disastrous opinion of the sentiments of a large body of Her Majesty's subjects. Anything more violent than the attack upon France, which he made about five minutes ago, upon no individual, but aimed at France—[Sir ROBERT PEEL: Hear, hear!]—and which the right hon. Baronet cheers, I cannot conceive; and looking back to the days of his great Father, so long in opposition to Lord Palmerston and the Liberal Party of that time, in all the very heated and most acute political 508 disputes of that day, such as those about Belgium, you will not find, I think, such violent language on the part of that illustrious statesman, or of any other responsible Leader. [Sir H. DRUMMOND WOLFE: Question, question!] I submit I am speaking to the Question. [A VOICE: You are not.]
§ MR. SPEAKERI trust the right hon. Gentleman will be allowed to proceed without interruption.
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)I say that in the whole career of that illustrious statesman, when he led the Conservative Party, you will not—I venture to say, without fear of contradiction—find that such violent language ever proceeded from him. [Cries of "Question!"] These interruptions will not distract me from what I intended to say, and I will venture to repeat, Sir, that after your Ruling, they are quite out of Order, and ought not to be made. [An hon. MEMBER: The Speaker did not say so!] The right hon. Gentleman not only attacked France in general, but he attacked one French statesman in particular; and he made a remark about the present Prime Minister of France, which, I think, everyone who reads contemporary history must feel to be greatly unjust, for he said that "he was not a man of much character that we know of." [Sir ROBERT PEEL: Hear, hear!] No doubt, here and in France, men will have different opinions as to the qualities of that statesman; but we must all remember that, however we may differ from him, he has proved himself to be a man of character, and he has thoroughly succeeded up to the present time in showing that he is competent to lead the French Government through great difficulties in which his Predecessors failed. The right hon. Gentleman was severe, not only upon Frenchmen, but upon other distinguished public officers and servants of this country; but before I pass to that, let me remind him of an extraordinary quotation he made from a private letter of Lord Palmerston, to show how differently he acted, as compared with the action of the present Government. He read the letter to show Lord Palmerston's way of dealing with French susceptibilities; but surely the right hon. Gentleman does not forget that, for having too much regard for French susceptibilities in reference to the Colonels 509 and the Conspiracy to Murder Bill, Lord Palmerston was driven from Office. It is not safe to read private letters in that way to judge of public character; it is much better to remember what a Minister has said and done in Parliament than what he writes in private letters to his friends. The right hon. Gentleman addressed a sentence to me, and I must confess I was greatly surprised at the statement he made, because I knew perfectly well it would be found on examination to be quite erroneous. He said, speaking of the Conference, that the Powers were asked officieusement, whether they would guarantee jointly the Debt of £8,000,000?
§ SIR ROBERT PEELNo; I said the Loan of £4,250,000.
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)That was part of the general Loan of £8,000,000. I asked, "By whom?" But instead of answering me, the right hon. Gentleman refused to state by whom the Powers were asked. He repeated his former statement, and when I repeated my question he refused again to answer it, and in a loud and indignant tone implied that I was denying the truth of what he had said, which I had not done, as I had simply asked in very quiet terms for information. The right hon. Gentleman has been entirely misled by somebody. There was no officieusement in the matter. If he had read the Protocols, he would have seen the story of this proposal at some length. The proposal was made by M. Waddington officially, in the course of the plans he laid before the Conference. At the foot of page 6, on the Sitting of the 24th of July, at the end of a series of proposals, we find M. Waddington's words on the subject of the Loan—
The Powers to be asked to join in the Guarantee;and I answer, on page 7—We could not expect, or ask Parliament to agree to a Joint Guarantee, nor have we reason to believe that all the Powers would agree.There was no officieusement or secrecy; it was a direct proposal which was declined. The proposal was renewed in the latter part of the Protocols. At page 16, M. Waddington, in the argument upon the respective merits of the French plan and of mine, says— 510The collective Guarantee of the Powers would afford a complete security without risk to anyone;but that we rejected; and I think Parliament would dislike a Joint Guarantee as much as we did. So, then, the great charge which the right hon. Gentleman made about this mysterious officieuse proposal has no foundation, except the public proposal of France which we rejected. I give that as an illustration of the accuracy with which the right hon. Gentleman has made his sweeping charges against us to-day. He has, in fact, set up in his speech, made with great power and magnificent voice, and no doubt with considerable oratorical effect, worthy of a much larger audience, a series of charges against us; but when I mention this one, I think the House will be satisfied as to their nature.
§ SIR ROBERT PEELI asked the right hon. Gentleman a question upon the subject—namely, whether that proposal had not boon made officieusement at the Conference? I did not say that it had been made.
