HC Deb 26 October 1882 vol 274 cc178-213
MR. O'DONNELL

said, that he wished to call attention to the fact that the No- tice which Her Majesty's Government had given of this Vote spoke of "the military rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Khedive." Seeing that there was an Amendment to be moved, he would suggest to the Prime Minister whether it would not be better to confine the Vote of Thanks to the services of the Army in Egypt, and leave out the debatable matter as to a military rebellion to be discussed on some other occasion.

MR. MOLLOY

, in supporting the suggestion, said, he had given Notice of an Amendment to the 2nd Resolution, that all the words after the words "the occupation of Cairo" should be omitted.

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, it appears to me that it is necessary, and that it is usual in a Vote of Thanks of this kind, to give a more marked or pointed idea of the character of the services rendered than would be conveyed by a mere colourless reference to military operations. It seems to me as if we were rather ashamed of giving to these military operations their true name. I do not think this Notice can have been brought with the intention of raising any differences of opinion of that kind, and I hope the Amendment will not be moved, because the Vote as it stands can have no possible effect in committing hon. Gentlemen on the point.

MR. MOLLOY,

in reply, said: If the Prime Minister will remove everything of a debatable nature I will be happy to withdraw my Amendment. In order to effect that, the part of the Vote which speaks of a military rebellion should be withdrawn; and if that is not done I shall press my Amendment to a division.

