§ Order for Committee read.
MR. GLADSTONEI rise, Sir, to move that you do now leave the Chair on this Bill, and I need not detain the House at any length. There is, however, a short explanation which I wish to offer. In the first place, I am sorry to have found that, without my intention, an expression used by me in a former debate upon this Bill has given offence to Lord Strathnairn. I used the expression, I believe, that the services of Lord Strathnairn were not special. I meant to use that phrase in a particular narrow and technical sense; and to express the fact that Lord Strathnairn's distinctions were not gained in any special expedition, like those of Commanders sent specially on a particular service. Lord Strathnairn, I believe, is not aware of this. Certainly, nothing could be more repugnant to my feelings than to have said anything derogatory to the noble and gallant Lord. I had no intention of comparing one distinguished General with another; and I am bound to say that I think the services of Lord Strathnairn will stand upon their own footing, and are not in the least danger of disparagement, even if I had intended to say anything tending towards their disparagement. There is also another matter I wish to mention. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman the Member for Londonderry (Mr. Lewis) is in his place or not; but, on a former occasion, he made what was understood to be an accusation against me for having charged Sir Frederick Roberts with cruelty in Afghanistan, and he read an extract from a letter of mine, which he has been good enough to place into my hands. I could not recollect at the time the accusation was made what I had 289 really said in the letter; but, upon referring to the letter, I am not surprised, but I am rather glad, to find I made no reference whatever to Sir Frederick Roberts. I was aware General Roberts' name was connected with the allegations which had been made with regard to the great severity supposed to have been exercised over the people of Afghanistan. I made no reference to him whatever, but I recited a great number of accusations, a great number of imputations connected with the Afghan Expedition, en which I entertained very strong opinions indeed, and I expressed at the time my hope that some of these accusations, at all events, would be denied. The accusations were subsequently denied; and on one occasion, shortly afterwards—on the 25th of March in the same year—when I had the honour of addressing a meeting in Mid Lothian, I adverted to the subject, and noticed the denial, and stated with what great satisfaction I found that General Roberts, who had been accused, had been able to deny the charges made against him. I think it due to General Roberts and to myself to make these few observations, as the statement of the hon. Member for Londonderry was calculated—no doubt unintentionally—to mislead the House. With regard to the Bill now before us, I have already adverted briefly to the manner in which we have arrived at the sum mentioned in it; and, therefore, I do not think I need dwell upon it now. The House, I imagine, has heard as much as it is disposed to hear on this question. There is, however, one word I wish to say. I heard some hon. Gentlemen say—Gentlemen who are entitled to great respect, and who speak with great sincerity and integrity of purpose—I heard them say they did not think that Naval and Military Officers ought to receive special rewards. They ought, these hon. Gentlemen said, to be sufficiently paid, and if they were sufficiently paid, that ought to be enough, and we ought not to have these rewards to give. I differ from that view. I do not think it sound. I am not one of those who think this country treats with illiberality any class of its servants, Naval, Military, or Civil; but I hold this distinctly—that while the public must be content to pay for average and ordinary service, distinguished and illustrious service in the Military Profession particularly ought to be made a subject of 290 special reward. What is military service and military life?—but an affair for the most part requiring very ordinary exertion. The common routine of it does not call for great exertion, does not impose great anxieties and great risks, does not make any extraordinary demand upon the human faculties; and when you put a man in charge of the handling of a great body of troops, under the condition of modern warfare, when he has to concentrate them at a given spot, at a given time, and bring them into conflict with the enemy in such a way as to save human life amongst the troops to the greatest extent, then, I say, you do make upon the human faculties, perhaps, the very greatest exertion that they are ever called upon to bear; and I hold that, if anything deserves reward, it is exertion of this kind by Commanders charged with those great responsibilities on behalf of the Crown of this country. That is a ground upon which I wish principally to put the matter; but I must say that if I am only to look at it prudentially, and from a point of view of consequences, I am persuaded that it is wise and prudent to reward great Commanders for great services. I do not mean to say, for one moment, that any of our English Commanders would exert themselves any the more in the hope of reward; but I think that if the hope of reward can supply to them additional stimulus, it is very well that we should offer additional stimulus in times of great national crises. Let those who grudge these rewards consider what is the consequence of discouraging those great operations, and consider how hundreds and thousands of lives, how many millions of treasure, how the hope and reputation of the country are staked upon the just and manly exercise of the highest faculties of the mind on those great occasions, and what consequences would ensue from even the slightest miscalculation and error on the part of our great Commanders. I am satisfied, in point of policy and in point of principle, that I am only giving expression to the general sense of the House when I say that the principle of the proposal of this kind is a sound principle. It has already received the assent of an overwhelming majority of the House, and I am convinced that the subsequent stages of this measure will receive the support of the House generally.
291 Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."—(Mr. Gladstone.)
§ MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, he was sorry to inflict any remarks upon hon. Members at that late hour of the night (12.10); but he did not make time, and it was not his fault that it was now so late. He confessed that the change that had been made in the Bill by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was an advantageous one. He thought that if they were to make these grants at all, they ought to be generous, and make the grants out of their own money, and not throw the burden of them upon posterity. Although, however, it was now proposed to pay the sum at once, Lord Wolseley had only to invest the £30,000 in the Funds in order to have a pension in sœcula sœculorum. He had no wish to go into the extraneous matters which had cropped up in this debate. He admitted that Lord Wolseley was not responsible for the war, and he admitted the noble Lord's capacity as a General. He had no doubt that if Lord Wolseley had to contend with an enemy "worthy of his steel" he would give a good account of himself; but where he (Mr. Labouchere) disagreed with the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister was in thinking that Lord Wolseley did "nothing" in Egypt which could be called an illustrious exploit. As a matter of fact, what did Lord Wolseley do? He went to Ismailia, and from there marched his men to Cairo. He took the straight road, and on the road he found a Let of miserable Arabs entrenched; he advanced, and the Arabs ran away. That was the whole history of the exploit in Egypt. Let him ask what they would have thought if Lord Wolseley had been defeated. They could not imagine any such contingency, and, therefore, he could not see why they ought to give him any special reward, because what had occurred was what they only anticipated. He did not see the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his place; had he done so, he would have asked the right hon. Gentleman to have supported him in the proposal, that the House do resolve itself into Committee upon that day three months. The other day, when someone was protesting against the large amount spent upon the armaments, the Chancellor of 292 the Exchequer said, in effect—"You do not understand that you spend these large amounts as a species of insurance; when you have a full and efficient army you know that this army is able to vanquish an enemy in a very short time." And the right hon. Gentleman cited this very case of Egypt as an instance of what was the necessary consequence of our yearly expenditure of a very large sum in our armaments. Without going to any further length into what Lord Wolseley did out in Egypt, he would point out to the House that a new light had been thrown on the matter since this Bill was brought in. Since the introduction of the Bill they had received the Report of Lord Morley's Commission on the Hospitals. He did not want to go at any length into the medical question; but he would take Lord Wolseley himself as his principal authority why this money ought not to be granted to the noble and gallant Lord. Lord Wolseley had distinctly said that the mode in which the sick were treated in the hospitals in Egypt was most disgraceful. He (Mr. Labouchere) held Lord Wolseley responsible for that. Lord Wolseley admitted the fact, but chose to throw the responsibility on others. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister rather put the matter on the ground that the campaign in Egypt was a political matter. [Mr. GLADSTONE: No; not political, prudential.] The right hon. Gentleman, then, said that they ought to make this grant for prudential reasons; that if they did not make it there might be a miscarriage, and a miscarriage would be something dreadful. He (Mr. Labouchere) could hardly suppose that any English General would say to himself—"I am not going to receive £30,000 if I win this battle, so I won't win it." He thought they might always count upon the amour propre of actuating our Generals; we might always count upon them winning, for the sake of their own honour, any engagement in which they were concerned if it were possible to do so. He had no doubt that Lord Wolseley did estimate far more than any money grant the glory of having gained a victory in Egypt. Therefore, if they were only to vote this money for prudential reasons, he thought they might save themselves £30,000. His objection, however, went to the whole root of these grants. He admitted there might be exceptional 293 services, that there might be some great victory like that of Waterleo, or like some of the achievements of General Moltke, in which exception ought to be made. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, as he understood it, laid it down that the rule ought to be, that whenever an Expedition was successful a considerable grant ought to be made. That was the principle upon which he quite admitted Parliament had proceeded for a very considerable time. It proceeded on that principle with regard to Lord Wolseley himself in the case of the Ashantee War. What was the Ashantee War? He had no doubt that Lord Wolseley efficiently performed his duty; but it could not be supposed that because he gained a victory over savages armed with "flint-locks," it was proper that he should receive £25,000; and now, because he had slaughtered a few thousand Arabs, he should receive £30,000 at the present moment. He (Mr. Labouchere) ventured to contend that they had already very largely rewarded Lord Wolseley. He had been made a Peer, he had received a considerable number of decorations, and there had been a Vote of Thanks passed to Lord Wolseley in this House. There was a grant of £40,000 made to the Army, and of that he understood that £1,000 went to Lord Wolseley himself. It could not be said that Lord Wolseley had not been well rewarded for this Campaign; and it could not be said that he came to the House in formâ pauperis. He already occupied a position for which he received £2,700 per annum. In fact, he received the plums of the Profession, which, as a rule, were reserved for successful Generals. Lord Wolseley already held the best paid position in the Army, with the exception of the Commander-in-Chief. Besides that, when he was in command of the Army in Egypt, he received a trifle under £10 per diem and very large rations. Looking upon this as a monetary question, Lord Wolseley had been very well paid. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had told the House that they ought to give Lord Wolseley this money because he had been made a Peer. He (Mr. Labouchere) thought that this was an exceedingly dangerous doctrine. He confessed he himself did not know why Lord Wolseley's children and great grandchildren should legislate for this 294 country; but, still, if they did establish the principle that these Peerages were to be granted, surely the country ought not to be called upon to vote at the same time a grant of £30,000, in order that the new Peer might properly sustain the peerage granted to him. He (Mr. Labouchere) was not a great admirer of the hereditary Chamber, and he thought he should find many persons to agree, that the sooner this hereditary Chamber came to an end the better it would be; especially if it was to be recruited at the cost of the country of £30,000 per head. He was somewhat surprised to hear the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Cowen) say that it was mean and shabby to discuss this Bill at all, and that we ought to avoid the great evils of Democracy, corruption, and meanness. The hon. Gentleman cited America as an example; but he (Mr. Labouchere) thought that this was very unfair, because America had been lavishly generous with their soldiers. They dealt with' their soldiers in a very different way from us. It was true that Grant, and Sherman, and Sheridan had received nothing; they would have considered it an insult had anything been offered to them. ["Oh, oh!"] Hon. Gentlemen did not seem to understand the feeling which actuated Democracies. He (Mr. Labouchere) re-asserted that those great American Generals would have considered it an insult had they been offered any reward, and that it would have gone against the feeling of the entire community in America if anything had been given to them. Let him remind the House of what America had done for her soldiers. Immediately after the war they voted 13 dollars per month to every man who was wounded, and who could not support himself; about a year ago, however, they increased the grant from 13 dollars per month to 30 dollars, and all the men who fought in the war had all the arrears paid up—that was to say, they had the difference paid to them between 13 and 30 dollars per month from the time they were wounded. It had been estimated that that would amount in the end to £80,000,000 sterling. It might be that our system of giving £30,000 to a General, and 3s. 6d. per week to men who had lost their legs and arms, was a good system. It might be that the American system was a bad one—namely, that of giving nothing to 295 Generals, and giving £80,000,000 sterling to soldiers; but he did not think they could fairly say that America had been stingy in the matter. Now, Lord Wolseley made a speech at the Mansion House, and it seemed an unfortunate thing that our Generals and Admirals were exceedingly fond of airing their eloquence before they received their money. Lord Wolseley, speaking of the officers, said they knew very well that honours in war meant promotion, and those things that were dear to mankind; but the hopes of the rank and file of the Army were different. Few honours and rewards wore in store for them, and they were to content themselves with the most ennobling of all convictions—that of having done their duty. He (Mr. Labouchere) hardly thought that the officers of the Army would accept this view of the motive which actuated them. If officers fought for money and reward, the soldiers fought from a conviction that they ought to do their duty. It was not surprising that while they found many gentlemen ready to be officers, it was difficult to keep up the rank and file. He thought no more cogent reason against the system of rewarding Generals had ever been used than that contained in the words of Lord Wolseley himself. If it were stingy not to give to officers, let him ask whether they considered themselves stingy in not giving to statesmen? He believed there were only four pensions given to Ministers; and it must be remembered that two things were necessary in the case of pensions to statesmen. In the first place, an ex-Minister was not to be in receipt, at the time he received the pension, of any salary; whereas Lord Wolseley was now receiving £2,700 a-year. In the second place, it was necessary that an ex-statesman, when receiving a pension, should not have any means of his own adequate for his rank as an ex-Minister. Now, could anyone tell him what the difference was? Why was a soldier to receive this pension, and a statesman not? He did not want to draw invidious comparisons, but let them take the present Prime Minister and the present Leader of the Opposition, for instance. Surely, these right hon. Gentlemen had done as much for the country, they had served the country as well as Lord Wolseley, yet they were not to receive a pension. Literary men, 296 for instance, received nothing from the country. If a literary man spent years and years in writing works of benefit for the country, and if his wife and children were without the means of support, what did they receive? From £100 to £150 per annum. The only ground for any difference was that there was precedent for the one, and there was no precedent for the other. He really did think that it was time that they should look at those matters upon their intrinsic merits. Were they who belonged to the Liberal Party, and who inscribed on their banner "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform"—were they to vote £30,000 because they were told that sums of the like nature were voted under similar circumstances by their Predecessors? Precedent to him had a perfectly homely sound in finance, and when "precedent" was argued he always knew that something was about to be done for which there was no valid reason. Were there not precedents for sinecures; were there not precedents for perpetual pensions? They could find precedents for almost every abuse imaginable, and yet it was argued by the Prime Minister, as a reason for giving this money, that there were precedents for it. If there were a thousand precedents he (Mr. Labouchere) should consider it no argument. What was the idea upon which these military grants were based? Why, the idea was that there was something glorious in military pursuits—that there was more glory in killing than curing, and in curtailing and destroying human life than in lengthening and increasing it. The tendency of all this was to produce a military spirit—he did not mean the spirit which would induce everyone to defend his country if it were attacked, but that which dragged us into these foreign enterprizes, and made us plume ourselves that we were playing a great part before Heaven and earth, whilst what we were really doing was violating a foreign country, and destroying the peace and happiness of, perhaps, millions of people. The hon. Member for Berkshire (Mr. Walter) had told them the other day that he rejoiced at this war, and that it was a very good thing, because it re-established our prestige. [An hon. MEMBER: It did do so.] So that we were to kill any number of Egyptians and go on with these wars in order to "re-establish our prestige." 297 Well, his view of the matter was this—that, in the first place, we did not require to re-establish our prestige; and that, in. the second place, we had not shown ourselves a great military nation by this Expedition to Egypt. He respected the soldier and he respected the officer; but he did not respect the Military Profession as in any way superior or in any way more ennobling than any other. When he saw a general coming back from Egypt, or some other officer riding through the streets surrounded by aides-de-camp and soldiers brandishing knives, he did not throw up his hat in the air and rejoice. We had far greater heroes at home. He believed the artizan and labourer who gallantly fought against want and penury, and vanquished them, did a far nobler thing than these military people. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister would be kind enough to bear in mind in regard to these grants that almost all the Radical Clubs in the country had protested against them. Let the Government remember this—if they ignored Radical opinions and Radicals, for his own part he believed that they would have reason to rue it at the next General Election. He begged to move that the House resolve itself into Committee on that day three months.
