SOUTH AFRICA—THE TRANSVAAL—POLICY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.—RESOLUTION.

HC Deb 13 April 1883 vol 278 cc202-59

[ADJOURNED DEBATE.] [THIRD NIGHT.]

Order read, for resuming Adjourned Debate on Amendment proposed to Question [13th March], That, in view of the complicity of the Transvaal Government in the cruel and treacherous attacks made upon the Chiefs Montsioa and Mankoroane, this House is of opinion that energetic steps should he immediately taken to secure the strict observance by the Transvaal Government of the Convention of 1881, so that these chiefs may he preserved from the destruction with which they are threatened."—(Mr. Gorst.)

And which Amendment was, To leave out from the first word "the" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "very grave complication that must attend intervention in the affairs of the native populations on the Western Frontier of the Transvaal, this House is of opinion that the action of British authorities in those regions should be strictly confined within the limits of absolutely unavoidable obligations,"—(Mr. Cartwright,) —instead thereof.

Question again proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Debate resumed.

MR. CARTWRIGHT

said, he wished, with the indulgence of the House, to make one or two remarks in reference to the Amendment which stood in his name. Unexpectedly in the course of the debate the Prime Minister moved an Amendment on his (Mr. Cartwright's) Amendment, so as to modify and alter its character very much. By the substitution of the new words for those in the concluding sentence of his own Amendment, the issue as involved in the original Amendment would be shifted from a general proposition to one relating solely to a particular incident touching the position of certain Bechuana Chiefs. The long interval which had elapsed since he moved his Amendment had given him time to reflect upon his position, and he was sorry to say he had come to the conclusion that he could not accept the words proposed to be grafted on the preamble of his Amendment by the right hon. Gentleman; and, therefore, with the permission of the House, he would withdraw his Amendment in order that Her Majesty's Government might submit their Amendment in a substantive form. Should this course be adopted, he should reserve to himself full liberty of action in the matter.

MR. ONSLOW

I rise, Sir, to a point of Order. I see that the Amendment of the Prime Minister is an Amendment to the Motion of the hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright). If the Amendment of the hon. Member opposite is withdrawn, it appears to me that there would be no sense in the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury.

MR. GLADSTONE

I believe it would be necessary to prefix to my Amendment, as it stands, that part, of my hon. Friend's Amendment which I propose to adopt.

MR. RAIKES

I wish, Sir, to ask you, upon a point of Order, whether considerable inconvenience will not be caused to the House if this Amendment is withdrawn at this moment? The Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman is an Amendment to that of the hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright). All the other Amendments are Amendments to the Motion of the right hon. Member for Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), and the House will be in this position, that after having spent two days in discussing the Amendment of the hon. Member for Oxfordshire, they will have to go back and discuss the question over again. I venture to ask you, Sir, whether, under these circumstances, it would be a convenient course at this particular point of the debate, for the Amendment to be withdrawn, and if it would be possible in that event for the subsequent Amendments standing in the name of the Prime Minister, of my right hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), and of the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Sir George Campbell) to be put?

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

I wish to ask if this Amendment could not be moved as an Amendment to the original Motion of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst)?

MR. GLADSTONE

In substance, my Amendment will be an Amendment arising upon and following the Amend- ment of the right hon. Member for Gloucestershire, and it is not confined to the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Chatham.

MR. W. H. SMITH

I think it would be very much for the convenience of the House that the Amendment which has already been moved should stand.

MR. ONSLOW

I wish, Sir, to point out that if the Amendment is withdrawn, I cannot see how the Amendment of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister can come in, because it states that it is to be moved in the event of the Amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright) becoming a substantive Motion. If the Amendment is withdrawn, it would follow that the Amendment of the Prime Minister must go too.

MR. SPEAKER

Of the four Amendments on the Paper, one is an Amendment upon the original Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Chatham. The other three are Amendments upon the Amendment of the hon. Member for Oxfordshire, which ho now desires to withdraw. If the House thought proper to allow the Amendment of the hon. Member for Oxfordshire to be withdrawn, I apprehend there would be no difficulty in the other Amendments on the Paper being re-cast, so as to adapt them to the altered conditions of the question; but it is for the House to say which is the most convenient course to adopt. In point of Order, there is no objection to the Amendment of the hon. Member for Oxfordshire being withdrawn; and any Amendment would be then in Order upon the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Chatham.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

Sir, if the Amendment were withdrawn, I am afraid the House would get into serious confusion. The whole scheme of the debate has been founded on the Motion of the hon. and learned Member for Chatham, and the Amendment of the hon. Member for Oxfordshire thereupon. It was understood that, in the event of that Amendment becoming a substantive Motion, there would be an opportunity of amending it. And two of the Notices given—namely, that of the right hon. Member for Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) and of the Prime Minister, have been given upon that hypothesis. But, without any Notice or warning to anybody on this side of the House, we are called upon to re-cast these Amendments. My right hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire told the Prime Minister that he wished to move his Resolution. [Mr. GLADSTONE: No, no!] Then I am more puzzled than ever. My right hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire is not present, and it seems as if the whole business would be conducted in a very unsatisfactory and un-workmanlike manner. The House has really got into this difficulty from the circumstance that the Government has not met, as they ought to have met, the fair challenge of my right hon. Friend the Member for Gloucestershire, which was given on the first night of the Session, to afford him an opportunity of straightforwardly impeaching the policy of the Government. The best and simplest way out of the difficulty would be for the Government to say they were prepared to give my right hon. Friend a proper opportunity for bringing forward his Vote of Censure on the Government. If we could once arrive at that conclusion, without all these shifting arrangements, which make the whole matter unintelligible, we should know what to do. The Government was first prepared to accept the Amendment of the hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright). Then the Prime Minister gave Notice of an Amendment; next that was altered; and now the House is asked to re-cast the whole matter. If the Government are prepared to defend their policy, they will take the simple course I have suggested.

MR. SPEAKER

According to the Rules of Debate, an Amendment cannot be withdrawn without the general consent of the House. That general consent does not appear to be given, and I presume the Amendment still stands before the House.

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, I hope I may be permitted to observe that we have just heard, on a point of Order, a speech involving accusatory matter in a greater degree than I think I ever heard compressed into so few lines. A proceeding so strange, so contrary to the usages of the House, and so regardless of its convenience, I cannot recall. I do not hold myself to be at liberty to reply to a single word of these accusations. If I am not at liberty, and I believe I am not, these accusations ought not to have been made on this occasion. The right hon. Gentleman entirely misunderstood me. What I wished to say is this. The difficulty of form suggested by the hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Onslow) had, in my opinion, no existence, because I said, so far as I was concerned, that I would prefix to my Amendment certain words, so that the House might then proceed to debate it. That was an observation on the point of Procedure.

Question put, "That the Amendment, by leave, be withdrawn." [Cries of "No, no!"]