MR. GLADSTONE,

in rising to move the Vote of Thanks of which he had given Notice, said: Sir, I was about to have said—and I have not yet abandoned the hope that I may say—that I was conscious, in rising to discharge the task now incumbent upon me, that I should at least have the advantage of the unanimous sympathy and support of the House, believing that it will be seen that these words—words of description—are words really not beyond the necessity of the case, and are thoroughly conformable to usage, and by no means do more than describe the fact. Nor have they any tendency to commit hon. Gentlemen with regard to their views of the ground and nature of the recent complications in Egypt. I shall yet trust that the House is not to be deprived of the advantages and the grace of rendering its thanks to distinguished men without any dissentient voice, or any rival proposals. Understanding the advantages of that concurrence, I must request the indulgence of the House, and commence with this apology—that I conceive it to be extremely difficult to discharge, even ever so partially and imperfectly, what is the duty of an historian by means of any such bald and slight outline of the recent occurrences as I can at the present moment, with propriety, lay before the House. I am sensible that I may fail in justice to many distinguished acts that have been done, and that I may fail in giving the due proportion to the several facts, and to the services of persona to whom I shall have to refer. It will not be, Sir, from a want of desire adequately to perform my duty, nor from a want of a very deep sense that there never was an occasion upon which the Houses of Parliament in this country had either stronger or more unqualified and unmixed reasons to feel from the heart those sentiments of gratitude to which we are about to give formal expression through the medium of the Motion I have the honour to submit. Now, Sir, I will say a few words severally, in the first place, on the operations that have been performed; in the second place, on the Services which, under the authority of Her Majesty, have been engaged in its performance; then upon the principal officers who have had the chief executive responsibility; and, lastly, I would refer to the two highly distinguished men, the Admiral and the General, to whom we are above all indebted, under Providence, for the accomplishment of this great and important success in Egpt. With respect to the operation that has been performed, I know that I have a certain danger to encounter. It is supposed—and I am afraid it is sometimes justly supposed—that among the many great characteristics of the people of this country, there are also besetting infirmities, and that, among our infirmities, there are two which, though opposed in their operation, yet may have a moral connection one with the other, a tendency, on the sudden action of the moment, sometimes to exaggerate difficulty and misfortune, and sometimes to overrate successful performance. I endeavour, therefore, Sir, to look at these operations, which will hereafter employ the pen of the historian, as impartially as I can. I would point out, therefore, to the House, in the first place, what was their object. Their object was to bring back from anarchy to order an entire country—a country peopled, if we include the Soudan, by some 8,000,000 of persons, and held against us by a Force that I cannot estimate at less than 60, 000, of whom not less than 50,000 were either enlisted in the actual Army of Egypt or were what may be called Reserve men, or ex-soldiers, of that Army, who had returned to the Colours for the occasion. Now, Sir, the means that we had for performing this operation were those of naval transport; and I could not do any sort of justice to the subject without stating, at least in round figures, what has been done in this respect, for I am bound to say that, on this happy occasion, we owe a debt to the Civil Departments under the Admiralty and under the authority of the War Office, which, even though it may be perfectly true that there are some of these Departments that have not yet reached the acme of perfection, yet is only second to that which we owe to the Military and Naval Services. And let me say what has been done with respect to transport. We had to perform this operation at a distance of more than 3,000 miles, from England to Alexandria and from Bombay to Suez. In the course of less than a month nearly 200 vessels were charged with the Army and the material that they had to convey to the scene of action, and those vessels could not have had a tonnage of much less than 400,000 tons. Such was the amount of the agency to meet the difficulties of the distance which it is in the position of this country—and, perhaps, of this country alone in the world—in these times to command. These transports, again—Ispeak in round numbers—carried 34,000 men, combatants, besides a body of 8,000 to 10,000 non-combatants, and 18,000 animals, intended for service either in the field, or for the civil purposes necessary to the Army. And what, Sir, was the time in which this operation has been conducted by the various Departments concerned? It was on the 20th of July that the Government arrived finally at the convic- tion that it was impossible to confine operations to the City of Alexandria and to the Forces in its immediate neighbourhood. It was on the 27th of July that the House of Commons supplied us with the financial resources necessary for the prosecution of the work we had in hand. On the 11th of August a Corps d' Armée of two divisions, complete in every respect, in every arm, and in every branch of supply, had left the ports of this country for Alexandria. On the 5th of August the despatch of the troops from India had commenced. In the course of the month of August the entire Force was landed in Egypt; and on the 14th of September, after a brief, but not inactive nor inglorious period, the General of the British Army was able to write from the field of Tel-el-Kebir, and with the knowledge of the possession of Cairo, that the war was virtually at an end. Well, Sir, we are greatly indebted to some of our fellow-countrymen for these results; and when I turn to the various Services making up the number of the Naval and Military Forces—of course, in the numbers I have given the Naval Force was not included—when I turn to the various elements of that Force, I feel it is difficult, that it is impossible, to award to them, with minute justice, the credit they deserve; but in truth, Sir, their competition with one another has been so vivid and so sustained that it would be hardly possible for me, were I to enter into details, to fulfil the purpose I have described with anything like exactitude. I may, perhaps, remind the House that Sir Garnet Wolseley wrote from the field of Tel-el-Kebir these remarkable words— I do not believe that in any previous period of our military history has the British Infantry distinguished itself more than upon this occasion. Sir, as an idea has gone abroad that there is some want of physical force in the British Infantry, unless when it is largely supplemented by the Reserves, the House will not be sorry to learn that the battle, to which I shall have further to refer, was fought with the assistance of only 1,000 men of the Reserve, the whole of the rest of the Army who carried the lines of Tel-el-Kebir being men within the actual term of their service. With respect to the Artillery, its efficiency attracted, I believe, the admiration of all who had the opportunity of observing it. With respect to the Cavalry, when I come to refer to Sir Garnet Wolseley I shall have to say a word upon that arm; but it is not of these forces alone that I ought to speak—I should be guilty of a gross injustice if I did not state that the entire Force which came from India was worthy in every respect of the brotherhood into which they had entered with the Army from this country, and that, as has happened before and will happen again, the Navy vied, even upon shore, in military service with its gallant comrades of the Army. I may even say that the limited Force which was drawn from Malta was worthy likewise of the Service to which it belonged. Sir, it is quite truly said that the campaign was a short one. I said just now that the landing of the troops in Egypt continued pretty much throughout the month of August, especially from India, the Indian troops being slightly in arrear of those that came from this country; but I do not mean to say that the war had not commenced in August. Very far from it. It was a month distinguished by active operations; but this campaign must not be measured by the length of time which it occupied. The surrounding circumstances must also be regarded; the distance, the length of sea voyage, the severity of the climate, the march through the Desert, the exposure to physical influences must also be taken into consideration. For my part, I am not ashamed to say that rarely in my life have I witnessed a more touching spectacle than that offered to our eyes on Sunday last by the return of a portion of the Household Cavalry through London. We have been accustomed to look upon those magnificent young men who form the regiments of the Household Cavalry with unmixed admiration for the vigour and buoyancy of their youth, for their very great physical power, for their splendid appearance; but we have hardly ever associated them with the fatigues and sufferings of war. But on that occasion, however, the most careless eye could not fail to observe that those who had left us in the very height of health and vigour had come back, after these few weeks or months of war, worn, wan, and even in some cases emaciated, by the labours they had freely and zealously undergone on behalf of their Queen and country. Well, Sir, the Vote which I am about to propose presents specially to the notice of the House the names of those officers whom alone it is possible to select on this occasion, for the conditions of our time require us to proceed by selection, when, if mere merit was concerned, the list which I have presented to the House might, indeed, be indefinitely multiplied and prolonged. The principal officers—I do not speak now of the Admiral and the General—to whom I shall have the honour to call the special attention of the House are men whose names are not unknown to us in previous years. In the first place, I may mention Sir John Adye, the Chief of the Staff, who, as the House well knows, is the second self of the Commander in Chief, and who was so associated with him in the operations of the campaign that it is difficult to draw the line of severance between the one and the other. I then come to the Generals of Divisions, General Willis and General Hamley, to whom the gratitude of the House is due for the admirable discharge of their duties as immediately under the General in Chief in command of the Forces. Next to these, Sir, I present to you the names of Sir Archibald Alison, the Duke of Connaught, Sir Evelyn Wood, and General Graham. Sir Archibald Alison has received the most marked token of the confidence of his Sovereign and of his country in being selected to the chief command of the considerable Force now remaining in Egypt, on which the security and tranquillity of that country as yet chiefly depend. Next, Sir, it is with peculiar satisfaction that the House will notice that His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught has, at every point in the detail of this campaign, earned the commendations of