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)It is very easy now to turn a positive statement into a question. Let me again remind the right hon. Gentleman that, when I asked him to state by whom the proposal was made, and by whom the plan was put forward, he, in a very loud tone of voice, accused me of denying something which I never denied. What I asked him was, Who made an officieuse proposal? Then the right hon. Gentleman spoke with great warmth, not only of my right hon. Friend (the Prime Minister), but also of Gentlemen, one of whom is not in this House, and the other is not even in Parliament—I mean Lord Northbrook and Sir Evelyn Baring. I cannot allow the unjust terms in which he spoke of the latter to pass without notice, for he has no power to defend himself against attacks of that kind, as he is not in Parliament. Lord Northbrook, it is true, can defend himself in the House of Lords; but even he has not the advantage of being in the same field with the right hon. Baronet. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of Sir Evelyn Baring, and with great emphasis, as a great failure. Now, I venture to say that whatever may be the controversies in which Sir Evelyn 511 Baring has borne a part, during a good many years past, the last thing that ought to be said of him is that he is a great failure. So far from being so, he is a very able man, and in great affairs he has discharged his duty with singular success, as Financial Minister in India, and in Egypt. All through a time of unparalleled difficulty, during which he has represented Her Majesty, he has shown great ability, great power, and great knowledge of difficult financial questions, which he has grasped with singular skill, and for which he deserves the approval and support of this House. Considering that Sir Evelyn Baring is still engaged in the same most important business, and is about to return to Egypt with great responsibilities, to advise as to the finances of that country, in a position which the right hon. Gentleman has frankly admitted is one of great difficulty, I say that it is not only unjust, but impolitic as well, to make these charges which can have no other effect but to depreciate him. Sir Evelyn Baring was not known to me personally, until he came back from Egypt, the other day, to take part in the preliminary financial business which preceded the Conference itself; but I have had the advantage of acting with him, and seeing his work from day to day, and I say I have never had the good fortune to meet with a better or clearer-headed public servant than Sir Evelyn Baring. Now I pass to one or two statements made before the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, the accuracy of which I feel it my duty on this occasion to correct. The hon. Member for Mid Lincolnshire (Mr. Chaplin) spoke, at some length, of our past transactions in Egypt; and the burden of his song was the special iniquity which we have committed in keeping back information with respect to Egypt which ought to have been communicated. In particular, he said that we had kept back from Parliament information as to Hicks Pasha in 1883, and that we had not informed Parliament as to what he was doing, and whether or not he was acting under our orders. We are not going to furbish up all the speeches which we made concerning Hicks Pasha early in the Session; but, whether we were right or wrong in refusing to interfere with him, nothing was shown more clearly than that, in the previous Session, we had stated most 512 clearly, in February, in March, and again in June and July, precisely the circumstances under which Hicks Pasha had gone to the Soudan, and the non-responsibility of Her Majesty's Government in the matter. Lord Granville distinctly stated that Hicks Pasha was not acting under this Government. Whatever may have been the opinion of the House as to our action in deliberately deciding that we were not responsible for him, we gave Parliament notice in the previous year of the conditions under which he went. We laid Papers on the Table in February, and again in June and July, and after the last Papers were laid on the Table, not a word was said as to our having acted wrongly in not taking that responsibility. The charge, therefore, of the hon. Gentleman falls to the ground. I wish to say a few words as to the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster). He said a great deal with which I agree; but there was one suggestion which I am bound distinctly to oppose. He said that the indemnity to be paid to those who had suffered from the riots and conflagration at Alexandria and elsewhere should be paid by the taxpayers of this country, because it was due to the action of Sir Beachamp Seymour, and to our not interfering in time. As to that, it was thoroughly discussed in the autumn of 1882, and we showed why it was impossible to move up troops to Alexandria, in spite of all expedition being used, and that the destruction of property was due to no tactics of ours. I say, then, that it is not for the taxpayer of this country to come to the relief of Egypt by granting £4,000,000 of money for the relief of those who suffered through no fault of ours. Nor do I think it right—and on this matter I think it is my duty to speak plainly—that this money should be paid, except as part of a general settlement of Egyptian affairs. It is necessary to raise a considerable sum of money to set right the finances of Egypt, and also to provide for those improvements in connection with irrigation, upon which, if properly carried out, so much of the future prosperity of Egypt depends, and I cannot conceive anything more useless than to take up separately one item of this expenditure and burden Egypt with it, without, at the same time, giving her necessary relief. I did not 513 rise to speak upon the question generally. The Prime Minister dealt with the general statement of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote), and I see no reason why I should enter into it; but I will, in conclusion, say one word or two as to our present position. It appears to me that there has been no exaggeration on either side of the House as to the important and critical position in which we stand about Egyptian finance. Without saying too much about the position of the other Powers, there is no doubt that we, by the failure of the Conference, have had thrown upon us a great responsibility; and we have taken the best course, both for Egypt and ourselves, by not hurriedly proclaiming intentions as to the future, but by sending out one of the most eminent and able Members of the Cabinet, Lord Northbrook, to examine on the spot Egyptian finance as it now stands, and to advise what should be done in the bankrupt state of the country. If we are right in taking that course, we are also right in refusing to give any explanation as to what we might do, or might not do, in any particular contingency; and if Parliament has confidence in us, and I believe it has, I hope we shall be allowed to pursue steadily that course. Before long it will be necessary for us to decide, and to decide clearly, what measures we may have to adopt; and if they require the approval of Parliament, we shall not hesitate for a day to bring them before Parliament.
§ SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHSir, I think the closing appeal which the right hon. Gentleman opposite (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) has just made to the confidence of the House is a remarkably bold one, looking at the series of signal failures which have befallen the policy of the Government in Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman, at the commencement of his remarks, was very severe upon some observations which were made by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Huntingdon (Sir Robert Peel) in reference to France. I do not myself agree with much that fell from the right hon. Baronet; but I utterly fail to see how any hon. Member who entertains the opinions held by my right hon. Friend can be blamed for criticizing the conduct of France, by a Member of a Government whose Head 514 did not think it improper to criticize the conduct of other Powers, whose alliance is of equal value to this country, and that in terms which, I believe, have already done infinite mischief. If there is a desire to maintain good relations with France, the best way of doing so is not to shrink from protecting British interests merely from any fear of French susceptibilities. I do not think that anyone who has read the Protocols, and who remembers the good relations with France which existed at the beginning of the Conference, can fail to notice the quarrel, for it cannot be called anything else, which broke out between the President (Lord Granville) and M. Waddington at the close, or will doubt that the action of the Government in this matter has done far more to impede the cordial relations between France and England than any words which could possibly fall from my right hon. Friend. Then the right hon. Gentleman went on to refer to the unfortunate fate of Hicks Pasha, and to the observations made by the Prime Minister as to our delay in calling the attention of the House to this subject. I do not quite see how it can be argued that the Government were not wrong in this matter, because we did not find out their blunders. But I say that all the circumstances connected with the movements of Hicks Pasha were absolutely unknown to anyone but the Government until February last. As soon as we obtained the necessary information from the Government as to the facts, we called the attention of Parliament to them without delay. I am sorry the right hon. Gentleman did not think fit to say something in answer to the questions which have been addressed to the Government by more than one hon. Member in the course of the debate in reference to General Gordon's position. I wish to give the Government every credit as to their intentions to do what is right in this matter. We must be thankful to know that, in spite of anticipations to the contrary, in which I must confess I myself shared, that gallant soldier has maintained himself in Khartoum up to the present time, and that he is actually in a position to take aggressive measures against his besiegers. At the same time, I desire to know when, in the opinion of the Government, the time will arrive for that 515 interference which was almost universally sanctioned by the Vote of the other day. The Nile is now high, and this is just the time when operations ought to be undertaken, if they are to be undertaken at all. I must say that I was very much disappointed at the reply of the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-night to my Question. I understood him to say that all the Government had done had been to send, or to decide on sending, another message to General Gordon, asking him what they were to do, and how they were to do it. The House has had enough of those kind of messages. It must be weeks, it may be months, before a reply to that message is received, and meantime what will be the position of General Gordon? Moreover, the time when action could be advantageously taken will then have passed by. Is it the wish of Her Majesty's Government that General Gordon should remain in Khartoum for the remainder of his life, waging war with those tribes which Her Majesty's Government say are fighting for their freedom, or do they wish to terminate the present position of affairs by his relief? Without asking that any definite plan of operations should be told us—for it would be wrong to ask for that—I think that Parliament is entitled, before we separate, to be informed distinctly by Her Majesty's Government what they really intend, and not to be put off with that miserable answer which the noble Lord gave me to-night.
§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICEI think the right hon. Baronet has misunderstood my answer. The right hon. Gentleman simply asked me whether an answer had been sent to General Gordon's telegram, and I told him that an answer had been sent. The right hon. Gentleman has entirely misrepresented my answer.
§ SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHWill the noble Lord tell me what his answer was?
§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICEThe right hon. Gentleman simply asked me whether an answer had been sent to General Gordon's message, and I said that it had been sent.
§ SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHThat was not the whole of my question. I asked whether Her Majesty's Government had sent, or proposed to send, any reply to General Gordon's 516 letter; and, especially, whether it was the intention of the Government to inform him that they had made preparations for an expedition for his relief? Will the noble Lord tell me what his reply to the latter part of the question is? All the noble Lord told us was, that they had sent a reply, and that they wanted to know when, and how, they should relieve him?
§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICEThe right hon. Gentleman is entirely wrong. He had better refer to my answer; it is a very long one.
§ SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACHI say the answer of the noble Lord contained nothing on that point; and I appeal, therefore, to some other Member of Her Majesty's Government to satisfy the legitimate desire of the House and the country to know what is to be done for the relief of General Gordon. In the course of this debate one thing has struck me with considerable surprise. We had, a few days ago, an expression of opinion from the Government favourable as to the Anglo-French Agreement; but we have not had the faintest attempt, in the whole course of this debate, either from any Member of Her Majesty's Government, or from any of their supporters, to justify the provisions of that Agreement, or to tell us why it was made, although the Prime Minister, only the other day, stated that he continued to value it, and Lord Granville expressed his regret that it was not binding on the country. The only reason I can find for the making of that Agreement is, that the Government, in entering into it, have acted on what has been their governing principle throughout the whole of the Egyptian business, last year as well as this—namely, the desire, in any way possible and at any cost, to evade their responsibilities. For what other reason could they have made that Agreement? Is there anything that they have gained by making it? There is nothing. The Prime Minister, in referring to it, spoke of the concessions of M. Waddington on the part of the French Government. There were no concessions on the part of France in that Agreement; but our concessions are very large, and are left entirely without justification by the speech of the Prime Minister. M. Waddington said it was a mistake to suppose that France had any intention of reviving 517 the Dual Control, or sending troops to Egypt, if our occupation ceased. How can it be called a concession, to say that you will not do that which you never intended to do? I listened very attentively to the speech of the Prime Minister, and I utterly failed to discover anything in it to justify the undertakings into which he entered in return for this. His first concession was the fixing of a definite time for the evacuation of Egypt. Considering that our troops have been in Egypt two years, and during that time all that has been done to promote reorganization and establish good government in Egypt amounts to what the Prime Minister tells us to-night is a most important reform—namely, the partial suppression of the kourbash and the completion of a small portion of the Cadastral Survey, how can he really anticipate that our work in Egypt will be completed by the time he has named? For what is the condition of Egypt in regard to other matters? The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, at the Conference—"If Egypt cannot, at an early date, pay the Alexandrian indemnities and pay off her debts, she is ruined." When this is the financial result of British occupation for two years, I cannot conceive how the Government ever presented to themselves as a likely result of three and a-half years' occupation, if it is to be carried on on the same principles, the establishment of order and good government. What was the second concession? The acceptance of the principle of Multiple Control. The Prime Minister told the House that the powers of the Public Debt Commission were to be simply of a negative and restraining character. That was not the French understanding of the Agreement. What did M. Ferry say in explaining the Agreement to the French Chamber? He said that the Public Debt Commission would have nearly all the power of the old Control, except the right of attending Cabinet Councils. What was the third concession? The neutralization—it was merely of a shadowy kind—of Egypt. My right hon. Friend (Sir Robert Peel) has shown