SIR HENRY HOLLAND

So many Amendments, Sir, have been put down on the Paper upon this important question, that, although one only is strictly under the consideration of the House, it is difficult to steer clear of the others; and the short discussion which we have just heard has not lessened that difficulty. I believe I shall best suit the convenience and save the time of the House by stating, without reference to the Resolution and Amendments, the view which I and many others on both sides of the House entertain of the position in which this country has been placed by the action of Her Majesty's Government. The first point is to ascertain the exact policy of Her Majesty's Government, and what course they intend to pursue. But this is by no means an easy matter. The speeches of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for the Colonies in "another place" and of the Under Secretary of State in this House seem to indicate a policy, though a highly unsatisfactory one, of continued remonstrances to the Transvaal Government—not of much avail if treated as our remonstrances have hitherto been treated—and of payment of compensation to Native Chiefs for losses against which we ought to have protected them. But the speech of the Prime Minister, in reply to the powerful and eloquent speech of the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) in which this undecided policy was attacked, and in which Her Majesty's Government were urged to adopt a firmer policy, was most vague and unsatisfactory. He concealed the decision of Her Majesty's Government, if indeed they have arrived at any definite decision, in a cloud of words. Indeed, his speech reminded me of nothing so much as the cloud with which we read in Homer a friendly god or goddess enveloped a wounded warrior, and thus enabled him to escape from his assailants. Different lines of action wore indicated as possible, but no distinct line of action was stated. Even the lines of action indicated were so hampered and hemmed in by conditions, limitations, and restrictions, that we are confused and baffled in our endeavours to make out what is really the course which Her Majesty's Government intend to follow. Some points, however, can he ascertained, by a somewhat negative process, from an examination of the Resolution and Amendments. In the first place, it is clear that Her Majesty's Government will not pledge themselves— Immediately to take energetic steps to secure the strict observance by the Transvaal Government of the Convention of 1881, so that the Chiefs may be preserved from the destruction with which they are threatened; otherwise, they would have accepted the Resolution of the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst). Again, they will not bind themselves to fulfil "absolutely unavoidable obligations," or they might have accepted the Amendment of the hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright). Surely, however, this was the very minimum of duty—the performance of absolutely unavoidable obligations—which the Government were called upon to perform. But the Prime Minister said that he did not consider this Amendment sufficient to meet the demands of the case. Then how does he propose to meet the demands? In what way does he consider they will be satisfied? For this we must turn to the Amendment proposed by the Government, and we find that it is by making— Adequate provision for the interests of any Chiefs who may have just claims upon the Government. But this action would have been included, clearly included, in the terms of the Amendment. If we do not protect the Chiefs, we are unavoidably bound to compensate them. The Government Amendment is a limitation of the original Amendment, and not, as the Prime Minister would wish us to believe, an enlargement of it. Unless the Government are not prepared to pledge themselves to any decided policy, I cannot understand why they should not ac- cept the Resolution or Amendment. It is true that the Prime Minister, in his speech of March 16th, to which I have before referred, said, in general terms— We all do the best we can, subject to jeers, and, perhaps, Party taunts, to obtain justice for those who have in every manner acted on our behalf, nor will we renounce any right whatever that we now possess as against either the Transvaal Government or freebooters proceeding from the Transvaal. But the country desires a more distinct answer and assurance. It is not sufficient for the Government to say that they will not renounce any rights. What the country requires to know is whether, if those rights are set at nought and infringed by the Transvaal Government, the Government will uphold them and secure their observance? Again, at one time we understood from the speech of the Under Secretary of State that remonstrances would be continued against the action of the Transvaal Government, though Lord Derby admitted the inutility of such remonstrances. But now it appears, from the speech of the Prime Minister, that such is not to be the case, and that no further step will be taken in this direction until a certain Dr. Jorissen has had an opportunity of making representations to Her Majesty's Government. In any case, Sir, it would show an undignified and feeble action to abstain from calling upon the Transvaal Government to return an answer to the grave charges brought against them by Sir Hercules Robinson in his carefully-considered despatch of January 22, 1883; but it is still more undignified when we consider that Dr. Jorissen, though, I believe, a Law Officer of the Transvaal Goverment, is not an accredited Agent of that Government, and has no authority to state their views or to make any promises on their behalf. He is here, as we are told, on private business, and looking to his antecedents, I cannot refrain from warning the Government against too hastily accepting his statements. When he says, for instance, as he is reported to have said to Lord Derby, that peace was restored amongst the Natives, I should like to know what kind of peace has been restored, and how restored? Has it been obtained by the crushing up Montsioa, and forcing him to submit to Moshette or to the Boer marauders? Has it been by the establishment of this new Republic of Stella- land? Dr. Jorissen's statements cannot be received as correct without inquiry; and are we in the meantime to hold our hands? The policy of Her Majesty's Government is a half-hearted and shuffling policy. It is a policy of indecision and waiting on events. It fails to uphold and safeguard the honour and dignity of this country. I desire to express my deep and unfeigned regret at the action of Her Majesty's Government. The effect of it cannot be measured by this case only. The effect will be, I fear, far-reaching, and may prove disastrous not only in the Transvaal, not only to our unfortunate Native allies, not only to our Government in South Africa, where we have masses of Natives to deal with both in our Colonies and outside the borders, but even in India and wherever we have to deal with Native Princes and Tribes. Take the case of South Africa and its probable effect there. The difficulties in our relations with South Africa were not exaggerated by the Prime Minister. They have often led to great waste of life and money; they have often baffled the statesmen of this country, and they will now be greatly increased. Hitherto the good faith of this country and its loyal observance of engagements have been unimpeached, and owing to that fact we have been enabled to do much good. The Natives have trusted us, and many a quarrel has been checked by our mediation which, if extended, would have been ruinous to the parties engaged, and perhaps perilous to the peace of our Colonies. Nay, more; troubles of a grave character between Natives and Whites, as in 1858 and 1864 between the Orange Free State and the Basutos, have been settled by our mediation. Destroy their faith in us, and our power of doing good will be crippled, if not altogether put an end to. We shall have no power to check those dissensions which the Boers foster, and by which they profit. And here I must refer to an answer of the Prime Minister to the hon. Member for Preston (Mr. Tomlinson), who asked for Papers to show that Bechuanaland was "always a land of turbulence and disorder," as stated by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister referred to certain Blue Books of 1878 and 1879. But if he had studied the history of this country he would have found that these disorders were stirred up by the South African Government. In proof of this I would cite one paragraph of the Report of the Royal Commissioners who settled the Pretoria Convention. They say— In 1872 and 1873 the Government of the South African Republic purported to acquire by cession certain portions of the disputed territories from Koranna Chiefs, from the Barolong Chief Moshette, and the Batlapin Chief Gasibone. The Government of the Republic, it seems, tried to raise up a question of paramount Chieftanship among the Barolong Chiefs, and to set up Moshette as paramount against Montsioa, and it was from Moshette, as paramount, that they sought to take the cession of the Barolong territory. Sir Owen Lanyon, in several despatches in 1878, points to the action of the South African Republic as being at the bottom, of those Native dissensions; and the House must remember that early in 1877 the South African Republic actually endeavoured, by Proclamation, to annex this very Bechuana territory. Against that and several similar Proclamations, Lord Carnarvon, when Secretary of State, firmly protested. The records of the Colonial Office and the Blue Books presented to Parliament, show persistent working of the South African Republic in this direction, causing untold mischief and trouble. I will only add that as regards the character and habits of the Natives, if left to themselves, the missionaries give a very different account from that described by the Prime Minister. Sir, I do not underrate the difficulty of the position. No one can view it without grave fear and apprehension; certainly no one who has studied South African affairs. But Her Majesty's Government have only themselves to blame for this difficulty. This special difficulty has arisen directly from the retrocession of the Transvaal and from the terms of peace, for which this Government alone are responsible. Other difficulties might have arisen if we had continued to hold the Transvaal, which, up to the early part of 1881, Her Majesty's Ministers stated was their policy. But I believe that such difficulties would have been of a much less grave character, and might have been overcome by firmness and judgment. If we had secured the victory, which was within our grasp, over the only army that the Boers could have got together, we should have gained the respect of the Boers'; we should have been in a position either to put down or make terms with the Boer leaders; we should have held the country with the assent of many well-to-do and peaceful Boers—as is shown by the Memorials from so many different places presented to Sir Theophilus Shepstone and by the Memorial of loyal Boers against the retrocession of the Transvaal—and with the unanimous assent of all the Natives. This latter fact is a very important element in the case, and is proved by the Report of the Royal Commissioners, and by an extract from one of Sir Hercules Robinson's despatches of the 4th of August, 1881, in which he says— It would he wrong of me to endeavour to conceal from your Lordship the fact, of which I fear there can he no question, that the Native population of the Transvaal lament the withdrawal of British administration from the country, and are dissatisfied with their new lot, and distressed and anxious at the prospect they see before them. Indeed, so strong was their dissatisfaction, that the Commissioners, probably very wisely, would not allow them to state their wishes in presence of the Boer leaders, for fear that they would use such strong language as to excite the Boers, and render themselves liable in the future to revengeful action on the part of the leaders of the Transvaal Government. We should then, I contend, have thus secured a good and strong Government to the country, and protection to the Natives both within and without the frontier line, over which we should have prevented encroachments from either side. If in the course of years we found that there was still a strong yearning amongst the Boers for a restoration of the Republic, we might have retired with honour and with full security to the Natives against Boor attacks. The Boers would have felt our power, and been thankful for concessions which now they have wrung, or consider they have wrung, from us by force. But, whatever might have happened if we had retained our hold on the country, this special difficulty with which we now have to deal admittedly arises from the hastily-patched-up peace, and the terms of the Convention. Now, what is the present position? Briefly this—that we have incurred obligations to Natives both within and without the Transvaal; and that the Boers, by breaking the terms of the Convention, and by attacking the Natives, have tested the force of those obligations and our power and readiness to uphold them. If so long a time had not elapsed, nearly a month, since this debate was adjourned, I should have been content to have simply stated these two points, and to have relied on the powerful speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), and the facts he adduced in support of them; but as some Members now present may not have heard that speech, and as the points are of vital importance in the case, I will venture to re-state to the House the proofs upon which I rely. And, first, that we are under some obligations to the Natives can hardly be denied, although the exact force and bearing of them are disputed by the Government. I will not refer at length to the speeches of Ministers and Supporters of the Government in both Houses in 1880 and 1881, but will only read one extract from the speech of the Prime Minister of the 21st of January, 1881, made, be it remembered, after the rebellion broke out. In giving the reasons why we must continue to hold the Transvaal, the right hon. Gentleman said— I must look at the obligations entailed by this annexation; and if in my opinion, and in the opinion of many on this side of the House, wrong was done by the annexation itself, that would not warrant us in doing fresh, distinct, and separate wrong, by a disregard of the obligations which that annexation entailed … Secondly, there was the obligation towards the Native races; an obligation which I may call an obligation of humanity and justice; and, thirdly, there was the political obligation we entailed upon ourselves in respect of the responsibility which was already incumbent on us, and which we, by the annexation, largely extended, for the future peace and tranquillity of South Africa. And, further on, he spoke of— The obligations we have undertaken with respect to the future tranquillity of South Africa, and the interests of the Natives of that country."—(3 Hansard, [257] 1142–44.) This speech covers the whole ground. We cannot get rid of our obligations by giving up the Transvaal. On the contrary, as that step was taken against the strongly-expressed wishes and prayers of the Natives, our obligations are more binding, and should be more carefully guarded and secured. This was distinctly recognized by Sir Hercules Robinson in his address to the Natives within the Transvaal, in August, 1881, "Rest assured," he said, "Your interests will never be forgotten or neglected by Her Majesty's Government." I am afraid he was rather premature in giving them such an assurance. As to the Natives outside the frontier, our engagements are no less clear. Firstly, by our having fixed, by the Convention, a frontier line in their interests and for their protection, which the Boers undertook to us not to encroach upon; and, secondly, and more clearly if possible, by our retaining the Suzerainty. This was fully admitted by the Prime Minister in a speech made on July 25, 1881, when he was defending the terms of the Convention, and relying upon those terms as a sufficient protection to the Natives, in answer to challenges and questions to him upon that point from both sides of the House. The Prime Minister then said— What was still more important was, that we should reserve sufficient power to make provision for the interests of the Natives. And this reservation of foreign relations was a most important one as regards the interests of the Natives, because a very large proportion of the Native interests of the country involve the Natives beyond the frontier of the Transvaal. Therefore, the whole of the interests of the Natives beyond the frontier of the Transvaal will be retained in the hands of the British Government by the retention of the Suzerainty. … By separating this veto upon laws relating to the Natives from any general interference with the business of the country, we have put ourselves in a position to make use of that power, and provide a far more efficient safeguard than we could have had for the interests of the Natives if we had retained the Transvaal in the Colonial connection."— (3 Hansard, [263] 1859–60.) Could stronger words be used? If the retention of the Suzerainty gave oven as efficient a safeguard to the Natives as our retention of the Transvaal would have given, it would have been an absolute protection, because it is certain that if we had continued to rule in the Transvaal we could have readily checked raids against the Natives; but it is stated to have given even a far more efficient safeguard. The Prime Minister now argues that we have reserved "rights," but incurred no "obligations." This may be technically correct, but it is a point that will hardly be appreciated by the Natives, who were promised protection; and if this is the position of the Government, the language of that speech of July, 1881, was most misleading, especially when the circumstances are considered in which it was spoken. Again, we have incurred honourable obligations, to say the least of it, to these Native Chiefs, Montsioa and Mankoroane, as our loyal supporters and allies. The Prime Minister demurred to this term "allies," and said we did not ask for assistance, but, on the contrary, desired them not to fight. Quite true; but did he remember that we asked them to give shelter to the loyal people escaping from the Transvaal; that they did give such shelter; nay more, that they refused to give these refugees up to the Boers, thus incurring, at our request, the hostility of the Boers? In passing, I would ask, is it quite certain that if the war had continued we should not have availed ourselves of their assistance? I was informed only a few days ago by Sir Owen Lanyon, that in 1878, during our Griqualand troubles, Mankoroane did assist us against a Batlapin Chief; and, unless my recollection deceives me, we did take steps not so long ago to ascertain how far the Swazis would assist us. I understood the Prime Minister to say that we should never employ Natives against White men. But I am not prepared to admit this as certain; and if we had had a prolonged war with the Boers, or if, unfortunately, hostilities were now to break out between us and the Transvaal Government, I am inclined to think that we should avail ourselves of the armed force of the friendly Native Chiefs. But to return to the case before the House. Sir Hercules Robinson and Sir Evelyn Wood did not hesitate to speak of these Chiefs as "our allies." In February, 1882, Sir Hercules Robinson speaks of them as having been always "our firm friends and' allies." He uses the same term in a despatch of July 6th, 1882, and again in his well-considered and important despatch of January 22nd, 1883. My second point is, that the Boers have broken the Convention in several respects, but especially by their non-observance of the frontier line, and by their "scandalous raids," as Sir Hercules Robinson calls them, against the Natives. This is admitted by all up to a certain extent, except, perhaps, by the hon. Member for Newcastle (Mr. John Morley), who appears to be of opinion that a Boer can do no wrong, and that he is immaculate. But, surely, the Blue Books must convince any unprejudiced reader that the Boers, at first covertly, by allowing Moshette to use the Transvaal as the base of his operations against Montsioa, but afterwards openly and deliberately, and with contemptuous and insulting language, broke their engagements with this Government. The question has been raised, how far the Transvaal Government can be held responsible for these proceedings? The Prime Minister has objected to admit their "complicity," as stated in the Resolution of the hon. and learned Member for Chatham, and he proposed words showing their "inability to restrain" the proceedings. But since then another change has been made, another Amendment has appeared on the Paper; and in lieu of the words "and of the inability of the Transvaal Government to restrain," we find the words "and of the absence of any effectual restraint upon." What is the meaning of this change? Is it that upon further inquiry the Government were not satisfied that the Transvaal Government were not really accomplices in, or unable to restrain, these proceedings? No, Sir; I gather from an answer of the Prime Minister to a question put upon this point a few days ago, that the Government desired to leave out of consideration altogether the question of the conduct of the Transvaal Government, and to deal with the Natives only. If this be so, it shows, I fear, that Her Majesty's Government even now are not alive to the full bearings of the case, and that even now they have no fixed line of policy. We have entered into a solemn Convention with the Transvaal Government, by which protection is practically secured, as the Government have themselves stated, to the Natives. The terms of this Convention have been broken by the Transvaal Government; the Natives have been attacked; and yet Her Majesty's Government desire to shut their eyes, and to ask us to shut our eyes, to this conduct of the Transvaal Government, and to treat it as in no way bearing upon the case, or upon the consideration of the policy to be adopted. They desire to avoid any decided action in relation to that Government, and to wait and see what may turn up. Whatever be their reason, I shall endeavour to show the complicity of the Transvaal Government in these scandalous proceedings, as I consider it an all important element in the consideration of this case. And first, as to the strong probability of their being accomplices, I would rely on two arguments, which, strange to say, were put forward by the Prime Minister to show their "inability to restrain." He said, on March 16th— The Transvaal Government, whatever else it may he, is eminently a popular and representative Government. In its virtues, if it has any, and in its vices, if it has any, it represents the sentiments of the community over which, or among which, it rules, and if wrong has been done by the Transvaal Government, you may rely upon it that the root of that wrong lies far deeper than the surface. It lies in the feeling of the population behind that Government. Now, surely, the closer the sympathy of a Government with the people is proved, the more probable is it that that Government will support the wishes and action of the people. If, then, the desire of the people is to resist British influence, to extend the frontier, and to annex Native territory, and they act accordingly, such a Government is not likely to interfere, even if it does not openly support such action. Again, the Prime Minister warned us that there was a strong feeling against this country throughout the Dutch population. He said— Nor is the matter confined to the Transvaal. An hon. Gentleman, who spoke in the debate, stated that in the Orange Free State, at the time of the action which took place a couple of years ago, he had heard people of the Orange Free State exulting in the miscarriages which had befallen British arms in the Transvaal. Then, that sympathy that exists between the Transvaal Government and the Transvaal population you admit goes beyond the Boers of the Transvaal, and pervades the Orange Free State as well. Does it stop there? Does it not go into the Cape? Are you not aware that a strong feeling of sympathy passes from one end of the South African settlements to the other among the entire Dutch population. Now, Sir, does not this increase the probability that the Transvaal Government, aware of this sympathy and sharing this fooling, the more strongly because of their recent conflict with this country, would connive at proceedings aimed both against us and our allies? Let me observe, however, in passing, that I think the Prime Minister somewhat exaggerated the feeling of the Dutch population against us. Against such a vague statement in proof of the bitter feeling against us of some subjects of the Orange Free State—

MR. GLADSTONE

said, that he did not rely on that statement, but only referred to it as having been mentioned by another Member.