his Commander for his thorough knowledge of his Profession, for his intelligent and considerate care for those under his command, and for his perfect conduct when he led that portion of the Army in the field. We may offer, though custom does not permit us to introduce it in a formal shape, our hearty congratulations to Her Majesty upon this opening promise of the career of her gallant Son, for Her Majesty's maternal affections have been, if it were possible, yet more deeply interested than her patriotic sentiments in the issue of this important Expedition. With regard to Sir Evelyn Wood, that experienced servant of his country, though he was, by the chance of war, not present at the centre of operations, yet he was not deprived of the opportunity of showing that he remains worthy of all the reputation which it has been given to him to achieve. With respect to General Graham, I will venture to say a word when I come to speak of Sir Garnet Wolseley. There is one other military officer to whom it is most necessary to refer—I mean Major General Earle, who was in charge of the communications. If the House will bear in mind what is meant by that word, what it was to supply the military and physical needs of the Army by a choice of routes, of which one was the small Sweet Water Canal, never intended for carriage; of which another was a railway, broken up almost all along the line; and of which the third was the Desert, they will understand what kind of service it is that was performed by Major General Earle. Although there are other names that I might dwell upon, I will not do so; because I do not wish, though I may have to do so longer than has been usual upon some of these occasions, unnecessarily to detain the House, for it yet remains to me, in fulfilment of the sketch which I drew at the beginning, to refer to the distinguished men who were the Naval and the Military Commanders of Her Majesty's Forces. They have already accepted the gracious offer of Her Majesty to add their names—Sir Beauchamp Seymour's and Sir Garnet Wolseley's names—to the Roll of Peers; and it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government in due course—and that, I believe, will be very shortly—to submit to the House—following the example which has been set on former occasions—to submit to the House a measure, in connection with that call of those gentlemen to the House of Lords, conferring upon them a suitable annuity in further acknowledgment of their services. With regard to Sir Beauchamp Seymour, undoubtedly it was as Commander of the Fleet in the Mediterranean he found himself charged with the most arduous duties—with duties in respect to the successful performance of which we might have trembled if we had not known, from former experience, much of the nature of the man who was in- trusted with the great service at Alexandria. Since the accession of the present Government to Office, and also in performance of his duties as Commander of the Fleet in the Mediterranean—of course, I am not referring now to the propriety or impropriety of any political measure—but the House will agree with me, and I think will unanimously agree with me, that he earned no small title to the gratitude of this country by the extremely difficult services—political as well as naval—which he performed when stationed at Dulcigno, on the Albanian Coast, two years ago; nor can I pass by this occasion without graceful mention of the fact of the admirable manner in which, upon so many occasions, Admirals of the British Fleet have found themselves capable of confronting, and of satisfactorily discharging, political duties of the nicest character which have fallen upon them in connection with the service of their country. It was therefore in the full confidence in this experienced Admiral that we saw him proceed to Alexandria under the instructions he had received; and well did he justify that confidence, for, in Alexandria, he had not merely to conduct with success the important action which is known as the Bombardment, but he had to watch with the nicest care, as a matter of principle, and not merely as matter of vigilant observation, for the moment when it was his duty to act under the instructions he had received. Nothing could be more insidious than the operations by which it was endeavoured to elude his vigilance. According to the information and the advice that we received, had that vigilance been lulled to sleep, had the processes of strengthening the works, which was clandestinely carried on, in despite of formal assurances to the contrary—had these processes been allowed to continue, even for so short a time as for another week, it is too probable that, notwithstanding an overwhelming force of ships, that great operation would not have been concluded without the loss of some of the best blood and vessels of Her Majesty's Navy. Sir, with the valour and skill of Sir Beauchamp Seymour, we have on record that he had to meet an enemy who, on that occasion, showed themselves not unworthy of his steel. It is but just to record that the artillery of the Egyptians was of a high class. It consisted of modern rifle guns, though not in weight, as nearly as possible equal to our own, and there was nothing to complain of in point of courage and capacity on the part of those who served them. In fact, there is every reason to suppose that if we compare the Bombardment of Alexandria with an event which, I think, naturally offers itself for the purposes of comparison—the Bombardment of Algiers, also in the Mediterranean, about 65 years ago—we may draw a satisfactory reflection from placing in comparison with one another the amount of loss suffered by the British on the one occasion and on the other; and yet, as I have said, there is no reason to believe that that difference of loss arose from any inferiority of the Egyptian resistance as compared with the resistance which was offered at Algiers. The numbers of the killed and wounded, which I have not now exactly in my recollection, during the action of the Bombardment were—though we deplore that there should have been any at all—yet they were very limited in number. A few tens, or two or three score, I think, would cover the whole statement, which I have not got accurately before me; but it may be in the recollection of the House that the killed and wounded at Algiers, when, for his distinguished services, Lord Exmouth was raised to the Peerage, though the vast majority of them were in the English Fleet, yet, in the entire Combined Fleet that conducted the bombardment, they amounted to a figure not less considerable than 900 persons. Sir Beauchamp Seymour, in conducting the Bombardment of Alexandria, hardly less studied sparing the city than he studied destroying the fortifications. He avoided almost entirely the infliction of damage to the city, for to other causes, to which I will not now recur, and which may not yet have been thoroughly examined, the conflagration of that city was due, and he happily had no responsibility. Sir, it was not merely the conduct of a naval operation which devolved upon Sir Beauchamp Seymour. He had likewise to land his forces, and to man with his men, at a moment's notice, a line of forts. The hostile Army having withdrawn from the city under cover of a flag of truce—and I will not now stop to discuss that most questionable act—Sir Beauchamp Seymour, with his seamen and marines, had to undertake, and for six days completely to discharge, the duty alike of the police and the defence of Alexandria—of the police of Alexandria, which had been thrown into confusion by the plunder, the fire, and the conflagration that had occurred, and of the defence of Alexandria in the neighbourhood of a force unknown in its exact amount, but known to be large and known to be hostile. After that portion of his duty had been done, he had to provide—strange, indeed, was the care thus cast upon him—he had to provide for the water supply of the population, for those with whom he was in conflict seemed to think that they were justified in stopping the Mahmoudieh Canal, a measure which could have no possible effect as regarded the enemy in the field, because it is matter of notoriety that a Fleet moves, supplied and provided with means sufficient, and more than sufficient, for creating a water supply for itself, so that the measure was taken with the menace of the greatest suffering possible, of something even more than suffering, possibly of very extensive loss of life, to the population of Alexandria, a population of the same origin and the same nationality as that to which the authors of the measure themselves belonged. Well, Sir, the last great service that Sir Beauchamp Seymour had to perform on this occasion was the occupation of the Suez Canal, for which, of course, he had the supreme responsibility. He was seconded in that and in the whole of his proceedings by the greatest gallantry and skill on the part of the Admirals who served with him, and in particular it is my duty to commend to the honourable notice of the House Admiral Hewett, who took possession of Suez, and was responsible for the Southern part of the Canal, and Admiral Hoskins, whose duty was to occupy the Northern part of the Canal, as far as the important and vital part of it, Ismailia; and I must say I think the world felt a thrill of astonishment and admiration when, after a period of quietude—when people were uneasy—aye, and in this House there was much uneasiness about the Suez Canal and what was to happen to it—those who had foreborne to strike before the time came, struck the moment it had arrived; and before anyone could put a question or raise a difficulty, it was announced that the whole line of the Suez Canal, the new base of operations, Ismailia, with the whole command of Eastern Egypt, was in the possession, and under the disposition, of the British Forces. Although I think, perhaps, I have said as much as necessary, yet not too much, on the subject of the services rendered by the Navy, I will just add this much—two facts which really ought to be noted. It will be recollected that when the Suez Canal was occupied, it was not occupied for the purpose merely of shutting out everybody from the use of it; it was for the purpose of introducing into it, and arresting at the proper point, this vast fleet of transports, nearly 200 great ships which I have described to you; and it is probably within the knowledge of the House that, for the nice business of pilotage through the Canal, that vast fleet of transports had to rely upon British resources, and that service of pilotage was successfully performed by the skill exclusively of British Naval officers; and, further, that while they had to effect this great operation of carrying 200 transport ships into the Canal and discharging them there, the regular traffic of the Canal—I own I was astonished when I heard it—was only suspended for a period of 48 hours. I have said already how these services were followed up by the action of the Marines and of the Naval Brigade during the advance of Sir Garnet Wolseley; but it is no wonder that Sir Garnet Wolseley has recorded himself his sense of his obligations by saying of the Navy that the Army owed them a deep debt of gratitude for the assistance they had given. Well, Sir, it remains for me to speak of Sir Garnet Wolseley himself, and here, again, we were not without the commendation and assurance of anterior service in the case of a man who, though happily he is still comparatively young, and may long, as I trust, remain available for the