DR. CAMERONsaid, that he seconded the opposition to the Bill, for the purpose of vindicating the Medical Department in Egypt against the charges which Lord Wolseley had, he (Dr. Cameron) thought, very ungenerously brought against it, and which had been sent forth to the world in all their nakedness, owing to the action of a Member of the Government in prematurely handing to one single newspaper a copy of the Report of the Morley Committee. So far as results were concerned, the Medical Department in Egypt could beast of results as brilliant in their way as those of Tel-el-Kebir, results secured by scientific knowledge and hard work. There had been bungling in the Medical Department, as in other Departments, but it alone had been harshly criticized. Lord Wolseley had himself severely criticized it. He (Dr. Cameron) did not say that the severity of Lord Wolseley's criticism on the shortcomings he denounced was unjustified; but he proposed to show that, for those shortcomings, Lord Wolseley alone was responsible, and his criticisms, 298 therefore, reflected on himself alone. Lord Wolseley denounced the state of the hospitals at Ismailia and Cairo, and there was a chorus of complaint about the absence of medical equipments and requirements along the line of operations. Well, who was responsible for that? The Carthage was the principal hospital ship. She had 326 tons of hospital equipment on beard, including three movable and two stationary hospitals. It would be remembered that the seizure of Ismailia with the change of base from Alexandria to that town was effected with the greatest secrecy. The change of base involved an entire change in the medical arrangements of the campaign; but the Surgeon General was never informed regarding it; he knew nothing about it, in fact, until he found himself in the Canal. He (Dr. Cameron) did not say that Lord Wolseley was not perfectly justified, on military considerations, in keeping his secret to himself; but, if he did so, he ought to bear the responsibility, and not attempt to throw it on other people's shoulders. Had he disclosed his intention to the Medical Department, or had he simply instructed the Carthage to be ordered to accompany the transports, she might have arrived with them at Ismailia on the 21st or 22nd. Instead of that, the Medical Department, being kept in entire ignorance of the change of base, the Carthage did not arrive at Ismailia until August 26th, and could not get her stores landed till the 27th and following days. Meanwhile, the empty palace had been handed over as a hospital to the Surgeon General on the 22nd; engagements had taken place on the 24th, 25th, and 28th; and the changes which the arrival of the Carthage, about that busy time, involved added to the work and confusion. Had she and the Courland arrived, as they might have done, in time; had Lord Wolseley but given a hint, there was evidence to show that there would have been no hitch whatever. But not only was the Surgeon General kept in ignorance of the intended change of base, but when the order for embarkation, issued at Alexandria on August 17, and involving an entire redistribution of the Medical Staff, was drawn up, he was never consulted about it. Had those orders been carried out, they would have upset the whole medical system, and they had to be abandoned. He was 299 informed that the Commissary General also had been kept in ignorance of the proposed change of base to Ismailia. He did not know whether that officer had been consulted regarding the provisions concerning the Commissariat embodied in the Embarkation Orders of August 17; but, if not, he thought that the Army might be congratulated on having fared so well as it did, and that many of the faults laid at the door of the Commissariat might, with greater justice, be charged elsewhere. The mention of the Commissariat reminded him that Lord Wolseley repeatedly charged the Medical Staff with incapacity, with "lack of initiative," he called it, in not undertaking the work of the Commissariat Department, and purchasing against them in the local markets. Lord Wolseley had confessed, before Lord Morley's Committee, that he was ignorant of an Order which had been issued on the subject by the Minister for War no later than August 5, and which distinctly and peremptorily laid down the duties of medical officers in the matter. The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Childers) wrote as follows upon the subject:—
It is essential that, except in the case of petty office or departmental purchases (which may be made by heads of Departments), there should be but one purchasing Department in the local markets, and all articles required should be supplied by means of requisitions upon the Commissariat.Had Lord Wolseley known of the existence of that Order, he would have known that it was his business not to find fault with the Medical Staff for adhering to it, but to insist on the Commissariat, on whom the Circular laid the responsibility, performing its own proper functions. Being ignorant of the Order, Lord Wolseley had omitted to perform what was really his own duty in the matter. Lord Wolseley found great fault with the system of evacuating the sick from Egypt, and cast the blame of it entirely upon the Medical Department. In answer to Question 6,212, he said—I think that the Medical Department at this time were beginning to feel a little frightened at what had taken place. The hospitals were in such bad order that they got rid of the patients by putting them on board ship, and sending them to England. In many cases, men were sent off who would have been well in a few days.300 Now, what were the facts? One of the earliest decisions arrived at, as to the medical plan of the campaign, was that Cyprus should be used for a base hospital. It was only 24 hours' sail from Egypt, and the design was that the less serious cases should be sent there to recover; and, when convalescent, rejoin their regiments. The original intention was that the hospital should be established on the high land at Troodos; but, on August 4, the Director General, the Surgeon General, and the Chief of the Staff, agreed that the hospital at Troodos should be given up, and a hospital established instead at Polymenia, near the port of disembarkation. The Minute on this subject was approved by the Secretary of State for War. In the proceedings of the Committee reference was made to another Order, sent out by the Secretary of State for War on August 9, that Cyprus should be abandoned altogether; that it should not be used or relied on for hospital purposes until October. Now, that Order was never communicated to the Surgeon General. He never heard of it till January last. He (Dr. Cameron) had asked a Question on the subject, but could get no information. The noble Marquess the present Minister for War (the Marquess of Hartington) referred him to the evidence before Lord Morley's Committee. He had looked there, and this was what he found. On August 30, the Carthage was at Ismailia, with 196 sick on board, ready to sail for Cyprus, when she was suddenly stopped by order of Lord Wolseley. Colonel Lord William Seymour, attached to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, had given some clear and impartial evidence, which explained what occurred. In reply to Question 1,638, Lord William Seymour said—There was one thing which very much put out the whole medical arrangements, which was