§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTEasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether Her Majesty's Government have decided on the line of policy which they propose to pursue in Egypt, with reference more especially to the following points:—The government of the Eastern Soudan; the relations which are to be maintained with the Western Soudan; the Government of Khartoum; the relations between the Soudan generally and the Egyptian Government; and, the general relations, political, military, and financial, between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt; whether he can give any information as to General Gordon's present position and views; and, whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to afford him any material support?
§ MR. FRANCIS BUXTONasked the First Lord of the Treasury, Whether General Gordon has yet reported, either to Her Majesty's Government or to the Khedive of Egypt—
On the best means of giving effect to the resolution of the Khedive to withdraw from the interior of the Soudan,for which purpose, according to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech, he was allowed to proceed to Khartoum; and, whether such Report can be laid upon the Table, or whether, in the absence of any such Report, the time has not now come to recall him from Khartoum, and thereby prevent any further risk of his own life, and put an end to all doubts of the intentions of the Egyptian Government with regard to the Soudan?
§ MR. ARTHUR O'CONNORasked whether the Government regarded General Gordon as representing at Khartoum the authority of Her Majesty's Government or that of the Khedive?
§ SIR ALEXANDER GORDONcomplained that his Question as it appeared on the Paper of Business upon this matter had been so altered as to make it mere nonsense, and he would therefore ask, Whether, with the view of avoiding anarchy, as resulting from the immediate retirement from the Eastern Soudan, the Government would modify their instructions to General Gordon so far as to empower him to administer the affairs of that province, with regard to which the revenues of the country were quite 1510 sufficient, until some authority had been established there competent to take over the reins of government.
MR. GLADSTONEThe Question of the hon. Gentleman the Member for the Queen's County (Mr. Arthur O'Connor) is one which, I think, has been answered by the information authentically communicated to the House— namely, that General Gordon was sent from this country by Her Majesty's Government, and under the authority of Her Majesty's Government, to ascertain the best means of executing the evacuation of the Soudan. The House was also informed that, upon his arrival in Egypt, he likewise received from the Egyptian Government executive powers, and these powers he exercises in the name and by the right of the Egyptian Government, although they are powers with regard to which Her Majesty's Government feel both great interest and responsibility. Then I come to answer the Question of my hon. Friend behind me (Sir Alexander Gordon) by saying I do not believe there is any modification at all requisite in General Gordon's instructions. I apprehend his instructions would cover whatever powers of administration he might find it expedient to assume in the Soudan, as they do cover, in fact, at the moment his administration and his proceedings at Khartoum. Now, with respect to Question 63 of my hon. Friend (Mr. Francis Buxton), I would assure him that I entirely enter into the spirit of that Question. Her Majesty's Government are very sensible of their obligations with respect to General Gordon, and they have no disposition unreasonably to stint them. But it is not the case that we have yet received from General Gordon any full Report, nor do we believe that the Khedive of Egypt can have received any full Report from General Gordon as to the best means of giving effect to the resolution of the Khedive to withdraw from the interior of the Soudan. And, although I cannot be surprised at the anxiety of my hon. Friend for such a Report, yet I think, when it is considered what the Soudan is, how it is inhabited, what a range of country it covers, and what diversities of population not organically united together it contains, and that General Gordon has been but a bare two months in the Soudan, we cannot feel very great surprise that no couclu- 1511 sive Report has come from him up to the present time on that subject. Of course, therefore, no such Report can be laid on the Table. So much for the first part of the Question of my hon. Friend. With regard to the second part—