service of his country, yet in his short life, in his comparatively short career, has had the opportunity of receiving the thanks of this House and of establishing distinguished titles to the public gratitude. First, Sir Garnet Wolseley showed the virtue—not a very common virtue—of successfully keeping his own counsels to himself; and while those prying eyes which do so much to entertain the public, and sometimes to perplex, or even to disturb, the action of a general, were completely at fault and befogged, and were dreaming of a useless assault on the difficult forts of Aboukir, Sir Garnet Wolseley, I may say almost in a moment, took firm possession of his new base of operations, and established himself at Ismailia. I believe the whole of the campaign had this, among other merits—that by dint of his insight and experience, and of the valuable assistance which he sought from the most competent and best-informed sources, it was a campaign of which the whole plan was accurately and minutely laid out, as it was within the same time, or even a shorter time, actually, minutely and successfully accomplished. Sir Garnet Wolseley, when he arrived at Ismailia in the middle of August—he arrived at Alexandria on the 15th, and went on the 18th or 20th of August to Ismailia—had not, of course, his entire Force with him; but he found he was in danger of the loss of his water supply, and, under these circumstances, it was necessary for him to make a venture for the purpose of securing it. He accordingly sent forward a portion of his Force, and then came those proceedings well known to the House on the 26th and28th of August at Kassassin. I need not dwell upon their military features; but I believe there was a charge of heavy Cavalry under General Drury-Lowe, which might well be named in its whole features as a subject for just admiration. But the qualities that Sir Garnet Wolseley has shown on this occasion, and the accomplishment of the plan which he intrusted to General Graham, were qualities of hardihood and vigour admirably backed by that General, who, if it were by these proceedings alone, has insured a distinguished name in the military service of his country. These were qualities of promptitude and vigour which were crowned by a complete success. The news of these actions arrived in this country, and that excited the appetite of the public, and in that public I include the entire country—no doubt, of us all. Stimulated by what had been already done, we looked out in eagerness for more to follow, and as day after day passed on from that 28th of August without any action on the part of Sir Garnet Wolseley, the stock of patience possessed by observers both there and here began to run short. The voice of censure upon Sir Garnet Wolseley began to be heard, and it was feared that, after all, he was not quite a man of the vigour for which credit had been given him. But, Sir, he was a man of that vigour for which credit had been given him, and he united with that vigour other military qualities not less necessary to form the character of a great General. He paused at Kassassin for a considerable time. Did he do so without cause? I am given to understand, upon what I think is sufficient authority, that as early as the 9th September, at any rate, Sir Garnet Wolseley could have made his attack on Tel-el-Kebir with a moral assurance of victory. But, Sir, there are some victories which are nothing more than the commencement and inauguration of a prolonged struggle. There are other victories which in themselves at once assure the consummation of the great work that the General has in hand; and it was the wise delay of Sir Garnet Wolseley, and his determination, whatever storm of criticism might come upon him, not to stir—not to touch the enemy until he could effectually crush him, and attain at once the objects of the war. It was that quality which caused Sir Garnet Wolseley to wait until he had such a force at his command—until he was able to throw out forward, right and left, such a brigade of Cavalry, for the purpose of surrounding a defeated enemy, that he might perform that great operation which I will describe in the single phrase of converting a victory into a conquest. It is impossible not to dwell for a few moments before I close upon the character of this remarkable action of Tel-el-Kebir. It is not merely remarkable because it was a victory achieved against a force well and securely, as they thought and might think, entrenched, or achieved against an entrenched force by a force inferior in numbers. Sir Garnet Wolseley fought the action of Tel-el-Kebir with 13,000 men. The force which was entrenched within the lines of Arabi, reaching for an extent of three and a-half miles from north to south, was about 26,000 men; but that was not all. Remarkable as the success is, the skill and the consideration—aye, and the humane consideration—with which it was achieved are, I think, more remarkable. Sir Garnet Wolseley waited until he could succeed, and he waited until he could succeed not only with the fullest measure of success, but with the smallest measure of loss of human life. We read, Sir, in Shakespeare, this expression—"Victory is twice itself when the achiever brings home full numbers." Well, Sir, it is a happy circumstance for a General to find himself in the condition of one who, having achieved a victory, brings home full numbers; but it is happier and better yet to be in the condition of Sir Garnet Wolseley, who will feel that consolation in his life and in his death that the fulness of those numbers was not owing to accident, or to the weakness of the enemy, but was owing to a deliberate and a well-laid combination, a skilful comparison and adaptation of means to ends, a judicious arrangement for every step of his measures, and the realization in actual experience of all that he had planned. He went forward in the silence of the night. He gave every order with the greatest minuteness and the exactest measure of place and of time. The Army bivouacked until the hour of half-past 2 in the morning. At that hour they breakfasted, and they then went forward upon a computation that, going in the dark through the Desert, this number of corps were to arrive at the lines of the enemy at a point of time, marked out almost to a minute, at daylight, and at that point so marked out they did arrive. They did march in silence through the Desert. It was the boast of the old Greeks that, while their opponents raised military clamour to keep up their spirits, they went in mantled silence to the war, and so it was that marched the Army of Sir Garnet Wolseley. They arrived at the enemy's lines at the very point of time which he had prescribed; and the movement, which was subject to so many chances of error, it is not uninteresting to recollect, was actually—such are the resources—such is the practical utility of science—directed by observation of the stars. It was thus that the force arrived at the lines of the enemy. They had been directed to practise a severe self-denial. They were to fire no shot until they took the first line, and they did fire no shot. They bore the fire of the enemy, they went steadily forward; and to that wise precaution of the General, and wise forbearance and manliness of the men, is in great part owing on our side the comparatively, at least, bloodless character of the battle. Well, the House knows with what complete and rapid success this operation was crowned. But one word more is to be said. What followed the battle? The echo, and the fame of it went through Egypt. It did its work at once at every point where the forces of the enemy were gathered together; and the men who had achieved the success at Tel-el-Kebir did not, on that account, rest inactively under the shade of the laurels they had won. Without a moment's loss of time the Indian Cavalry were pushed forward under General Macpherson, to the important point of Zagazig, at the junction of the railways, and that point was occupied at half-past 4, on the very afternoon of the day when the action of Tel-el-Kebir had been fought. More than that, a march of 65 miles to Cairo, beginning on that afternoon, was accomplished by the British Cavalry under General Drury-Lowe, and the gallant and skilful officers who worked under his command. Some of those were Indian; but, of course, the main portion were British Cavalry, and they arrived at Cairo on the afternoon of the 14th. Sir, there was a little incident which is not recorded in the official papers, but which is, I believe, unquestionably true, and may be worth mentioning to the House, because it shows the wisdom of relying much on the moral effect of a victory complete and crushing in itself. A garrison of 10,000 men held the City of Cairo; but all the heart and all the pith was gone out of them in consequence of the news they had received from Tel-el-Kebir. When General Drury-Lowe marched forward with his Cavalry, the first vanguard representing, of course, no more than a few hundred men, though a large body was coming up almost immediately behind them, on this tremendous march—for such I believe I may properly call it—of 65 miles—the garrison of 10,000 men, instead of waiting to resist them, made what I may call a procession of surrender. The Cavalry saw in their front a white line presented by some object which, at first, they were unable to accurately determine; but they found, after a very short interval, that this was the front rank of a body of several thousands of troops marching out of Cairo, apparently well qualified to cope with them, but who had taken the precaution of hoisting on the points of their bayonets handkerchiefs, or any rag of white, or anything that would carry a white appearance, in order to signify immediate, absolute, unconditional submission. That was the ripe result of the skilful operations of Sir Garnet Wolseley, and on the very day after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir he found himself in possession of the Egyptian capital, able to give an official and responsible assurance to the Government at home—aye, more than to the Government—to the Sovereign and the nation, that in his judgment the war was ended. I will not detain the House any longer. I have spoken longer than I intended. I have done so under the impression—I would not willingly make too much of what has happened—under the impression—it may be an erroneous impression—that these are remarkable occurrences; that they are qualified to carry into the mind of the House of Commons, and into the mind of the nation, the full conviction that if there has been much labour and much discussion, and much doubt and difficulty and vast expense of late years in connection with our military establishments, the nation does not remain without some return for what it has laid out; that it has not got merely gallant people to depend upon—for that it always had—but that it is approaching at least to a powerful and effective organization; and there will be the conviction that when, in a just cause, there is a great object to be gained, that organization will be found effective in its ends, and that men will not be wanting, whether as Admirals or as Generals, to encounter the immense difficulties and the arduous labours which, in the moment of a crisis, are cast upon them, and to carry forward the flag of their country to honour and to victory. The right hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the 1st of the Resolutions of which he had given Notice.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

