SUPPLY-NAVY (SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE), 1882–3.

HC Deb 05 March 1883 vol 276 cc1438-509

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

(1.)Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £350,000, be granted to Her Majesty, in addition to the Bums already granted by Parliament, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883, for additional Expenditure arising out of Military Operations in Egypt.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

wished to say a word or two in regard to this Vote. He saw that there was a large contribution from the Egyptian Government towards the maintenance of the Army of Occupation. He intended to have mentioned the subject the other night; but when they reached the Army Vote the hour was so late—between 1 and 2 o'clock in the morning—and he knew that nothing would be reported in regard to any discussion which might take place—that he did not feel himself justified in making any remarks upon the contribution of Egypt towards the Army of Occupation. But it did seem to him, in regard to the large contribution Egypt was called upon to pay for the Army of Occupation, that some explanation ought to be given by Her Majesty's Government. For instance, the Committee ought to know whether this was the whole expenditure, or whether there was any other expenditure besides that which was asked to be voted in the Estimates. Having said so much, he would like to call the attention of the Committee to the fact that the statement of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, the other day, with regard to the occupation of Egypt, was that it would only last for six months. That statement had produced, as far as could be judged from the papers, a most disastrous effect in Egypt. It was stated that money would not nowbelent—in fact, that money was going out of the country; that applications for money to be taken to Egypt were now withheld; and that a feeling of insecurity was daily increasing in that country. he should like, then, to ask the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, whom he was glad to see in his place again, and with hopes that he had quite recovered from the illness which took him abroad, if the Government had come to any definite determination with regard to the occupation of Egypt? That was a very serious question, and the answer to which was anxiously looked forward to by all classes in this country, as well as by all classes in Egypt. Everyone was anxious to know what the determination of the Government was, and what their aims were. He believed that this was a legitimate opportunity for asking these questions, and he was quite sure that this country would not be satisfied unless they know that the results of the expenditure, both of life and money, caused by the rebellion in Egypt were of a practical and substantial character. The country would desire to be assured that among the practical results which would accrue from the sacrifice of life and treasure, Egypt herself would be placed in such a position that no future intrigues would be likely to occur in that country. At any rate, we ought to have control over the Canal, and no interference with the Suez Canal should be allowed to take place. Unless the occupation of Egypt was such as would render these things certain, all that they had done would be thrown away. He had no wish to raise an Egyptian debate; but he wished to know if any determination had been arrived at by the Government in regard to the occupation of Egypt?

MR. GOURLEY

said, he wished to make one or two observations upon this Vote. In the first place, he desired to call attention to an item of £50,000 for "a special gratuity to Seamen and Marines." He wanted to know from the Secretary to the Admiralty how the money was to be distributed—whether it was to be paid to seamen on board of Her Majesty's ships as an award, in larger proportion than they had been in the habit of receiving? Then, again, under the head of "New Works, Buildings, &c." there was the very large item of £76,000 for "purchase of house and land at Port Said." He should like to know what that £76,000 was for, and whether it had any connection with the formation of a new depôt? Was it intended by Her Majesty's Government that they should, for diplomatic purposes, remain permanently at Port Said, or was it intended to create a military depot? If so, he was at a loss to understand the statements which had been made in regard to the Suez Canal as an international highway. He quite agreed with what had fallen from the hon. and gallant Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), that before they were called upon to vote so large a sum of money as £76,000, they ought to have from Her Majesty's Government some explanation as to what their policy really was in regard to Egypt—whether they intended to give up all control over the affairs of that country for all time, or whether they proposed to retain possession of the Suez Canal as a protection to the road to India? If it was intended to give up all control, which was certainly indicated in the despatch of Lord Granville, then he was at a loss to see for what purpose they had been at war with Egypt at all. There was another question upon which he also desired information. There was the large sum of £15,000 in the Estimates for "piloting and towing Her Majesty's ships." That was a very large additional sum for Her Majesty's Government to ask the Com- mittee to grant for such a purpose. He had always held the opinion that many officers of the Navy, instead of being kept in a state of enforced idleness on half-pay on shore, should from time to time proceed to sea in order to acquire a knowledge of duties of this nature; and above all things he considered it necessary that they should be educated in the duties of piloting our ships of war, and there would then be no necessity to go outside the Navy at all, or for so large an expenditure as this. Under Vote 17 there was another item of £1,600 for pilotage in connection with the conveyance of troops, making the total charge for pilotage and towage £16,600. That was a sum asked for, for the services of men altogether outside the Navy. It was quite true that a portion of the money was to be returned by the Army Department; but he did not think there ought to be such a thing as charges for pilotage except in waters where it was compulsory. There was still another item to which he wished to direct attention—namely, £4,000 for Medals for Seamen and Marines. He thought that, considering the very efficient services rendered to the country during the recent war by the officers and men of the Mercantile Marine in carrying out our troops to Egypt at a moment's notice, and with such signal success, the services rendered ought in some way to be recognized by the Government. Something like 250,000 tons of shipping had been employed in conveying the troops to Egypt, and the duty had been accomplished without the loss of a single man. He therefore thought that the services of the Mercantile Marine ought in some way or other to be noticed and recognized. It was proposed to give to the men in the Navy and in the Army a distinguishing medal, and he thought it would be a wise policy on the part of Her Majesty's Government to make a similar recognition of the services of the officers and men of the Mercantile Marine. Seamen being cosmopolitan, recognition of their services would tend to increase their loyalty.

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, he did not agree with his hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) that more money ought to be expended in medals. In fact, in his opinion, a good deal too much had already been spent in that way. If a man could not be attached to his country and Queen without occasionally being given a medal, it was of no use seeking to attach him. There were two points upon which he desired information. The first was the item of "Wages to Seamen and Marines—special gratuity." When the Vote for the military employed in the Egyptian Expedition was before the Committee on Friday last, he asked what portion of the £90,000 that was to be granted for military services was to be given to the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley. He had done that with a specific object, because the Committee had been told that an additional grant was to be voted for Lord Wolseley and Lord Alcester. He supposed he must take it from the Prime Minister that full Notice would be given of the day on which that grant would be brought forward. What he wanted to know now was, what portion of this £50,000—[An hon. MEMBER: £90,000.]—the sum included in the present Vote was £50,000; and he wanted to know what proportion of that amount was to go to Lord Alcester? There had been a statement in the newspapers in regard to the way in which this money was to be apportioned to the Army and Navy; but he did not think there had been any statement laid upon the Table of the House. He would suggest that before the Vote was taken for a special grant of money to be given to Lord Wolseley and Lord Alcester, they should have some statement in an official form laid upon the Table, to show how the money had been expended. There was one other point to which he desired to call attention. He observed a charge of £76,000 for the purchase of a house and land at Port Said. Now, he believed that this particular house and land had been offered to the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, some little time before, for £30,000. He quite admitted that the Government might be required to give more than a private individual; but the difference between £30,000 and £76,000 was so enormous that he should like to have some explanation of the matter.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

said, he desired to ask, before the Secretary to the Admiralty answered the questions which had just been put to him, if he would inform the Committee whether what was generally stated was accurate or not—namely, that this pur- chase was made by the Admiralty officials without any previous application to the Treasury, and without the sanction of the Treasury?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, his hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) had asked some questions as to the contributions from the Egyptian Government towards the cost of the Army of Occupation, and upon those questions he had founded an inquiry as to the policy of the Government in the future with respect to Egypt. Although he quite admitted that his hon. and gallant Friend was entitled to ask any questions of this sort upon the Vote, still he had to point out that the particular item in the Vote now before the Committee referred only to the present financial year, and had nothing to do with the maintenance or withdrawal of the English Forces at the period stated by his noble Friend the Secretary of State for War. It merely covered the extra charge involved upon us by the maintenance of the Force which was now occupying Egypt up to the end of the year; and, of course, it included the Transport Charges, the charges connected with the bringing home of invalids and time-expired men, and the sending out of drafts. He believed the contribution, as far as the Navy was concerned, would cover the entire cost entailed upon this country. His hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) put a question to him in regard to the gratuity to seamen and marines. It was not in the nature of prize money, and was, therefore, not distributed under the Prize Acts; but for convenience they had followed the prize scale, in order that they might have something to guide them in the distribution. The unit with which they started was, in the Navy, the ordinary seaman, and in the Army the private. In each of these cases the amount would be £2 per man, and the prize scale would be increased to warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and commissioned officers, according to their rank, up to the Commander-in-Chief. He believed that the Military Commander-in-Chief would receive £1,000, and Lord Alcester £927 9s. With regard to the Dutch house at Port Said, it was a large house erected on ground acquired from the Suez Canal Company, and when operations on the Canal were under- taken, it was found absolutely necessary to secure some sort of basis of operations on shore. The house in question had been used as a hospital and headquarters, and the difficulty of the operations would have been immensely increased if no such place had been obtained. Therefore the Government had thought it right to purchase this house. [Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: Whose property was it?] He believed that it was purchased from the Dutch Government, or from the representatives of the late Prince Henry of the Netherlands. Exception had been taken to the price which had been paid for it. He was quite ready to admit that the price was high, in this sense—that it was quite conceivable a person who had had the opportunity of watching the market, in order to secure this property as an investment, might have bought it for a smaller sum than £76,000. He believed that Prince Henry of the Netherlands paid £35,000 for the land, and the building cost £103,000, so that it was by no means a disadvantageous bargain to get it for £76,000, especially when it was borne in mind that it was absolutely and essentially required for the purposes of the Expedition. It was not necessary for him to support the purchase on the ground of its being commercially an excellent investment. That was another question altogether. The purchase was made at a time when warlike operations were on the point of commencing, and it was unnecessary to say that at such a time they could not hope to make such a deliberate and careful bargain as they might have do no on another occasion. There was no reason whatever for thinking that too much money had been paid for this property, when it was considered of what great value it had already proved in connection with our military operations. He had discussed the matter only within the last few days with Sir Anthony Hoskins, who was the Admiral in command at Port Said, and that gallant officer assured him that it would have been simply impossible to have carried on the operations without having possession of this house. His hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Gourley) asked questions about certain items of the Vote for pilotage and towage in the Suez Canal. Now, a great deal was done by the officers of the Navy; but there were certain charges—dues and fees for towage and pilotage—which were necessarily included. They were really expenses incurred during the war. The only other point he had to answer was, the question which had been put to him in reference to medals. His hon. Friend wished the Government to consider whether a medal could not be given to the officers and men engaged in the Transport Service. He believed that such a thing had never been done hitherto. At any rate, he did not know of any case in which a modal had been granted for services of that kind. He could, however, assure his hon. Friend that the matter should be fully considered. He quite agreed with all that his hon. Friend said of the great service which had been rendered to the country by the officers and men engaged in the Transport Service, and the admirable manner in which they had discharged their duty.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

said, the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty had not answered the particular question which he had put to him, and which he felt was a very important one—namely, whether, when the purchase of the house at Port Said was made, there was no previous consent on the part of the Treasury? To that question he had received no answer. He had now several other questions to put to the hon. Gentleman. He thought most hon. Members would agree that the statement of the hon. Gentleman with respect to the house at Port Said was extremely unsatisfactory. A large sum of money had been expended in the purchase—no less a sum than £76,000; and the hon. Gentleman must have known that such an item would have itself attracted the attention of the Committee. Nevertheless, the hon. Gentleman, knowing that fact, came down to the House, and, instead of being prepared to give every information as to the purchase, he did not even know of whom the purchase had been made. He (Lord Randolph Churchill) did not think that there was any precedent for such a want of information with respect to the expenditure of so large a sum of money. [Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: There is a precedent.] The hon. Gentleman said there was a precedent. He was obliged to the hon. Gentleman for the information. At the same time, that was no answer to his complaint, which was that a full explanation had not been given to the Committee in this particular case. Another thing he should like to know was, who bought this house? Who was the particular person? Who was the purchaser first of all? Who was it, and what authority had he for making the purchase? Was any man of business employed in England or in Egypt? The Secretary to the Admiralty said that the Admiralty were not in a position to watch the market. Now, it was a notorious thing, if his (Lord Randolph Churchill's) information was correct, that the matter had been hanging about for some years. In point of fact, this house had been hawked about to Hotel Companies, and it was offered to the Anglo-Egyptian Bank for less than one-half the sum the Government afterwards paid for it. He thought, he was entitled to ask for this information before the Committee voted the money. There was one more question he desired to ask—namely, what were they going to do with the house now? Did the Admiralty authorities contemplate selling it? Was it occupied at present, and, if so, by whom? All these were matters on which the Committee should insist upon having information before they consented to vote the money; and in order to get this information in a more explicit form from the Government, he begged to move the reduction of the Vote by the sum of £76,000.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £274,000, be granted to Her Majesty, in addition to the sums already granted by Parliament, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending the 31st day of March 1883, for additional Expenditure arising out of Military Operations in Egypt."—(Lord Randolph Churchill.)

MR. SCLATER-BOOTH

remarked, that objection had been so frequently taken in former years to investments by Her Majesty's Government in land and house property for Embassies in foreign countries that he was not surprised by the course which had been taken by the noble Lord and others with regard to the large sum of £76,000 which had been given for the purchase of this house at Port Said. He was not going to quarrel with the Admiralty in regard to the exact price they had given for the purchase, although he believed that the property might have been acquired, on a previous occasion, for a much smaller sum. He did not know who effected the purchase on the part of the Government—whether it was the Naval authorities on the spot, or the Board of Admiralty at Whitehall, or the Treasury. Whether it was an excessive purchase, no doubt, would be determined partly on the use already made of it, and partly on the use to be made of it hero-after. He had had an opportunity of visiting Port Said not many weeks ago, and he found this house occupied, with great advantage, by the Marines. It was used at the time as a Marine barrack, and he was glad to hear that it had been very effective for the purpose of a barrack, and that the health of the Marines had been remarkably good since they had been there. But he had heard since his return to England that the Marines had been withdrawn. Therefore, at this moment, as far as he was aware, the house was of no use to the Government. He should, as he had already stated, make no complaint in regard to the price paid. He was told that it was part of the policy of the Government to retain this commanding position for such uses as might hereafter crop up during our occupation of Egypt. He had no objection to the purchase if that were to be the case; but he hoped he should not be told that this property, which had been purchased so expensively, was now to be sold, and that the responsibility of the Government in respect to it was at an end. He was sorry to hear the statement of the Secretary to the Admiralty, in reply to his hon. and gallant Friend behind him (Sir Walter B. Barttelot), as to the observations made by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, upon a recent occasion, in reference to the term during which the troops might be retained. He confessed that he (Mr. Sclater-Booth) was one of those who, when he heard the noble Marquess's observation, imagined it was a mere slip of the tongue, and that he had not really intended to pledge the Government to any time whatever for the withdrawal of the troops. He hoped that some notice would be taken of the question of his hon. and gallant Friend. Perhaps this discussion was not the best mode of raising so important a question; but he hoped, if any answer was made, to find that no definite term had yet been fixed, and that as long as British interests required our troops to be kept in Egypt they would be retained. It appeared to him impossible, at the present moment, for any man to say at what time the withdrawal of the troops ought to take place.