that the Surgeon General had sent away a ship almost empty—I think it was the Orontes— saying he had no further use for her, thinking that he could send the Carthage to Cyprus; but in the afternoon, he got an order that Cyprus was not to be used as a hospital. That threw 400 sick on his hands which he was not prepared for.Again (Question 1,706), Lord William Seymour narrated a conversation which he had had with the Surgeon General on the occasion, in which that gentleman said— 301I have just been disappointed of the whole hospital at Cyprus; I have been told not to send any sick there. I wish now I had been able to send more away in the Orontes. Instead of the Carthage making a 24 hours' trip to Cyprus, she will probably have a much longer one to make to Malta.This, be it remembered, was on August 30, at a moment when there had been three engagements within the six preceding days. Surgeon General Sir James Hanbury, in his evidence before the Commission, supplemented this evidence by an account of a conversation which he himself had had with Lord Wolseley on the following day, August 31. He told him that the Director General at home had instructed him to use Cyprus for slight cases—As a sort of stopgap to prevent too rapid evacuation to England—exactly the fault of which Lord Wolseley now complained. What Lord Wolseley then said, according to the Surgeon General, was this—Dr. Crawford does not know Cyprus as well as I do. It is much more unhealthy than this, and I believe the best way is to send the sick to England.And yet, in the face of that statement, Lord Wolseley now came forward and accused the Department of having become frightened at what had occurred, and of shipping the sick to England in order to got them off their own hands. To say the least of it, they should have some explanation of this very irreconcilable evidence. But the vacillation regarding Cyprus did not end with the stoppage of the Carthage on August 30. After further communication with Cyprus, the Chief of the Staff, on September 4, gave the Order—"Sick may be sent to Cyprus." On September 6, 72 sick were there, and, on September 13, 300 were shipped and ready to start, when, owing to the decisive result of Tel-el-Kebir, their destination was altered, and they were sent home. As the result of this shilly-shallying, the hospital was locked up at Cyprus when most needed in Egypt, and did not arrive at Alexandria until September 30. There was some further delay in getting it on to Cairo. Hence the unfurnished state of the Cairo hospital, of which Lord Wolseley complained. Now, had the hospital at Cyprus been used, as originally intended, it would have been invaluable. Had the Surgeon General been informed 302 that it was not to be used, it would have been his duty to bring its Staff and equipment to Egypt, where extra accommodation was much required. But he was neither allowed to use Cyprus, nor told that he was not to be allowed to rely on it, as arranged, until the first batch of sick were on beard ship on their way thither. Even then, he was not told that the Cyprus hospital had been abandoned, and that he was free to utilize it elsewhere; but he was kept in suspense till the end of the war, and the services of the Cyprus establishment was thus lost during the entire campaign. Three times after Tel-el-Kebir—on September 16, 24, and 30—Lord Wolseley had written or telegraphed home, to the effect that the Medical Department was "everything that could be desired," that "it reflected the greatest credit on the Surgeon General," and that "it was working to his entire satisfaction;" and then he had come before Lord Morley's Committee, and said that he "never saw a properly-equipped field-hospital during the war;" that—Medical officers constantly held others responsible for failing to do what he considers should have been their own principal duties—purchasing against the Commissariat, to wit—and that heSupposes the base-hospital was never brought from Cyprus to provide accommodation at Ismailia, because the principal medical officer never thought of it at the time, or never brought the subject forward.The Chief of the Staff, Sir John Adye, in his evidence, had not only given a much more favourable account of the actual state of things in the military hospitals; but he had frankly told the Committee that, from the nature of the campaign, military considerations, supreme above everything else, had compelled troops to be sent forward to Kassassin in advance of supplies, in advance even of ammunition, and, of course, in advance of medical appliances and comforts. Had Lord Wolseley impressed this fact upon the Committee, and accepted the responsibility that properly devolved on him, not a word could have been said. But what he (Dr. Cameron) complained of was that, for a state of things entirely the result of his own arbitrary action, he had chosen to cast the blame upon the Medi- 303 cal Department of the Army. Lord Wolseley found fault with the Medical Staff for not "taking the initiative," and undertaking the work of another Department. After the experience they had had of his Lordship's baneful fondness for taking the initiative, and undertaking the management of the Medical Department, of which he know nothing, but whose responsible heads he never appeared to think it worth while to consult, it seemed to him (Dr. Cameron) a matter of congratulation that one class of officers, at least, among those serving under him, had been found who were content to devote themselves strictly to their own duties. To that it was to be attributed that, despite all that Lord Wolseley had done to mar their efficiency, they had been able to bring the European forces through this arduous and trying campaign, in an unhealthy climate, with a total death-rate, per 1,000 per annum, including deaths in battle, from sickness and from wounds, exceeding by a mere fraction that which normally prevailed in the civil population of this Metropolis. To this, it was to be attributed that they had been able entirely to ward off pyæmia, to deprive ophthalmia of its terror, and to deal with the wounded after Tel-el-Kebir, with a promptitude and efficiency characterized by the Committee as unparalleled in military history. Lord Wolseley had talked a great deal about initiative; but he (Dr. Cameron) considered that he would have displayed a much sounder and wiser initiative, as well as much more intelligent solicitude for the well-being of the sick and wounded, if he had instructed the Surgeon General to order the Carthage to accompany the transports to Ismailia, and, acquainting him with his views regarding Cyprus, had left him to utilize its hospital appliances elsewhere, than he displayed in acting as he had done—leaving the Medical Department in ignorance of his intentions and decisions; arbitrarily overturning its most fundamental arrangements; writing home that all was well, "false and malicious reports to the contrary notwithstanding;" and then coming home and coolly casting on the shoulders of the Medical Department the entire responsibility for shortcomings directly the outcome of his own peculiar mode of conducting the medical business of a campaign.304 Amendment proposed, to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "this House will, upon this day three months, resolve itself into the said Committee," —(Mr. Labouchere,)—instead thereof.
Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."