Sir, I rise to say a very few words in seconding the Motion which has been made by the Prime Minister; and perhaps I may be allowed, at the beginning, to express and re-echo the hope, which the right hon. Gentleman expressed in the beginning of his speech, that the graceful act which we are now called upon to perform will not be marred by any want of unanimity on the part of the House of Commons. No doubt, to everyone who is connected with the Military or Naval Profession, it must be a source of the greatest gratification and delight to receive the approbation and thanks of the British Houses of Parliament; but that gratification must be greatly enhanced—indeed, it may be said almost to carry its character, according to the unanimity with which that approbation and those thanks are expressed. It is absolutely impossible that in eases of this kind, or in any great cases of military operations, these should not be mixed up with the consideration of the greatness and value of the services performed, questions of political character—questions upon which there must, and will be, differences of opinion, and upon which there must be discussion and division between different Parties and sections in the House. Such, undoubtedly, is the case with regard to these Egyptian operations; but the present is not the time, the present occasion is not the occasion, upon which those differences can profitably be considered; and I say that for two reasons—in the first place, because I think that, as I have already said, it would mar the graciousness of the act we are about to perform; and, secondly, because the discussions themselves would, I acknowledge, be somewhat prejudiced by the very fact of the splendour of the services which have been rendered, and by the eloquence with which they have just been described to us. The speech to which we have listened was in itself a great and an inspiring piece of eloquence. Yet I do not mean to say that, great as the speech was, it exceeded the acts which have called it forth. The services which have been rendered would speak for themselves, even if they had not so eloquent an exponent as the right hon. Gentleman; and, therefore, I wish to say, once for all, that I hope and trust we shall understand that the Vote we are called upon to give is one solely with reference to the Military and Naval operations, and that we in no way, by doing so, or by any construction that can be put upon that Vote, commit ourselves upon questions of a debatable and political character. I cannot quite understand what is the objection which is raised to the expression with regard to the suppression of the Military rebellion in Egypt. I could quite understand, if we were to suppose that, by adopting this phrase, we adopted, without further discussion, the Government explanation of the circumstances of the country, that we should be doing that which it would be unreasonable to call upon us to do; but what I understand and appreciate on the part of the Government in introducing these words into the Motion is, that they desire to put on record not only the fact that the services rendered were in themselves noble and conspicuous, but that they fully accomplished the object which the Government, who ordered the operations, had in view, because, as the right hon. Gentleman so eloquently put it, it was a case not of a victory, but for the time being, at all events, of a conquest. Whether the consequences will be such as the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues expect and hope is a matter we shall have to discuss. Whether the conquest is in a strict and real sense complete, and whatever its sequel may be—a matter upon which I entirely reserve my opinion—upon that we may have severe discussion—for the moment, it was a complete transaction, and one which was accomplished greatly to the credit of those engaged in it. I need not say it would be out of place for me to follow the right hon. Gentleman in the details of the advance, and of the actions of which we are speaking. Nor need I undertake to single out and praise any of those whose services have been so well recorded by the Prime Minister. But I would ask to be allowed to make an exception in the case of one of those officers who has, as the right hon. Gentleman reminded us, a peculiar claim upon our sympathies. I mean His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught. I cannot but feel we are specially interested in the fact that a Scion of the Royal House has gone forth to the duties which his Profession involves, and has discharged those duties in the manner in which he has done. Of the Generals and the Admirals who have commanded in these operations it is really useless for me to speak. We know what they are, and we have known for a long time—recently, at all events—with what very great skill they have conducted the services placed upon them. I am glad the right hon. Gentleman named and singled out a name which I was afraid might not have otherwise been specially mentioned—I mean that of Sir Herbert Macpherson. The fact that he commanded the Indian Con- tingent is one which gives him a special claim to our consideration; and there are other Services to which, I think, we ought to pay official tribute, and I would particularly mention the Marine Forces. What is particularly remarkable, it seems to me, in this whole operation is, that it afforded an opportunity not only for the display of individual valour, not only for the display of the strength of one particular arm of the British Forces, but that it has shown in a remarkable manner how the whole Forces of the Empire may, in a short time, and with great precision, be brought to bear on a single point of the Globe. And I think there is this, at all events, which is remarkable in the campaign we have witnessed; in the first place, it has been so short. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of that as if it might be thought that, because it was short, it had not been very significant. I say that the very fact of its having been so short is, in itself, one great and most remarkable feature which distinguishes it amongst other operations. The fact that it was so completely organized and so well arranged as it was in so few weeks is, in itself, I think, one of the great features of the campaign. But there is this also that is remarkable—and I do not know that any other instance can be found—it has been found possible to combine every description of Force of the Empire in the operations. We have had the Artillery, the Infantry, the Cavalry, the Indian troops, the Marines, the Sailors—we have had all these Forces, all of them actively engaged; and it is, in fact, owing to the way in which one was able to come with its Force to the help and assistance of the other that the great success of the operations is due. It would not be just or graceful on my part if, in referring to these actions of our Services, I were to omit to pay a tribute to those who have conducted the operations from home, and who have directed the Departments through which the Services are controlled and equipped. I think I may take up the concluding words of the right hon. Gentleman, and say that there is a little more than even the services rendered by the particular Departments on the present occasion to be noted; for the operations which have been so successfully completed are themselves a testimony to the work not of a particular Ministry, but to a succession of Administrations, and to a succession of Parliaments in making proper provisions, or endeavouring, at all events, to make proper provisions, for the strength and efficiency of our Naval and Military Forces. We have certainly been able to show—and it is of the highest importance to the country and the world—how rapidly and how effectively England can act upon occasion. I trust that the House may be content upon the present occasion, and more than content; that it will be desirous to evince its satisfaction with the conduct of our troops by unanimously adopting this Resolution. But, at the same time, I may repeat the warning with which I began—that in giving this Vote we by no means accept, what we might be supposed to express, any particular theory with regard to the political questions which are involved.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Thanks of this House he given to Admiral Sir Frederick Beauchamp Paget Seymour, G.C.B. for the distinguished skill and ability with which he planned and conducted the attack on the Fortifications of Alexandria, and the Naval operations in the Suez Canal, which aided materially in the suppression of the Military rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Khedive."—(Mr. Gladstone.)