MR. GLADSTONE

I quite admit that it is the natural and primary duty of the Committee to scrutinize closely any investment on the part of the Government in any case, and especially when so large an outlay as £76,000 is involved. But then, viewing as I do, and as I think the Committee will do, our duty of scrutinizing such purchases with jealousy, it must be borne in mind that this house was acquired under circumstances of real necessity; and I think it would be premature if the Government were to go the length which the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down invites them to go, and to declare that it is our intention to retain the building as permanent Government property. On the other hand, it would be a great mistake to suppose that any definite conclusion has been arrived at. Any proposal on the subject will have to be considered on its merits. The time the property was purchased was, undoubtedly, a time of urgency. There is certainly no question of urgency now, and we shall be able to make a deliberate inquiry as to the best step to be taken. With respect to the question put to me by the noble Lord opposite (Lord Randolph Churchill) I think I shall state the case correctly if I say, in general terms, that there was no prior application to, or intervention, on the part of the Treasury in regard to the purchase of this property; but there was an early explanation to the Treasury of the circumstances under which it took place. The explanations supplied by the Admiralty were of such a character as to satisfy the Treasury, on examination, that there was no good reason for passing an unfavourable judgment on the transaction. The noble Lord may say, and on general grounds primâfacie he is right, if he says that an ex post facto application to the Treasury is not the kind of application contemplated in the regular business of the Government. But this was a peculiar case, and I am bound to say that the Naval authorities, provided they used—and I believe they did use—their best discretion in the matter and act for the best, were perfectly right in proceeding without a prior ap- plication to the Treasury. This was a measure, on the first blush of the case, of military necessity. What would have happened if an application to the Treasury had been made? If such an application had been made it would have been the business of the Treasury to require, in a regular and formal document, all the considerations in favour of the purchase to be stated. What would have been the effect of drawing up a document of that kind, to be submitted to the Treasury and considered by the Treasury? Considerable delay must have occurred in the carrying out of measures that were necessary for the purposes of the Expedition, and it would have been in the highest degree pedantry on the part of the Treasury to have looked for any communication of that kind. It was, therefore, in my opinion, quite within the discretion of the Treasury for the Naval authorities to act without having reference to the Treasury.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

Who did actually buy the property?

MR. GLADSTONE

The Naval authorities on the spot arranged the transaction, and, as we believe, they exercised their best judgment, and acted upon the best information in their power. I do not admit at all that there is in the facts of the case any reason to suppose that there was any error committed. As my hon. Friend near me (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) has stated, although this is a very large sum, and although at a certain time the property might have been in the market at a lesser price, and that in the end we were forced to purchase it at double the price at which it might have been originally obtained, that is not the ground on which we can pretend to look at the matter. It must be looked at altogether as a question of military necessity, and questions of property become of secondary importance when a real necessity is involved in the matter. That is the way in which we ought to look at the question. I do not wish to appear disrespectful in passing by, without notice, the appeal made by the hon. and gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) on the subject of our general policy. But I think I make a reasonable reply to it when I say that, in regard to a general appeal of that kind, the circumstances of the case preclude our giving anything but a general answer. Anything in the shape of a specific answer would be liable to be misunderstood. My noble Friend the Secretary of State for War referred to a certain period within which he thought it possible we might withdraw from Egypt, and that statement has been understood by hon. Members opposite to mean that we were to withdraw from Egypt within that particular period. But what my noble Friend stated was simply his hope. That hope was derived from the impression which he had received from such a review of the circumstances of the case as in the present development of those circumstances was practicable. What my noble Friend felt, and what all the Government feel, is that, in the first place, we have an important purpose to accomplish in Egypt; and that, in the second place, when that purpose is accomplished we shall be sincerely desirous to withdraw. But, in regard to the definition of the time, it is impossible to go beyond the expression of a hope, because it is evident that the purpose we have in view must regulate the time to be employed, and a fixed and arbitrary time must not be permitted to interfere with the attainment of that purpose. Now we may say this—that the definition of the objects for which we are in Egypt has been explicitly explained upon more than one occasion in this House. We are there for the establishment of order and stability; we are there for the improvement of the institutions of the country; we are there to secure, as far as depends upon ourselves, the equal fulfilment of international engagements; and we are there undoubtedly in a principal degree in reference to the freedom and security of the great passage by the Canal from one sea to another. If these are matters which are entirely and absolutely matters in our own hands, it might be right, and part of the duty of the Government, that we should from time to time state exactly the point we have reached in the adjustment of them. It must, however, be borne in mind, that we are not in Egypt as masters, but as friends and advisers, in the first instance, of the Egyptian Government, and that, with respect to many of the purposes, for which we are there, other nations have interests, and not only interests, but rights just as definite and as undeniable as our own. Nor are the Government aware of any separate or selfish interests on the part of this country as severed from the general interests of the world, and of all civilized nations which we ought to prosecute in a selfish and a narrow spirit. I may farther venture to say that, in the opinion of the Government, through the ability and indefatigable action of our Civil Agents and Representatives, which has been worthy, I may say, to be classed—and certainly I could bestow no higher eulogy upon them—with the admirable services rendered by our Naval and Military Commanders—we believe that through their ability and indefatigable action reasonable progress has been made, and that, viewing the nature of the case, everything has been done thus far which could possibly have been expected. But the Committee is very well aware of the importance and delicacy of the relations in which we stand in regard to those many parties who are interested in Egyptian affairs; and they will, I think, believe with us that the Government would not be contributing to the acceleration of our rate of progress were we to undertake to give explanations to the House of Commons of a premature character with reference to these proceedings. I hope the Committee will think that this is all that can fairly be expected from us; that that disclaimer, on the one hand, of separate objects, and the expression, on the other, of determination with the support of Parliament, which has already been granted to us to accomplish, as far as depends upon us the purposes, important for Egypt and the world, which we consider the proper object of all civilized communities, will be regarded as sufficient.

SIR JOHN HAY

remarked, that, in regard to the purchase of the house at Port Said, he was glad to hear what had been said in defence of the gallant Admiral by whom the purchase had been effected; and after the statements which had been made he hoped his noble Friend the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) would now withdraw the opposition which, perhaps, on not unnatural grounds, he had offered to the Vote. No doubt, the Suez Canal, as a basis of operations, had been of vital importance to the success of the Expedition. The operations themselves were of a most delicate character; and, as far as he was acquainted with the particulars of the operations, the gal- lant Admiral whose duty it was to superintend them had done so in a manner to prevent irritation either on the part of the great Company who made the Suez Canal, or the foreign countries who were interested in it. It was quite certain, he believed, that there had been an intention on the part of M. de Lessops to occupy this particular house in order to prevent its being made a basis of operations, and the gallant Admiral in charge of Port Said telegraphed to the Admiralty for authority to purchase it without delay. The Board of Admiralty at once gave their consent to the purchase of the house, and then the matter was referred to the Treasury. As a basis of operations it had proved of the utmost service. He believed that the gallant Admiral might have seized the house, have placed his Marines in it, and paid nothing for it; but, although France and other nations were accustomed to acts of violence of that character at the commencement of a war, it was not considered advisable to copy their example by this country. It must be borne in mind that the Naval officers engaged in the Suez Canal had very delicate operations to carry out; and he was sure that at this moment, when they remembered the successful issue of those operations, they would not feel inclined to reflect upon Admiral Hoskins for the arbitrary measures he was obliged to resort to. He (Sir John Hay) knew it was right that the Treasury ought to have been communicated with; but it would have taken a long time to get the Treasury to agree to the purchase of this house, and in the meantime it might have been taken possession of by other people, so that, in the end, they would have been compelled to resort to violent measures in order to make use of it for their own purposes. Those violent measures had, happily, been avoided; and if the purchase had cost the country £76,000, instead of £35,000, there was very little doubt that they had been saved the extra £40,000 by the judicious steps taken by Admiral Hoskins, and the manner in which that gallant officer had been seconded by the Board of Admiralty. The possession of this particular site had been of the utmost advantage so far as the health of the persons who occupied it was concerned. He trusted, after the explanations that had been given on the matter, his noble Friend would withdraw his opposition to the Vote.

MR. RYLANDS

said, he was not at all going to dispute for one moment the position which had been taken up by the Secretary to the Admiralty. In the first place, the Admiral in command believed that it was necessary, upon military grounds, to take possession of this house and site. He admitted also that the Treasury might very well not have been communicated with, in the event of an immediate decision being required. He thought the Committee were bound to accept those two points; but there was another point which must not be overlooked. They were not contesting these two particular points, nor had the noble Lord who moved the rejection of this Vote contested them. No one disputed the statement of his right hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Sir John Hay), as to the gallantry of the Admiral and the splendid success of our Forces. No doubt, they were matters on which they often congratulated the country and the Army and Navy; but what he wanted to point out was this—that whenever they engaged in warlike operations they found those who had administered the affairs of the country rushing into expenditure without the slightest check or control; and unless the House had these transactions constantly brought under their notice, in regard to the loose and reckless manner in which certain officers of the Crown, placed in responsible positions, handled the public money, nothing would be done to discourage practices by which the country might lose millions. Let the Committee carefully examine the question which had just been raised. Here they had the fact before them that a large mansion, built by a foreign Prince for a considerable sum of money, had been acquired by the Government; but if used for any other purpose it was not worth a mere fraction of the outlay that had been made upon it by this foreign Prince. He dared say there were hon. Members to be found who would advocate the application of large sums of money in the purchase of property, which, if ever it came into the market, would be looked upon as a sort of white elephant. There was every reason to believe that up to a recent period this building, being even unsuitable for an hotel or anything else, was hawked about for sale at a very low sum, and then, in an emergency, it was purchased at a figure very much in excess of that for which it had been offered. What he wanted to know was, how the transaction had been carried out? Who was the reputed owner of the property when the Government purchased it? Did the Admiralty carry on the transaction directly with the owner of the property, or did they, as he thought it was probable, employ a go-between? If they did employ a go-between, that fact might possibly, to some extent, account for the difference between the sum originally asked and the sum paid by the Government—a considerable portion of it having very likely found its way into the pocket of the go-between. He certainly thought that explanations ought to be given by the Government, because, upon the face of the matter, it was possible that, by better management, a good round sum of money might have been saved in the purchase. He thought the Committee ought to be told whether the Admiralty purchased the property from the actual owner, or in what way the negotiations were carried on.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, the property, as he had already stated, belonged to Prince Henry of the Netherlands, and it was purchased from the representatives of Prince Henry. As to the question whether the intervention of commercial agents would have led to a lower price being given, there was no time for any such proceedings, or, indeed, for any protracted negotiations. The essence of the whole thing was that if the Government were to have the property at all they must have it immediately; and, therefore, the immediate occupation of it was secured on the best terms the representatives of the Admiralty could make. Before the negotiations were carried out, a Report was made to the Board of Admiralty by the Director of Works, General Pasley, whose opinion was taken as to the value of the property. It was only upon his advice that the purchase was completed. He could only repeat that there was no time to go into elaborate negotiations through a commercial agent. He did not think that if such negotiations had been permitted they would have been effectual in carrying out the purposes of the Admiralty.

MR. RITCHIE

was bound to say that he agreed with the hon. Member who had just sat down that these things could hardly be regarded in a carping spirit, or from purely a mercantile point of view. Looking at the very serious position of affairs, and the value of the property, which, in common with other Members of the House, he had himself seen, he was bound to say he could not agree with the strictures which the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) had passed upon the bargain. It was quite possible that more money had been paid for the property than it was commercially worth; but, looking at all the circumstances of the case, its admirable position and the value of the property, he did not think the Committee should look upon the bargain with dissatisfaction. He also wished to say that he thought the country was indebted to his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for West Sussex (Sir Walter B. Barttelot) for having obtained from the Prime Minister the answer which he had given to the question of his hon. and gallant Friend. Of course, the Committee had no wish whatever to force from the Government any premature declaration as to what their policy was to be, or what the duration of their occupation of Egypt was likely to be. He was perfectly satisfied with the declaration of the right hon. Gentleman that Her Majesty's Government had no intention of withdrawing from Egypt until they obtained what they wanted to secure—namely, that peace and good government should be restored in Egypt, and be placed upon such a sound and permanent footing as would give a guarantee for their continuance for a long time to come. He could not but think that if they were to withdraw from Egypt before those objects had been secured, the money and the sacrifices they had made would be entirely thrown away, and all that they had done, at such a large expenditure of life and property, would simply have to be done over again, at a largely-increased cost, in a few years. He was satisfied that it was for the good of this country and of Europe, and of the people of Egypt, that our occupation should continue until good government was secured. So far from the Committee desiring to force any premature declaration from Her Majesty's Government, he would say, in reference to that point, that it was to guard against the evil effects of the premature declaration of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War that an explanation had been asked for. Undoubtedly the impression had gone abroad, and had done much mischief in Egypt, that the Government, on reviewing the situation, had come to the conclusion of withdrawing their troops from Egypt in the course of six months. Seeing the harm which that declaration had done, the noble Marquess ought to be thankful for the explanation given by the Prime Minister, which would certainly afford satisfaction both in this country and in Egypt. There was another matter upon which he wished to say a word, and that was in reference to the grant of £13,500 to the family of Professor Palmer and the expenditure incurred by Colonel Warren in searching for Professor Palmer and his companions. He did not propose to criticize this item in any adverse spirit. The Papers which had been distributed lately showed that every care had been taken to endeavour to discover the whereabouts of these unfortunate gentlemen, and that every effort was made from every quarter to secure some intelligence as to their fate. He was sure, however, that few people would rise from an inspection of these Papers without feeling that sufficient security was not taken before the Expedition was sent out that these gentlemen were properly protected. In the first place, it was quite apparent from the Correspondence which had been published that, even at the best of times, when the country to be traversed was in a state of profound peace, and when there were no large sums of money in the possession of the travellers, such an expedition as this would have been attended with considerable risk and danger. But when they came to consider that it was a time of war, and that these gentlemen were entrusted with a very large sum of money in gold, it did seem to him that it was the height of folly to allow the Expedition to go out without some efficient and proper protection. With reference to Professor Palmer, there could be no doubt that he felt confidence in his friendly relations with the Sheikhs of the district. His previous acquaintance with them inspired a certain amount of confidence in his mind; and, no doubt, the consequences that followed were due, in some degree, to that confidence.

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

rose to Order. He understood that an Amendment had been moved by the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) in reference to the purchase of the house at Port Said; and he wanted to know whether that was a proper opportunity for discussing the Expedition of Professor Palmer?

MR. RITCHIE

understood that the Question put from the Chair was that the whole of the Vote be granted to Her Majesty.