Whether, in the absence of such Report, the time has not come to recall General Gordon from Khartoum, and thereby prevent any further risk of his own life, and put an end to all doubts of the intentions of the Egyptian Government with regard to the Soudan?I hope that it is not necessary to take any step for the purpose of putting an end to doubts as to the intentions of the Egyptian Government. I believe there is no question whatever in regard to their intentions; and undoubtedly there is not the smallest change, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, with respect to the execution of our intentions. But I am bound to say that we do not think that the time has come for sending a peremptory order to General Gordon for the purpose of recalling him from the Soudan. The principle upon which we should act in all matters relating to him is never to interfere except in a case of clear necessity. Now, I believe the matter stands thus with regard to General Gordon, and, perhaps, this may be important intelligence to my hon. Friend —at any rate, it is a very material part of the case—General Gordon is under no constraint and under no orders to remain in the Soudan. As far as his instructions or orders are concerned. General Gordon is authorized to use his own discretion, and to withdraw from the Soudan if he thinks proper. I stated that General Gordon was under no orders requiring him to remain in the Soudan; neither, as far as we are aware, is he under any inability to leave the Soudan at this moment if he chooses. As far as our information goes, he may exercise a free judgment upon that matter. Further, we gather quite distinctly from such reports as have reached us that General Gordon believes himself to be safe in Khartoum, where he is at the present time; and he has held out to us no anticipation of danger. Therefore, what we presume is this—that General Gordon does not conceive that the time has come either when he considers that the purpose of his mission is accomplished, or when he ought to despair of carrying that purpose forward; and we should be very reluctant indeed to in- 1512 terfere with his judgment on that subject. I think I may say it might be warrantable, or it might even be a duty incumbent upon us, to order General Gordon to withdraw if his work were at an end, or if he was seen to be in probable danger. But, according to all the information before us, that case has not arisen, and consequently there is no occasion for our intervention; nor is General Gordon in any way hampered as to the prosecution of his work or as to desisting from it if he thought the time for desisting from it had arrived. With regard to the Question of the right hon. Gentleman, I have asked my noble Friend—in the first instance, at any rate —to answer it, because some part of what the Government has to state to the House will come best from him, as it relates to military particulars, and likewise because the threads of former transactions for the last two or three weeks have been in the hands of my noble Friend.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI hope, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman and the House will not think that I or the Government are guilty of the slightest disrespect to himself or to the House for the course which has been suggested by my right hon. Friend. I am conscious that, even under the circumstances of the temporary absence of my right hon. Friend from the House, the statement which I have to make would come far better from him. But as it has been my duty on more than one occasion to make a promise that on the first opportunity we should make to the House any statement it might be in our power to make, my right hon. Friend has thought it would be the most convenient course that I should endeavour to reply to the Question of the right hon. Gentleman. In doing so I am afraid I shall have to trespass on the attention of the House for a much longer time than is usual in answering a Question; but I shall try to condense what I have to say as much as possible. In the first place, I must observe that, although I have been asked to reply to the Question of the right hon. Gentleman, there is a great deal in that Question which appears to me and to the Government it would be utterly impossible for us to answer at the present time, and, further, a great deal which, in the opinion of the Government, ought not to be answered. There are, how- 1513 ever, certain points upon which I have undertaken that we should, at as early. a date as possible, endeavour to give the House some information; and although our information, even upon these points, is not as complete as could be desired, and although I am free to confess that, even as regards some subjects upon which I shall have to touch, it may possibly be premature to say anything as yet, still I will endeavour, as fully and completely as I can, to redeem the pledge which has been given. The first point upon which I wish to say a word is as to communications that took place between the Government and Sir Evelyn Baring and General Gordon on the subject of the appointment of Zebehr Pasha. On the 10th of March I informed the House that General Gordon had recommended the appointment of Zebehr Pasha as Governor of the Eastern Soudan. His recommendation was that Zebehr should be sent to Khartoum with the moral support of the British Government, but with nothing more; that certain engagements should be taken from him as to the extent of the country over which he was to exercise authority, and as to his proceedings at Khartoum and certain other matters. As I