SIR HENRY HOLLAND

I am aware that the Prime Minister did bring it forward, but he referred to it as showing the feeling in that State; but I would put against it the conduct of the people during our troubles with the Boers, and the friendly action of their President. Nor do I believe that, at this time, there is at the Cape any strong sympathy with the Boers. On the contrary, I have good authority for believing that the Cape Government would be very glad to see us put an end to these raids and restore peace. It is clearly for their interest that the Natives just North of Griqualand should be quiet and well-disposed. I hold, therefore, that it is incorrect to say, as the Prime Minister did, that a strong sympathy possessed everyone from one end of the South African settlements to the other. The Under Secretary of State contended in this House that the Transvaal Government were unable to restrain these marauding Boers. But Sir Hercules Robinson entertains a very different opinion, and his opinion is the more striking, as for some time he believed, and stated this belief in more than one despatch, that the Transvaal Government were really unable to restrain these raids. But after the Reports of officers sent into Bechuanaland, and the later Reports of the Resident, he came to a very different conclusion. On July 6, 1882, he writes— If the Transvaal Government were really in earnest in putting an end to these discreditable proceedings, they would do so by calling in their subjects, or confiscating their property. And in his despatch of January 22, 1883, he says— After carefully perusing these papers (Mr. Rutherford's Report), it appears to me difficult to resist the conclusion that the Transvaal Government are morally responsible for these proceedings. And— This state of affairs, which has now been going on since September, 1881, cannot have been unknown to the Transvaal Government. No secret has been made of the names of the leaders at each laager, who wore well-known burghers; and the great majority of the freebooters amongst both Moshette and Massouw's volunteers were Transvaal subjects. Nevertheless, the Transvaal Government, when invited by me to join the Imperial and Colonial Governments in combined action against the marauders by sending a small force to arrest their own subjects who were violating the neutrality proclamation of their State, declined to take such a step, which was well within their means and ability. It appears to me, therefore, that the Transvaal Government are fairly open to the imputation of having connived at those discreditable proceedings. I will state another reason which strongly tends to prove complicity on the part of the Transvaal Government. It must be remembered that, from the first, the Boer leaders protested against the frontier line fixed by the Convention, and they prophesied troubles which would necessitate a change of it in their favour. It may, therefore, be reasonably assumed that they were not sorry for these raids and troubles, and would not interfere, though they could have done so with effect. What does Sir Hercules Robinson telegraph on July 9, 1882?— Hudson has interviewed Transvaal Government who say no chance of serving Mankoroano and Montsioa unless territory of Massouw and Moshette placed under Transvaal jurisdiction. If this agreed to, Vice President would send force to restore peace upon basis of new boundary. In other words, if the boundary was altered in their favour, peace should be restored by force. What is this but an admission of the power of the Transvaal Government to keep the peace if they were so inclined. This proves "complicity," and destroys the theory that they were "unable to restrain." It is to be observed further, with reference to breaches of the Convention, that though this discussion has mainly turned upon the cases of Montsioa and Mankoroane, the Boers have been encroaching on Zulu territory. They retired in the winter of 1881, in consequence of the remonstrances of Sir Evelyn Wood; but Mr. Hudson, in November, 1882, reports that— They repeated the trespass to even a greater extent during the last winter, and there is no doubt that they will continue to move into Zululand until steps are taken to prevent them. They have also severely treated, or connived at maltreatment and robbery of, a loyal Native Chief, Ikalafyn, within the Transvaal. This Chief, whom Sir Hercules Robinson reports to have been always friendly to the English, erected some walls at his kraal, and it was urged that this showed his "intention" to join with Montsioa against Moshette. He was fined 3,500 head of cattle for this "intention," of the value of about £21,147. This was paid; but he was I also plundered by Boers, who have not been arrested, although they are well known. In July, 1882, Sir Hercules Robinson says— I am assured by reliable authority that, between the authorized and unauthorized raids upon this unfortunate Chief, 'a clean sweep has been made of everything in his country larger than a domestic fowl.' A few months ago, Ikalafyn was a wealthy and prosperous man; but now, although he has never been accused of any graver act than 'intention,' he is so impoverished that he is stated in the latest telegrams to have been obliged to proceed to Pretoria, to sue for time, being unable to pay his but tax. I believe, Sir, I have established the two positions which I laid down—First, that we have incurred obligations to the Natives both within and without the Transvaal; and, secondly, that the Transvaal Government have connived at the breaches of the Convention. But if I have established the first proposition, surely there is enough to show that the Government are bound to do more than compensate the Natives for losses, to secure them against which the Convention was framed, and the Suzerainty retained. Surely they are bound to uphold in the future a performance of the Convention by the Transvaal Government, whether that Government has hitherto failed to insure such performance by in-advertence, inability, or, as I hold, by deliberate complicity in the breaches of it. Before going further, I should like to put one or two questions to the Government, to make clear their position and test their views when the Convention was made. Did they at the time believe that the Boors would observe the Convention? If they did, then, looking to the conduct of the Boers with reference to the Sand River Convention; to their dealings with the Barolongs since 1870 and before; to the fact of the annexation by Proclamation in 1877 of Bechuanaland; and to the state of things in 1881, and the avowed discontent of tho Boer loaders and Volksraad with the terms of the Convention, they showed a want of foresight and judgment which is almost inconceivable. No, Sir; they must have contemplated probable breaches of the Convention by the Transvaal leaders. If so, did they believe that the Boers would yield to moral, or, as it was called in "another place," "salutary" in- fluence? If they did, they again showed an easy credulity and want of knowledge of Boer character which can hardly be credited. They must, as responsible statesmen, have considered what they would do if the Convention was broken, if the Natives were attacked, and if they were called upon to fulfil their obligations. Did they, then, decide that they would not use force to compel observance of the Convention, and to protect the Natives? If they did, then they grievously misled this country in putting forward the Convention as a sufficient protection to the Natives when challenged by Members on both sides of the House upon this point. If they did, they played a very sorry farce—a tragedy, indeed, to the Natives, who trusted to us—when they held up before us this Convention, of which they did not mean to enforce the observance. I can hardly believe this of the Government. I believe that at that time, as now, they had no distinct policy, and that they did not choose to face the consequences of any breach of the Convention. They hoped all would go right; but they shut their eyes to the grave probabilities of the case, determined, as they were, at all hazards, to get quit of the Transvaal. And we are now in these difficulties owing to this conduct. Let me, in passing, point out what might have been done to secure observance of the frontier and the protection of the Natives. The Transvaal Government might have been bound to keep up, in combination with Her Majesty's Government, and at their joint expense, a mixed body of frontier police, for, say, five or eight years. It may be said that the Transvaal Government would have failed to perform this engagement, as they have failed to perform other terms of the Convention. But, in the first place, it is a more difficult thing to avoid the performance of a substantive obligation, as, for instance, to provide a police force, than of a negative clause, as, for example, not to encroach, not to do such and such things. And, in the second place, a clause would have been inserted, reserving power to Her Majesty's Government in such case to provide and keep up a body of police at the joint expense of the two Governments. Then, again, it may be said that the Boer police would have joined the raids against the Natives, as, in fact, they have done. But they have done so, because they were not checked by the Transvaal Government; and it would have been very different if they had been joined with Europeans commanded by a European, and under the eyes and direction of our Government, as well as of the Transvaal Government. The expediency of having such a police has been recognized by Sir Hercules Robinson and by Lord Kimberley. It would have checked inroads from either side of the frontier line, and would have afforded ample protection to the Natives. At the same time, very decided attempts should have been made to unite the Natives, and settle the questions as to boundary and paramountry, the fruitful causes of their dissensions. The necessity of unity might have been enforced upon them with the greater force, as we should have been protecting them by the frontier police within the Transvaal; and Sir Hercules Robinson, in July, 1882, states that he could, As High Commissioner, select an impartial and independent Commission to undertake such a work. It is not for the Opposition to suggest what should now be done. But I am disposed to think that even now steps might be taken in the direction of establishing a frontier police, either in the Transvaal, with the assent of the Transvaal Government, or outside the frontier, with a Resident, as suggested by Sir Evelyn Wood, in his dissent to the Report of the Commissioners in August, 1881. And attempts should be made to unite the Chiefs and to settle all boundary questions by a well-chosen Commission. No doubt, expense would be incurred; but this country would readily incur it to support their honour and character for loyal observance of engagements. Such a course would not lead to annexation, as the Prime Minister seemed to fear, but the reverse. To secure the unity and independence of Native Chiefs would be the object; and I am not prepared to advocate the permanent protection of the Natives, or the assumption of authority over Native territory. Nor would it lead to war—though one, of course, must be prepared to face this contingency. The extraordinary want of firmness shown by the Government, and the concessions so hastily granted in 1881, may, of course, make the Transvaal Government more inclined to resist; but if even now Her Majesty's Government would be really firm and decided, and show that they were determined to enforce performance of the Convention, I believe the Transvaal leaders would give in. They must know that in the end we should conquer. A war would be expensive to us, but ruinous to them. They would lose the power they have now gained—the freedom of their country would be endangered. I desire to say a few words as to the proposals in the Government Amendment to make "adequate provision for the interests of any Chiefs who may have just claims" upon the Government. This is, to begin with, very vague, and it was rendered still more vague by the answers given from time to time by the Under Secretary to questions put by Members upon, the subject. Adequate provision can only be made in money or land. But is money compensation to be made to the Chiefs only, or to the Tribes as well? It is not only the Chiefs who have suffered; and yet it would seem that they only are to receive money compensation. Then, again, as to locating them elsewhere. If the Chiefs only are to be removed, is it likely that they will be willing to leave their people, their land, and power, greatly diminished though it may be, to become pensioners elsewhere? If the Tribes are to be located elsewhere, where can sufficient land be found? I doubt whether it could be found. But, secondly, even if this policy can be applied to the cases now before us, it cannot be carried out beyond a certain extent. What will the Government do if the Transvaal Government continue to set at naught the Convention? Looking to the action of the Boers in Zululand, and to the one case of dealing with a Native Chief within the border, the Government must face the possibility of further breaches of the Convention, especially if the Transvaal Government know that their action will not be checked. What will the Government do if the Transvaal Government put in force laws against the Natives not sanctioned by Her Majesty? What if they break Articles 12 and 13 of the Convention? Her Majesty's Government must or ought to have made up their minds as to what action they will take in such cases, and the country has a right to know. Compensation must fail in such cases. Are we, then, to remonstrate—to trust to moral influence? Such a policy is not only discreditable and half-hearted, but it must end in failure, and land us in those very troubles which we are anxious to avoid. In truth, there are but two courses to choose between, and any attempt to take an intermediate course will almost certainly fail. One course is to decide to uphold the Convention, to enforce observance of it, and to fulfil our engagements to the Natives. But if the Government finally decide not to enforce the observance of the Convention, but only to trust to moral influence; if they are prepared to stand by and lot these scandalous raids against our Native allies be continued; if they are prepared to lot enforced Treaties with the Natives have practical effect given to them, thus setting at naught the decision of Her Majesty as Suzerain; in short, if they are not prepared to uphold our engagements, even at the risk of hostilities, then we had better adopt at once the other course. We had better clear out of the Transvaal altogether, abandon the Convention, and, alas! the Natives within and without the Transvaal; renounce the Suzeranity, which would in such case not only be a sham, but would make Her Majesty and this country indirectly, if not directly, responsible for the discreditable and cruel action of the Boers. I do not conceal from myself the gravity of taking this course, and the effect it may have in South Africa. It must render our government there more difficult; it may embitter our relations with the Natives in our own Colonies; it will certainly lower us in their eyes and destroy their faith in our honour; it will hamper us in dealing with Natives in Zululand and the Transkei districts, where troubles must be expected. Such a step is not only dangerous, but it is also humiliating. It is probably for the first time in the annals of this country that it has been possible to bring a charge against us of desertion of our allies, and of failure to uphold our engagements, which could not be refuted— Pudet bac opprobria nobis, Et dici potuisse, et non potuisse refelli. But, at all events, we should be relieved from a position which is intolerable; from a moral responsibility for actions which we are not prepared to control, and for outrages which we are not prepared to check. I believe that one of these two courses must be taken. I advocate the more firm and dignified policy of standing by our engagements. I deny that this should be called a war policy. We who advocate this course believe, on the contrary, that it is more likely to prevent than to create hostilities. But even if hostilities should arise, if loss of life and money has to be unfortunately incurred, this country would rather face that loss than abandon principles of which our loyal observance has hitherto earned us the respect of other nations.