THE CHAIRMAN

The Question now before the Committee is that the Vote, reduced by the sum of £76,000, be granted to Her Majesty.

MR. RITCHIE

understood from the answer of the Chairman that he was perfectly in Order, or it would have been intimated to him that he was pursuing an irregular course. He would, therefore, proceed with the few remarks he wished to make. He was about to say, with reference to Professor Palmer, that he went out very much in the character of a volunteer, and that he was prepared to take the risk in consequence of the friendly relations he had with the Sheikhs. But that was not the case with Captain Gill and Lieutenant Charrington. They were ordered to proceed with the Expedition; and those who ordered them ought to have taken reasonable care to see that they were properly protected in the mission they had undertaken. So far from being properly protected, there was not the smallest attempt to protect them in going into the Desert in a hostile country with a large amount of specie in their possession. He understood that, so far from being on friendly terms with the Sheikhs of the country, the Sheikh under whose guidance they proceeded was not even connected with the tribes of the locality through which they had to pass. He was a man of no influence whatever among them; he had been taken from a different part of the country, and was the Sheikh of a small district with a very small amount of authority. Therefore, there was not even the precaution taken of seeing that these gentlemen proceeded on their expedition under the guidance and guarantee of a Sheikh of some influence and authority over the district through which the passage was to be made. Indeed, there was not the smallest precaution taken to secure the lives of the gentlemen who had been ordered out on the Expedition by Her Majesty's Government, notwithstanding that the Expedition itself was attended by great peril. He had no fault to find with what was done after the catastrophe which happened to the Expedition. No doubt, every effort had been made to rescue Professor Palmer and his companions, and, since their fate was discovered, to bring their murderers to justice; but he thought that great blame and responsibility attached to the Government in having allowed the Expedition to go out without the smallest attempt to provide for its protection.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he thought it would have been a better course to proceed to a decision upon the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill) before entering upon the question of the Expedition of Professor Palmer. At the same time, his hon. Friend the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ritchie) had made certain specific statements to the Committee which he thought ought to be replied to at once. The hon. Gentleman said that he quite understood the position of Professor Palmer; that Professor Palmer was well acquainted with the Desert and the Bedouins, and had formed a somewhat sanguine estimate of the prospects of the Expedition. But the hon. Member contrasted the position of Professor Palmer as a volunteer with the character in which Captain Gill and Lieutenant Charrington joined the party, and he said that they were ordered to join the Expedition. Now, he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) ventured to say that in all matters connected with the Expedition which had ended so unfortunately, it was desirable they should be correct in all their statements. First of all, he would take the case of Captain Gill. In answer to a Question put to him in November last, whether Captain Gill was ordered to join the Expedition, he had distinctly stated that Admiral Hoskins—and this, be it remembered, was Captain Gill's own account—gave him directions at Port Said to go to Ismailia and consult the telegraph engineer there as to the best mode of cutting the telegraph. His only business was to consult with the telegraph engineer; but when he got there he met Professor Palmer, and in consulting with that gentleman he came to this conclusion, which he afterwards wrote— I have decided to do the business myself, as it seems the best and surest way, and I have arrived at this conclusion after a long consultation with Professor Palmer. I am very glad that I have come down here, for I have more confidence than I had before seeing him that Palmer has not overrated his power; indeed, from our conversation this morning, I am convinced that he thoroughly understands the business on which he is engaged. It would thus appear that he had discussed with Professor Palmer the manner of doing the business, and that there were certain reasons which induced him to go with him. This plainly showed that Captain Gill was not ordered to go with the expedition. He would not say that Captain Gill was not right in going. It was a very gallant act on the part of that officer, and no doubt he was, of all men, best qualified to judge which was his best course; but he was not ordered, any more than Professor Palmer was ordered, to go upon the expedition. He now came to the case of Lieutenant Charrington. Professor Palmer was going to start upon this expedition, and he asked Admiral Sir William Hewett to allow a naval officer to go with him as a guarantee that he was acting on behalf of the British Government. Most of the young naval officers were anxious to be allowed to go; and Admiral Hewett permitted Lieutenant Charrington, who volunteered among the rest, to go on the expedition. He would ask his hon. Friend, who must know the relations which existed between an Admiral and his flag lieutenant—relations almost of a filial character—if it was at all likely that Sir William Hewett would have ordered Lieutenant Charrington to go on an expedition if he thought he would have been incurring undue risk. He had seen a letter from Sir William Hewett himself, in which he expressed himself a good deal hurt at the insinuation that he had neglected proper precautions. The expedition was accompanied by Professor Palmer and Captain Gill, two men who, it was generally allowed, were most qualified to form a judgment as to the risk that was run; and it was by their deliberate advice that the expedition went out. He thought, therefore, that his hon. Friend was a little too hard upon the Government at home, because, as his hon. Friend knew very well, they did not in any way interfere in the details; and his hon. Friend had spoken approvingly of the search after the lamentable catastrophe which befel the Expedition happened. He certainly thought that his hon. Friend went a little too far when he spoke of these gentlemen being ordered on a dangerous mission without proper precautions having been taken for their protection by the authorities.

MR. A. F. EGERTON

wished the Committee to go back to the purchase of the house at Port Said. It was stated that negotiations were carried on outright by Admiral Hoskins at Port Said; and he wanted to know if it was by arrangement with the Dutch Government? He should like to have that point cleared up. He was quite convinced that it was an advantageous purchase to make, but he should like to have the matter fully explained. There was also another question he desired to ask which was incidental to the Vote—namely, whether the Admiralty had, during the course of the operations in the Suez Canal, placed dues on their war ships? Had any dues been paid according to the usual scale charged in a time of peace?—because, if such had been the case, he thought it might be fairly contended that they had no business to pay them. He hoped the Secretary to the Admiralty would, be able to clear up these points.

MR. GORST

said, that it might be in Order, upon this Vote, to discuss the Expedition of the late Professor Palmer, but, at any rate, it was extremely inconvenient; and he could not help thinking, when the Secretary to the Admiralty pointed out that obvious fact to the Committee, that it was a curious commentary upon his remarks that he should himself immediately afterwards enter into a long discussion upon that Expedition. It certainly looked as if the Admiralty wished to draw the attention of the Committee of Supply away from the question of the purchase of the house at Port Said, in which they had been immediately engaged. Now, he must say that the speech of the Prime Minister entirely exonerated the Treasury from all blame and responsibility for this purchase; but, while exonerating the Treasury, there seemed to be some doubt as to the action of the Admiralty in the matter, which made the Committee still more anxious to have a more full and complete explanation from the Admiralty in regard to their conduct. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister said that the purchase was dictated by military necessity. Then it was obvious, if it was a military necessity, there was no occasion for the Admiralty to make any purchase at all. Hon. Members were there, as the guardians of the public purse, to see that the Government, in carrying out their operations, either in the East or elsewhere, did not spend more of the public money than they were obliged to spend. And if this was a case of military necessity for the carrying on of operations in the Suez Canal, the Government could have taken possession of this house, and have paid a moderate compensation afterwards to those whose property they had occupied. They saw what was done in other parts. It was what was done at Ismailia. Property at Ismailia and the railway at Alexandria were taken possession of by a military force; engines and other rolling stock of the railway were taken possession of, and at a subsequent period the Government paid a moderate but sufficient compensation for the use of them. If, in a time of necessity, that was a preliminary step, why had it not been taken in the case of this house and land? He thought the Admiralty ought to point out why they had departed in this case from the usual custom, and why, instead of taking possession of this property, they had considered it necessary to purchase it. He presumed the Government did not intend to occupy this house and land permanently; and, if so, why had they purchased it? He did not say that there might not be an explanation; but the explanation should be given, if it could be given, why the temporary possession of these premises could not have been obtained. The question asked by the hon. Gentleman near him (Mr. A. F. Egerton) was a pertinent question, and the explanation hitherto given to the Committee by the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty was that the purchase was effected in Egypt, and that the negotiations took place in Egypt between the Admiral commanding there and the representatives of the late Prince Henry of the Netherlands. Now, if it was the fact that the negotiations took place, not at Port Said, but in London, and that it was not the Admiral at Port Said, but the First Lord of the Admiralty who made the purchase, and, further, that it was made, not of the representatives of Prince Henry of the Netherlands, but of the Dutch Government, some explanations were most assuredly demanded. It was a most remarkable thing that the Secretary to the Admiralty, in the first instance, said that the property was bought of the Dutch Government. It was quite likely that it was bought of the Dutch Government, not as the representatives of the Dutch Government, but as the representatives of Prince Henry of the Netherlands; but all these matters required explanation. If the property was really bought in London, he did not understand why it was impossible to consult the Treasury. He supposed the Treasury was quite as capable of acting on an emergency as the First Lord of the Admiralty, and if the First Lord of the Admiralty had in his hand a telegram from Port Said, stating that the purchase of this house for £76,000 was an absolute matter of necessity, he could easily have gone over to the First Lord of the Treasury and obtained, as he ought to have obtained in the first instance, the sanction of the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the purchase. He did not say that those were matters that were not capable of explanation; but they ought to be explained, and the Committee would not be doing its duty to the country unless it insisted upon having them explained. He therefore hoped, if the Secretary to the Treasury did not give a fuller explanation than that which had been given by the Secretary to the Admiralty, his noble Friend would press his Amendment to a division.

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

said, he did not understand why there should be so much trouble about the taking of this house at Port Said. Seeing that they had taken the whole country, surely there was no difficulty in taking a single house. They were carrying on what was called a military operation, and surely that military operation would include the taking of a house. He had risen, however, not to comment upon the purchase of this property, but be- cause he thought some of the statements made in this short debate were not altogether satisfactory. A short time ago, when the Prime Minister was away, the noble Marquess at the head of the War Department gave the House an intimation that it was very probable the English troops would be brought back from Egypt in the course of six months. That was a declaration which gave hon. Members sitting below the Gangway great satisfaction, and they thought there was going to be an end of this miserable matter. But now the Prime Minister, on the first night of his return to the House, came down and dashed away all their hopes by saying that the noble Marquess was wrong, and there was altogether an uncertainty about the matter. ["Hear, hear!"] It was evident, from the cheer which that statement received, that there were a great many hon. Gentlemen in that House who, he was sorry to say, looked forward to the permanent occupation of Egypt. ["No!"] Well, then, to a very indefinite occupation, which would be next door to a permanent one. He thought they had been travelling about in the debate very wide of the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill). His own opinion was that they ought to have an opportunity of discussing the occupation of Egypt distinctly, fairly, and fully in that House. They ought to know what the troops were kept in Egypt for, and for what purpose all this expense was incurred. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister said the troops were going to stay there until they got security for the improvement of the institutions of the Country; but surely they ought to be told what the improvements were to be. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister gave, as another reason for continuing the occupation, that the troops must remain there until the great sea passage by means of the Suez Canal was secured from danger. But he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) wanted to know who had endangered it? He had never been told any fact yet which could have led any single individual to believe that it was in danger. Yet they were now told that their troops were to stay there until the danger was removed. Let them understand what the danger was. The noble Marquess had spoken of International engagements. He should like to know what those International engagements were? It was all very well to come down to the House and talk about International engagements; but he should like to have a statement he could understand as to what those International engagements were for, as it had never yet been stated in the House. He did hope that they would have some statement so that the House might have some chance of saying, after it had heard the whole matter, what it thought of the occupation of Egypt by our troops. On Friday last, when they discussed the matter, the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs alluded to the despatch of Lord Dufferin, and said that when it came it should be discussed. He (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) hoped that it would be discussed, and he trusted that Her Majesty's Government would promise, when they got Lord Dufferin's despatch, that a fair and full opportunity for discussing the whole question should be given to the House, especially as such discussion had been offered to them by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on Friday night. It was desirable that the House should have an opportunity of discussing it as soon as it arrived, and at a convenient period, so that the House might be able to state distinctly whether it approved of their troops being kept in the land of Egypt.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

said, he thought that his hon. Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty ought to give an answer to his hon. Friend the Member for Wigan (Mr. A. F. Egerton), because it would appear that some very slipshod proceedings were going on in reference to the acquisition of the house at Port Said, which it was absolutely necessary should be explained. The Committee were entitled to know how the purchase was negotiated. His hon. Friend the Member for Wigan had asked distinctly whether the negotiations were carried on in Egypt or in this country; and, as far he could understand the matter, they were done in this way. The Admiral at Port Said thought the house and land ought to be bought, and he wrote home to this country stating that in his opinion the house should be purchased; whereupon the Admiralty here concluded the bargain. If the Admiral on the spot had made the purchase he would have been exonerated by the reasons put forward by his right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wigtown (Sir John Hay); but it did not appear that anything of the kind occurred. This building had been in the market for a long time, and the Admiral, finding it in the market, thought it right, for reasons of his own, that it should, be purchased. He accordingly telegraphed to the Admiralty, and the Admiralty went at once and purchased the establishment for £76,000, without even consulting the Treasury, although the Treasury was next door to them. He thought there ought to be an understanding that when money was spent in London it was spent on the authority of the Treasury. On this occasion it seemed that the Treasury was not even consulted in the matter. They did not know of it until after the purchase was made, when they were horrified at what had occurred. Thus they found the Board of Admiralty in this happy-go-lucky manner spending a large sum of money on a house, without any idea whether it was to be ours permanently, or whether it was only required for six or 12 months. He also thought the Committee was entitled to have an answer to another Question put by his hon. Friend the Member for Wigan as to the dues paid to the Suez Canal. Had any dues been paid or not; and, if so, to whom had the money been paid for piloting and towing Her Majesty's ships? Had it been paid to the owners of the Canal? He thought there ought to be the clearest explanation upon these points, because, as the matter now stood, it was open to the gravest suspicion.