the impossibility of the neutralization of that country, at least, in any way akin to that of Belgium or Switzerland. The only possible neutralization which could result from the Anglo-French Agreement would be the neutralization of British influence in Egypt, 518 the predominance of which is absolutely necessary, if you are ever to see order and good government established in that country. What did we get in return for our concessions? Nothing, besides the consent of France to enter the Conference; and what object could England expect to gain in that Conference? It has been a Conference in regard to a country in which the interests of England are mainly political, and those of France mainly financial; and yet the Government thought that they had gained a great thing, when, by such concessions as those which I have recounted, amounting to a voluntary abdication of our position in Egypt, they obtained the consent of France to enter the Conference, without any undertaking on the part of that country that its Representatives would consent to that reduction of the interest of the bondholders which was the keystone of the financial scheme of the right hon. Gentleman. It was clear, from the statement of M. Ferry in the French Assembly, that he had never any real intention of submitting to the reduction of the bondholders' interest. The result of that Conference is now alleged by the Government, with considerable show of satisfaction, to be nothing at all; but I only wish that could be truthfully said of it. I am afraid that this, at any rate, has been one result—namely, a decided want of cordiality between England and France. I also fear that the concessions which we made in that unlucky Anglo-French Agreement will be remembered against us wherever and whenever it may suit people to remember them in the future. Bad as the financial position was before, it has been rendered infinitely worse by the result of the Conference. The Government will find themselves in this dilemma—they will either have to adopt some scheme not involving the reduction of the interest of the bondholders, and thereby confess that when they proposed that reduction to the Conference they proposed breaking faith with the public creditor without any sufficient reason; or they will have to attempt to effect a reduction of that interest, after they have asked the Powers of Europe to consent to a reduction, and have received a refusal. But it is quite evident that money must be found in some way. What the Government propose to do now is to send out Lord Northbrook, 519 and it has been supposed that this is to be the beginning of a new policy. I hope that it may be so. The Prime Minister said this evening that the financial famine places us in a new position in relation to Egyptian affairs. I hope that view is really entertained by the Government, and that they will at last accept their responsibilities. We are always told that we, on this side of the House, are advocating annexation; but I do not think that anyone who has considered this question imagines that we could act in reference to Egypt otherwise than in accordance with our Treaty obligations, and the general opinion of Europe; and I should be very glad to see the day arrive when it might be no longer necessary for a single English soldier to remain in Egypt. But I am quite sure that we, and we only, ought to be the judges of the time when that necessity shall no longer exist; and I feel convinced that the Government never did anything more dangerous to the interests of this country and of Egypt, which they were bound to protect, than when they attempted to fix a time for our withdrawal. If the Government will take up this matter in an honest, earnest, and proper spirit, much may be condoned by the country as regards the past; but they can only deal with it in a proper spirit by no longer subordinating their principal duty in Egypt—namely, the establishment of a firm and just Government on a durable basis—to their paramount anxiety to get out of the country. The Prime Minister has referred in previous debates to the sacred duty of respecting the position of the Khedive. What a farce is this! We assume the control of the Khedive's Army; we negotiate Treaties on his behalf; we name his delegates to a Conference on the financial affairs of his country; we order him to dismiss his Ministers; and to give up a large portion of his dominions; and yet we cannot assume the rest of the control which it is necessary to assume, in order to put down those horrible cruelties which are reported to us by our officials, and those exactions on the Natives which the miserable Native Government permits. Perhaps a reduction in the expense entailed by this costly sham of Dual Government might provide sufficient funds to render any reduction in the interest due to the bondholders un- 520 necessary. But even if it were otherwise, surely if the bondholders were satisfied that the country would be well governed, and likely to be financially prosperous in the future, and that they would have better security for their capital, they and the Governments who support them would be more willing than at present to consent to a reduction of interest. The time has come when it is necessary for the Government to decide between leaving Egypt and governing it themselves. Nothing would be more cowardly or cruel towards Egypt—it would be better to have sailed out of the harbour of Alexandria with the French Fleet—than to continue in the vacillating policy which has prevailed during the last 12 months. If Lord Northbrook could be intrusted with sufficient power to carry into execution a scheme for the establishment of a just and firm Government I believe he would find the means not only of solving the financial difficulties, but of solving them with the cordial assent of the European Powers, who must prefer good government and order to anarchy in Egypt.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, he thought the country was to be congratulated on the collapse of the Conference. The nation owed a deep debt of gratitude to the Great Powers of Europe for having rendered abortive the fantastic and mischievous schemes that the British Cabinet had devised. It was, he thought, a matter of great regret that the House of Commons would not have the opportunity of expressing its opinion upon the Anglo-French Agreement by a direct vote, for he did not believe that even the cringing and subservient Ministerial majority who had followed Her Majesty's Ministers on previous occasions would have endured that abject, humiliating, and mischievous surrender of National and Imperial influence and power. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1884 was more absurd and injurious than even the Suez Canal scheme of 1883, which perished of universal ridicule. Under the terms of this remarkable document the Ministers of the Crown were willing to promise that British troops should march out of Egypt at the dictation of Foreign States, whether or not our work there was accomplished. They assented to the infliction upon the suffering Egyptians of an oppressive 521 Multiple Control, which would, according to M. Ferry, have "had nearly all the powers of the old Control." They even promised that Egypt and the Suez Canal—in which the interest of this country was greater than that of all the rest of the Powers of Europe put together—should be neutralized in favour of other Powers—our rivals and our foes. They were anxious to throw away the fruits of all the efforts of our statesmen and soldiers—all the expenditure of blood and treasure which had taken place from the time of Pitt to Beaconsfield, and from Nelson to Wolseley. All the sacrifices of blood and treasure and political efforts made during the past two years were to be cast away. Our rivals and enemies were wantonly invited to enter in and take equal rights with ourselves in a country where British interests exceeded the interests of all other countries. The Prime Minister and his Colleagues were willing and anxious to incur paralyzing engagements as to this neutralization. They would have deliberately debarred themselves and their Successors from safeguarding the Canal, the great waterway for our commerce and reinforcements to the East, and they would have put it in the power of any daring foe to block, if not destroy, our shortest and best passage to India. Happily, the Government had been baulked in their precious scheme, and baulked in a way unexpected by themselves. They were baulked by the action of a Power to whom reference had been made to-night. He did not believe the Chancellor of the Exchequer was right when he said this country deprecated the view taken by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Huntingdon (Sir Robert Peel) as to the course taken by Her Majesty's Ministers in reference to France. The country wished for no offensive or aggravating expressions towards Foreign States; but she was sick of cringing and fawning, and of these nauseating encomiums which had been bestowed by Her Majesty's Ministers upon a Power which was affecting, in a most mischievous and injurious way, our interests and commerce in different parts of the world. The country was absolutely weary of this surrender to France, and wished to have no more of it. After all this, Her Majesty's Government were willing to guarantee a loan of £8,000,000 to Egypt. He noticed 522 that the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer just now repudiated the idea that we should lend or guarantee a loan for the Alexandrian indemnity. ["No, no!"] Yes. The right hon. Gentleman distinctly stated that the Government were unwilling to lend or guarantee the money to pay the Alexandrian indemnity.