MR. E. A. LEATHAM

Mr. Speaker, I do not rise to reply in minute detail to the speech of my hon. Friend who has just sat down (Sir Heny Holland), which was directed chiefly to the Treasury Bench, and to which, therefore, I think the House will expect a reply from the Treasury Bench. But I should like to say a few words in this debate; because I think it important that the Government should know how their policy with regard to the Bechuanas is regarded in the great constituencies of the North, for one of which I am entitled to speak. And this is the more requisite because of the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), who represents another. So far as I can ascertain, there is only one feeling with regard to the proposal to interfere in the last resort by force of arms, and that is, that any such interference under existing circumstances would be a positive prostitution of the resources of the country. Now, we are asked to interfere upon three grounds— Because these Bechuanas are our allies; because we have made the Convention with the Boers; and, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, has added, because if we do not interfere, the settlements of the Missionaries, which are scattered through this country, will be endangered. I think the plea as regards the Missionaries may be dismissed at once. The Missionary possesses no public character whatever. So far as the State is concerned, he is a religious freebooter, filibustering upon the territory of other religions. We all wish him well, because we share his views; but it is his peculiar glory that he goes forth with his life in his hands, and this is not a distinction of which we desire to deprive him. If it be once understood that, wherever the Mission- any chooses to penetrate the Army of England stands behind him, the sooner we double that Army, or pass an Act of Parliament to recall all Missionaries in exposed situations, the better; nor do I think that the cause of Christianity is to be advanced by bloodshed and devastation. But then we are told that these Bechuanas are our Allies, and that it is a base thing to desert your Allies. But what are Allies? I have always understood the definition of Allies to be this— States which have entered into a league for mutual defence. Now, into what, league have we entered with this people? My right hon. Friend himself tolls us that we have made no Treaty with them; and, as regards mutual defence, he tells us further that the country would have scouted the idea of asking military assistance from them. Now, what kind of an alliance is it in which there is not only no league, but no possibility of mutual defence? Yet, if these people were Europeans, if they were bound to us by a solemn Treaty, if they were inarching their forces side by side with ours for common purposes of offence and defence, you could hardly ask more for them than is asked by my right hon. Friend. They are, in fact, friendly Natives; that is all—who have received acts of kindness from us and returned them; and, as friendly Natives, they are proper objects of our sympathy, and of our good offices, when we can render them without too great risk or damage to ourselves; but to say that they have done anything in return for which we ought to go to war on their behalf is about as absurd a travestie of the idea of national obligation as I ever heard. But then we have entered into a Convention with the Boers. The hon. Gentleman who has just spoken almost spoke as though the Convention were with the Bechuanas. If it had been with the Bechuanas, they might have claimed something under it; but since it was with the Boers, and with the Boers alone, surely it is with us to say how far we care to insist upon all its stipulations. But no doubt we shall be told that, when a great country acquires rights by Treaty, the enforcement of those rights becomes a duty. Well, but what if there are other duties which conflict with it? What if we have to make a choice between conflicting duties? And what if the duty which conflicts with this relative duty is the paramount duty of consulting and protecting the interests of those who send us to this House? One would have thought that the use of the word "Suzerainty"—itself a quaint and obsolete term—would have warned hon. Members that any obligations arising under it must be of a somewhat hazy and indefinite character. Whatever it might mean, it certainly did not bind us, for all time, to undertake the whole police of South Africa. Whatever the Convention might mean, it could not bind us to make war again upon the Boers, for the protection of a Black man here and there, when, at the very time of our making it, with all our forces on the spot, we refused to continue a war which was actually in progress for such an object as the retention of a portion of the Empire. We made that Convention not because we had not the means of coercing the Boors, but because we shrank from the consequences of that coercion, because we shrank from the very consequences which my right hon. Friend is labouring to bring upon us. We were not prepared to go on annexing and annexing, we were not prepared to prosecute the policy to which Sir Bartle Frere has given his name; to send British Residents here, and British expeditions there; to fancy every Black man we met either an Ally or a foe; to bolster up one savage at the expense of another, not because we cared a straw for either—but because this perpetual intermeddling in the interminable squabbles of this region of violence enabled us to get a foothold everywhere, and, finally, when the right time came, quietly to absorb everything and everybody. No doubt, when the struggle was over, those who, under the guise of friendship for us, had indulged their tribal or personal animosities, found themselves with very awkward neighbours. Grudge and resentment in that region are very apt to take the form of violence and outrage. But the proper defence against these isolated outrages is an effective combination among those who are threatened with them. And if those who are threatened with them are too supine, or too cowardly, or too jealous of one another to combine, is that any reason why we, who are thousands of miles away, should shed our blood and empty our pockets in order that they may quarrel with impunity? Sir, I rejoice that the Government has resisted the dangerous—I fear I must say the desperate—philanthropy and the ruinous good nature of my right hon. Friend, and I shall certainly vote with them.

LORD JOHN MANNERS

said, he was not sure that the Government would he very grateful for the intervention of the hon. Member who had just spoken in that debate. The hon. Member's charges were directed much more against the Convention of Pretoria than anything else, and his final argument could scarcely find favour with the Government when the hon. Gentleman denounced the Missionaries of this country as freebooters, as filibusters. He wondered what would have been Lord Derby's sensations if ho had heard such a vindication of his policy before he received the influential deputations from the Missionary Societies. The hon. Gentleman said that the unfortunate Bechuanas were not our Allies; it did not matter what Sir Hercules Robinson, or Sir Henry Bulwer, or anybody else said; they were not our Allies, and we were not bound to take any notice of them. Was that the view of the Government when they entered into that Convention? Was that the view of the House when it sanctioned the Convention? Was it intended by the Convention that those friendly tribes were to be subjected to those outrages, that pillage, that decimation which had been inflicted upon them without a finger being raised by the Government in their defence? The only way in which the speech of the hon. Member and other speeches could be justified was by admitting that when the Convention was sanctioned it was necessary to magnify its provisions, and to make it appear that those friendly tribes were not to be disregarded and to suffer the cruelties which had been inflicted upon them, and that the great enterprizes of those Missionaries who were now treated as freebooters were not to be ignored. But now that the Convention was a thing of the past, those independent supporters of the Government asserted that the Convention was a mere agreement between the Boers on the one hand and the British Government on the other, and that the Natives had no concern in it, no right to be protected under it; and it was perfectly lawful and right for the Government, after careful consideration of all the circumstances of the case, to decide on what course they should adopt; and as it would require, according to the Prime Minister, 2,000 men to enforce the Convention, quietly to sot it one side. But the hon. Member went farther, and said that the term "Suzerainty" had no definite moaning, and did not bind us to anything. But in both Houses of Parliament the Government attached great importance to that word. In the House of Lords there was one remarkable speech which would be remembered as long as the English language remained. He referred to the speech of Lord Cairns. To that speech no less a person replied than the Lord Chancellor, and, among other questions, he dealt with that word. But did the Lord Chancellor say, like the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, that the term meant nothing?

MR. E. A. LEATHAM

said, that he had said that under such a term the claims to which we were bound were of a shadowy and indefinite eharacter.

LORD JOHN MANNERS

said, that was not the language of the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor said —?"Suzerainty means nothing if it does not mean that the Suzerain is Lord Paramount to the people who are subject to him." Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would see that that applied to the people of the Transvaal, Boers as well as Natives. But there was a further explanation from the Prime Minister. The term "reserves," said the Prime Minister— The foreign relations as a most important element, because any large portion of the Native interests involves the Natives beyond the frontiers of the Transvaal. Therefore, the whole interests of the Natives beyond the Transvaal wilt be retained in the hands of the British Government. How? "By the retention of the Suzerainty." That was not all. The President of the Board of Trade said— The only thing that remained was the difference between Sovereignty and Suzerainty. Whatever meaning Gentlemen opposite might attach to that difference, he ventured to say that, for all practical purposes, no distinction could be established with reference to our obligations to the loyal settlers and Natives; and full compensation would be exacted for damage, not only actually inflicted upon their lives and properties, but for all damage following upon the war. Thus, the right hon. Gentleman said there was practically no difference be- tween Suzerainty and Sovereignty. Did it not occur to the House that every one of the difficulties which had been pointed out must have been present to the mind of the right hon. Gentleman when he signed this miserable Convention? The right hon. Gentleman reminded them that some 30 years ago he had solemnly warned Lord Grey of the great difficulties he would have to encounter at the Colonial Office in respect of matters connected with South Africa. The right hon. Gentleman made a great point of Lord Grey. His Lordship had, however, responded to the occasion, and, in an admirable letter in The Times of that morning, had given the country the benefit of his deliberate opinion on this subject. In future, he thought the right hon. Gentleman would be a little shy of appealing to the authority of Lord Grey. They were not, it seemed, to consider the Missionaries or the Native Allies. They were to consider nothing, according to the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down, but pounds, shillings, and pence. But was the hon. Gentleman, and were Her Majesty's Ministers, so thoroughly assured that they had considered the pounds, shillings, and pence argument sufficiently in this matter? Were we to set aside all considerations in respect of trade and commerce in South Africa? Were we to set aside the very remarkable documents which appeared in The Times that morning on behalf of the South African Association? He had not had time to verify the figures relating to the exports and imports between South Africa and the United Kingdom during the past year; but he believed they must amount to no less than £12,000,000. That was a consideration which ought to be present to the minds of hon. Gentlemen. He would read a sentence from the document to which he had just referred. The South African Association said— We desire to express our earnest hope that Her Majesty's Government may, at this critical juncture, see the fitness—we had almost said the necessity—of adopting and pursuing a policy of resolute firmness in support of law and order with regard to those who have recently disturbed or attempted to disturb, or who may hereafter in any way attempt to disturb, the public peace in any of the extra-Colonial territories, subject to the Suzerainty of the Queen, which are close to, or border on, Her Majesty's Colonies in South Africa. These eminent merchants appear to re- cognize very clearly the right course which Her Majesty's Government ought to pursue. It seemed to him that in this matter Her Majesty's Government had against them almost every authority to which that House was in the habit of listening. They had heard the right hon. Member for Bradford. They knew what were the opinions of Lord Grey with his long experience. They had just heard the admirable speech of his hon. Friend the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland), and the other day they listened to two most eloquent and stirring speeches from two hon. Members who had had recent experience in South Africa — the noble Lord the Member for Argyllshire (Lord Colin Campbell) and the hon. Member for the North Riding (Mr. Guy Dawnay). And now they had the authority and the earnest advice of the South African Association as to the commercial feeling of that considerable section of the community. What had the Government to sot against this remarkable weight of authority? They had heard the speech of the hon. Member who had just sat down, and they had heard the long and laboured speech of the Prime Minister, which was one continuous plea against the Convention from its inception to the present moment. And now they had to consider what was the policy, or the working called a policy, which Her Majesty's Government proposed for the acceptance of the House. It was extremely difficult to know how they could criticize and lay bare this policy of Her Majesty's Government. It was brought forward in a most inconvenient and almost an un-parliamentary manner. There was an Amendment on an Amendment, and that Amendment was again amended. They hardly knew where they were; but they must look at the speech of the Prime Minister, rather than at the Amendment itself, for the definition of this policy. About three weeks ago Lord Derby received a deputation from a Wesleyan Missionary Institution, and told them that the Government hoped to be able to remove, not only a couple of the Chiefs, but also a number of the people to other territories.