MR. ONSLOW

wished to point out that the acquisition of this piece of land was diametrically opposed to everything the Prime Minister had said in Mid Lothian. The right hon. Gentleman had said, in denouncing the acquisition of Cyprus— That there was no greater folly than to suppose that, by multiplying their garrisons and islands, they could guard the road to India. The road to India was perfectly safe as long as they retained command of the sea. Nevertheless, they now found the right hon. Gentleman coming down to the House for £76,000 to provide for the accommodation of a garrison at Suez. It was really a very serious matter indeed, after all the right hon. Gentleman had said before, that they should be garrisoning the whole of the Suez Canal in direct opposition to the views which the right hon. Gentleman had expressed elsewhere. He thought the Secretary to the Admiralty ought to give the Committee a little more information about the purchase of this house and land. Did he know anything about it when the Treasury were asked to agree to the purchase? He thought the remarks of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill), and of his hon. Friend who had just spoken, deserved a clear and straightforward answer, and unless such an answer was given he should certainly vote for the Amendment of his noble Friend.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he could not help thinking that the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken was somewhat ill-advised in making reference to the Mid Lothian declarations of the Prime Minister. He was sure the reception which the declarations in Mid Lothian had received from the Radicals below the Gangway afforded a convincing proof that they had long since taken their place amongst the good jokes of the Liberal Party. He was sorry to see that with the return of the Prime Minister had returned the régime of vague declarations. They had a short time ago a statement from the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War which had, at any rate, some character of clearness and decisiveness about it. The noble Marquess gave the House to understand that the occupation of Egypt by British troops, and the interposition of despotic tyranny by British bayonets would probably come to an end in six months. They now learned from the Prime Minister that no period could be fixed for the return of the troops. No doubt the in-definiteness of the British occupation of Egypt would only be prevented from becoming an eternity by some circumstance over which the British Government had no control. When the British Government and the British arms entered a foreign country, the tendency was to diminish self-government, and even the capacity for self-government. All that was known of the most recent proceedings in Egypt showed that the very worst elements had sedulously been brought into operation; that anything like the independent working of any native institutions would be carefully guarded against by British interests; and that the so-called desire for self-government in Egypt resolved itself into a more or less elaborate sham to cover the intervention of Her Majesty's Representatives. That was the history of India, and he was very much mistaken if it would not prove to be the history of Egypt. He did not intend to refer on the present occasion to the grave questions which had been raised about the Palmer Expedition. He thought that matter had better be raised on definite points suggested by the specific mention of the Expedition in the Vote. But he had thought it would not be right to let the statements which had fallen from the Treasury Bench be passed over without a word of protest. The very worst elements in Egypt had been called into existence, and now they were assured that the native population of Egypt—the masses of the population—had been practically excluded from the new Army which had been created, and that the Turks and Circassians—those ancient favourites of the Premier in Bulgaria—were to fill the ranks which, under British officers, were to supply the Army of Egypt for all time to come. The Prime Minister had referred to the necessity of securing the Inter-Oceanic highway of the Suez Canal. He (Mr. O'Donnell) could only say that the measures being taken in Egypt were the safest and surest means for rendering the Suez Canal insecure, and anything but safe. In the possession of Egypt the Canal might have been made perfectly safe. There had been no attempt to interfere with it during the war except by Her Majesty's Government. The only interference with International traffic came from Her Majesty's Government after an elaborate declaration by the Chief of the British Expedition—that some other means of access to the heart of Egypt was to be chosen by the British Expedition. He would only say that the result of the Expedition to Egypt would be most unquestionably to hasten the ruin and break-up of the Ottoman Empire, and too late Her Majesty's Government would see power passing from the Asiatic side of the Suez Canal, and when this happened, and there was a serious attempt to interfere with the Canal, Her Majesty's Government would find themselves deprived of the assistance of Europe. In regard to the question of the Palmer Expedition, he proposed to discuss that by-and-bye.

MR. SCHREIBER

said, that he should like to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty whether the real owner of this house, and the real vendor of the property, was not His Majesty the King of Holland? He had heard Prince Henry of the Netherlands described that evening as a "foolish Prince." That was not an expression which would be applied to him by anyone who knew him. The only folly of which he was guilty was that, being a man of immense wealth, he had allowed death to surprise him without having made a will; and, as a consequence of his intestacy, all his property, including that in question, passed to his elder brother, the King. This fact, he thought, would serve to explain the transfer of the negotiations from Port Said to London, and the intervention in the affair of His Majesty's Representative at the Court of St. James's. With regard to the Amendment of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock, he did not feel that he should be able to give it his support, because, looking at all the circumstances, he inclined to the belief that the country had received value for its money.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, the purchase of the house at Port Said was, in fact, a military necessity—not in the sense that military operations were going on at the time, but as a preliminary necessity for military operations which had not then commenced. The Admiral had been so fully impressed with the necessity of having the house at once, that he communicated with the Admiralty, who, after consultation as to the value of the building, entered into negotiations with the trustees of the late Prince Henry of the Netherlands. [Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: Who are the trustees?] He could not say who were the trustees; but, after negotiations, the purchase was made. [Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: Was it made in London?] The purchase was made in London, but on the advice and urgent insistance of the Naval authorities on the spot.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

said, after the statement made by the Secretary to the Admiralty, he should be wrong if he did not take the sense of the Committee on the purchase in question. He regretted having to put the I Committee to the trouble of dividing; but they had not found the hon. Gentleman able to give any satisfactory information with respect to this largo sum of £76,000. He did not know what view of the matter was taken on the Front Bench; but he and his hon. Friends considered they had no option whatever as to the course which it was right to pursue.

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 19: Noes 156: Majority 137.—(Div. List, No. 16.)

Original Question again proposed.

SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT

said, he had to ask a question with regard to the Transport Service. He wished to know whether the arrangements made by his right hon. Friend the Member for Westminister (Mr. W. H. Smith) in connection with fittings for transports were fully availed of by the present Government? And, further, he asked whether the fittings had been returned into store, and would be available for any future operations which might take place? He was very desirous of information upon this subject, and would thank the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty for any explanation which he was able to afford. As there had been some ugly stories in circulation with reference, not only to the inefficiency of the Medical Department, but also with reference to the food supplied to the sick and wounded brought home by the transports from Egypt, he should be glad if the hon. Gentleman was in a position to state that there was no foundation for those stories; and he took that opportunity of asking him whether there was any truth in them?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, the greatest advantage had been derived from the arrangement made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Westminster, which the Admiralty had availed themselves of; and the fittings as to which the hon. and gallant Baronet had inquired had been returned to store, so far as they were in good condition, and would be available at a future time. With regard to the hon. and gallant Baronet's question as to the treatment of the sick and wounded on the voyage from Egypt, he believed there had been some complaint of the kind indicated. That, however, formed one of the subjects which was now under consideration by a Committee at the War Office; and for that reason any opinion which he might be able to express would be but second-hand and unauthoritative. As a matter of fact, he believed that a good deal of discontent had occurred because the Carthage hospital ship was extremely well provided, and men, when transferred to ordinary transports, missed the comforts they enjoyed in her. The average transports were quite up to the usual requirements of the Service; but the hon. and gallant Baronet would know that this service was undertaken by the Admiralty for the Army; and, as he had already stated, the whole question was being thoroughly investigated by that Department.

MR. SALT

said, it was necessary to regard this Vote, which was another Vote to supplement the amount taken for the purposes of the Egyptian Expedition in the summer of last year, with great caution. He did not complain of it as being a Supplementary Vote, because when war had to be carried on it was impossible to know precisely what the charges in connection with it would be. But when the original Vote was proposed in the summer of last year, he had felt, what no doubt had occurred to other hon. Members, that the amount of the Estimates would in all probability be insufficient for the purposes for which it was intended. For his own part, he was much gratified that the expenditure had been kept within the present figures, and he was bound to say that it reflected great credit on all concerned in the management of the Department that it was not larger than the amount now asked for. Nevertheless, he wished to know how far the present Supplementary Estimate would carry them? The House, in his opinion, ought, as far as possible, to have been told the whole amount of the probable expenditure at the commencement of the war, in order that it might be understood what the country was committing itself to, and that was not an insignificant matter when they were dealing with so large an undertaking as the recent operations in Egypt, because the magnitude, and consequently the policy, of an undertaking of the kind depended very much upon its cost. It was possible that a Government might deliberately undertake an Expedition, and move for a very moderate Vote at the commencement when they knew very well that the estimated expenditure would be enormously exceeded; and therefore, although it was impossible to arrive at a perfectly accurate Estimate it was of the first importance that the Government of the day, who were responsible for the policy of the undertaking, should at once place before the House as nearly as possible the whole of the probable expenditure about to be incurred. He was not then saying anything in a spirit hostile to the Vote, because he regarded the Expedition as having been most successful and, on the whole, economical; still, he should have been more satisfied had the House been told at the conclusion of the War that they had been in the first instance asked for too much money. It was not without reason, now that they had got to the end of the War, to call attention to the fact that when the present Supplementary sum had been voted, they would still be required, as appeared on page 2, to vote a further sum in 1883–4. This Vote would be in connection with the special gratuity to seamen. Another item was called Supplementary Estimate for the year 1882–3, by which he inferred that the Estimates were ascertained with tolerable accuracy up to the 31st of March next. But in the next page of the Paper he found the heading—"Supplementary Estimate of Her Majesty's Navy for 1883–4." This, it appeared was a misprint, but it was not, therefore, a small matter; because, although an error of the kind in writing might be rectified, a misprint in figures might make all the difference in the world. Was this Estimate to carry them bonâ fide to the end of the present financial year? He wished to be certain that when they came to deal with the Estimates of 1883–4, they would be told distinctly what was going to be the expenditure on this account, and that they were not to have one statement in 1883, a Supplementary Estimate in July, and another Supplementary Estimate in February, 1884.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, this was the Supplementary Estimate for the current financial year. The first Vote, as the hon. Gentleman would be aware, was taken in the form of a Vote of Credit. As had been stated by the hon. Member, it was impossible in respect of operations of the kind for which that Vote was taken to definitely state what the charges in connection with it would amount to. He agreed that it was most unfortunate when war was first undertaken that small Estimates should be brought forward, and that these should be afterwards very greatly exceeded, as was the case in the Abyssinian Campaign. In the present instance, however, he thought the Government Estimates had been, on the whole, most exact. The first Vote of Credit was stated in the House to be for three months only, and to meet the requirements of a certain force. That force, however, had to be very much increased, and the figures before the Committee included not only the Military and Naval expenditure during the three months originally contemplated, but it also represented the whole cost of the subsequent period after the military operations ceased. The present Estimate exhausted the whole amount of the Naval expenditure on account of the war, with the extion, he believed, of three items. There was a certain amount of transport, the payments for which could not be brought within the present financial year. This would be about £15,000. Then there was a small item for special gratuity to seamen and marines, which it was impossible to include in the present financial year, the ships having returned to the India and China station. This would amount to about£10,000. Finally, there was the sum of £2,000 for medals, which the Mint had not been able to supply in sufficient numbers, and delay had in consequence arisen. He trusted this statement would be satisfactory to the hon. Member who had just sat down.

SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL

said, the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Salt) entertained the same considerations with reference to the Vote as he himself had ventured to address to the House in connection with the Military Estimates under consideration on Friday last. He held it to be a great pity, when the country entered upon a war, that they could not get at the worst of the expenditure on account of it. It was almost always the case that the Estimates first presented to the House were under-Estimates. It was true that the estimated cost of the Indian Contingent was not exceeded, but turned out to be considerably less than the amount said to be required at the time. He expected, however, that when this came to be inquired into, it would be found to be due to the mode in which the Indian Accounts were made up, that there was a reduction in the Indian expenditure. He had pointed out at the time that the sum asked for the English part of the Expedition on account of the war was not reasonably sufficient to carry the operations to a conclusion. In the present instance, however, the excess in the case of the Navy was so small that he thought it might very well be condoned. He considered that the thanks of the country were due to the right hon. Gentleman the late Secretary of State for War for the economy with which the war had been conducted, and especially to the Admiralty for the efficiency and economy of the Transport arrangements. When that was compared with the Abyssinian Expedition, its small cost must cause amazement to most persons.

MR. GORST

remarked, that there was a credit for the contribution of the Egyptian Government towards the cost of the Army of Occupation. Was that credit taken for the present financial year? He would be glad to know whether the amount had been actually paid, and if not, when it would be received?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)

said, that the amount would undoubtedly be paid within the present financial year. he was very glad to hear the praise which his hon. Friend (Sir George Campbell) had bestowed upon the Transport arrangements of the Admiralty. The movement entirely depended upon the good working of those arrangements; and as it had been his duty to watch them carefully throughout the operations, he was bound to say that the arrangements made for that purpose by the Earl of Northbrook could not have been excelled. With regard to what had fallen from his hon. Friend with reference to the excess on the Army Vote, it must be borne in mind that the original Estimate was made with reference to a much smaller number of men than were afterwards sent out, and the sum originally asked for was in consequence exceeded. It was stated at the time that the French Government took the responsibility of the naval operations in the Suez Canal; but three days after our Vote of Credit was taken, the Vote of Credit proposed for the operations of the French Fleet was rejected by the Chamber, and the responsibility with regard to the Suez Canal fell upon the British Government, the consequence being that a considerably larger number of men were sent out.

MR. W. H. SMITH

said, he wished to express his concurrence with the terms used by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) as to the extremely efficient way in which the Egyptian Expedition had been organized. Credit was, no doubt, due to the First Lord and other officers at the Admiralty; but it was also due to the permanent officers at the Admiralty and their professional advisers, without whose assistance no amount of skill would have been of any avail. These gentlemen had rendered to the Government most valuable and efficient service, and he was glad to see that Admiral Sir William Mends, to whose great efficiency during the time he (Mr. W. H. Smith) had the honour to preside at the Admiralty he wished to bear testimony, had received a high mark of recognition. The despatch of the troops had been, undoubtedly, greatly facilitated by the stock of fittings on hand for the use of the troops on board ship, without which a much larger expense must have been incurred as well as much delay. He understood that these had been freely availed of by Her Majesty's Government, and that they had been returned into store; but he would also be glad to learn whether any waste, destruction, or loss with respect to them had been made good, and whether money was taken in this Vote for the purpose? Experience had shown that there was a great value in having in store the means of quickly despatching troops by transports, and there was a general belief that the existence of the stores in question had been the means of effecting great economy in the cost of the Expedition, both as regarded the War Department and the Admiralty. It would, therefore, be of advantage if the House were furnished with a statement, in the form of a balance-sheet, showing what were the stores in existence before the war was contemplated; what were now available for carrying on the service of the country, and those which had been dissipated in carrying on the late war. He had no doubt whatever that the statements made by his right hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Guilders) were perfectly accurate; but nothing would tend more to give the country a greater feeling of security and satisfaction on the subject than the publication of a balance-sheet, countersigned by the First Lord, and for the accuracy of which the officers and storekeepers of each Department were held personally responsible, making it clear that we were none the worse off in respect of stores in consequence of the operations of the last six months, or, if so, that the money would be taken to make good the loss sustained.

MR. PULESTON

said, he was desirous of receiving some information with regard to the item of £50,000 for special gratuity to seamen and marines. Did this amount stand alone, and was it the sum total? If so, he would ask in what way the gratuities had been distributed? The item very largely affected the Navy; and seeing so large a sum by itself, they were not able to form an opinion as to whether the whole of it was given to seamen and marines, or whether the officers participated in the distribution.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he had just made a full statement on the question, which his hon. Friend, who was probably engaged elsewhere at the time, had not heard. A similar statement had also been made in Committee on Friday night.