§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)No. I said that the Government were unwilling to guarantee money for this purpose separately from the general arrangements for a loan, and for the settlement of Egyptian affairs.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, he accepted the correction of the right hon. Gentleman; but he did not see in what respect the Government had advanced their case by that statement. The Government, according to a statement in the first Protocol, proposed to guarantee to Egypt a loan of £8,000,000 in order to pay for the outcome of their bombardment of Alexandria and their failure to provide a landing force, and defray the extra charges thrown upon the Egyptian Exchequer since July, 1882, by their incredible irresolution and blundering. Well, how had the situation changed since then? Had they more information? Had the financial condition of Egypt improved? Why should they draw back now from what they were willing to do two months ago? He could not see that the state of things had been advanced in any degree by the statement of the right hon. Gentleman. They had been saved from this loan or guarantee by the obstinacy of the French and the coldness of the Powers; and now, strange to say, the French Republic, from whom they had complacently accepted every degree of insult and injury, was not satisfied with all the preceding concessions. The French Cabinet actually demanded that £8,000,000 should be lent without security, and that the burdens upon the wretched fellaheen of Egypt should be lightened in the interest of the financiers of Europe. He did not feel at all satisfied that they were free from this Anglo-French Agreement. It had been described as being in abeyance; but he was not at all sure that they were free from the danger of its being revived. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Huntingdon had referred to the extraordinary significance 523 of the remarks of the Prime Minister directly on his announcing the failure of the Conference. The right hon. Gentleman had spoken of "a spirit of conciliation," and of the wisdom of the French Government. Well, he (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) was not disposed to dispute the wisdom of the French Government. He had never inveighed against the French Government for their action in the interests of their own country. He had inveighed against the British Government for yielding to the arrogant demands of France—for not attending properly to their own interests. It was a remarkable circumstance that the Prime Minister was able to make that statement on the 2nd of August, when Lord Granville, less than three hours before, had made the remarkable declaration that he saw nothing in the statement of M. Waddington which induced him to think that the French Government were differently disposed towards us than he had expected. The Government had wisely, and in their own interests, avoided a discussion of their proposals and their policy. Their last artifice of the despatch of a Cabinet Minister was but another expedient for delay. The Prime Minister had said, with a flourish of trumpets, that he invited discussion, and was willing to abide by the judgment of Parliament. It was perfectly certain, however, that the House had been jockeyed out of the discussion, as they had been jockeyed out of another a short time ago—when Ministers prevailed on their followers to go into an opposite Lobby to themselves to prevent a discussion and consequent notice being taken of their mistakes. Lord Northbrook was going out "to examine and advise." It was an utter farce. Advice and investigation the Government had had in abundance. What they needed was not advice, but resource; not investigation, but resolution; not fresh plan, but decision and courage. They had tried every agent they could employ "from Dufferin to Gordon." As the Prime Minister had said, Sir Edward Malet, Sir Charles Wilson, Lord Wolseley, General Gordon, Lord Dufferin, had all been engaged in this painful business. Not one of them was to blame. All had done their duty, and given admirable advice. The fault was not with the agent; it was with the employers. The 524 counsels had been excellent; but they had never been executed. The fault had been entirely at home. In each case the most urgent and vital warnings had been neglected, and the most precious suggestions despised. The result had been anarchy, bloodshed, and ruin. He would only say that Sir Edward Malet, Mr. Cookson, even the unfortunate and despised Sultan, and many independent persons of position and knowledge, including Lord Dufferin, General Hicks, General Baker, General Gordon, General Graham, Nubar Pasha, and Sir Evelyn Baring—all those persons, who had well qualified themselves on the spot to give advice, had given it, and had had it treated it with scorn. The Government had been warned of the dangers from Arabi's movement; but they had neglected the warning. The destruction of Alexandria and the war ensued. Lord Dutferin told them of the mischiefs that would spring from indifference to the Mahdi's revolt; and Sir Charles Wilson urged that the Indian Brigade should be sent to Khartoum in the autumn of 1882. Responsibility was shirked for 15 months. Anarchy, massacre, and ruin resulted. Lord Northbrook was going out to "advise and report." What a cruel farce! If he went to act, with means to act, and with loyal support to secure his success, well and good. But of warning and advice the Government had had a surfeit. The ghosts of the despised advice of Malet and Dufferin, of Wilson, Tewfik, and Baker, of Hicks and Gordon, haunted their memories, and pointed the finger of scorn at the foredoomed failure of Lord Northbrook's Mission. For months and for years the financial crisis in Egypt had been anticipated. Ever since the destruction of Alexandria it had been certain. Since the beginning of this year it had been imminent. The experts and the Plenipotentiaries at the Conference had investigated the pecuniary position of Egypt with the utmost care. As the Prime Minister said, it had been probed to the very bottom. Why, then, further delay? A deficit of £8,000,000 had to be met; how was that to be done? The Ministry confessed to a degree of ignorance and improvidence almost incredible. They had absolutely no alternative plan to propose now that the Conference had failed. Yet now, over three months from its first convocation, the British 525 Ministers, who had been in occupation and had complete control of Egypt for two years, had not in any way provided against so probable a contingency. Ever since the award of the indemnities they knew well that over £4,000,000 would have to be provided by the Power that was in possession and control of Egypt, and that caused the waste which had now to be paid for. Yet they could only send out Lord Northbrook to give more advice. He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) had never heard of a greater exhibition of Ministerial incapacity—he might almost say imbecility. He did not think hon. Gentlemen opposite realized what the course of the delaying and blundering of the Government in Egypt had been. He repeated that the sending out of Lord Northbrook was a mere expedient for delay, and for putting off responsibility. The Ministry dared not ask Parliament now to provide the £8,000,000 which must be found if Egypt was to avoid a ruinous bankruptcy. Such a proposal would kill their mechanical agitation against the House of Lords. They made a show of a pitiful Vote for General Gordon, though they still shut their eyes to the necessity of relieving their gallant Agent, who had been beleaguered by savage enemies, and who had been in imminent danger for five long months. But Parliament had a right to know how these claims were to be met. The victims of the Alexandria riots were clamouring for their promised indemnities, and the Great Powers were supporting their claims. The wanton waste of human life and treasure during the past two years was horrible to contemplate. Allowing £1,000,000 as the unavoidable cost of suppressing the Mahdi, even had the timely measures advised by Sir Charles Wilson been