SUPPLY—CIVIL SERVICE ESTIMATES. (Hansard, 9 August 1883)

HC Deb 09 August 1883 vol 282 cc2117-241 2117

§ SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

§ (In the Committee.)

§ CLASS V.—FOREIGN AND COLONIAL SERVICES.

§ (1.) Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £113,300 (including a Supplementary sum of £6,000), be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1884, for the Expenses of Her Majesty's Embassies and Missions Abroad.

MR. JOHN MORLEY
said, he rose with no intention of moving a reduction or otherwise affecting the Resolution which had just been read from the Chair; but it had been understood that the Vote for the Diplomatic Salaries would be the proper occasion for a certain amount of discussion upon the salaries of Sir Edward Malet and his successor, Major Baring. No one would be less willing than he was to make any comment other than that of the warmest agreement and approval upon the commission of Egyptian affairs to hands so competent as those of Major Baring; and he felt particularly unwilling to say a word against any Diplomatic Representative in Egypt, because he accepted and emphasized, as a definition of the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt, the words of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War at Darwen in January, when the noble Marquess said that they were to look for the future to the political influence which they ought to exercise in Egypt as springing from the position that they had acquired there, and resting on the ability and the authority of their Diplomatic Representative. It was from no doubt in his own mind that Her Majesty's Government still adhered to the intention which the noble Marquess then expressed, that he (Mr. Morley) ventured to ask the Prime Minister, on Monday last, whether Her Majesty's Government still held to these views. It was rather because the maintenance of their troops in Egypt was made the constant text of those who were partizans of a policy of annexation or a Protectorate; and it, therefore, became essential that 2118 those who distrusted a policy of annexation should have it placed upon record that Her Majesty's Government still intended in the ultimate settlement to rely, not upon a military occupation, not upon a Protectorate, but simply and solely upon the moral position they had already acquired in Egypt, and upon the ability and authority of their Diplomatic Representative. The answer which the Prime Minister gave to his Question on Monday night was entirely satisfactory to him, and to the Friends who sat around him. The only doubt that arose in one's mind was, whether, by the same indecision, if he might call it so, which allowed Europe to think that they were not going into Egypt, they might not bring upon themselves new complications, by allowing Europe to go on thinking that they were not coming out? They were now responsible for everything that happened in that country. Whatever went on they got the blame for it—from the payment of dividends, or their possible non-payment, down to the salubrity of the prisons, and even to the cleansing of the latrines. For everything Her Majesty's Government were held responsible by Foreign Powers, and even by many journalists and politicians at home. What he thought was wanted, when he put his Question to the Prime Minister, was a pledge or undertaking from Her Majesty's Government that the troops should be withdrawn when the time and hour were suitable; because so long as they had so much as a corporal's guard in Egypt, for so long it was a symbol of annexation. What were the arguments which had been urged to show that their troops should not be withdrawn? Roughly speaking, they were two. The first was that, if their troops came out of Egypt, some other Power would go in. But there was only one Power which the most excited imagination could conceive as at all likely to go in, and that Power obviously was France. If an European war were to break out, and the English and the French Governments were to come to some misunderstanding, and there were no material obstacles in the way of it, he could suppose that France might be inclined to move. But it was pretty well known that one of the reasons why France did not join us in the original movement last summer was found in her apprehensions and suspicions of, at least, one of her 2119 neighbours. He believed that the movement of France upon Egypt would not depend upon our being there or not, but would depend entirely upon larger diplomatic considerations with which our presence there had little or no concern. The second reason—and he admitted that it was a much more formidable one—was that if their troops were withdrawn there was the risk—the undoubted risk—of a rising on the part of the turbulent population of Alexandria. But his contention was that, so far as the general state of the country was concerned, not only now, but for three or four months past, there had been a very general tranquillity-tranquillity which would in time allow the total withdrawal of their troops, the greater number of whom had already silently disappeared. What was the evidence of the state of things at present existing in Egypt? They saw every day the comments in the papers — alarmist rumours proceeding from writers who had all along been advising that England should boldly annex Egypt, and who disapproved of the action of Her Majesty's Government when they intervened on behalf of Arabi. But he looked upon those papers with the greatest suspicion; and he would take instead the words of Lord Dufferin himself, who said in February last—and this was so important that he (Mr. Morley) hoped he might be allowed to read a few lines—who said on the 20th of February last, in a despatch to Earl Granville— As far as I can learn, the most absolute tranquillity prevails from one end of the country to the other. Nowhere are there signs of disaffection, or of a desire to revolt against the established order of things. In April, Lord Dufferin wrote again— The moral agitation excited by recent events has disappeared. The material tranquillity of the country is absolute from one end to the other. And he said further— The progress made in the reconstruction of the Army has excited the surprise and admiration of all who have witnessed its evolutions. There was one other remarkable passage which was written on the 7th of April by Lord Dufferin, and which particularly referred to these European residents, correspondents, and others, in Cairo and Alexandria, who were constantly alarming the minds of the public at home here. The passage was worth reading, 2120 because it enabled them to understand the people from whom those rumours spread. Lord Dufferin said— On the one hand, the recent experience of these European residents must, undoubtedly, predispose them to take a gloomy view of the future, and to entertain grave misgivings; and, on the other hand, their chief occupation is naturally the promotion of their own material and mercantile prosperity. As a consequence, Lord Dufferin went on to say— it is not necessary to consider their views as infallible or conclusive. Lower down, Lord Dufferin remarked, of the American Missionary Society— They assure me that they consider that nothing but the continued presence of the British Force for some time longer can insure the tranquillity of Egypt. That, no doubt, was a view which many hon. Members would maintain that night; but Lord Dufferin went on to say— I confess, however, that in spite of the trustworthy source from which they emanate, I cannot bring myself to coincide with all these gloomy prognostics. Considering how the country has suffered from these revolutionary crises there is general tranquillity in Egypt. It was clear that if the tranquillity of Egypt was to depend upon the continuance of their occupation, that occupation would have to go on for ever. He hoped that the right hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) would let the Committee have the benefit of his views on the subject, and that the right hon. Gentleman would say when he thought the occupation, which he, no doubt, believed to be necessary, ought to cease and determine. If it was to depend upon the tranquillity of the country, they were not likely to get any better evidence of that tranquillity, nor was there anything likely to lead to a better condition of the country than, judging from the evidence afforded by Lord Dufferin's despatch, the country had attained from February down to the 29th of April. It would, no doubt, be urged that the moment they withdrew their troops, and were content to rely, as the Secretary of State for War had announced that the Government intended to do, upon the authority of Major Baring, that would be the signal for the instant revival of international jealousies and intrigues; and they would again see the Consuls of the dif- 2121 ferent nations plotting against each other, one pushing for this object, and another pushing for that, and all turning Egypt once more into a focus of international rivalry and fierce jealousy among the European Colonies. Well, they had that state of things before; and though, no doubt, it was bad, he did not believe that it was found to be absolutely intolerable; and even if the symbol of annexation—as he had ventured to call the maintenance of the troops—were not withdrawn, these intrigues would go on with precisely the same force and with unabated activity. They would go on in any case. They were not, he supposed, going to exclude the French Consul General. That official would be there as before, but there with this difference—that whereas, for example, Baron de Ring was before recalled, it would be a point of honour with any French Government, if we were there in occupation, that the Baron de Ring of the future should not be recalled, but should receive support. On the principles and in accordance with the policy under which the Government hesitated to employ isolated action last year, he submitted that on the same principles, and in accordance with the same policy, they should now avoid an indefinite prolongation of an isolated occupation. He might be told that if they came out of Egypt—that was to say, that if the 5,000 or 6,000 troops that they still had there were withdrawn—the policy of the Government would have failed. But he submitted, on the contrary, that it was by maintaining their troops there that the policy of the Government would be shown to have miscarried, and their pledges to be falsified. What were the objects with which the Government commenced the undertaking? They were written in a hundred despatches, and had been declared in a hundred speeches. They were—an independent Administration, an autonomous Government, and Egypt for the Egyptians. Every day that their troops stayed there made the possibility of every one of these three things by so much the more remote. It weakened the habit of responsibility instead of strengthening it; it surrounded the Native Government, which they professed to wish to support, with all the odium of the unpopularity which always attended a Government that was supported 2122 by foreign bayonets. He would ask what else it did? It inflicted a heavy blow upon the Party in France which, according to his views of politics, it was to their utmost interest to fortify in every direction that they could—he meant the Peace Party in France. For there was such a Party there; and, as those who had followed the events of last July were well aware, it was principally owing to the energetic efforts of that Peace Party—politicians who obtained their influence in the discussions on the Egyptian Question at that moment—that the French Chamber were prevailed upon to abstain from intervention a year ago. That Peace Party acted as they did, no doubt, from other motives as well, but, still, mainly from their firm faith in our protestations, and their conviction of the sincerity of the assurances that we then gave that we were not going beyond an act of international police. How, did anyone suppose, would that Party now feel, when they read articles in the English Press, telling them that we were going to govern Egypt as we governed India. How would they feel when they heard politicians of great importance insisting that we should use our military occupation in order to drive a hard bargain with M. de Lesseps, and make the Khedive set aside an Instrument which our own Law Officers told us was binding: when they heard on every side that though Her Majesty's Government might profess the intention of coming out of Egypt, yet they did not mean it, and if they did mean it the public opinion of this country would not permit it? How could they expect this Party of peace and non-intervention—a Party of the utmost importance for English interests—to thrive in France if they betrayed them, and left them exposed, as they had been for six months, to the taunts of their Chauvinist adversaries as the dupes of Lord Granville's civil words and the spurious professions of the Ministry? There was one phrase in the statement of the Prime Minister on Monday last, which was not in all respects what he (Mr. Morley) should have expected. The right hon. Gentleman, quoting, he thought, from certain expressions in Lord Dufferin's despatch, said they must "avoid the danger of future perturbations." But he (Mr. Morley) would like to know whether there was a single Government in the 2123 world that was free from all danger of perturbations? He would like to ask hon. Gentlemen whom he saw opposite (the Irish Parliamentary Party) whether Lord Dufferin's own native land was free from such a thing? To illustrate the view which foreign nations might justly take of the contrast between our proceedings now and what we did a year ago, he might point out that there was a time when we urged the Sultan to restore order in Egypt, and even limited the time within which he was to do it, and to retire from the country afterwards. But did any of them expect that the Sultan would remain there until he succeeded in setting up a good Government? Why, they knew that he was the very last person in the world to undertake a task of that kind. Foreign observers, then, had some excuse if they regarded this new-born anxiety of ours for an ideal perfection of Government in Egypt as something very like a piece of hypocrisy. He (Mr. Morley) could not find, in the earlier history of this Egyptian business, that it was ever contended that they went into Egypt to secure for that country a first-class Government, with all the newest contrivances and manifold improvements of Western civilization. A Government of that sort they had now; they had a new Constitution, which not only gave them universal suffrage and vote by ballot, but even the refinement of the cumulative vote. He thought, however, that in such a country they might be satisfied with something a great deal short of perfection. 'They might be contented in Egypt with a Government of a lower and simpler kind, and with a much less imposing organization. It was only because Governments in such countries were loose in organization and lower in type that they possessed such vitality as they had. Therefore, it was not by their action in Egypt that they had made anarchy. They found it there, and it would remain there, whether they remained there or not. If they waited until these new institutions had thoroughly ripened, it was perfectly clear that not only months, but years, must elapse before they could make sure whether the new Egyptian Government was going to land safely, or going to be submerged in whirlpools and rapids. Were they never to withdraw until this new Constitutional experiment had been 2124 exhaustively tried? If not, they would remain there as long as the Pyramids. There was one point to which he wished particularly to invite the attention of those hon. Gentlemen who were in favour of a Protectorate or of annexation in any shape or form, and that was this. If they were going to set up in Egypt such a Government as they would care to make themselves responsible for in every particular and branch, it would not be a cheap Government; it would have to be so dear a Government that Egypt could not afford it. He might, perhaps, be excused for mentioning a circumstance that happened four or five years ago, when a very eminent Egyptian statesman was in England, and came into contact with an experienced Indian official. The Egyptian statesman was all for annexation by this country, and the establishment of a Government similar to that which they had set up in India; but the Indian official suggested the question of cost, and told him on what principles they governed India—how elaborate the administration, how costly the machinery; and when the Egyptian statesman heard that, he agreed that such an experiment was impossible in Egypt. Indeed, it was a question whether they did not give India, and, perhaps, some other countries nearer home, a much more costly machinery than they could well afford. There had been horrible accounts of the prisons in Egypt—indeed, he had never been more sickened with horror than when he had read those descriptions; he did not let himself forget that 100 years ago all the prisons in the most civilized countries of Europe were in an equally low condition of barbarism. He mentioned this matter of the prisons because he was now submitting that good government would be very dear, and that Egypt had not the money at present to give her people even decent government. What did Lord Dufferin say on the subject? No very considerable improvement in the foregoing state of things will be possible until new gaols are erected. Unfortunately, the Egyptian Government is not at present in a position to embark on the required expenditure. He (Mr. Morley) would take another instance. Everybody knew that one of the greatest curses that afflicted Egypt was the horrible corruption of its minor officials. From all the evidence, it ap- 2125 peared that this corruption existed because the Judges and official Administrators had such low salaries, and were so ill paid, that they had to live upon bribes. But where was the money to be got to pay them better and more regularly? He would only say, further, that when they heard and read columns of fine language about extending the blessings of Western civilization to a country like Egypt, it ought not to be forgotten that they were not going to pay for it out of their own pockets; and to exact from the Egyptian Government £4 per month per man for the English Force in Egypt was hardly the most hopeful way of easing the strain of Egyptian finance. If they were to carry all our Western blessings to Egypt, it was clear that that impoverished country would have to pay for them; and they would be paying for that which they did not want, and did not value. It was notorious that among all the difficulties of Egypt the greatest was the financial difficulty—it was much more financial than either political or military. All the evidence showed that the unrest which preceded Arabi's movement was caused, not by political or military affairs, but by something like an economic crisis. The important passage which the right hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) quoted in his Question to the Prime Minister, on Monday last, contained, in his (Mr. Morley's) opinion, a most alarming account, both of the present, and still more of the future. He would not read it again; but the point of it was that agriculture was deteriorating; that land was going out of cultivation; and that good observers had come to the conclusion that the productiveness of the soil was actually decreasing. He was aware that this was disputed; but even the risk of such an apprehension being well founded was surely a good reason for studying economy, and for advising the Egyptian Government to study economy also, before any other consideration that they or we could place before them. He would not detain the Committee more than a few moments longer; but he urged that they would incur enormous responsibilities in this matter if they allowed even a corporal's guard to remain at Alexandria or elsewhere in Egypt. In fact, they could not limit our 2126 responsibilities in such a case. He would venture to give an instance. There was the Soudan, which, with the territory belonging to it, would carry us something like 2,000 miles South of the Mediterranean. Were they going to undertake even an indirect responsibility for an enormous territory like that? They might look at it in another way. The Soudan was for the moment tranquil; but it was notorious that the inhabitants of that vast region were by no means reconciled to Egyptian misrule, and that the Egyptian Government was hopelessly unable to maintain oven a semblance of order there. His contention was that they were making themselves responsible by-and-bye for the Arab population of that vast district—a population that was emotional, superstitious, and fanatical. They had had a Mandi or "False Prophet" put down there the other day; but there was no security that another would not appear to-morrow, and every probability that he would. The administration of justice was barbarously corrupt and tyrannical, and excessive tribute was exacted. The people could not easily pay up, and in order to get the means they resorted to slave dealing, and if they could not pay up after that they revolted. The taxes of the Government—a Government which they were invited by their counsellors in Cairo, and by some politicians in this country, to make themselves responsible for—were collected by Bashi-Bazouks, who were described in Colonel Shute's Report as swaggering bullies, plundering and maltreating the wretched people under them with perfect impunity. The question, then, which they had to ask themselves was this—were they going to acquiesce in the military occupation of the Soudan, and if they were going to exercise a quasi-Protectorate there, should they acquiesce in such a state of things as now existed in that district? If they were to compel the Egyptian Government to retire from the Soudan they would scarcely deserve the name of protectors; they would really become masters; and if they did, the task of governing half India would be child's play compared with the difficulties and embarrassments that would accompany the attempt to introduce even the semblance of order into the Soudan. The fact was that they could not afford to 2127 be responsible. He would only make one more remark—he would invite the Committee to recall what happened in the Northern part of the Ottoman Empire some half-dozen years ago, before they went into the Southern part. As everybody knew, Russia went into Bulgaria, and Austria into Bosnia and Herzegovina. He would not go into the history of these two great transactions, nor examine the motives of the two Powers; but he wished to recall what actually happened, because he saw, or thought he saw, a most instructive example in the one case, and a most instructive warning in the other. He thought he saw in the course of the one case exactly what they ought to do, and in the other exactly what they ought not to do; and he felt sure that the same Minister who warned Austria to keep her hands off one portion of the Ottoman Dominion was not at all likely to run any risk of putting his own hands upon another portion of it. He would not discuss whether Russia would have fulfilled her undertaking to evacuate Bulgaria had there been no pressure from this country; but the fact remained that in spite of the bitter assurances of some English politicians that when once she wont into the country she would never come out of it, and that Bulgaria would fall into a state of anarchy and be unfit for government—in spite of that, Russia fulfilled her pledge and brought her military occupation to an end. What did Austria do? He had no criticism to offer upon her motives—it would be unbecoming were he to attempt to criticize them. She had her own difficulties, and went in, perhaps, not entirely without compulsion from another side. But what was the result? There used to be a strong Austrian Party in Bosnia; but now there was none. The population hated her laws, resented her schools, and only accepted the rule of her officials with sullenness; finally, the military expense of that occupation was last year £3,000,000 sterling. He ventured to say that they would do well not to impose on themselves an equally thankless burden. The views that he had always held prevented him from being identified with those who said they ought never to go to war, or who said that they might repudiate national responsibilities or shirk all burdens. It was exactly be- 2128 cause he felt the weight of those obligations, and desired them to be discharged, that he hoped occasion would be taken to assure Parliament once more—it could not be repeated too often—that they were not going to land themselves in a now series of obligations of great obscurity and enormous magnitude. The risks of withdrawing from Egypt were great—and he recognized them fully—yet he believed that to overrate the possible risks of withdrawal was the surest way to bring down upon themselves the certain disasters of permanent annexation.

§ MR. BOURKE
said, it was always very agreeable to listen to the hon. Member for Newcastle, because he treated the subject with which he dealt in an extremely fair and candid manner. On the present occasion the hon. Gentleman had made no exception to the rule; but he had been thinking, during the hon. Gentleman's speech, that one might fairly ask him this question—"Why did they go to Egypt at all?" The hon. Gentleman had shown conclusively that they had incurred enormous responsibilities; and the only question that seemed to stand between different Members of the House was this— "How could they best exercise those responsibilities which they had most decidedly undertakers?" When the hon. Gentleman described the state of anarchy which did exist in Egypt, he seemed to have forgotten that the state of anarchy I existing at the present moment seemed to be much worse than it was before, and everybody who took an unimpassioned view of the subject must admit that that was the case. In point of fact, it must be so, because the effect of the intervention of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt had been to sweep away a great deal that existed before, and, among other things, to sweep away many institutions which were doing a great deal of good, and which promised to do a great deal more. He need not mention what those institutions were; but they must all remember a good deal of what had been said for and against the Control. The Control was not an institution which anyone would have chosen to set up; but they had abolished it, and left nothing in its place, and Egypt would be left in a much worse position now than she was in before if they did not set up something in place 2129 of the Control they had abolished. The hon. Member for Newcastle had spoken about the cost of governing Egypt if they undertook to govern it in the same way that they governed their Indian territory. But the hon. Gentleman went a little too far in his declarations on that subject; because he (Mr. Bourke) was not at all certain that even if Egypt were to be governed upon the same principles as those upon which India was governed—he was not at all certain that the expense need be anything that anybody need be afraid of; but, on the other hand, he was quite certain of this—that if Egypt were well governed the resources of the country would improve so much and so rapidly that she could afford before long, over-taxed as she now was, to pay even a still greater price for a good administration. They all knew very well that if a larger amount were spent upon the good administration of any Eastern country, the poor people would have to pay even less than they paid now for a very poor administration. Let them take Turkey and Egypt as examples. They knew very well that the poor people in those countries were impoverished by the enormous sums which they had to give in bribes, owing to the corrupt administration of the State; and, therefore, if one of those countries were to cost a great deal more than it did at present for better government, he did not think the people themselves would be worse off—on the contrary, they would really be very much better off. The hon. Member for Newcastle had quoted many passages from Lord Dufferin's despatch; but, if the hon. Gentleman would allow him to say so, he (Mr. Bourke) did not think the hon. Gentleman had been quite candid in the use he had made of that despatch, in which Lord Dufferin spoke of the great tranquillity of the country. The hon. Gentleman seemed to argue that as the country was tranquil, in the opinion of Lord Dufferin it was, therefore, time for them to leave. But anybody who read the despatch must come to the conclusion that that was exactly the reverse of anything said by Lord Dufferin. The noble Lord showed that the country was tranquil; but, instead of drawing the conclusion which was drawn by the hon. Member for Newcastle, any sensible man with a candid mind must draw the very opposite con- 2130 clusion, because he would ask—Why was the country tranquil?—and the answer was obvious; because they had introduced a certain amount of order there. They had not only a large Army there, comparatively speaking, but officials in every branch of the administration. The hon. Member seemed to attach a great deal of importance to the withdrawal of their Army; but he said nothing at all about the withdrawal of their Civil servants, who were in every branch of the administration; and, so far as the responsibility which this country had undertaken was concerned, they were just as much responsible for the government of the country as long as their Civil servants were employed in the administration as they were responsible so long as their Army remained in Egypt—in fact, he should say that, so far as Parliamentary and political expediency went, they were a great deal more responsible in the first case than in the last; because everybody knew that an Army of Occupation could do very little either in favour of or against the good administration of a country; whereas Civil servants did a great deal. The hon. Member did not lead them in the least degree to suppose that he was in favour of a policy that would remove their Civil servants who were now in the pay of the Egyptian Government. It was needless to remind the Committee that those who sat on the Opposition Benches had always been opposed to the policy which led to the Egyptian War, and to the Egyptian War itself. They had always opposed it, because they thought it was unnecessary. [A laugh.] The late Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Charles W. Dilke), who always spoke with great authority on this subject, seemed to laugh at the notion that the Opposition opposed the war as unnecessary; but the fact was that they never used any language except language of that kind in that House, and certainly the Government had taken very good care to give them as few opportunities of discussing the matter as possible, and the events which led to that war. The Committee would remember that it was not until the Vote of Credit was asked for that they were allowed to discuss the subject. The fact remained that the Opposition were opposed to the war because they saw very well that it would entail enormous responsibilities; 2131 and they believed that if those responsibilities were undertaken by England, they would, in all probability, have questions arise with regard to Foreign Powers which at that time would certainly have been found extremely inconvenient. He did not wish now to raise any question with respect to difficulties with Foreign Powers—it would be time enough to deal with anything of that sort when it came prominently forward. No person who had had anything to do with the government of a country would wish to anticipate in any way such questions as that. But, much as the Opposition did oppose the policy of Her Majesty's Government which led to the Egyptian War, he was sure that they never denied that the course of events which led to it would, if properly guided, be in the end a great benefit, both to Egypt and to England; and he thought that even now, if the Government acted with firmness, with discretion, with prudence, and with statesmanship, they might do a great deal to justify the war which they unnecessarily undertook. Nobody could deny that they undertook that war in opposition to everything they had said with respect to foreign intervention whilst they were in Opposition. But if they were allowed to accept these responsibilities he thought it was necessary that the Government should tell Parliament exactly what it was that they were going to do. It was the duty of Her Majesty's Government to tell Parliament whether or not they were going to follow in the steps of Lord Dufferin's despatch — that able production which went so minutely into all the details of every branch of the administration. It was essential that the House should know that; because if Lord Dufferin's despatch meant nothing more than a dream of the "Arabian Nights"—a dream for future generations—the Government were almost trifling with the House and with the country in putting that despatch before them. The hon. Member for Newcastle had referred to the long Question which he (Mr. Bourke) addressed to the Prime Minister on Monday night; and that Question gave those portions of Lord Dufferin's despatch in which, after going through a most elaborate description of all branches of the administration, Lord Dufferin clearly pointed out that these reforms 2132 would all be perfectly useless if British protection were withdrawn from Egypt. That, then, was the question for the House to decide. The hon. Member for Newcastle seemed to think that if the Army were withdrawn from Egypt—which was a very vague term which did not seem to take into account their Civil servants — their responsibilities would cease. Well, if that was to be the case, at all events Parliament should know what was going to be done. But if they were to go upon the lines of Lord Dufferin's despatch it was perfectly clear that the sooner they accepted their responsibilities the better, and the sooner that Foreign Powers knew what their position was to be the more likely they would be to have peace in Europe. As to the Egyptian people, who, after all, ought to be their first consideration—he was sure they had been with him, for he had endeavoured, in his humble way, to approach these questions with the view of seeing what, after all, was best for the Egyptian people — everybody knew that if these people were to be told that they were to produce these autonomous institutions, and to work out their own salvation as best they could, the whole thing would collapse in a very few weeks. Lord Dufferin had pointed that out in far better language than he (Mr. Bourke) could use. He was quite sure that the hon. Member for Newcastle, who so worthily represented a large section of the Radical Party, would not acquiesce in their leaving Egypt under circumstances in which., if they did leave the country, they would leave nothing behind them except the ruins of Alexandria, and a paper Constitution, thrown at the heads of the people, which really meant nothing at all. He wished now to say a few words as to the attitude of Her Majesty's Government. From the first, in answer to all Questions put to them about Egypt, they had ostentatiously put it forward that it was the Egyptian Government, and not the British, who were responsible for the events which were now going on. He was sorry to say that that was nothing but hypocrisy on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and hypocrisy by which Nobody could be deceived. In the Egyptian administration, there was nothing but a dummy at the head of every Department. There was a dummy Finance Minister, a dummy 2133 Prefect of Police, a dummy Minister of Justice, and dummy Judges, a dummy Minister of Public Works, and a dummy Commander-in-Chief. It was, therefore, hypocrisy on the part of Her Majesty's Government to say that, with such an administration as that, the Egyptian Government were really governing Egypt. They had European officers in every Department; and what he wanted to know was, whether these European officers were to be withdrawn, because their responsibility would remain just the same—the same morally, and far more politically—if they withdrew the Army and left them in Egypt. Another subject on which he would like to say a word was the despatch of Lord Granville respecting the Suez Canal. He would not read the proposals made by Lord Granville, which amounted, practically, to the neutralization of the Canal; but if they wanted to be in Egypt for the purpose of obtaining that, they had gone to war for a very unnecessary object, for they certainly might have obtained it without going to war at all. The subject had been before the Powers for the last 12 years, and it was a subject which the late Government certainly thought they had better leave alone. He was very much puzzled to think how the arrangements proposed for the future neutralization of the Suez Canal were to be carried out. In the first place, it would be impossible to say who was to carry them out; and, certainly, if the Egyptian Government were to be saddled with a responsibility which it could not fulfil, it would necessarily devolve upon us. He must also remind the Committee that these Treaties were exceedingly vague; they not only diminished their power in time of war, but they increased their responsibility in time of peace. Therefore, he hoped Her Majesty's Government would pause before they gave effect to the Treaty which had been shadowed forth in one of the despatches. He had no hesitation in saying that, in his opinion, it might become the imperative duty of England, as a matter of self-preservation, to violate that Treaty to-morrow, and he did not think that anyone would deny the truth of that proposition. Certainly, if the circumstances were to take place over again which took place last year with regard to the opposition given to their Fleet in the Suez Canal it would 2134 be the duty of the English Government to take that course. That was a strong expression; but he hoped that the common sense of it would approve itself to the Committee. With regard to the salary of Major Baring, he had nothing to say, and he was certainly not going to move any reduction of the Vote. He had no doubt the Government had exercised a wise choice in their selection, and he would only remark that the strongest man in their Diplomatic Service should be sent to Egypt; because all Lord Dufferin's experience went to show that it only required a master hand and a master mind to make everything they wished with respect to the Government of Egypt to go smoothly. If Egypt was to have the great blessing of Constitutional Government, that result could not be arrived at by the policy of leaving the people to themselves, which would only lead to disaster. The only hope of Egypt obtaining Constitutional Government was by their keeping in the country for the present, and taking Egypt under their protection, and by showing, both to the Egyptian people and to Foreign Powers, that they could not allow any interference between them and the Egyptian people in carrying out those reforms which everyone in this country desired to see effected.