§ MR. GIBSONsaid, he should like to make one or two very short observations in consequence of what had fallen from the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron). Everyone must be aware of the great interest the hon. Member had taken in the particular subject he had brought under the notice of the House, and the right he had to speak on this subject with authority. He (Mr. Gibson) himself took considerable interest in the matter from the point of view from which the hon. Member bad approached the question, and should himself be prepared to vindicate and assert the position of the Medical Service and those who were responsible for it at a more convenient time, when the discussion which would take place could be reported in a manner that was essential for the proper understanding of the case and the due vindication of this great Service. He had read with all the care he could the charges which had been made against the Medical Service in Egypt. He had read very closely the evidence of Lord Wolseley and of the distinguished Medical Officers who were responsible for the Medical Service, and his opinion was that the charges against the Medical Service could be placed in the point of view indicated by the hon. Member for Glasgow, and that they could be thoroughly investigated and placed before the public opinion of the country in a fair and favourable light. At the proper time he should himself be prepared to call attention to these charges and to refute them to the best of his ability, and, if he might presume to say so without offence, to challenge all those who held a contrary opinion to repeat these charges in the the face of day, and express their belief in them. When his challenge was put forward he would undertake to say that there would be very few who, on their responsibility, would be found to get up and defend the charges which had been made against the Medical Department. 305 It was another thing to consider how far these charges should imperil the defeat of the Grant now proposed to be given to the General who had accomplished his military duties so successfully. He was simply asserting his own views. He yielded to none in his desire to defend the position of the Medical Profession; but he believed, also, he spoke with the approval and sanction of the Medical Profession. Only to-day he had spoken with some of the most eminent medical officers who had served in Egypt, and they had expressed a hope that the vindication of their position should not in any degree be used to imperil any grant to the illustrious General who had so successfully carried out the campaign. It would be found, he believed, that Lord Wolseley, in his despatches from the seat of war, which had been referred to by his hon. Friend (Dr. Cameron), had throughout expressed a desire that the Medical Service should have its full share of justice—that it should be denied no reward and no advantage that would be offered by the country, and in no case had he referred in his despatches in ungenerous, unworthy, or disparaging terms to those responsible for the medical conduct of the war. It would be found that these medical officers had received their share of reward for their services in the East. The true reading of Lord Wolseley's evidence, he thought, would be found in those four or five passages where he stated that he was giving his evidence because he was summoned there before the Committee, which had to consider not so much the Egyptian War as the methods which were to be adopted, of an improved and altered character, in future campaigns. Lord Wolseley stated—he (Mr. Gibson) had the documents with him, but would not trouble the House with them now—that he was not making charges against individuals, but simply stating wherein he thought the existing system had failed. That, he thought, was the view Lord Wolseley had intended to present to the Committee, and he could readily make a distinction between the time Lord Wolseley was writing despatches about the conduct of individuals and the way in which the sick were treated, and the time when, before the Committee, he was indicating that it might be desirable to have a new and improved system. He 306 would only refer to two questions put to Lord Wolseley—there were four or five on this point, but he would only refer to two—namely, numbers 6,164 and 6,176. In reply to the first, Lord Wolseley said—"It was the system that was bad;" and, in answer to the second, he said—
I think I never came across a medical officer during the whole campaign that really did not work, according to his lights, as hard as any man in the whole Army. It is the system I find fault with. I do not for one moment wish to say that the officers were not good.Ho did not concur in all the statements that Lord Wolseley had made before Lord Morley's Committee in reference to the Medical Department of the Army; but he trusted that the evidence given before that Committee, and the opposite views held with regard to that evidence, would not in the slightest degree interfere with the reward to be given by this House at the rate measured by the Government to the distinguished Commander to whom the House had recently awarded its Thanks.
§ COLONEL O'BEIRNEsaid, he thought that when Lord Wolseley received the Thanks of Parliament the incidents of this campaign were not well known to the House; nor did the House know the character of the enemy he had to encounter, who were simply a rabble, who did not understand the use of their arms. He objected to placing Lord Wolseley, by means of this reward, on a level with Viscount Gough, Lord Hardinge, and other distinguished Generals. Lord Wolseley had a salary of £2,700 as Adjutant General at the Horse Guards, and he thought that ought to be taken into account, and also because that was almost a permanent appointment, as when once an officer got on to the Staff he was very rarely removed. The five years' rule was theoretically supposed to apply, but in reality it did not. The Prime Minister had said, with regard to Tel-el-Kebir, that Lord Wolseley deserved the highest thanks for having captured that without loss of life; but he could not see much strategy in manœuvring an Army against troops who did not know how to fight. He simply executed a movement during the night in imitation of the Russians at Plevna; there was nothing very brilliant in that manœuvre, and he thought it was amply acknowledged by the Thanks of the House.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONI think the House will not desire that I should follow at any length the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere) who has moved this Amendment to the Motion. The hon. Member devoted the greater part of his speech to the views he entertained of the principle of rewarding such services as these by pensions or pecuniary grants. That is a subject which the House has discussed on several occasions, and upon which it was shown by very large majorities unmistakable opinions. On the second reading of this Bill we discussed the principle of the proposed annuity, and I think there can be no doubt that the House, having fully considered all the arguments advanced by my hon. Friend, is of opinion that it is not desirable, and in this instance it would not be generous, to withhold from Lord Wolseley a reward of the same nature as has been conferred upon his distinguished predecessors under similar circumstances. The hon. Member says the operations in Egypt were of a simple character, and are not worthy of such a reward as it is proposed to give to Lord Wolseley. It is very easy now to talk lightly of the difficulties of the campaign. We have never professed that the Egyptian Army was a very formidable foe; but I venture to think that the skill and forethought required in these operations were of no inconsiderable order. These operations were conducted 3,000 miles from home; Lord Wolseley had to organize not only a considerable force of men, but also the transport of supplies, and in a country which presented serious difficulties. He had to march not along a straight road, but along a route which was in great part a desert. There were difficulties of considerable magnitude to be contended with in these operations; but the operations were so well accomplished, and with so small a loss of life, that they redounded greatly to the credit of the Officer who commanded the expedition and conducted the organization of both men and supplies, as well as to the credit of the officers and men. the hon. Member has depreciated the importance of the victory of Tel-el-Kebir; but