MR. EVELYN ASHLEY

, interposing, said, he was present, and that the noble Lord's remarks had been misreported.

LORD JOHN MANNERS

thought it was a misfortune, in that case, that three weeks had been allowed to elapse before it was contradicted. They were now-given to understand that Lord Derby did not say anything of the kind, and what he really did say remained a mystery. Stripped of verbiage, what did the proposal of the right hon. Gentleman amount to? Instead of the firm vindication of the 18th section of the Convention of Pretoria, we had a miserable attempt to bribe away the Chiefs from their tribes, and to leave the 25,000 Natives to the tender mercies of freebooting and filibustering Boers, and British deserters. Did the right hon. Gentleman really believe that by pensioning off a couple of Chiefs, and leaving their subjects to be plundered or destroyed by these marauders, he had settled this question? As the hon. Member for Midliurst (Sir Henry Holland) had pointed out, a precedent of this sort was certain to be followed. The right hon. Gentleman talked of the difficulty of enforcing the Convention on the West Frontier of the Transvaal; but was the difficulty greater, or the obligation more sacred, in enforcing the Convention on the North Frontier or in the Transvaal itself? There was no portion of the Convention more imperative in the terms of it than this defence of the loyal Natives on the Western Frontier. They might disguise it as they could; they might make what excuses they pleased; but the Convention was as dead as Julius Cæsar. It lay dead on the floor of that House, killed by its authors. Two years ago many Englishmen thought that no nation had ever undergone greater humiliation than was inflicted upon them by the signing of this Convention. They were deceived. Below the lowest depth there was a lower still in the abandonment of the Convention by the Government who made it. He trusted that the House, irrespective of politics, and that hon. Members, on whatever side they might sit, would at least spare this country the further degradation of inscribing upon the Journals of the House the miserable, paltry, pitiful, and huckstering Resolution of the Prime Minister.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN

Sir, the noble Lord has made, as he always makes, an extremely vigorous and somewhat interesting speech; but, if I may venture to gay so, it wanted one thing—a logical conclusion. I have noticed during the whole course of the debate to-day that the cheers of hon. Members opposite have followed upon everything in the speeches which enforced on the Government the duty of going to war in order to maintain the Convention. There was much of that enforcement in the speech to which we have just listened; but when I come to the Resolution for which hon. Gentlemen opposite are going to vote, I find nothing whatever to that effect, and therefore it is perfectly evident that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite are going to make warlike speeches, and are going to pass a peaceful Resolution. If the House inquires what is the reason for this, I think they will find that it is very safe to pass a Resolution to the effect that the Government ought to have gone to war two years ago; but it would not be safe, in the present temper of the constituencies, to support a Resolution that the Government ought to go to war now. There are two issues of very different importance raised in the course of this debate. The first was raised by the hon. and learned Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst), and also by the right hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster, and it is this—What remedy can we find, or ought we to suggest to the consideration of the Government, for the present, or at all events for the recent, state of affairs in Bechuanaland? Both the hon. and learned Member for Chatham and the right hon. Member for Bradford are consistent in entering upon this question, for this is not the first time they have shown an interest in these Native Tribes. After the Prime Minister had replied at length upon this part of the debate, a new issue was raised by the right hon. Baronet the Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), and with equal consistency, for in times past the right hon. Baronet has taken part in the discussion of the affairs of South Africa, but he has not shown any sympathy with Natives who have been subjected to ill-treatment. What the right hon. Baronet wants to do is to apportion, if he may, the blame for the state of things which has arisen; and, above all, to fix it on the shoulders of the Government. I do not deny that this is a matter of considerable interest to the Government; but it is of no importance whatever to the people in Bechuanaland, for whom so much sym- pathy has been expressed. The first of the issues to which I referred is one in which I believe the whole of the House will feel an equal interest. The other is less important, and is a mere incident of Parliamentary strategy. But I will take the less important issue first. The grounds of the accusation against the Government are that they assented, two years ago, to the retrocession of the Transvaal, and that we gave our assent without having first inflicted a sanguinary defeat on the Boers when we had the military power to do so. I do not know why we are called upon to go over that issue again, for we defended ourselves at the time, and I believe we had the great bulk of the country with us. We said then that we retired from the Transvaal when we found that the annexation of the country had been made upon false information, and under the mistaken assumption that the majority of the people desired it. We knew the annexation was in distinct violation of the Sand River Convention, unless it could be shown that the Boers were in favour of it. The hon. Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland) said that if we had retained possession of the Transvaal we should have had with us a considerable portion of the Dutch burghers. But that is absolutely contrary to the information in our possession, contrary to the Report of Sir Garnet Wolseley, and contrary to the inference that may be drawn from the fact that a Petition signed by 7,000 of adult Boer males has been presented against the annexation, and that at a time when the whole number of Whites in the Transvaal was only about 8,000 men. No doubt there were some of the English settlers who preferred British rule; but of the Dutch population I do not believe there was even a fractional percentage who were not absolutely opposed to the annexation. When we discovered these things we asked ourselves what right we had to be there, and it was upon that consideration that we decided to leave the country. As to our duty, under these circumstances, to have continued the war after we had determined to abandon the territory for the purpose of revenge, and to maintain our military prestige, it was, and it is, our opinion that that would have been an act of unparalleled wickedness. But suppose we had remained, what would have happened? Assume we should have defeated the Transvaal Government with the forces which Sir Evelyn Wood had at his disposal, we should have had to maintain a permanent occupation of the country; and it is not certain that we should not have found ourselves faced with a general uprising of the Orange Free State and the whole of the Dutch people. A near relative of a Member of the Cape Government told me the other day that at the time of the retrocession we were within a few weeks of a general uprising of the Dutch population. That would have been a more serious and a greater disaster than any we are now considering. Not only so, but in all probability the Boers would have done what they have done on two previous occasions; they would have resented any attempt to re-establish our hated rule, and they would have once more "trekked" into the wilderness, where we might have once more been tempted to follow them. The difficulties and conflicts with the Native population would have arisen afresh, and we should have had to determine whether or not we would again impose our rule upon these people. I would ask hon. Gentlemen opposite, who take the view that in 1881 we ought to have pressed our rule on the Transvaal, why should they not be consistent? Why do they not put in their Resolution a statement that we ought to go to war now to force our rule on these people? The situation is the same now as it was then. It would be as easy for us to secure the subjugation of the Transvaal now as it would have been two years ago. But they dare not face the difficulty when it is a present difficulty, and they only think it safe to put it in their speeches with reference to past times, with regard to which it can have no practical effect. Then we are asked— "Why did you make this Convention, if you had decided to give up the Transvaal, if you knew that it would not be observed, and if you determined that you would not enforce it?" In the first place, I say we had not at that time determined to exclude altogether the idea of the possible employment of force in order to maintain any portion of the Convention, and we do not exclude it now. The Prime Minister expressly said we reserved all our rights under the Convention; but we also say that we are entitled to consider each circumstance as it arises upon its merits, and to determine, with a full knowledge of all that has happened, whether a particular case is one in which material intervention is desirable or necessary. With regard to the other point, we really have not the gift of prophesy, and we could not have foreseen whether or not the Boers would in every particular observe the Convention; but I will go further and say that I think we had every reason to believe that the Convention would, on the whole, be faithfully observed. We may have been too sanguine. I do not deny it. Recent events have shown that, to some extent, we have been so; but were we wrong to take from the Boers an assurance of their intention to do what we desired them to do, even though it has turned out that the assurance has been insufficient and the guarantees have proved fallacious, and even though, in the present instance, we are not prepared to enforce them by material intervention? I ask hon. Gentlemen distinctly if it is our crime that we have made a Convention which has turned out to be ineffective? I need not ask the question, because that is the charge, and it appears in the Amendment of the right hon. Member for East Gloucestershire (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach). Our position appears to hon. Gentlemen opposite to be very ludicrous. I think they ought to be more considerate to us. [An hon. MEMBER: Why?] We are not the only Government who made a Convention. The late Government also made a Convention. It was a secret Convention. Ours is an open one. In their Convention they took from the Sultan of Turkey certain engagements. They took definite engagements from the Sultan in regard to the good government of the people of Armenia and other Christian subjects. Did they know at the time they made that Convention that it would not be fulfilled? Did they at the time have any intention of enforcing it? They certainly seem to me to have been more sanguine even than we were if they expected it to be fulfilled; and I have proof that they did not intend to enforce it. No step was taken during the time of the late Government for carrying out that Convention. Did right hon. Gentlemen opposite propose a material intervention? Did they propose to go to war to enforce that Convention? Not a bit of it. Did they intend to go to war? No. Because Lord Salisbury has declared publicly — it is one of the charges brought against us—that we have alienated our old Ally by a threat of Imperial intervention in order to force him to carry out that Convention. I say that, under these circumstances, ludicrous as our position appears to be to hon. Gentlemen opposite, it is not half so ludicrous as the position of those hon. and right hon. Gentlemen themselves. And those who live in glass houses should not be so ready to throw stones. Now, if the House was to get at the real cause of the position in which we find ourselves they must not stop at the time of the making of the Transvaal Convention. They must go back a good deal further. They must go back further even than the late Government; but for my present purpose it is enough to go back to the late Government, and I say our position is due to their policy of meddlesome intervention in all parts of the world. That policy led to the annexation of the Transvaal. It led subsequently to the Zulu War, and the war with Secocoeni, and it destroyed the power of the only Native Chiefs who were capable of holding their own against the Boors. I come now to the more important issues that have been raised; and they are, What are the remedies for the present state of affairs? And lot me say, in the first place, that in this branch of the subject there seems to be a very general agreement amongst all who have spoken. They have agreed that these Chiefs have been lately very hardly used, that they are the victims of oppression and tyrannical injustice. We are agreed that these two Chiefs have special claims upon Her Majesty's Government. I do not admit that these claims arise out of the fact that they have been our Allies. I do not admit that they arise out of the fact that we have made a Convention with the Boers; but they do arise out of the distinct pledges which have been given to them by the officials of Her Majesty's Government. Then, I am afraid, we must say of the Transvaal Government that in reference to this matter they have either been unable or unwilling, or both unable or unwilling, to restrain these outrages. The only reason why the Prime Minister has made the alteration in his Amendment which caused so much confusion to the hon. Ba- ronet the Member for Midhurst (Sir Henry Holland) is that he did not think it fair to ask the House to commit itself to the proposition that the Transvaal Government were unable to restrain these outrages. They may have been; but we have no information to enable us to speak with confidence. They may have been unable and unwilling; but their unwillingness may be due solely to their inability. I go one step further, and say that I think we are all agreed that, in the course of these proceedings, the Transvaal Government have violated the spirit, and I think also the letter, of the Convention. It will be observed that I have admitted a great deal; but still, in the interests of the truth, do let us try to establish the actual circumstances of the case. Do not let us be led away by our sympathies for people who have been injured, and over-estimate their case or exaggerate their claims. As the Blue Books show, there is a good deal to be said on the other side. Let us take the case of Mankoroane. He has been continually at loggerheads with the Transvaal Government or the inhabitants of the Transvaal. He has also been periodically engaged in opposition to the other Chiefs; but his recent troubles began in 1881. He was then attacked by a Chief called Massouw, who set up a claim as to the permanent Chieftainship of the tribe. Massouw was assisted, as I am inclined to think, by the White Volunteers, and these were paid according to the policy which had been adopted— and, over and over again, winked at by the English Government—by our own Colonists; half by booty and half by a farm to be allotted to them, in the enemy's country. It has sometimes been said that the reason why these people have been attacked is because they are the faithful Allies of the English. That is clearly not the case, because these difficulties arose many years before the war in the Transvaal. But it is also shown not to be the case, because these volunteers are not entirely volunteers of the Transvaal State. They are volunteers from the Orange Free State, from Griqualand West, and from the Cape Colony. The real fact is that all these men are animated by self-interest, and by a particular kind of land hunger which seems to exist to an aggravated extent amongst the Dutch popula- tion of South Africa. On the 14th of September, 1880, Sir Bartle Frere wrote to Mankoroane, saying—"If he obeys orders, he may rely on every reasonable support." That is a claim which I think those Chiefs can establish, and which we are bound to acknowledge. The only orders which they did receive were to keep quiet, not to attack the Boors, and to shelter any refugees who might seek refuge in their territory. No doubt they did obey these orders. This message of Sir Bartle Frere to Mankoroane was not communicated at the time to the British Government or approved by them. At the same time, we are bound to consider the action of our officials. If it had been communicated to us, if we had any voice whatever in the matter, I certainly do not think that we, or any Government, would have agreed to give an unqualified promise to support Chiefs such as those of whom I am speaking. What is the history of Mankoroane? Only two years before the pledge of support in 1878, Colonel Warren wrote accusing him of Pertinacious harbouring of rebels, and while holding out one hand to us, he has been assisting our enemies with the other. In fact, his conduct was so suspicious that Colonel Warren established a kind of protectorate over his country, which probably would have led to annexation if Colonel Warren's action had not been very wisely repudiated by the late Government. Surely a man of this kind, who, only two years before, was playing this double part, is not exactly the kind of man to whom unqualified support under all circumstances ought to be given. I do not think the pledge of support, although it is a strong one, is to be interpreted as being an unqualified pledge. We were to give him "every reasonable support." That does not mean that we are to support him with the whole force of the British arms whenever he gets into trouble, whether right or wrong. Surely a pledge of that kind entitles us to consider the circumstances under which he got himself into difficulties. In the Blue Book it will be found— As regards the war between Massouw and Mankoroane, the latter is to blame for its commencement. Again, in a subsequent letter— Mankoroane commenced the war with Massouw, without sufficient reason, relying on the assistance of the British Government should he be defeated. Now, I turn to the case of Montsioa. In Ills case, as in the case of Mankoroane, recent difficulties cannot be said to have arisen out of the Transvaal War, because it appears from the Papers that Montsioa bad been in contest with the Boers, more or less, during the last 30 years, since the Sand River Convention; and at one time he was so badly beaten that he was driven away from the territory, and only came back afterwards in consequence of the Keate Award. The latest disturbances arose in 1875. Montsioa says the difficulties arose when Matchabi stole two of his horses. He was a subordinate Chief, but under allegiance to Moshette. This chapter of the struggle was closed in 1881; and I desire to call the attention of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) to the account given in the Blue Book, and the result of the final struggle in this contest. It there appears that Montsioa made a treacherous attack by night upon the kraal of Matchabi, when he killed 71 men and burned alive 12 women and children, afterwards mutilating the dead, cutting the heart out of one man's body, and skinning six other men. These, my right hon. Friend says, are not savages. I should like to know what definition of civilization and Christianity my right hon. Friend would propose which would include those who flayed men and burned women and children as ordinary incidents? What I wish to ask is this— Are these people, whose past history I have described, whose actions are common enough amongst all savage people, are they the kind of people in whose intertribal disputes we are bound to interfere, and for the settlement of which we are bound to expend the life of a single soldier, or expend a single pound of British taxation? I confess it seems to me that anyone who has studied these proceedings will come to the conclusion that while we are bound to recognize some reasonable claim for support, it would not be reasonable, practical, or expedient that we should acknowledge a claim to send an Army for the protection of these people, who have been defeated in their struggle. I come now to consider the conduct of the Transvaal Government. I have already pointed out that the Transvaal Government are not alone concerned in this matter. These freebooters, according to the Report of Mr. Hudson, consist of British deserters and volunteers of the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony; and when the English Government appealed to the Orange Free State and the Capo Colonists to join with them and the Transvaal to send a police force to clear the country, it was not the Transvaal Government only that refused, but the Orange Free State and our own Colony. There is no use blinking the fact that the opinion of the Dutch population, which constitutes the majority of the Cape, is altogether opposed to what they consider the sentimental and humanitarian views of this House and Her Majesty's Government. I only mention this because it seems to mo to afford some kind of excuse, if the Transvaal Government have been unable to fulfil their obligations, when we find in the Cape Colony an objection to join us in attempting to keep order. Now, in what way have the Transvaal Government broken the Convention? Clause 19 says that the Transvaal Government undertakes to do its utmost to resist encroachment across the Border. I find it very difficult to say that the Transvaal Government has done its best to resist these encroachments; and, therefore, I admit, as a matter of opinion—which cannot be absolutely demonstrated—that I think the Transvaal Government have broken the spirit of the Convention. But they have gone further, for they have, in some degree, broken also its letter. They have not paid their Debt; but, on the other hand, they have done more than some debtors do—they have paid the interest upon it; so I do not think that one would consider that was a very serious infringement. They have also taken a different title for their State from that which was authorized by the Convention; but that is not an important matter. But what is more important is that they did enter into negotiations, in direct contravention of the Convention, with those two Chiefs for the cession of all their territory. I understand their view of the matter is that, although they concluded the cession, that they did so subject to confirmation by the Suzerain authority. It seems that they had no right to enter into negotiation except through Her Majesty's Representative. When complaint was made of this and other matters, there is no doubt that they replied in a manner which was not at all diplomatic. I say, with reference to all this, it raises a very important question, which was adverted to, in the course of the last debate, by the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill). He pointed out, and I think with great force of reason, that this Convention, like most Conventions, is a bi-lateral and reciprocal agreement; that it involves obligations that we have undertaken, as well as imposed obligations on the Transvaal; and that, while, on the one hand, we have a right, as long as the Convention subsists, to call upon the Transvaal authorities to restrain their subjects from encroachments beyond the Border, on the other hand, if the circumstances prior to the annexation should reproduce themselves, and the Natives should unite and prove to be too strong for the Transvaal authorities, the Transvaal would have some claim upon us to support them. Therefore, it may well be— if the Transvaal authorities show themselves to be unable, or prove to be unwilling, to carry out their part of the Convention—it may well be matter for consideration, as the hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst has said, whether we should not withdraw from it altogether. [Sir HENRY HOLLAND: I did not say so.] The hon. Baronet did not say so; but lie said we have only two alternatives, and if we did not take the course he preferred we must take the other. It may well be, I say, that we may consider whether we should not withdraw the privileges which we have conceded, if we find ourselves unable to secure the fulfilment of the obligations we have imposed. The question, therefore, is, what is to be done? My right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) says—"You must make remonstrances. They must be serious remonstrances, and you must convince the Transvaal of your intention to carry them through;" and he does not hesitate to say that, if remonstrances made in these circumstances are neglected, then you must seek by force to establish your authority and protect your Allies. The hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. R. N. Fowler) spoke in language equally strong. He says we ought to take a decided line, and vindicate the power of England. Until the hon. Baronet the Member for Midhurst spoke, I thought it rather a singular thing that only two Members who were in favour of a policy of war were two hon. Members whose proud boast it is to be descended from men whose distinguishing characteristic was their love of peace. The right hon. Member for Bradford spoke very slightingly of the difficulty. He said he believed it had been altogether exaggerated. I must point cut to him that it does not turn upon the extent of the difficulty, or on the cost of fulfilling our obligations. He does not urge us to go to w7ar because the war would be cheap and easy; but ho talks of it as an inevitable position from which we cannot with honour escape, and, whether it be costly or not, we are bound equally to undertake it. That it will be costly is a point upon which I can entertain no doubt. At all events, no responsible Government is entitled to go to war on the assumption that the war will be cheap and inexpensive. I will put the matter in another way. I am inclined to admit, upon the evidence at present before us, we have got what is called a casus belli. We have got as good a case as we have had for most of the wars we have been engaged in—quite as good as for those wars referred to the other day in a public speech, by which, by the expenditure of countless millions of money, we are said to have secured the blessings of the Protestant Succession. But having got a cause of war, I say that we are bound to go further, and before we go to war we should ask whether the result of the war will be at all adequate to the sacrifices we are called upon to make. These sacrifices may be almost illimitable, and the result would be altogether inadequate. There are no Imperial interests at stake in those miserable quarrels, and I do not believe even the Natives—our sympathies for whom and whose claims upon us are really the only ground upon which war could be advocated—I do not believe they can benefit by our interference. Whoever gains, they always suffer, like the dwarf in his alliance with the giant. I do not hesitate to say, and I think a similar statement will be found in the Papers, on the authority of Sir Hercules Robinson and some other officials, that it would, on the whole, have been very much better if we had told them in the past that we would have nothing whatever to do with them, and let them manage their own affairs, and fight their own battles. They are not, as the Natives in New Zealand, a decaying race, that required protection if they are to be maintained in existence at all, although our protection of the Natives in New Zealand is not a thing which can be appealed to with pride. In the case of these Natives they are continually increasing upon us. They will be the great difficulty of our colonization. They were the great difficulty of the Transvaal State before the annexation. If these Chiefs cannot rely upon us to interfere in their quarrels, if they should unite their forces, I have no doubt that their enormous superiority of numbers would be able to obtain fair, just, and equitable treatment from their oppressors. What I have endeavoured to do is not unduly to minimize our responsibilities, and I have endeavoured not to exaggerate them unduly. I say I admit that we have come under obligation, and I say that we are bound to do all we reasonably can to meet that obligation. We propose to meet it if it be the desire of the Chiefs—if the Chiefs cannot come to satisfactory terms—by offering to them either a money compensation or compensation in land. We offer it to the Chiefs and their personal followers. We do not offer it to the tribes at large. The tribes at large in these two cases number 50,000 people—more than the whole White population of the Transvaal. The reason we do not offer anything to the tribes is because with the tribes we have come under no personal obligation. The pledges are made to the Chiefs, and not to the people. [" Oh!" and "The 18th Article."] The 18th is the Article which declares the duties of the Resident. There is no pledge given to the Natives in that Article. The thing is absurd. The Convention was between the Boers and the English Government, and the Natives were no parties to it. Our position is similar to our position the other day with regard to the Khedive of Egypt, when the Governments of England and France gave a pledge that if he would follow our advice we would stand by him and keep him on his Throne; but that could not be interpreted as a pledge to stand by his people, but a personal pledge which bound us to the Khedive. If we had been unable to defend the Khedive he might have had a claim upon us for some alternative compensation; but not so the people of Egypt. In like manner as regards the Bechuanas, our offer is made to the Chiefs, but not to their followers, because we have given no pledge to the people at large. But I go further, and say the Government do not propose to give any compensation to the people, because the Government very much doubt whether the people have any material interest in the matter. To them, whether their superiors are the Transvaal Government or the Chiefs, it means only a change of masters, and very cruel masters some of those Chiefs have often proved themselves to be. There is no evidence that the Natives are being, on the whole, badly treated by the Boers of the Transvaal. Their numbers have largely increased by immigration into the Transvaal since the Boers have held the government of that State; and there is no reason to state, at the present time, at all events, that if the Boers were to take possession of this territory of Montsioa and Mankoroane, that the Natives under their rule would be any worse off than they are present. The head men would lose their privileges and lose their income. To them we have given a personal pledge, and to them, therefore, we admit that we are under some obligation. That is the extent of the obligation that we admit, and that is the way we will endeavour to fulfil it. But one thing we will not do. We will not suffer ourselves to be tempted, either by the taunts and jeers of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, or by the crusading enthusiasm of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bradford—we will not be tempted by either the one or the other to enter into a war, the responsibilities and the consequences of which may be absolutely incalculable; a war which, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for East Gloucestershire said, nobody in the country wants, and a war which, under these circumstances, would be altogether without justification.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