informed the House upon that occasion, the Government felt the strongest objections to the proposal which was first made—objections in the main founded upon reports received both formerly and recently from General Gordon himself with regard to the character and antecedents of Zebehr. I said on that occasion that we thought it due, both to General Gordon and Sir Evelyn Baring, to ascertain fully, before we came to a final decision on the subject, on what grounds that recommendation was made. Further information that we received tended to show that General Gordon's advice was founded mainly on the conviction that in order to secure quiet in Egypt and the pacification of the Soudan it was necessary that the Mahdi and the rebellion of which the Mahdi was the head should be completely subdued and crushed; and that Zebehr Pasha was, in his opinion, the only man possessed of sufficient authority and military talent to accomplish that object. It appeared to the Government that General Gordon had somewhat overrated the danger to be apprehended in Egypt from the Mahdi, and the insurrection of which he was the 1514 head. The Mahdi had not, in our opinion and so far as we had information, exhibited any pre-eminent military capacity, and although, of course, it could not be disputed that he had exercised considerable authority over the tribes in certain districts of the country, and had obtained several successes over the troops sent against, him, he had not shown any great capacity in utilizing the fruits of his victories. We also thought that, while General Gordon appeared somewhat to overrate the danger to Egypt from the insurrection of the Mahdi, he had somewhat underrated the dangers which would be involved in installing Zebehr at Khartoum, altogether irrespective of the slavery and slave-hunting antecedents of Zebehr. I am referring to the danger which we thought existed in, installing at Khartoum, in a position of authority, a man who, according to General Gordon's own account, was a man of great military character and boundless ambition, who had a grievance against the Egyptian Government, and who appeared, from I all the information we could obtain, to be the one man under whom it was not improbable a great and aggressive slave-holding trade might be formed on the borders of Egypt. We thought also, from the tenour of General Gordon's communications, that he appeared to give undue weight to the assumed necessity for the immediate evacuation of Khartoum; and in informing him that we could not be parties to his recommendation as to the institution of Zebehr as his successor in Khartoum as Governor General, we asked him to remain there as long as he might think necessary, and as long as he should think it possible to carry out the original objects of his expedition, those objects being, as has been stated, to effect, peaceably if possible, the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops, and the reform of Egyptain affairs in the Soudan, and, in fulfilment of his original policy, to hand the country over to the representatives of those Rulers who existed at the time of the conquest of the country by Mehemet Ali. Since the sending of this despatch to General Gordon, through Sir Evelyn Baring, the communication with Khartoum, as the House is aware, has been greatly interrupted. As yet we do not know what General Gordon proposes under these circumstances to do, and we 1515 have no intimation as to how far his plan of proceeding is modified by the refusal of the Government to comply with the suggestion that Zebehr should be nominated as his successor.
§ LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILLWhat was the date of this communication?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI have not the Papers before me, and I cannot tell the actual date on which the final decision of the Government was sent to General Gordon. We are not aware as yet whether the communication of Sir Evelyn Baring, containing the final decision of the Government, has reached General Gordon; at all events, we have not got his views on the subject, nor a statement of his policy as affected by the refusal of the Government with regard to Zebehr. Reference has been made to the suggestion which emanated from General Gordon that a small British force should be despatched to Berber, and a British, or Indian, or Egyptian force to Wady Haifa, on the Nile, for the purpose of effecting a diversion against the Mahdi. As far as we can ascertain, these suggestions have been made by General Gordon in connection with his proposal that Zebehr Pasha should be sent to Khartoum as his successor in the Government, and also in relation to the policy, which he appeared to consider at that time necessary, of subduing and crushing the revolt of the Mahdi. If he said that Zebehr should be sent at once on his suggestion, in our opinion that would not then have been in itself sufficient. It was the delay which, in General Gordon's opinion, caused the necessity for a military diversion. But General Gordon has never suggested, to my knowledge, the employment of troops for the relief of Khartoum. He