§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKE
said, before he replied to the extremely interesting and valuable speech of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Morley) it was necessary that he should make some observations in answer to the right hon. Gentleman who had just spoken, and who had addressed the Committee in a speech which he could not fancy would be considered very judicious by those who belonged to his Party. Of course, it was not for him to consider the effect of that speech on the Conservative Party in the House of Commons; but certainly he should be inclined to doubt whether the whole of that Party in the country would give their adhesion to a speech which had fallen very little short, if at all, of a proposal for the annexation of Egypt. According to the right hon. Gentleman, Her Majesty's Government had swept away from Egypt a large number of institutions which had existed, and which had preserved the country against anarchy. The hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Cowen) 2135 cheered that statement; perhaps he could tell the Committee what those institutions were which had been swept away. The only one selected for mention had been the institution of the Dual Control; and in spite of the good which, in certain respects, had been done by it, the right hon. Gentleman himself appeared to throw some doubt on the value of that institution had they been starting it afresh; and he spoke of it as ail institution which no one would care to set up. But he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was under the impression that the Dual Control had been set up by the Conservative Party; and if it had not been invented by the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends he could not conceive how it came into existence at all. [Mr. BOURKE: The right hon. Member for Ripon (Mr. Goschen).] The right hon. Member for Ripon The Dual Control had been altered from an unofficial Control by the late Government into an official Control; the British Controller to be named from that time forward by the British Government; and it was that re-creation of the Dual Control which, according to his right hon. Friend, no one would care to set up again. The Dual Control, in the form in which it was best known to the House of Commons, was an institution for which he believed the country held the late Government entirely responsible, and for which Her Majesty's Government held them responsible. The right hon. Gentleman said that they had swept away that institution without having put anything in its place. He would not press him by asking what he meant by the other institutions which Her Majesty's Government had swept away; but in the latter portion of his remarks the right hon. Gentleman spoke of the character and authority of their agents, by whom they and the Egyptian Government were served, saying that Egypt was safe in their hands, and yet he told the Committee that Her Majesty's Government had substituted nothing for the Dual Control. He went on to speak of their governing Egypt on the principle on which their Indian territory was governed. Well, in one sense, no doubt, it might be for the benefit of all less civilized people in the world that they should be governed by them. The right hon. Gentleman said the happiness of the Egyptian people should be the 2136 first consideration with us, and that it was in their interests that he advocated the government of Egypt on the principles referred to. No doubt they could produce a more effective administration if they exercised more care than was usually exercised; and, no doubt, they could produce a cheaper administration; but that was scarcely a reason for violating every pledge that had been given, and for taking the administration into their own hands. Not only would that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, be an insufficient reason, but they believed that the act itself would be contrary to the true interests of the country at the present time. Lord Dufferin's despatch (No. 13) had been quoted by the hon. Member for Newcastle, as well as by his right hon. Friend, with approval. That despatch, however, had led each of those hon. Members to an entirely opposite conclusion; it led the hon. Member for Newcastle to the conclusion that the policy of the Government should be carried into effect; but the right hon. Gentleman opposite said that the despatch in question would lead every intelligent person to a conclusion opposite to that which the hon. Member for Newcastle had drawn from it—that was to say, it would lead to the conclusion that their troops should remain in Egypt. Now, if every intelligent person would draw that conclusion from the principles laid down by Lord Dufferin in his despatch, Lord Dufferin himself was certainly not one of those intelligent persons, because he supported the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and he had been a party to that policy throughout, which was the steady reduction of the Forces in Egypt, with the view to their ultimate withdrawal. The right hon. Gentleman had told the Committee that the Conservative Party had always opposed the Egyptian War, and that they never held any other language in that House. He was quite willing to admit that the right hon. Gentleman himself had never held any other language; but the Members of the Party with whom he ordinarily acted had done so, in words that had been quoted over and over again, and which were repeated in a speech delivered by the Marquess of Salisbury at Willis's Rooms. At that meeting, which was held before the operations in Egypt began, the Marquess of Salisbury, in the strongest 2137 terms, declared it to be the duty of the Government to conduct those operations with vigour, to which the right hon. Gentleman now said he had been always opposed. The only point on which he cordially concurred with the right hon. Gentleman was that the happiness of the Egyptian people ought to be their first consideration; but as the right hon. Gentleman had said, with regard to Lord Dufferin's despatch, that any intelligent person would draw from it a conclusion different from that of the hon. Member for Newcastle, so he (Sir Charles W. Dilke) must draw an opposite conclusion from the phrase of the right hon. Gentleman from that which he drew himself. In almost the last words of his speech, before his right hon. Friend came to the few sentences about the Suez Canal, with which he concluded, he asked whether all the European officials in Egypt, upon whom he said the government really rested, were to be withdrawn, and that at once? He (Sir Charles W. Dilke) had heard no such proposal from the hon. Member for Newcastle as that all the servants of the Egyptian Government who happened to be Europeans were to be withdrawn; and, although it was not for him to put a statement into the mouth of the hon. Member, he probably shared the opinion that there were too many European officials in Egypt, although he would not pick out for withdrawal those able and intelligent men who were at the head of the Departments of Egyptian administration. What he understood the hon. Member for Newcastle to advocate was not the withdrawal of those officials, but the withdrawal of the British troops. The right hon. Gentleman concluded his speech by a passage referring to the Suez Canal; and the point of his declaration appeared to be that if Lord Granville's principles had been carried into effect, we should, in the operations of last year, and in any future operations in Egypt, be violating the neutrality of the Canal. We should be doing nothing of the kind. He would point out, however, that the Khedive himself had power to exercise authority over the Suez Canal. [Mr. BOURKE: That is a fiction.] Whether it was a fiction or not, that was the view taken, not only by the British Government, but by other Governments with regard to the operations of last year. The Go- 2138 vernment of Germany had consistently maintained its refusal to pay dues for its men-of-war which used the Canal during those operations for police purposes; the view of the German Government was that, if any question of war arose, vessels of war were exempt from the ordinary restrictions imposed on vessels which used the Canal at other times. He now passed to the extremely able and valuable speech of the hon. Member for Newcastle, on which, perhaps, he might be allowed to congratulate, not only the hon. Member himself, but the House of Commons. In that speech he found very little to which, personally, he could not agree; but there were, perhaps, two or three points to which exception might be taken. The hon. Member had used the word "indecision" with regard to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the matter of the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, and he asked whether their retention depended upon the tranquillity of the country. In one sense it did; but it had always been put forward by Her Majesty's Government that they were neutral, and acted through the Egyptian Army or Police to maintain that tranquillity. The hon. Member said nothing else than that in the course of his main argument; he asked whether the British Army would be withdrawn from Egypt when the time and hour were suitable. That was the declaration which the Prime Minister had made a short time ago; and, putting aside any difference there might be on points of detail, that was the main policy advocated by the hon. Gentleman, and Her Majesty's Government were perfectly prepared to adopt that main line of his argument. The hon. Member pressed for the steady reduction of the British Forces in Egypt; he did not press for their immediate withdrawal, but their ultimate withdrawal from that country, and on that point Her Majesty's Government were entirely agreed with the hon. Member. The position taken up by Her Majesty's Government had never varied during the last 13 months. When the British troops were sent to Egypt, under the pressure of overwhelming necessity, Her Majesty's Government stated that it was their duty to restore settled government in that country. The policy of Her Majesty's Government might be summed up in the words of Lord Derby in a speech 2139 delivered last winter, when the noble Lord said— We have no business in Egypt a day longer than is absolutely necessary to restore order there. and he pointed out to the Committee that, in the phrase "restoration of order," the noble Lord included the leaving of tranquillity behind. On the 29th of September the Government addressed to the Agent in Egypt a despatch, which had been laid before Parliament in February last—page 32, Blue Book No. 2 of the present year. In that despatch they laid down no new departure; but they said that the British Force of 14,000 men was to be brought down to 12,000 men at once, and was to be reduced from time to time in view of the formation of a Native Force ready and able to take its place. That was the policy of Her Majesty's Government as set forth in the despatch on the military question. In February last the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, who, during the absence of the Prime Minister, was acting as Leader of the Liberal Party, explained that despatch to mean that their Forces would remain in Egypt until a new Egyptian Army, organized on a moderate, but at the same time on a scale sufficient to undertake the defence of the country, was established, and that, as soon as that work was accomplished, it was the intention of the Government that the British Army should not remain in Egypt. On the 15th of February the noble Marquess again stated the policy of Her Majesty's Government to the House in the debate on the Address to the Throne, when he said that he trusted the British occupation of Egypt for the purpose of preserving the tranquillity of the country would not be prolonged. The Secretary of State for War had been sometimes blamed for naming a definite period for the withdrawal; but his noble Friend had repeatedly shown that the declaration as to the number of months was entirely misunderstood; at all events, the circumstances under which that statement was made had been clearly explained to the House. The declarations of his noble Friend were exactly similar to the declarations made by all the Members of Her Majesty's Government, and conformable to the main doctrine set forth in their despatches. General Wood had been organizing in Egypt a Force which, although not yet 2140 completely organized, was becoming extremely efficient, and had been declared to be entirely satisfactory by those who had seen it on parade. Whilst that Force had been organized, the British Army had been steadily reduced. It was reduced from 13,840 men, the number at which it stood when Parliament met, to 6,763; and, therefore, his hon. Friend was fairly right in the figures he employed. The British Force had been reduced during the period he had mentioned to little more than one-half of its strength, and the cholera had alone prevented its further reduction. Had it not been for that, Her Majesty's Government would have reduced the Force in Egypt to less than 6,000 men by the present time. Now, that course of steady reduction was the course which Her Majesty's Government intended to pursue, and it was that which had arisen out of their declarations on the subject during the last 13 months. They had great confidence in the character of the Force commanded by General Sir Evelyn Wood, and Her Majesty's Government believed that by November next he would have one regiment of Cavalry, one battery of Artillery, and eight battalions of Infantry, with which he would be able to answer for the tranquillity of the capital. At all events, the reduction was likely to be rather accelerated than the reverse; and they hoped that before the winter a further large reduction would be effected. Their policy, therefore, was the same as they explained in July, when they went to Egypt; the same as it continued after the operations were over, and was absolutely consistent with the speeches made by the various Members of the Government during the Recess and afterwards, and the same as was recommended in the despatches which had been laid before Parliament. He could assure his hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle that the word "indecision" which he applied to the policy of the Government in respect of the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt was undeserved. There had been no indecision; there had been no reconsideration of the principles which had guided them, because there was no necessity for such reconsideration. It was the opinion of agents of the Government that the policy of reduction of the British Force was wise and prudent as well as inevitable—inevitable, because 2141 to refuse to reduce the Force after the Egyptian Army had been formed would be to violate every pledge they had given to Parliament, and through Parliament to the whole of Europe. He had said thus much with regard to the reduction of the Force, and it was not necessary for him to say anything with regard to its withdrawal. His hon. Friend knew that he was not himself prepared, at the present time, to advocate the immediate withdrawal of the troops. It was not possible for Her Majesty's Government to speak with regard to months or any specific time, and the only statement he could make was that which had been made so often before—namely, that they would not keep the Forces in Egypt longer than it was absolutely necessary to keep them there; for to do so, in their opinion, would be a breach of their pledges, as well as a violation of sound policy. Nor would they, on the other hand, actually withdraw their troops from Egypt until they were sure that the conditions which they themselves had laid down had been fulfilled. He need only say, in conclusion, that he could not adopt the hopeless view expressed by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, that the withdrawal of the British Forces would be followed by that anarchy which the right hon. Gentleman dreaded. He agreed with him that the happiness of the Egyptian people should be the first consideration with Her Majesty's Government in their policy in Egypt. It was the policy of this country that there should be order and peace in Egypt; it was almost a necessity that that should be the case; and Her Majesty's Government believed that by the policy they were advocating and steadily pursuing they were reconciling the interests of this country in the maintenance of peace and order in Egypt with the happiness of the Egyptian people.

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
said, he should not endeavour to reduce the Vote for the salary of Major Baring, because he considered the choice of the Government with respect to that gentleman was most fortunate, he being one of the few men who were able to cope with the difficult position of affairs in Egypt. What he did object to was that Major Baring was not invested with any higher functions or character than that of Consul General. It was, unfortu- 2142 nately, the case that on some occasions the Consul General came into collision with the Controller; and he wanted to know whether it was intended to appoint a Financial Adviser to the Khedive; and, if so, what his relations would be to Major Baring?

§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKE
said, there would be a Financial Adviser.

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
remarked, that there had been one before.

§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKE
said, it would be the same person.

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
said, he was sorry for it. He thought it would be most unfortunate that there should be an English officer attached to the Khedive as Financial Adviser, as it would probably lead to a collision between the English officials in Egypt. When Mr. Cave was sent out in the first instance to advise the Khedive, the first thing that occurred was a quarrel between him and Colonel Stanton. Colonel Stanton felt himself perfectly independent of Mr. Cave, and gave such advice to the Khedive as entirely ruined the Mission of Mr. Cave. Then, again, it was well known that Sir Rivers Wilson and Mr. Vivian were not agreed upon matters of policy in regard to Egypt; and they could not help noticing, from the Correspondence which took place previous to the war, that there were certain points on which Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin were not agreed. Then, why should they repeat the same experiment now which had been so disastrous on three previous occasions? It appeared to him to be utterly hopeless to expect any good result if they were to send out two officers who were to be co-existent in Egypt at the same time. Two such officers occupying such positions could not exist without coming, some time or other, to a dissension, which dissension must inevitably be damaging to their policy in Egypt. He would go even further. He thought that the very position of Consul General was a distinction too low for the functions to be discharged by Major Baring. By the Ordinary rule of diplomatic etiquette he would come below other Consul Generals occupying the same position; and the fact that he would hold an official dignity lower than that of their Representative in Sweden and other small countries would considerably damage his reputation in Egypt. His 2143 (Sir H. Drummond Wolff's) impression was that he should be called a High Commissioner, which was a designation that would separate him from the ordinary run of Consul Generals, and insure him the respect given in that country to official dignity. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle (Mr. Morley) had impressed upon them very much the desirability of retiring from Egypt, and the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board had declared that they should withdraw from Egypt gradually, and that their ultimate retirement was to depend upon the institutions they prepared for preserving peace and order in that country, as peace and order were all they required. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) had rightly said that they ought to consult the happiness of the Egyptian people. Would they consult that happiness if they handed them over to a Government supported by an army of Turks and Circassians? Such a course could only lead to the perpetuation of a system of rule which had subjected the Egyptian people to debasing, degrading, and hideous tyranny in the past. Nothing could be more terrible than the position which the Egyptian Fellah had occupied for centuries. He had been systematically plundered and robbed by his rulers; and he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) wanted the Government to tell the Committee what they intended to do to establish some system by which the Egyptian Fellah could live in decent comfort and freedom. The hon. Member for Newcastle said they could not expect to give to Egypt all the civilizing institutions which they possessed in this country; but if they were to give them any liberties whatever, when were they to begin to confer them upon them? When was the initial step to be taken? If they merely retired when Sir Evelyn Wood's Forces were strong enough to maintain the Government of the Khedive they might retire at the moment when they should be handing over this unfortunate people to one of the worst tyrannies that had ever existed. Lord Dufferin had sketched out certain popular institutions; but, as they were not yet in operation, it was not his (Sir H. Drummond Wolff's) duty, to criticize them. Lord Dufferin had proposed certain initial steps which were to be taken for the benefit of the 2144 Fellaheen and people of Egypt, and he supposed that at some time something would be done to give effect to Lord Dufferin's proposals. But would the Government undertake not to retire from Egypt the moment Sir Evelyn Wood's Forces were strong enough to maintain the power of the Khedive; and would they undertake not to abandon the country until they had placed the liberties of the Fellaheen upon a satisfactory footing? He did not expect that they were to give to the Egyptians a House of Commons, or those wide liberties which existed, fortunately, in this country; but they were to give them, at all events, such liberties as would preserve them from personal torture—some guarantee that they would not be robbed of their property; and they would be committing a political offence if they withdrew their troops before they had placed the country on a footing of law and order which they were satisfied would be permanent. The next point to which he wished to refer was the position of this country in Egypt towards the Sultan. He was more anxious to touch upon that point, because his noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, some time ago, alarmed him by an answer which he gave upon that subject. He had asked the noble Lord whether he would produce a document, which had never yet been submitted to the House—namely, the Note addressed by the Porte to this country and to France in 1863, on which Note an appeal was made to the Emperor of the French, and the final award was given by him on the question of the Suez Canal? His reason for asking for that Note was, he thought, of some importance, both to their interest in the future government of Egypt, and still more in regard to their relations with the Sublime Porte. In 1863, the Sublime Porto consented to the concession of the Sweet Water Canal; but in view of the fact that it might be a menace against the independence of the Porte, and an interference with the regulations in reference to the furnishing of workmen, the Porte addressed a Diplomatic Note to its Representative in London in regard to the works connected with the Canal. Now, he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) thought everyone must agree that the intervention of the Porte at that time in the continuance of the works of the Canal 2145 was a most valuable intervention, not only as regarded the rights of the Porte, but in the interests of civilization; because it put an end to the concession of forced labour which M. de Lesseps had obtained, a concession which, if carried out, would have been to the great injury and cruel treatment of Egyptian workmen. But, at the same time, the Porte declared that the large margin of land accorded to M. de Lesseps—including, as it did, Port Said, Ismailia, as well as the Port of Suez—was giving a great strip of country to French officials which might hereafter become most menacing to the Ottoman Empire. His noble Friend the Under Secretary of State, when he (Sir II. Drummond Wolff) asked for that Paper, said it was unnecessary to produce it, as the circumstances under which it was written, and the conditions, had been changed by the Firman of 1879. That Firman of 1879 was issued with a view to enable the Khedive to conclude Conventions of Commerce with other States. But it appeared to him (Sir H. Drummond Wolff), on looking at the original Note, which he had in his possession, although it had not been published, and on comparing it with the Firman of 1879, that that Firman in no way altered the conditions under which that Note of 1863 was written. According to the Note of 1863, the Porte considered the concessions of M. de Lesseps dangerous to its independence; and he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) did not think the Firman conferred on the Khedive any right to give the concession of a second Canal, inasmuch as such a concession would be practically interfering with the Sovereign rights of the Porto. The Firman of 1880—published in Egypt, No. 1—said, amongst other things, that having given to the Khedive the right to enter into Commercial Treaties the Khedive would not be able, under any pretext or motive, to abandon to others, even temporally, the privileges accorded to Egypt which were confided to him, and which were privileges inherent in the Sovereign power of any part of the territory. He thought his noble Friend, when he gave him that answer, must have misapprehended the full force of that Firman, or he would have given it more force then he did. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) should have thought that in any question of a new Canal 2146 through the Isthmus of Suez, the right to make such a Canal could not be conceded without the sanction of the Porte. The answer of his noble Friend implied that the sanction of the Porte was not necessary. He hoped that was not the view taken by the Government; but he thought it would be well to have the point explained, because if the Government did take up that position, it would be a most dangerous one, not only injurious to the Porte, but one that might lead to great complications. It must be recollected that if they endeavoured in any way to put aside the rights of the Porte over any part of its territory, it was not the Porto alone they would have to deal with, but other countries, who would be glad to assume such a pretext for taking the part of the Porte against this country. From the speech of his right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board, he understood the Government had determined not at present to remove their troops from Egypt; but they had put a certain varnish upon their words by promising that whatever was done was to be done gradually. If they postponed their departure from Egypt until Sir Evelyn Wood was able to secure free institutions in that country, he thought it would be a long time before they went, and that, he could help thinking, was the real intention of Her Majesty's Government. They all knew that there were supporters below the Gangway as well as above it, and the Government were very much divided in their allegiance to the wishes of different sections of their own followers. But he hoped the Government would not sacrifice the position they had obtained, both internationally and in regard to the interests of the country, simply to some sentimental cry. Having taken the position which they now occupied in Egypt, they were bound to look to the interests and the happiness of the Egyptian people as well as their own interests. The hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Morley) told them that if they did such and such a thing, they would offend the susceptibilities of the French people. But surely the French people had not much regard for the susceptibilities of others when they took possession of Tunis, and secured a paramount influence in Syria. Surely it was to their interest to prevent the Mediterranean from being turned into a French 2147 lake. When they left Egypt, they should leave it only when the happiness and interests of the people of Egypt were secured; and they should at least see that their influence in that country should be, if not paramount, at least on a footing equal to that of France.