said, that the general effect produced on his mind by the speech of the President of the Board of Trade was that the Government were going, after all, to continue in the policy which they had followed for the last two years, and do nothing at all. The more he regarded the present question, the more he felt that the embarrassments of the present time were entirely owing to the action of the Government in 1881. They must not forget that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. K Forster) was responsible for the Convention, as a Member of the Cabinet at the time; and he (Mr. Herbert), at any rate, thought that under that Convention we were bound to protect those Natives. He could not, however, for the life of him, make out what the opinion of the Government really was in regard to that question. In the latter part of his speech, the President of the Board of Trade apparently tried to get out of any obligations—and, he was bound to say, he had considerable difficulty in doing it—that we might have incurred to these unfortunate people. The Boers on the Border had been attacking the Native Chiefs, had seized their land, had murdered them, and done everything it was possible to think of contrary to the Convention; and yet all that Mr. Hudson had to offer the Chiefs, in answer to their earnest appeal, was the moral support of the British Government, which, under the circumstances, was of about as much value as the credit of a bankrupt. No wonder Montsioa and Mankoroane were driven to despair. It was true that there were two Members of the Volksraad among those marauding parties; and yet, when this fact was brought to the knowledge of the Transvaal Government, they treated our representations, from first to last, with the most studied contempt. On the first occasion, they denied the fact after proof had been given to them; on the second occasion, they said they could not inquire into the matter because they had a grievance against us—a preposterous grievance—which took up all their energies; and the third time they attempted to bring up a case which could bear no possible parallel to the case we had against them. He could not understand why the Government should want to move any Amendment to the Resolution of the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chatham (Mr. Gorst). He could not conceive how he could hamper them. He should rather think a strong Resolution carried by the House of Commons would be a powerful weapon in their hand with which to deal with the Transvaal Government. He could not help thinking that the British Government had been carefully assisting the Transvaal Government to make this claim. The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies had advised the House not to act upon the unregulated impulses of humanity; but what length of time did the Government require for regulating their impulses?— for these outrages were reported to them 12 months ago, and they had done nothing since. He was not sure that the inaction of the Government was not as much the cause of the outrages that had been perpetrated by the Boers upon the Natives as the conduct of the Transvaal Government itself had been. The statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer the other night that the Transvaal War was a legacy left to the present Government by the late Government was a most monstrous one. The war had been declared by the present Government, and it had been the subject of a remarkable paragraph in a Speech from the Throne. It must be recollected that this was not the first difficulty that had been encountered in respect of our Colonies. As long as we maintained our Colonies in all parts of the world such difficulties were certain to arise. In the past other Governments had had to meet them, and in the future other Governments would have to meet them; and they had been, and would have to be, dealt with in a statesmanlike manner. Her Majesty's Government, however, had failed to meet this difficulty in such a manner; and if they continued in their present course they would leave a most unfortunate legacy to their Successors. In conclusion, he deprecated our leaving to the vengeance of the Boers those whose only crime was that they had been too loyal to England.

MR. GOSCHEN

Sir, I rise on this occasion not in any spirit of controversy, because I regard the issues before the House as so grave, and as so much involved, that we ought to try and discourage controversy with regard to them as much possible, in order that we may face the difficulties connected with them as firmly as possible. That the issues involved do raise difficulties, I am sure will be acknowledged by hon. Members on both sides of the House. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade has considerably advanced this discussion by pointing to two possible courses which might have been adopted with regard to this matter be- sides that to which Her Majesty's Government is committed in the future. The right hon. Gentleman indicates, in the first place, that Her Majesty's Government reserves the question of the right to use force for the protection of the Natives; and, in the second place, he points to the possibility of the withdrawal of our Resident, and the cancelling of the Convention. I trust that I do not misinterpret his remark when I say that he has suggested those two possible alternatives. Every hon. Member who has taken part in this debate has felt himself called upon to state the issues which he believes are involved by the Motion before the House, and the Amendments to it which have been placed upon the Paper. I would venture to add to the number of those issues, and to say that this Motion involves the whole question of what is to be the action of this country in the future in dealing with the Native Races in South Africa. I think that it is time that this country should make up its mind whether it intends to follow the policy of protecting the Native Races in that part of the world, or whether it intends to follow the opposite policy, which is said to be popular among certain Members of the Liberal Party— that of strict non-intervention. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade has said that no questions of Imperial polity are involved in this miserable tribal dispute. With that remark, however, I cannot entirely concur. The question which we have to face is, what attitude England will take in the future in the great struggle that is going on in this part of the world between the Native Races and the White Colonists. That struggle is an historical one at the Cape, and it is one with which past Governments have always had to deal, and it is one with which future Governments will have to deal. The right hon. Gentleman has spoken of the possibility of the Native Races, if left to themselves and untrammelled by the intervention and the protection of England, becoming numerous, strong, and prosperous, and, therefore, able to hold their own against the Whites. But if this possibility should become a reality, is it not also possible that difficulties may arise between the Natives and the White populations in which we may be called upon to protect the Whites against the Natives in the same way as we are now called upon to protect the Blacks against the Whites? On this subject we ought not to drift on holding up one principle this year and another the next. If we were to adopt that course we should find ourselves landed in all manners of humiliations and difficulties, and sometimes in enormous and most difficult enterprises. Therefore it is that I venture to submit that we have before us more than the mere consideration whether one or two Chiefs should be compensated. The tone of this debate must decide once for all what is to be our attitude in the future on the great question I have referred to. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, in dealing with the past, spoke of two questions—that relating to the annexation of the Transvaal, and that relating to its abandonment after the defeat of Majuba Hill. With regard to the annexation of the Transvaal, the right hon. Gentleman stated, as I have often seen it stated before, that the Liberal Party consented to it because they were ignorant of the real state of affairs, and because they had been misinformed with reference to the wishes of the Boers on the subject. That was one motive for not resisting the proposal of the Conservatives at the time; but it is a matter of history that the Liberal Party, or a large number of Members of that Party in the House, were animated in consenting to the annexation by another circumstance. They resisted many attempted annexations; but why did the Liberal Party not throw itself more into resistance on this occasion? It was because they believed that the Boers were not doing justice to the Native population. [Opposition cheers, and "No!"] I really think it is a position which can scarcely be attacked. There are individual Members who voted on other grounds; but the Liberal Party had always been anxious for the protection of the Native Races, and they saw that on this occasion there was an opportunity of substituting for the rule of the Boers —which, in their opinion, was unjust and cruel, and was driving the Natives from their homes—a better government, w?hich would be more just, and would secure the rights of the Native population; and I maintain that, whether rightly or wrongly, that was one of the reasons why the Liberal Party consented to the annexation of the Transvaal. I wish now to refer for a moment to an unfortunate business. I think Her Majesty's Government are right in their assertion that when defeat had overtaken our arms, the country approved of the magnanimity with which the Government retraced their steps. ["Hear, hear!" and "No, no!"] I believe so, and I am only stating my opinion. The majority of the country take that view. ["No!" and cheers.] But I shall add to this remark that it is a dangerous thing, and one that cannot often be repeated, for a Power like England to retreat in the face of Native populations. We cannot combine the consciousness of this sincere magnanimity with the maintenance of that predominance in the minds of Native populations, and of countries like that of the Boors, which alone will insure that legitimate influence for the doctrines which we hold, and that pacifying and civilizing and Christianizing influence which we hope to exercise over the Native populations in all parts of the world. We have lost some of our influence; that cannot be denied. And we cannot forget that the British Agent now in Pretoria is the Agent of a Power that was beaten by the Boers. The country must make up its mind with respect to this Convention, about which I shall presently say a word. It is a question of our power—not to annex countries for our own interests, but to maintain that influence which has served, not so much the interests of this country, as those of the civilized world. Now, Sir, I come to the Convention. I am not sure whether, if the proposition were made to this House that that Convention should be cancelled, it would not be passed by a large majority. One thing, I trust, may be the case—either that the Convention may soon be cancelled, or that the attitude and relations between this country and the Boers may be put upon a different footing from that which is contained in the Blue Book which we have had the pain to read. Now, what is the frontispiece, if I may so speak, to this Blue Book? It is a Petition from the Congregational Union of England and Wales—a Petition to this effect—that the Assembly of the Congregational Union recognize with great alarm that the Boers threaten to ruin all that has been done by civilization and charity in that land. The Assembly of tin; Congregational Union also pray that the Government shall take such steps as shall effectually put a stop to such a state of things, on the ground that it is as inconsistent with the pledged word of England as it is with the welfare and progress of the Bechuana Natives. That is what we publish as the frontispiece of the Blue Book, which is followed up by showing the actual value of the policy of having a Resident to carry out the provisions of the Convention to which allusion is made. Now, Sir, I do not blame the Congregational Union; but I should blame, if it were not presumptuous to do so, the public of this country if in one year they speak in this way, and in a different tone when the moment comes for insisting upon the Convention. Let us throw our minds back. I can assure hon. Members on this side of the House that I do not desire to say anything disagreeable to the Government or to hon. Members on this side of the House; but I speak as I do in order that in the future they may not incur these great difficulties by at one time insisting that there shall be a Convention for the protection of the Native population, and that the country shall do its duty by taking such measures as shall protect the Native population, and then, two years afterwards, speaking of the impossibility of carrying it out. It must be admitted that the country, which was warm for protection of the Natives two years ago, and would have blamed the Government unless they had made the Convention, would now be perfectly content if that Convention was withdrawn, and our Resident at Pretoria removed. If these are the fluctuations of opinion, it appears to me that we may be landed in the future in serious difficulty. I do entreat this House, and I entreat all who blush to read of the ineffectual attempt of the Representative of the Crown to get justice, not from a foreign nation, but from a country of which the Queen is Suzerain, to bear these facts in mind. Then, I say, let us take care that we may not be led up to a situation of this kind by provisions that have afterwards been thrown aside. Let the country not indulge in national humbug. Let us either be non-interventionists or follow the traditions of the past. Now, Sir, the question is, what is to be done? My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade has spoken of the manner in which it is proposed to deal with the Chiefs. That is a question for the moment. We may get over the difficulty as regards these Chiefs. But I confess I should find it difficult to reconcile with the whole attitude previously taken by this country action now confined to the protection which is to be given to the Chiefs. I understand that the Government will support the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright), with the addition of words to the effect that, in the absence of effectual restraint upon crime and outrage in Bechuanaland, the House trusts that the Government will make provision for the interests of the Chiefs who had just claims on them. Now, Sir, looking to the fact that the Convention established our right, and many persons think also our duty, to intervene in the affairs of the Native population—that it was the very object of the Convention to give us such rights, it is not wise to adopt the Preamble which the Prime Minister has prefixed. I am quite prepared to admit that we should confine ourselves to absolutely unavoidable obligation. But I am not prepared, in a Preamble, to say that we are driven to this position on account of the difficulties of intervention. The difficulties are great. But, as has been pointed out, these difficulties exist, not from anything that has arisen since the Convention, but are inherent to the situation of having to intervene in Native affairs at all. The President of the Board of Trade must excuse me if I say that I cannot agree with his language "miserable tribal disputes." The question is not so much whether we entered into a contract towards the Native population as whether we did not contract a duty towards this country to intervene in Native affairs if they required our intervention. I think it is too late for my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield (Mr. E. A. Leatham) now to minimize our obligations two years after the Convention has been in existsnce. That ought to have been done when the Convention was framed. But, Sir, with regard to these unavoidable obligations, how far can they be carried out? My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade wisely, I think, would not exclude the possibility of a resort to force, and he also said that the alternative will have to be considered as to withdrawal from the Convention. But he added that the Convention was bi-lateral, and if the Boers did not execute their part of the Convention it was no part of the duty of Her Majesty's Government to maintain the privileges conferred on the Boers by that Convention. But I know of no privileges conferred by that Convention upon the Boers beyond the high privilege of retaining the Queen as their Suzerain; and I scarcely think there is a single Boer who will not be willing to forfeit that privilege on the first opportunity. I only beg and entreat the Government that they will soon make up their minds whether or not it will be right to withdraw our Resident from Pretoria and to abandon the Suzerainty. I do not consider that we need compromise our attitude towards the Native population by such a course. It appears to mo that experience has shown that the action of the Government is more hampered by the peculiar provisions of the Convention than facilitated by them; and that without them we should be in a better position, both with regard to the Boers and the Native population, and that the Natives would be able more effectually to face the Boers than they are at present. We undertook the liability that the Natives should not be supplied with ammunition, and yet we talk of their uniting to resist the Boers. Again, our Resident has interfered to prevent the Native Tribes from coming to agreements with the Transvaal Government. In this he was doing his duty under the terms of the Convention. It was his duty to see that no Treaties were made between the tribes and Boers, and he stopped a Treaty that was being negotiated; but it is clear that his action, if we now abandon the tribes, has aggravated the position of those tribes, instead of meeting the very object which it was the mission of the Resident to fulfil— namely, to protect the Black population against the aggressive tendencies of the Dutch and other White Colonists. I am bound to say I think that unless there is a great clearance in the air, and unless the relations between Her Majesty's Representative at Pretoria and the Transvaal change very much indeed during the next two or three months, Her Majesty's Government will find some difficulty in passing the salary of that official when it comes forward in our Civil Service Estimates. I cannot con- ceal that it is this which appears to me to be an infinitely more important question than the particular treatment of the two Chiefs. The relations of the Representative of the English Government and the Transvaal are not satisfactory; but are they tolerable, and can they be endured? Can we allow the Native populations to see the impotence of the Representative of the Queen? Can such a state of things continue? I do not think it is necessary to drive either Her Majesty's Government or any of those who speak in this debate to face the alternative either of war or drawing back. We may draw back; but if we should draw back from Pretoria I trust Her Majesty's Government will be clear, and that the Liberal and the Conservative Parties will also be clear on this point—that we do not abandon the doctrine which has been held for so many years by this country, that where the English flag has once been raised we cannot shake off a certain responsibility towards the Native populations around us. If we do withdraw, I presume that we shall withdraw to Natal; and notwithstanding a debate of this kind, and notwithstanding the view put forward by influential men and by the sincere Representatives of some popular constituencies that it would be better to withdraw altogether—that doctrine will not, I believe, be ultimately held by the English people. I believe that when the moment of peril comes this country will assert the old doctrine. If the people of this country prefer that the Native populations should — I will not say stew in their own juice—but stew in the juice which their neighbours may prepare for them —if the people of this country will endure that, I trust they may persuade the public once for all to decide on that policy; but that on no account we may drift between these two currents of opinion, for if we thus drift, we are sure to be planted in the midst of difficulties, humiliation, and disaster.

