CAPTAIN AYLMERasked the Secretary of State for War, Whether, in consequence of the reported breakdown in the Transport and Commissariat Services in Egypt, he intends that an inquiry should be held on the organization of those Services?
§ MR. CHILDERSIn reply to the hon. and gallant Gentleman, I have to inform the House that I have had a long conversation with Sir Garnet Wolseley on this subject, and that he will furnish me in a few days with a full and exhaustive Report on the working of the Commissariat and Transport arrangements in Egypt. I am bound, however, at once to say that nothing which could possibly be called a breakdown of those Services occurred. In the first place, the most ample quantities of Commissariat supplies were sent from this country and arrived promptly at Ismailia. For their carriage across the desert full provision was made. But we had to deal with these facts. First, there was no communication between the utterly insufficient wharves at Ismailia and the railway station outside the town. At these miserable wharves the Army and the whole of the munitions of war and the supplies had to be landed with the greatest speed. In the second place, the railway itself was a single line, broken down by the enemy, without adequate 376 sidings or rolling stock, and was, therefore, at first hardly available. What we had done in this respect was to send out large supplies of rolling stock and permanent way material from England, the first ship containing which arrived at Port Said before the Expedition itself, and was followed by others containing, not only material from England, but engines sent in pieces from Alexandria, erected at Suez, and sent up to the base. We had also organized at home, before the Vote of Credit, a Railway Corps in the Force of Sappers, which arrived out promptly. We had further purchased several thousand mules; and although the unfriendly action of the Porte delayed the arrival of those collected in Syria and Asia Minor, this delay did not practically do us as much harm as apparently it was intended to inflict. Our Transport arrangements were more than sufficient, and no failure occurred in connection with them; but Sir Garnet Wolseley wisely decided, on military grounds, suddenly to push on a large military force 22 miles into the Desert, in order to seize the head of the water at Kassassin Lock; and having successfully done so, he deliberately waited until his Transport arrangements enabled him to bring up his supplies, forming there ample depots of munitions of war and food, so as to be able to strike a decisive blow. During the sudden advance from Ismailia to Kassassin the Army was, of course, somewhat ahead of its supplies, and there were, perhaps, cases of complaint and hardship; but as to these Sir Garnet Wolseley's Report will doubtless give me full particulars. When I receive it, I shall consider what course to take.