taken in 1882, there remained £3,000,000 for which the Government was clearly responsible, besides the £4,000,000 of Alexandrian indemnities, so that £7,000,000 out of the total deficit might, with all justice, be set down to the vacillating and pusillanimous policy of the British Government. This sum was quite beyond and independent of the costs of the late Egyptian War, or "military operations." That war cost England and India together close upon £7,000,000, and it cost Egypt, in the shape of extra military expenditure and of loss to com- 526 merce and industry, £3,000,000 more. The total cost of Ministerial irresolution, weakness, and blundering in Egypt had been, therefore, at the very least, £18,000,000 of money. And they could not cover the loss of human life which had been caused by the same mistakes by an aggregate of 50,000 lives. More than 50,000 lives had been thrown away by the weakness and blunders of Her Majesty's Government. Such a total had never been exceeded—it had never been equalled—by any Minister in the past, and would, he hoped, never be equalled by any Minister in the future. Alexandria, Tel-el-Kebir, Hicks, Baker, Sinkat, Berber, Khartoum, aroused heartrending memories of useless slaughter, caused directly by irresolute delay, insufficient precaution, and unmanly endeavours to shirk plain responsibilities. It was time all this was done with, once and for all. He had only one word to say as to the statement made by the Prime Minister with reference to what had taken place at the Conference. He would advise hon. Members—if he might venture to do so—to read the Protocols with great care, and compare with them the statements which had fallen from the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, particularly as to the attitude of the Powers. No doubt, the British Representative had broken up the Conference in a most determined, if not arrogant, manner, by simply putting on his hat and declaring the Conference closed. He (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett) did not blame him for so doing. He blamed the Government for going into the Conference, in the first instance, when everybody knew that the result must be such as had taken place. He must say that Lord Granville had shown a firmness which, if it had been adopted earlier, would have been productive of useful consequences. It was said that Italy and Turkey approved of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and that the other Powers considered the Conference must close, because of the difference between England and France. Well, he should like it to be shown to him where Italy and France had approved of the attitude of Her Majesty's Government. He found that all the Italian Ambassador had said in support of England was with regard to one single portion of the financial proposals. With regard to the estimate of the Re- 527 venue of Egypt, and the interest she was able to pay, the Italian Ambassador said he greatly deprecated yielding unduly to the interest of the bondholders, and was sure the English estimate was correct; and if the English Representative stood firm, Italy would support him. As for Turkey, he found that she supported Her Majesty's Government only to the extent of being in favour of the reduction of the interest to 4 per cent. Only in that diminished form could he find that Italy and Turkey supported Her Majesty's Government. But in page 18 of the Blue Book, he found a most remarkable statement with regard to the rights of Turkey, which it must have been gall and wormwood to Her Majesty's Government to read. He found that Musurus Pasha asserted, in the plainest way, the rights of Turkey in Egypt, and that all the Powers supported Turkey against England. The Austrian Ambassador said that his Government recognized all the rights of the Porte—the Porte whom Her Majesty's Government despised, and whose territory they endeavoured to deal with after producing anarchy and bloodshed throughout its length and breadth. The statement and references of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, after all, was a mere shuffling, because he had referred to old propositions long since passed over. Let Ministers show from the Protocol of the last meeting any sign that their conduct was approved of by the Powers on the questions at issue. When the French Ambassador proposed that the Conference should be postponed until the 20th, Her Majesty's Government absolutely refused to allow the proposal to go to the vote. Lord Granville put on his hat, and walked out rather than allow it. The noble Lord was right in doing that from the point of view of British interests; but was he right from the point of view of the Prime Minister? What did the Prime Minister think of isolated and arbitrary action on the part of England in this matter? Why, not long ago, the right ton. Gentleman had said—
I heard some persons say—'Would the dissent of England be of itself sufficient to neutralize the voice of the Powers?' I must say that I think that if we thought of entering into negotiations so solemn and so important with France, and of undertaking to submit ourselves on certain conditions at certain times to the voice of Europe, having in our own minds the 528 intention all the while to neutralize the action of the Powers of Europe by our own resistance when that time arrives, then I do think there would have been occasion to talk about the honour of this country. I cannot answer for the Government of that day when it arrives; but if the present Government are in Office I have no hesitation in saying that they certainly would not plead the adverse opinion of England in the circumstances of the arrangement into which they had entered with France.That was what the Prime Minister said, and yet he acquiesced in the decision of his Colleagues in refusing to postpone the Conference. Quotations such as this showed how extraordinary were the contradictions in which the Government of this country were involved by the hand-to-mouth policy and the pretexts they put forward from time to time to justify this chapter of accidents which they falsely called a "policy." The obstinacy and hostility of the French Republic had again freed our hands from the entangling engagements in which the weakness of the British Cabinet threatened to involve us. Let the Government have a policy by themselves. It was time they took this Egyptian problem in hand like men, thoroughly and without loss of time, and ended a state of uncertainty and administrative paralysis which was a scandal to the fame of England and ruin to Egypt. Two objects stood before us—to insure the predominance of British influence in Egypt, in connection with the Suez Canal, and the good government of the long-suffering people of that country. Let the Government give over this impracticable joint action with the unstable and unprincipled Republic of France, which had led them into so many and grievous embarrassments. Let them cease crying after that chimerical "Concert of Europe," which they had invoked only to their own discomfiture. Let them take the matter in their own hands resolutely and completely. Let them go to the Sovereigns of Egypt, and, in a spirit of real friendliness, and candour, and mutual concession, arrange for the thorough supervision of the Egyptian Administration by competent British officials, and for the occupation of the country until our work there was fully done. Let them give Gordon the means to overcome the savage and fanatical revolt in the Soudan, and restore good government there, and give one of our ablest Anglo-Indian Administrators 529 power and support to introduce purity, economy, and liberty into the domestic government of Egypt. All Europe would applaud such beneficial firmness, except, perhaps, France; and the open antagonism of France would be less difficult to cope with than her false and embarrassing alliances. There had been enough shuffling, cant, and cowardice in our dealings with Egypt. What we needed was a little of the good old British statesmanship, when Ministers said what they meant and did what they said, and when Governments ruled, and Cabinets were not afraid of responsibility.