MR. GORST

said, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Westminister (Mr. W. H. Smith) had a few minutes ago made a suggestion to Her Majesty's Government, but no notice had yet been taken of that suggestion, which was that a statement in the form of a balance-sheet should be drawn up showing the stores remaining on hand after the recent operations as compared with those in existence previous to the commencement of the war. No intimation had been given as to whether or not that suggestion would be adopted by Her Majesty's Government. There had been a good deal of criticism against the Government, and many people believed that our stores had been very much depleted during the war, and that if there were a stock-taking it would be found that large quantities of the national stores required to be replaced. That belief might or might not be unjust, but if it were unjust, there could be no better way of proving it to be so than by adopting the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Westminster. Let the Government put before the country the amount of stores which the Army and Navy possessed before the war began, and the amount of stores which they now possessed, and if there had been any depletion it would be made clear. He should have thought Her Majesty's Government would have at once adopted the suggestion of so experienced a Gentleman as the right hon. Member for Westminster, and he could but express his surprise that they had not done so.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, they had listened to the observations of the right hon. Gentleman opposite with great interest and satisfaction. The suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman had not been lost upon him; but it was quite impossible to say at once that the Government would assent to his proposal. Hon. Members would easily understand that a stock-taking of all the stores in the various Departments was a very complicated matter and could not be undertaken off-hand. He did not wish to be understood to say that the Government could not do this, but he thought they were entitled to a little time to consider whether the production suggested by the right hon. Gentleman would be worth the money and labour that it would be necessary to expend upon it. Upon that question he did not himself offer any opinion; but with regard to the feeling which the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst) had stated to exist in the minds of some persons that the Army and Navy stores had been depleted during the recent operations, he would only say that amongst his own acquaintances he did not find that any such feeling existed.

MR. PULESTON

said, the effect of a depletion of the national stores had been illustrated in former years, when after starving all the Departments it was found necessary to spend largely in getting a new supply in a hurry. If that was the case at the present time a balance-sheet would show it, and would tend to prevent a recurrence of such a state of things in future.

Mr. O'DONNELL

asked on what security the contribution of the Egyptain Government in relief of the expenses of the war rested? Had the sum of £70,000 specified been already paid?

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)

said, that the amount would absolutely be received on the 28th of March.