MR. JOSEPH COWEN
said, he entirely agreed with what had been said by his hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) respecting the authority possessed by the Khedive to grant concessions for the construction of Canals or Harbours. He believed the Khedive could not give any such concessions without the approval of the Sultan. The Khedive had certain powers of government in Egypt; but the right of disposing of Egyptian territory was vested in the Suzerain. He would cite a circumstance, which the Committee might not be generally aware of, that would bear out this opinion. Last year the King of Abyssinia sought to obtain from the Khedive—through the intercession of the English Government—a harbour on the Red Sea. We used our authority with the Khedive to obtain this concession. It was granted, and Massowah was accorded to the Abyssinian King as the seaport he desired. But the Sultan declined to confirm the concession; and, as a result, the King of Abyssinia did not get the port which he wished for, and which the Khedive and the English Government were willing to grant him. These facts justified the contention of the hon. Member for Portsmouth that the Khedive, of his own motion, had not the power, even if he had the wish, to grant any concession for the making of a second Canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. But to recur to the subject more immediately before the Committee, he wished to say that he thought it was a question on which the least said the better. The Government occupied a peculiar position, and consideration ought to be shown them. They were assailed from one direction by a section of their partizans, and they were pressed on the other by a section of the English people. On one side there were Party pledges; on the other side there were British interests; and they very naturally hesitated as to the course they should adopt. The Prime Minister made, on Monday night, a statement which could be justly described as remarkable. It had the merit 2148 of pleasing everyone. It satisfied those Gentlemen who wished the Government to retreat from Egypt, and it satisfied those who wished them to remain. Nothing could be better than that. He, for one, was willing to allow matters to rest there, and neither by vote nor speech precipitate the Ministry into any course of action that they did not feel at the moment willing to adopt. The Prime Minister used a very happy phrase on the occasion in question. He said he would "adjust the balance of expression;" and as everybody was pleased with the adjustment, nothing further need be said. His hon. Friend and Colleague wished the Government to abandon Egypt. He dared say the Premier and some of his brother Ministers—perhaps all of them—were not unwilling to do this. But whether they could do it or could not was a different thing. Circumstances were often stronger than men—oven the strongest—and the circumstances in Egypt, he believed, were such as would compel them to remain there. He, for one, objected to their going to Egypt. As far as his small influence was concerned, he used it to prevent their going. But the war having been entered into, Egypt having been beaten, a state of anarchy having been produced, it would be almost criminal to abandon the people to the confusion and misery into which our course of action had plunged them. Of course, it was a matter of opinion; but he had a strong belief that we should never retreat from Egypt. There would always be some pretext to keep us there. At one time it would be the better organization of the police; at another time the cholera; and at another time some other reason; but the date of our retreat would recede, like the poet's north, as time advanced. They might lessen the number of troops—probably would do so, and that soon. They might alter their place of location, and leave only a corporal's guard at Alexandria. But if they did take the troops away they had Cyprus at hand. That much-disparaged possession was nearer to Egypt than any French port; and he had a strong conviction that whenever the English authority in Egypt was in danger, troops—if we had not any or sufficient in the country at the time—would be drawn from Cyprus or elsewhere. This was a mere opinion; but 2149 he thought that Egypt was now, and would continue to remain, as much a portion of the British Dominions as India was. His hon. Friend had set before them the cases of Russia and Austria in European Turkey, and had counselled the Government to follow the example of Russia when she retreated from Bulgaria, and not of Austria when she retained possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The illustration did not cover the whole case, as Russia was driven from Bulgaria. She never would have left if the Indian troops had not been brought to Malta, if the English Fleet had not gone to the Sea of Marmora, and the £6,000,000 had not been voted by that House to resist her aggressive designs. But even as it was, although Russia had retreated in form, it was very doubtful whether she did not still hold a predominating influence in Bulgarian counsels. And as for Austria, it should be remembered that she occupied Bosnia after the Treaty of Berlin, and as a consequence of that Instrument. We could not deal with Egypt in the same way as Bosnia and Bulgaria had been dealt with. The conditions were altogether different. What did they propose to do in Egypt? Let them look straight at the proposals of the Government. They proposed to set up a modified form of Constitutional rule there. Alongside of the Khedive we were to have a British Representative. He was to be nominated by the Khedive, but sanctioned by England. If he was not approved by England, he could not be appointed. He had to have absolute control over the finances, and control of the finances in Egypt meant an absolute mastership. The theory was that lie had to advise the Khedive in all difficulties; and the Khedive in his turn was to rule through responsible Ministers. Perhaps the plan might work. Perhaps it might not. Suppose the Khedive was submissive, suppose his Ministers were obedient, suppose the Legislative Council was tractable, suppose the Army did not mutiny, and suppose the people did not rebel, then possibly the Governmental machinery would run smoothly enough. But suppose any one of these contingencies occurred, what then? Suppose the Army did mutiny, and the people did rebel, where would our Agent be if he had not troops to enforce his authority and restore order? 2150 Power in Egypt, as in all other countries, rested in the last resort in the Army. He did not believe in the theory of a combined Eastern and Western Government. They might grow bulrushes on the Nile, but they could not grow oaks. They could not galvanize an English Constitution into life there. An Eastern Belgium was an idle dream. Whenever the Eastern and Western races touched, they came into collision. The instincts and feelings of the two were altogether distinct, and very often hostile. They could not mingle. Every attempt to join them had been futile, and every project of the kind they might evolve—either in Egypt or elsewhere—was foredoomed to failure. The Eastern people went down before the Western as rapidly and completely as the Redskins went down before the White men. The Orientals imbibed all the vices of Western civilization, and they could not learn the means we possessed of curing them. The Turk was an honest, sober, and truthful man until we debauched him by our finance, and degraded him by our diplomacy. If the Government imagined they could build up in Egypt a composite Constitution of the kind they spoke of, they were mistaken. It would be a mere house of cards. They could build up a genuine Native Constitution—or, rather, they could have done that before the war. He believed, and always had believed, that a Mahommedan Government in that country was not only practicable, but highly desirable. It might have been made an instrument of progress, and produced contentment and comfort for the population. The Arabs had often made an attempt to form a nationality; but there had been obstacles in the way—sometimes political, sometimes geographical. All their efforts after this end in North Africa had been defeated; but in the Nile Delta there was a fair chance of their being successful. They had the opportunity of constituting an Arab nationality which would have been a centre of Arab civilization. To the lasting disgrace of the English Liberal Party, they prevented that interesting and hopeful experiment being tried. He knew nothing in modern politics more dishonouring than the tergiversation of hon. Gentlemen who sat on that side of the House. They had made the world vocal with their clamour for nationalities, but bad used the power 2151 of England to destroy an honest effort after Arab national life. Arabi was an Eastern soldier, and, he believed, a patriot. He had his faults, like every other man. His schemes might be visionary in some- particulars; but, take it all round, his was a patriotic attempt to give national life and form to the Government in Egypt. We destroyed it. We created anarchy and occasioned bloodshed, and the men who did this with their eyes open were now bemoaning the mischief they bad wrought. It was a pity that those who lamented the anarchy had not bethought themselves of what they were doing earlier. All they wanted in Egypt could have been got without war. Having destroyed the best—indeed, the only—chance of establishing a National Government in that country, he had no hope whatever from the scheme of dual or mitigated Constitutionalism that they were about to give a flickering existence to. It would fall a victim to Native intrigue and foreign ambition. Of course, he knew it was very unpleasant for the opponents of aggression to be saddled with such a very serious addition to British territory in Egypt; but they must accept the consequences of their own policy. lie could but repeat that, however much they might regret it, he believed they would find that circumstances would compel them, in one form or other—either by a British Army or a Native Army under British control —to keep our predominating hold on Egypt.

§ MR. SCLATER-BOOTH
said, he had listened with regret to the views of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Cowen) in regard to Arabi and his insurrection; but he entirely agreed with many of the earlier remarks which fell from the hon. Member. He fully admitted that Her Majesty's Government were placed in a position of great difficulty as far as Egypt was concerned, and that they had been swayed to and fro by contending influences acting in contrary directions. He deprecated the frequent attempts which had been made, either on the one side or on the other, to draw the Government. They had an expression of opinion from the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, in an earlier part of the Session, which was speedily contradicted by an explanation of the Prime Minister on the evening the Estimates were first introduced. The other 2152 day, in consequence of a rumour which came from abroad, they had the Primo Minister questioned again as to the withdrawal of the troops. The Prime Minister on that occasion gave an answer which was satisfactory to most of the hon. Gentlemen who sat on that (the Opposition) side of the House, but was not so satisfactory to the hon. Gentleman who put the Question on that occasion. Now they had the question raised again by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Morley); and the President of the Local Government Board, in the able speech he had made, gave an answer which would certainly tend to an opposite direction, so far as public opinion was concerned, when contrasted with the answer given by the Prime Minister the other evening. It was impossible, in answering Questions put by their supporters, for the Government not to show some sympathy with their views. The truth was that the Government were controlled in the matter by circumstances; and while they had found themselves bound to delay the withdrawal of the troops beyond the term indicated by the noble Marquess, they would be compelled to continue in Egypt more or less until the object for which they went to Egypt had been practically accomplished. He wished to point out that the diminution of their Force in Egypt was one thing, and a complete withdrawal another. So far as he was aware, no one complained of the diminution of their Force. The President of the Local Government Board pointed out that it had been diminished from 17,000 to 14,000, and he did not know that anybody objected. For his own part, he should regard with satisfaction the gradual and continuous reduction of the strength of their Army of Occupation; but he should view the complete withdrawal of their troops with great dissatisfaction. He was sure that the Government would be acting in accordance with the opinion of all reasonable people who had any interest in the question, whether in this country or any other, if they were to reserve themselves upon the question, and were to hold themselves free to keep their grip upon the country until the objects for which they went to Egypt had been accomplished, and the interests of the people secured. He would remind hon. Gentlemen who deprecated the retention of their Forces in Egypt that they 2153 would not obtain what they desired by the withdrawal of troops as long as the Army was officered by men in the distinguished position of Sir Evelyn Wood. They could not be ignorant that Sir Evelyn Wood was one of the most distinguished and active officers in the English Army. Nobody supposed that he had been surrendered to Egypt for all time; but he retained his liability to serve this country whenever he might be called upon. The same might be said of all the other officers who had been sent to Egypt. The hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Morley) had referred to the war in the Soudan, 2,000 miles away from the Mediterranean, as a thing for which we might be held responsible if matters went on as at present. Who was the officer commanding in the Soudan? It was au Artillery officer, who had been lent to the Egyptian Government by this country, and who, undoubtedly, retained his rank in the English Army, and who had only taken service for two years, which period would not expire until Christmas twelvemonths. The same might be said of other English officers in the Egyptian Army. Therefore, he said, it would not be enough to withdraw the Army of Occupation in order to secure what hon. Members opposite had in view—namely, the withdrawal of English influence and control in the affairs of Egypt. It was not enough to say that the English Forces should be withdrawn as soon as Sir Evelyn Wood was in a position to maintain law and order in Cairo. Before their Forces were withdrawn they must be assured that the Egyptian Army, on the one hand, was loyal, and, on the other, that it would not be used for the purposes of tyranny and oppression. How were they to secure that the Army would be free from those two temptations? It was quite evident that the withdrawal of the troops must be delayed until both of those questions had been made clear by the result. He had said, in the first instance, that he was not, for one, in a position to find fault with the Government. On the contrary, he was rather desirous of sympathizing with them in ' the position in which they stood; and he expressed a hope that no definite prognostication would be given, from an endeavour to make things pleasant for the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Morley), which would be disagreeable to 2154 hon. Members on that (the Opposition) side of the House. He entirely differed from his right hon. Friend the Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke), and he had no desire to accuse the Government of having plunged the country into an unnecessary war. He congratulated the country on having escaped from the difficulties which would have arisen had we engaged in the war in conjunction with either France or Turkey. When they bore in mind the circumstances which occurred in the spring of 1882, they could not but remember that they were on the verge of entering into the war in association with M. Gambetta. From that danger they were relieved not by any effort of their own, but by the providential break-down of the negotiations. Again, within a few weeks, even within a few days, and almost at the very moment when warlike operations commenced, they were in the position of having saddled upon them the officers and troops of the Sultan. It was a matter for thankfulness that they were saved from incurring so great a risk, and that circumstances so turned out that, both as regarded France and Turkey, they were spared from the embarrassment of being accompanied in their occupation of Egypt by the Forces of either of those nations. They entered into the campaign single-handed, and they had conducted it to a satisfactory issue. He believed that no Power in Europe desired the hasty or premature withdrawal of our troops from Egypt. He did not think that France desired it, or that any other nation desired it; and if they only did their duty, and followed the dictates of common sense in the matter, they would secure the permanent interests of the country, the pacification and good order of Egypt, and they would have an opportunity of exercising a paramount and lasting influence in maintaining their communications with India. It would not be consistent with what he had already said if he were to enter into any controversial matters. He did not wish to see the Government pressed either on the one side or the other. He was satisfied with the position of things as they were, and he was convinced that the premature or sudden withdrawal of their troops before the objects for which they went to Egypt were secured would be disastrous. He 2155 regretted that the debate should have been brought about in a somewhat irregular manner on a Motion in Committee of Supply, because he believed that it would have been preferable to leave the Government to their responsibilities in the matter.

§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL
said, that both the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Sclater-Booth) and the hon. Member (Mr. Cowen) who preceded him had expressed an opinion that the debate should now cease—in point of fact, that they should make speeches, but that Nobody else should. The right hon. Gentleman thought that they ought to remain in Egypt, and the hon. Member for Newcastle thought that it was likely that they should remain there. For his own part, he thought the sooner they got out of Egypt the better. He agreed with a great deal that the hon. Member for Newcastle had said, but not in thinking that they were likely to remain permanently in Egypt. He quite concurred with the junior Member for Newcastle (Mr. J. Morley) that there was no desire to reduce the Vote by the amount of Sir Evelyn Baring's salary. Sir Evelyn Baring was quite worth all that they could give to him. It was desirable that they should have a worthy Representative there, and they could not have selected a better. His only regret was that Sir Evelyn Baring should have been withdrawn from very important work in India. He thought it desirable on this occasion, which was probably the last on which the question of Egypt would be debated in that House during the present Session, that they should have a clear explanation of the intentions of the Government on subjects which seemed to be somewhat doubtful. He was one of those who had early thought that, although it might be easy to go to Egypt, it would be very difficult to come away again; and he thought it was quite evident that facts were now fulfilling his view of the case. In February last the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War expressed a sanguine hope that they would be able to withdraw their troops in the month of August. They were now in the month of August, and they had received from the Government good reasons why they should stay a few months longer; and at the end of that time they would probably have again to consider the question of 2156 withdrawal. He gave the Government credit for the best intentions in desiring to withdraw from Egypt, and lie thought that they should do so; but it did not appear at all clear when they would. They had been more than 100 years in India, and had not yet ventured to withdraw their troops; on the contrary, events had made it necessary to increase them. In India they had their own Administration, —but in Egypt everything was against them; they had the Turks, the Sultan, and the Porte at Constantinople, who had intrigued against us as far as they could, and there would be a war of races in Egypt and other difficulties of various kinds. Then, again, it must be borne in mind that if they withdrew their troops from India they might go back again; but it would be very difficult to do so in the case of Egypt. In that case, in all probability, they would have again to consult France and the other nations of Europe. He wanted to know whether, if they withdrew their troops, they were also prepared to withdraw their Civil Administration? He quite agreed that while Sir Evelyn Wood and other British officers remained at the head of the Egyptian Army they would be still accountable for the administration of the country; but if they withdrew Sir Evelyn Wood they must withdraw also their Civil Administration. He had placed a Question on the Paper that day; but his noble Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had asked him to defer it, because he thought it would be better answered in the course of the debate. As he agreed with the noble Lord, he had accordingly abstained from asking the Question, which was— Whether it is still intended that a Foreign Financial Adviser to the Khedive of Egypt shall be appointed; whether the opportunity will be taken to reduce in some degree the excessive staff of highly-paid Controllers, Commissioners of one kind of Domain Lands, Commissioners of another kind of Domain Lands, and other Officers; and, whether the body of European employés of the Egyptian Government is to be reduced, or is to be increased by new appointments such as that proposed to Mr. Clifford Lloyd? That was a very important Question, which he should like to have answered; but, at the same time, he should like to admit that he was a little rash in put- 2157 ting the Question. At the time he placed it upon the Paper he had not completed his study of the Blue Book. He had since discovered, in one of the last letters of Lord Dufferin, a clear answer to that Question; and he wanted to know whether Her Majesty's Government adopted the view of Lord Dufferin or not? Lord Dufferin's view in regard to the administration of Egypt was quite clear and distinct. Lord Dufferin said— The Khedive and his Ministers remain the real Rulers of Egypt; but, appreciating the sincerity of our intentions, they have, of their own accord, asked us to furnish them with a certain number of highly-trained, experienced, and able officers, whom they have attached to each of the Departments of the State. The same principle has been applied to the Army, the Police, and the Constabulary. As a consequence, the whole machinery of the Government will be assisted and inspired by an exceptionally able staff of Europeans, principally Englishmen, but in which both France and Germany will be represented, working in harmony with each other, and in loyal subjection to their Chiefs. …. Our representative institutions have been so contrived that while, on the one hand, neither the Legislative Council nor the Assembly could, through ignorance or perversity, obstruct the Government, on the other hand a strong and almost irresistible force of public opinion, as represented by the most intelligent men in the country, is focussed in such manner as to exercise an effectual control upon the arbitrary or capricious impulses of the Khedive's Ministers. Then the noble Lord went on, in another Paper, to say— I think it right to inform your Lordship that every new appointment has been made not merely with the consent, but at the solicitation of the Egyptian Ministers. In no case have I attempted to force upon them an European Administrator, if they themselves did not think his services required. … The Egyptians are perfectly intelligent enough to understand what an insignificant relation the salaries of a dozen first-rate experts bear to the profits their ability and talents enable them to confer upon the country. It is when we descend into the inferior regions and return to the protected Administrations that the multiplication of European Clerks and Commissioners begins to breed bad blood and discontent. The upshot of this letter was that, in the view of Lord Dufferin, it was desirable and expedient to appoint a certain number of high officers to assist the Egyptian officers; but he proposed to reduce the lower grade of servants, because their continued employment produced bad blood and discontent. That was, practically, the view of the Khedive; and Lord Dufferin in this represented the views of the Egyptian Government. It 2158 was with that view that Baker Pasha had been brought into Egypt, and established as the right hand of the Khedive; and it had become known lately that the Khedive desired to have the services of Mr. Clifford Lloyd. He (Sir George Campbell) knew nothing of Mr. Clifford Lloyd; he might be a good man or a bad man; but he knew he was reported to be a strong-handed man, and that he had been a leading man in Ireland under a very unfortunate system of policy. The deduction he drew from this was that the Khedive, acting in concert with our officers, was anxious to obtain the services of energetic, strong-handed English officers to rule the people of Egypt, but to get rid of many others. If this were persisted in, it seemed to him that it would be calculated to cause misunderstanding and ill-feeling between the different European nations who were represented in Egypt, as a large proportion of the lower grade of Government employés were foreigners—French, Italian, and others—and their removal, in order to substitute a higher class of Englishmen, was a policy which would not tend to create good humour and contentment. The policy of Lord Dufferin, which he had drawn up in charming anticipation of the future, was to have something in the nature of a British Resident, with a strong staff of able and energetic officers, who were to be the main-springs of the Departments presided over by Egyptian dummies. That was the policy of Lord Dufferin; and he wanted to know if it was also the policy of Her Majesty's Government? He disagreed with such a policy altogether, because he thought it was likely to lead them into trouble and difficulty, if not into annexation. Let them compare the introduction of this policy with what they had already realized. There had been a good deal of praise bestowed upon the late Dual Control. What had been the result of that Control? Lord Dufferin showed that it had egregiously failed in establishing anything like decent government in Egypt. If there was one thing they might have a hope for it was the Survey of the Land for Revenue; but Lord Dufferin told them that the Survey was an absolute and complete failure. It was filled by incompetent people, drawing large salaries, but doing next to nothing. He 2159 knew that in India occasions arose when it was necessary for the population of the neighbouring villages to come together, in order to keep out floods, and to maintain works for the benefit of the general community. But let them see how the system in Egypt was described by the hon. Member for Waterford (Mr. Villiers-Stuart). The hon. Member told them what he actually saw and heard himself in regard to the system of forced labour now going on in Egypt. The date of one letter was June, 1883. The writer said— The overseer told me that the entire forced labour of the Provinces was 40,000 men in all; that they worked from sunrise to sunset without intermission, except a brief interval at midday, for a meal consisting of bread soaked in unfiltered Nile water. This bread was sent them by their relatives, and they had a meal of it before commencing work and another at night. They- have also to provide their own baskets for carrying the excavated soil; they were engaged in filling their baskets with gravel (using their fingers for the purpose), climbing the sides of the cut and tipping them on the outer slope; the majority had no implement but their hands and a limited number of short picks a foot long, which they also have to provide, the Government contributing nothing whatever. Lord Dufferin told them that the condition of the Egyptian Fellaheen, instead of having been improved, had gone from bad to worse; they were heavily loaded with debt to usurers, and the land was passing out of their hands. That had been the result of what had been done in the past; and what was to be the result of the present state of things? He was not one of those who placed implicit credence in Special Correspondents; but he believed that where there was so much smoke there was some fire, and that the circumstantial way in which the people of this country were told of the abuses which prevailed in Egypt could not be all pure imagination. He could not believe that the present administration was a decent administration, of which they ought to be proud or contented. The same might be said of the administration of justice. Only the other day Suleiman Sarni was hanged while the House of Commons was debating his case. However guilty he might have been, the form of his trial was, undoubtedly, a disgrace to their control over Egypt. It did not even have the form of a decent trial; the witnesses were never heard in public; and the 2160 prisoner never had an opportunity of offering a defence, and, guilty or not, he was hanged even without the semblance of a decent trial. Then, again, there was the trial of Khandeel. No doubt, that was due to the English Government, and there was some form of trial; but what was the result? They had it on the authority of the English Procureur Général, one of the great institutions of the country, that there was evidence that the man was really ill on the day of the massacre; but it was said that he was not so ill as not to be able to go out and do his duty. Khandeel had been acquitted of any real complicity in the massacre at Alexandria; and yet, because he kept his bed through illness, but was not so ill that he ought to have boon prevented from going out and doing his duty, he had been sentenced to seven years' penal servitude in the Soudan, which amounted virtually to a sentence of death. It did not appear possible that such a sentence could be carried out. He desired very much to impress on the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Her Majesty's Government what had been the result of similar experience in India, in order to support his belief that no double Government could ever succeed. They must either have a Native Government or a European Government, and not one which was half Native and half European. He would allude to an experiment of the same kind in the Punjaub by Sir Henry Lawrence.

THE CHAIRMAN
I must call the attention of the hon. Member to the fact that he is going far beyond the Question before the Committee. The Punjaub is altogether beyond the Question.

§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL
said, he certainly had understood that this was an occasion upon which the policy of the Government in Egypt was to be debated. If the Chairman ruled that he was out of Order he must seize some other opportunity before the Session ended.

THE CHAIRMAN
I referred to the hon. Member's excursion into the territory of the Punjaub.

§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL
submitted that what he was arguing was, that the system of double government which had been introduced into Egypt had been tried in India and had failed; 2161 and he was about to briefly illustrate that argument by his own personal experience in India. Was he to understand that he was not to go on with that argument?

THE CHAIRMAN
The hon. Member may proceed until I rule him out of Order.

§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL
said, he was only going to point out that in a Province in which he had had experience in India the system of double government was tried by a man most likely to make it succeed—namely, Sir Henry Lawrence—but it had failed; and in Egypt, with first-class European assistance, it would also fail. They might go back and find that throughout their whole history in India the same thing had occurred.

THE CHAIRMAN
I must call the attention of the hon. Member to the fact that the Diplomatic Vote is under consideration, and not the history of our rule in India.