SIR WILFRID LAWSON

, who was received with cries of "Oh!" said, he rose to move as an Amendment to the Motion which had been made the Previous Question; and if hon. Gentlemen would give him a proper hearing he would promise to detain them as shortly as he could while explaining his reasons for doing so. He quite agreed with the right hon. Gentleman who had just sat down that this was not the time to discuss the policy which led us into the late war; there would be no occasion to do so now, because from what he knew of the Leader of the Opposition and of what he said in the country, he felt perfectly sure not many weeks or days would elapse before the right hon. Gentleman gave them an opportunity of saying what they thought on that policy. He would give the right hon. Gentleman's words the other day at a meeting in Glasgow, when he said—"I believe myself the war was unnecessary, and, being unnecessary, cannot be said to have been justifiable." An unjustifiable war was the greatest crime which a Ministry or a country could commit. [Mr. GLADSTONE: Hear, hear!] The Prime Minister cheered that; he accepted the challenge; and, therefore, if they did not have an opportunity of voting on that point before very long all he could say was that the public life of this country would be thought by many to he little better than a political farce. They would probably have to wait a little while, however, because before coming to a conclusion the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition would have to consult with the noble Lord the Member for Woodstock (Lord Randolph Churchill). He did not move this Amendment merely on account of the Egyptian War, to which he was opposed. He was always opposed to special Votes of Thanks to the Military Service. He had looked back to what he had said last May 12 months, when a Vote of Thanks was proposed on account of the Afghan War. He did not think one's own speeches agreeable reading; but on that occasion he found it more disagreeable than usual, because he discovered that he had made two assertions, both falsified by events. One assertion was that he did not fear they should have an opportunity of passing such a Vote so long as the Liberal Ministry were in Office, because they would not go into any such war; and the other foolish remark was that the Radical Party, who had assisted in putting them into power, were decidedly opposed to all aggressive wars. It was with great regret he admitted the foolishness of his remarks, for this war, which he acknowledged had been very popular with the country at large, was even more enthusiastically supported by other classes of the community, by Radicals, Nonconformists, and Quakers. He did not wish to find any fault with the soldiers. [An hon. MEMBER: Or the sailors!]—or the sailors, or the marines. All these brave men had done what they believed to be their duty, and what the country told them was their duty; but was that a reason for a Vote of Thanks to them? Why, we have a celebrated motto—"England expects every man to do his duty," whether soldier, sailor, or Member of that House. If Votes of Thanks were to be given, why not thank the Minister for War? His right hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) had had a great deal of trouble. Why not thank the man who made the war, the Prime Minister? He did not see, without disparaging him for a moment, why the soldier was specially selected. The soldier when he entered the Army entered into a contract to do a certain amount of work, and also to run great risks. He entered into a contract to kill, destroy, ravage, anywhere the country pleased that he should go. He got his remuneration, and, more than that, the soldier acquired a great social position, especially in this Christian country, where he was looked upon as the greatest man possible. If the soldiers had done anything more than their duty he did not think he should have found it in his heart to rise and oppose the Vote. What were the facts? He saw an hon. Member of great experience on the opposite side of the House shortly before he was going to Egypt, and he said—"What about these Egyptian soldiers?" The hon. Member replied, as he (Sir Wilfrid Lawson) believed too—"Why, they are the worst soldiers in the world." So they had proved themselves to be. They were actually beaten by the Abyssinians, and when he had said that he had said enough. We went to attack these people—we, a rich, powerful country, spending £30,000,000 a-year in preparation, while the Egyptian War Budget was about £600,000—we, with all the resources of civilization at our command, not only with 35,000,000 of people, but with 200,000,000 in India at our back—we, experienced in those wars, for we had made three invasions within the last few years—the Afghan, the Zulu, and the Transvaal—invaded a country with 5,000,000 of people. And now, having been successful, we were singing Hallelujah choruses all through the Kingdom. Was it not a farce to make such a fuss over it? The Prime Minister told them not three months ago that we were not at war, but only bombarding Alexandria—just a little bye-play; and he said that there was not a scrap, not a shred, not a tittle of evidence to show that Arabi had any National feeling at his back. And when we entered into this war without the slightest provocation, as far as he could make out, the soldiers who were attacked fled before us. He could not but feel it to be an anti-climax when it came to the taking of Cairo, the miserable Egyptians fleeing for their lives at the sight of an English soldier. He believed if our troops met men as brave as themselves they would fight and overcome them. But if it came to a Vote of Thanks it was not to the English troops but to the Egyptians they should have moved it for running away. We were making just a little too much of it, and he thought that the military officers themselves were beginning to feel that they were a little overdoing it. It reminded him of a scene that had been described, in the last of the Egyptian Blue Books, how the Khedive was sitting in his palace while we were bombarding his town of Alexandria, and his Pashas were coming in and telling him about it, and some of them were in tears; but the account went on to say—"A distribution of decorations by the Khedive followed, and confidence was greatly restored." If Peerages and annuities were to be given now to our gallant soldiers, what would the country do when our Army should ever have to fight real soldiers? Why, we should be bankrupt in the matter of decorations, and there would be nothing left worthy of bestowal. They should remember that it was possible that before long we might have a war with Russia, and the Prime Minister had already given them a hint that we might have to go to the Soudan to have a turn with the False Prophet. He would ask the House whether we had not done enough in connection with this war? Were we not making ourselves a little ridiculous? We have had banquets, addresses, triumphal entries, thanksgivings in the churches, and the Prime Minister on a balcony in Pall Mall on Sunday last. And all this because, forsooth, after tremendous preparations, we had licked these miserable Egyptians. He really thought that the way in which we were going on was an insult to the British Army, and he, for one, did not want to insult it. It seemed to him as if we were expressing our surprise that the Army had been brave, hardy, and successful. Well, he should have been very much surprised if it had been otherwise. Did they know what Colonel Ewart, of the 2nd Life Guards, said, when one of the addresses that were flying about was presented to him by some ridiculous person or other in a country town? He said—"We have done what English troops are in the habit of doing—our duty." Of course they had, and they did not want these extravagant Votes of Thanks. He warned Radical Members, if there were any, not to vote for the Motion under the idea that it was a complimentary vote to the poor fellows who had been engaged in hard service, for it was nothing of the kind. The Motion was really nothing more than a homage to the military spirit and Profession which brought unnumbered evils to England, and Europe, and the world. This was the reason why he ventured to move the Previous Motion.

MR. SPEAKER

Does any hon. Member second the Motion?

MR. STOREY

seconded the Amendment.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Original Question be now put."—(Sir Wilfrid Lawson.)

MR. LABOUCHERE

said, he had come down to the House prepared to vote with the Prime Minister, and he had not been convinced that he ought to take a contrary course by the speech of the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). The hon. Member had stated that our soldiers had only done their duty. Well, there were so few people in this world who did do their duty that we need not grudge a Vote of Thanks to men who had done it so well and bravely as our troops had. His hon. Friend also said that the Prime Minister exaggerated when recounting the exploits of those who took part in the Expedition. But of such exaggeration he did not complain. Had our soldiers met foemen worthy of their steel, they would have given an equally good account of them. On occasions like the present some exaggeration in panegyric was undeniably graceful. He would say no more in reference to this point, except that he felt sure that the Prime Minister would agree with him that Agamemnon gained a great deal in reputation by having all the imaginative eloquence of Homer to describe his battles. Turning to the terms of the Resolution, he found that certain controversial matter had been introduced into it. He referred to the words—"the complete suppression of the Military rebellion against the authority of the Khedive." No one could deny that those words raised controversial matter, and he very much regretted that the Prime Minister had not withdrawn them. He would point out that when we spoke of a military revolt we assumed that it was a revolt of soldiery unsupported by the wishes of the people. But it appeared to him from the Blue Books that the whole Egyptian people were on the side of Arabi and not on the side of the Khedive. He denied that it was justifiable or fair to describe what had taken place in Egypt in this insulting manner. In a rebellion against a despot, he regarded the rebel and not the despot as the patriot. He should be very sorry to give a vote that would involve the idea that he agreed with the opinion that we should interfere to support a despot against a rebel. There was another point which also caused him regret. He had been under the impression that the Vote of Thanks was to be all that the House would be asked to pass, and that it would be almost an insult to those gallant Commanders, Sir Beauchamp Seymour and Sir Garnet Wolseley, to offer them a sum of money as if the House supposed that personal interest was the spur which had induced them to do their duty. When the Vote dealing with pecuniary rewards should come before them, he should oppose it unhesitatingly. At the same time, he thought that he and some other Gentlemen on that side of the House were put in a difficulty with regard to this Resolution. They were willing to give a Vote of Thanks to the Forces, but they were not prepared to compromise their opinions by voting in favour of the proposal of the Prime Minister, so long as these words which he had taken the liberty to call controversial remained. He did not know what other Gentlemen might do, but he should walk out of the House when the division took place.

MR. EDWARD CLARKE

said, he hoped the House would forgive him for a few minutes while he made an appeal to the Prime Minister as to the form of this Resolution. When the right hon. Gentleman had been appealed to from below the Gangway as to the insertion of those words, to which he thought most just exception might be taken, as introducing controversial matter, he had replied that they did not bear that character at all, and suggested that they were in accordance with forms which had been previously used. He (Mr. Edward Clarke), however, contended that the words "military operations," which many hon. Members desired to see inserted in the Resolution, instead of the words "military rebellion," would be in more consonance with former precedents. On the last two occasions when similar Votes of Thanks were given, in 1879 and 1881, the expression "military operations" was used, and in 1840 and 1858 Votes of Thanks had been proposed in the same terms. If the Government made their present Resolution to accord with the previous ones, they would avoid putting any Member in a difficulty with regard to the controversial matter. He wished to support the Vote of Thanks to the Army and Navy; but the war was not for the suppression of a military revolt, and when the time came for a discussion upon the Egyptian policy of the Government there would be a controversy raised on that point. As the Prime Minister had stated that the words in the Resolution relating to a military rebellion were not intended to carry any sanction of the policy of the proceedings in Egypt, it was hoped the right hon. Gentleman would omit them, and so avoid all danger of division of opinion on the subject.