MR. O'DONNELL

asked if he was to understand that the English Government had levied a sum of £70,000 on Egypt, and that the money was to be collected by the English Army? Because, if that were the state of things, it was not, in his opinion, too much to say that it would have been fairer to put down in the Estimates, "Forced contributions," or "Forced loans," phrases which more accurately described what was taking place than that used in the Estimate. However, he perceived that the Government were rather shy of explaining their relations with the so-called Egyptian Government. Before going any further he wished to ask what were the miscellaneous charges in connection with the Palmer Expedition which were put down at £13,500?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, one item was the sum of money which Professor Palmer had with him when he was murdered. There were also the expenses of the journey incurred before the Expedition started. He was not in a position to give the items.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he accepted the explanation of the Secretary to the Admiralty, and should, consequently, be able to take the course he intended without interfering with the allowance which it was proposed to make to the families of the officers and the expenses of finding the body of the late Professor Palmer. He should, therefore, propose that the Vote be reduced by the sum of £5,000, which would cover with sufficient accuracy all that had relation to the Palmer Expedition apart from the payments to the families. The reason he proposed that reduction was in order to ask for information on the whole subject of the Palmer Expedition, which, as far as he was aware, had been apparently concealed from Parliament as long as possible, and with respect to which, even at the present moment, there seemed to be rather a desire to disguise the truth. There was, to a certain extent, an amount of difficulty in the way of a Member of that House asking for information, because he was not at all satisfied that they had before them anything like complete information as to the Expedition. He asked for information as to the number of asterisks which occurred in the Papers laid before the House, and which, he believed, concealed the absence of names of a character most important to the proper understanding of these proceedings. There were also letters omitted from the Blue Book which seemed to have a very important bearing indeed upon the nature of the credence which the House ought to attach to certain portions of it. No less an authority than The Times, of Friday last, alluded to a letter from Colonel Warren in the following terms:— The record of the stratagems and devices by which the 'guilty ones'—for so Colonel Warren throughout speaks of the accused persons—were entrapped and forced into giving evidence and confessions, is not altogether agreeable, though it is instructive reading. Colonel Warren, for instance, in his first expedition, writing to a Sheikh (this letter does not appear in the Blue Book), whom he wishes to persuade of Arabi's overthrow, which had not yet occurred, informs him that the Sultan has landed 6,000 soldiers at Port Said. He thought that the statement in The Times with regard to the absence of this letter threw a responsibility of a very grave kind upon Colonel Warren, who had played such an important part in the matter, and upon the Government, which had omitted, for some reason or other, to include this letter amongst the other Correspondence published in the Blue Book. They knew that the Sultan did not land 6,000 soldiers at Port Said, and they could have no doubt that Colonel Warren was thoroughly aware of that fact. [Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN: Please quote the date and place.] The date and place could come afterwards. At the same time, he would remark that, as far as he was aware, at no date did the Sultan land 6,000 soldiers at Port Said. The Times did not appear to give the date; but it gave an extract of considerable length from the letter, and in that letter Colonel Warren informed a Sheikh that the Sultan had landed 6,000 soldiers at Port Said, and Colonel Warren made that declaration for the purpose of putting pressure upon a Native Sheikh, to cause him to deliver up persons whom Colonel Warren considered "guilty persons," and who, they were informed, had been recently executed. He (Mr. O'Donnell) said that if Colonel Warren made that statement to anyone, they were compelled to approach the other statements of Colonel Warren with a certain amount of reserve, because he was an officer in Her Majesty's Service, and the case was not that of an ignorant or uninformed man. It was against this officer, who had such important duties laid upon him, that the leading English journal had brought a charge which could not be disguised as anything else than a grave imputation upon his veracity. If that misrepresentation on the part of Colonel Warren were defended on the ground that it was a lawful stratagem to misrepresent the truth to an Arab Sheikh, how were they to banish from their minds the feeling that other statements of Colonel Warren were legitimate stratagems also? For in other portions of his Correspondence, Colonel Warren, who varied in his accounts, appeared inclined to convey as much as possible the impression that the attack on Professor Palmer and his party was a mere Bedouin onset, stimulated by the hope of plunder. That was the account given to Her Majesty's Government; and when he found that the Government supported that view, how was it possible to feel otherwise than that the whole thing was a stratagem on the part of Her Majesty's Government, as it was on the part of Colonel Warren? A very serious imputation was thus cast upon the accuracy of one of the principal witnesses who might afterwards have to be called on behalf of the Government. At the same time, the circumstances of that imputation might render the evidence of Colonel Warren all the more important for his (Mr. O'Donnell's) purpose. What he wished to bring before the Committee, and what he maintained was the fact, was that the death of Professor Palmer and his companions was not the result of a Bedouin onset, stimulated by the hope of plunder, but that Professor Palmer, Lieutenant Charrington, and Captain Gill formed part of a surreptitious Military Expedition directed by the Government of Great Britain, then at war with the Egyptian nation, and that this Expedition, carrying out its purpose in disguise, was met, surrounded, captured, and executed by Arabs in exactly the same way as that in which three Arabs and one English soldier, disguised for the purpose of cutting telegraph wires, would have been met, surrounded, captured, and executed by a file of English troops under the orders of Her Majesty's Government. Now, with regard to the sacrifice of Professor Palmer and his military and naval companions, he had not one word to say that would in any way detract from the gratitude due to them. The man who took up the dangerous and disagreeable office of spy in an enemy's country knew that he exposed himself to the very last penalty; the man who undertook the act of bribing the enemy's soldiers rendered a service to his country far more onerous even than that of the soldier who volunteered to go on the forlorn hope. Professor Palmer and his companions went out to do a duty for their country, and they lost their lives in the performance of that duty; but he protested as an Irishman, and he believed that every honest man in England would be ready to join with him in protesting against the act of those defenders of their country, who treated Professor Palmer and his coadjutors as we would have treated three Arabs, being palmed off as a case of murder, and that for the purpose of concealing one of the most dubious and unpleasant transactions to which Her Majesty's Government had committed themselves in the pleasant and dubious act of carrying on war while they maintained the principles of peace. When the question was raised during the last Session of Parliament, every effort was made to impress on the country that Professor Palmer had been engaged in the peaceful office of purchasing camels, that he had with him money for that purpose, and that this fact had drawn upon him the cupidity of the Bedouins of the Desert; and so the whole thing was to be explained. But, as a matter of fact, the expedition on which he was engaged had been most comprehensively and carefully planned and entered into with the officers who died on the occasion to which the Blue Book particularly referred. It would have been necessary—and here was another defect in the Blue Book—for the full explanation of this matter, for the Government to have produced a true report of the use they made of a M. Picard, French telegraph engineer in the service of the Khedive's Government, who was placed at the disposal of nor Majesty's Government, be- cause, while they were sending Professor Palmer to cut the telegraph wires in the Desert, they were sending M. Picard into Turkish territory—into the Lebanon—where he stayed for months, and where he was also engaged in cutting telegraph wires. This execution of Professor Palmer, Lieutenant Charrington, and Captain Gill was not an isolated execution, for while an Islamite force was capturing and executing the English portion of the Expedition, another Islamite force was looking after M. Picard in the Lebanon. The whole thing was a Mission of carefully-disguised spies for the double purpose of cutting the telegraph wires communicating between Constantinople and Cairo, and seducing and bribing the Bedouin warriors who were prepared to assist us in the attempt upon Egypt. The tale about the purchase of camels must be thrown aside and utterly repudiated. But he must observe that, even if the Expedition had been for the purpose of purchasing camels, if that purchase had been conducted by spies in disguise, it would subject those spies, according to the English laws of war, to the last penalty. But it now came out clearly that this was not an expedition for the mere purpose of getting camels. They had the Admiralty introducing "Professor Palmer, passenger for Brindisi," to Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and it spoke of him as a person who Speaks Arabic and knows Bedouins. Keep him at your disposal. Then, on the 21st of July, the Admiralty, in another telegram to Sir Beauchamp Seymour, expressed the desire that Captain Gill should be attached to Rear Admiral Hoskins— For the purpose of assisting him in communicating with the Bedouins. And the telegram went on to say that Captain Gill had travelled among the Bedouins and was employed to collect the information which had already been sent to the Admiral, and it added that Captain Gill was— Fully acquainted with the arrangements made with Professor Palmer. The Admiralty had also telegraphed to Sir Beauchamp Seymour what might be looked upon as the outline of the story afterwards to be put upon Parliament—namely, that, in anticipation of the arrival of troops, he should hire all available camel transport in the vicinity of the Suez Canal, which the telegram went on to say would be— A good opportunity of enlisting the services of Bedouins. Now, they had a telegram on August the 5th, from Rear Admiral Sir William Hewett at Suez to the Admiralty, which showed the manner in which the resources of the Government were employed to place Professor Palmer in communication with the domestic traitors of Egypt and Syria who were expected to assist the work of British invasion in Egypt. It ran thus— Forward following message to Consul at Jerusalem:—'Want reply to message which commences: "To British Consul at Jerusalem from British Admiral at Suez." Send trustworthy horsemen to Gaza at once, to deliver the following message to Sheikh Misleh in Arabic. He expects this message, and is in the neighbourhood. Message begins: "Kajah Abdullah wishes Sheikh Misleh Ameer of the Tizahah to ride a swift camel and meet him at Nakhl on the 12th."' Sheikh Abdullah was the name and disguise under which Professor Palmer was to seduce the Bedouins by money to assist the British invasion of Egypt; it was at Nakhl that Professor Palmer met his fate, and there was reason to believe that the Sheikh did ride a swift camel as requested by Professor Palmer. On the 6th of August they had a telegram from Sir Beauchamp Seymour to the Admiralty, which said that— Palmer, in letter of 1st August at Suez, writes that if precisely instructed as to services required by Bedouins and furnished with funds, he believes he could buy the allegiance of 50,000 at a cost of from £20,000 to £30,000."— A gigantic scheme for getting Bedouins to assist in the invasion of Egypt— Palmer with Hewett still. Gill still there. Will Admiralty communicate with Palmer direct? The Admiralty were, therefore, directly implicated in this transaction. They had a return telegram to Rear Admiral Sir William Hewett at Suez on the 6th of August, which run thus— Admiral reports Palmer's proposal of 1st August. Instruct Palmer to keep Bedouins available for patrol or transport on Canal. A reasonable amount may be spent, but larger engagements are not to be entered into until General arrives and has been consulted. That showed that the Admirals were implicated in the scheme which it was intended to put on the country as a robber onset for the sake of plunder. It was now clear what was the nature of the services which Professor Palmer was engaged to perform; and, as he had before said, he deserved every honour and credit for playing such a part, which was a difficult and dangerous one, because he not only exposed himself to the risks of ordinary war as a soldier, but he exposed himself to the certainty, if caught, of being executed as a spy. But what about Captain Gill? Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour, in a telegram from Alexandria on the 6th of August to the Earl of Northbrook, said— Gill has gone to Suez to make arrangements about Bedouins with Palmer. Authority has been given to Hoskins to expend for this service. Arrangements made to cut the Syrian telegraph wires and for Bedouins to help in preventing its repair. What made this act on the part of Her Majesty's Government reprehensible was that arrangements were made not only for seducing the Bedouins to help our Army, but for seducing them into cutting the telegraph wires of their liege Lord the Sultan, with whom we were supposed to be at peace. Such double-dyed treason and trickery never was exceeded in the whole history of tortuous transactions. Then there was a telegram from Sir Beauchamp Seymour, who, if he did not deserve his Peerage for the bombardment of Alexandria deserved it for other reasons, stating that— Gill expected to accomplish it Thursday or Friday; not yet known. This, as the Admiralty note at the foot of the telegram explained, referred to cutting the telegraph. Rear Admiral Hoskins, on the 14th of August, next telegraphed the Admiralty— Gill, who is in Desert to cut Syrian wire, has not yet been heard of. At that time, when Admiral Hoskins was writing a telegram evidently full of joy at the work being done, Captain Gill had been seized and probably executed for attempting to cut the telegraph wire, contrary not only to the usages and laws of peace, but, as he believed, contrary to the laws and usages of war. By August the 17th the Admiralty was becoming anxious, so they telegraphed on that date to Rear Admiral Hoskins at Port Said— Have you heard anything of Gill? orders did you give him? And Rear Admiral Hoskins telegraphed back the same day— Gill left 5th to confer with telegraph engineers at Ismailia. On the 6th he wrote to me from Suez. After discussing the matter with Palmer, he had determined to go and cut wires in Desert himself, and hoped to effect his object by Friday. Nothing heard of him since. He had been intercepted, just as an Arab wire cutter would have been intercepted by English troops. Wires have not been cut. Sent…to coast of Syria in the Beacon to cut the wires and gain news. Will report result on return. Thus the Government were cutting the telegraph wires of their Ally, the Sultan, at the very time they were keeping up before Europe the farce of seeking to come to terms with regard to the pacification of Egypt. They were designedly cutting off Arabi from every source of communication with the rest of the world, so that they might wake him up one morning with the rush of their 17,000 bayonets, cutting and stabbing his half-armed troops. Oh, the Liberal victory! It was evident that the unfortunate Professor Palmer began early in August to realize the consequences of the hostility he would incur on the part of the Arabs and the extreme danger in which Her Majesty's Government had placed both him and Captain Gill. Accordingly, they found a telegram from Professor Palmer to Rear Admiral Hewett on the 8th of August, from Suez, as follows:— I think it would be most desirable that an officer of Her Majesty's Navy should accompany me on my journey to the Desert as a guarantee that I am acting on the part of Her Majesty's Government. Professor Palmer knew well what he was at, and he sent for the uniform of the British Navy in order to cover that work. It was an act of self-preservation on the part of Professor Palmer; but the grant of that naval uniform, the sending of Flag Lieutenant Charrington to Professor Palmer and Captain Gill in their joint expedition of seduction and wire-cutting, deepened the part played by the Home authorities throughout the whole of these characteristic transactions. Now, he maintained that even from those miserably imperfect documents, in spite even of all the asterisks and all the suppressed passages of the missing letters, in spite of the complete silence that had been observed with re- gard to the Lebanon portion of the wire-cutting expedition, the Blue Book before him contained ample evidence that the resistance which the Palmer Expedition met with was a national and a popular resistance directed by the Arab authorities, and that the Palmer Mission was intercepted not merely for the sake of plunder—although prize money had its temptations even for the British soldier—not merely for the sake of loot, as the miserable misrepresentation that had been circulated sought to convey, but that the Mission was intercepted and found its death in consequence of that national resistance to invasion, and to spydom, bribery, and treachery, and that the orders came from the Government at Cairo to intercept the English spies, just as the English Government would give orders to intercept Arab spies. He maintained that the alleged murderers of the Palmer Mission were simply half-a-dozen rank and file from a couple of Bedonian tribes, who stood in the same position as a party of English soldiers employed to shoot down a man as they were commanded. The trial which took place under Colonel Warren, carrying out the instructions of the Government to represent the whole thing as having been done for the sake of plunder, and which had resulted in the execution of five humble Arab tribesmen, was a bloody judicial trial carried out with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government. They need not go to the source of the authority under which these men met their doom. The Egyptian Government were but the instruments in the hands of Her Majesty's Government. Those humble men wore slain for doing what they believed to be their duty to their tribe and tribal Chief, and their execution was a judicial murder, and a judicial murder of the most atrocious description. He would read an extract from the letter of Colonel Warren, dated Suez, November 28th, and received by the Admiralty on November 30th. The name of one of the Sheikhs engaged in the interception of the spying party had arrived at Suez, and Colonel Warren reported that— Sheikh Salami Shedide arrived from Cairo on the 22nd. He professed to be quite ignorant of the facts connected with Professor Palmer's murder; protested that he had no power as a Sheikh beyond the Canal, and gave the name of a Sheikh (Mahomed Feyere) who lives beyond Akabah, a ruler of the country about Wady Sudur. I refuted his statements by means of his own Hawetats brought in from Wady Sudur, who declared that the Shedides of Cairo were their only Sheikhs, that Sualim Assam Farey ruled them by deputy, and that Mahomed Feyere was to them only a name. Having at last acknowledged that he was Sheikh of the Hawetats about Wady Sudur, Salami Shedide asked me to give him the names of the culprits, and the details connected with the murder. This I refused to do, and told him to get it from his own people. He protested he could not do this, but eventually sent to Cairo to ascertain the particulars from the Bedouins about there. Having thus obtained from him the acknowledgement that the particulars of the murder were known to the Bedouins about Cairo, and that, therefore, he must be aware of what took place, being head Sheikh, I told him to examine the Hawotats brought in by his party from the Desert, and elicit the facts in my presence. He might at this point observe that to throw upon a mere tribesman the whole of the alleged guilt of this transaction, was an artifice which could not have blinded any eyes but those willing to be blinded, for he found in the Blue Book that Colonel Warren was forewarned as early as October 20, 1882 (page 40), that the war being over, the Shedides who stood high with Arabi still continued in power, and were endeavouring to throw the whole guilt upon the Towarah; and so great was their power that they had succeeded in fixing the impression on the minds of the local Egyptian officials. So that the policy of throwing guilt on the men—the mere executioners—was fully known to Colonel Warren and Her Majesty's Government as early as October the 31st. In the same letter, Colonel Warren showed that the pursuit and capture of the English Mission was not an act of isolated robbers, but was a true Governmental act, and a part of the Government defence against English invasion. On page 39, Colonel Warren reported that there was a considerable amount of evidence showing that the attack on the party was aided from Cairo by Ibu Shedide, whose brother was at Suez, helping him to discover the guilty parties, and who professed entire ignorance in all matters connected with the attack. Abu Sofieh endeavoured to ransom the party, but failed to do so; and after they had been prisoners for two or more days, they were taken up into the mountains over a precipice, and told that by orders of Arabi, through Nakhl and through Cairo, they must die, and were at liberty to choose be- tween dropping over the precipice or being shot. It was said that Professor Palmer and Captain Gill chose the former death, while Lieutenant Charrington, the Dragoman, and the Cook chose the latter. It was also said Professor Palmer solemnly called Heaven to witness that the death of the party would be avenged upon the murderers. Colonel Warren went on to say that there could be no doubt whatever that it was the intention of those in authority and the Bedouins that a veil should be drawn over all the details of this tragedy after the attack upon the baggage; and every available clue had, as they thought, been successfully obliterated. Even the murder of the Cook Moussa was solely actuated by a desire to conceal all facts connected with the attack, for it was known that Moussa was not a Christian; and the outrage was committed, not by a mere band of robbers, but by an organized band of Moslems acting under authority to kill Christians. But, although, said Colonel Warren— I believe the order for the attack came from those in authority immediately under Arabi. I do not think the order to kill Christians proceeded from Cairo, but emanated from the over-zealous fanaticism of the Egyptian Governors of Nakhl and El Arishe. The attack was made principally by the Hawetat, whose Sheikh is Sualem Abu Farag, acting immediately under I be Shedide of Cairo. This man was actively engaged during the war, and commanded the line of Bedouins covering Cairo; and yet, in the face of the well-known fact to all Bedouins, that Sualem is the Sheikh of the Hawetats of Wady Sudur, under the Shedide, Shedide's brother has protested that these Hawetats were under a Syrian Sheikh, and he had no power over them. There was much more evidence in these documents. In an enclosure, Colonel Warren, writing to Pear Admiral Sir William Hewett, reported— I visited Mr.…"—these asterisks were always turning up in the most convenient places—"and ascertained from him that he would be able to arrest, near Gaza, a Bodouin who had been heard to say that he had assisted in killing two accursed Feringhees near Suez. He also informed me that he had evidence to show that the Governor of El Arishe had sent out a party of Suwaki Bedouins after Professor Palmer, to bring him in dead or alive on his journey from Gaza to Suez. They had a very important statement from Consul West upon the same subject. Her Majesty's Consul, at Suez, writing on the 20th of November—the letter was received at the Admiralty on the 4th of December—said— It is becoming every day more apparent that the Shedides at Cairo, acting under the influence of their own convictions, in the power of Arabi and his followers, if not under their direct orders, had sent instructions to the Sheikhs in the Desert to arrest all travellers, at least, and to prevent them from obtaining assistance from these over whom they, the said Sheikhs, had any control; to what extent their instructions, which were only verbal, as a matter of course, would have instigated such a crime as that committed, it were difficult to say, and may be still more so to prove. It is, nevertheless, certain that the Shedides now here, ostensibly for the purpose of bringing in these of their tribe who are 'wanted,' are far from doing their utmost to clear up matters, their action tends to show that they are in great dread of the exposé which they can see is hanging over their heads. That was a Report of Consul West, a Report completely removing the possibility that it was a mere set of robbers; a Report completely proving that a levy en masse had been ordered to prevent an incursion of English soldiers and spies. The name of Arabi was mentioned. There was no blame on Arabi respecting the murders; indeed, there was every reason for supposing he did not give express instructions to execute such men as Palmer, Gill, and Charrington. It was, however, clear that the Government of Egypt had taken every precaution to arrest and to execute enemies and spies entering the country. There was other evidence which would not be less impressive. The Native witness, Hassar Ateiya, of the Marani tribe, examined by Colonel Warren, page 52 of the Blue Book, stated that the Huvalats, the tribesmen engaged in the attack upon the Palmer Party, expressly said— We are Arabi's soldiers, and if we meet any English people, we must get hold of them. And the wretched story had been set going that it was all an attack of Bedouins stimulated by the hope of plunder. What part of the explanation of Her Majesty's Government with regard to their policy in Egypt could they credit in a higher degree than they could now credit their statement as to the object of the Palmer Mission, and the nature of the opposition which that Mission provoked? Nay, not only was there all this evidence, which he could multiply even from these documents, as to the manner in which these orders were disseminated through the country to oppose an English incursion, large or small, and to arrest English people, but they had evidence that the execution was really known at Cairo; and they had the evidence of Colonel Warren that it was the impression of Professor Palmer himself that he was being hunted and watched and opposed by the tribes of Arabi Pasha. On November the 14th—the letter was received at the Admiralty on the 28th of the same month—Colonel Warren wrote to Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour— I am under the impression that Professor Palmer has elsewhere stated that he travelled over this ground in haste, and during the night, to avoid Arabi's emissaries. And yet the Government shut their eyes to all this; this miserable and sham Government shut its eyes and allowed five wretched tribesmen to be executed as murderers and robbers for only carrying out the orders of the Government of their country. Furthermore, Colonel Warren reported that the actual orders for the capture and, as it appeared, the execution of the English emissaries were given by a man of such a low class, that it was quite evident that in order to obtain the obedience which followed his words, he must have been only a messenger from some higher authority. Colonel Warren said— The Bedouins generally concur in stating that Ali Showyar is a man of very low class, and could only have been used as a messenger, giving information with reference to orders already given. It appears that the Terabin, Debour, and Hawetat, had already been instructed to attack the party, and they were prepared to waylay them on either of the three roads into the interior. That comprehensive plan for arresting an incursion of these English emissaries; that comprehensive plan, carried out with every appearance of the concurrence of the general patriotism and loyalty of the country, it had been attempted to explain away in the miserable manner the Committee were aware of. There was more evidence still of first-class importance. The Committee, or such Members of it who had paid attention to Egyptian affairs, might have noticed in the list of sentences passed the other day by a so-called court martial, that five persons were sentenced to death and hanged in conformity with that sentence, and a certain Governor of Nakhl got off with 12 months' imprisonment. That was perfectly in keeping with the warning that had already been given to Colonel War- ren and the Government—namely, that every attempt would be made to throw the blame as low down as possible. But on page 51, there was the translation of a letter from the Governor of Nakhl to the Governor of Akabah, written towards the end of August or the beginning of September. It was written, as was stated in the Blue Book— About the 27th of Showal, and delivered at Akabah about the 9th of September. The letter went on to say— We let you know that, on the 11th day of Showal (9.9), we have appointed one soldier Bedouin to carry the mail. Soon he reached Ismailia. He learnt that the English Christians attacked the Bedouins who lived about Ismailia when they were much in need of water, and the Fresh Water Canal was blocked, so that no water could go from Ismailia to Suez. Then at night the English attacked the Bedouins, who ran away and informed Arabi Pasha about it. So he came from Kafr Dowar with lots of troops, and attacked the enemy, &c. And towards the end of the letter it went on to say— As regards the three Christians who were going to the Fort of Nakhl, accompanied by Meter Sofieh (Meter Nassier), one of the Sofieh tribe, they were killed, through the son of Abu Mushid, one of the Sheikhs of the tribes of Bedouins who live at Wady Sudur, and never arrived here. My only object (in writing to you) is to inform you to be careful about the Fort (Akabah), and to inform the Bedouins not to be far away from the fort, already to be ready for the enemy, and not be afraid. I hope God will permit that you are not found wanting. If any men of war come in your direction not to lire on them, but if they go on shore to get hold of them by hand, and if they fire, fire your selves. Let me know what is going on in your place. Don't be afraid. Don't wonder because the Moslems are victorious by the force of God. Abu Shedide has informed his Bedouins, by writing, that if they see any Christians to get hold of them and send them to their place (in Cairo), when they had learnt that the Christians were killed which I spoke of. Till now we did not receive any instructions from Cairo. More evidence of the constant communication there was going on between the centre of the National defence and the outlying places which were opposing the English invaders, and the complete victory of the English invasion in no way detracted from the legitimacy of the Egyptian defence. The Governor of Nakhl boasted that the work was done by his own orders, and, in one statement, by his own hands. Of the sympathy of the Governor in the transactions there could be no doubt. Consul West, throughout the Blue Book, was a most valuable witness, and anyone who wished to try the case fairly and apart from the pressure of Ministerial Whips, could not do better than trace from page to page the despatches of Consul West. Evidence which was also worthy of particular attention on the present occasion was that of Meter Abu Sofieh, who acted as guide to the party, and who was very probably in collusion with the attacking party. Very probably Meter Abu Sofieh thought that spying against spies was legitimate. Just as Her Majesty's Government appeared to act on the principle that they need keep no faith with Bedouins, he acted on the principle that Bedouins need keep no faith with Englishmen. As to the comparative casuistry of the two parties in the case, he (Mr. O'Donnell) would say nothing, save that the Bedouins were acting in the defence of their own country. Meter Abu Sofieh died in hospital, certainly under suspicious circumstances, after having given certain evidence. There was a post mortem examination held on the body by some English Army surgeon, but whether the surgeon was a proficient in the detection of poisons there was no evidence to show. If, however, there was ever an Arab who deserved a cup of bad coffee, it was the Chief Meter Abu Sofieh, after giving this testimony, testimony which was stated to be spontaneous— All the questioning will do you no good; but if you get Ali Showyar, he will tell you who sent him after us to tell them to attack us"—he spoke of "us"—"I heard that Ali Showyar had gone all round the Bedouins to tell them to attack us; and Colonel Warren reported that all the Bedouins concurred in that statement. Meter Abu Sofieh, who, it was not to be wondered at, died under suspicious circumstances, went on to say— I hear he was at the wells when we left, but I don't know his face the Bedouins were quite quiet till Ali Showyar went away, though he is not a Sheikh lie is of the lowest Natives, but must have been sent by someone. The Government won't allow me to say who it was. I do not know who it was. I hear that Ali Showyar brought a message. I don't know if message came from Cairo. I hear that Ali Showyar said the Christians come into this country, attack them, and take their things. He said Abu Sofieh was bringing the Christians to buy camels, and they had money with them for that purpose. So, Ali Showyar knew how to encourage the attacking Bedouins with the hope of prize money, as well as with the satisfaction of patriotism. Now, if the statement of The Times was true, Colonel Warren was a gentleman who, when intrusted with a mission by a Liberal Government, was capable of embroidering the facts, and giving a diplomatic misrepresentation of the facts. But there was another thing to be taken into consideration in regard to the so-called confession wrung from the principal of the wretched culprits, who might or might not have been guilty, and it was that nothing was more usual in the East, when great men were implicated, for humble men to come forward and take the blame on themselves for the sake of saving their wives and their families. The men who were put to death were men whose wives and families had been previously taken prisoners by Colonel Warren; and it was under the pressure of the terrorism, caused by that fact that these men apparently were ready to make any admission, though the only admission they did make was that they were actually the executioners in carrying out the sentence on the English Mission. The Committee had heard most important admissions made by Colonel Warren; but at page 91, in a letter to Admiral Lord Alcester, dated Port of Nakhl, Desert of the Tib, December 25, 1882, he said— Most of the culprits, when first brought in, denied even belonging to this portion of the country; but, after being wearied with constant cross-examination, they have now all confessed to the attack upon Professor Palmer's party, and on the baggage, and some of them have confessed to having been present at the murder; and I hope eventually to be able to obtain a full detailed confession from each man, except, perhaps, from the live murderers, of whom three are now secured. What he (Mr. O'Donnell) wanted to know was, what was the worth of that evidence, even as regarded the participation of these wretched men? At any time a tribesman would give his life 100 times over, if he could, at the mere suggestion or wish of the Sheikh. These men merely formed the firing party; and that was all the Government had proved. The confessions were due to a wish to spare their tribes; and it was very important to observe that the Sheikh only gave his adhesion to the pursuit of the suspected men on the condition that the quiet of the Desert should not be disturbed. The Committee could fully understand how very small was the amount of credence to be placed on the confession of the tribesmen acting in conformity with the wishes of their Sheikh, and after being wearied with such constant cross-examination that it was in the power of Colonel Warren to apply. There was no reliance to be placed on the confessions of these wretched men; but even admitting the confessions wore to be accepted, the Government had only got hold of the firing party who acted under the orders of the National authorities, just exactly as any firing party of English soldiers would act against American or Irish spies. He had stated at some length, but with the utmost possible brevity—leaving out large and important portions of testimony which he might endeavour to furnish in addition, if, in the course of the debate, Her Majesty's Government required it—he had stated, with the utmost possible brevity, a clear, convincing, and indisputable case, which proved that they were not in face of an onset of Bedouin robbers on an innocent travelling party for the sake of loot, but in the presence of a deliberate combination of Native tribes for the purpose of intercepting an English spying Mission, engaged to cut down telegraph wires in time of war, and to seduce from their national allegiance 50,000 or 60,000 Bedouins, if necessary, at an expense, in the words of Professor Palmer himself, of from £20,000 to £30,000. That was the case he laid before the Committee and the country.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £345,000, be granted to Her Majesty, in addition to the sums already granted by Parliament, to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1883, for additional Expenditure arising out of Military Operations in Egypt."—(Mr. O'Donnell.)