§ SIR GEORGE CAMPBELL
said, he would, of course, submit to the Chairman's ruling; but lie wished to point out that they were bringing from India a tried and efficient administrator, in order to make use in Egypt of the experience he had acquired in India to establish an efficient and sufficient system of government in Egypt; and if that system had not been successful in India, it was not likely to succeed in Egypt, because it would be tried in Egypt under conditions much more difficult than those in India. In Egypt they had to deal with conditions which did not exist in India. There was an enormous debt, a war of races, and Capitulations which had made government almost an impossibility. He should like to quote a passage from the Report of a very able Indian officer upon the question of carrying out a system of police administration in Egypt. He stated that it was an utter impossibility to carry on anything like administration in Egypt, when he was met at every turn by the claims of foreigners to be exempted from all police control. He stated— A foreign subject may commit any crime, break the law, and refuse to abide by any regulations; assault any public servant in the execution of his duty with what may be termed practical immunity, and certainly without fear of any deterrent punishment such as would be awarded to other evil-doers. That was an evil with which they would 2162 have to contend in Egypt. They tried to make other Powers grateful for the work we had done, and to help us in establishing good and able administration. Were there any signs that Foreign Powers were grateful to them, or were likely to assist their efforts? Were they not ready to blame us for everything—for everything that went wrong—for the cholera, and even for inundations that might come? He had no doubt, if inundations occurred, they would say we had tampered with the sources of the Nile. There was every indication that they would not be assisted by the foreign residents in Egypt, but rather that their hand would be forced, and they would be thwarted in their endeavour to establish a Native rule at every turn, as far as it was possible to thwart them. Then, what were they going to do about the financial question—about the great additions to the Debt? What were they going to do about the great Indemnities, the cost of the English troops in Egypt, and the losses through the cholera? Paper 13 showed that, of the sum assigned in satisfaction of the claims of the Mokabileh payers, not a farthing had been paid, and that fully £500,000 had now to be added to the difficulties of the administration. What was the source to which the Government were apparently inclined to turn? It was nothing but the old resource of a new loan, with the consent and goodwill of the Sovereign. the Sultan had expressed his willingness, and that was the way in which the Government were to get over the difficulty—by raising now debts to pay old debts. A much more important question was the vast private debts of the Fellaheen, which Lord Dufferin had so energetically stated, and which the hon. Member for Waterford (Mr. Villiers-Stuart) had done such great service in placing before the House. He was anxious also to know what the Government proposed to do with regard to the International Tribunals? It was those Tribunals that made the independence of Egypt impossible. They made it impossible for us to save the land from this vast loan of debt, and while they lasted would throw the land of the Fellaheen into the hands of foreigners. These International Tribunals would expire before Parliament met again, and he very much wished to know 2163 whether the Government proposed to renew them or not? He looked with great confidence to the clear-headedness of the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke); but if ever there was an occasion on which his belief in the foresight of the right hon. Gentleman was shaken it was when, 18 months ago, when he (Sir George Campbell) raised this question, the right hon. Gentleman stated that the International Tribunals were the one institution which everyone agreed was good. That was so, with the exception of one body of people—the people of Egypt. Not a word had been heard about their views; but the hon. Member for Waterford (Mr. Villiers-Stuart) had now laid those views before the House in most striking language. He had marked several passages to read, but hon. Members had had the Book in their hands for some time; and as they seemed so little inclined to prolong this debate, he would only say that it was clear that in the eyes of the people of Egypt these Tribunals were not their benefactors, but their oppressors. It was by those Tribunals that the land was being taken from them, and a social war was threatened, compared with which the rebellion of Arabi would be a mere fleabite. He hoped that before the evening closed the Government would state whether they proposed to continue these Tribunals, or whether they would, as he knew they could, put an end to them, and say they would not have the Egyptian people ruled over by Foreign Tribunals over which they had no control whatever. They had been led to believe that there was a good time coming, and that all these difficulties would be overcome by representative institutions. He believed that was quite possible, if only the Government had the courage to establish such institutions. There had been a Representative Assembly in Constantinople; but the Sultan found it so independent that he sent it to the right-about. He believed there might be representative institutions; but what were the institutions now proposed to be elected? It seemed to him that a mountain had conceived and only brought forth a mouse. So far as he could see, the only thing the Fellaheen would do was to elect Delegates who would elect a Body which would have no power of control, but would only be 2164 able to advise. So there was to be a consultative Council under a system of double election. What did Lord Dufferin state about this electoral body? He stated that neither the Legislative Assembly nor the General Assembly, through ignorance or perversity, could obstruct or control the functions of the Government. He thought there were a great many Governments which would be glad to have an Assembly of that kind, which would have no power to obstruct them. There was, perhaps, good reason why the Egyptian Assembly should not have that power, because, if it had, it would very likely sweep away the debt of the bondholders and the International Tribunals. If they were to maintain this system of Control, he thought it was clear they could not give this power to this Egyptian Representative Assembly. The two things were incompatible; and that was the reason why they proposed to give Egypt a sham Assembly and not a real Assem- bly. He had exposed what he believed?to be the difficulties and dangers of the administration in Egypt; and he might be asked now what he would do. He thought they had better not have gone to Egypt at all; and the only view he could express was that they had better get out of it as soon as they could. The only plan was to leave Egypt to the Egyptians, and let them manage their own affairs. In an Oriental country, if the people were to be left to manage their own affairs in their own way, the Darwinian system must be allowed to operate until the strongest came to the top. He would not say anything against the present Khedive, for he believed he was a well-meaning man, and had been the faithful ally of the English Government. He was very much inclined to say to the Khedive—" We have maintained you on your Throne for some time; now you must manage your own affairs. If you are willing to try the experiment of ruling by yourself by all means try." He would give the Khedive every encouragement and assistance in attempting that work; but, on the other hand, if it should turn out that the Khedive was unable without their assistance to carry on the work of Government in Egypt, he was not at all sure that, in the end, they might not be obliged to do what they once did in Afghanistan. They had a strong Ruler 2165 there, and they turned him out; but when they found they could not govern Afghanistan without him, they had to bring him back. He was inclined to believe the same thing might occur in Egypt; they might have to get back Arabi. If they withdrew their troops they would have to withdraw their administration. He entirely agreed with the right hon. Gentleman the late President of the Local Government Board (Mr. Sclater-Booth) that, although they might withdraw their troops, and leave their officers to command the Egyptians and be at the head of the Departments, they would still be responsible for the wellbeing of Egypt. In such a position, if a rebellion broke out they would be responsible for putting it down; and so the mere withdrawal of the troops would lead to greater difficulties. Therefore, they must not attempt too much, but let the administration be as Oriental as possible, and let us get out of the country as soon as possible. With reference to the argument that those who wanted to get out of the country as soon as possible ought to be opposed to our interference with the discretion of the Khedive regarding political trials and other matters, he denied the soundness of that contention. It had always been a strong argument against their going to Egypt that, when they had got there, they would be responsible for seeing that injustice was not done. So long as they, by their arms and bayonets, suppressed the sacred right of rebellion, so long they were responsible for seeing that political opponents should not be put to death without trial, and that gross injustice should not be committed. They could not get rid of that difficulty without leaving the country. If they continued their present system, importing more and more energetic officers and more and more of the English element into the higher Departments of the administration, they would go further and further in the direction of that annexation which was prophesied by so many hon. Members. They would drift towards annexation; and, although they might very well administer Egypt for their own benefit and for the Egyptian people, still, in view of their political situation with respeet to France and the other Powers, any attempt at annexation would lead to evils far counterbalancing any advantages from it. He 2166 was convinced that their only course was to get out of Egypt as soon as possible, and to abstain from interfering with the country, and to put themselves in a position in which they could fairly object to interference by other Powers.

§ MR. LABOUCHERE
said, it was clear, from the explicit statement of the President of the Local Government Board, coupled with some other observations he had made, that, with the exception of a few details, he agreed with the speech of the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Morley); and his speech, on the whole, would, he thought, be most satisfactory to those who were desirous that they should withdraw from Egypt as soon as possible. For his part, he did not see that it was necessary that the Government should make any such declaration. He thought the reply given the other day by the Prime Minister was perfectly clear in regard to that matter; but that, undoubtedly, was not the view of Conservative Members opposite. In point of fact, after the Prime Minister had made his statement he happened to be with some Conservatives, and they were strongly of opinion that the Primo Minister did not himself intend to withdraw; and four or five of them mentioned, as a new fact, that we should be in Egypt this time next year. He thought, however, that no Conservative Member would be of opinion, after the clear statement of the Prime Minister, that we should be in Egypt this time next year. But the Conservatives seemed to have taken that view; and, in fact, they had clearly and explicitly stated what their view of the matter was. The right hon. Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke) had clearly stated that they ought to take advantage, in the view of the Conservatives, of their being in Egypt to remain there, and, practically, to annex the country. That, as he understood, was the view of the right hon. Gentleman.

§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE
It was nothing like annexation. The word used was not annexation.

§ MR. LABOUCHERE
said, that was so; but he knew why the word "annexation" was not used, and why the right hon. Gentleman did not say anything about annexation. If he had done that there would have been an outcry at once; but hon. Gentlemen opposite hoped the Government would remain in 2167 Egypt from year to year until the Conservatives came into Office, so that they could then throw it on the Liberals that they had remained so long in Egypt, and had violated their pledges, and that the Conservatives were only fulfilling them. Annexation! God forbid! But they were to remain there and rule in the name of some dummy Government. That was what he understood was the policy of the Conservatives—if not, he could not understand their speeches inside and outside the House. So far as he could make out, these speeches had shown practically a desire that the present Representatives of Her Majesty should remain in Egypt until the fact of their being there had become such an accomplished fact that it would be impossible for them to withdraw. The Press was just as bad as the Conservatives. The Press chose to ignore the plain, simple language of the Prime Minister. The Times said they wore to read between the lines; and what did the other newspapers say? They rejoiced to think that the Prime Minister was not going to be bound by some random assertions he had made, but would remain in Egypt for an indefinite time. What did an indefinite time mean? It was not necessary to read between the lines to arrive at a conclusion; but an indefinite time obviously meant that they were to remain there for 20, 30, or 40 years. Practically, they were to remain there because they were there. He would not go into the question of the expediency of such a course; but he thought he could show that it would be inexpedient for them and for the Egyptians that they should remain there; but the question of expediency need not be raised now, because he considered that the Government and the country were absolutely bound in honour to withdraw as soon as possible after they had established order and tranquillity in the country. Whenever Her Majesty's Ministers had had an opportunity they had stated that their bonâ fide intention had been, and still was, to withdraw from Egypt. It was perfectly true that those statements were made in that House; but, although made in that House, they were made to foreign countries. Foreign countries took note of them, and recognized and accepted the fact that the Ministry would not make those solemn pledges in that 2168 House without intending to maintain them. There was only one point in the statement of the President of the Local Government Board with regard to which he must express regret. As far as he understood the right hon. Gentleman, the troops now numbered about 6,700, and were gradually to be reduced; and in a short time they would be reduced to 2,000. He imagined that they would be withdrawn from Cairo and from the country, and would be collected at Alexandria; but he did not gather that they would be withdrawn as soon as he thought was desirable. He perfectly understood that, at the present moment, it would be difficult to withdraw the troops, and that it must be a gradual matter. He understood that it was desirable to collect the few troops that remained at Alexandria; but he would venture to urge on the Government how desirable it was to withdraw these few troops as soon as possible. He did not say that every European in Egypt was a scoundrel—far from it; but he thought a great many of them wore, and he suspected the majority of them were. They went there to dip their hands into the flesh-pots of Egypt, and that they had done for a very long time. They wore anxious to make a fortune, and their rights were, generally speaking, the wrongs of the Egyptian people. Everyone knew how the Egyptian Debt had been piled up, and concessions had been obtained, and money made from them; how the Fellaheen had been oppressed, and who did it, and for whose profit it was done. It was for a small body of Europeans. They were influential owing to their wealth; they managed to induce England to believe that it was absolutely necessary that England should remain there. Why? In order that they should remain and continuo to make money. He, however, did think it was desirable that they should withdraw as soon as possible; but, so far as he was concerned, the statement of the Prime Minister was satisfactory: Several hon. Members did feel that it would be most desirable, as soon as possible, to withdraw this corporal's guard from Egypt. As a matter of fact, there was a largo body of wealthy and influential men who wished to bring back the English troops. Indeed, they would only be safely out of the Egyptian Business when the last sol- 2169 dier of the British Army had left the soil of Egypt. If it was requisite they could have their ships of war there. Their ships of war had a perfect right in the Alexandrian waters; and it would be only reasonable, if their troops were withdrawn, that the ships of war should remain. In that case, they would have their men on board ship. They would not have their troops on Egyptian soil, or have the English flag flying in Egypt. They would not then be always liable, in the possible contingency of some disturbance arising out there, of there being a great outcry for their troops to be sent to Egypt. Let the House, in the name of goodness, settle the matter as soon as possible. He thought it better that some ships should be out there. ["Oh! oh!"] He was speaking of the alternative of whether it was desirable to leave the soldiers on shore; and he believed it would be more desirable that they should simply have ships of war there. He thought that that alternative would be better than having their soldiers remaining in Egypt. Unquestionably, this Expedition was a great strain upon the Liberal Party. He did not believe that any man, except the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, would ever have induced the Radicals to support such a policy as that which he had pursued in Egypt; and he must point out to the right hon. Gentleman that the Radical Party did support him, and did honestly stand by him—[Several hon. MEMBERS: Not all!]Anyhow, the main body of the Radicals in the country—[" No, no! "!— did stand by the right hon. Gentleman in his Egyptian policy. They might regret it; but it, nevertheless, was a fact. They supported his policy, however, under conditions. They did so because they had faith in the Prime Minister. It was because, when the Prime Minister told them he meant to withdraw as soon as possible, they knew by the prior speeches of the right hon. Gentleman on many other matters—they knew by the declarations he had made in regard to the Russian War, and the Afghan War, with respect to Cyprus and the Transvaal, that his policy was non-intervention in matters which did not concern them. They thoroughly believed that the right hon. Gentleman would withdraw from Egypt as soon as it was possible; that he would not, by entering the plea of 2170 fostering Liberal institutions, endeavour to gradually acquire power in that country. They knew that it was absolutely necessary, in the interests of peace and order, that they should remain, at least some short time, until the Khedive had surrounded himself with such a Force as would enable him to maintain peace and order. But now there was a distinct assurance given—an assurance which, for his part, he did not consider necessary on this occasion, because it had been made before—they had a distinct assurance that as soon as the Khedive was able to organize that Force, or until Sir Evelyn Wood was able to organize that Force, so soon would the last English soldier leave Egypt. He thought the Committee ought to be satisfied with that assurance; and he thanked the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister for having, against strong opposition on the other side of the House, and against the opposition of many interested persons, stood so nobly to his pledges. He fully believed that before 12 months were over the last English soldier would have left Egypt, and he rejoiced to think that such was the case. He had got an Amendment to this Vote on the Paper —namely, to reduce the sum by £2,000. His Amendment, however, had no reference to Egyptian matters, but related to the Special Mission to Russia. He estimated that £4,000 out of the £6,000 would be spent by Sir Edward Thornton at Constantinople, and that £2,000 would be spent by the Duke of Edinburgh upon his journey to Russia. He, therefore, begged to move the reduction of the Vote by the sum of £2,000.

§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE
said, they were now in the middle of the discussion upon the Egyptian Question, and the Amendment of the hon. Gentleman had reference to another subject which would come under the Vote. He hoped the hon. Gentleman would not necessitate the stoppage of the present discussion at this point, which would be the effect of his moving the Amendment now.

§ MR. LABOUCHERE
said, he understood the debate would not be stopped.

THE CHAIRMAN
stated that the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Labeuchere) would be perfectly in Order in moving the Amendment.

2171

§ SIR WILFRTD LAWSON
said, he thought that if the hon. Gentleman moved his Amendment now, the debate must necessarily turn upon the Russian matter.

§ MR. LABOUCHERE
said, that if the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote) thought that they would not be able to continue the present discussion, he would gladly withdraw his Amendment.

MR. BOURNE
considered that it would be for the convenience of the Committee that the hon. Member for Northampton should withdraw his Amendment for the present. There were several hon. Members who wished to speak upon Egyptian matters; and the moving of the Amendment now would only introduce another element of' irregularity into their proceedings. They were supposed to be engaged in discussing Major Baring's salary; but, as a matter of fact, it did not arise on that Vote at all.

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
pointed out that one-half of Major Baring's salary was in this Vote, and one-half in the Consular Vote.

§ MR. LABOUCHERE
said, he was entirely in the hands of the Committee; but, in his opinion, it would certainly do no harm if he were to move his Amendment now.

THE CHAIRMAN
said, the hon. Gentleman was perfectly in Order.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £111,300 (including a Supplementary sum of £6,000), be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1881, for the Expenses of Her Majesty's Embassies and Missions Abroad."—(Mr. Labouchere.)

§ MR. M'COAN
said, that the peg upon which the discussion had thus far hung was the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle (Mr. Morley). It struck him (Mr. M'Coan), when the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) was speaking, that there was a suspicious harmony between his observations and those of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Newcastle; and that led him to attach considerably less weight to the declarations of the right hon. Baronet than he should otherwise have done. He was bound to assume that the declarations of the President of 2172 the Local Government Board were made in all bona fides, and that they expressed the present intentions and purposes of Her Majesty's Government. Before, however, he ventured to offer a remark upon them, he would like to comment briefly upon some of the chief points in the speech of the hon. Member for Newcastle. The hon. Gentleman began his speech with a declaration in favour of the evacuation policy. He had referred to Lord Dufferin's statement in January, that peace and tranquillity reigned in Egypt; and contended that, if that were so, there was no need for our troops in Egypt. The hon. Gentleman, however, did not choose to see that the very cause of such peace and tranquillity was this presence of the troops in that country. The hon. Gentleman had then referred to the representatives of the Press, and of persons who had been present in Egypt during recent months, and had stated their views with regard to the condition of the country. He described them as alarmists, and endeavoured to detract from the value of the information they had given as to the state of affairs by the suggestion that they had selfish interests which gave colour to their evidence. He himself, however, happened to have some knowledge of the facts; and, speaking with reference to all the Correspondents of the London journals in Egypt, he could assure the Committee that they were men who knew the country well, and who were as incapable of misrepresenting the actual state of affairs as any Member of that House. But the hon. Member, unhappily, went further, and attacked a class of witnesses than whom he could not have mentioned any higher, or more trustworthy — namely, the American Missionaries in Egypt. Now, it had been his own good fortune to be personally acquainted with most of these gentlemen for many years; and, having been an eye-witness of the way in which they performed their work, both in Egypt and Turkey, he was able to testify that a more trustworthy and estimable class of men than these American Missionaries did not exist. They had no pecuniary interest in the state of Egypt; they lived amongst the Natives, whom they knew well, and were men of the very highest integrity. Well, these men had given evidence entirely confirmatory of what had appeared in the public Press; 2173 and he had, therefore, no doubt whatever that the condition of the country was as the Correspondents of The Times and Standard described it. The hon. Member said that our diplomatic influence ought to be enough in Egypt; that we should not rely on a Protectorate or a military occupation, but on the action of our Diplomatic Representatives. But the hon. Member had quite overlooked the fact that our diplomatic influence would not be real unless there was force behind it. The hon. Member had further remarked, as an argument against a permanent occupation of Egypt, on the cost of governing the country; but there, again, the hon. Gentleman seemed to him to have fallen into a fallacy, because all our experience had proved that the better the country was governed the greater had been the Revenue, and therefore the cost to the Administration was less. They had heard, in the course of the discussion, a good deal on both sides of the question about the Dual Control. For his own part, he regarded that much-abused arrangement as a salutary ono—certainly, it could not be denied that the taxes were never collected more regularly than they had been while it was in operation. But he thought that if a practically British Administration were set up in Egypt, the cost would, in the end, be found to be much less than any Native Government that could be set up. But when he heard the right hon. Baronet the President of the Local Government Board respond, point by point, to the speech of the hon. Member, he felt that the agreement of opinion between them was, to say the least, suspicious; it seemed to him, indeed, as if the hon. Member had risen with the set purpose of eliciting from the right hon. Baronet a declaration of policy which was intended to serve a particular Party purpose; and, having listened to the speech with that conviction, he confessed that it commanded less respect and carried less weight with it to his mind than if it had been delivered under other circumstances. But when the speech of the right hon. Baronet was tested, although it seemed sufficient to satisfy the most thorough-going Radical, it had not advanced the matter one step beyond the position in which it had been left by the Primo Minister. It said no more than that, as soon as the British troops could leave without mischief to 2174 our policy in Egypt, then, and not till then, would they be withdrawn. Believing that that was a very remote contingency indeed, he (Mr. M'Coan) felt re-assured, and was very confident that the withdrawal of our troops would be a very distant operation. Only three possible courses seemed open to us. The first would be to leave Egypt to the present Khedive, supported, as the hon. Member for Newcastle would have it, by the diplomatic influence of our Consul General; the second, to withdraw entirely, which meant abandoning the country to anarchy, or to remain, and govern it ourselves; and the third, to restore the late Khedive, who, after all, was the strongest Ruler that had governed Egypt since the days of Mehemet Ali. It was the fashion to speak ill of the late Khedive, and to magnify the abuses of his Government; but he would venture to remind the Committee that, however Ismail Pasha might have exacted money from the Fellaheen himself, he, at least, protected them from the extortions of the usurers and the taxgatherers—a protection which had not been given to them either before or since. Our wisest policy, and the policy which events would compel us to adopt, was honestly to annex and govern the country ourselves.

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
said, before he touched on the various points connected with the present position of affairs in Egypt which had been dwelt upon by the several speakers in the course of this debate, he would first ask to be allowed to refer to one or two incidental points brought under the notice of the Committee by the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff). The hon. Member, in the course of his speech, alluded to a Question asked by him the other day, with regard to a despatch of the year 1863, in respect of which he was not satisfied with the answer lie (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had given, nor with the answer received a few days afterwards from the Prime Minister. The hon. Member had asked for the production of a despatch containing a protest on behalf of the Porte against the concession by the Khedive of Egypt to the Suez Canal Company of certain land adjacent to the Fresh Water Canal, and he wished for the production of that Paper at the present time, because he considered it relevant to the 2175 issue as to whether or not the Khedive had the right to sell the grant of a new Canal without the consent of the Porte. He had stated, on the occasion referred to, that he thought it was unnecessary to produce that Paper; because, since the year 1863, there had been two other Firmaus issued which had greatly altered the relations between the Porte and the Khedive. They, however, carefully guarded themselves from expressing any opinion upon the very difficult legal question as to whether the Porte had the right, under possible circumstances, to give or withhold its consent to the construction of a second Canal. The Prime Minister and himself considered the production of the Paper unnecessary, on the ground that it was irrelevant to the present condition of affairs, and because it was not a protest on the ground of law, but on the ground of policy, the Porte considering that the grant of these enormous territories to the Suez Canal Company would be the source of future danger to the country. Hence arose that arbitration and award of the Emperor of the French, which was, no doubt, of great use, and which put this question upon a more satisfactory footing. But at that point he must object to the manner in which his hon. Friend, in his Question, described the document which he asked for; because, as the Question was placed on the Paper, any person reading it would suppose that the protest of the Porte was against the grant of the Fresh Water Canal itself, and also the lands adjacent; whereas it was, in reality, a protest against the granting of the lands adjacent. When he stated that the objection was to the granting of this large extent of territory to the Company, carrying, as it undoubtedly would, authority over the future growth of towns and cities, he meant that it would be the creation of an imperium in imperio. As he had before stated, his objection to the production of the despatch was that it was unnecessary to produce it, and, moreover, that it would involve a considerable amount of expense; but, as his hon. Friend was anxious to have the Paper, he would see whether it could be presented, and communicate further with him on the subject. Then his hon. Friend alluded to Syria, and said that Her Majesty's Government had allowed the French to establish a paramount authority in that 2176 country. He could not see any connection between the allusion of his hon. Friend and the subject of this debate; but he would say that Her Majesty's Government had no reason to complain of the attitude of France in regard to these negotiations, and in regard to the successor of Rustem Pasha in the Lebanon. A man had been appointed who, he believed, commanded universal respect in the district; and Her Majesty's Government, having exchanged communications on the subject with the French Government, believed they had taken a course most useful in every way to the country he was called upon to govern. He now passed to the more immediate subject of debate; and, first of all, he must pause to notice the very strange allegation which had been made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Bourke) with regard to the attitude of the Opposition upon the Egyptian policy of Her Majesty's Government. They had been told by the right hon. Gentleman, who had, perhaps, the right to say so for himself, but not for his Party, that they had always objected to the policy of Her -Majesty's Government with regard to Egypt, and especially to that policy, culminating, as it did, in a military expedition. Now, he might, perhaps, be permitted to dwell for a moment upon that ever memorable speech delivered by the Marquess of Salisbury to a crowded and most fashionable audience in -Willis's Rooms on the 22nd of Juno, after the massacre. The Marquess of Salisbury said— Yon have sent to the Alexandrian waters a powerful Fleet, the bearers of a Note demanding what England is determined to exact the fulfilment of—the removal of a military adventurer from power in Egypt. That observation was tolerably strong; but if it should be thought not strong enough, he would turn to an authority in that House. He found that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman who represented North Lancashire (Colonel Stanley) spoke on the Vote for Egypt in the most vigorous language. He said— The Expedition is a grave matter; not, of course, only in a military point of view, but grave, possibly, beyond all recognition in the consequences that may ensue. If the Government is determined to go straight forward with single-heartedness to preserve British interests, and to keep British interests well before them, while by no means oblivious to those of other Powers, then they would find this country 2177 united almost to a man behind them."—(3:Hansard, [272] 1700.) And the right hon. and gallant Gentleman added that it would not then be necessary to enter into too minute calculations of material cost, and that the objects which Her Majesty's Government had in view would commend themselves to the universal approval and support of the country. He presumed that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman did not exclude from that the support of so important a body of persons as Her Majesty's Opposition. The hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff), speaking of Major Baring, had expressed a fear that Her Majesty's Government had not given him a sufficient position and title to insure respect for his authority, saying that he was only a Consul General; and what was a Consul General? He said Major Baring was one of a numerous body of gentlemen bearing that name, and whose position was not precisely that which was demanded by the circumstances of the case; and that, therefore, he would not command that confidence and respect which it was desirable that he should possess. The answer to those comments of the hon. Member was plain and simple; in cases of this kind it was not a matter of name or title. The question was—" Who is the man?" For the man would create his own position. Major Baring was a man of great ability and of great reputation in Egypt; and it might be depended upon that he would require neither name, decoration, nor title to make his advice carry weight in the Councils of Egypt. He would speak with the whole weight and authority which his long previous experience, both in that country and in India, had given him. He might remind the Committee of the well-known story of Lord Castlereagh, who, although he appeared at the Congress of Vienna without star or decoration, was, nevertheless, said to be the most powerful and distinguished man there. And so, doubtless, Major Baring would stand first in the Councils of that Ruler whom, from time to time, he would probably be called upon to advise in difficult situations. The hon. Member also asked whether or not there was to be another Financial Adviser? That was a fair question. Her Majesty's Government had said nothing which would lead anyone to suppose 2178 that there would not be another Financial Adviser; there would be another, and at the proper time his name would be announced. Again, his hon. Friend said that if there were to be another Adviser, various disputes and wranglings would arise between him and the Consul General, and he referred to the relations between Colonel Stanton and Mr. Cave. He did not want to go back upon what might have occurred; but he would say that the circumstances which respectively surrounded those two gentlemen and Major Baring were not at all the same, and he believed there was no doubt that Major Baring and the gentleman who would be appointed in the capacity of Financial Adviser would know how to work harmoniously together. [Sir H. DRUMMOND WOLFF: I mentioned several cases.] The other cases referred to by the hon. Gentleman he did not think could be placed on all fours with the position of Major Baring and our Financial Adviser. Now, as to a matter of the greatest interest to the Committee. The Financial Adviser and the Consul General would advise the Khedive as to the good government of the country, which had known so many centuries of oppression. Whatever differences of opinion there might be; whether Gentlemen were in favour of the Expedition or against it; whether they were in favour of retaining Egypt or withdrawing from it; they had, he was satisfied, but the one desire that her suffering millions should be prosperous and happy. His right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board had sketched out what had been done in the matter of Army organization; and the Prime Minister the other day had stated that the plan with regard to the Constabulary and the Police was also well advanced. If nothing else had been accomplished than those three things, it would be an answer to what was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for King's Lynn (Mr. Bourke), who, with a touch of epigram, observed that when they left Egypt there would be no memorial of their stay there but the ruins of Alexandria and a paper Constitution. It was no small achievement to have re-organized the Army, Constabulary, and Police, whatever might be the opinion of hon. Members opposite. But these were not ' the only things that had been done. If 2179 anybody would examine the two last Blue Books that had been laid upon the Table with regard to the re-organization of Egypt, and the general subject of the condition of Egypt, he would find that progress had been made, and he would find from time to time in the despatches of Lord Dufferin clear indications and statements of what had been done. For example, a great number of Questions had been asked at various times, chiefly by hon. Members opposite, as to the ill-treatment of the Fellaheen by officials. In "Egypt No. 13" there was a Circular which had been issued to the Provincial authorities, warning them against the ill-treatment of the Fellaheen, and peremptorily forbidding the use of the kourbash or lash, which had been several times prohibited by Ministers of the Interior. [A laugh.] A Circular had also been issued with regard to the payment of the debts of the Fellaheen by instalments. Some hon. Members had cheered derisively when he had referred to those Circulars; but he would ask them to consider how any reforms could begin except in the first place by the drawing up of a scheme, and then by the Executive doing its best to carry it out. What other steps could be taken unless they were prepared to advocate what some hon. Members opposite were prepared to advocate—namely, that the Government should do the very thing that had been deprecated—take the government of the country into their own hands. Some hon. Members said—"Leave the Egyptians to themselves." But he found in this very statement what they might fairly suppose would be the immediate and only result. Who were they who so oppressed the population? Were they the agents of the central power? No. He believed there were some hon. Members who supposed these persons were agents sent clown from the head-quarters to override the country; but in many parts of the East the Mudir was the person who was regarded as the local authority; and if they went back on the idea of Egypt for the Egyptians and carried it out, the Mudirs were the very persons upon whom they would have to rely, and those were the persons whom they would have to keep in order. In European Turkey there was a form of election in many districts, of these local authorities, and they were regarded not as being the agents of the 2180 central power, but as what would be called in India the headmen.