I cannot help thinking that it would have been considered of greater importance by my hon. Friend, and more worthy of reward, if it had been attended by greater loss of life. I do not think it 308 is possible to underrate the importance which the House ought to attach to the skill of the General who accomplished his object with the least possible loss of life. I hope the House will not be inclined to accept the views of the hon. Gentleman. It seems to me equally undesirable that we should on this occasion enter into any minute or elaborate discussion of the details brought before us by the hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron). It is, I think, altogether not only inconvenient, but out of order, to enter into any minute examination of the Report of Lord Morley's Committee, or of the evidence upon which that Report was founded. It is, of course, open to the hon. Member, and to other hon. Members, to discuss that Report as bearing on the conduct of Lord Wolseley in this campaign but I venture to think that that would be not only an irregular, but a very inconvenient course. In the first place, I do not think it would be a very dignified course; and then I do not think this is the most convenient opportunity for discussing the particular orders on particular dispositions made by the Commander-in-Chief of the campaign. What the House has to consider is whether, on the whole, the plan of the campaign was a good one, and whether, on the whole, it was ably and successfully carried out. I do not suppose that either in that campaign or in other campaigns there was a total absence of faults or errors; and I do not say that it is not perfectly competent to the House, on a fitting opportunity, to call attention to those errors; but surely, when the House has decided, as it did, on the second reading of these Bills, and on a previous occasion when it granted its Thanks, this is not the most convenient and the most dignified opportunity to go into a minute examination of the orders given during the campaign. The right hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down (Mr. Gibson) has also pointed out, with great force, and with great truth, that this Report of Lord Morley's Committee does not give to the House anything approaching the full means for a complete and exhaustive criticism of the conduct of the General. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has stated, with perfect accuracy, that this was not an inquiry into the conduct of the General commanding, or of any individual concerned. 309 It was an inquiry with a much more practical object. It was in continuation of an inquiry already proceeding into the organization and management of the Army Hospital Corps. It took its rise in certain defects which were discovered in the South African Campaign, and in an inquiry into the organization of the Army Hospital Service. Incidentally, the conduct of Lord Wolseley and individual officers may have been considered by the Committee; but the inquiry was not an inquiry into the conduct of any particular individuals, or set of individuals, but into the defects of our existing organization, and the manner in which that organization could be improved. Therefore, this inquiry was not conducted in such a manner as to enable the House to form a complete judgment on the conduct of any particular individual. Lord Wolseley was examined comparatively early. Some of the evidence was taken subsequently, and he has not had any opportunity to reply to it. He is not in this country at present, and neither I nor anyone else has been able to consult him; and surely it would not be fair to condemn him, and would be scarcely desirable to criticize his conduct, when he is absent from the country, and when it is impossible to tell what is the answer he would desire to make to the charges brought against him. The evidence Lord Wolseley has himself given is a point into which I do not intend to go at this moment. I shall be quite ready, when we have an opportunity, to discuss this Report generally; but it seems to me perfectly unnecessary to go into that now. Whether the evidence of Lord Wolseley was well-founded or judicious or not in all respects is not now the question. The House of Commons is not going to refuse Lord Wolseley a grant of money in recognition of his services because it may think his evidence before this Committee was not all it might have been. I am perfectly aware that Lord Wolseley stated that he did not condemn individuals; but, at the same time, I cannot conceal from myself that some of his evidence was of a character that did reflect, and was felt to reflect, on the conduct and ability of some of the Departmental officers; and I cannot help thinking that if Lord Wolseley had reflected more carefully on the 310 great and exceptional difficulties under which, to a certain extent, they laboured, he would have given that evidence in a somewhat different manner; but, certainly, that evidence, given in London, is not going to be made, at this time of day, a reason for withholding a recognition of his services in Egypt. There are only two other points as to his conduct upon which it is just necessary to say a word. The hon. Member for Glasgow (Dr. Cameron) said that Lord Wolseley kept the medical officers in ignorance of his intended movements, and thereby prevented them from making the necessary and proper preparations. In the absence of Lord Wolseley it is impossible for anyone to say how great was the necessity for that absolute secrecy which, no doubt, he preserved, and successfully preserved. It is possible that the arrangements of the medical and other officers might have been, to a certain extent, impeded and embarrassed by the secrecy he observed; but, on the other hand, it is impossible to say how great may have been the advantages which that secrecy secured, and how great might not have been the loss of life if that secrecy had not been maintained. It is scarcely for us to criticize the conduct of the campaign, and to say that Lord Wolseley was not fully justified in any measures he took, although, perhaps, at the expense, to some extent, of the Departmental arrangements. Then Lord Wolseley is attacked for having unnecessarily interfered with the arrangements made by the medical officers. I do not think that the evidence bears out that charge. The evidence which has been referred to by the hon. Member for Glasgow shows that, on the 24th August, the principal medical officer inquired as to the transport available for the men who were not likely to be able to return. He was informed what the arrangements were, and acknowledged that they were perfectly satisfactory. He was told by the Chief of the Staff to communicate directly with the Governor of Cyprus, and orders were given that the sick men should be sent to Cyprus, and 72 sick men were sent there. Ten days later 300 more were ordered to be sent to Cyprus. In the meantime, the engagement at Tel-el-Kebir had taken place; the campaign was at an end, and the officer in charge of the sick took upon himself, perfectly 311 justifiably, to send the men to Malta, and so home, instead of to Cyprus. [Dr. CAMERON: What about the stoppage of the Carthage?] No doubt Lord Wolseley, who had personal knowledge of Cyprus, was of opinion that it was not desirable to send the men to a hospital on the sea-shore at Cyprus until later; but the stoppage of the Carthage did not prevent the sick men being sent to Cyprus, and arrangements being made for 300 more being sent. The Carthage was available at Ismailia; and I do not understand that these arrangements were seriously interfered with by the orders of Lord Wolseley. I think, therefore, it would be far more convenient that these details of Lord Wolseley's complaints of the Medical Department should be discusssd as a whole, and not on this occasion. I think I have shown that the evidence, so far as I have been able to read it, shows that the medical officers are not open to the blame cast upon them by some hon. Members and by some organs of the Press. I think it will be possible to show that, considering the difficulties of the situation, the arrangements were not only, on the whole, good, but were most certainly successful. I deny entirely that any evidence has been brought forward which should, in the slightest degree, prevent the House from ratifying the Thanks already given to Lord Wolseley, or in the slightest degree cause them to reverse the decision to which they came on the second reading to reward the services of Lord Wolseley by a pecuniary grant.