MR. STUART-WORTLEY

said, he could have wished that the debate was not to so great an extent foredoomed to be unprofitable in its results. No doubt the subject they were discussing was one of importance to civilization. But it was little that they could do by talking of their helpless humiliation and their impotence in the presence of wrongs which Ministers themselves described as a disgrace to humanity. But whose fault was it that the position was humiliating? At least, they could place that on record. He understood that the latest development of the defence of the Government was that the obligations we incurred under the Convention were not towards the Black population, but towards the Chiefs in their personal capacity. That argument could avail the Government only if it were a dynastic guarantee that we had given; but our obligation was nothing of the kind. If, moreover, we were entitled to repudiate our obligations on that ground, Foreign Powers might repudiate every Treaty obligation on the plea that the Treaty had been entered into by the Head of the State. If the Natives remained in the territories of the Chiefs to whom we had given a guarantee, there could be little doubt that they would disappear by a process which was euphemistically called absorption. As to the analogy with the Turkish Convention, we had a hold over the Sultan that we had not over the Transvaal; for the Sultan knew that when the day of reckoning came, if he had not carried out reforms, we were not bound to defend him against Russia. There was little probability that we should ever be called on to defend the Transvaal against the Natives. What had been said about our incurring these illimitable responsibilities was fallacious, because north of these territories was a pestilential one, on which no permanent settlement could be made by man or beast. If the bad character of the Chiefs was a reason for not keeping our obligations, it was also a reason for not entering into them. The President of the Board of Trade asked the Opposition to blame the Government for not going to war two years ago. But that was the very thing they did. They claimed credit for the retrocession on the ground that they believed the annexation was against the will of the inhabitants; but when did they arrive at that conclusion? Was it before they went to war; or did the conviction become mature during the campaign? Very craftily the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies kept before their minds the fact that if they wished to do anything at all the only things they could do were either to go to war with the Boers, or else to make a virtual annexation of Bechuanaland. The Under Secretary of State knew he was sure of a cheer if he turned round to below the Gangway and asked—"Do you want to go to war, or do you want virtual annexation of this new territory?" His Friends below the Gangway on that side cared not what happened to these unhappy negroes, while they sat at ease, cheering the old platitudes about peace and non-intervention. But whose fault was it that they had before them none but these singularly odious alternatives? It was the fault of those who, by surrendering the Transvaal to the Boers, had made possible again these insolent and criminal practices of which the Boers, by common consent, had been convicted. The Under Secretary of State for the Colonies know equally well that he was sure of a cheer from the same quarter when ho said—"We annexed the Transvaal, and the country wisely undid that." But if there was one thing that was made absolutely clear by the present deplorable state of affairs, it was that they would not be in their present galling position if it had not been for this surrender, winch reversed the annexation. He was not concerned to defend the annexation. Mr. Grant Duff, whose knowledge of the subjects he took up was at least as great as that of his Successors at the Colonial Office, spoke in the House of the annexation as a thing which would become some day inevitable; and, although he disapproved of the manner and the time of carrying it out, he was content to accept it, so far as a man did who said of any act—Fieri non debuit factum valet. Only the week before the commencement of this debate, the period of British rule in the Transvaal had been described from the Treasury Bench as the only interlude that that country had enjoyed for 25 or 30 years of lawlessness and strife. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster) wrote to the papers in January, 1880, a letter which showed but little disposition to complain of the annexation, for he urged that if we were to consider what was to become of the country we had annexed, we ought to remember that there were 10 negroes in the Transvaal to one White man, and reminded his readers that the Boers' ideas of Native policy were not much in accordance with the usual ideas of justice and humanity. Whether the an- nexation was wrong or right, ho (Mr. Stuart-Wortley) repeated that it was not the annexation which had led to these troubles, but that they had been brought about by the surrender, which reversed the annexation. The surrender was forced on the Government by successful rebels. He ventured to doubt whether any rebellion would have followed the annexation if it had not been for the Prime Minister's ill-considered declaration in Mid Lothian that he would repudiate our acquisitions in the Transvaal. The Prime Minister had put on those words a peculiar construction of his own. Taxed with them in his (Mr. Stuart- Wortley's) presence in that House, the right hon. Gentleman laboured to show that repudiation of an act meant no more than a wish that it had not been done. So it might, with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister found it convenient to forget that to repudiate a Treat}' or an obligation did not mean to confine yourself to a wish that the Treaty had not boon made. Nothing could be clearer than that the chief element in the meaning of the words of the Prime Minister was the undoing of something which had been done. They were not, however, concerned with the Prime Minister's own interpretation of his own words; but what they had to look at was the effect which they would probably have when translated into Dutch by persons who read English in its ordinary and accepted sense. Who could then wonder that the Boers looked forward to an undoing of the annexation, and that, finding a Liberal Government slow in undoing it, thought they would precipitate events? It was, he repeated, the surrender of the Transvaal itself, led up to by the Prime Minister's rash speech, that had brought on the present troubles. He thought that the House had been much edified by the cynicism which had told them that "Statesmen cannot afford to yield in every case to the natural impulses of humanity," and that those who had responsibility were not bound to follow every unregulated impulse. He supposed it was because the Prime Minister had no responsibility that his love for the Bulgarians was an "impulse of humanity;" and, of course, now that ho was Prime Minister, ho would, if ho were to show any practical sympathy for the victims of the Boers, be yielding to a mere "unregulated im- pulse." After all, Her Majesty's Ministers were human, and it was not difficult to conjecture why they allowed themselves to enter into this dishonourable and cynical Convention. Hon. Members were told that the Liberal Party-were bound to take the broader view of this subject than those who were on the spot. The Liberal Leaders had to consider their unfortunate utterances whilst in Opposition; and could hon. Members, therefore, wonder if they said to themselves—"We will make a Convention that shall talk about the rights of the Natives, that will please the Anti-Slavery Society and the Aborigines' Protection Society. Our Convention shall exact all sorts of terms, of which the peaceful enforcement shall be impossible, and the Peace Society will then applaud our refusal to enforce them. The Boer's facility for Biblical quotations, and his amiable habit of accompanying his atrocities by the singing of Psalms, will commend and endear all our concessions to that piety which is the backbone of Liberalism, and the consciences of Liberal Jingoes shall be quieted by the reservation of a Suzerainty to the Queen." This same Suzerainty was not the least unfortunate part of the arrangement. It made them morally responsible for all that the Boers might choose to do. The Government had practically abandoned territory and power, as well as humanity and principle. Why should Suzerainty be retained? Could it be intended to retain it in order that the fair name of England should be sullied by association with robbery and aggression? Nor was that all. Actually it was proposed that the taxpayer of this country should pay his money to transplant and indemnify those Chiefs who helped us in our war, and whom we could not defend against our own conquerors. We were told that their territories would remain under "the existing authority." He suspected that the existing authority when they were gone would be the Vulture and the Jackal. It was not difficult to guess what was the enlightened and civilizing power into whoso hands would fall the tenancy that we should have bought out. The Amendment of the right hon. Baronet (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) implied a direct censure on the Government. He considered that they richly deserved censure. They had bound us to concessions which wore not only dis- graceful on account of the defeat which they signalized, but also on account of the bloodshed which they came too late to avert; with their eyes open they had bound us to stand by as idle spectators of injustice and inhumanity, of practices which impeded and defeated the extension and progress of civilization. In conclusion, he hoped that House would, by an emphatic vote, record its strong sense of the policy which had brought them into their present unfortunate situation, and in which they found themselves bound by obligations, which he would not say they were too supine or too cowardly, but which they were not able to perform.

MR. W. FOWLER

begged to move the adjournment of the debate.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Debate be now adjourned." — (Mr. W. Fowler.)

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

asked to what day the debate would be adjourned? He hoped that it might be concluded at a regular Evening Sitting. It was extremely inconvenient that it should be carried on at a Morning Sitting, and he thought they had arrived at that period when they might be sure that with a proper Evening Sitting they would be able to conclude the debate in one day. If the Prime Minister could not now name a day, perhaps he could do so on Monday.

MR. GLADSTONE

said, he agreed, to a certain extent, with the right hon. Gentleman that nothing could be more inconvenient than the present condition of things, because they had not only not made progress at this Sitting, but had distinctly gone backwards. At the close of the last fraction of the debate it was understood, perhaps erroneously, from the speech of the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill), that a recommendation would be made for the withdrawal of the original Motion, and that would have advanced things very materially; but permission had not been given to the hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Cartwright) to withdraw his Amendment, and therefore the original Motion could not be withdrawn. The Government Amendment was put down, not at all in the view of its being taken on the back of a series of other Amendments, but in the belief that the original Motion and the present Amendment in its substance were to be withdrawn. He really would suggest that there might be some communication between Parties in order to simplify the position. In the present state of things he could give no assurance as to the close of the debate. The Government would be content to take a division either on the original Motion, or on the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach). The Government Amendment was put down with a view to satisfying a feeling that was widely extended in the House; but it was not necessary to persevere with it, provided that they could get at the issue in a more satisfactory way. The state of Public Business did not at that moment allow of his naming an evening for the debate; but he would endeavour to arrange for its resumption and close within a reasonable time. He would suggest that it should be postponed till Monday, and that an arrangement should be come to in the meanwhile.

Debate farther adjourned till Monday next.

The House suspended its Sitting at Seven of the clock.

The House resumed its Sitting at Nine of the clock.