§ MR. M'COAN
said, that in every case these men were appointed directly by the Government, and were the actual Administrators of Provinces.

LORD EDMOND FITZ MAURICE
said, he was not speaking of Egypt but of Turkey. He was saying that it was not at all necessary to regard these persons as the agents of the central power; for they were in many ways regarded as the representatives of the localities, and as persons who had to charge themselves with the interests of their districts. Then he had referred to Turkey, and drawn a distinction; but his main proposition was this—that if the idea of Egypt for the Egyptians was carried out to its logical conclusion, it was, to a great extent, upon these men, and the men whom they represented, that they would have to depend; and when it was said that they must proclaim the doctrine of Egypt for the Egyptians, and push it to its logical conclusion, they must recollect the difficulty that there was no class in Egypt, so far as was known, which was at that moment fully able to rise to a conception of local administration, unless they were, to a certain extent, guided by the greater skill and longer experience of men whose services had been placed at the disposal of the Egyptian Government. Another ques- tion was that of prison re-organization. There was a despatch by Lord Dufferin in which he pointed out that no reform was more urgent than this, and that no considerable improvement could take place until new gaols were erected; and the Egyptian Government was at that moment turning its attention to that matter, notwithstanding the financial difficulties. That was a most practical and useful suggestion; and in regard to any objection that might be taken to it of the same kind as was taken with respect to the Circulars, he would simply say that there must be a beginning in some way; and he wanted to know how that was to be made except by carrying out careful inquiries into the real state of things? [An hon. MEMBER: Has anything been done?] He had already stated that the prison organization question had received attention, notwithstanding the financial difficulties. As these Papers showed, with regard to the 2181 existing prisons, there had been an improvement, owing to the amount of attention given to them; but there could be no great improvement until the prisons had been rebuilt. The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) had said a great deal about the indebtedness of the Fellaheen, and he seemed to think that that was a matter which had not engaged any serious attention. He could hardly suppose that the hon. Member had looked very closely at the recent Blue Book, because the indebtedness of the Fellaheen was a constant subject of comment in Lord Dufferin's despatches. Lord Dufferin pointed out that he was inclined, in the first place, to modify in a favourable sense the estimate he had made of the magnitude of that debt. He first thought it was nearly £7,000,000; but on consideration he found that it might be put down at between £4,000,000 and £5,000,000. Then he also modified the opinion which had been expressed as to the very unfavourable action of the Mixed Courts on the ownership of land by peasants. He was inclined to think that the influence of those decisions had not been so dangerous or disastrous as had been represented, and that the Mixed Courts were an important institution in Egypt. No doubt, that modification of opinion was one which was supported. But, be that as it might, he pointed out that in our Tribunal a step had been taken to bring the Fellaheen into more direct connection with the land they tilled—namely, by a plan on which a separate Blue Book had presented, as to the disposal of the Domain Lands—to enable the peasants to acquire their holdings. Reference to the Fellaheen brought him to the subject of finance; and here he would at once state that the peculiar manner in which, until now, Egyptian finance had been regulated in regard to time did not enable him to place a complete statement before the Committee as to the financial condition of Egypt in 1882. The financial year ended on December 31; but under the system which at one time, he believed, existed in this country, all payments belonging to the year ending on December 31, were credited to that year so long as they were paid in before the 30th of April following, so that the closing of the books and the making up of the accounts was delayed for a considerable 2182 period. But that, he was glad to say, had been already remedied by the Egyptian Government, and their financial year would in future end on December 31, and any payments coming into the Exchequer subsequently would be credited to the following year, so that it would be possible more rapidly to present the financial accounts of the country. But, although he was not able to enter into any great detail upon this subject, lie could say that, not withstanding the disturbances of last year and the war which took place, the finances of Egypt were showing a most extraordinary and rapid power of recovery. The Revenue was coming in with regularity, and those preparing the Budget of 1883 had every reason to believe that the country was going through a rapid financial recovery. Nevertheless, the present year, it was quite certain, was an exceptional year, because there must be on both sides of the account certain important items which would probably not recur, and which deprived the present year of a normal character. For example, there was a deficit, though not a large one, upon last year. The recovery of the Revenue was, to a certain extent, bound up with the condition of the Domain and the Daira Lands; the accounts were separate, but each, under certain circumstances, might come on the Revenue of the country for the payment of any loss from the collection of the Revenue. Then there was the unfortunate war which had been going on in the Soudan, which was, no doubt, a considerable drain on the country. The Soudan had its own Budget; but, nevertheless, it had before now drawn on the finances of Egypt, and the war was still going on. Some of the many things to which he had alluded—the necessity of building new prisons, the improvement of the barracks, and several other matters of that kind—must come in this year, but they would not recur another year. Then there was the question of what must be done with regard to the Indemnity Loan, and how much of that might have to come on the current year; and then there was, of course, the cost of Army organization, which was rapidly decreasing, owing to the steps described by his right hon. Friend. These were all special and diminishing charges. Then there were certain items, on the other hand, which might come into the 2183 account on the credit side, some of which would not occur again—such as the sale of war matériel to a considerable extent; and other matters which it was hoped it would not again be necessary to have recourse to—for instance, the sale of certain lands to recover the deficit of last year. He only dwelt on these points to show that the present year was a transition year, and that it was idle to prophecy upon these subjects. With regard to the cholera, there was no doubt that that outbreak had had a most disastrous effect on the collection of the Revenue. Nevertheless, he was inclined to hope —and he was not speaking witbeut having consulted those who were competent to know—that unless the cholera continued to rage with intensity for a far longer period than was at all deemed probable by those most conversant with the progress of development of that terrible disease, the disturbance to the Revenue would not be permanent. Still, there would be a loss. The Land Revenue fell off considerably during July. There would be considerable loss; and it was almost certain that in those country districts which had been most visited by this calamity, the Egyptian Government would find it necessary to make remissions of taxation. But, on the other hand, if there was this pros-poet of loss, there was also a prospect of gain by the taxation of all classes of property belonging to foreigners, which was alluded to in reply to a Question to-day. Negotiations were proceeding which he believed would before long put an end, not only to this most unjust privilege, but would bring into the coffers of the Egyptian Exchequer, if not a very large, at all events an ap. preciable sum. Two hon. Members had spoken of the Moukabala arrangement and the question of the foreign employés of the Egyptian Government. There seemed to be an impression that the Government were in some way responsible for the Moukabala arrangement, and they had been defended and apologized for in respect to that. But the Government had no responsibility whatever for that arrangement. That was an arrangement made many years ago. It was, in his opinion, a very unwise arrangement; but it was sanctioned by a Commission and settled by the Law of Liquidation, and the Government had every confidence that that Commission 2184 considered the immense difficulties of the case, and the Law of Liquidation was drawn up after careful inquiry which took place to make the very best arrangement possible under the disastrous circumstances of the day. He believed the Egyptian peasantry suffered great injustice by the arrangement; but, still, he believed the Commission made as just and equitable an arrangement as could be made. The injustice consisted not so much in the arrangement itself as in the way in which it was carried out. But the responsibility must not be put upon the wrong shoulders. He was not speaking of the present or the late Government; but the blame must not be put on the shoulders of the gentlemen who composed that Commission, out of which the Law of Liquidation eventually grow. They should rather go back to the time when the arrangement was made, and rest the responsibility on the proper shoulders. The other point was the question of the foreigners employed by the Egyptian Government. The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) devoted a large portion of his observations to that subject; but there, again, the hon. Member did not seem to have taken trouble to look at the most recent information which had been presented. He quoted largely from the earlier Blue Books of the Session; but he did not see that, as already stated in two of the recent Blue Books, a change had been effected in many cases by the removal of useless foreign employés. The Egyptian Government had shown great courage in this matter. The removal of employés was exceedingly difficult, and especially in Egypt; and the Egyptian Government had shown very great resolution, because they had not been afraid to incur the, possible of many persons, who might think their claims had been very hardly dealt with. The economies effected in many Departments amounted to £148,000. The total dismissals up to the end of April numbered 148, of whom 75 were foreigners, receiving salaries amounting to £23,000 a-year. In connection with this matter, he wished to point out that there had been a good deal of misunderstanding in regard to the number of foreign employés. Out of 20,000, which was the Civil Service proportion of the people, there were only 5 per cent Europeans. 2185 He had been told that all the Egyptian Government had done amounted only to what might be called virtuous intentions; but his answer was that a Constitution could not be founded in a day. They must begin by making the institutions carefully, and by adapting them to the habits of the people, and then proceed to carry them out. They were being carried out; and but for the outbreak of the cholera he believed the new organic law would have been completed by now. The electoral colleges were all voted for on June 19th. The cholera began before that date; but the electoral lists had been drawn up, which was a clear sign of intended action; and he found that the electors numbered 903,000 out of the total population. This was a clear proof that these plans of reform had already reached the stage of the electoral lists having been drawn up, and showed that when the cholera had passed away the elections would take place, and the foundation would be laid of something approaching that ideal of popular government which obtained in this country. These were the principal subjects mentioned in the debate that night; but there was one other matter. The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy made a strong appeal to him to say something more about the International Tribunals; but a very full answer—as full an answer as could be given consistently with the delicate nature of the subject and the circumstances of the hour—was made at Question time by the Prime Minister, and he was not now able to go beyond the terms of that answer. The answer was surely distinct—that the Government recognized the evils; but those evils had been recognized before—the evils of a mixed jurisdiction, the facilities of which, unfortunately, foreigners sometimes availed themselves—of evading one jurisdiction by another. These Tribunals were renewed in February last, and would expire in February next; but no doubt the time had come when the matter should receive the attention of the European Powers. That was, no doubt, desirable; but he could not join in the sweeping judgment which had been passed upon those Tribunals. They had their faults; they were, to a certain extent, due to the commercial and civil procedure under which they worked; but he believed, on 2186 the whole, that they had been the cause of great public advantage to Egypt, and that they ought not to attempt to destroy them, or limit their operation, but rather ' to reform them and strengthen their operation. A question had also been asked whether the statements which had been put forward in the Blue Books were correct or not, and what was the feeling of the people in regard to them? There had been a remarkable conversation between Suleiman Pasha and Lord Dufferin which was recorded in these Blue Books. He would not quote it; but he would ask hon. Members to look at it, and there they would see what the opinions of the people were. They would see that Lord Dufferin, and the able man to whom he was speaking, fully recognized that time must be given for the subsidence of the passions aroused by the war; but they believed that when a little more time had been allowed to elapse, and the new institutions had been allowed to operate, and an army of police had restored peace and security to the country, the Native population would recognize the great advantages of the new order of things. When that day came, then, no doubt, as his right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board had said, would come also the day when it would be possible to withdraw the British Army from Egypt. There had been no variation in the language and attitude of the Government upon this subject. As Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs he might be allowed to quote the language of the Chief whom he had the honour to serve. On the 15th of February, Lord Granville, speaking in "another place" on the question of fixing a date for the withdrawal of our troops, said— I cannot conceive that it would be prudent for me to make such a statement. We shall not keep our troops there any longer than is necessary; but it would be an act of treachery to ourselves, to Egypt, and to Europe, if we withdrew them without having a certainty, or, if not a certainty—because we cannot have certainty in the affairs of this life—until there is a reasonable expectation of a stable, a permanent, and a beneficent Government being established in Egypt."—(3 Hansard, [276] 41–2.) He believed that by the operation of the institutions he had described that evening, before long stable, and firm, and beneficent institutions would be 2187 established in Egypt; and that those who, at a future time, looked back on the events and debates of these times, would realize that they had succeeded in that land, where the monuments of the past stood shoulder to shoulder with the working realities of everyday life, in establishing something more useful than the Pyramids and sepulchres of early Kings, but something which might berrow something of their character, and might take at least one of their characteristics—which might have something of their grand solidity and their majestic splendour.

§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE
I almost expected, when the noble Lord indulged in his peroration, that he was going to give us a quotation from Horace, and to say— Exegi monumentum aere porennius, Regalique situ pyramnidum altius, because he was pointing to something of a very permanent and solid kind. When he tells us—with a touch, I admit, of very pardonable pride—that he hopes the result of the British temporary occupation of Egypt will be to leave behind something which will be more permanent and more durable than the Pyramids—

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
I said more useful.

§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE
I am sorry I misunderstood the noble Lord. When we couple that with the observation made a few minutes before by the noble Lord, that we could not found a Constitution in a day, I am bound to say he opened a very considerable vista as to the future of our connection with Egypt. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. J. K. Cross) is in his place. If the hon. Gentleman were present, his mouth must have watered greatly when he considered how extremely difficult it was to induce the House of Commons to give a day for the discussion of the Indian Budget, and when he heard, on this occasion, the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs giving us, in considerable detail, the Egyptian Budget, I could not but think there was something very significant in the whole tenour of the speech of the noble Lord. Sir, I have heard that it was questioned whether it was right or advantageous 2188 for us to have any discussion upon Egyptian affairs at the present time. There is something, no doubt, to be said against our having such a discussion; but I think, under all the circumstances of the case, the House and the public have a right to expect a full explanation should be given, before the termination of the present Session, of the real nature of our position in Egypt, and of the intention of Her Majesty's Government with regard to Egypt. Not only because the matter is one of very great importance and difficulty, but because, explain it as you will, there is no doubt that there is a great deal of uncertainty in the public mind as to what the intentions of Her Majesty's Government are. I do not mean that Her Majesty's Government have not stated, over and over again, what their intentions on the question are; but, somehow, their statements all bear a resemblance to the shield in the old story, which was silver on one side and gold on the other. You are always able to tell us that your occupation of Egypt—the maintenance of troops in that country—is not to be permanent, but temporary, and that we are to withdraw our Forces from that country as soon as possible—that is to say, as soon as the state of the country permits, and as soon as order is firmly established and tranquillity secured. On the one side, hon. Members who desire to see our Forces quickly withdrawn are gratified by the statement that our troops are to be withdrawn in a very reasonable and moderate period of time, that our troops shall come away in a very short period, so short that the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchero) has made a very considerable and heavy engagement contingent upon the withdrawal within the next 12 months. But, on the other hand, we find that those who are anxious that we should not come away without having done the work which we went to do, can find comfort in such observations and speeches as those of the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and in the language used by Lord Granville, to the effect that we are not to come away until order has been restored, and, not only that, but until tranquillity has been secured—which is a very different thing, and which involves something beyond the restoration of order, Under these circumstances, 2189 I cannot but think that the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Morley) is acting perfectly reasonably and sensibly in bringing forward this question on the present occasion, and in endeavouring to obtain a somewhat more accurate and minute explanation of what those somewhat ambiguous statements meant. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Morley) has made a speech on which he has been complimented; and I desire, on my part, to say it was, in my judgment, one of very great ability and clearness. But when I come to consider the substance of the speech, I am not able to agree with some of the views taken up by the hon. Gentleman. The hon. Gentlaman spoke of two grounds which he said were sometimes, or were generally, given by those who wished us to remain in Egypt. One of those grounds was that if we were to withdraw, some other Power would step in; and the other was that if we were to withdraw, risings might take place. He treated both those contingencies very lightly indeed. He said—" As regards the question of other Powers stepping in, after all that can only mean France, and the French would be guided not by what wo might do, but by what might be the feelings of the other Powers." I am not sure that that is a sufficient answer to be given to the suggestion that if we were to withdraw, some other Power might step in; but I must take it in connection with the other ground—namely, that risings might take place. I think it perfectly reasonable to suppose that if it were simply a question of England withdrawing and clearing out of the way, some other Power would go to Egypt and would take the position vacated by us. I think it is more than probable that if we were to withdraw at the present time, there would be disturbances in Egypt, and those disturbances would not only affect the peace of Europe, but would threaten international interests, and would possibly affect European States very considerably. There would, I think, be very great probability, almost amounting to certainty, that some Power or Powers would be likely to step in. The hon. Gentleman tells us that we are incurring a very considerable and heavy responsibility as long as we have a Force in Egypt, and that we are thereby making ourselves responsible for the Maintenance of the Government of that 2190 country; and the hon. Member said—and said, I think, with a great deal of force—that, as long as we have merely a corporal's guard in Egypt, we are responsible, because that is the visible sign of our interest in, and our influence over, the Government of the country. I quite agree with the hon. Gentleman that we do bear a heavy responsibility; and, however moderate may be the Force which we retain there, any Force at all gives its a responsibility which we cannot get rid of. The question whether we are to have 14,000, or 12,000, or 6,000, or 2,000 men there is comparatively unimportant. It is not the point at issue. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke) drew a distinction between withdrawal and reduction, and, as far as he explained himself, his argument came to this—that we ought to proceed and act deliberately, but speedily, in the reduction of our Force, but that, as to withdrawal, that was another matter, upon which he entirely reserved his opinion, and there is nothing in what he said to lead us to believe he does contemplate any absolute and total withdrawal.

§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKE
On two occasions I used words most distinctly pointing to absolute withdrawal.

§ SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE
I certainly understood the right hon. Gentleman to speak with considerable precision with regard to the reduction of our Force—that is to say, lie told us that we had reduced our Force; that the reduction was proceeding; that it might be accelerated; and that before the winter considerable progress would be made in it. The right hon. Gentleman guarded himself against expressing an opinion about the actual time of withdrawal. I was about to refer to two observations that have been made by Gentlemen who have taken part in this debate. One of these observations was made by the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell), and the other by the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labeuchero). The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy went the whole length of saying that he wished to get rid of our responsibility with regard to Egypt. He said—" Not only do I desire and require that you should withdraw the great bedy of your Force, but I desire that you should withdraw them all. But 2191 I am not content with that, for as long as you keep any of your officials in the country, you still retain a position there; you make yourselves responsible. And, therefore, I am in favour of withdrawing your officials, so as to allow Egypt to manage its own affairs." The hon. Gentleman would bring back Arabi, and would see what the Darwinian theory would produce in the country. Now, that is a policy which has the merit of being what may be called thorough; but I venture to think it is not a policy which Her Majesty's Government would be likely to adopt, nor do I think it is a policy which would relieve us of responsibility for what we have done. It is not the responsibility you incur from day to day; but if you were now absolutely to withdraw from Egypt, and left things in such a condition that there would be great misery and anarchy and disturbance in that country as the immediate consequence of your withdrawal, you would be responsible for having brought about that state of things, and for having then left it to dcvelope itself in an unsatisfactory manner. This is what I say; and I will make one more observation with regard to the argument of the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy. The hon. Gentleman says — "Withdraw altogether from Egypt, and leave things to settle themselves." Yes; but would they settle themselves? Depend upon it that there would be others who would step in, and you would merely have brought about a state of things which would lead to something very different to that which you yourselves desired. The hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labeuchere) was inclined to take a somewhat vigorous course, and he advised the withdrawal of the last corporal's guard. But then he could not get rid of the consciousness that, somehow or other, we should be responsible, and it would not do to leave things entirely by themselves; so that after he had elicited an unguarded cheer from the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Morley) he said that, after all, you could leave your ships of war there. It might be more convenient to have ships of war there than a regiment of soldiers; but that is a question which must be dealt with upon a different footing. If you are to maintain any semblance of military or naval power, you cut the ground from 2192 under your feet when you go to the extreme conclusions to which the hon. Member wishes to draw you. I do not wish to weary the Committee by going at any great length into the whole question of the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Egypt; but I do think it desirable that we should have a rather clearer understanding with regard to the views of the Government than we have yet had. The fact is, we have rather too many understandings just now, because the understandings are hardly consistent one with the other; and what I am desirous of asking is, whether it is not possible to bring matters so far forward that we may form something of an idea of the real proba bilities of our occupation of Egypt, and of the maintenance of the present policy in that country? I do not expect, and I do not desire, that the Government should talk about days, and times, and seasons. I do not want them to get up and say that the occupation will end in six months, or before the winter, or anything of that sort. I want rather to have some clear idea as to what are the circumstances, what is the position which they think we ought to attain before we begin to withdraw? I think we may, to a certain extent, arrive at this knowledge by referring to the very important despatch which was written by Lord Granville at the very beginning of this year—on the 3rd of January, I think. That despatch contained an explanation, addressed to foreign nations, of the position of Her Majesty's Government with regard to Egypt, and of the views which they entertained. Hon. Gentlemen will find in No. 2, page 34, the Circular Despatch addressed by Lord Granville to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, and St. Petersburg. Lord Granville began by pointing out that the course of events had thrown on Her Majesty's Government the task of suppressing the military rebellion in Egypt, and of restoring peace and order in that country; and then he proceeded to say that the position in which they wore placed imposed upon Her Majesty's Government the duty of giving the Khedive advice, with the object of securing that the earlier things to be accomplished should be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress. Having laid down 2193 that principle, the noble Lord went on to divide the subject to be treated into two categories—into those which concern other countries, and which are matters requiring the consent and concurrence of the European Powers, and those which are matters of internal administration. Then he proceeded to enumerate 13 points to which he was anxious to call attention. I will not trouble the Committee with all the 13 points; but I will mention one or two of them, which appear to me to be very important. Some of them were points which were to be disposed of between the British Government and the Government of Egypt as international matters; while others were matters upon which the opinion and the interests of foreign nations had to be consulted. What I want to know is, first of all, ought we not to remain and continue our occupation of Egypt until we have fairly disposed of those points which were laid down in the beginning of the year, immediately after we had obtained our position there, as being the essential points aimed at? If so, I want to know how far we have advanced in settling some of the chief of those points? The first point is the settlement of the Suez Canal Question. Lord Granville makes a suggestion of various conditions. He mentions eight conditions which he proposes should be agreed to with regard to the maintenance of the integrity of the Canal. I wish to know whether the Government have done anything, and how far they have gone towards obtaining the settlement of that great question? Everyone knows it is the great interest we have in the maintenance of this great waterway that has really given us occasion to take the line we have adopted. It is all very well to talk about having no selfish objects. I hope we have no selfish objects in the sense in which some use the phrase. I hope we have no object of obtaining territory or exclusive command; but if we are really going to commit ourselves to the doctrine that we are going about making war, and bombarding cities, and destroying places with no selfish object, but out of pure chivalry and good-will, I think it is a very dangerous doctrine to hold, and a doctrine much more dangerous than that of pursuing a policy in which we had in view our own legitimate interests—inte- 2194 rests which are acknowledged, and which ought to be secured without injustice to anyone else, but in perfect harmony with the interests of other people. I say that the maintenance of the Suez Canal upon a proper footing is one of those objects. We are told that the Circular of the 3rd of January has been answered to a very limited extent by the Powers—by Russia and by Italy. But we have no notice whether any progress at all has been made in the settlement of this great and important question. Turning to another point—the taxation of foreigners—that, I believe, is a matter which is in progress; but it is a very difficult question, and it not only affects foreign countries, but the interests of Egypt itself. The country can never be in a satisfactory condition if foreigners are allowed to enjoy exclusive immunity from the taxation which is imposed on the Natives. But it is a difficult thing to got that matter settled, and it is not a matter to be settled by letters and communications. You will have to get the new system on foot, and see it regularly carried into effect. I do not think the communications we have yet received point to any great development of the plan devised. Something has been done, and I want to know how far it has proceeded? Then there is the question of the improved administration of justice. With regard to the Mixed Tribunals, I understand that they will probably be renewed; but with regard to the improved administration of justice in cases in which foreigners are concerned, that is a matter of the most essential character in the interest of Egypt. You can have no peace and prosperity in that country until that question is settled, and now is the time it is ripe to be settled. In order to illustrate the great importance of this point, may I trouble the Committee by referring to a letter written by a very able officer who was at the head of the police system—General La Touche? He is a gentleman who knows the wants and difficulties of Egypt as well as anyone. What he said was that the status quo might be summed up thus. A foreign subject in Egypt might commit any crime, break any law, refuse to abide by any regulation, police, sanitary or general, assault any public servant in the execution of his duty, and, in fact, enjoy practical immunity from all 2195 restraint, without fear of any deterrent measures being taken, while the Natives were obliged to be tractable and law-abiding. That is a state of things which I presume anyone who really knows the country will confirm and say is really no exaggeration. How can the country prosper, how can you have peace, as long as such an anomalous state of things continues in existence? Lord Granville, in his despatch of the 3rd of January, puts this forward as one of the points on which he wishes to have the assistance of Foreign Powers, in order to obtain a satisfactory settlement. Have the Government received any answer? Have they made any progress in the settlement of this question with the foreign nations who are interested, and whose consent is necessary before any alteration can be made? How far have the Government gone; and do they mean to maintain their position in Egypt until this question has been properly solved? I could take other points out of the 13 which are contained in Lord Granville's despatch; but I do not think it isnecessary. I mention these as illustrating the position which I wish to take up; and I think it would be well if the Government would tell us what they intend to do—whether they have any hope of a practical settlement of these questions, and whether they are prepared to remain in their present position, with the responsibility which lies upon them, until those matters have been disposed of? I apologize to the Committee for having detained them on these points; but the question is one which seems to me to be of vital importance, and it is one on which there ought really to be no misunderstanding. I have no wish to embarrass the Government in this matter. I am only anxious that we should have a clear and distinct assurance, and that there should be an understanding which will enable all persons concerned to know where they are. Reference was made to the mischief which is done by uncertain language, and by anything which amounts to annexation and permanent occupation. I disclaim having anything to do with annexation or permanent occupation in the broad souse of those words. But it is, on the other hand, possible to use expressions of an opposite character, which are calculated to produce the greatest mischief, not only to the interests of the country, but to the pros- 2196 pects of a permanent settlement of these important Egyptian Questions.