left this country with a most distinct and clear understanding, repeated over and over again by himself, that the mission which he was going to undertake was one which he was prepared to undertake with such resources as he might find on the spot; and he distinctly understood that it was not a part of the policy of the Government in despatching that expedition to risk having to send a fresh expedition for the relief of Khartoum or any similar garrisons. I have said that General Gordon has never, to my knowledge, suggested the employment of British 1516 troops for the relief of Khartoum. We have no knowledge that he considers the employment of troops there necessary. We have no knowledge that he even desires that troops should be sent. Nevertheless, the possibility of taking advantage of General Graham's Force and sending it to Berber, and thus effecting a diversion that might be of advantage to General Gordon, has been carefully considered by the Government. After the victories of General Graham, it is probable that a small force, a force of Cavalry at all events, might be sent from Suakin to Berber without any great risk from a military point of view. But the information which we have received is that, although the military risk of such an operation might not be very great, the physical difficulty—the difficulty caused by want of water, the difficulty caused by the intense heat, the risk of the health of the troops, and other physical difficulties of that kind to be encountered—would be enormous. On the other hand, the advantage of sending a small force to Berber, even supposing that it should arrive there, appears to be extremely doubtful at this season, when the river communication between Berber and Khartoum is very difficult, if not impossible, and when there are surrounding Berber, and between that place and Khartoum, tribes in numbers which are entirely unknown to us, apparently in a more or less disturbed state. As to the position of General Gordon at Khartoum, I have already given the latest information which we have received from him. That information was to the effect that the tribes under his command at Khartoum had gained one success of some importance against the rebels threatening him, but that on a later occasion those tribes had suffered a considerable reverse, which appeared to be duo to some extent to the conduct of certain officers in command of the force. General Gordon's latest report is that he thinks that Khartoum is now safe, and he states, though I do not know exactly what meaning is to be attached to the expression, that "as the Nile rises he will be able to account for the rebels." That is the news of the 23rd of March. He also reports that provisions are coming in freely from the White Nile. In fact, the tenour of the latest reports from him is satisfactory. Further, although, 1517 as I have said, the country between Berber and Khartoum is more or less disturbed, communications, although they are slow, are not altogether interrupted, and it is possible to send and receive messages from General Gordon at Khartoum or Berber. Under these circumstances, because the Government, after fully considering all the bearings of the case, have declined to send to Berber at the present season a small force at very great risk, and with no evident advantage either to General Gordon or to anyone else—because we have refused to do this at a time of year when it would be utterly impossible, in any circumstances, to send a large or adequate force, we are charged in some quarters with abandoning General Gordon. The Government have accepted—my right hon. Friend, both to-day and on previous occasions, accepted—the responsibility for General Gordon's actions so far as they have sanctioned them, and they feel also that they are greatly responsible for General Gordon's safety. But, at the present time, with the imperfect knowledge which we possess of General Gordon's policy in view of the decision not to send Zebehr Pasha as his successor to Khartoum, in. ignorance as we are of his own wishes and desires, it is impossible for the Government to state what measures may ultimately have to be taken for discharging that responsibility which they feel for the safety of General Gordon. The Question which the right hon. Gentleman has placed upon the Paper assumes that the Government undertook to establish a system of government in the Eastern Soudan, and to regulate its relations with the Western Soudan on the one side and with Egypt on the other. Sir, the Government have never undertaken any such obligation. They adhere to their opinion, which has been stated over and over again in this House, that the re-establishment of Egyptian authority over the Soudan is neither possible nor desirable; but they have never undertaken to establish the authority of this country over the Soudan. General Gordon himself believed, when he undertook his mission, that with time and patience it would be possible for him, without any material assistance, either from the Egyptian Government or the British Government, to effect an arrangement for the withdrawal of the garrisons, and