§ MR. FINCH-HATTONsaid, that even if the hour were not so late as it was, the present would not be a fitting occasion to go fully into detail with regard to the present position of affairs in the Soudan. He must confess to a great feeling of disappointment at the speech delivered that night by the Prime Minister, as it appeared to him (Mr. Finch-Hatton) that instead of entering upon those great principles which the country were expecting the Government to enunciate, the right hon. Gentleman had confined himself to dealing with matters of detail which would not give any satisfaction to the country when they read the account of it to-morrow. As this was the last occasion on which hon. Members would be able to take anything like a review of the position of affairs in Egypt, and as they would be called upon for nearly three months to abandon entirely all Parliamentary control over Her Majesty's Government as to the course of events in Egypt, he thought they were justified in asking to-night for that which, he was sorry to say, they had not received—namely, some indication or sign that Her Majesty's Government had abandoned that policy which, in spite of what had fallen from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had not received the assent of any considerable portion of the people of this country, and which had not received the assent of some of their most influential supporters, such as the hon. Member for Orkney (Mr. Laing) and the right hon. Gentlemen the Members for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) and Ripon (Mr. Goschen). The responsibility for the policy the Government had pursued was more particularly their own, because, though France and Europe had been 530 taken into their confidence, the House and the country had never been admitted to that confidence until it was too late to pronounce an opinion. It was the more important that the House should inquire whether any change was really contemplated, because within the last fortnight the Government had announced to the country two steps, which he (Mr. Finch-Hatton) ventured to think they had decided upon merely in order to induce a belief that they were about to change their policy in Egypt. The first of these steps was the Vote of Credit, which Her Majesty's Government had asked for in order that they might make "preparations for operations" for the relief of General Gordon. Of course, the question which would at once occur to the country was this—did the Vote of Credit mean that the Government pledged themselves to direct action in the matter, or was it merely another attempt to delay the settlement of the question? For his own part, he could not believe that there was any connection between the Vote of Credit and action being taken by the Government, because in the speech in which the Vote was asked for the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had stated that the contingency on which action would be necessary had not yet arrived. The House had a right to ask what contingency did the Government expect to arrive. Why had the time for action not at this moment arrived? Were they waiting for less favourable news from Khartoum? If so, he could only compare the relative positions of Her Majesty's Government and General Gordon in this matter with those of a man who was drowning, and another who, with all life-saving appliances ready to his hand, was watching from the security of the bank the swimmer struggling with the waves. Ever and anon the man on the shore placed the telescope to his eye, and so long as he saw the swimmer was above water he refused to put off to his relief; but as soon as the unfortunate man disappeared beneath the surface, he went to render an assistance which was then too late to be of any avail. But when, to make the parallel complete, they knew that the swimmer had undertaken to stem the tide in order to save the honour and credit of the man who was watching him from the bank—when they knew that he had risked his life for the 531 man, who was doing nothing for him in return, what could they think of such conduct? There was another point which had not received that consideration which was due to it—namely, the government of Khartoum. He (Mr. Finch-Hatton) had been surprised to hear the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War (the Marquess of Hartington) state in his place the other day that General Gordon had no instructions to establish an organized Government, and that if he endeavoured to establish it, he would be exceeding his instructions. The exact contrary was, however, the case. The instructions given to General Gordon were definite and precise upon this point, as could easily be seen by referring to the copy of them which Her Majesty's Government had laid upon the Table; and they were, to provide for the establishing of a settled form of Government in the Soudan when the garrisons were withdrawn. But there was this further fact to be considered—they were about to make some preparations which would involve a loan of £8,000,000 to Egypt—on what security did not yet appear. But, in making that loan, had they considered that if they abandoned Khartoum without providing for any settled form of Government there, they, as a matter of fact, abandoned not only the key of the military position in Upper Egypt, but also the emporium of trade of Upper Egypt, and the key of the Nile; for if no settled form of Government were established there, the whole of Egypt would be placed at the mercy of any adventurer, who might make himself master of Khartoum cut off the supply of water from the country by a very inexpensive process, and divert the inundation of the Nile into the surrounding desert, thus turning Egypt from a garden into a wilderness, and destroying the only security which, from a monetary point of view, we should have to look forward to. So much for the Vote of Credit. It would be unwise to foreshadow what would be the result of Lord Northbrook's Mission; but this he would say, that it seemed very curious that at the very moment when Her Majesty's Government had invited assembled Europe to consider the effect of their two years' study of the position of Egypt, and that invitation had turned out to 532 be barren of result, they should say to the House of Commons—"We can explain nothing to you, because we can know nothing ourselves until the elements of the case have been presented to us by our Commissioner." One thing struck him with irresistible force—namely, that faults there must have been on the part of the Government, and faults of a very grave kind, to have enabled them, in two short years, to bring the richest and most productive country in the world to bankruptcy, and to bring the most easily-governed country in the world to anarchy, and to convert the goodwill of a friendly and affectionate people into