MR. GLADSTONE
I came down to the House this evening with the lively hope that I should not be called upon in any manner to take part in any debate which might arise upon Egyptian affairs, because I have had to trouble the House several times of late, and I am sensible of the value of the public time, if we are to make any endeavour to arrive at the Prorogation on a reasonably early day. More especially I cherished this hope when I had heard the speech of my right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board (Sir Charles W. Dilke); because, I must say, he said everything I was desirous of hearing, and nothing I was not desirous to hear. Consequently, I hoped my duty was finished when I had listened to that speech. But the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote) has thrown out ideas which would tend, I think, to cause a degree of uncertainty upon the ease, and to leave it not quite as it was left by the declarations made on the part of the Cabinet by my right hon. Friend. As the right hon. Gentleman is quite right in saying that there ought to be no misunderstanding as to the intentions of the Government, I am desirous of following him for the purpose of bringing back the matter to the point at which it was left by my right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board. In the closing sentence of his speech the right hon. Gentleman said—and I have nothing to complain of in the tone of that speech—that he disapproved in a certain sense, as I understand him, or declined to be responsible for languge savouring of the doctrine of annexation or of permanent occupation, and admitted that there might be danger in that language; but he said—and these, I think, to be ominous words—that there was great danger in language of an opposite description. I do not blame him for attaching the idea of danger to language which appears to point in the direction of annexation or lengthened occupation, or which, if it did not amount to annexation, would, perhaps, be found to entail and involve annexation; but I confess I have had no experience of the danger, and have no strong sense of the danger, of language of an opposite nature, and in that respect I differ from the right hon. Gentleman. The lan- 2197 guage which tends to propogate the idea of annexation, in the first place, I think, has an admitted likelihood of encouraging a sentiment which I think always exists in a portion of the community, and which not long ago was predominant in the country—a sentiment of greedy anxiety to appropriate what belongs to others, and to give, under no call of duty or necessity, unnecessary extensions to an Empire, the cares of which, in my opinion, are already such as to tax the strength of the best and ablest men tolerably and even perfectly prepared to bear them. Secondly, that language savouring of annexation is most injurious to the fair fame and honour of England. The right hon. Gentleman says there is uncertainty in the public mind about the intentions of the Government. If it be so, why does that uncertainty exist? Not because the declarations of the Government have been wanting in clearness, nor because those declarations, numerous as they were, have been in conflict with one another. The cause is of a very different description. As there are none so deaf as those who will not hear, so there are no men to whose minds it is so difficult to convey a clear idea as those who have an internal bias which leads and disposes them to affix a strained and unnatural construction to plain words for the purpose of favouring the views which they themselves entertain. In consequence, if there be uncertainty in the public mind with regard to the intentions of the Government, that is the cause to which I believe that uncertainty is duo. But for the evil effects of this strained construction, I should think little of the unscrupulous and not very honourable doctrines that I sometimes hear proposed and propounded with regard to Egypt in particular, and public events generally, if only we could keep such constructions strictly amongst ourselves, because we are strong enough amongst ourselves to settle and dispose of such matters. But these declarations go abroad, and, going abroad, they come into contact with susceptible minds —they touch jealousies which naturally exist in every country with regard to the action of every other country. They there find a not unwarrantable and not unjustifiable disposition ready to construe such declarations as if they were clandestine efforts propagated by the Eng- 2198 lish people, possibly by the English Government, for preparing the European mind for a total change in, or a total abandonment of, the solemn declarations which we made last year, and then the mischief of these comments and constructions is very great. I must confess that I think the declaration, made by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, that there is much danger in holding language the opposite to that which tends to annexation, and the opposite to that which tends to permanent occupation, will not be either to the interest or to the honour of this country. [" Oh ! "] I am sorry to excite thus the—what shall I call them?—the instincts that find inarticulate expression in one quarter of the House; but I am afraid that the inarticulate expressions are only further evidence of the reality of the mischief I have in view. Sir, the right hon. Gentleman has raised an issue which I quite admit is a fair one. He has referred to a despatch of Lord Granville—a very important despatch—in which I think he said there were about 13 subjects of the greatest importance with respect to the condition of Egypt; two in particular that he named had relation, the one to the Suez Canal, and the other to the International Tribunal; and he said this despatch, and, so far, truly, was a despatch dated the 3rd of January, and addressed to Her Majesty's Representatives in the different capitals of Europe. Then came the grave question raised by the right hon. Gentleman, who said, in effect—" I cannot gather from this despatch whether or not you intend the military occupation of Egypt to continue until these 13 questions are disposed of; "and he said—" This is a subject on which some light ought to be thrown for the formation of our judgment." Well, Sir, I quite agree that the right hon. Gentleman is entitled to have light afforded for the formation of his judgment upon a question so portentous as to whether the military occupation of Egypt is to continue until those 13 subjects, of which many are great, complicated, and difficult, and likely to extend over years and years, are brought to a solution. I must say it appears to me that the right hon. Gentleman has got that light already, but that he has closed his eyes against its admission. In my opinion, two things are to be said—first of all, 2199 there is not a syllable in the despatch in any way connecting the military occupation of Egypt with the disposal of those 13 subjects. I am satisfied of this—no presumption whatever can be raised, from the contents of this despatch and from the fact that it enumerates these subjects, as to the duration of the occupation; and, secondly, I hold that the first paragraph of the despatch puts an absolute negative upon the idea of any such connection. Lord Granville felt—and I think very justly felt—that with the responsibility under which we lie towards Egypt, it was our duty to open to the Powers of Europe all the great subjects which appeared to us to offer themselves naturally to consideration in the interests of that country; because, be it observed, quite apart from military occupation there are many subjects in regard to Egypt which are of standing and permanent interest to all the Powers of Europe—to us, perhaps, most of all—with respect to which it was natural to communicate with them, desirous as we are to carry with us not only the knowledge, but the approval, of every country in Europe with reference to the occupation of Egypt. Lord Granville, in introducing the subject, refers to the military occupation. Here is his language— The object has, happily, been accomplished; and although for the present a British Force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, Her Majesty's Government are desirous to withdraw it as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it. [Sir STAFFORD NORTHCOTE: Will you read the remainder of the paragraph?] The noble Lord goes on to say— In the meanwhile, the position in which the Government are placed towards Egypt imposes upon them the duty of giving advice, with the object of securing that an order of things shall be established of a satisfactory character, and possessing the elements of stability and progress.'' Most proper words. This was our solemn declaration; and most certainly Lord Granville was not guilty of such an absurdity as to say that we should quit the country without admitting it to be any part of our duty to see that we left behind us a state of things without any guarantee of stability or progress. Stability has reference to the position of the country, and progress to the interests 2200 of the country. Surely I am right in saying that these words answer the question of the right ben. Gentleman, and in saying that the military occupation has no connection whatever with such questions as the question of the Suez Canal and the question of International Tribunals. Sir, the right hon. Gentleman says that my right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board has shown a desire to escape from the subject of the withdrawal of the British Forces from Egypt, and that he had spoken only of the reduction of those Forces. Now, my right hon. Friend says it is necessary to observe the distinction between the mode in which he spoke of reduction and the mode in which he spoke of withdrawal, because as to reduction my right hon. Friend pointed to the matter of time. He signified not a precise date, but a season, and he said that it was the hope of the Government before winter to bring about a large and effective reduction of the present Force. Having so pointed to a particular period, and not being prepared to name a day for the withdrawal from Egypt, which must depend upon a different sot of considerations from those affecting the question of reduction, all he said was that he did not undertake to name a day or period for withdrawal; and in doing so he followed the rule which we have observed all along. The withdrawal of the British Forces from Egypt is, undoubtedly, a serious question; we have our views upon that question, and we have endeavoured to convey them to the House. But the application of those views is, undoubtedly, a matter of delicacy and great responsibility, and one which must depend upon the situation as a whole, having regard to certain contingencies, and the bringing about of a state of things which we most sincerely desire. The uncertainty, if there be uncertainty, in the public mind, as there may be in some small portion of it, has reference, in my opinion, to those desires which exist in a portion, though I trust in a small portion, of the community, and possibly oven in the minds of some Members of this House—those desires which tend towards the permanent occupation of Egypt and its incorporation into this Empire. Sir, that is a consummation to which we are opposed at present, and 2201 with the bringing about of which we will have nothing to do. We are against everything that resembles it and approaches it, and against all language that tends to bring about the expectation of it. We are against it on the ground of the interests of England; we are against it on the ground of our duty to England; we are against it on the ground of the specific and solemn pledges given to the world in the most solemn manner and under the most critical circumstances —pledges which have earned us the confidence of Europe at largo during the course of difficult and delicate operations, and which, if one pledge can be more sacred than another, special sacredness in this case binds us to fulfil. We are also sensible that occupation prolonged beyond a certain point may tend to annexation, and, consequently, that it is our duty to take the greatest care that the occupation does not gradually assume a permanent character. We cannot name a day, and do not undertake to name a day, for our final withdrawal; but we desire the arrival of that day, and no effort will be wanting on our part to hasten it. You will ask what are the conditions of the withdrawal. Well, Sir, our conditions are those which have been set out by Lord Granville—restored order in the state of the country, and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority. Our first duty was the restoration of order; happily, that has been achieved, and the achievement of it in an Oriental country is rather a severe task. But pestilence has come into Egypt. That trial has been, so far, withstood; and, sorrowful as has been the experience of the cholera, in other respects, I think, it has done something to increase and corroberate our confidence in the means which have been called into existence for bringing about order and stability in Egypt. Next to the fact of having secured order, is the provision of the means by which it is to be maintained. In the organization of an adequate force we were desirous that that force should be as little as possible a military force, and as much as possible a civil force. On that principle we have acted. Great progress has been made in the civil force, and not an inconsiderable progress in the other. So much for stability. What with reference to progress? The right hon. Gentleman has treated us as if 2202 we intended to remain in Egypt until we had brought about institutions worthy of Utopia. Sir, we have no such ideas. But in the circumstances in which we found ourselves in Egypt, we thought we should not be justified in confining ourselves simply to the restoration of order, and the supplying of the material means for its maintenance. We might have stopped at that point; but I doubt whether it would have been right to do so. There was an opinion most properly expressed by the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff), and by other Members of the House, that something should be done for the future; that some seeds should be sown which would bear fruits for the relief of the country from those great abuses which in former times disgraced its administration, and for enabling it to maintain some tolerable conditions of civil life. What have we done with respect to progress in that direction? We have looked at the most essential institutions of the country, and we have regarded it as part of our duty to have the Judiciary put into such a state as would at least bear fair promise of answering the primary conditions of justice and of civilized society; and, going one step beyond that, we have looked to the provision to be made for future legislation in the country. Sir, are we to say that we are to remain in Egypt until these institutions have reached such a condition that there can be no doubt whatever of their stability? Such a view would be absolutely and wholly visionary. How many countries are there in Europe—the most civilized and powerful countries — with regard to which any man would be beld enough to inform us what transmutations they might undergo before another century has passed over our heads? We have no such view, Sir. What may be said in popular language is this—that it is our duty to give Egypt a fair start, and I believe to make provision for peace and order there. If we see supplied a military and civil force suitable for the maintenance of that peace and order; if we have placed in control of the country a man in whose justice and benevolence we have confidence; if we know that the administration of justice is under enlightened supervision, and in competent hands; if we have made a reasonable beginning in legislative institutions, into which there is incorporated at least 2203 some seeds of freedom, and some elements of rectification; then, I think, a state of things may be said to exist in which, undoubtedly, some assumption may be made that our duty is complete. But we must have regard to the character of the work before us. We must not begin the work in Egypt with the assumption that WO can efface from that country its Oriental mark, and that we can by any device of ours bring it into identity with Western lands. We must assume, and I believe safely—although I speak with reserve, and with an absence of all intention to dogmatize—the good disposition and the good capacity of the people themselves. With those assumptions, I believe the sort of work which we have repeatedly sketched in rough outline, and of which I have endeavoured to give a faint idea, may be carried to a conclusion. We shall then, I think, have brought about as much as is reasonably within our power to attempt, and as much as, if accomplished, will immensely contribute to the future happiness and prosperity of Egypt. Now, Sir, I will end, as I began, by saying that I was perfectly contented to leave this matter in the position in which it was left by my right hon. Friend who spoke on behalf of the Cabinet at the beginning of the evening. I hope I have explained the cause of uncertainty in the public mind, if any such uncertainty exists; and I hope I have shown that Lord Granville, in the despatch to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred, has given no ground whatever for extravagant ideas, or for the slightest imputation that we have forgotten the solemn engagements by which we stand bound, and from which we do not intend, either in the whole, or in part, to recede.

§ MR. ASHMEAD - BARTLETT
said, he thought the Committee would feel that the objections which the right hon. Gentleman had taken with respect to the military occupation of Egypt were, in view of a large portion of his speech, wholly unjustifiable. [Interruption.] He could assure hon. Members that those expressions of dissent would not prevent his addressing the Committee. He certainly did claim the privilege and the right of a fair hearing on this occasion. The right hon. Gentleman took exception to certain statements made by the Leader of the Opposition with regard to our 2204 duty to the Egyptian people; but in a portion of his speech, and notably in the last portion of his speech, he practically made the same admissions. Of course, it was perfectly clear that any interpretation might be put upon the speech of the right hon. Gentleman. In different portions of his speech he made statenients absolutely contradictory. He threw out a word here for the extreme Radical section of his Party, to satisfy them that the Government were going to withdraw from Egypt as soon as possible:; but, on the other hand, he made a distinct statement that the Government considered it their duty to remain in Egypt until the new institutions of the country had had a fair chance of success; and those institutions he mentioned to be the Legislative Assembly, the existence of a pure Judicature, a successful Police Force, and a sufficient and a disciplined Army. The contention of those who knew anything about Egypt at the present time was that the Government had not advanced in any degree towards these points. They asked the Government what proof there was that the then Government of Egypt, so far, had tended to produce any of these results? The Army they knew comparatively little about; but they did know that there had been a complete break down in all the branches of Egyptian administration. The evidence from all independent sources in support of this break down was overwhelming. He had boon very much surprised by the remarks which fell from the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. Morley), by which he hoped to convince the Committee that Egypt was in a state of satisfaction and tranquillity. The hon. Member made two or three quotations from dospatches, none of which related to the existing condition of Egypt. The latest despatch was one in April last. But the hon. Member gave no satisfactory proof that Egypt was not now in a state of absolute administrative anarchy. There was a great deal of evidence that Egypt was in that condition. There was evidence in the correspondence of gentlemen of great ability and of large experience in Egypt, who unanimously stated that Egypt was at present in a state of administrative anarchy; that every branch of the Public Service had broken down; that Egypt had suffered more during the past three or four months 2205 than during the 13 years of despotism she experienced under the late Khedive. The hon. Member for Newcastle had given nothing in disproof of that. He had quoted not one single jot of evidence to show that the state of Egypt at the present moment was not what it was represented to be by able judges—namely, administrative anarchy. It was incumbent on the hon. Member, who largely based his argument on the fact that Egypt was in a satisfactory condition, to give some evidence to prove that; but he failed to do so, and he would advise the hon. Member with great respect—and any other hon. Member who wished for information on this subject—to see the very interesting and remarkable letter which had been sent to The —Times by its Correspondent at Alexandria. That gentleman stated most emphatically—and he was a gentleman of credit and position, and he had rested his reputation upon the statement—that Egyptian administration, in spite of our presence, had broken down in every detail. That statement had not been controverted. The noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did not attempt to controvert it, and the Prime Minister did not attempt to do so; and, in view of these facts, he wished to ask the Government what they had gained in Egypt, and what they intended to do to justify their action in that country? There were two policies. One was to have left Egypt alone from the first, which was a consistent policy, and which, however dangerous and absurd, at least had the merit of consistency. For those Gentlemen who had supported the Government in the earlier stages of their interference in Egyptian affairs, or who condoned that interference, as the hon. Member for Newcastle did, to come down to the House and advise immediate withdrawal, in the face of the action taken by the Government, was utterly inconsistent and unjust, not only to the interests of this country, but to the interests of the Egyptian people. We had largely broken down the element of self-government which Egypt had possessed. The Prime Minister had taken credit for having established a strong Army in Egypt. That was a very doubtful assumption; but, granting it, he wished to ask whether the Army was in any better condition now than it was under Arabi—whether it was 2206 stronger or better disciplined at this moment? The condition of the Army was worse now than it was prior to the beginning of our joint intervention with France. With regard to all else, we had broken down the power of the people for self-government. We had destroyed their National Parliament, and we had broken down their independence, and refused them the Constitution they demanded; and now our Ministry pretended, after repelling by the bayonet the just demands of the Egyptians 18 months ago, to be anxious to grant them something similar to those demands now. The position of the Government in this matter was absolutely inconsistent. Having destroyed, they were bound to build up again. As the Under Secretary had said, Constitutions were not built up in a day; and the view he took was not that there should be annexation, or even a permanent protectorate, for there were many objections, but that we were bound, before leaving, to build up, on firm and lasting foundations, law and order and good administration in Egypt. We were bound to do that, regardless of what might be said by hon. Members below the Gangway or by Foreign Governments. The Prime Minister accused the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote) of offending, and of running the risk of causing trouble with, Foreign Powers by his speech; but the right hon. Gentleman had said not one word in favour of annexation or protectorate. He said we must build up an administration so solid that we could be certain there would be no excuse for Foreign Powers to interfere themselves, or for such disturbances as brought about an interference last July. That was a perfectly clear and consistent position; and not only did our great interests in Egypt demand it, but it was due to the Egyptian people, whose power of self-government we had been largely instrumental in removing. The great danger in this matter was that the Government might be driven down hill by the representations of Foreign Powers. They had shown themselves remarkably susceptible to these representations. They believed all that was told them with regard to the feeling abroad on this question. It was, on the other hand, notorious that certain Powers would have no objection to our remaining in Egypt altogether; and no Power but one had any objection. That Power 2207 was France, which was anxious to drive England out of Egypt as fast as it could; and it was, no doubt, for that purpose that the diplomatists of Franco were constantly telling us that, unless we left at once, great exasperation might arise in France; and that, unless we left at once, France might not offer an apology or reparation for what had occurred at Madagascar. That was the way in which the matter was being worked all over Europe; and the danger was that the right hon. Gentleman, who was so susceptible to foreign representations, and who took everything for granted in these matters, and felt the "deepest emotion" when any representation was made by the French Republic, or by any other rival Power, might be driven down hill without cause, and induced to give up the interests of this country. That was exactly what was happening at the present moment; and he hoped the right hon. Gentleman would remember that it was the French who abandoned him at the critical moment last year. Very fortunate that was for us; for if French troops had joined ours in Egypt, as our Ministry at one time wished, we should never have got them out again without war. Still, the withdrawal of France then justified resolute action on our part now. He hoped the right hon. Gentleman would remember that, and take up this work alone. Our interests in Egypt wore greater than those of any other Power—greater than the interests of all the other Powers. They were just and legitimate interests. By firmness and consistency in this matter we could carry our improvements in the administration of Egypt through without giving serious offence to any other Power. He would point out that the late Administration managed to keep on the most perfectly good terms with France, although they based their policy on the German alliance. The present Government had not only alienated the German Powers and Turkey, but they had all but come to blows with the French Republic. The fall of Lord Beaconsfield was universally regretted by the French Press; but the reason of all this was their firm and consistent course, which never neglected to defend our legitimate interests. He wished to make a protest against another statement by the hon. Member for Newcastle. The hon. Member attributed interested motives to those gentlemen 2208 who now had the conduct of the administration in Egypt. He considered that very unfair to gentleman who, he believed, had only the welfare of the Egyptian people at heart; and the hon. Gentleman advanced no proof in support of his statements. He would also make a fervent protest against the conversion of the fatal doctrine of non-intervention into a sort of fetish-worship in order to quiet the country. How could nonintervention ever be the policy of a great Empire like that of Britain? It was by the contrary doctrine that the power and the influence of this country were built up. It was the fearless extension, and not by the contraction, of our Dominions, by the refusal to be afraid of the responsibilities of Empire, that towns such as that represented by the hon. Member obtained their commercial importance and their wealth. Gentleman representing those towns owed everything to the enterprize and courage of their ancestors, and yet they were elevating this pusillanimous theory of non-intervention into a political dogma. He protested against this; and he hoped the time might never come when we should adopt a view so utterly unworthy of any great State, and so especially unworthy of the ancient and Imperial English race.

§ MR. LABOUCHERE
said, he gathered that the Supplementary Estimate would not be proposed, because he had a Motion to reduce that Estimate. He found that there was an item of £6,000 charged for the Special Embassy to St. Petersburg; but he wished to see a reduction. We had an Ambassador at St. Petersburg; it was right that he should go to the Coronation at Moscow, and it was equally natural that he should be paid for that, because at Coronations things were excessively dear; but it seemed to him that they had done enough for the Coronation of the Czar when they had given their Ambassador £4,000 to proceed to Moscow and take part in that ceremony. But it appeared to have been thought necessary to send the Duke of Edinburgh, accompanied by Lord Wolseley. His Royal Highness, as all knew, was the brother-in-law of the Czar, and it might be supposed that, in all probability, His Royal Highness would have gone to see this interesting ceremony performed upon the Czar if he had not been sent as Special Ambassador. In fact, he very much 2209 doubted whether anybody, except a small circle of the Court, knew that the Duke of Edinburgh was an English Ambassador. Most people were under the impression that his Royal Highness was there as a Member of the Royal Family of England, allied to the Royal Family of Russia, and that he went at his own expense. He did not see that it was desirable that they should, in addition to their regular Ambassador to Russia, send a Special Ambassador on this occasion; but if they must do so, he really thought it was undesirable that one of the Royal Family, particularly if he was allied to the Russian Royal Family, should receive a considerable sum of money to act as Ambassador. He did not want to go into the details; but he found "gratuities and unforeseen £1,000." What were those gratuities? he supposed that when a Gentleman went to take part in such things he gave the servants something; but to come on the country for £1,000 for gratuities was a great deal too much. He should move to reduce the Vote by £2,000, and should go to a Division upon it.

§ MR. RYLANDS
said, lie objected to a Supplementary Vote like this being put in this irregular way. The course hitherto had been to put such a Supplementary Vote separately; but if there was to be a system of Supplementary Votes slipped into a Vote put from the Chair, it would be impossible for hon. Members to follow the Votes. He entirely objected to this, and contended that the usual course should be adhered to.

§ MR. COURTNEY
said, that the hon. Member was entirely in error. The usual course was for the Supplementary Estimate and the Original Estimate to be taken together. That was the case last Session.

§ MR. BOURKE
said, if the hon. Gentleman would look at this Estimate lie would find that in the column for 182–3 there was a sum of £206,000 put down as the whole Vote for Diplomatic Services. That way of putting down the whole Vote was entirely misleading, because there were £30,000, in addition to that Vote, as a Supplementary Vote for 1882–3. That did not appear, and the total Vote was £236,000.

§ MR. SCLATER-BOOTH
said, the doctrine of the hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Treasury was new to him. 2210 It might be that last year the Original and the Supplementary Estimates were mixed up; but last year was a year in which the Civil Service Votes were unduly delayed. Certainly, when the Civil Service Votes were taken in duo course, it was out of the question that the Supplementary Estimates should be mixed up with them. This was an important point, although there might not be a precedent for taking this course.