MR. T. P. O'CONNOR

said, he would not have risen had not the Government, as represented by the Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman), seemed disposed to allow the very able and powerful speech of his hon. Friend the Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell) to pass by without any answer. He was rather astonished that the Secretary to the Admiralty had not thought it worth his while to rise in his seat and attempt to destroy the arguments just advanced by the hon. Gentleman. The questions which the Government were called upon to answer were divisible under three heads. In the first place, was his hon. Friend justified in describing Professor Palmer and his colleagues as spies. In the second place, were the Government justified in having these five men executed as murderers. And, thirdly, the manner in which the confessions were extracted from the prisoners, and the mode in which their guilt was proved. He was very glad his hon. Friend prefaced his remarks by encomiums upon Professor Palmer and his colleagues in the Expedition for their gallantry. They had, as it proved, given up their lives to the service of their country and their race; but the question which the Committee were asked to consider was, what was the position of the men in the country? His hon. Friend maintained that their position was that of spies, and that their object was to raise up against what was the then de facto Government of Egypt a considerable portion of Egyptian subjects. On that point, he observed, once or twice there came some thing like interjected contradictions from the Secretary to the Admiralty; but he (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) would challenge anyone who had read the Blue Book to deny that Professor Palmer over and over again asserted that it was within his power, if properly supported by the Government, to get as large a number as 50,000 Bedouins to withdraw their allegiance from Arabi and ally themselves to the Khedive. On that point the proof was great. He would challenge the Secretary to the Admiralty, if he were present, to deny that the military authorities so far accepted Professor Palmer's estimate as to agree to give £20,000 for the purpose of getting the Bedouins over to the Khedive's side. If £20,000 was to be employed for that purpose, it was clearly to be employed against Arabi, and, therefore, Arabi was justified in attacking the Expedition. During the American War of Independence, Major Andre was taken as a spy, and executed by order of General Washington. Major André, it was admitted by friend and foe, was a man of great personal bravery and of high personal character, and yet, according to the laws of war and by the circum- stances of case, General Washington was justified in the course he took. If during the American War an Englishman had gone down to the Southern States, and had endeavoured to induce the negroes to fight against those States, he would have been, if caught, executed. The Committee were entitled to more satisfactory explanation than they had yet received from the Government as to the real character and purpose of the Palmer Expedition. The second point on which he wished to address a few words to the Committee was, were the Government justified in having the five men executed as murderers? That would depend upon whether the men were acting upon their own initiative or under the orders of superior powers. It was a very significant fact that the Governor of Nakhl was in the neighbourhood on the day of the murders; and all who had read the Blue Book would know that, as a matter of fact, this person had no business whatever to be so near the place at the time, and that when he was called upon for an explanation, all he could give was that he had applied for leave of absence and had started for Suez. The explanation was far from satisfactory, and he (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) thought it was clear from the evidence, that these men, low in position and without any social prospects, or any real or other power at their disposal, were acting under the authority of others. If they were, he wanted to know why it was that these unfortunate dupes and tools should be executed, while the superior authorities were allowed to go almost scot-free—because the sentence of 12 months' imprisonment on the Governor of Nakhl was a farce in the face of the sentence of death passed on the others? With regard to the third point, he would ask the Committee whether they could read without something of shame, the statement made by Colonel Warren himself as to the manner in which the evidence upon which these men were convicted and afterwards executed, was obtained? The most important fact which was brought out with regard to the alleged confessions of the prisoners was that one set of witnesses gave such and such persons as the guilty parties, whereas an altogether different list of guilty parties was given by other witnesses who were examined. It was plain, from the Blue Book, that Colonel Warren acted on what was not supposed to be an English doctrine—namely, that the end justified the means. It was clearly proved by the admissions of Colonel Warren himself, that he did not scruple to adopt any means, either of duplicity, or force, or virtue, to extort confessions from the prisoners. He (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) might express his gratification that the Secretary to the Admiralty had now returned to his place. He would not repeat the observations he had made; but he hoped the hon. Gentleman would not lose the opportunity of answering the very detailed and very conclusive charges which the hon. Member for Dungarvan (Mr. O'Donnell) had brought against the action of the Government. He was dealing with the third point—namely, the manner in which the evidence was obtained from the incriminated parties; and he would ask the Secretary to the Admiralty to explain the reason of the omission from Colonel Warren's despatch of a large quotation from it, which omission had appeared in The Times. In connection with the statement that Colonel Warren told a Sheikh that the Sultan had landed 6,000 troops, he (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) invited the attention of the Secretary to the Admiralty to page 40 of the Blue Book, and to the following paragraph in Colonel Warren's despatch:— For I pointed out to Musa Nassir, who arrived yesterday, that matters were being arranged so cleverly against him and his tribe that it simply lay between their divulging everything they had heard or knew and being arraigned as the guilty parties. Or, in other words, these men were put to the alternative either of confession or being placed along with the other prisoners who were executed for taking part in the murders. He ventured to say that was a most un-English mode of conducting a trial of the kind; and the public and the Committee had a right to be anxious on the three points he had enumerated—namely, Was the Expedition one for the purpose of spying—he did not use the word in an offensive, but in a military sense? Were these men who were executed principals, or merely tools? Were they murderers acting for plunder, or soldiers acting under what they considered lawful authority? And, thirdly, was the evidence against the men obtained in accordance with the laws of justice and honour?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

apologized to the hon. Gentleman (Mr. T. P. O'Connor) for being out of the House when he began his observations. He should, however, be very willing to reply to all he had said. he thought that, perhaps, the best thing he could do was to state very plainly and candidly what the object of the Expedition was, and how it came to pass that Professor Palmer was sent into the Desert of Sinai. At the end of June, before the attack on the Alexandrian forts, and when there was only a strong possibility, not even a probability, of warlike operations, it became obvious that steps must be taken to secure the tranquillity of the Suez Canal; and the fact that the duty of taking those steps was imposed on the Admiralty was the reason that he was here to-night to explain to the Committee what had happened in regard to the matter. Practical measures were necessary with regard to the Canal, because, as hon. Members might recollect, there were constant rumours of the Canal being blocked by the Arabs; and there was even a most circumstantial rumour one day of a ship in the Canal being looted. It therefore became necessary that, apart from the military operations, something should be done to secure the friendliness of the Arabs, and to obtain from them any help they could render in furnishing transport for the Indian Contingent. These were really the objects the Government had in view—to utilize the Arabs for the protection of the Canal, and secure their goodwill. For this purpose the First Lord of the Admiralty consulted two persons—Colonel Bradford, a well-known Indian officer of great experience and knowledge of the Arab people, and Captain Gill, who was then attached to the Intelligence Department of the War Office, and who was also an experienced traveller, thoroughly conversant with the habits and disposition of the people of those parts. They at once suggested to him that the best man to consult in regard to the whole matter was Professor Palmer. He had spent a good deal of time in Sinai, in connection with the survey of that country; he was an extraordinary adept in languages, and he had been able to go about and live among these people as one of themselves; and so far from it being the case, as was assumed by the hon. Member for Dun- garvan (Mr. O'Donnell), that he disguised dim self on this occasion and took a false name, in order to cover his identity, he went there with the same name as he had always used, and the same dress as he had always worn among the Bedouins. Every traveller that he ever heard of, who had had these acquirements and these facilities for going about among such people, had dressed as a Native, and had adapted himself more or less to their habits and appearance. Professor Palmer was asked who would be a likely man to go out and assist Sir Beauchamp Seymour in his communications with the Arabs on the Canal, and act also as interpreter between our officers and the Natives, and he volunteered to go himself. He was not asked to go; he distinctly volunteered to go upon this service. His own proposal was that which was adopted; and that was that he should go to Gaza, and cross the Desert to Suez. He believed that he would be able upon that journey to acquire certain knowledge as to the feelings of the Bedouins; and, at the same time, he would be less conspicuous and less likely to attract attention than if he went by the Canal. Undoubtedly, his journey was in that sense secret; for it was desirable that it should not be bruited about that he was going for this purpose, because probably, if his intention had been known of, steps would have been taken to prevent his achieving the object he had in view. He went by Gaza; and on arriving at Suez, where he was told to report himself, he was appointed chief interpreter. He received no money on that journey to secure the allegiance of the Arabs. No sum whatever was given to him, and he was not encouraged to expect any money for that purpose. The object in view was to have him available at our disposal at Suez, if necessity should arise; and he had no authority to bribe the tribes. It had been stated in The Times that when he arrived at Suez he sent a report to Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and that report might be the "Letter" alluded to at the bottom of page 2; but the Admiralty had not seen any such report. He appeared to have taken a sanguine view of what he could do, and he described himself as able to secure the allegiance of 50,000 Bedouins for about £20,000 or £30,000. That proposal originated with himself alone. He had not been encouraged to conceive any such purpose at all, and he must say that the telegram which the Admiralty sent on the receipt of that opinion was calculated to discourage him; and if it did not fully express that meaning, he could assure the Committee that it was intended to do so. It was not desirable on the other hand, as it were, to snub him, or to imply any rebuke on account of over-zeal—nor did he now wish to attribute to him over-zeal—but he was instructed to keep the Bedouins available for control or transport on the Canal, and that for that purpose a reasonable amount might be spent. Now, he had no money given to him either at home or by the authorities on the Canal for any such purpose as the purchase of the allegiance of the Arabs. [Mr. ARTHUR O'CONNOR: Or for service?] No. The only money given him beyond his expenses was £3,000, which was handed to him at Suez by Sir William Hewitt to go into the Desert and secure camels for the use of the Indian Contingent. Sir William Hewitt said at first that the number of camels required was 1,500, but further information, after Professor Palmer had left, showed that 750 would be sufficient. That £3,000 represented only the cost of a fortnight's hire of 1,500 camels. Whether they would be ultimately required was doubtful; but they were required to be collected near Suez, and the £3,000 was intended as a guarantee to their owners that, if the camels were not eventually needed, the loss of time would be paid for. That was the whole history of the transaction. There was no bribery, and no purchase of allegiance or goodwill. It was certainly part of his mission to conciliate the Bedouins, and to use his well-known influence to get them into a favourable state of mind towards us; but that was a very different thing from what was often suggested—that he was furnished with large sums of money for the purpose of bribing the Bedouins. [Mr. T. P. O'CONNOR: Was he never promised £20,000?] He could not understand that £20,000 being named, or how it got into the article in The Times. He did not know who the writer of that article was; but he must have had access to some confidential Papers which were only in the hands of four persons beside the Heads of the Ad- miralty. One of those four persons was allowed to see the actual Papers, and the others were furnished with copies in the strictest confidence. [Mr. ARTHUR O'CONNOR: But they were genuine.] He was coming to the genuineness. There was nothing in them that the Admiralty were afraid should come out, as he would show immediately. In the original of the same, or the next despatch, mention was made of £20,000; but that sum had nothing to do with the Palmer Expedition. It was an intimation that, under the authority given by the Admiralty, Sir William Hewitt, who was without money, had received £10,000 from Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and £10,000 from Admiral Hoskins, for the general purposes of the Indian Contingent. Professor Palmer had nothing whatever to do with that money. No part of it was given to him. It was required for the general purposes of the command at Suez, and, therefore, all mention of it was omitted from these published Papers, which referred to the Palmer Expedition alone. Those were the facts of the case, for which he could vouch. The £20,000 being alluded to in one of these original despatches, which also alluded to the Palmer Expedition, did get into the confidential Papers, which included all the information the Admiralty had on the subject. He hoped he had made it plain to the Committee how it was that this sum of £20,000 got into the confidential Papers, and also, he was sorry to say, into the hands of people who were anxious to find some tangible proof that Professor Palmer was being supplied with money in order to bribe the tribes. He could assure the Committee, upon his own knowledge, that what happened had nothing to do with Professor Palmer's Expedition, and that he was merely furnished with the £3,000 which he had with him when murdered.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

How was that money to be expended for the Indian Contingent?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

replied, that it was for the ordinary expenses of the command at Suez. Sir William Hewitt had no funds whatever, lie had to pay his men, and pay for provisions and coals for his own ships, and to meet the requirements of a considerable force at Suez and of the Contingent coming from India. The other Admirals being Letter supplied with money than he was, he asked them for some; and the telegram which referred to that matter also alluded to the Palmer Expedition, which took place at the same time. He hoped this was a sufficient explanation of what, no doubt, appearing as it did, might have conveyed an entirely wrong impression to many minds. That was the whole story so far as the Admiralty were concerned. He would add, with regard to the accusation that Professor Palmer was going as a spy in disguise, of which the Committee had heard so much that night, to these simple Bedouins, that he went in the ordinary dress and under the ordinary name which, as a well-known English Christian, he had always assumed, and in which he was well known to the Sheikhs. As to this emissary of ours going to act as a spy, what was the first thing he asked for before leaving Suez? He wrote to the Admiral— I think it desirable that an officer of the Navy should accompany me to the Desert as a guarantee that I am acting on the part of Her Majesty's Government. Lieutenant Charrington went with, at all events, a great part of his uniform, and particularly with his naval sword, as a proof of the nature of the Expedition, and to give the Arabs, from whom they were to buy the camels, confidence that it was a bonâ fide transaction, and that they would not be outwitted in the matter. This was not consistent with the suggestion upon which the whole speech of the hon. Member for Dungarvan was based—namely, that Professor Palmer was sent as a spy to deceive the Bedouins.