MR. DAWSON

said, he thought there was another feature of this question which was passed over by the House—namely, that Arabi was not only not considered a traitor by his people, but that he was not considered a traitor by the Sultan or by the Khedive. They had seen it stated that there were numerous documents in existence which would prove that he was not only in the confidence of the Egyptian people, but in the fullest confidence of his Sovereign. Therefore, he thought the suggestion of his hon. Friend was perfectly correct, and that the debatable matter referred to should be withdrawn from the Vote now before the House. Personally, he felt very little admiration for the achievements of the British arms in Egypt, and when he said he had not been in any degree influenced by the eloquent speech of the Prime Minister, the House would infer that he had formed a very low estimate of the whole transaction.

MR. O'DONNELL

said, he had listened with as much attention as any supporter of the Government to the conscientious efforts of the Prime Minister to make a mountain out of a molehill. At the same time, he should protest against the attempt to smuggle the Ministerial view of the transactions in Egypt into a Vote of Thanks to the troops engaged in the recent campaign. They were told by the Premier that the concluding words of the Resolution were not binding on the House. If so, why were they introduced into the Resolution at all? They were asked in this Vote to declare that there had been a complete suppression of the military rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Khedive. There was hardly a word in that clause which was not a mis-statement, at least a mis-statement from the conscientious view of those who opposed this war in the beginning as criminal, and who did not cease to regard it as criminal because it had been successful. There had been no complete suppression of the movement in Egypt. It would spring up as strong as ever to-morrow if the garrison which was holding down the nationality of Egypt was removed. The suppression of the Egyptian national protest would not be complete as long as they kept British bayonets at the throats of the Egyptian people. It was not a rebellion against the authority of the Khedive. When Sir Beauchamp Seymour bombarded Alexandria Arabi was Minister of War to the Khedive; and if the insufficient forts under his control had succeeded in beating back the assaults of the most formidable Navy in the world Arabi would have been further decorated by the joint approval of the Khedive and the Sultan. It was a mockery to say that there had been a military rebellion against the authority of the Khedive. The name of His Highness the Khedive was a mere pretence behind which to conceal the most aggressive policy that ever animated the enterprize of a British Minister. He did not desire to say a word against the bravery of the British Army in Egypt. That Army was composed of the best fighting races in the world. He supposed there were enough Irishmen in the Highland Regiments alone to carry the assault on Tel-el-Kebir. If the Premier meant that his statement should in any degree be accepted as a contribution to an impartial history of the subject, he might have mentioned a few circumstances bearing on the defence made by Egyptians to a formidable Army opposed to them. He might have mentioned that the Egyptian Army of 60,000 men did not three months previously consist of more than 10,000 nominal soldiers. He might have mentioned that long before the Inflexible cast her first shell into Alexandria the Egyptian Army had been practically destroyed, not by open warfare, but by the treachery of European Controllers, who had broken up the Egyptian defences, who demoralized the Egyptian Army, and who, upon a single day, cashiered 25,000 trained Egyptian officers. The reason why the Suez Canal was so easily captured was because the Egyptian people believed the statements made from the Treasury Bench, that the Suez Canal ought not to be brought into the field of warlike operations. The nationality of Egypt was not suppressed; and neither in England nor out of it did one man in a hundred believe that the uprising of the armed fellaheen of Egypt was a mere military rebellion against the authority of a contemptible Khedive, who was now the nominee of the foreign garrison who held down his country. The Premier might make statements such as those just listened to; but throughout the world a different opinion would be held from that which was the official view of the Liberal Party.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 354; Noes 17: Majority 337.—(Div. List, No. 345.)

Original Question put, and agreed to.

1. Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That the Thanks of this House he given to Admiral Sir Frederick Beauchamp Paget Seymour, G.C.B. for the distinguished skill and ability with which he planned and conducted the attack on the Fortifications of Alexandria, and the Naval operations in the Suez Canal, which aided materially in the suppression of the Military rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Khedive.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Thanks of this House be given to General Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., for the distinguished skill and ability with which he planned and conducted the Military operations in Egypt which resulted in the Victory of Tel-el-Kebir, the occupation of Cairo, and the complete suppression of the Military rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Khedive."—(Mr. Gladstone.)

MR. MOLLOY

said, he moved to leave out the words "and the complete suppression of the military rebellion against the authority of the Khedive." He had not the slightest objection to the Vote of Thanks to the Army; but he submitted that the operations of Arabi Pasha ought not to be described as a military rebellion; and he was certain that the words to which he did object had prevented many Members from voting in the last division.

Amendment proposed, To leave out the words "and the complete suppression of the Military rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Khedive."—(Mr. Molloy.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, I cannot help thinking that I will be able to show the House, and also the hon. and learned Member who has moved the Amendment, why he should not persevere with his Amendment. The first question is the true import and bearing of this description. The movement made by Arabi is described as a military rebellion, and the hon. Member for Northampton (Mr. Labouchere)—I will not say he is justified in the breadth of his proposition, but I think he is justified to a certain extent—said that most people would admit that to describe a movement as a rebellion is not necessarily a condemnatory description. It is an established historical name. The history of the war under Charles I. is known as The History of the Great Rebellion; but there were many Gentlemen of this House who accompanied Hampden in that rebellion, who thought it right to do so, and therefore it is not a condemnatory description. It is a description of a plain fact. [Mr. O'DONNELL: No, no!] Well, what is the use of crying out "No, no!" The hon. Member for Dungarvan will not convince me by crying "No, no!" It is a plain description of a fact that this was a rising against the constituted authority of the country. ["No, no!"] Yes; it was a rising, in which the parties who headed it forced themselves, first of all, upon the Notables, and then into the Ministry, and compelled the Khedive, under fear of his life, to accept them. That is what I call a military rebellion, and it is not a condemnatory description, but simply a matter of fact. Then comes the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite (Mr. Edward Clarke), who says it is contrary to precedent; but I assure him it is according to precedent. There is no doubt, in certain cases where the operations for which Votes of Thanks have been given have been operations of a more or less undefined character and object, they have been described as military operations and nothing else. I believe we ourselves described the operations of Sir Frederick Roberts, in asking for thanks for him, as military operations. How else could we have described them? They were a march to victory gained against a personage in Afghanistan, for the purpose of supporting a military occupation of Afghanistan for the time, and securing Her Majesty's Forces. There was no fixed and defined result which we could describe; but after the Battle of Waterloo you could not have thanked the Duke of Wellington for the military operations in Belgium, nor after the Peninsular War you could not have thanked the Duke of Wellington for the military operations in Spain. Where you have a definite result, as you have in this case, you describe it, and that is what has been done here. I beg attention to this, as it bears strongly on the appeal I make to the hon. Member who moved the Amendment. In 1861 a Vote of Thanks was moved to the combined English and Indian Forces in the operations in China, which terminated in the Treaty of Pekin; and here I want to point out, first of all, that the description in that case goes a great deal further towards committing the House than the description in the present ease, which, I contend, does not commit the House at all; and, secondly, though there was considerable discussion and objection to the policy, no one on that occasion moved an Amendment to the Vote. On reference to Hansard, it will be found that the Vote contained the words— That the thanks of this House be given to Lieutenant General Sir James Hope Grant," and so on, "for the skill, zeal, and intrepidity with which they conducted the operations in the north of China, which terminated in the capture of Pekin, whereby an honourable peace has been obtained on the terms proposed by Her Majesty. There were Gentlemen in that House who entirely disapproved of the whole proceedings, who thought it was anything but an honourable peace, but quite the reverse, and who took objec- tion to the policy; but no Amendment was moved. These proceedings are of a solemn and rare character, in which the whole legislative authority of the country—that is to say, of Parliament—is accustomed to move together. Uniformly, the Vote of Thanks is moved to the different descriptions of Forces by the two Houses in the same terms. Let me represent to the hon. Member in what position he is asking the House to place itself. We have just voted Sir Beauchamp Seymour our thanks, and that without any opposition on the Main Question, for naval operations which aided materially in the suppression of the military rebellion against the authority of the Khedive; and now the hon. Member invites us to move a Vote of Thanks to Sir Garnet Wolseley for military operations in Egypt which are not to be described, and, in fact, to give a lower and fainter description to the services of Sir Garnet Wolseley than we have given to those of Sir Beauchamp Seymour. We cannot do that. It seems to draw a most invidious distinction. I think it will go far to involve the hon. Gentleman in an approval of the Bombardment of Alexandria, while he does not approve of the attack on Tel-el-Kebir. If the House adopts the unparalleled proceeding of two forms of thanks—one for the Army and one for the Navy—let me also observe to the hon. Gentleman that we now have it on sufficient authority that the other Branch of the Legislature has voted thanks in the terms proposed; and, therefore, the hon. Gentleman really will see that his Amendment would involve us in a strange anomaly, placing us first at variance with the House of Lords, and secondly with ourselves. Under those circumstances, I hope he will be satisfied with saying "No," if he thinks fit, when the Question is put. But perhaps he may now be disposed to withdraw his Amendment.