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
said, he had inquired very carefully what was the usual course, and lie was informed that any other course than that adopted would be quite irregular; and he would remind the Committee that he had a warning as to what would happen to him if lie pursued the course now recommended by the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands), as there was a Motion still on the Paper in the name of the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labeuchere), criticizing the course proposed to be taken, of putting this question forward separately. Owing to certain reductions made, it was found that the Revised Estimate was £4,000; and he found that it would be irregular, when a new Estimate was presented, not to bring forward every matter with which that was connected. The Committee would see a sub-head for Special Missions in the Service, so that there was already an item of the same kind in the ordinary Vote; and the Supplementary Estimate was simply an additional sum provided for by gentlemen at the Foreign Office of great experience in the preparation of these Votes.

§ MR. RYLANDS
said, that this item was not included in the Revised Estimate to which the noble Lord referred.

§ MR. SCLATER-BOOTH
pointed out that a Revised Estimate was one thing and a Supplementary Estimate was another. It was quite evident that what was now presented on a Supplementary Estimate ought to have been produced when the Original Estimate was brought in.

§ MR. COURTNEY
said, it was to be regretted that the Original Estimate should stand over; but the practice of incorporating Supplementary with Original Estimates was perfectly well known.

§ MR. DILLWYN
said, there was no mention of Supplementary Estimates upon the Paper of to-day.

2211

§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER (Mr. CHILDERS)
said, that the practice of taking the Supplementary Vote together with the Original Vote, under the circumstances described by the Secretary to the Treasury, encouraged the Government to present the Supplementary Estimates as early as possible. This year, the Supplementary Estimates were smaller than they had been for years past, and they had been presented earlier in the course of the year. From the point of view of control, the House had had better control over the expenditure this year than for some time past; and he hoped that on the ground of precedent, and also on the ground of convenience to the Committee, they would be allowed to take this Vote.

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
said, he desired to say one word with regard to Major Baring's salary. When the question of increasing Major Baring's salary was first mooted, the noble Lord refused to give the House any Estimate. It was only when he was pressed by hon. Members that lie consented to do so. [Lord EDMOND FITZMAURICE dissented.] He begged the noble Lord's pardon; and he asserted, unhesitatingly, that the noble Lord positively declined to give any Estimate. The noble Lord stated distinctly that they meant to carve the salary out of other Votes, and it was only when he was pressed that this Estimate was given at all. Now, what he wanted to point out was that they were increasing Major Baring's salary, and that, in order to do so, they actually reduced the salary of the Minister in Belgium. The Belgian Minister had been in Belgium for 15 years. He had never once been mixed up in any European politics. He bad received a certain salary. He had refused other places; he had refused promotion. Now, however, they had made him Ambassador in Italy, and they sent Sir Edward Malet to Belgium at a reduced salary. They had also reduced the salary of the Minister in China. He maintained that this way of carving out the salary of Major Baring from the salary of the new Minister in Belgium and from that of the Minister in China was monstrous; and he should move hereafter to reduce the salary of the Ambassador to Rome. He thought that if Maj or Baringwas to receive an increased salary, such hard-worked men as Sir Edward Malet and the Mi- 2212 nister in China should not be made to suffer. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister had promised the Irish Members that lie would discuss the Registration of Voters (Ireland) Bill that night; and, therefore, he would not trespass more on the time of the Committee.

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
said, it would not be respectful to the Committee if he were not to reply to the observations made by the hon. Member for Portsmouth. The hon. Gentleman had made an attack upon the Government for having effected certain economies; but he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) maintained that it was the bounden duty of the Foreign Office, from time to time, to revise the Estimates carefully, and wherever they saw an opportunity of making a legitimate economy to do so. The hon. Member had quite misrepresented, unintentionally no doubt, what he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) said in regard to the Supplementary Estimate for Major Baring's salary. What he had said was that the increase in his salary would be met by economies in other directions, and that in that way it would be incorporated in the Votes.
Question put.

§ The Committee divided: — Ayes 42; Noes 11–1: Majority 72.——(Div. List, No. 270.)

§ Original Question again proposed

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
said, he now desired to ask the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a question about Sir John Lumley. He had just pointed out that Sir Edward Malet had been hard at work in Egypt and elsewhere for a considerable time; that he had been promoted to Belgium; and that the place he had vacated in Egypt was to be held by a gentleman from India, to whom an increased salary was to be given. He did not wish to go through the list of Sir John Lumley's services. He would simply say that Sir John Lumley had been Minister in Saxony and in Switzerland, and for 15 years Minister in Belgium. Sir John Lumley had refused promotion. He had chosen to remain in Belgium, and he had, during the whole of the time, received a certain salary. He had, however, been sent to Rome, and the salary of his successor in Belgium had 2213 been diminished. The Minister in China had spent his life in that country, and he had been one of the most useful public servants this country ever had. He had worked himself from the lowest to the top rung of the ladder; and almost at the end of his career his salary was diminished by £500, in order to make up for the increase in the salary of Major Baring. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) was not opposed to economy. Indeed, he desired to see economy practised wherever it could be. It must, however, be practised judiciously; and he maintained that it was a monstrous thing to reduce the salaries of such trusted servants of the Crown as Sir Edward Malet and Sir Harry Parkes to make up for an increase elsewhere. Unless he received a satisfactory explanation why Sir Edward Malet and Sir Harry Parkes, who had a preferential claim to Sir John Lumley, had been passed over, he should move to reduce the Vote.

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
said, the doctrine of the hon. Gentleman was rather an extraordinary one. The hon. Member had laid down the doctrine that diplomatists had a vested interest in succession to certain places. If such a principle were adopted, it would make economy in the Public Service impossible; because it would follow that a high salary received by a distinguished diplomatist should be paid to his successor, no matter what his past services were, and no matter how limited his experience might be.

§ MR. RYLANDS
said, that if the hon. Gentleman (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) would look at the list of Envoys Extraordinary to the different places in South America he would find that we were paying large salaries. He (Mr. Rylands) could not see how it was possible to make any considerable remissions in the high salaries unless opportunity were taken on occasions of promotion to place in the stead of those promoted gentlemen at lower salaries.

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
said, these economies were broken reeds to rely upon. The hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) picked out the case of Belgium, but said nothing about that of China. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) wished to ask a question respecting Sir John Lumley, as to whether he had been allowed to succeed to the post of Ambassador at Rome without any diminu- 2214 tion being made in his salary, whilst a diminution had been made in other places? Sir Edward Malet, who had worked hard for many years, had been promoted to the Mission of Belgium, and the Government were putting in his place a gentleman to whom they were giving a large salary. Sir John Lumley had been in Belgium for 15 years, where the duties were a perfect sinecure. The Government sent him to Rome, one of the best posts in Europe, and then diminished the salary of Sir Edward Malet instead of that of Sir John Lumley, through sonic backstairs-influence with Lord Granville about which he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) knew something.

§ MR. LABOUCHERE
said, he thought they ought to move a reduction of this Vote, not so much because of what had taken place with regard to the diplomatic post in Belgium, but because of what had occurred in China. He remembered it being stated in that House, when a Motion was made to reduce the Vote for the salaries of the Diplomatists in China, that it was most undesirable to do so, because China was unconnected with England by telegraph; and that, therefore, it was necessary to have a first-rate man there in order to prevent our getting into trouble with that country. If hon. Members would look at the salaries in China as compared with those in Italy, they would find them higher, and also higher than those paid in some other parts of the world, the reason of this being to some extent, no doubt, because living in China, after the European fashion, was a good deal more expensive than in Europe. Another reason was that China was very far off, and that there were hundreds of persons ready to accept Consular service in Europe who would not accept it in China. It did, therefore, appear to him, when they had gentlemen in such a place as Portugal receiving £4,000 a-year, that it was desirable to reduce expenditure in connection with those posts rather than in China. They required to have a good man in China, and because that post was somewhat out of the way, they had no right to make au unnecessary reduction. He presumed it was done because the gentleman who was sent to China had no friends. At any rate, such was the suggestion of 2215 hon. Members. He did not know whether it was the fact or not; but, no! doubt, the post being a long way off and out of the way had a great deal to do with it. If it were possible for him to do so he certainly should propose to increase the Vote; but that, of course, was entirely beyond the power of a private Member.

§ MR. THOMASSON
said, he begged to move the reduction of the Vote by £2,425, being the Vote to complete the sum for the salaries of the Minister Resident of Wurtemburg, the Chargé d'Affaires of Darmstadt, the Secretary of Legation of Coburg, and the Chargé d'Affaires of Bavaria. He believed these reductions would be quite consistent with the efficiency of the Public Service. At any rate, he would like to know what the diplomatic services of these gentlemen were; and whether it was desirable to pay them salaries varying from £500 to £1,250, in addition, in some cases, to the rents of their houses? All these places, he believed, were in the German Empire; and he supposed the work was really managed in Berlin. He would venture to say that the places on the map to which the Votes referred would be unknown to the majority of Members. He should be glad if the Government would vouchsafe some information as to why these diplomatists were maintained in such out of the way places.

THE CHAIRMAN
I would point out to the hon. Member that there has already been proposed a reduction of the General Vote; and that, therefore, it would not be in Order for him to propose the reduction of another specific item.

§ MR. R. N. FOWLER
said he had to apologize to the Committee for speaking on this subject; but he had been in Japan, and had had the pleasure of knowing Sir Harry Parkes, whom he believed to be a most able and efficient servant of Her Majesty. In these circumstances, he was sorry to find that when this gentleman was promoted to Pekin the salary accorded to him was £500 per annum less than that which had been paid to his Predecessor. He protested against such treatment of a man who had spent his early years in China, and had rendered the greatest service to his country. He protested, in the strongest manner, when he found this gentleman's salary cut down, and 2216 when he saw a gentleman of whom he knew nothing, but who, he had no doubt, was a very deserving public servant, who had been in Belgium for many years, being appointed to Rome, and receiving exactly the same salary that his Predecessor in that post had been paid. He (Mr. R. N. Fowler) protested against the way in which Sir Harry Parkes had been treated; and, as a protest against the reduction of his salary, he would propose to reduce the Vote by £500. Her Majesty's Government would do well to give this matter their careful consideration; and, if they did, he trusted the result would be that they would give this diplomatist the salary his Predecessor had received at Pekin.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sum, not exceeding £112,800 (including a 'Supplementary sum of £6,000), be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1884, for the Expenses of Her Majesty's Embassies and Missions Abroad.'' —(Mr R. N. Fowler.)

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
said, that in regard to the question of salary, it seemed to him there was only one question to ask, and that was whether the salary was adequate for the post? The moment they entered into all these personal questions they embarked on very difficult topics. Questions of personal controversy were, nine times out of ten, questions of great difficulty, and were nearly always in the highest degree distasteful to the gentlemen who were the subject of them. He should be the last person in the world to under-rate the services of that distinguished gentleman whose name had been mentioned, and who was now going to China; but the fact that they were able to obtain the services of so distinguished a man at such a salary seemed to him to be the best argument in favour of, that salary. If it could be shown that the moment the salary was reduced they could no longer obtain the services of such a man as Sir Thomas Wade, and the other distinguished men who had represented this country in China before, then hon. Members would have been armed with a very formidable argument that he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) would have experienced great difficulty in answering. But they had obtained the services of a man of great 2217 skill and ability, and that was his answer to the hon. Member in regard to China. As to what had fallen from the hon. Gentleman behind him (Mr. Thomas-son), he quite admitted the force of some of his remarks. He quite admitted that the circumstances of these countries where the posts existed which the hon. Gentleman desired not merely to reduce, but to abolish, had materially altered since the time in which these posts were first instituted and the salaries attached to them. It was felt, however, that some changes in regard to these posts might be made; and he could only say that the Foreign Office were watching all these cases very carefully, not only in regard to the four places which the hon. Member mentioned, but other posts in addition. He would venture to observe that the same argument did not apply to all these four places; and it was difficult to lump together in one sweeping condemnation Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Darmstadt, and Coburg. There were peculiar circumstances which marked one from the other. The position of the various States and Duchies of the German Empire was not the same. Bavaria, for instance, had reserved itself a far more independent position than most of the States of Germany which had been affected by recent events in that country. Then there had been one other point mentioned, he having been asked why it was that they had not the-courage to do something in the case of Portugal; and their conduct in regard to China had been attacked, it having been stated that they had been actuated in what they had done by the consideration that the country was a long way off, and because the gentleman who had been appointed unfortunately had no friends. He had a plain answer to that, which was that it had been determined to make considerable alterations in connection with the Lisbon Mission on the very first opportunity, the circumstances of the Mission having very materially altered since it was established.

§ MR. ILLINGWORTH
said, he saw in the Votes charges made for seven Consular chaplains; and as they had not a Bishop in that House, as they had "elsewhere," to whom a Question on this subject could be put, he would address himself to the Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Courtney). Ile would ask the hon. Gentleman upon what 2218 principle they were supposed to go in fixing these salaries? He found that in the case of Turkey the chaplain was paid £400 a-year, including £100 for rent; £300 was paid in the case of Austria; £200 a-year in the case of Denmark; £200 also in the cases of Spain and China; £100 was devoted to the chaplaincy of Greece, and only £50 to that of Italy. He supposed there was some rate or scale of the worth of the services of these gentlemen; and he should like, therefore, to ask how these services were assessed? In the case of Denmark he should like some explanation as to an additional item, because it seemed that this was the only place in which there was an extra charge made in connection with a chaplaincy which was partly subsidized by residents. The case of Denmark was the only one in which there was any contribution from outside towards the salary of the chaplain. He should like to know whether, in other cases; contributions were made in the capitals of Europe, or why Denmark was made an exception? Why should the chaplain in Turkey receive £400, whilst the chaplain in Italy received only £50?

§ MR. SCLATER-BOOTH
said, there was one further question he wished to ask on the subject raised by the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir II. Drummond Wolff). The noble Lord (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurico) appeared to him (Mr. Sclater-Booth) to have proved too much. The noble Lord said, in a light manner, how satisfactory it was to him to have obtained the services of so distinguished a man as Sir Harry Parkes at Pekin for the modest sum of £5,500 per annum, as though all these appointments were put up to "Dutch auction" whenever a vacancy occurred. Why, then, was not the principle of paying the precise sum for which they could get a suitable official adopted in the case of Rome? Could not the new Ambassador to Rome have been induced, in like manner, to accept a smaller salary?

§ MR. CAUSTON
said, he wished to ask a question as to the chaplaincy at Vienna. Last year they had been asked to vote £300 for a chaplain in Vienna; but there had been. no English service there for several weeks; in fact, he thought, for several months. If they voted £300 a-year it ought surely to insure to the residents and visitors to 2219 the great City of Vienna a regular Sunday service.

§ MR. RYLANDS
said, it appeared that the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Sclater-Booth) considered that the j edging of the salaries according to the requirements of the Missions and the duties to be performed was really putting these salaries up to "Dutch auction."

§ MR. SCLATER-BOOTH
I did not say so. It was the noble Lord.

§ MR. RYLANDS
said, it was admitted that there was a number of excessive sums paid—sums which were a great deal more than was sufficient to secure the services of suitable gentlemen. It appeared to him that the only course the Government could adopt would be to reduce the salaries when they were making promotions and changes, or when vacancies occurred. Salaries should be reduced where practicable, provided always that they did not reduce them to such an extent that they could not obtain efficient men. That was the point. He quite agreed with those who were of opinion that the salary of £7,000 a-year to their Ambassador in Rome was a very excessive amount, and one that should be reduced. If the noble Lord would allow him to say so, he would suggest that he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had not replied to the observations of the hon. Member for Bolton (Mr. Thomas-son). The noble Lord had very cursorily referred to these German Embassies; and he (Mr. Rylands) had rather inferred from his observations that he was not prepared to advocate their continuance in all cases. In addition to these Ministers, there were second Secretaries voted, and, in seine cases, even third Secretaries. Saxony was a place mentioned in which there had been a Mission maintained for many years past. [Lord EDMOND FITZMAURICE: I said Bavaria.] His hon. Friend (Mr. Thomasson) was prevented from moving a reduction, but he had done good service by calling the attention of the Committee to this matter; and he (Mr. Rylands) trusted sincerely that when the Treasury could see its way to revising these sums next year, they would consider whether reductions could not be made both in regard to the German and South American Missions.

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
said, he thought the noble Lord and the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylauds) were 2220 really of the same opinion as himself on some of these points. He trusted, with the hon. Member for Burnley, that the Government would take the opportunity, when making new appointments, to reduce the salaries in the cases to which he had already referred. His objection was that, in the case of a new appointment, they had reduced the salary of one Ambassador; whilst in the case of Italy they had not revised the salary paid. According to the doctrine of the noble Lord, because they could get Sir Harry Parkes to accept the post at Pekin for £500 a-year less than was paid to his Predecessor, why could they not have tried it on with Sir John Lumley to see if he would take £500 a-year less? His (Sir Ii. Drummond -Wolff's) complaint was, that they should apply the screw to a man who had been 40 years in China, and who had worked so arduously, and with so much zeal, as Sir Harry Parkes, instead of to the case of a gentleman who was removed to one of the pleasantest posts in Europe—to a post which was almost a sinecure—that they should have removed Sir John Lumley from Belgium to Italy without having reduced his salary £500 a-year. If they wanted to reduce the salary of Sir Harry Parkes, why did they not also reduce that of Sir John Lumley? He was glad the attention of the Committee had been drawn to this matter, because the way in which patronage had recently been distributed by the Foreign Office had almost amounted to a scandal. He was quite aware, however, that it was of little use to move to reduce Votes, as the economists opposite, and the weak Front Bench on the Conservative side, would be certain to support the Government. However, if his hon. Friend (Mr. R. N. Fowler) divided, he should vote with him.

§ MR. LABOUCHERE
said, before they finished the discussion on this Vote it was necessary to say something about superannuation. He found, in Class VI., besides £7,000 charged on the Consolidated Fund, there was a charge of £19,918, which made nearly £27,000 together. This sum was devoted to pensions. An Ambassador got a large pension, the rule being that when a gentleman had been 15 years in the Diplomatic Service lie was entitled to a superannuation allowance. No doubt, it might be desirable to bring about 2221 these changes at the expiration of that period; but it certainly seemed to him that a person who had been 15 years in the employment of the Government was a fit individual to continue in the Service, if he was not above a certain age. By continuing a diplomatic servant in the service of the Crown beyond the limited period of 15 years a great deal would be saved in the matter of pensions. Let them take the case, for instance, of Lord Napier, one of the ablest diplomatists they had, and not a particularly old man. Tie had been receiving a pension for a number of years, and in that way they were not only depriving themselves of the services of a thoroughly able and experienced diplomatist, but they were burdening themselves with a payment which was altogether unnecessary. If they appointed a man like Lord Napier—and he took his Lordship merely as an instance—as an Ambassador in some foreign capital, they would be saving the country a pension of £1,700 per annum. Some time ago, he (Mr. Labouchere) had had a Motion on the Paper on going into Committee, dealing with this item. His object in putting that down was, he admitted, to call attention to the case of Sir Henry Layard. This gentleman, as the Committee was probably aware, had not been 15 years in the Diplomatic Service—he had been about 13 years, or something of that kind—and consequently, according to the strict letter of the law, was not entitled to a pension. But it seemed there was an idea at the Foreign Office that he should be made Ambassador at Rome, because then, after a service of two years, he would be entitled to a pension. Well, it had struck him (Mr. Labeuchere) as being a highly objectionable thing that a person like Sir Henry Layard should be appointed to Rome for two years, in order to legalize the charging of a pension of £1,700 a-year upon the country during the term of this gentleman's life. Sir Henry Layard had not been brought up to the Diplomatic Service. In his early youth he was an attaché at Constantinople; but he received that appointment simply to give him a position whilst he was making those interesting discoveries at Nineveh, with which the Committee, no doubt, were thoroughly familiar. He had no intention to attack Sir Henry Layard; he had been for 2222 some time in that House sitting on the Liberal side, and was a scientific man, as well as a very able diplomatist. He (Mr. Labeuchere) did not by any means agree with what Sir Henry Layard had done at Constantinople; but, at the same time, he admitted that was no reason why Sir Henry Layard should not be employed again in the Diplomatic Service. Sir Henry Layard had carried out his own views and those of the Government he served; and he (Mr. Labeuchere) was not raising this point against Sir Henry Layard as a reason why he should not be sent to Rome for a couple of years to qualify him for a pension. It might be thought that in making these observations with regard to Sir Henry Layard, he, and those who took the same view as himself, felt that he was not a fit person to be employed. Nothing was further from their feelings on the subject.

§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKE
said, he was glad to hear the last remark of the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labeuchere) in regard to Sir Henry Layard, because it would be a very great pity if it were to go abroad that Sir Henry Layard, who was a gentleman of very great ability—indeed, one of the ablest diplomatists they had in many respects—should be looked upon as in any sense under a cloud. The Prime Minister had left the House; but, before going, had requested him (Sir Charles W. Dilke) to state that nothing had been further from his thought than that any difference of opinion between himself and Sir Henry Layard with regard to the Constantinople affair, which took place a long time ago, should interfere with the arrangements in which that able diplomatist might be interested. It must not be assumed that Sir Henry Layard was not entitled to a pension—he would not say whether he was or not, the question being a legal one, which had not been finally settled.

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
said, with regard to the chaplains and the other matters which had been mentioned, he would first of all refer to one observation which had been used by a right hon. Member on the opposite side of the House (Mr. Sclator-Booth). He wished to state that he had never, in a single instance, referred to what hon. Members had been pleased to call a "Dutch auction" in regard to the 2223 re-apportionment of these salaries. He had, on the contrary, said that it was the bounden duty of the Foreign Office, whenever a vacancy occurred, to examine the salaries and the circumstances attaching to the post or Mission to see whether the salary required to be increased or decreased, as the case might be. That principle had been applied in the cases which had been under discussion this evening. In regard to the Motion, or rather the question as to why an economy bad not been effected in Rome—why it had been effected in Brussels, and was going to be effected elsewhere, and not in Rome—he might state that Italy was a great rising State, a Kingdom with which this country had a very great and active sympathy. The salary of the Ambassador was only fixed 18 months ago, and to reduce it thus early after its having been fixed would be an act of very great absurdity. He could not possibly conceive how any person could imagine that there was anything in common between the Embassy at Rome and the Legations at the other places mentioned. With regard to the chaplaincies, he would remind hon. Members that of late years there had been considerable controversy about these matters. The chaplaincies were six, and the salaries ranged from £50 to £300 a-year. The Paris chaplaincy was abolished in 1869 by the House of Commons. That at Copenhagen was retained, for the reason that that seaport was the resort of a large number of British sailors. He believed £85 was given for the chaplain at Copenhagen, in addition to a sum equivalent to the subscriptions of the residents. In the other cases to which reference had been made there were exceptional circumstances which rendered it desirable that the chaplaincy should be kept up. He very much regretted to hear what an hon. Member had said with regard to the Church Service at Vienna; but the statement of the hon. Gentleman would cause attention to be paid to the matter, and, no doubt, the evil would be remedied without delay.

§ MR. RYLANDS
said, that he should like to ask his right hon. Friend the President of the Local Government Board whether he could not give the Committee some information upon a question which had excited a great deal of interest in his mind? Sir Henry 2224 Layard had been employed, to a certain extent, in the Diplomatic Service; and, as he (Mr. Rylands) understood it, there had been a distinct arrangement made, whereby a certain number of years' service entitled a diplomatist to a pension. How it could be a legal question, when it was known what number of years Sir Henry Layard had served in the Diplomatic Service, he was at a loss to imagine. The Committee, he thought, should give some attention to this, because, if he was rightly informed, in consequence of what was happening a new principle might arise for regulating these pensions. He was informed that Sir Henry Layard would count the period for earning his pension from the time he held Office as Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. If that was the proposition, it struck him as a most extraordinary and outrageous one. He (Mr. Rylands) had had the pleasure of sitting with this gentleman, and he remembered perfectly well the time when he occupied this Under Secretaryship. He denied the right of the Government to grant a pension on that understanding; and he appealed to the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Local Government Board to let them know how the difficulty arose, and why this claim was set up? So far as he (Mr. Rylands) knew, no such difficulty occurred when the years of service were known, and the amount of salary bad been determined.

§ SIR CHARLES W. DILKE
said, he was not competent to discuss the legal aspects of Sir Henry Layard's claim for a pension. All he had said was that there were some legal points to be decided, and that the matter had not yet been finally settled. It was a difficult legal question, and he assured his hon. Friend (Mr. Rylands) that a great number of hours' discussion had taken place amongst most competent persons in the Foreign Office upon the matter without a final result being arrived at.

§ MR. THOMASSON
said, he intended to vote with the hon. Gentleman opposite. He had never known a reduction carried in Committee of Supply; but if it wore carried the Government would have this advantage—that they would be able to effect the reduction either in China,Wurtemburg, Darmstadt, Coburg, or Bavaria.

§ GENERAL SIR GEORGE BALFOUR
said, there could be no doubt as to what 2225 the intention of Parliament was when it sanctioned the pension of Sir Henry Layard. The House would not so far violate the spirit of the law as actually to consider, in the diplomatic career of a man, what period he had served as an Under Secretary in that House, and what period he had served on a Foreign Mission.