MR. ARTHUR O'CONNOR

Was the uniform used by the officer, or was it packed away in a bag?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

The Admiralty had reason to believe that it was used on some occasions, and, at all events, when his remains were found, a pair of duck trousers was found with them. The hon. Member had a good deal to say on the cutting of the telegraph wires, and made much allusion to a gentleman, who, he believed, was an Englishman, but who was called by the hon. Member, "Monsieur Picard." The object of cutting the telegraph wires which connected Egypt with Constantinople was to prevent information of the preparations we were making from reaching the Egyptian belligerents. The Government had every reason to believe that the wires were being largely used for that purpose; and perhaps some hon. Members would remember that once or twice he and some of his hon. Colleagues refused to answer specific Questions as to their preparations in this House—Questions as to which information could be easily got by anybody who had access to the ordinary sources of knowledge, but replies to which, if given in a prominent way in that House, would immediately be telegraphed to Egypt. That was an instance of the way in which this telegraph was used; and, so far from it being an usual method of modern warfare to cut telegraph wires, it was an acknowledged form of warfare. [Lord RANDOLPH CHURCHILL: In an Ally's country?] They were not going out of Egypt in order to cut the telegraph. The hon. Member for Dungarvan had alluded to an expedition under Picard into the Lebanon, where the telegraph was cut, and where, as he understood the hon. Member, two persons were seized and executed. That was the first he had heard of it; and, if that was done at all, it was not done in connection with this Expedition.

MR. O'DONNELL

They were hanged in opposition to the Expedition.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, he had no knowledge of any telegraph engineer or anyone else going into the Lebanon to cut the telegraph wires; but it was intended to cut the wires between Kantarah and El Arishe, and it was for that purpose that Captain Gill was sent with this Expedition. Now, with regard to the Papers generally, the hon. Member had pointed out that there were a great many gaps, and that these gaps were distinguished by asterisks. Well, at all events, the asterisks were honest asterisks, and showed where something was left out. If the Admiralty had made no asterisks at all, no one would have known there was anything left out. They were, at all events, a sign of a certain degree of honesty. He had carefully gone through the Papers and marked the passages that were left out, and seen what they contained, and, as far as he could find, only two passages—one of them of no great significance—were omitted for any other reason than that they were totally unconnected with the main subject of these Papers, or that brought in names of men who would be compromised, in this sense—that they might be exposed to danger if it was known that they had been friendly to us. The hon. Member seemed to think it would have been better to have kept all their names in, in order that these men who had been induced to do us a kindness should suffer; but he thought it was better, if there was any danger that they would suffer in their trade or in any other way in consequence of what they had done for us, that their names should not appear. One instance of omission was the letter which was quoted in full in The Times, and which was addressed by Colonel Warren to a certain man named Musa Nassir. Colonel Warren, no doubt, spoke of 6,000 Turkish troops being sent by the Sultan to help the English. When the hon. Member referred to that matter, he had asked the lion. Member to quote the date of the letter and the place from which it was written. It was written from Tor, in the Desert, on September 12. Colonel Warren could not be expected, when in the Desert, to be in possession of the most recent intelligence as to whether the Turkish troops had been sent or not; but when he left Suez it was the expectation of everyone there that Turkish troops would be sent to Port Said, and he apparently concluded that by that time they had been sent, and so he wrote that letter. Of course, that statement was not true, inasmuch as it was not confirmed by the facts; but there was no reason to attribute to Colonel Warren any intention to utter a deliberate falsehood, seeing that he might very well have believed that these troops had been sent. He put it rather too strongly, perhaps; but, at all events, he merely did so to satisfy a friendly Arab that he would be treated in a friendly manner, and had nothing to fear from us. The letter, which was said to have been written in order to induce some poor creature to come in and be convicted of complicity in crime, was written for no such purpose. It was written to Musa Nassir, who was not one of the criminals at all, but was a friendly Arab, with a view to inducing him to bring in Professor Palmer, the belief being that he was alive and in the custody of some Arabs, or under the protection of friendly Arabs. The letter was written for that purpose only, and not to bring in cul- prits on false pretences. That was the only Paper of any importance that was omitted from the Papers published. He was not going to follow the hon. Member for Dungarvan in the very imaginative account he had given of the whole transaction; but the Papers, he thought, showed with how much zeal, tact, courage, and patience Colonel Warren had conducted the whole of the negotiations and search, first of all, for the unfortunate victims, and afterwards for those who committed the crime; and the conclusion at which Colonel Warren arrived was very clearly stated. He said, at page 92— There can be no doubt that the attack upon the party was owing to the extreme avarice and culpable negligence of Meter Sofieh, and that their death was due to his persistent refusal to ransom the party and to give up the money placed in his hands by Professor Palmer. He appears to have betrayed the trust imposed in him, whether viewed from a European or Bedouin standpoint, and is certainly the principal cause of the sad disaster. The hon. Member for Dungarvan said this was not a simple case of murder. He (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) did not believe that they could be quite certain as to what was the inducement to these men to murder the unfortunate gentlemen who fell into their hands; but it might be partly a purpose of murder and partly political excitement. There might have been political feeling in the occurrence; but the fact remained that those men, whom Colonel Warren, with great patience and astuteness during weeks and months, had been able to trace as the principal actors in the deed, richly deserved the punishment they received. The hon. Member said these poor men wore, after all, only the instruments of people at Cairo and elsewhere who hired them to commit this atrocity. That might be the case; but it was unfortunately sometimes true, not only in this occurrence in the Desert, but in other cases and other countries. It often happened that the instruments of crime of this kind could alone be detected and punished, while those who incited them to the crime could not be approached. That often happened, and it was greatly to be regretted, but that ought not for a moment to prevent the infliction of punishment upon those who actually committed crimes. The case of these men had been thoroughly investigated, first by Colonel Warren, and then by an Egyptian tribunal. All the men had confessed their crime, and the passages read only showed what might be expected from the habits of these people—that it required a great deal of skill and patience to get at the real truth; but he felt perfectly certain, and he was sure that hon. Members would agree, that Colonel Warren had successfully brought homo to these men the guilt with which they were charged; and that he had done his best, not to make reparation, but to inflict punishment upon them for the murder of these unfortunate gentlemen. In answer to the speeches that had been made, he had given the plainest explanation he could as to the objects of the Expedition, and the part which the First Lord of the Admiralty had taken in it, and he felt sure the Committee would approve of what he had done.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, that, in reading from the letter which was now recognized as genuine, and which had appeared in The Times, the hon. Gentleman had forgotten to quote some important sentences from the letter given in The Times, in which Colonel Warren said— The Sultan has declared Arabi a rebel. He has sent 6,000 troops with English officers to support the Sultan's Khedive, to act with the English, and reduce Arabi to submission. Your old friend Khedive Wilson is with the troops, who have now landed at Port Said. After that, he said— the Governor of El Arishe and Nathl will soon be prisoners. Do not think of obliging men who are rebels to your Sultan. Clearly those sentences showed that Colonel Warren was aware that the Governors of Nakhl and El Arishe were at the head of the local resistance to the English invasion, and yet the Committee was now to be told again this story—that the attack upon the English Mission was a mere matter of attack by isolated Bedouins working for mere lucre. There was a little political excitement about it; that was all that the hon. Gentleman would admit. He found also that in that letter from Tor, on November 10, Colonel Warren stated that during the recent investigation concerning the disappearance of Professor Palmer and his party, he had ascertained that there was a general impression, both at that place and at Suez, that the Governor of El Arishe was employing stringent mea- sures to induce the Bedouins of the Desert to make common cause against the Christians and the Europeans. There was another matter which might have occurred to the hon. Gentleman—that Professor Palmer and his party shed blood and took life before their blood was shed and their lives were taken. When the Arabs first attempted to intercept and capture the party there were shots fired on both sides— Meter Sofieh asserts that there were shots fired, and that he and Professor Palmer fired, and that the remainder were unharmed. Shots certainly appear to have been exchanged, for the camel of Salami Ibu Azed was shot in the head, and Ayed, a Hawetat, is supposed to have been wounded; and Muret died six days afterwards. It was a matter of importance which should be borne in mind, that these men were engaged in bribing a levée en masse, not to oppose the English, and were prepared not only to spend money, but to shed blood in the undertaking. The hon. Gentleman had spoken of honest asterisks. They were comparatively honest, for it would have been much more dishonest to have given fictitious names, and after listening to the enlightening voice of the hon. Member, on the whole, he thought the Committee had every reason to hold in high esteem the hon. Gentleman's preference for honest asterisks—at least, to fictitious interpolations. With a delicacy only equalled by its propriety, the Representative of the Admiralty had suggested that he (Mr. O'Donnell) was anxious in some way to have these names put in so that their publication might endanger the lives of the men holding those names. He was not aware that the Blue Books circulated largely in the Arabian Desert, and seeing that the hon. Gentleman had control over the nominal Government of Egypt, he could, no doubt, prevent Hansard, in a vernacular edition, circulating among the Arabs. These men had been tried, and found guilty, and hanged. Was that with the connivance of Her Majesty's Government? Were they hanged on a charge of murder for money, which this Committee knew was unfounded? Were the lives of these men taken with the connivance of Her Majesty's Government? He called this as atrocious an assassination as would be the hanging of five English soldiers who shot down Arab spies. The hon. Gentleman made light of the offences committed by Professor Palmer's party. Prom an English point of view, he would say let every honour be paid to Professor Palmer and his companions, for they sacrificed their lives for their country; but they not only underwent a soldier's risk, but they knew that they were putting their necks into the halter by the task they undertook. If a similar task had been undertaken by any Frenchman during the German invasion of France, any German sergeant who had caught a Frenchman cutting down telegraph wires would have blown his brains out without a court martial or a word of delay or explanation. Yet these men, the creatures of their Chiefs, acting in a cause they believed to be not only patriotic but sacred, had been put to death after a mock trial, in order to spare somebody from making further investigations! The conclusion he drew was not only drawn by him, but by the general public opinion of the country. It was drawn by all who had any acquaintance with the facts of the case and the facts in the Blue Books. The evening newspapers of Saturday had agreed that, whether or not the actual perpetrators of the murder of Professor Palmer had been executed, unquestionably the original instigators had not been brought to justice; and The Times of Saturday had also said that— After reading the Papers on the subject, the painful impression prevails that, if the perpetrators of the crime had been brought to justice, the instigators of the crime were still at large But there was no crime in the matter. It was a legitimate offence, and these men were as much entitled by Holy Law to defend their country as were the Natives of any other country. One thing had resulted from this debate. There was an end to the camel-purchasing story. It was published to the ends of the world, and it could not be denied that these gentlemen received money to purchase the allegiance of the Arabs.

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

said, the hon. Gentleman having made a violent attack on the Government had, no doubt, through inadvertence, absented himself during his reply to that attack. He had given an elaborate and detailed account of the whole object of the Expedition, and distinctly denied that Professor Palmer or any of his party had any power whatever, or was fur- nished with any funds for the purpose of buying the allegiance of anyone.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, the hon. Gentleman would remember that after he had spoken the hon. Gentleman did not rise, but that a Member of the Irish Party rose. He was, therefore, not responsible for not supposing that the hon. Gentleman would choose the hour when he (Mr. O'Donnell) was at dinner in order to make his explanation. He had no doubt the hon. Gentleman made an elaborate explanation, but he had got a clear explanation which was perfectly convincing. The telegram from Sir Beauchamp Seymour to the Admiralty on August 6th said— Palmer in letter of August 1st at Suez writes that if precisely instructed as to service required of Bedouins, and furnished with funds, he believes he could buy the allegiance of 50,000 at a cost of from £20,000 to £30,000. What elaborate explanation would the hon. Gentleman put on that? Then there was the reply of the Admiralty to Sir William Ilewett— Admiral reports Palmer's proposal of 1st August. Instruct Palmer to keep Bedouins available for patrol or transport on Canal. A reasonable amount may be spent, but larger engagements are not to be entered into until General arrives, and has been consulted. That was to say, the Admiralty consented to expend money on the Bedouins, who otherwise might have opposed the British operations on the Canal, in order to make them available for patrol and transport in the service of the invader of their country. Was not that bribing and seducing the Bedouins from their natural allegiance? There could be no clearer explanation than the six lines of this simple telegram. There were only £3,000 spent! Did the hon. Gentleman remember that in consequence of the unfortunate and summary stoppage of Professor Palmer's Mission, he had not time to spend even those £3,000? They were part of the money stolen from the Expedition; and but for the precautions taken by the Arab tribes in charge of the at portion of the country, if the English Mission had succeeded in penetrating that country, was there any doubt that there would have been plenty of money forthcoming in addition to the £3,000 in order to buy Bedouins by the thousand for patrol and transport or any other purpose? Ono great and valuable result of this discussion was that some light had been thrown on the means by which the great and glorious Liberal victory in Egypt was attained. There was as much gold as lead and steel in that campaign.

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

observed that the hon. Gentleman had stated that Professor Palmer's duty was not to bribe the Bedouins with money, but to conciliate them. He wished to ask how Bedouins could be conciliated without being bribed?

MR. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN

replied that Professor Palmer's influence among the Bedouins was very great. He was in great favour with them, and had remarkable powers of ingratiating himself with people of that kind. From his habits he was very acceptable to them, and had great power of getting them on his side. The hon. Member for Dungarvan had repeated what he had already denied, but he thought he could appeal with confidence from that hon. Member to the hon. Member behind him (Mr. T. P. O'Connor), who had made some reasonable remarks on the subject, and had listened to his explanation, whether he had given a complete answer or not?

Question put, and negatived.

Original Question put, and agreed to

(2.)£17,500, Civil Charges of Expedition to Egypt.