that it would be 1518 possible for him to establish some form of Native Government. He may fail or he may succeed in his undertaking; but certainly, in our judgment, the time has not yet come when it can be said that General Gordon has definitely failed in, his mission; and certainly nothing, in our judgment, has occurred to induce the Government to think that it is necessary, either in the interests of Egypt or of this country, to engage in military operations for the establishment of any Government whatsoever in the Soudan. My right hon. Friend has already said, in reply to the hon. Member for Andover (Mr. F. Buxton), and to other hon. Members, that General Gordon has the fullest possible discretion, either to remain at Khartoum should he think that a more permanent government by himself would result in greater success, or to withdraw should he consider his mission to be incapable of success. But, as I have said, we are at present without any recent information as to General Gordon's own views, and as to the policy which he thinks ought to be followed after the refusal of the Government to support him in the measure which he thought would be the best measure for the ultimate settlement of the Soudan and for the protection of the Frontier of Egypt. With regard to General Gordon and his position in Khartoum, I have said all that I think is necessary; but I may be allowed to refer to one or two points, to which allusion has been made on one or two previous occasions, with reference to the retirement or to the return to Egypt of General Graham's Forces without securing the road from Suakin to Berber. I have never said, and my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has never said, as was suggested the other day, that General Graham's operations were in any degree directed to the securing of that road by an advance of British troops, or holding possession of the road by British forces. What we said was that when Osman Digna's force was dispersed an attempt would be made to open up communication between Suakin and Berber by means of negotiations with the tribes. Attempts in that direction are being made. As long as Osman Digna's forces were unbroken there was no possibility of that road being opened for peaceful purposes, or trade purposes, or for the 1519 passage of troops. But now that the destruction of the power of Osman Digna has been completed, the position is altogether changed. Major Chermside, who was sent specially to assist General Graham with this object, has been directed to enter into negotiations with the friendly tribes, and by arrangements which are perfectly understood in that country, and which are perfectly easy of accomplishment, to secure, as far as possible, their services for opening, protecting, and maintaining the security of the road for peaceful purposes. As a further step in the same direction, Major Kitchener, an officer in Sir Evelyn Wood's force, was sent some time ago, at the suggestion of General Gordon, to inquire into the state of the country and the condition of the troops at a point lower down the Nile than that at which Major Chermside was engaged. Major Kitchener's Report has been received, and it is to the effect that emissaries from the Mahdi have been at work among a powerful tribe which inhabits that part of the Nile Valley; but, as far as he was able to ascertain, they have not had any success, and the Chiefs of that tribe are perfectly ready to be employed for the purpose of assisting in operations such as I have described, with the eventual object of opening and securing the Berber road. We are in communication with Sir Evelyn Baring in order to ascertain whether the services of these tribes can or cannot be utilized; but it is an example of the inconvenience of making a full statement on a subject of the kind at the present time, that only since I have been in the House this evening I have received a telegram from Sir Evelyn Baring pointing out the extreme caution with which any negotiation of the kind with one tribe, and the risk of alienating other equally powerful tribes, should be conducted, and the danger of making too abrupt an announcement of the negotiations which are going forward. A Question has been asked by the noble Lord the Member for Essex (Lord Eustace Cecil) with regard to the future garrisoning of Suakin. Some time ago Sir Evelyn Baring reported that arrangements would shortly have to be made for such garrisoning; and he recommended that an Egyptian force from General Wood's troops should be sent to Suakin after the departure 1520 of the British Forces. He said at the time, in his opinion, the period had come when the idea ought to be abandoned that the Egyptian Government should have two forces—one for service in Egypt and the other for service in the Soudan; his view being that in the future the only positions which would require to be held in the Soudan would be the Red Sea ports, and he thought that General Wood's force might be properly and usefully employed in garrisoning the necessary positions.
§ LORD EUSTACE CECILWhat is the date of the Report to which the noble Lord refers?