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
said, he would draw the attention of the hon. Member for Burnley (Mr. Rylands) to something which bere upon this ques- tion. In dealing with the services of Sir Henry Layard, or that of anybody else in the Public Service, no one should be actuated by any other feeling than the justice of the case. Well, in the Act of 1869, it was distinctly laid down that where a person in the Consular Service, or in any other branch of the Civil Service of Her Majesty, was appointed to some employment in the Diplomatic Service, or where a person in the Diplomatic Service was appointed to some office in the Civil Service, and suffered prejudice in regard to his retiring allowance by reason of his not continuing in his former service, the Treasury might award such superannuation allowance, having regard to his services. Sir Henry Layard would have been entitled to a pension if he had been Under Secretary of State for 10 years. Of that there was no doubt. [" Oh, oh! "] Well, Under Secretaries had received pensions, and were entitled to them, as his hon. Friend (Mr. Rylands) would, no doubt, find out when he was made an Under Secretary. Had the Government chosen to retain the services of Sir Henry Layard he would have been entitled in three years to a pension for diplomatic services, looking at the time he had served as Ambassador. He (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) had spoken to several legal friends when this matter was first brought up; and they were clearly of opinion that under the Act of 1869 Sir Henry Layard would be entitled to a pension.

§ MR. RYLANDS
said, that the hon. Gentleman (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) was mixing up two things together. No doubt an Under Secretary, after a number of years' service, might, under circumstances in which he required a pension, receive a superannuation allowance, there being a limited number of pensions for bestowal under these circumstances. 2226 But the Civil Service, to which the hon. Gentleman had referred in the extract he had given them from the Act of 1869, was altogether a different thing. That dealt with persons who were permanent in the Service, and their position was entirely different from that of an Under Secretary of State. His point was, that if the Government were led into such an arrangement as that they were discussing it would be made into a most objectionable precedent—it would be a piece of political jobbery to count a period served in an Under Secretarial capacity in estimating a pension for diplomatic services, because the Government might pitchfork an Under Secretary into the Diplomatic Service for a time in order to qualify him for a pension.

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
said, he did not intend to enter into a discussion as to the question of law, but would merely state that the Foreign Office would have to be actuated by the best opinion it could obtain. They would have to say what was to be done in order that the Statute might not be violated.

THE CHAIRMAN
pointed out that the whole of this discussion was rather irregular, seeing that there was nothing whatever relating to the pension of Sir Henry Layard in the Vote before the Committee.

§ MR. ILLINGWORTH
said, he would like to ask if there was any intention on the part of the Government to decrease the number of chaplaincies which had been referred to? They would be more satisfactory if they were conducted upon some kind of system; but that did not appear to be the case, for he found that whilst the chaplain in Italy was receiving only £50 a-year, in the case of Turkey £400 a-year was paid. He was at a loss to imagine how these salaries could be fixed. Were the services rendered in Constantinople eight times more valuable than those rendered in Rome—were the chaplains paid according to the duties they performed, or according to their ability, or how were these salaries estimated? If he did not receive a satisfactory reply he should certainly move a reduction in the Vote.

§ MR. COURTNEY
replied, that the case of the Italian chaplain was quite peculiar, the salary not being paid to any chaplain at Rome, but to a Vaudois church in Turin.

2227

§ MR. SHEIL
was at a loss to imagine why chaplains should be appointed in one place and not in another. He should have thought that the duty of a chaplain was to say prayers for those connected with the British Mission. Why, therefore, should people be administered to in one place and not in another? As to the salary of Sir Henry Layard, it seemed to him that those who were not his apologists ought to remember that in the last Parliament a Vote of Censure was moved upon him in consequence of the despatch lie wrote in reference to the present Prime Minister of an insulting character. He (Mr. Sheil) was in the House at the time, and had taken upon himself to refrain from voting, rather than vote against Sir Henry Layard and cause his destruction in the middle of his career. The right hon. Baronet (Sir Charles W. Dilke) now seemed to act as Sir Henry Layard's chief apologist; but he (Mr. Sheil) was not at all sure that the right hon. Baronet had not voted against Sir Henry Layard on the occasion to which he referred. If, on the present occasion, the Amendment were carried to a Division he should support it.

§ Question put, and negatived.

§ Original Question put, and agreed to. (2.) £152,477, to complete the sum for Consular Services.

§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT
said, that, with regard to this Consular Vote, he wished to know from the noble Lord the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether there was any Representative of this country at present in the Dominions of the Emperor of Annam; and, if so, where he was residing? He wished also to ask whether the noble Lord could give them any information with regard to the intention of France to annex Tonquin?

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
said, he was not in a position at that moment to give the hon. Member any information. The hon. Member, no doubt, had seen a statement in the newspapers on the subject, and he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had seen it likewise. The Government could give no further information with regard to Annam than had appeared in the public Press, communication with that country being very much interrupted. As a rule, in- 2228 formation from the country was obtained from Consuls in Siam. Information was sent to the Government by a very talented gentleman who had been Siam for several years. At the present moment that gentleman was not at his post; he was in this country. Most of the information he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had been enabled to obtain with regard to that quarter of, the globe had been from that gentleman.

§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT
said, he should like to know whether the House was to understand that England had absolutely no Representative whatever in Tonquin, or in the Dominions of the Emperor of Annam? He understood that the British trade with that country amounted to from £500,000 to £1,000,000 per annum. The importance of Tonquin as commanding a trade route from China to Burmah and Annam was very great; and it would hardly be satisfactory to this country to have an important European Power strongly established on the East of our Indian Frontier. Did Her Majesty's Government really admit that they had no Representative in those regions, where considerable trade interests were at stake, and where they all knew the French Republic intended to make annexations in addition to the territory they already held in Cochin China? Tonquin and the Kingdom of Annam were countries embracing a largo number of people and capable of great development. These annexations might be of considerable danger to their trade with China and Japan, as they would place the French Naval Stations right in the track of our trading fleets. He would point out to the noble Lord that it was a very significant and threatening circumstance that whilst one Great Power was drawing down close on us in the North-West of our Indian Dominions, another was concentrating its power to the East of these Possessions. They heard the other day that France was sending out Ambassadors to the King of Burmah, who was dissatisfied with this country. If England had no Representative in that part of the world, could the House have some assurance given that one would be shortly sent there?

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
remarked, that he had already stated that he had received information from Mr. Polgreave, who was stationed at 2229 Bankok. He was not in Annam, but in Siam. But there were Southern ports in China where Her Majesty's Government had Consular Agents, from whom it was difficult to obtain information as to what was taking place where the struggle was going on.

§ MR. R. N. FOWLER
asked whether there was a Vice Consul doing the duty of the gentleman who was in England?

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
replied in the affirmative.

§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT
said, the places which the noble Lord had mentioned were from 500 to 1,000 miles away from the scene of operations. He would impress upon Her Majesty's Government the importance of sending someone to that part of the world. He should like to know from some Representative of the Government whether a successor had been appointed to the late Consul Pakenham in Madagascar? He had put a Question the other day, and had received the answer that Commander Johnstone, of H.M.S. Dryad, was not acting as Consul, and that any information to that effect was inaccurate. He should like to know who was representing them in Madagascar at Tamatave now? He saw a salary on the Votes in regard to this place.

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
said, that Consul Pakenham, whose decease they all deplored, had been, shortly before his death, promoted to the important post of Odessa. This well-deserved promotion had been accorded to him after very long service; and the fact that he died just when about to enjoy that promotion rendered his decease all the more melancholy. Consul Pakenham's post had been offered to another gentleman, who was very able to fill it; but he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) would urge the Committee not to insist upon knowing who the gentleman was. It would be inconvenient for him to state the name that night.

§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT
Is he there?

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
No.

§ MR. BOURKE
It would be interesting if the noble Lord would tell the Committee to whom that Consul is to be accredited.

§ MR. ASHMEAD - BARTLETT
Is Commander Johnstone Acting Consul at the present time?

2230

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
After Consul Pakenham died, Commander Johnstone took upon himself to perform certain duties; but he is not Acting Consul.

§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT
Who represents the British Consul there at the present moment?

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
It has been impossible to send anyone out.

§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT
Then no one is there?

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
No one.

§ Veto agreed to. (3.) £990, to complete the sum for the Suez Canal (British Directors).

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
said, he wished to call attention to this question, because he desired to find out what wore the real functions of these Directors. He wished to know how far they could compromise Her Majesty's Government by statements they might be disposed to make. He would call attention, for instance, to the statement in the newspapers, with regard to a meeting of the Council of the Suez Canal Company. He found that those gentlemen who were employed by Her Majesty's Government to negotiate that scandalous arrangement the other day forwarded home a despatch, which Her Majesty's Government laid upon the Table of the House, to the effect that it had become necessary to obtain from Her Majesty's Government final instructions for the conclusion of the Agreement, and that Her Majesty's Government stated to the Directors their opinion that no further concession could be obtained from M. de Lesseps, and that the only thing for this country to do was to secure the advantages they had obtained, and leave the Company in full possession of the monopoly they had of the transit across the Isthmus. Her Majesty's Government laid that despatch upon the Table as one of the reasons for this Agreement. It was announced that the English Directors had attended a meeting of the Company, and had given their unqualified approval to the letter of M. de Lesseps to Mr. Gladstone of the 20th of July last, in which letter M. de Lesseps claimed, in the widest possible manner, the enjoyment for 99 years of the exclusive monopoly of excavating 2231 any maritime Canal through the Egyptian Isthmus. That was the position in which they were placed by their Directors; and before the Committee voted their salaries lie thought the Government ought to inform hon. Members—he was sorry there was no Cabinet Minister present—[The Marquess of HARTINGTON here entered the House.]—he begged pardon; he saw the noble Marquess who, in the absence of the Prime Minister, led the House, in his place; and he would ask him whether he could give any information as to how far the position of these gentlemen as Directors of the Canal Company, and as negotiators with M. do Lesseps for this arrangement, was to compromise either this [louse or this Government with regard to the Suez Canal? Our Directors, in the most formal way, had recognized the monopoly of M. de Lesseps on a previous occasion; and, according to a report he had read in a newspaper today, they, at a meeting of the Directors, assented to the claim of M. do Lesseps to the exclusive monopoly of excavating Canals through the Isthmus; at any rate, they had attended a meeting where a resolution to that effect had been passed, without contradiction or protest on their part. He wished to know from Her Majesty's Government how far those gentlemen could pledge this country in regard to this Canal? Did these gentlemen sit merely as Directors of the Canal Company, or as Representatives of Her Majesty's Government?—that was a matter of the greatest importance. Had they acted with the authority of Her Majesty's Government in recognizing the monopoly of M. do Lesseps, or had they acted without it? To-day, when he asked a Question of the Government upon this matter, he was informed that these gentlemen had received no instructions, and that if they had been present when the declaration to which he had referred was made they had acted without instructions. That appeared to him to place them in a most compromising position—in a position, at any rate, to compromise this country. He would appeal to the noble Lord to postpone this Vote. It would be desirable to do so under the peculiar circumstances of the case, seeing that Her Majesty's Ministers had not received any information as to what had taken place at the meeting yesterday.

2232

MR. ASIIMEAD-BARTLETT
said, he should like to add an appeal to the same effect. The Vote was an important one, and there were some very important considerations attaching to it. This country might find itself committed by these Directors without knowing anything about it—we might find that in consequence of their action serious claims were to be made against us. The quotation that had been read by one of Her Majesty's Ministers, from a despatch which was written so long ago as 1872, showed how ready they were to admit the power of these casual remarks and claims, if not promptly rebutted. He felt almost compelled to move to report Progress; in fact, he would do so, unless the noble Lord explained these points, or consented to a postponement of the Vote.

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
said, that the two points raised by the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) hardly, he thought, afforded a justification for the postponement of the Vote. The first point the hon. Gentleman had raised was in regard to a document which had already appeared—a document in which a certain opinion was expressed by the English Suez Canal Directors with regard to the position of M. do Lesseps. Well, that opinion was no more than the opinion which had been expressed by Her Majesty's Ministers. That opinion, it was true, was not entertained by hon. Gentlemen opposite, and had been the cause of a great deal of discussion in that House and abroad. Still, it was plain that in the statement they had made the Directors had not started any new opinion of their own. That despatch was written at the time when they were in communication with Her Majesty's Ministers, and was in perfect harmony with what had been stated by persons in authority in the House of Commons. As to the meeting of the Company at which the British Directors were present, the question amounted to this—how far could the British Directors, either by active assent or silent consent, bind this country? In the first place, he might say that this information which the hon. Gentleman had brought forward was not information of any official kind; and, as the hon. Gentleman had been informed to-day by the First Lord of the Treasury, no instructions 2233 had been given to them. In fact, there was nothing to add to the statement which the Prime Minister had made today. What he would point out was that, whether the statements in the newspapers were true or untrue, these British Directors were not in such a diplomatic position that their statements could bind this country in her dealings with Foreign States. Therefore, however natural the apprehension of the hon. Gentleman might be, he trusted he would see that was no cause for alarm, and that these Directors did not, and in the nature of their appointments never could, affect this country by being present at a meeting of the Board, of which they were Members, at Paris.

§ SIR R. ASSHETON CROSS
said, he felt considerable alarm at what had fallen from the noble Lord, because lie seemed to support the view expressed by these Directors, that the monopoly really (lid exist—he seemed to affirm what hon. Members on that (the Opposition) side of the House had always contested, and which he was sorry to find the Government were still holding fast to. He appealed to the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) to say something which would do away with the effect and bad impression which would be created by the language of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON
said, with regard to the question raised by the hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett), his noble Friend (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) had admitted no more than had been admitted on previous occasions in that House by Her Majesty's Government. It was true they had taken no action upon the opinion they expressed; and, therefore, the opinion so expressed by Her Majesty's Government, or by the British Directors of the Suez Canal Company, could have no binding effect either upon Parliament or upon the future policy of the country. The fact that Parliament had refused to ratify the Agreement was the strongest proof that, whatever admissions were made by the Directors, or by the Government, they were not binding on Parliament.

§ MR. A. J. BALFOUR
said, it was true this country was not committed to anything by what had fallen from Members of the Government, or from the British Directors of the Canal Com- 2234 pany; but it was the fact, nevertheless, that these officials were paid by the British Government, and it could not but be, if they allowed themselves to use assertions to which Parliament deliberately refused its assent, that our future relations with the Canal Company might be imperilled. He could not but think that it would be a great convenience if the Government would transmit to these Directors instructions to this effect—that they were not to commit themselves to any broad assertion which might imperil our future negotiations with the Company. If they would restrict their operations to directing the Company instead of laying down or assenting to this broad political proposition, they would, no doubt, be more fittingly earning the salaries which the Committee was about to vote. He thought his hon. Friend (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) had done good service by calling attention to the fact that the British Directors had assented to a proposition to which that House had deliberately refused to give its assent, and that in doing so they had certainly not done good service to this country.

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
said, the statement of the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) was a most alarming one, for he now reiterated, as he (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) understood, as the view of Her Majesty's Government, that opinion which had been so strongly opposed in the House.

THE MARQUESS or HARTINGTON
I did not reiterate anything. I merely said that the Suez Canal Directors had, I believed, stated very much the same thing that had been expressed in this House by Members of the Government. Nothing that may happen in the future can possibly do away with the fact that these opinions have been expressed by Her Majesty's Government, although Parliament has not seen fit to give effect to these opinions.

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
said, certain Members of the Government held the opinion that M. de Lesseps had a monopoly for the construction of a Canal through the Egyptian Isthmus; and he had read an extract from a despatch to show that the British Directors of the Canal Company entertained a similar view. Parliament had, practically, repudiated that view of the matter.

2235

An hon. MEMBER
No, no ! We did not admit it.

§ SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF
said, that, never having admitted it, then the Government allowed these gentlemen to go over to Paris and express their ml-qualified approval—for the Government would be committed to that unless the statement of the Directors was contradicted—to this demand of M. do Lesseps for an "exclusive monopoly to excavate any maritime Canal through the Egyptian Isthmus." The British Directors, it seemed, had cast in their vote in favour of the monopoly of M. de Lesseps, in face of the fact that Parliament had deliberately abstained from ratifying the view taken by Her Majesty's Government. If that were really the case, it seemed to him to place this country in a most dangerous and difficult position. It might be that those officials were not in a diplomatic position; but if they acted as the Representatives of Her Majesty's Government on the Canal Board, and concurred in a vote which was passed upon that Board, making no protest, when it was alleged that the Company had a right to monopoly, there could be no doubt in the world that their action compromised us to a very great extent. He thought it only right that the Government should allow this question to be postponed.

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
said, he thought the memory of the hon. Gentleman opposite was very short. He declared that Parliament had repudiated the view put forward by Her Majesty's Government; but that had not been the case. What had happened on the debate raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devonshire (Sir Stafford Northcote) was this. A Motion was brought forward aimed at the larger claim of monopoly raised by M. de Lesseps, and that Motion was not adopted by Her Majesty's Government. He was quite aware that the right hon. Gentleman subsequently attempted to place a construction upon the attitude of the Government which was not admitted by those sitting on that (the Ministerial) side of the House, and which was not placed upon it by the country outside. It was clear that the strategy of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for North Devonshire did not meet with the approval of the House; and he (Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) was 2236 justified in saying that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth (Sir H. Drummond Wolff) was not right in his statement that the view of Her Majesty's Government had been rejected. Further, he did not wish to go fully into this matter, as it was not germane to the Vote before the Committee. He might explain that there was a definite arrangement with the British Directors of the Canal Company as to remuneration for services. As a matter of fact, they were entitled to certain fees; but instead of withdrawing these fees they were put into the Treasary, a salary being paid in lieu of them.

§ MR. BOURKE
also considered that the observations of the noble Lord were extremely alarming. He was very reluctant to take part in this discussion, because he was perfectly content to leave the discussion as to the monopoly of M. do Lesseps where it was left a few days ago; but owing to what had taken place in Paris within the last few days, and also to what had been said by the noble Lord just now, he had no hesitation in saying that this country found itself to be in a much worse position than it supposed. They heard it stated that the British Directors of the Company had formally admitted the monopoly of M. do Lesseps—that had been stated in the public journals. The question had been raised, and, as yet, remained uncontradieted. Prom the answer given shortly before by the Prime Minister, he had been led to believe that the allegation in the newspapers was correct. The noble Lord now got up and told them that this monopoly was not repudiated by hon. Gentlemen on that (the Conservative) side of the House.

§ LORD EDMOND FITZMAURICE
I did not say anything of the kind. I said it had never been repudiated by Parliament.

§ MR. BOURKE
said, all he could say was that they on that side of the House repudiated, with all their might, this question of monopoly. He (Mr Bourke) had not had an opportunity of addressing the House the other night upon this question, and lie had not wished to do so, particularly as the discussion had taken rather a legal turn. His view had been that this question could not be called one of legality, so far as English jurists looked upon it. It was a far more important matter than that, and, 2237 after all, must be settled by Turkey and Egypt. Whatever assumption of monopoly might be made by M. de Lesseps, or by English jurists, or English capitalists, or Parliament, it would have no effect in the ultimate decision of the matter. That ultimate decision must rest with the Porte, who had decided already, in terms the most conclusive possible, that M. do Lesseps had no monopoly whatever. If he had had the despatch in which this view was convoyed in his possession at the present moment, he would have alluded to it. He was sorry that the Primo Minister was not now in his place, as he had been anxious to draw the attention of the right hon. Gentleman to this matter. This question of monopoly was raised in 1872, when the right hon. Gentleman had called them to task in the most unfair manner possible. He (Mr. Bourke) had stated that he did not know anything about the despatch; but the right hon. Gentleman seemed to forget that the despatch was written when lie himself had been four years in Office, and before the Conservative Administration attained to power. The whole of this question was discussed in this despatch by Lord Granville, and the most conclusive opinion was given by the Representatives of the Porte that M. de Les-sops had no monopoly whatever. There was a proposition made by Italy that the Canal should be bought by all the Powers of Europe, and that question came before the Porto; and it was in reply to a despatch from the English Government with regard to that, that the statement to which he referred was made by the Representatives of the Porte. M. de Lesseps had nothing but his own concession; and, as for monopoly, it was a thing which had been treated from that day to this by the Porte with the most supreme and utter contempt, and he did not think there was a single jurist in Europe who would contend that the monopoly ever existed at all.

§ MR. LABOUCHERE
said, that we in this country were responsible for these Directors, who were appointed and paid by us; and to say that they could do what they liked, without reference to the views of, or without responsibility to, those who appointed them, was an utter absurdity. He hoped that these Directors would not compromise themselves 2238 upon another matter which he (Mr. Labouchere) bad asked about. When M. de Lesseps retroceded a certain part of his land to the Egyptian Government, he was allowed to retain a certain portion along the banks of the Canal; but the concession of that small portion of land was in every case specified as being for "his employés," for "gardens," for "trees,"&c. In spite of the fact that this land was allowed to remain in the possession of M. do Lesseps for purposes such as these, M. de Lesseps, as they saw, was continually claiming his right either to make a second Canal, or to enlarge the existing one by the use of the land which he so held. He (Mr. Labouchere) entirely denied his right to do so. It seemed to him as clear as possible that he had no such right. He had heard from several Egyptians of political eminence, who took part in the proceedings at the time, that they specially made this arrangement in order that M. de Lesseps would not be able to make a second Canal. He thought the Law Officers of the Crown ought to express that opinion to the English Directors; that they should look into the matter, and thoroughly satisfy themselves as to whether M. do Lesseps really had a right to make a second Canal.

§ MR. HEALY
said, the noble Lord would think it a great change, no doubt, to take him away from the salubrious climate of Egypt to the sunny land of Spain, and he (Mr. Healy) must apologize to the Gentlemen of the Conservative Party, who desired to discuss another matter, for venturing to interrupt their conversation; but he had a very strong desire to call the attention of the Committee to the conduct of the British Consul at Corunna.

§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT
That has nothing to do with the Vote we are now discussing.

THE CHAIRMAN
The hon. Member (Mr. Healy) will not be in. Order in raising any question in regard to the British Consuls on this Vote. The Vote upon which that question could have been raised has been passed.

§ MR. HEALY
Then I will draw attention to the matter on Report.

§ MR. ILLINGWORTH
I should like to ask you, Sir, whether the Committee is in Order in discussing the details and legal aspects of the Suez Canal Question upon this Vote?

2239

THE CHAIRMAN
In answer to the hon. Member I must say this—that it is difficult to know what this will lead to, seeing that in the question is involved the salaries of the English Directors of the Suez Canal Company. It is contended, as far as I can understand, that the conduct of the Directors in regard to the matter under discussion is of such a character as to entitle the Committee to deprive them of their salaries. It is difficult for me, therefore, to say that the discussion is not in Order.

§ MR. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT
said, the Prime Minister had stated the other day that the House was not in any way bound by what he (the Prime Minister) had stated, nor by the individual opinions of the Ministers on this Suez Question. They must treat the opinions of Ministers, to which the noble Lord and the noble Marquess had attempted to give a binding force, as merely opinions of Ministers in no way binding the country. The declared opinion of these British Directors, however, stood on a very different footing. It was their duty to defend British interests, as far as possible, by their argument and votes. It was clearly of extreme importance that these Directors, from their position as Representatives of the interests of this country, should not do anything to commit this country to any agreement or promise to M. de Lesseps. It appeared from the statement of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Portsmouth (Sir II. Drummond Wolff) that they had been doing this. The claim made by that hon. Gentleman with great clearness was that Her Majesty's Government should postpone this Vote for further consideration, or else give the Committee and the country clearly to understand that these Directors had no power in the past, and would not be allowed in future, to bind Great Britain in any shape to recognize the extraordinary monopoly claimed by M. do Lesseps. As the Government had said the other day, the House had reserved its freedom upon this point; but the vote taken had been practically a condemnation of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It had declared the House to be absolutely unfettered, even by the formal recognition of Ministers as to M. de Lesseps' claims; and that, undoubtedly, was the effect of the Amendment 2240 moved by the hon. Member for Hull. Her Majesty's Government had only availed themselves of the particular form in which the Motion was carried in order to save themselves from utter defeat. That being the position of affairs, it was reasonable for the Committee to demand that these British Directors should be informed that, in spite of the influence of M. de Lesseps—that "very sagacious "gentleman, as the Prime Minister described him—must not commit us to the recognition of a claim which the country entirely repudiated.

§ SIR ASSHETON CROSS
said, there evidently was a division of opinion on the Treasury Bench upon this question. The Prime Minister said the other day that Parliament insisted upon the withdrawal of the Agreement; but the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Hartington) had made a statement which was not on all fours with that observation, for lie had got up in his place and practically admitted the claim which M. do Lesseps made to monopoly. That was a most alarming admission. Hon. Members ought, at least, to ask the Government whether they would, at all events, communicate with the British Directors, and inform them that they, at least, were never to make such an admission again until they had distinct authority to do so. Unless the Committee obtained such a compromise as that, they were bound, lie thought, to press this matter to a Division.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON
said, that the appointment of these gentlemen was, in the first instance, only with a view of their representing the British Government as shareholders, and that function they had up to the present time exercised. He did not believe it was in their power to commit this Government, or the country, to anything by any admissions they might make, or by any part they might play in the proceedings of the Council of Administration. Undoubtedly, questions which were not foreseen at the time of the appointment of these gentlemen—questions of a much larger nature than those which it was supposed they would have to deal with—had arisen. He thought this discussion would be not at all without its use. It was desirable that the Government should consider whether general instructions should not be given to these gentlemen as to the 2241 part they should, or should not, take when present at meetings involving the consideration of questions of this kind.

§ Vote agreed to.