MR. EDWARD CLARKE

said, it was perfectly true that the House was in a difficulty, and that, having passed a Vote of Thanks to the Navy, it could not now consistently refuse to pass the same Vote to those who were concerned in the military operations. He thought, however, that when the observations of the Prime Minister as to the real meaning of the words in question were sent forth to the country they would be considered rather curious. He understood the right hon. Gentleman to say that rebellion was the only term that could be applied to the proceedings of Arabi in Egypt; and he illustrated his contention by reference to the rebellion in the 17th century, which certainly had the historic sympathy of many Members of the House; and the House was now called upon to express its thanks to the Land and Sea Forces for doing that which might turn out to have been a most unfortunate mistake, having regard to the future and the freedom of Egypt. The Prime Minister said it was a fact that the Military Party forced itself on the Chamber of Notables, then into the Ministry, and then on the Khedive. He (Mr. Clarke) ventured to demur to those propositions. There was no evidence in the Papers that the Military Party did force itself on the Notables, and when the Khedive accepted the new Ministry in Egypt, he did so on the unanimous representation of the only Parliamentary Chamber which Egypt had to look to. As to the Khedive, and the rebellion against the Khedive, it was like the old history of the Roses of York and Lancaster—one Party took the King prisoner, and then in the King's name called the other side rebels. We took the Khedive prisoner. Practically, he had been under the control of this country; and now the Prime Minister insisted on thanking the Military and Naval Services of the Crown in a form of thanks which made them apparently officers of the Khedive in putting down simply a domestic insurrection against his power.

MR. PARNELL

said, he thought it was somewhat unfortunate that the expression which his hon. and learned Friend the Member for King's County (Mr. Molloy) proposed to omit should have found its way into the Resolution of Thanks, because if they adopted the Resolution as it stood it would place the House in an almost unprecedented position. The House would have done an act which it had never been called upon to do before by a Minister of the Crown, or by a Government of the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland. Practically speaking, if they adopted the Resolution they affirmed by the deliberate judgment of the House of Commons that Arabi Pasha had been guilty of rebellion against the Khedive. He hardly thought that this House, or, indeed, anybody in England, was in a position to form that I judgment, because they had no evidence before them. But if they were in that position, the fact remained that this was one of the charges which at the present moment was a subject of judicial investigation before a tribunal in Egypt. The Government, therefore, placed themselves, he had no doubt, unwittingly in this position. While, on the one hand, they had taken precautions that Arabi Pasha should have a fair trial as regards the charges which had been made against him, they, on the other hand, invited the House of Commons to declare before the tribunal had investigated those charges that Arabi Pasha was guilty. He (Mr. Parnell) submitted that his hon. and learned Friend the Member for King's County had not put himself out of court by having, through an oversight, due to the confusion and noise consequent on a division, failed to propose the Amendment at an early period.

MR. MOLLOY

said, that the reason why he had not moved his Amendment on the 1st Resolution was because he understood from Mr. Speaker that he could not do so in consequence of the Amendment moved by the hon. Baronet the Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson).

MR. DAWSON

said, that in justice to Arabi Pasha, whose life was at stake, some Members of the Government ought to make a formal announcement that, no matter what decision the House of Commons might come to on this Resolution, the condemnation of Arabi Pasha implied in it would not be allowed to prejudice the trial about to take place in Egypt. Why was he to be condemned first and tried afterwards? He thought it was a great boast of the English nation that when a man was on his trial judgment was suspended until the trial was ended.

MR. BIGGAR

said, that, according to the doctrine laid down by Mr. Justice Lawson in the case of the High Sheriff of Dublin, if the House affirmed that Resolution as it stood, the Prime Minister would be guilty of contempt of the Court that was trying Arabi, and would be liable to imprisonment by that Court. [A laugh.] This was not a matter to laugh about, because the two cases were perfectly identical—not quite identical, because the law was rather stronger against the Prime Minister than against the High Sheriff, because all that was done in the case of the High Sheriff was to criticize the means after a verdict had been arrived at; but in this case the Prime Minister asked them to declare positively that the prisoner at the bar was guilty of the offence of which he was charged. Therefore he submitted that the Prime Minister was bound in honour and fair play to do one of two things—either to accept the Amendment of the hon. Member for King's County, or else to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Court which was now trying Arabi Pasha in Egypt, in order that he should be punished for his contempt of Court.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 230; Noes 25: Majority 205.—(Div. List, No. 346.)

Main Question put, and agreed to.

2. Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That the Thanks of this House he given to General Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., for the distinguished skill and ability with which he planned and conducted the Military operations in Egypt which resulted in the Victory of Tel-el-Kebir, the occupation of Cairo, and the complete suppression of the Military rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Khedive.

3. Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That the Thanks of this House he given to,—

And to the other Officers and Warrant Officers of the Navy, Army, and Royal Marines, including Her Majesty's Indian Forces, both European and Native, for the energy and gallantry with which they executed the services they have been called upon to perform:

4. Resolved, Nemine Contradicente, That this House doth acknowledge and highly approve the gallantry, discipline, and good conduct displayed by the Petty Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Men of the Navy, Army, and Royal Marines, and of Her Majesty's Indian Forces, European and Native, and also the cordial good feeling which animated the United Force.

MR. GLADSTONE

There is a question of a supplementary character, and that is to move that the said Resolution be transmitted by the Speaker to Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour and to General Sir Garnet Wolseley, and that they be requested to communicate the same to the several officers and men referred to therein.

Motion agreed to.

5. Ordered, That the said Resolutions be transmitted by Mr. Speaker to Admiral Sir Frederick Beauchamp Seymour, and General Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley; and that they be requested to communicate the same to the several officers and to the men referred to therein.