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONIt is impossible for me to state the date precisely; but our reply was that if Sir Evelyn Wood saw no objection to his troops being so employed, and the troops themselves were willing to engage in the service, the Government saw no reason to disapprove the suggestion. Preparations are, therefore, now being made to send a portion of Sir Evelyn Wood's Army to garrison Suakin on the departure of the British troops. Some questions have arisen as to the civil and military command at Suakin after the change of the garrison takes place; there are also questions as to some other matters which are still under consideration, and with regard to which final orders have not as yet been given. Until the arrangement to which I refer has been completed, a small British force will remain at Suakin; and the Admiralty have also made arrangements that for a time—perhaps for some considerable time—a force of Marines shall be detained at Suakin, partly on shore and partly in what I may describe as barracks afloat. They will be detained there for the purpose of giving support, if necessary, to the troops who will constitute the main force in garrison at Suakin. Finally, the right hon. Gentleman has asked further for a statement from the Government in regard to the relations which they hold—political, financial, and military—with Egypt. In the presence of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, I need hardly say that it is not my intention to undertake a reply to that part of the Question. If the right hon. Gentleman will be good enough to specify in somewhat more of detail, and in a more precise form than 1521 he has done, the nature of the information which he wishes to obtain, I have no doubt that my right hon. Friend will, as far as lie can, reply to the Question. I will say, however, that in my view it is neither possible nor desirable to make any further statement of a general character such as is asked by the right hon. Gentleman. No such statement ought, in my view, to be made until, in the first place, the Government and the House have more definite knowledge of the course of events in the Soudan, and the result which those events will have upon the government and the administration of Egypt. Furthermore, I think that such a statement ought not to be made until additional progress has been made in the examination which is now being conducted by the Government as to the financial position of Egypt, and of the changes which may become necessary in view of that position. It has been already my duty, in the course of this statement, to repeat the disclaimer which has been made by the Government on former occasions of responsibility for establishing a Government in the Soudan. We have never made any such disclaimer with regard to Egypt, and we make no such disclaimer now. we have acknowledged our responsibility in this respect both to Europe and to the people of Egypt itself; but it would not, in our view, render the fulfilment of those pledges more easy—on the contrary, it would render that fulfilment more difficult—if we were to make declarations of policy from day to day whenever we were asked to do so. The affairs of Egypt are constantly changing and are constantly liable to change, and contingencies are almost always arising, the full effects and bearing of which it is impossible, in our opinion, at the present moment to foresee.
§ BARON HENRY DE WORMSasked the First Lord of the Treasury, with reference to the following statement, made in a Letter signed by his secretary, and addressed on his behalf to the Workmen's Peace Association, in reply to a Resolution condemning "the wholesale slaughter of thousands of brave men in the Soudan," "the covenants under which this Country has been acting in Egypt were not made by the present Government," Whether he will state what are the covenants under which Her Majesty's Government have sanc- 1522 tioned the Military expedition to the Eastern Soudan; and, whether Her Majesty's Government are precluded by such covenants from relieving General Gordon at Khartoum?
MR. GLADSTONEThe covenant to which the Question of the hon. Member refers was one made by the late Government earnestly to support the Government of the Khedive. There are no other covenants. If the hon. Member does not think that covers our operations in the Soudan, the hon. Member is at liberty to retain his own opinion.
§ LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILLasked in what diplomatic document that covenant was contained?
MR. GLADSTONEI have stated over and over again in the hearing of Members of Her Majesty's late Government what I have now said in answer to the hon. Member, and I can go no further.
§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFFasked whether the covenant to which the right hon. Gentleman alluded was not undertaken by Her Majesty's Government in conjunction with the French Government, and how far Her Majesty's Government thought it necessary to adhere to that covenant after the French Government had withdrawn from it?
MR. GLADSTONEI apprehend, Sir, that the title of the French Government, of the French Chambers, and of the French people to interpret for themselves their own obligations is absolute and indefeasible, and it would be an impertinence and a piece of presumption on our part if we gave an opinion as to the course which they have taken. Whatever they may have done has not absolved us from our duty to interpret our engagements according to the best of our lights, which is what we have endeavoured to do.
§ BARON HENRY DE WORMSasked the right hon. Gentleman how he connected this matter of the covenant with that part of his Question which referred to the "wholesale slaughter of thousands of brave men in the Soudan," and whether he would state to the House what the covenant really was?
MR. GLADSTONEI have already stated in distinct and express terms what the covenant was. The hon. Gentleman must see, and the whole House must see, that the Question which is now put is a matter of argument, and 1523 if he is of opinion that the covenant does not cover our proceedings in the Soudan, it is open to him to call the attention of the House to the matter.
§ BARON HENRY DE WORMSWhat covenant?
MR. GLADSTONEThe covenant earnestly to support the Government of the Khedive. If, as I have said, the hon. Member does not think that covenant covers our proceedings in the Soudan, he is perfectly at liberty to call the attention of the House to it.
§ BARON HENRY DE WORMSI wish, Sir, to ask the Prime Minister whether Her Majesty's Government have not themselves carried out the covenant to support the Government of the Khedive; and, if so, how it is that they throw the responsibility for the massacres in the Soudan upon some other Government? [Cries of "Notice !"]
§ [No reply.]