hatred and contempt. These were the results, the undoubted results, spoken of by all the world, which had followed upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt; and what they (the Opposition) asked here, on the eve of the Prorogation of Parliament, was this—was there any sign that these faults on the part of Her Majesty's Government would not be indefinitely repeated? Was there any sign that the Government were really making a change in their policy, and were about to pursue a vigorous and consistent course of action; for if there was, he should be the last to go back to the past, and should willingly act on the principle of letting bygones be bygones? The faults of the Government were very superficial—that was to say, they lay on the surface. They had been constantly pointed out, not only from that (the Opposition) side of the House, but in no less unmeasured terms, and in no less forcible language, from the other side of the House. One of the gravest faults of the Government lay in their having refused to recognize, from the first, that we were the undoubted arbiters of the destinies of Egypt. From that had resulted all those evils of uncertain government, all those intrigues against our power, the continuance of all those unreformed abuses, and that general paralysis of the Executive which they all deplored, but which so few traced to their right source. He certainly thought that a great fault the Government had committed was that which had been repeated in the Anglo-French Agreement—namely, their having proclaimed our occupation of Egypt to be a merely temporary occupation. The moment they made that de- 533 claration the whole force of that numerous body of individuals who profited by the existing unsettled state of things was turned into the channels of intrigue, and devoted to the one object of paralyzing all our efforts for the reorganization of the country until the hated term of our occupation was over, when they would once more be free from control, and when, naturally enough, all those abuses which we had had to lament in the past would begin again. There was a point in the history of the last two years which had been noticed at some length in the course of this debate to-night—he meant the extraordinary way in which Her Majesty's Government had deferred to the opinion and susceptibilities, in regard to this Egyptian Question, of the French Government. Now, he (Mr. Finch-Hatton) should be very unwilling indeed to say one single word in disparagement of a great, a neighbouring, and a friendly country, with whom he trusted we should always be on terms of peace and goodwill. But he thought the best way to maintain those relations was not to attempt to run in double harness with France when her interests were opposed to ours. France had determined for the last 80 years that she would be the preponderating Power in Egypt. That fact had been recognized more by Foreign Powers than probably it had been recognized in debates in this House. The Prime Minister recognized it, as was evident from one of his speeches. It was an open secret, and if it was not yet learnt by Her Majesty's Government, the sooner it was learnt the better, that there was a struggle for pre-eminence going on between France and England in Egypt; and if we gave up the position we now held, so surely as the English troops marched out of Egypt, so surely, whether this year or next year, or some subsequent year, at any rate in the long run the time would come when French troops would march in, and French influence become predominant. He (Mr. Finch-Hatton) had no wish to impute any want of sincerity to any individual French Minister who might have made any contrary statement, nor did he think he could be charged with doing so if he proposed that they should read this matter by the light of history rather than by that of any individual statement. He might remind the House of an analogous 534 case—namely, that of Russia. Russia made a solemn statement that she had no intention to annex Merv; but, in spite of that declaration, as time had gone on, she not only annexed that place, but a territory larger than the whole of France. Any statesman who preferred for the future to rest his policy with regard to the movements of Russia rather upon the personal word of a Monarch than upon a reading of Russian history would be justly regarded as a criminal lunatic. In the case of France we should be prepared to lay down and to carry out a policy based upon a judicious view of our own interests. If Her Majesty's Government were prepared at this moment to give up a preponderating influence in Egypt, then he would assure them that the opportunity of acquiring it might never occur again, and that the position they abandoned would be taken up by France. The only question was, whether our interests in Egypt did not legitimately far outweigh those of France, and undoubtedly they did. English and French predominance in Egypt was now hanging in the balance, and the present crisis would decide the issue, perhaps finally. If Her Majesty's Government knew this fact—if knowingly they had thrown the weight of their influence into the French scale by volunteering, as they had volunteered, in deference to France, to withdraw British troops from Egypt at a stated time, then he said that so deliberate a betrayal of English interests deserved nothing less than impeachment; but if, as he must suppose, they were still in ignorance of this fact, then he could only hope that the Mission of Lord Northbrook to Egypt, if it had no other result, would, at any rate, have the effect of raising the knowledge of Her Majesty's Ministers upon this point to the level of that of every moderately well-informed traveller in the East. He had seen no sign that Her Majesty's Government intended to change their policy in Egypt; but he trusted that during the Recess they would come to a better mind on the subject. There were no signs that that was likely; and if, as time went on, there was still an absence of such sign, he could only hope that the country would not be deterred from continuing the watchful and jealous attitude it had assumed as to Egypt and the conduct of Her Majesty's Govern- 535 ment in that country. The steps the Government were taking appeared to him to be so inadequate as to suggest the idea that they had been devised merely to lull the country into a false security. He trusted the country would not be lulled in that way, and would not suffer itself to be led astray by a manufactured agitation out-of-doors only devised for the double purpose of concealing from the country the surrender of British interests in Egypt, and of enabling Her Majesty's Government either to destroy or to mutilate, in an essential feature, that Constitutional control which, on taking Office, they had solemnly promised to defend.