Question put.
The House divided:—Ayes 166; Noes 28: Majority 138.—(Div. List, No. 129.)
Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.
Bill considered in Committee.
§ (In the Committee.)
§ Clause 1 (Grant of £30,000 to Baron Wolseley).
§ MR. LABOUCHEREsaid, notwithstanding the decision which the House had arrived at, there were many Gentlemen present who were anxious to divide on the Amendment he proposed to move—namely, to leave out the words "thirty thousand pounds," in order to insert "twelve thousand five hundred pounds." Upon that Amendment he 312 was afraid he must put the Committee to the trouble of dividing. They had listened, in the course of the evening, to a great many reasons against these grants; but he would trouble the Committee with one only. He wished to make no comparison between Sir Frederick Roberts and Lord Wolseley; but would remark that the sum of £12,500—the amount to which he proposed to reduce the present Grant—was awarded to Sir Frederick Roberts. He presumed that the explanation of the increase asked for in the case of Lord Wolseley was that each Ministry preferred its own campaigns to those of other Ministries, and accordingly they showed their preference by giving larger sums to their own Generals. Unless this practice were put a stop to, they would probably have the Conservative Party, when they came into Office, proposing grants of £50,000 to their Generals. For that reason, he begged to move the Amendment of which he had given Notice.
Amendment proposed,
In page 1, line 13, to leave out the words "thirty thousand pounds," and insert the words "twelve thousand five hundred pounds,"—(Mr. Labouchere,)—instead thereof.Question proposed, "That the words thirty thousand pounds' stand part of the Clause."
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, he should be very much disposed to vote for the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton, if he could possibly find it in his heart to oppose any grant in connection with the Army at the present time. The real danger now was that the Army would be underpaid rather than overpaid. But while he felt strongly that justice should be done to Lord Wolseley, he felt, also, that it should be done in the case of Sir Frederick Roberts, whose brilliant services had certainly met with insufficient reward, if these grants to Lord Wolseley and Lord Alcester were not excessive. He rose in order to call attention to some observations made on a former stage of this Bill by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War. At that time he had ventured to point out that the difficulties encountered by Sir Frederick Roberts's Afghan Campaign, and especially in the really great march to Candahar, were greater than those experienced in the 313 Egyptian Campaign. To this the noble Marquess replied that the Government could not have proposed a larger Vote to Sir Frederick Roberts, because in that case they would have been obliged to propose a larger Vote to Sir Donald Stewart. The Committee would see that that was no reason at all, for it would have been just as easy to propose Votes to both Sir Frederick Roberts and Sir Donald Stewart as it was now to propose them for Lord Wolseley and Lord Alcester. The noble Marquess stated, also, that Sir Donald Stewart deserved as much credit for his march from Cabul to Candahar as Sir Frederick Roberts; that it was carried out under Sir Donald Stewart's directions, and that he had given the flower of his army for that purpose. The noble Marquess was painfully inaccurate. The fact was that the march was first proposed by Sir Frederick Haines, Commander-in-Chief in India, who received no reward whatever. It was telegraphed to Sir Donald Stewart that the march would be undertaken; but Sir Donald Stewart vigorously opposed it, and declined to carry it out himself. It was only after peremptory orders from the Viceroy that Sir Donald Stewart consented to let Sir Frederick Roberts undertake that most brilliant and well-conducted march of 350 miles through a most difficult and hostile country.
THE CHAIRMANsaid, he must call the attention of the hon. Member to the fact that he was not confining his observations to the Question before the Committee.
§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETTsaid, he would not dispute the ruling of the Chairman, but would remark that on a precisely similar occasion the noble Marquess had been allowed to go into the whole case. He challenged the noble Marquess to deny the facts he had just stated as to Sir Donald Stewart and the march to Candahar. The connection he wished to establish was that the grant to Sir Frederick Roberts was disproportionate to the amount of the grant now proposed for Lord Wolseley, and that the arguments of the noble Marquess were inadequate to prove that it was otherwise. As he had already said, he was unable to vote for the Amendment of the hon. Member for Northampton; but he felt that if simple justice was to be done in the present case, the Government ought to move 314 a larger Vote to the heroes of the Afghan Campaign—that was to say, to Sir Frederick Roberts, Sir Donald Stewart, and Sir Frederick Haines, who had overcome far greater difficulties than those of the Egyptian Campaign. If there had been any delay in the settlement of this question it was entirely due to the mismanagement of the Government, who, by changing the forms of these rewards from a pension to a lump sum, had caused two debates instead of one. The Prime Minister had practically admitted that when the Government first considered the question of these grants, they had not given to the subject the full amount of consideration which it required.
THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTONsaid, he regretted that the hon. Member for Eye had not been able to continue his speech on the subject of the Afghan Campaign, because that portion of it which he heard contained some very extraordinary statements, and he was extremely anxious to hear all that the hon. Member had to say. He was also very anxious that it should be understood that he had never desired, in the slightest degree, to depreciate the immense services of Sir Frederick Roberts, or the immense difficulties with which both he and Sir Donald Stewart had to contend. He had simply pointed out, on the occasion referred to by the hon. Member, that the Government were unable to confer upon an officer who was not in chief command of the Army a greater reward than was conferred upon one who was actually in chief command.
Question put.
The Committee divided:—Ayes 143; Noes 25: Majority 118.—(Div. List, No. 130.)
§ Clause 2 (Short title) agreed to.
§ Bill reported, without Amendment; to be road the third time upon Thursday.